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# AMERICAN STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT

OF THE

SECRETARY

TO

THE PRESIDENT

AND THE SENATE

AND

OF

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND

OF

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

IN THE

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## INTRODUCTION TO VOLUMES II. AND III.

AFTER the publication of Volume II., containing Lord Grenville's correspondence from the beginning of 1791 to the end of 1794, a second inspection of the portfolios at Dropmore brought to light other papers of great interest relating to the periods embraced by Volumes I. and II. These papers are now printed as *addenda* to Volume III. The earliest of them are confidential letters from Pitt, Sir James Harris, and William Eden, to Grenville, and the replies of the last-named, during and after his missions to the Hague and Paris in 1787. Besides affording valuable information in regard to the internal factions of the Dutch Republic, which involved Prussia and Great Britain as supporters of the House of Orange, and France as the ally of the Burgher party or Patriots, in sharp collision and almost in war, they bring into contrast the methods and characters of Harris and Eden, representing rival schools of English diplomacy; and they show clearly the unbounded trust already reposed by Pitt in Grenville's ability and judgment, in situations of great responsibility for which previous training had not specially fitted him. While Pitt sought by negotiation to obtain the concessions required from France, the Duke of Brunswick cut the knot of the difficulty by marching into the Provinces at the head of a Prussian army, and restoring the supremacy of the Prince of Orange. In April 1788, Harris signed a treaty at the Hague renewing the political alliance that had existed between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic from the English Revolution of 1688 until 1780. In the following June, he induced the King of Prussia to join the maritime powers in forming a Triple Alliance for mutual defence and the preservation of peace. For these services George III., on Pitt's recommendation, raised him to the House of Peers as Lord Malmesbury. As appears from his letter to Grenville, dated December 27, 1787, Harris had aimed at making union between the English and Dutch nations firm and cordial by coming to an agreement in regard to conflicting claims of maritime right and commercial interest which formed a



perpetual cause of dissension. "Affection," he wrote, "will follow complaisance, gentle usage, and not too rough and unqualified an exercise of our influence. The reverse of this lost us the Republic."<sup>1</sup> But the British Government demanded advantages which the Dutch would not grant. Later on, William Eden, who had been rewarded for his diplomatic labours at Paris by an Irish barony, with the title of Auckland, and succeeded Malmesbury as ambassador at the Hague, resumed the unfinished work of conciliation on which the stability of the Anglo-Dutch alliance in a great measure depended. His letters to Grenville, now Secretary of State for the Home Department, in 1790 and the earlier months of 1791, indicate clearly that although the Duke of Leeds held the office of Foreign Secretary, Grenville was Pitt's chief confidant and counsellor in matters affecting the external interests of the monarchy.

Lord Grenville's correspondence, however, for the first four months of 1791 is chiefly concerned with the business of the Home Department; the administration of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies. The Quebec Government Bill, to which some reference is made, possesses historical interest as initiating the system of colonial self-government; and as affording occasion for the heated debate on the French Revolution in the course of which Burke renounced the friendship of Fox. Mr. Mitford's Bill, removing some of the disabilities of English Catholics, passed with the assent of Ministers, but forms the subject of a characteristic letter of criticism from Lord Chancellor Thurlow<sup>2</sup>. Most of the letters at this time, however, are from or to Lord Westmorland, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. They are of little value except in so far as they illustrate the system by which a narrow monopoly of power was maintained. The Lord Lieutenant set his face against an extension of the benefits of Mitford's Bill to Ireland. In several letters he complained bitterly of the political conduct of Mr. Robert Stewart, who soon rose to wider celebrity as Lord Castlereagh.<sup>3</sup> Stewart's offence seems to have been an adherence to his hustings' pledges, as a member of the Opposition in the Irish House of Commons, in spite of the fact that before his election his father had obtained an Irish peerage through the influence of Lord Camden, a member of

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<sup>1</sup> III. p. 442.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 89.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 28, 36.

Pitt's Cabinet. Another incident may be noticed as a curious symptom of weakness in an administration which commanded large majorities in both Houses of Parliament. The case of Mr. Bruen, who, having as Deputy Quarter-Master-General of the British army in North America defrauded Government of an enormous sum, took refuge in Ireland, purchased large estates, and set the judgment of the English Court of Exchequer at defiance, had been brought to the attention of the Cabinet by Lord Buckingham.<sup>1</sup> To protect the Crown from such depredations, Pitt, Grenville, and Lord FitzGibbon, the Irish Chancellor, drafted a Bill which, if accepted by the Irish Parliament, would put an end to the immunity Mr. Bruen enjoyed. But Lord Westmorland shrank from the responsibility of introducing the measure. Bruen had become a borough proprietor and returned himself to the House of Commons as a member of the opposition. And the Lord Lieutenant feared "the discredit of attempting to frame a law for the express purpose of catching an Irish patriot."<sup>2</sup>

Towards the end of April the king appointed Lord Grenville Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in succession to the Duke of Leeds. A brief summary of the events leading to this change will supply a key to the correspondence that followed it.

After the formation of the Triple Alliance, the earlier throes of the Great Revolution disabled France for several years from any exertion outside the sphere of domestic politics. Great Britain, however, soon found herself involved in two serious disputes; one on her own behalf with Spain; the other, chiefly on behalf of Prussia, with the Empress Catherine II. of Russia. The first found a favourable issue in a treaty signed at Madrid in August 1790 by Mr. Fitzherbert, soon afterwards created Lord St. Helens, and Count Florida Blanca, the Spanish Prime Minister. The second had less fortunate results. Catherine had entered into a compact with the Emperor Joseph II. for a partition of European Turkey. Notwithstanding the remonstrances and proffered mediation of the Triple Alliance, the Austrian and Russian armies wrested several provinces from the Sultan in the campaigns of 1788 and 1789. Frederick William II., King of Prussia, however, was determined not to suffer the aggrandizement of his powerful neighbours unless fully compensated by an equivalent addition to his own

<sup>1</sup> I. p. 359.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 14.

territory. Taking advantage of the troubles which misgovernment had excited throughout the Austrian monarchy, he placed his army on an offensive footing, concluded alliances with Turkey and Poland, and summoned the Emperor to abandon his conquests on pain of war. During this crisis Joseph died. His brother and successor Leopold, accepting the mediation of the Maritime Powers, undertook, by a convention signed at Reichenbach in July 1790, to discontinue hostilities against Turkey and accept the *status quo* in regard to territory as a basis of negotiation for peace. By another convention, signed at the Hague in October 1790, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic guaranteed the Emperor's dominion over the revolted Netherlands, on condition of his restoring their ancient constitutions. Catherine, having lost her ally, also signified her intention to make peace with the Sultan, restoring all her recent acquisitions, with the exception of the fortress of Ockzakow and a narrow strip of land lying between the rivers Bug and Dniester. Lord Auckland, in letters to Pitt and Grenville, which conveyed the views of the Dutch Government as well as his own, contended that the cession demanded by the Empress was too unimportant even to Turkey to justify a prolongation, much less an extension, of the war.<sup>1</sup> The King of Prussia, however, having failed to effect an arrangement with the Emperor by which he had hoped to gain possession of the Polish cities of Dantzic and Thorn, moved troops to the frontiers of Livonia, and insisted that the condition of the *status quo*, accepted by Austria, should also be imposed on Russia. Catherine haughtily repelled this interference. The British Cabinet, in its anxiety to preserve the Prussian alliance and the free navigation of the Dniester, a channel of British trade, entered into an engagement to support Frederick William's demands by sending naval squadrons to the Baltic and Black Seas, to co-operate with Prussian and Turkish armies.<sup>2</sup> But the prospect of an armed conflict with Russia for the defence of Turkey caused such general dissatisfaction in England that Pitt found it necessary to retrace his steps. The Duke of Leeds resigned, and Lord Grenville, who alone of the leading Ministers had consistently opposed war, undertook the difficult task of withdrawing without damage or

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<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 22-25.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 68.

discredit from an untenable position, and accomplishing by moral pressure the English aim of preserving the Dniester from Russian control. His hopes of success seem to have depended chiefly on the action of the Emperor Leopold. If the Emperor could be brought to join the Triple Alliance, or even to give it diplomatic support, Catherine II. might be forced, without a shot being fired, to recede from her demands, or at least to consent to the territory in dispute being laid waste as a neutral zone between the Russian and Turkish empires; and, at the same time, the latter might be secured against further aggression by a guarantee of the chief European powers. With these objects in view, Grenville despatched Lord Elgin on a special mission to confer with the Emperor, then in Italy<sup>1</sup>; and Mr. Fawkeners on another to St. Petersburg,<sup>2</sup> to support the representations of Mr. Whitworth, resident minister of Great Britain. And Mr. Ewart, British Minister at Berlin, who had been for some time in London, ardently advocating warlike measures, returned in haste to his post, with instructions to reconcile King Frederick William to the pacific line of action which Pitt found himself compelled to adopt. An interesting sketch by Mr. Ewart of the past relations of Russia and Great Britain since the middle of the 18th century is dated April 1791.<sup>3</sup>

The course of these various negotiations may be traced, with some help from public despatches, in Lord Grenville's confidential correspondence with Lord Auckland, Messrs. Ewart, Whitworth, and Fawkeners. The letters of Auckland and Ewart are especially worth attention. As the only British Ambassador in Northern Europe, Auckland had control of the packet service between Helvoetsluys and Harwich, and the despatches from Berlin, St. Petersburg, Vienna, Constantinople, passed through his hands. The confidential footing on which he lived at the Hague with the Princess of Orange and the Dutch Ministers, his wide and intimate relations with continental statesmen, gave him command of a great variety of political information, which Grenville, who eagerly sought his advice, encouraged him to communicate without reserve. He represented in diplomacy the pacific views then dominant in England. His letters, intended

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<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 54, 61, 73.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 76.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 44.

to be read only by Grenville and Pitt, abound in amusing anecdotes and shrewd comments on men and affairs; and allowing for natural bias, may be regarded as epitomes of instructed European opinion on current events. Ewart had been one of the chief instruments in building up the Anglo-Prussian Alliance. His anxiety to maintain it, as well as the close connexions, private and public, he had formed at Berlin, inclined him to promote the aggressive designs of the Prussian Court, without, as Auckland often complained, taking sufficient account of the situation of the British Ministry and Lord Grenville's instructions. The King of Prussia at first took Pitt's excuses in good part, and sent his ruling favourite, Colonel Bischoffswerder, to Italy, to support Lord Elgin's representations to the Emperor. But Leopold gave the envoys only fair words. He had his own game to play, and he waited on events. His plenipotentiaries, then treating with those of the Sultan at Sistova, under the mediation of the maritime powers, spun out discussion. His armies still occupied Turkey, and he refused to commit himself to any new engagement that might separate him from Catherine II. She on her part set Prussia at defiance, and smote Turkey with redoubled vigour. Being well informed of the state of public feeling in England, she and her ministers showed their sense of the impotence of the British Ministry by their contemptuous treatment of Mr. Fawkener, and the attentions they lavished on Fox's friend Mr. Adair. It appears probable from Mr. Whitworth's letter to Grenville dated June 17<sup>1</sup> that the story of Fox having sent Adair to the Russian Court to thwart Fawkener and bring Pitt's administration into discredit in England, was the suggestion of a mortified diplomatist. Grenville, however, writing to Auckland on August 1,<sup>2</sup> seems to give it credit. And the anxiety felt in official circles to obtain proof of what was only surmise, is shown in the circumstances that Whitworth's official messenger and Mr. Lindsay, his principal secretary, took charge of Adair's letters in order to deliver them at the Foreign Office in London<sup>3</sup>; and that when Adair's arrival at Paris on his return to England became known, Bland Burges, Lord Grenville's Under Secretary, took measures at Dover to

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 109.<sup>2</sup> II. p. 149.<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 101, 163.



obtain a list of his travelling library, in the hope of discovering the key of the cipher in which the letters from St. Petersburg were written.<sup>1</sup>

The turn of events brought still deeper mortification to the King of Prussia. He had urged the Turks to continue the war and engaged to defend them. But the defection of Great Britain and the doubtful attitude of the Emperor reduced him to inaction. In the meantime, reports from Swedish engineers employed to fortify the Dardanelles gave good ground for apprehension that Prince Potemkin might force a passage through the Bosphorus with an armed flotilla and take Constantinople by a *coup de main*.<sup>2</sup> In this dilemma, Frederick William asked the English Government to send a naval squadron to cruize in the Black Sea. Ewart warned Grenville that the friendship of Prussia depended on compliance. Grenville, however, felt bound at all risks to reply that the British Ministry could do no more than observe strictly the engagements they had contracted by the Triple Alliance, and the Convention of Reichenbach.<sup>3</sup> An attempt of Prince Kaunitz to wring concessions from Turkey, contrary to this convention, threatened for a moment to drag England into a continental war. But the increasing perils of the French monarchy, which affected him sensibly on public and personal grounds, determined Leopold to come to an understanding with his German rival. Frederick William responded eagerly to the Emperor's advances, and throwing over the Triple Alliance, concluded a separate agreement with him, as a preliminary step to a conference at Pilnitz.<sup>4</sup> In July 1791 the Austrian and Turkish plenipotentiaries signed articles of peace at Sistova. Catherine II. to all appearance had European Turkey at her mercy. But the conservative views of the Emperor Leopold and the course of events in Poland counselled moderation. She assumed a more gracious bearing to Messrs. Whitworth and Fawkener, and disclaimed any intention of interfering with the free navigation of the Dniester.<sup>5</sup> Gladly accepting this unexpected concession, the English envoys, in conjunction with their Prussian colleague, Count Goltz, concluded a treaty with the Russian Ministers which gave Catherine the territory she claimed, and left the

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 211.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 87.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 74, 81.

<sup>4</sup> II. p. 170.

<sup>5</sup> II. p. 134.

Sultan the option of acquiescing, or being abandoned to the chances of war. The Prussian Court, without going so far as to disavow Goltz, disclaimed responsibility for this treaty<sup>1</sup>; and the Sultan submitted reluctantly to terms so much more favourable, as George III. wrote to Grenville, than his situation entitled him to expect.<sup>2</sup>

Interesting accounts of the flight of Louis XVI. and his family from Paris in June 1791, founded on statements of Count Fersen, Marquis de Bouillé, and M. de Calonne, and sent to Grenville by the British resident at Brussels, are included in the *Addenda*.<sup>3</sup> Letters from Lord Gower, British Ambassador at Paris, Lord Robert FitzGerald, Secretary of the Embassy, and Mr. Moore of the English Foreign Office, describe the state of the French capital after the King's return as a prisoner from Varennes. A<sup>4</sup> letter from Lord Auckland throws light on the Royalist plans frustrated by that event.<sup>5</sup> From another, enclosing one of Charles Lameth, as well as from that of Lord Gower already referred to, it would appear that Louis's flight was not less ill-timed than ill-executed.<sup>6</sup>

During the conferences at Sistova, Lord Grenville had continued to hope that the Emperor might be induced to adopt the system of the Triple Alliance, and had even contemplated Catherine II.'s adhesion to it. Upon Leopold's conduct in this respect he had made depend the decision of the British Government as to the ratification of the Convention of the Hague, hitherto withheld by the Maritime Powers in consequence of the [narrow sense in which the obligation to restore the constitutional privileges of the Netherlands had been interpreted at Vienna. But the subsequent agreement between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, instead of drawing the former to the Triple Alliance, drew the latter away from it into a project of armed intervention on behalf of Louis XVI. of France, in which the British Government neither would nor could concur. When, therefore, peace had been concluded at Sistova, Grenville, as he informed Auckland on August 23, publicly announced the intention of his sovereign to observe strict neutrality in regard to the internal affairs of France.<sup>7</sup> He also refused to ratify

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 156.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 142, 143, 166.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 448, 450.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 115, 117, 153.

<sup>5</sup> II. p. 122.

<sup>6</sup> II. p. 131.

<sup>7</sup> II. p. 171.

the Convention of the Hague; and, contrary to Auckland's opinion, insisted that the Dutch Government should adopt the same course. Burke strongly disapproved of this policy. In one of Dundas's letters, dated September 15, he is represented as saying that "if the French Revolution goes off undisturbed, he would not give twenty years' purchase for an annuity on the existence of this country."<sup>1</sup> Richard Burke also figures in the correspondence as a medium of communication between the French princes on the Rhine and the British Cabinet. Later on in the year he acted in a similar capacity for the Irish Catholics.<sup>2</sup> The abstention of Great Britain deterred the Emperor from entering into an open conflict with the French Revolution. Lord Grenville's interpretation of the declaration of Pillnitz was, that the German sovereigns had determined to do nothing.<sup>3</sup> An account of the motives attributed to them, and the chagrin of the French *émigrés*, is given in a confidential letter from Mr. Jackson, Secretary of Legation at Berlin.<sup>4</sup> In September, the release of Louis XVI. from restraint, on his accepting the constitution offered him by the National Assembly, left no ground for foreign intervention in his behalf. Mr. Ewart, whose too zealous efforts to avert a breach between the Governments of Great Britain and Prussia had gradually brought him into disfavour with both, now found himself compelled by broken health to retire from the diplomatic service. A letter from his friend Hugh Elliott announced to Grenville the melancholy circumstances of his death in January 1792.<sup>5</sup> Pitt granted pensions to his widow and children.

Many of Auckland's letters during the year 1791 deal with current negotiations for a commercial treaty intended to cement the political alliance of the English and Dutch nations. The chief point in dispute concerned the carrying trade of the Dutch in time of war, and conflicting interests in the Eastern Seas. After two years had been wasted in barren discussions, Auckland and Van der Spiegel, Grand Pensionary of Holland, the ablest statesman of the Orange party, drew up articles of agreement in the summer of 1790, by which, as the former averred, the Dutch made concessions which no British Government had ever before

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 193.<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 190, 191, 221.<sup>3</sup> II. p. 192.<sup>4</sup> II. p. 194.<sup>5</sup> II. p. 253.

ventured to ask from a foreign power.<sup>1</sup> These however failed to satisfy Pitt, or at least Lord Hawkesbury, President of the Board of Trade. Grenville therefore sent a counter project, which not only the Dutch Commissioners but the British Ambassador, in a remonstrance addressed to Pitt, declared to be unreasonable in its demands and impossible to enforce.<sup>2</sup> Van der Spiegel deplored in confidential letters to Auckland this exacting temper as fatal to the union of interests they had laboured to effect. Auckland returned to England on leave of absence in the autumn of 1791, and discussed the points at issue with the ministry. But all his efforts to frame articles which the Dutch Government could accept proved unavailing against the adverse influence of Lord Hawkesbury.

During his absence from the Hague, another cause of difference put a severe strain on the Anglo-Dutch Alliance. In view of common danger from France, the Emperor, as ruler of the Austrian Netherlands, proposed to the Dutch Government a mutual guarantee of their respective rights.<sup>3</sup> Van der Spiegel welcomed a proposal which placed the interests of the House of Orange under the protection of the two great German powers. But the British Government distrusting the Emperor, and fearing to be drawn by him into a quarrel with France, objected to it so strenuously, that the Prince of Orange, having to choose between England and Austria, put an end to the negotiation.<sup>4</sup>

Diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and the United States of America had been suspended in consequence of breaches by both parties of the articles of peace agreed to in 1784. Mr. Colquhoun, a Glasgow merchant, and Colonel Smith, son-in-law of Vice-President Adams, exerted themselves to improve the relations of two kindred peoples. Encouraged by Colquhoun's letters, Lord Grenville sent Mr. Hammond to Philadelphia in the summer of 1791, to discuss terms of settlement; and, later in the year, Mr. Pinkney came in London to represent General Washington. It appears from one of Hammond's letters that a geographical blunder in an article of the treaty of 1784 framed expressly to secure to British

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 161.

<sup>2</sup> I. p. 598; II. p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 217.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 251, 270.

subjects the free navigation of the Mississippi, completely excluded them from that river.<sup>1</sup>

Interspersed with these letters on political affairs are others of freer range and more familiar character from Lord Grenville's elder brother, the Marquis of Buckingham, and the Earl of Mornington, his most intimate friend. Mornington's letters are chiefly concerned with the scenes and incidents of his travels in Italy and Germany during the winter of 1790 and the spring and summer of 1791. They are the gems of the collection, and cannot fail to delight the reader by their power and brilliancy of description, cultivated taste, amusing and instructive comment, and the pleasing light in which they exhibit the writer's personal relations with Lord Grenville. Lord Buckingham's letters too frequently reflect the temper of a dissatisfied politician, irritated by constant disappointment of his hopes of place at Court or in the Cabinet in requital for services and sufferings in great measure self-inflicted, during his second tenure of the post of Irish Viceroy. But the habits of affection and unreserved confidence in which the brothers lived, and the thoroughness with which Lord Buckingham entered into every question affecting Grenville's advancement or happiness, give them great historical value. Though excluded from office, Lord Buckingham remained an eager politician. As Lord Lieutenant of an English county, colonel of a militia regiment, great landed proprietor returning several members to the House of Commons, he led a very active life, and acquired much practical knowledge of local affairs. His views on domestic politics, and especially those of Ireland, in which he took particular interest, appear to have had considerable influence in moulding Lord Grenville's public conduct in times of difficulty; as, for example, when in his letters of December 11 and 13, 1791, he insisted on the expediency of making concessions to the Irish Catholics in spite of the opposition of the Irish Government.<sup>2</sup> Extracts, more or less full, from Lord Grenville's answers to his brother have been published in *The Court and Cabinets of George III.* But several interesting passages omitted by the editor of that work, are printed in these volumes from duplicates preserved at Dropmore.

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<sup>1</sup> II. p. 254.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 237, 238.



The prolonged correspondence on the subject of the Duke of York's marriage exemplifies the chronic ill-humour and biting sarcasm to which Lord Thurlow seems to have given free rein in communicating with his principal colleagues, after Pitt sent Grenville to the House of Lords to take charge of public business. During a visit to Berlin in the summer of 1791, the Duke became engaged to a daughter of the King of Prussia. George III. postponed his formal assent to the union until Parliament should meet and make suitable provision for it. The King of Prussia growing impatient of the delay, Mr. Ewart, at the Duke's solicitation and unmindful of the Royal Marriage Act, assumed the responsibility, on the strength of a private letter of inquiry from Pitt, of signing a provisional contract, which satisfied the Prussian Ministry, and enabled the ceremony to be performed at Berlin. Ewart's letters on the subject of this marriage, and the replies of Pitt and Grenville, will be found in the *Addenda*.<sup>1</sup> When the news reached London, Lord Grenville wrote to consult Lord Thurlow, then in the country, as to the steps which should be taken to make the marriage legal in England. The Chancellor, conceiving that he had been purposely kept in the dark about such an interesting event, returned a very ungracious answer; and, notwithstanding the intervention of the King, to whom Grenville appealed, the correspondence lost little in acrimony until the second marriage of the Duke and Duchess on their arrival in England in November, brought it to a close.<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards, Lord Grenville having obtained the vacant office of Ranger of the Parks, the Lord Chancellor lent countenance to the clamour which, as appears from Lord Buckingham's letters, the appointment raised in exalted circles, by delaying for some time to pass the patent under the Great Seal.<sup>3</sup>

Abundant evidence may be found in the correspondence of the increasing distrust which the aggressive character assumed by the French Revolution at the end of 1791, under the direction of the Girondin party, aroused in the British and Dutch Governments. Barthélemy, French Ambassador in London under the *Fevillant régime*, having been recalled in December, the King and Queen received him graciously at parting audiences. "His

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 452-457.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 198, 200, 201, 230, 231.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 239, 247.

conduct personally," the King wrote, "has ever been as attentive as could be expected from a Frenchman."<sup>1</sup> But the envoys who succeeded Barthélemi seem, without exception, to have been regarded by George III. and his Ministers as revolutionary emissaries, sent to intrigue with the enemies of established order. A letter from J. Petrie, whom Lord Grenville employed to make confidential inquiries on the subject in Paris, gives interesting information in regard to Talleyrand's abortive mission to London at the beginning of 1792.<sup>2</sup> Shortly after Talleyrand's departure, M. du Roveray, another man of mark in the confidence of the Girondin leaders, applied to Lord Grenville for a letter of introduction to Major Hobart, Chief Secretary in Ireland. Grenville did not refuse his request, but advised Hobart to have him "narrowly and carefully watched."<sup>3</sup> Lord Auckland's letters in 1792 contain frequent allusions to the secret relations of De Maulde, the new French envoy at the Hague, with the "Patriot" party, and the care taken by the Dutch Government to intercept and copy his correspondence.

Mr. Lindsay, by his confidential reports as *Chargé d'Affaires* at Berlin after Ewart's return to England, led Lord Grenville to attribute the estrangement of the King of Prussia to personal faults of Ewart, rather than to political causes.<sup>4</sup> The letters of Sir Morton Eden, Ewart's successor, quickly dispelled this illusion. Eden found himself completely excluded from the confidence of the Prussian Court, while Frederick William concluded a defensive treaty with the Emperor, against whom the Legislative Assembly of France had denounced war. His letters give us striking pictures of the weak and dissolute character of the Prussian monarch, the sway of his profligate favourites, the impotence of Prussian Ministers, the evil influence of court manners on the society of the capital.<sup>5</sup>

In the spring of 1792, on the very eve of the Revolutionary war, three of the leading figures in European politics suddenly disappeared from the scene. Lord Grenville's letters barely notice the deaths of the Emperor Leopold, and Gustavus III. of Sweden. Lord St. Helens, on February 28, sent a report of the dismissal and exile of Count Florida Blanca, without being

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<sup>1</sup> II. p. 243.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 259.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 255.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 219, 224.

<sup>5</sup> II. pp. 245, 257, 276, 277.

able to account for it.<sup>1</sup> But a letter of later date, communicated by Lord Auckland, attributed the fall of the Spanish Minister to his opposing the advancement of the Queen's favorite, Godoy, Duke of Alcudia.<sup>2</sup>

Towards the end of April, the Marquis de Chauvelin came to London as French Ambassador, having M. M. de Talleyrand and du Roveray attached to him unofficially as advisers. He brought a letter from Louis XVI. to George III., expressing a desire for a formal alliance between France and Great Britain. The English sovereign's appreciation of the more important members of the French Embassy, in a note to Grenville, dated April 28, and his comments, a few days later, on the disgraceful incidents of a repulse suffered by the French troops, showed little disposition to accept this overture.<sup>3</sup> Lord Buckingham's letters for May 1792, and the following months, refer to various events in England that excited great interest at the time; Lord Thurlow's mutiny and dismissal; Pitt's negotiation with the aristocratic section of the Whig party; a royal proclamation against seditious societies, and the loyal addresses it evoked: the Birmingham riots. "M. de Chauvelin's *memoire*" censured in Lord Auckland's letters of June 5 and June 15 did not improve the relations of Great Britain and France.<sup>4</sup> But Grenville's answer to Auckland's suggestion that he should demand the recall of the French Ambassador is a very strong testimony to the pacific temper of the English people in the middle of the year 1792. "The quarrelling with France" he wrote on June 19, "wou'd give encouragement to the persons in both countries who wish to introduce French maxims of government amongst us, and would give them the command and direction of the very prevailing wish for peace which I take to be the ruling sentiment both here and in Holland."<sup>5</sup> The British Ministry appears to have adhered strictly to a line of neutrality both in regard to the internal troubles of France, and the war between France and the two great German powers. On the one hand, it provoked the anger of Austria and Prussia by dissuading the Dutch Government from listening to a new proposal from the Emperor Francis II. of a defensive alliance for the protection of the

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 256.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 368.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 267.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 277, 279.

<sup>5</sup> II. p. 231.

Netherlands.<sup>1</sup> On the other, it refused an official application from the French Government for its mediation to restore peace and a private request, through Lord Gower, for its friendly interference to save the royal family of France from revolutionary violence.<sup>2</sup> Of the utter inability of the French to resist the German armies no doubt seems to have been entertained by Lord Grenville or any of his correspondents. An equally firm conviction finds expression in letters of Grenville and Auckland, that the successful termination of the war in Mysore, known in London early in July, and the happy effect of the King's proclamation in quelling domestic sedition, had assured to Great Britain a long enjoyment of peace and unexampled prosperity.<sup>3</sup>

Lord Grenville's marriage to Annette Pitt, only daughter of Lord Camelford, is the subject of an affectionate letter from the Marquis of Buckingham, dated July 18. His wedding tour was interrupted by the overthrow of the French monarchy on August 10. The Cabinet immediately recalled the British Embassy from Paris. Horrible details of the massacre at the Tuileries, communicated by Morley, a Foreign Office messenger, and Mr. Lindsay, Secretary of the Embassy, are given in letters from Bland Burges to Grenville, dated August 15 and September 3.<sup>4</sup> The "application from Baron de Breteuil," and Chauvelin's official note, referred to in letters of Pitt and Dundas, dated August 17 and 18, are included in the *Addenda*.<sup>5</sup> Another letter from Burges to Grenville, dated September 8, contains particulars of the September massacres, brought from Paris by Mr. Lindsay, who had been detained in that city for several days after Lord Gower's departure. It is not easy to say whether Lindsay's account of Madame de Lamballe's murder, or of the indifference with which Philippe Egalité received the intelligence of that atrocity, is more revolting. A very interesting memorandum by Lord Grenville, dated September 24, of a conversation with M. de Talleyrand on the subject of the political tragedies of August and September in Paris, may be found among the *Addenda*; as also two letters from Edmund Burke in reference to the new political situation created by them.<sup>6</sup> A sudden rush across the British Channel of a multitude of

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 286, 287.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 286, 294.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 459, 460.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 282, 300,

<sup>5</sup> II. pp. 301, 308.

<sup>6</sup> III. pp. 463, 466, 471.

proscribed priests, reported by Mason, a Foreign Office messenger, on September 12, seems to have caused some dismay in England. As a set-off against this unwelcome news, Mason wrote an amusing account of Thomas Payne's escape to France.<sup>1</sup> The people of Calais received the author of the *Rights of Man* with open arms, and chose him, though apparently unable to address them in their own tongue, to represent them in the National Convention. The arrival of the royalist refugees suggested to the Ministry the alarming prospect of an inroad of Jacobin fugitives, in the event, considered at that time certain and imminent, of the Duke of Brunswick's army capturing Paris. In order to provide against this danger, Pitt and Dundas took counsel with Lord Loughborough,<sup>2</sup> who in the beginning of the following year accepted the vacant office of Lord Chancellor. Their deliberations bore fruit in the Alien Act.

Sir James Murray had gone to the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters at the end of July with private instructions from Lord Grenville to send home reports on matters affecting the political or military situation. But the German sovereigns, being much dissatisfied with the policy of the British Government, kept it quite in the dark in regard to their plans and objects. Letters however from General Money, commanding a division of Dumouriez's army, and a letter from another English officer serving under the Duke of Brunswick, giving interesting accounts of the campaign of Valmy from opposite camps, will be found in the *Addenda*.<sup>3</sup> These also include a report by Stephen Rolleston of intelligence collected from various quarters regarding the secret negotiations between the King of Prussia and the Executive Council of Paris, which paved the way for the evacuation of France by the German armies;<sup>4</sup> and an account of the early career of Lebrun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, by A. W. Miles.<sup>5</sup> Lord Grenville at first regarded the defeat of the allies as a mere check, involving no material alteration in the political situation of Europe, though testifying clearly to the wisdom of the British system of non-intervention. But the rapid conquest of the Austrian Netherlands by Dumouriez; the revival and spread of political agitation in Great Britain,

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 316.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 314.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 467-470, 475.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 473.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 462.



Ireland, and Holland; the encouragement given to it by French agents; and offensive decrees of the Convention, soon changed this mood of self complacent criticism to one of intense alarm and anger. Every symptom, real or imaginary, of internal disaffection is carefully recorded in the letters of Lord Buckingham, who prescribed as remedies, concession to Irish Catholics and repression of English radicals. The rapidity with which the English Government and people passed from a pacific temper to an ardent determination to bridle effectually the power of France is clearly reflected in Lord Grenville's letters to Lord Auckland during the last months of 1792. On the other hand, the strong desire of the Dutch Government not only to avoid war, but to bring about a general pacification on a basis of non-intervention by any state in the internal affairs of another, is not less clearly expressed in Auckland's letters to Grenville. The Grand Pensionary, Van der Spiegel, appears to have come to a secret understanding with Dumouriez through De Maulde and Joubert, agents of the French Government at the Hague, who, from time to time, were paid sums of money supplied by Grenville through Lord Auckland;<sup>1</sup> and to have received assurances that the Dutch provinces should not be molested by the French so long as England remained neutral.

The papers contain only passing references to the official correspondence between Lebrun or Chauvelin and Grenville, which led up to an open rupture between Great Britain and France. But they supply a good deal of information with respect to a concurrent negotiation, in which Dumouriez seems to have played the principal part. It would appear that the French general conceived a project of inducing the neutral powers to intervene for the restoration of peace; and, with their moral if not material support, of using his army to re-establish constitutional monarchy in France. The Dutch Government identified itself with the first part of this scheme, in which Lebrun also co-operated. Dumouriez made overtures to Lord Grenville through M. de Talleyrand,<sup>2</sup> who had returned to England after the downfall of Louis XVI., and disclaimed all connexion with the rulers of the Republic; and through De Maulde he invited Lord Auckland to a personal conference.<sup>3</sup> Lord Grenville, however, as his letters show, had by this time

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 356, 357, 377.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 375.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 377.

made up his mind thoroughly as to the necessity or expediency of war with France. He declined to grant Talleyrand an interview on December 22.<sup>1</sup> And although he seems to have entered into communication with him afterwards at the request of M. Malouet, he returned no answer apparently to Talleyrand's remarkable letter of January 28th, 1793, from Juniper Hall, announcing Maret's mission to London; and he only consented to an interview between Auckland and Dumouriez, in order that the Dutch Government might have more time for military preparation.<sup>2</sup> This meeting, however, was prevented by the declaration of war by which the Convention replied to an Order in Council, requiring Chauvelin to quit England. Madame de Stael joined Talleyrand at Juniper Hall after the trial of Louis XVI., and announced her arrival in England to Lord Grenville in a characteristic letter.<sup>3</sup>

Confidential letters and instructions in reference to treaties of alliance with Spain, Prussia and Russia, then engaged in the second partition of Poland, Austria, and Naples; the appointment of the Duke of York to command the British and Hanoverian troops in the Netherlands; and other matters bearing on the war, make up a large part of the correspondence during the first months of 1793. A letter of Lord St. Helens contains an amusing sketch of Godoy, the new prime minister of Spain.<sup>4</sup> Sir Morton Eden, who had resigned the office of British Minister at Berlin in disgust, was transferred to Vienna early in the year; and Count Starhemberg, brief notices of whose character and aims occur in Lord Auckland's letters during the year 1792, replaced Count Stadion as Austrian Minister in London.

Letters of the King and Pitt point to the capture of Dunkirk for Great Britain, and the fortresses of French Flanders as a barrier for the Austrian Netherlands, the destruction of French arsenals, and the conquest of French colonies by naval expeditions, as the main objects to which the efforts of the monarchy were to be directed.<sup>5</sup> Additional light is thrown on British policy at this time by the refusal of government to allow the French princes, Counts de Provence and d'Artois, to set foot in England; the satisfaction expressed by Lord Grenville, in a letter to Lord St. Helens, at the failure of the attempt made

<sup>1</sup> III. p. 477.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 374, 377.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 371.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 387, 388.

<sup>5</sup> II. p. 386.

by Dumouriez in concert with the Prince of Cobourg to restore the French monarchy while preserving its integrity; and the King's declaration, in reference to a last overture for peace from Lebrun, that "France must be greatly circumscribed before " we can talk of any means of treating with that dangerous " and faithless nation."<sup>1</sup> But the plans of Dundas, as Minister for War, were greatly hampered by a difficulty of obtaining men for the army and navy. The employment of German and Italian mercenaries partly supplied military deficiencies. But deep disappointment, caused by the inactivity of the Channel Fleet and the delays of projected expeditions to the West Indies, is expressed from time to time in Lord Buckingham's letters during the whole year. On the other hand, secret reports from Paris throughout the spring are filled with encouraging accounts of a terrible dearth of food in France, and the strife of republican factions in the capital, which culminated at the beginning of June in the arrest or flight of the Girondin leaders in the Convention, and a general insurrection of the provincial cities in their favour.<sup>2</sup>

A British peerage having been conferred on Lord Auckland for his exertions in Holland, he returned to England after the evacuation of the Netherlands by Dumouriez, and soon afterwards retired from the diplomatic service. In the course of the summer he introduced to Lord Grenville M. de Jarry, a distinguished French strategist, strongly recommended by Count Mercy, Imperial Minister at Brussels.<sup>3</sup> Grenville engaged De Jarry to collect information about the royalist insurgents of Brittany and La Vendée, but seems to have employed him chiefly in drawing up military plans and reports, highly lauded for ability and knowledge, but apparently never followed, or not until it was too late. In July the surrender of Valenciennes, Condé, and Mayence, and repeated defeats inflicted on the French armies, inspired sanguine hopes of a speedy conclusion of the war. But at the critical moment of the campaign the allied forces in the Netherlands separated to besiege the petty fortresses of Dunkirk and Quesnoy, and the King of Prussia remained inactive on the Rhine. Two remarkable letters from M. Malouet, a leading French statesman of the party of constitutional monarchy, and M. Mallet du Pan, one of the ablest

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 392-394.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 482, 483.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 400-410.

political writers of the time, warned Lord Grenville in August that the dilatory tactics of the allied powers, each of them intent on the pursuit of some selfish aim, by allowing time to the Jacobin Government of Paris to crush internal revolt and gather up all the resources of France to repel invasion, would infallibly lead to the triumph of the Revolution.<sup>1</sup> De Jarry also, supported by Lord Auckland, insisted on a concentration of force on Paris, in union with the insurgent royalists, to destroy the Convention.<sup>2</sup> These remonstrances, followed almost immediately by the surrender of Toulon to Lord Hood, to be held for Louis XVII., and the repulse of the Duke of York from Dunkirk, seem to have had considerable influence in modifying British policy. This effect may be discerned in M. Mounier's mission to Switzerland<sup>3</sup> and the substitution of Mr. Wickham for Lord R. Fitzgerald as British Minister at Berne; in urgent applications to the Prussian, Austrian, and Sardinian Governments to move troops to the assistance of the insurgent city of Lyons; in a manifesto written by Grenville, and issued in the name of the allied powers, offering to aid the French people in restoring constitutional monarchy<sup>4</sup>; in the fitting out of an expedition under the command of Lord Moira to assist the Breton royalists.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand the manifesto maintained the demand of "indemnity for the past and security for the future" at the expense of France, formulated by Lord Auckland at the Antwerp Conference in April 1793; and the British Government refused to allow Count de Provence to repair to Toulon, at the invitation of the King of Spain.<sup>6</sup> The correspondence for the remainder of the year 1793 records the failure of conflicting interests and a want of energy in command, to overcome the patriotic efforts of the French people to save their country from partition. After the repulse of the Duke of York from Dunkirk and of the Prince of Cobourg from Maubeuge, the allied armies in the Netherlands remained inactive. The Sardinians made no effectual attempt to relieve Lyons. The King of Prussia having, by a victory at Pirmasens, established himself on the borders of Alsace in September, directed Marquis Lucchesini to inform the British Government that, unless aided by a large subsidy and a guarantee of his

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 483, 484.

<sup>2</sup> II. p. 454.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 427; III. p. 486.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 428, 429.

<sup>5</sup> II. p. 431.

<sup>6</sup> II. p. 476; III. p. 487.

recent Polish acquisitions, he must withdraw from the war at the close of the campaign.<sup>1</sup> The Dutch Government refused to assist the Emperor further in annexing towns in French Flanders unless he agreed to restore territory taken from the Republic by his predecessor Joseph II. Lord Moira's armament did not reach the coast of Brittany until the beginning of December, when the royalist insurrection had been temporarily quelled. The evacuation of Toulon later in December, and the complete discomfiture of the Prussian and Austrian armies operating in Alsace, filled the measure of popular disappointment, so freely expressed in Lord Buckingham's letters.

Lord Grenville's letters, however, showed no signs of discouragement.<sup>2</sup> He seems to have relied confidently on the inability of the Jacobin Government, with ruined finances, and a famine-stricken and generally hostile population, to maintain such an exhausting and unequal struggle. A strenuous and united effort of the coalition, on a regular plan, must, it was thought, bring the war to a successful issue. Acting on this conviction the British Ministry sent Lord Malmesbury to Berlin to confer with the King of Prussia; put pressure on the Austrian Government to appease by concessions the jealousies of the Dutch and Prussians; and with judgment biased no doubt by an absorbing care of British interests, caused General Mack's plan of campaign for 1794 to be adopted.<sup>3</sup> Although the Emperor Francis II. assumed the chief command in the Netherlands with Mack as chief of his staff, it appears from a letter of Sir Morton Eden, dated March 11, 1794, that neither he nor his principal adviser, Baron Thugut, had faith in Mack's plan.<sup>4</sup> They condemn it as depending for success on the doubtful co-operation of a Prussian army, and as employing the main force of the coalition in tedious sieges on the northern frontier of France, instead of penetrating at once by more open routes into the interior of the country to rally the royalists of the provinces, and assail the revolutionary Government in Paris, its chief stronghold.

It is clear from Pitt's letters to Grenville in October 1793 that the Ministry at first decided to insist on the King of Prussia fulfilling his engagements to Great Britain. Frederick William pleaded inability to do so on account of the empty state of his exchequer, but offered an army of 100,000 men for a subsidy of

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 430.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 451, 464.

<sup>3</sup> II. p. 505.

<sup>4</sup> II. p. 525.

about 2,000,000l.<sup>1</sup> Two confidential letters from Lord Malmesbury, written on January 9, 1794, throw considerable light on the state of affairs at Berlin. The first, to Grenville, describes the Prussian Court and the principal personages who figured there.<sup>2</sup> The second, to Pitt, deals more at large with the political situation. "The question," Malmesbury wrote to Pitt, "reduces itself to a very narrow compass. *Can we do without the King of Prussia, or can we not?* If we can, he is not worth giving a guinea for, if we cannot, I am afraid we cannot give too many."<sup>3</sup> A Prussian army was an essential factor of the military plans adopted, but the difficulty of raising the subsidy demanded could not be overcome. In April, however, Lord Malmesbury, Count Haugwitz, representing Prussia, and the Dutch Government signed a convention at the Hague, by which the King of Prussia engaged to place 62,000 troops, then on the Rhine under Marshal Möllendorf's command, at the absolute disposal of the maritime powers for the remainder of the year, in consideration of monthly payments amounting in all to about 1,200,000l., of which 100,000l. was to be paid in advance.<sup>4</sup> Owing to delay in London it was not until June that Lords Malmesbury and Cornwallis joined Count Haugwitz at Maestricht to arrange for the moving of Möllendorf's army into the Netherlands; and then further delay was caused by intelligence from Baron Jacobi that none of the money due in virtue of the Convention of the Hague, and on which the Prussian Government professed to depend for the equipment and pay of the troops, had been sent to Berlin.<sup>5</sup> In the meantime vigorous attacks of the French and the inactivity of the Prussians had compelled the allied commanders in the Netherlands to abandon Mack's plan and stand on the defensive. A letter from the Duke of York to his father, dated May 23,<sup>6</sup> and correspondence arising out of it, leave no doubt either of the bad feeling that had sprung up between the Austrian and English generals, or of the disbelief of leading ministers at home in the Duke's capacity for independent command. The Emperor returned to Vienna. And on June 26, Lord Hertford, who had been present at the battle, sent Grenville a report of Jourdan's victory before Charleroi, which decided the fate of the Austrian

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 434, 442, 470.<sup>2</sup> II. p. 492.<sup>3</sup> II. p. 494.<sup>4</sup> II. p. 552.<sup>5</sup> II. pp. 554, 565, 566.<sup>6</sup> II. p. 559.

Netherlands.<sup>1</sup> The French Generals Jourdan and Pichégu, having driven the allied armies across the Scheldt and the Meuse, paused for a time to recover the border fortresses still held by Austrian garrisons; but the despatch of Lord Meira, with troops long destined for La Vendée, to the assistance of the Duke of York, was a grievous blow to the royalist cause in France. Marshal Möllendorf having no instructions on the subject from the King of Prussia, declined to obey a summons from Lords Malmesbury and Cornwallis, who reached his camp in the middle of June, to march from the Rhine into the Netherlands.<sup>2</sup> Count Haugwitz, on whose co-operation the British Commissioners relied, had suddenly abandoned them at Frankfort, and returned to Berlin. On receiving Malmesbury's report of this breach of the Convention of the Hague, Grenville seems to have proposed to stop payment of the Prussian subsidy. But Pitt, taking also into account a report from Cornwallis of the military reasons alleged by Möllendorf for remaining on the Rhine, deferred a decision on the question.<sup>3</sup>

A memorandum of Pitt, dated July 15, tells us the measures by which he proposed to retrieve the reverses in the Netherlands.<sup>4</sup> The only new political feature it presents is a concert with the French princes for the enrolling of regiments of *émigrés*, to reinforce the royalist insurgents in Western France. The King consented to allow Count d'Artois to come to England, in strict incognito and for a short time, to take part in this work; but the invitation had hardly gone, when it was thought expedient to revoke it.<sup>5</sup> Later in the month Lord Grenville despatched Lord Spencer and Mr. Thomas Grenville on a mission to Vienna for the purpose of urging the Austrian Government to make more vigorous exertions. At the same time Baron Thugut sent Count Mercy to London with instructions to demand more efficient military support in the Netherlands; an immediate advance of money as subsidy or loan, to enable the Austrian army to move forward for the relief of the besieged fortresses in French Flanders; financial help on a larger scale for the next campaign.<sup>6</sup> Mercy died within a few days after his arrival in London.<sup>7</sup> Before Pitt could supply the funds immediately required, the besieged fortresses surrendered; and the French generals

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 592.<sup>2</sup> II. p. 577.<sup>3</sup> II. p. 592.<sup>4</sup> II. p. 599.<sup>5</sup> II. p. 609, 622.<sup>6</sup> III. p. 513.<sup>7</sup> II. p. 625.

resumed the offensive, Pichégru against the English and Dutch, and Jourdan against the Austrians. When the campaign of 1794 opened, the Cabinet had earnestly pressed the King to give Lord Cornwallis an important command in the Netherlands<sup>1</sup>; and Pitt now wished to make him Commander-in-Chief of the allied armies. But the opposing claims of the Duke of York and the Austrian General Clairfait received such powerful support as to defeat on both occasions the intentions of the English Ministry. Mr. Grenville's letters from Vienna presented a very discouraging picture of the internal state of the Austrian monarchy, the unpopularity of the war, and the difficulties thrown in Baron Thugut's path by the great nobles who filled the chief places at Court.<sup>2</sup> A want of vigour in the administration, and of accord between its military and political views and those of the British Ministry, impressed the envoys so unfavourably that they set their faces against England incurring any pecuniary risk for an Austrian alliance. When, however, they returned home in November, Lord Grenville sent back Sir Morton Eden, then repenting at leisure of a hasty acceptance of the vacant embassy at Madrid, to resume his post at Vienna, and discuss with Thugut the amount and conditions of an Austrian loan to be raised in London on the credit of the British Government. Marshal Möllendorf having again declined to move his army for the defence of the Dutch Republic, Pitt stopped payment of the Prussian subsidy for October. The King of Prussia retaliated by withdrawing his troops from the Rhine, and refused to take any further part in the war until all arrears had been paid up. A note of the Prussian case, as presented to Lord Grenville by Baron Jacobi, is included in the *Addenda*.<sup>3</sup> The French generals were not slow in turning the discord of their enemies to account. Letters which passed at this time between Lord Grenville and Lord St. Helens, who had succeeded Lord Auckland as British Ambassador at the Hague, and from the Duke of York to his father, bring out clearly the impotence of the Dutch Government to take effectual measures of defence, in consequence of the disaffection or apathy of a population exasperated by the disorderly conduct of at least a part of York's army.<sup>4</sup> The Duke of Brunswick having declined an offer of the chief command of the British and Dutch

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 506, 507.    <sup>2</sup> pp. 614-636.    <sup>3</sup> III. p. 556.    <sup>4</sup> II. pp. 612, 615, 644, 650.



troops, the Prince of Orange, with the consent of George III. made an ineffectual attempt to open a separate negotiation for peace at Paris.<sup>1</sup> Other letters from General Clairfait, who had succeeded Cobourg in command of the Austrians, to Count Starhemberg, throw a good deal of light on the circumstances that facilitated Pichégru's rapid conquest of the Dutch provinces in the winter of 1794-5.<sup>2</sup>

References in Lord Grenville's papers, after the breaking out of war with France, to matters of domestic politics, or of merely personal interest outside the catalogue of Lord Buckingham's grievances, are few and brief. In December 1793, Pitt's negligence or inadvertence in respect to a military arrangement affecting the professional prospects of Colonel Nugent, a near connexion of Lord Buckingham, drew an angry letter of remonstrance from Grenville, and ruffled for a time the affectionate relations in which these Ministers lived.<sup>3</sup> Another discussion of more amicable character followed in February 1794 in reference to the rich sinecure of Auditor of the Exchequer which Pitt offered Grenville on disadvantageous terms.<sup>4</sup> A compromise seems to have been arrived at in this case which left Grenville's official income unaltered, and secured to him the auditorship as a permanent provision on his quitting office. Another correspondence in which Pitt and Grenville took part, arose out of one of several strange misconceptions of the conditions on which the Duke of Portland accepted the post of Home Secretary in the summer of 1794. In order to extricate himself from the embarrassments of what seems to have been a comedy of errors, Pitt asked Grenville to resign the Foreign Office to Portland. Grenville readily consented, but the change, besides being unwelcome to the Duke, was rendered unnecessary by a somewhat late discovery of his willingness to satisfy Pitt's requirements, by leaving the conduct of the war in the hands of Dundas.<sup>5</sup> Lord Buckingham's intense dissatisfaction at the ministerial arrangements resulting from Pitt's coalition with the aristocratic wing of the Whig party is abundantly displayed in letters to his brother.

But although poor in information about the internal affairs of the British monarchy, the collection is exceedingly rich

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 646.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 21, 50, 517, 519.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 482-486.

<sup>4</sup> II. pp. 511-513, 515.

<sup>5</sup> II. pp. 595-597.

in confidential reports on the internal affairs of France. Two series of these, anonymous and in French, dealing with the Revolutionary government established in Paris in the autumn of 1793, its methods, its resources, the perils that beset it, the characters and aims of the men who directed it, the internal dissensions that finally destroyed it, though now published in an incomplete form, are of special interest and importance. Lord Grenville dealt with these two sets of reports in the same fashion. He retained one part of both in his own hands, and left the other part in the Foreign Office, without adding in either case note or comment to denote the author, or the common origin of the separated parts. The concluding papers of one series, of which the more important is entitled *Memoire sur le Comité de Salut Public*, are printed with the *Addenda* of this volume.<sup>1</sup> They form the continuation of an elaborate historical treatise, the first part of which, now preserved in the Public Record Office, has been published by Mr. Oscar Browning as an appendix to Lord Gower's despatches from Paris. Copious extracts from both parts in M. Taine's History of the French Revolution leave no doubt as to their being the work of the famous political writer Mallet du Pan. Mallet appears to have been brought into relations with Lord Grenville by M. Malouet in August 1793.<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards he sent to Malouet, for Grenville, a *mémoire* on the state of Switzerland, which has not been found in the portfolios at Dropmore; but his reports on France seem to have been forwarded by Lord Elgin, British Minister at Brussels, after Malouet's departure from England. Mallet's engagements to the Austrian Government may serve to account for the care taken to keep his communications with the British Ministry secret. As to the ability and knowledge displayed in his essays on the French Revolution, it is sufficient to say that Malouet's enthusiastic appreciation of them was not more warm than that expressed by distinguished historians of the present time.

The other series of secret reports, beginning on September 2, 1793, and forming in Volume II. a continuous record to June 22, 1794, came to Lord Grenville from Mr. Drake, British Minister at Genoa. In transmitting the first of these bulletins, as he named them, Drake wrote on November 9:

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 489, 491.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 483, 485, 487.

" I have the honour to enclose a detailed account of the sitting  
 " of the *Committee of Nine* on the 2nd of September. . . .  
 " Your Lordship may rely on the authenticity of it, as it was  
 " drawn up by a person who is employed as secretary of that  
 " Committee, and who conceals his real principles under the  
 " cloak of the most extravagant Jacobinism."<sup>1</sup> He referred  
 Grenville to Lord Mulgrave, then returning to England from  
 Toulon, for information as to the route by which the bulletins  
 reached him, and requested that, for the safety of the writer  
 they might be shown only to his Majesty's Ministers. Lord  
 Grenville retained in his own custody all the bulletins that  
 came to him during the Reign of Terror, generally six weeks after  
 they had been written. Those received after August 2, 1794,  
 he deposited with Drake's secret despatches in the Foreign  
 Office. Although their relations continued with hardly a break  
 during the remaining period of his diplomatic employment in  
 Italy, Drake appears to have been unable for a long time to  
 learn anything more about his mysterious correspondent than  
 the circumstance that he was a royalist of fanatical type,  
 and a secret agent of Count de Provence, known as Monsieur  
 until the death of his nephew in June 1795, and afterwards as  
 Louis XVIII. But his secret despatches in the sequel supply  
 information which seems to fix the identity of the writer of  
 the bulletins beyond reasonable doubt. A royalist agent  
 residing at Venice, referred to in one of the bulletins as a  
 man of considerable mark, personally known to English  
 Ministers, and an old friend of the writer, acted as intermediary  
 between the latter and Drake. This description points to  
 Count d'Entraigues, chief political manager for Monsieur, or  
 some one intimately associated with him. An unsigned covering  
 letter from the intermediary to Drake, dated August 27, 1795,  
 excuses orthographical errors in the bulletins by stating that  
 in order to guard against discovery which might compromise  
 the writer he had the originals copied at Venice by a child  
 only ten years old. In the same month the writer warned the  
 British Government that the plans of Mr. Wickham, its Minister  
 in Switzerland, for raising an insurrection at Lyons and drawing  
 military deserters across the French frontier to recruit the army

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<sup>1</sup> II. p. 456.

of Prince de Condé, had been denounced three times to the Committee of Public Safety, in consequence of the indiscretion or infidelity of the agents employed. He had kept back the reports, and would run no further risk for such men, or by holding communication with Wickham. But as the British Government had now identified itself with the cause of Louis XVIII., he undertook, if supplied with 500 louis for preliminary expenses, to establish four trustworthy agents in different parts of France to furnish intelligence and serve its other objects. He asked no other payment for himself or his subordinates; only stipulating that facilities should be given him for the transmission of his own fortune of 400,000 livres to England, and that his agents, if their conduct gave satisfaction, should be assured of means of subsistence, in the event of misfortune compelling them to fly from France. Drake, in forwarding this proposal to Grenville, stated that he had sent his correspondent 100*l.* as a retaining fee, but could not take the responsibility of remitting the whole sum required without special authority. In the following month, having received instructions as Minister Plenipotentiary at Milan to join the headquarters of the Austrian army of the Alps, Drake arranged that the bulletins should be sent direct from Venice to Grenville or Aust, one of the Under-Secretaries of State, and signed (58). But the writer failing to obtain an answer from Lord Grenville to the offer he had made, discontinued them in February 1796. In June 1796, however, Drake wrote in cipher from Venice that the proposal to supply secret intelligence had been repeated, with the same conditions and exceptions, by Ramon, a member of the Council of Five Hundred. Ramon acknowledged having received an instalment of 3,000 livres from Drake, but stated that 9,000 livres more were required to complete his plans. And he refused to have any relations with Wickham, who by his account had done more injury to the royalists of Lyons than Collot d'Herbois. This letter of Drake and a later one in the autumn gave some particulars about Ramon. He had been a member of the Convention, and although a zealous royalist enjoying the confidence of the emigrant princes, had voted for the death of Louis XVI. He had afterwards turned his connexion with the Committee of Public Safety to profitable account, and had placed

his large gains for safety in the hands of Sir John Lambart, anxiously awaiting permission from the British Government to transmit them to England. In the autumn of 1796 he travelled in the south of France as a delegate of the Directory, while working secretly for Louis XVIII. He complained that all his efforts for the promotion of the royal cause were hampered by want of money, but was determined to risk none of his own on such an uncertain venture, Louis XVIII. and Monsieur being themselves the chief obstacles in the way of a restoration of the French monarchy. Gamon kept up communication with Drake, sending occasionally interesting reports on French affairs signed Z, until Bonaparte's victories left British diplomacy no foot-hold in northern Italy.

The unbounded confidence Lord Grenville reposed in Wickham, to whom, as their correspondence shows, he allowed a free hand in organising and subsidizing insurrection in France, may explain his tacit refusal of Ramon's proposal, although he must have found in Wickham's confessions of failure to obtain recruits for Condé's army, and the occasional ineptitude of his agents, some confirmation of the indictment which paved the way for that proposal. It may be stated that Ramon's name appears on contemporary public documents as a member of the Committee of Public Safety in the summer of 1795.

Strong antipathies divided the writer of the bulletins, who hated a constitutional royalist more than a Jacobin, from Mallet du Pan, an advocate, like his friend Malouet, of the reforming policy of Louis XVI. One of the bulletins affords amusing proof of this antagonism in the care with which the attention of the British Government is drawn to a boastful letter of Mallet, found among the papers of Herault de Sechelles.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, a remarkable degree of agreement may be observed in their reports, in regard not only to the leading features of the system of terror, but as to details of its working, and the characters of those who worked it. Another point worth noting is that information supplied in the bulletins as to matters particularly affecting the British Government is frequently confirmed by other evidence in the correspondence. For example, the revelation of a design to murder George III. and Pitt is fully

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<sup>1</sup> II. p. 555.

corroborated in the disclosures of an Irish priest named Ferris to Bland Burges at the Foreign Office in London.<sup>1</sup> And Count Mercy, at Lord Grenville's request, caused the emissaries of the Committee of Public Safety to be tracked and arrested in Belgium on their way to England.<sup>2</sup> Drake's own accounts from the south of France correspond with the statement in another bulletin of the number and condition of the French troops besieging Toulon. The double part played by the writer enabled him to diversify his narrative by confidential information drawn from royalist as well as Jacobin sources. But the chief ground on which the bulletins challenge attention is their want of accord with most of the standard works on the French revolution in two particulars of great historical interest: 1. The position they assign to Abbé Siéyès as standing counsel of the Revolutionary government, and more especially, prompter and mainstay of Robespierre; and 2. The part attributed to St. Just as chief opponent of Robespierre's supremacy, after the latter had rid himself by means of the guillotine of all his political rivals, in March and April 1794. The bulletins immediately following the last printed in Volume II., dated June 14-22, embrace the events of the 9th Thermidor, or July 28; and consequently bring the narrative in regard to both of those debatable points to a conclusion. A brief summary of their contents will therefore supply an obvious deficiency caused by the untimely separation of the series. Siéyès is represented in the interval between June 22 and July 19 as exhausting his powers of persuasion in eloquent appeals to the Committee of Public Safety to lay aside internal strife, and unite heartily in carrying on war at the expense of the rich at home and abroad, for the destruction of kings, priests, and nobles, in order that society might be reconstructed on a really democratic basis. On the other hand, St. Just, notwithstanding the reconciliation he had sought with Robespierre, which seems to have given him control of the northern armies,<sup>3</sup> continued to suspect his powerful colleague of a design to make peace with the allies for his own advantage; and wavered between him and his antagonists until he found, on July 19, in the course of a conference with the Dantonist

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<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 445, 461.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 510, 511.

<sup>3</sup> II. pp. 585, 588.

Committee formed to resist Robespierre, that they were determined to abolish the Revolutionary Tribunal. Starting up in fury at this announcement, he declared himself their mortal enemy, and joined Couthon and Robespierre to maintain the system of terror. At a meeting of the Committee of Public Safety on July 20, angry feelings, hitherto kept under restraint, exploded. Robespierre, supported by St. Just and Couthon, repeated in a menacing tone a demand recently evaded by the majority, that Fouché and other Dantonist deputies should be accused and tried. He wound up a long harangue by declaring that Fouché's head or his should fall. Billaud Varennes, an old friend of Fouché, replied fiercely that if either head fell it should be Robespierre's. He found a backer, furious as himself, in Collot d'Herbois. With this declaration of war the meeting broke up. Siéyès finding it impossible to avert an open rupture, vanished from the scene until the conflict had been decided. He appears to have extricated himself from the ruin of the Terrorists with his usual adroitness, baffling several attempts of Tallien to include him in the decree of accusation subsequently passed in the Convention against Billaud, Collot and Barrère. The writer states in his bulletin for August 1-9, that on July 25, Robespierre had all the means of success at his command, and that his want of nerve and decision on the following days gave the victory to the Convention. He also asserts that an examination of Robespierre's papers disclosed his secret negotiation for peace with Austrian agents, and a project to place Louis XVII. on the throne under his own guardianship.

Mr. Hammond's negotiations at Philadelphia for a settlement of claims and controversies in respect of various articles of the treaty concluded in 1794 had been interrupted by new causes of complaint, originating in the renewal of war between Great Britain and France. It appears from the bulletins that the American Government, in anticipation of hostilities with England, instructed, early in 1794, Robert Morris, its Minister in Paris, to apply to the Committee of Public Safety for money to equip a naval armament.<sup>1</sup> Later in the year, Mr. Secretary Randolph despatched Mr. Jay to London to discuss, and if possible conclude, a pacific arrangement with Lord Grenville. In

<sup>1</sup> II. pp. 526, 537.

anticipation of this mission, Lord Auckland, on June 22, sent Grenville a graphic sketch of Jay's character from the pen of Mr. Elliott, a former Lieutenant Governor of New York.<sup>1</sup> A letter from Grenville to Jay, dated October 7,<sup>2</sup> shows that they had already made considerable way in a negotiation, of which (1) an abstract of the various grievances alleged by both parties; (2) letters from Randolph and Jay in regard to high-handed proceedings of British officers on the Canadian frontier; (3) a letter from Grenville to the Duke of Portland suggesting a reorganisation of West India prize courts, with a view of checking their unjust practices; and (4) a letter from Buckingham to Grenville in reference to the impressment of American seamen by Admiral Jervis, and the Canadian projects of Governor Simcoe, clearly indicate the subject matter.<sup>3</sup> A letter from Jay to Grenville, dated November 22,<sup>4</sup> bears strong testimony to the conciliatory spirit which had enabled the negotiators to sign a new treaty. Grenville, at Jay's suggestion, recalled Hammond from Philadelphia in September 1794, but appointed him Under Secretary at the Foreign Office in November 1795. A friendly letter from Grenville to Jay, written in May 1795, after the latter had returned to America, deals with various impediments which prevented the treaty from coming into force until the following year.<sup>5</sup>

The circumstances of Lord FitzWilliam's appointment as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and sudden recall, assume a somewhat novel aspect in Lord Grenville's correspondence. Readers of Lord Buckingham's letters during his tenure of the same office in 1788-1789, published in Volume I, will remember the strong personal antagonism that embittered his conflict on the Regency question with Mr. Ponsonby, leader of the Irish Whigs and close ally of the Duke of Portland; and his deep mortification at what he considered the ingratitude of the Crown for services rendered during that political crisis. Constant disappointment of his hopes of royal favour, for which he held Pitt in some measure responsible, did not suffer those feelings to subside during the five following years. In this frame of mind he resented the appointment of the Duke of Portland as Home Secretary, with an intention, avowed soon afterwards,

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 578.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 517.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 520, 522, 529, 533; II. p. 610.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 534.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 68.



of restoring Ponsonby to office in Ireland under Lord FitzWilliam, as a repudiation of his own acts as Lord Lieutenant by Pitt and Grenville, who had been, parties to them ; and when, in spite of his remonstrances, the new arrangements had been completed, he gave free vent to his indignation in letters to both.<sup>1</sup> Grenville's replies betrayed deep pain on account of his brother's reproaches, and conveyed the most earnest assurances, which a letter from Pitt confirmed, that Buckingham's reputation had been particularly guarded by the rejection of every proposal which could be interpreted as casting a slur on his Irish administration. Buckingham however demanded as a public testimony of the approbation of the Crown, either the endowment of an Irish peerage for his second son, or a seat in the Cabinet for himself. On these terms being rejected, he broke off all relations with Grenville and Pitt until the recall of FitzWilliam afforded him the satisfaction he required. An attentive perusal of the following papers, Buckingham's letters to Grenville, dated September 20 and October 1, 1794 ; Grenville's Minute, dated March 1795, of the conditions imposed on FitzWilliam at a conference he'd in Pitt's house in November 1794 ; Buckingham's letter to Grenville, dated November 24, 1794, and the reply, dated December 5 ; Pitt's letter to Buckingham, dated December 20, 1794 ; Buckingham's letters to Thomas Grenville, dated December 30, 1794, and to Grenville, dated January 3 and 23, 1795 ; Grenville's letters to Buckingham, dated January 23, FitzWilliam, dated January 28 (answered on February 9), and Portland, January 31, 1795 ; and, finally, Buckingham's letter to Grenville, dated March 11, 1795,<sup>2</sup> leaves an impression that the personal sensibilities of the Marquis of Buckingham formed an important though hitherto unappreciated factor in the shaping and the ending of a political episode which has provoked much controversy. It would appear from the endorsement, dated February 15, 1799, that Lord Grenville's Minute, as printed in this volume, was a first draft, which Pitt afterwards corrected. On March 28, 1795, Grenville sent a copy of it, no doubt in its final shape, to Lord Camden; with a request

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 597, and see below.

<sup>2</sup> II. pp. 683, 637 ; III. p. 35 ; II. 647, 649, 653, 655 ; III. pp. 2, 11-14, 17, 34.

that it might be shown to Mr. Pelham, who had already gone to Ireland as Chief Secretary.<sup>1</sup>

This is probably the document to which Mr. Lecky refers in his history of that time, as having been found by him among the Pelham Papers.

While this Irish question was still in debate, his strong objections to a project approved by Pitt and a majority of the Cabinet, of a new convention with the King of Prussia for the hire of 60,000 troops to expel the French from the Dutch Provinces, seems to have determined Grenville to retire from the Ministry. The reasons on which he based this resolution are fully set forth in an official minute; but, in deference apparently to Pitt's wishes, he postponed giving it effect until the close of the session.<sup>2</sup> The King at first concurred with Grenville, but northern Germany having been exposed to invasion by the march of General Clarfait's army to Mayence, to replace the Prussians withdrawn from the Rhine, he changed his mind. The treaty of Basle, signed on April 5, 1795, between France and Prussia, by putting an end to Pitt's project, appears to have restored harmony in the Cabinet.

A comparative statement of the conditions of two new conventions concluded by Great Britain with Russia and Austria, and constituting a triple alliance for defensive purposes, will be found at the end of the correspondence for May 1795.<sup>3</sup> The Empress Catherine despatched twelve ships of war to join the British naval squadron in the North Sea. Financial exhaustion, jealousy of Prussian designs, and a strong inclination to peace in the Imperial Diet, seem to have paralysed Austria. It appears from a letter of General Clarfait to Count Starhemberg, dated April 9,<sup>4</sup> that preparations absolutely necessary to enable the principal Austrian army to take the field, were still under consideration at Vienna. Starhemberg had proposed to Grenville on March 8, the adoption by Austria and Great Britain of a plan of combined operations in France, drawn up by General des Rosières, an eminent French strategist.<sup>5</sup> Lord Cornwallis, now a member of the Cabinet, thought that no better scheme could be framed, and recommended that it

<sup>1</sup> III. p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 25, 26, 30, 50.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 74.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 50.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 31.

should be sent to Vienna for the Emperor's approval.<sup>1</sup> But apparently neither of the powers on which the execution of it devolved, could undertake to carry it out. In May, after protracted discussion, the terms of an Austrian loan to be raised in London on the guarantee of the British Government were finally settled. It was not however until the following July that the money was despatched in a man-of-war to the mouth of the Elbe, for transmission to Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

Against these discouraging circumstances might be set off the prospect, which British Ministers seem to have regarded as certain, of a sudden and complete collapse of the Jacobin Republic. An anonymous report in French gives a vivid picture of the miserable condition of France in the spring of 1795, under the combined pressure of famine, anarchy, and financial embarrassment; and of the rapid progress of a conservative movement for the restoration of religion, monarchy, and peace. The writer's statements are amply confirmed in an abstract, made by or for Lord Grenville, of speeches in the French Convention, and reports of British diplomatic agents.<sup>3</sup> The comments on these reports, as well as Grenville's minute, dated April 23, of a conference with Count Wedel,<sup>4</sup> Danish Minister in London, testify to his firm conviction that the provisional government dragging out a precarious existence in Paris, could not possibly continue the war. French and English accounts bear witness alike to the ascendancy of Siéyès in the French Convention.

Two of the circumstances which told fatally against the success of the unfortunate expedition to Quiberon Bay in June 1795, are clearly brought out in the correspondence; (1) a general disinclination of continental governments to allow facilities for the enrolling of regiments of French *émigrés*; and (2) the long detention of Count de Puisaye in London while the Ministry considered his proposals, a main cause of the submission of the Royalist Chiefs at La Jaunaye in February 1795. Notwithstanding an urgent request from the Cabinet, the King refused to set an example to other German Sovereigns by allowing a dépôt for French recruits to be formed in Hanover; and would only consent

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 33, 45.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 70, 89.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 62, 80.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 58.

to Count d'Artois's sojourn there for a very limited time.<sup>1</sup> An abstract of numerous letters addressed by the Chouan chiefs to Puisaye during the winter of 1794-5, insisting on the need of immediate succours from England, and of his own return to Brittany, is included in the *Addenda*.<sup>2</sup> When accounts arrived early in July of the occupation of Quiberon peninsula by Puisaye's small force, and the good dispositions of the Chouans, Pitt determined to send nearly 20,000 British troops, under the command of Lord Moira, to support the French insurgents. A British ship of war brought Count d'Artois from the Elbe to Spithead to join the expedition.<sup>3</sup> Later news of Puisaye's defeat retarded the naval and military preparations; and the peace concluded at Basle between France and Spain caused the enterprise to be abandoned. Lord Buckingham was at this time quartered at Southsea with his regiment of militia. Several of his letters to Grenville during the month of August are almost exclusively concerned with the situation of the French prince, who, in order to avoid arrest for debt, lived on shipboard for several weeks in a painful state of suspense and discomfort, until the Cabinet despatched him and the French regiments which had escaped from Quiberon, to join Count de Charette in La Vendée.<sup>4</sup> General Doyle accompanied Artois with 4,000 British troops to protect his disembarkation on the coast of Poitou.

A long and interesting report by Baron de Nantiat, who was sent by Lord Grenville early in July on a mission to Charette and did not return until after Artois's departure from England, exposes frankly the wants, plans, and sentiments of the great royalist chief, at this critical period of his career.<sup>5</sup>

These expeditions, projected or actually undertaken, formed part of a general plan of operations, which also embraced the eastern provinces of France, under the superintendence of Mr. Wickham, British Minister in Switzerland. Wickham's efforts, involving a profuse expenditure of money, had a two-fold object; to raise the strength of the Prince of Condé's army on the upper Rhine by drawing into its ranks, from the interior of France, Republican soldiers who had disbanded for want of pay; and then to use this force and the Austrian army to which it

<sup>1</sup> II. p. 645.<sup>2</sup> III. p. 536.<sup>3</sup> III. p. 89.<sup>4</sup> III. pp. 93-103.<sup>5</sup> III. p. 105.

was attached, for the encouragement and support of royalist insurrections, having their centre at Lyons. According to his own reports, the whole scheme failed; the second part mainly, as appears by his letters, dated August 4 and 12, and September 6 and 7, from want of co-operation by the Austrian generals. Sir Morton Eden's letters from Vienna, dated May 4 and August 26; Grenville's letters to the King, dated July 26 and September 9; and particularly Mr. Drake's "secret and confidential" report from Italy, dated August 28, throw additional light on the inaction of the Austrian armies during the whole summer of 1795.<sup>1</sup>

Lord Grenville's correspondence shows that the political state of the Dutch Republic also occupied much of the attention of the Ministry during the year 1795. A compact entered into with the Prince of Orange in February, soon after his flight to England, having for its object the rendering up of ships and fortresses still acknowledging his authority to British officers,<sup>2</sup> may not improbably have facilitated the acquisition by Great Britain of valuable Dutch colonies in South Africa and the Eastern seas. In the same month Lord Grenville sent Count Charles Bentinck on a secret mission to Holland, with instructions to keep alive a spirit of resistance in the Orange party by discreet assurances of help whenever it could be given with effect.<sup>3</sup> M. Fagel, who had been Greffier under the Orange Government, accompanied Bentinck to Hamburg. Finding there that they could not proceed to the Hague without personal danger, they retired to Varel, in Oldenburg, where they seem to have enjoyed ample opportunities of corresponding freely with their friends in the Dutch provinces. Their reports, especially those of Fagel, afford much information, no doubt of a partizan character, of the condition of the Dutch under the democratic institutions they had borrowed from France. A large part of the army and navy of the Republic had remained faithful to the House of Orange, and refused to serve new masters. In the course of the summer a plan was formed to assemble the disbanded troops at Osnaburg, in British pay, and hold them ready to march into the Provinces whenever the course of events proved favourable to a counter

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<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 67, 92-104, 129-133.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 26.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 4, 9, 16, 19.

revolution. A letter of the Prince of Orange, dated July 22, asking the co-operation of the King of Prussia, and the King's reply condemning the project as a violation of the treaty of Basle, to which Hanover owed its present security, are included in the correspondence.<sup>1</sup> Under strong pressure from Berlin, George III., as sovereign of Hanover, engaged in September to remove all foreign troops from the Electorate, and conform strictly to the treaty of Basle.<sup>2</sup> Fagel retired to Switzerland in the spring of 1796. Bentinck remained at Varel, carrying on political intrigues, and sending reports of them to Grenville, until the treaty of Loeben in 1797 closed for a time all prospect of foreign intervention on behalf of the House of Orange.<sup>3</sup>

Most of the King's letters during the last months of 1794, and the first months of 1795, are concerned with preliminary arrangements for the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the Princess Caroline of Brunswick, whose journey to England under the care of Lord Malmesbury was much retarded by the French conquest of Holland. In November 1795, the Hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg became a suitor for one of the King's daughters, but, judging from George III's first letter on the subject, with little prospect of success.<sup>4</sup> The prince's perseverance, however, gradually surmounted all the obstacles raised by his Majesty's dislike of the alliance, and the marriage was celebrated in the spring of 1797. The King peremptorily rejected the addresses of the Duke of Ostrogothia, who aspired to the hand of another English princess.<sup>5</sup>

In September 1795, the correspondence begins for the first time to betray signs of discouragement in regard to the prosecution of the war, and a sense of the expediency of making peace if peace could be obtained on honourable and advantageous terms. Indications of this disposition may be found in the Duke of Portland's letter to Grenville, dated September 23; Windham's letter of October 11; Pitt's letters of October 16 and 18; and an undated letter of Mornington, in reference to the new French constitution.<sup>6</sup> Pitt's letters just cited conveyed to Grenville a decision come to by him self and Dundas, to recall from Isle Dieu the forces of General Doyle and Admiral Harvey,

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 91, 94.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 148.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 318, 319.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 147.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 290.

<sup>6</sup> III. pp. 135-141, 149.

which had retired thither after an ineffectual attempt to land Artois on the French coast. They show that he had made up his mind on three points ; (1) not to allow the cause of the French monarchy to stand in the way of negotiation for peace ; (2) not to risk British troops in aiding French Royalists ; but, (3) in answer apparently to Windham's vigorous protest of October 11, to supply the royalist insurgents, so long as war lasted, with arms, clothing, ammunition and money. It appears, however, from a later letter of Pitt, dated January 3, 1796, that the supplies thus promised could not be conveyed during the winter months to Charette, then in extreme need of them.<sup>1</sup> It is also clear from Windham's letter, dated February 18, 1796, that the engagement was allowed to remain a dead letter in regard to all the other insurgent chiefs, until his spirited remonstrances, with which Grenville expressed full concurrence, produced some tardy attempts at performance.<sup>2</sup> Detailed accounts of British expenditure under this head of service may be found in Windham's letters to Pitt, dated September 2, and November 15, 1797.<sup>3</sup> The military efforts of Great Britain were now apparently concentrated upon conquests in the West Indies, particularly of St. Domingo, of which France had obtained entire possession by her treaty with Spain.

Lord Buckingham's letters in November refer, in a lighter vein than might be expected from an alarmist, to riots in London, and feeble opposition in the Legislature to repressive measures introduced by Government.<sup>4</sup>

In December, M. Regnier sent Grenville a report on French affairs, containing short accounts of the Directors and their principal Ministers, who formed the executive government of France under the constitution of the year III.<sup>5</sup>

George III. rejoiced in Marshal Clairfait's victories over the French Generals Pichégu and Jourdan in the autumn and winter of 1795, as fortifying his argument that Great Britain should not think of peace until France had been reduced to submission.<sup>6</sup> But, much against his will, the Cabinet at the end of January 1796, entered upon a series of negotiations extending over nearly two years, with the view of bringing the war to a close on favourable terms, or convincing the nation that such

<sup>1</sup> III. p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 174.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 362, 392.

<sup>4</sup> III. pp. 144-146.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 159.

<sup>6</sup> III. pp. 143, 149.

terms could only be won by persevering in it. Lord Grenville's scheme of pacification, submitted in outline to the King on February 9, seems to have embraced three main proposals: (1) to purchase the co-operation, or at least the armed mediation of the King of Prussia, by an agreement to hand over to him at the end of the war certain Westphalian bishoprics and the Austrian Netherlands; (2) to reconcile the Emperor to this aggrandizement of a dangerous rival by allowing him to add Bavaria to his hereditary dominions; (3) an overture to the Directory, through Wickham and Barthélemy, the English and French Ministers at Berne, for the holding of a Congress to discuss terms of peace. The King condemned the project as "immoral and unjustifiable," and only yielded reluctantly to the advice of his Cabinet.<sup>1</sup> But the preliminary hints of British diplomacy receiving little encouragement in either of the German capitals, and the proposal for a Congress being rejected at Paris in terms which George III. considered "insolent," the whole scheme was laid aside for a time.

Lord Elgin's confidential letters from Berlin as British Minister during the years 1796 and 1797 give us pictures of the governing influences and unstable policy of the Prussian Court not less curious and discreditable than those contributed by his predecessors, Lord Malmesbury and Sir Morton Eden.

The increasing difficulties Pitt had to encounter in providing money for carrying on the war, which formed no doubt the main motive for Grenville's negotiations, are brought clearly to view in the correspondence for 1796. It appears from a letter of Count Starhemberg, dated April 12, that the British Treasury could not arrange for a new loan, of which Austria stood in absolute need.<sup>2</sup> This failure was particularly unfortunate because, as Wickham's letters from Fribourg and Berne, dated April 30 and June 15, indicate, Bonaparte's astonishing victories in Italy had already begun to alter the whole military and political situation in favour of France.<sup>3</sup> Among other bad consequences they seem, by exciting suspicions, expressed in Grenville's letter to Sir Morton Eden of May 24 and Pitt's letter to Grenville of June 23,<sup>4</sup> that Austria would make a separate peace, sacrificing the

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 173, 174, 278, 311, 327.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 197, 212.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 192.

<sup>4</sup> III. pp. 206, 214.



Netherlands to save Lombardy, to have delayed the monthly advances from the British exchequer, in anticipation of an Austrian loan, on which the Emperor chiefly depended for the pay of his armies. It would also appear from Eden's reply that Baron Thugut was disposed to reciprocate Pitt's want of confidence in his intentions; and Wickham's letter of July 19 represented the French princes and their agents as actuated by deep distrust of the British Government.<sup>1</sup> Pitt, in his letter just cited, informed Grenville that, so far as he could see, "any idea of our enabling Austria to act with effect beyond the present year is out of the question. In this "situation" he continued "it would be inexcusable not to try "any chance that can be tried, honourably and safely, to set "on foot some decent plan of pacification." On July 29, Grenville, in the name of the Cabinet, again brought his scheme for dictating terms to the French Government before the King in a more definite and complete form, and asked authority to send Mr. Hammond, his Under Secretary, to Berlin and Vienna, in order to discuss it with the Prussian and Austrian Governments. The King repeated his objections with more method and detail, and equal emphasis. Pitt and Grenville replied that the safety of England required the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands, which could only be effected by the co-operation of Prussia and Austria; and that the union of these powers could only be procured by the inducements which the Cabinet proposed to offer. Having summoned the two Ministers to confer with him at Windsor, the King again gave way.<sup>2</sup> In adopting the "Italian politics" so distasteful to his sovereign, Grenville seems to have been more or less influenced by Robert or Gouverneur Morris, who figures prominently in the French bulletins of Volume II., as Minister of the United States of America in Paris. Morris, according to information which Count Woronzow and Bland Burges derived from conversations with him, and conveyed to Grenville in letters, dated June 21 and 28, 1795,<sup>3</sup> having been recalled from Paris at the request of the French Government, came to England with feelings of hatred for the French Revolution, and sympathy for Great Britain as the chief bulwark of civilization.

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<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 208, 223.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 227, 230.

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 78, 87.

Through Burges, then Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, he sought an interview with Grenville, in order to give confidential information in regard to the situation of the French Government and the means of frustrating its designs.<sup>1</sup> In the summer of 1796 he went to Germany, apparently for the purpose of ventilating political ideas intended to promote the aims and interests of England, and combat those of France. And he communicated with Grenville from the various capitals where he sojourned in a series of anonymous letters. These letters are very curious and interesting, as well on account of the power of keen observation they display, as for reports of discussions with leading statesmen, and sweeping plans of territorial redistribution, evolved with all the freedom of irresponsibility, but often anticipating changes since accomplished or attempted.<sup>2</sup> In forwarding the first of them from Berlin, on July 28, Lord Elgin reported that Morris was listened to with deep attention and interest by Count Haugwitz and the foreign ministers at the Prussian Court; and expressed a hope that Morris "had authority to speak in behalf of England." Grenville writing on August 23 to Hammond, then on his way to Berlin, recommended him to show "attention and a proper degree of confidence" to Morris, whose ideas were "not wholly dissimilar to those on which we "are acting, though carried into a much wider field of speculation than I should like to see opened."<sup>3</sup> Morris, it may be noticed, in re-arranging the map of Europe, gave Hanover to Prussia, and the Austrian Netherlands to Great Britain.<sup>4</sup> Hammond's mission failed, though supported by the "indirect menaces" of Catherine II. Count Haugwitz having, as afterwards appeared, come to a secret arrangement with the French Directory, treated the British envoy with rudeness, and the latter left Berlin abruptly without awaiting further orders from home.<sup>5</sup>

On September 2, Lord Grenville, with the King's consent, applied to the French Directory through the Danish Minister in London, for a passport authorising a British diplomatist to go to Paris, in order to discuss terms of peace.<sup>6</sup> The instructions

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<sup>1</sup> III. p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 22, 224, 230, 258, 266.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 238.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 224.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 249.

<sup>6</sup> III. p. 239.

by which the envoy was to regulate his proceedings form part of the correspondence. The King considered the answer returned from Paris too discourteous to admit of further parley; but the Cabinet, in order to prevent mis-representation, as Grenville explained, repeated the application by the bearer of a flag of truce.<sup>1</sup> The demand thus made being complied with, Lord Malmesbury went to Paris as British Plenipotentiary in the middle of October, accompanied by Mr. George Ellis as his confidential adviser.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime a confidential despatch from Baron Thugut to Count Starhemberg, dated September 10, announced that the Empress of Russia had consented to place 60,000 troops in the field against France, on condition of receiving a subsidy from Great Britain about equal in amount to that paid to Prussia in 1794.<sup>3</sup> In this state paper the Imperial Chancellor marshalled with great skill the arguments calculated to bring the British Government into an arrangement on which he felt that all hope of an advantageous peace depended. But he insisted that it should not entail any diminution of the monthly advances which alone enabled the Emperor to keep his armies on foot. Pitt could not undertake to provide more than three millions sterling altogether for Austria and Russia, in the coming year. The Cabinet, however, with the King's consent, offered to transfer to the Empress Catherine the sovereignty of Corsica, and thus give her what she had long coveted, a naval station in the Mediterranean.<sup>4</sup> Her sudden death in November put an end to warlike projects which found no favour with her successor.

The brilliant successes of the Archduke Charles in Germany during the autumn, and a temporary check suffered by Bonaparte in Italy, raised the spirits of the allies. But Pitt's announcement, through Sir Morton Eden, of a diminution of the pecuniary help he had been affording to the Austrian Government was received with the utmost consternation at Vienna. In November, Thugut instructed Starhemberg to insist on monthly payments of 200,000*l.* from December 1, 1796, with an additional 400,000*l.* for the month of January 1797, in anticipation of an Austrian loan of 4,500,000*l.* as absolutely required to enable the

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<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 255, 256.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 246.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 259.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 261.

Emperor to open and support another campaign.<sup>1</sup> Pitt appears from the subsequent correspondence to have been desirous of supplying Austrian needs; but the embarrassments of the Bank of England tied his hands; and although the Loyalty Loan enabled him to send 300,000*l.* to Vienna in January,<sup>2</sup> it was not till April 4, 1797, that Grenville found himself in a position to give Baron Thugut anything like positive assurance of further aid.<sup>3</sup>

The slow course of Lord Malmesbury's negotiation at Paris, clearly foreshadowed in the terms of Lord Grenville's instructions, may be traced in the correspondence for the last quarter of 1796. Writing to Pitt and Grenville on November 28, Malmesbury brought the business to a point.<sup>4</sup> It had become necessary, he stated, to send him the project of a treaty, and to specify the articles on which he must insist. If the allies allowed France to retain Belgium, he anticipated little difficulty in coming to an agreement. The project returned by Grenville denying this concession, the French Government sent Malmesbury his passports in the middle of December. Grenville seems to have hoped that the Loyalty Loan would cow the Directors.<sup>5</sup> But they appear to have been much more influenced by the death of Catherine II., and a declaration of war by Spain against Great Britain, announced to Parliament by a royal message on December 12. Letters from the King and Pitt at the end of that month compliment Grenville very highly on his able defence of the conduct of the Government in an official manifesto, and a speech in the House of Lords.<sup>6</sup>

In January 1797 the tortuous policy of Count Haugwitz seems to have revived hopes that Prussia might be lured back into a coalition against France. Every expectation of this kind, however, vanished in March, when Lord Elgin transmitted from Berlin a copy of the secret treaty concluded between the French and Prussian Governments in August 1796.<sup>7</sup>

Bonaparte's victories in the Tyrol and descent into Carinthia, having reduced Austria to extremity, the King authorised Lord Grenville on April 10 to despatch Mr. Hammond on another mission to Vienna. Hammond was instructed to propose a joint

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 270, 271.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 297.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 308.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 279.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 282.

<sup>6</sup> III. p. 290.

<sup>7</sup> III. p. 306.

appeal to the Emperor of Russia, to intervene for the restoration of peace; and also to take part as colleague of Sir Morton Eden in any negotiation which the approach of the French army to the Austrian capital might compel the Emperor Francis II. to open.<sup>1</sup> Before Hammond landed at Cuxhaven, Bonaparte had signed the preliminary treaty of Loeben with Count Meerfeldt and M. de Gallo. An interesting letter from Count Razoumoukoi, Russian Minister at Vienna, to Count Woronzow in London, gives some curious particulars relating to this event.<sup>2</sup> The reticence of Baron Thugut in regard to the terms of the treaty, and his subsequent postponement of any arrangement for repaying the Austrian debt to Great Britain, ruptured for a time the close and more or less cordial relations that had existed for four years between the British and Austrian Governments.

Final discussion in regard to the conditions of a general peace had been relegated by the treaty of Loeben to a conference at Berne, open to the allies of the contracting powers. The British Government, however, being now released from obligations to Austria which had hampered negotiation in the autumn of 1796, preferred making another direct and separate overture for peace to the French Directory. In a letter dated June 1, the King expressed in confidence to Grenville his painful sense of the national humiliation involved in this step.<sup>3</sup> The answer returned by De la Croix, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, had a highly provocative tone. On June 16, Grenville informed the King that he found himself unable to concur in a second communication to the Directory approved by his colleagues, considering it deficient in spirit; but that his obligations to the Crown did not permit him to quit office in the dangerous crisis through which the kingdom was passing.<sup>4</sup> He referred more particularly to the mutiny of the Nore. The correspondence shows that in June Admiral Duncan had only two ships of war left to watch a powerful Dutch armament in the Texel, until, at Lord Grenville's request, Count Woronzow assumed the responsibility of ordering the admiral in command of a Russian squadron in the North Sea, which had been recalled to the Baltic, to defer his departure, and rejoin Duncan.<sup>5</sup> A sympathetic note from the King enjoined Grenville to remain at his post to direct the

<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 310, 311.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 318.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 327.

<sup>4</sup> III. p. 329.

<sup>5</sup> III. pp. 329, 335.

negotiation with France<sup>1</sup>; and explanations of a conciliatory character having been received from Paris, Lord Malmesbury repaired early in July to Lille, to confer with M.M. Letourneur, Pleville, and Maret, representing the French Republic. Confidential documents relating to the negotiations at Lille, now published for the first time, are of extraordinary interest, revealing clearly the strange conditions and the various channels, one public and two secret, through which those negotiations were carried on.<sup>2</sup> Two members of the Directory, Carnot and Barthélemy, supported by a large majority of the Legislative Councils, and the ardent wishes of France, desired peace. The three remaining Directors, Barras, Rewbell, and Lepaux, forming an ultra-Jacobin and ruling majority, and De la Croix, Minister for Foreign Affairs, only sought for a plausible pretext, which they hoped to find in the British demands, to continue the war. France having been aggrandised by the acquisition of the Austrian Netherlands and other territory in Germany and Italy, the British Government, taking its stand on the ground of compensations, demanded that Great Britain should be indemnified by the cession of Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, Cochin, and Trinidad, her conquests from the Dutch and Spaniards. De la Croix replied that the Directory had pledged itself not to surrender Dutch Colonies without the consent of the Dutch Government; and consent being refused, the public conferences at Lille came to a dead-lock. In this emergency, Maret, acting in concert with Carnot and Barthélemy, and as he thought with Talleyrand, who now replaced De la Croix at the French Foreign Office, arrived at a private understanding with Malmesbury that they should work together in concert to make peace on terms which France and England could honourably accept.<sup>3</sup> Maret promised on behalf of his political friends that pressure should be used at the Hague to bring the Dutch to a more compliant mood. In order to guide their action in this respect, he sought to learn in confidence from Malmesbury how far the British Government would relax its demands. At the same time he avowed that the strength and efficiency of French pressure at the Hague would depend on the issue of the conflict then waging between the Jacobin Directors and the majority of the Legislative Councils. In these circumstances, all the parties

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<sup>1</sup> III. p. 330.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 336, *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> III. pp. 339, 345.

concerned seem to have come to a tacit agreement to mark time at Lille, until the struggle in Paris was decided. Full particulars of these secret transactions are contained in minutes of intelligence brought from Lille by Mr. Wesley and Lord Granville Leveson, members of Lord Malmesbury's embassy; and in letters of Malmesbury, Grenville, and Canning, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Foreign Office. The confidential communications from Lille, in which the Frenchmen concerned are designated by false names, were, with the King's sanction, read only by Pitt and Grenville<sup>1</sup>—of the leading Ministers; despatches merely recording the formal proceedings of the plenipotentiaries being circulated by Canning among the other members of the Cabinet. The *coup d'état* by which Barras and his friends re-established a Revolutionary government early in September while retaining the forms of the French constitution, brought this second stage of the negotiations to an end. The Directory recalled Maret and his colleagues from Lille; and, through two new representatives, MM. Treilhard and Bonnier, repudiated the basis of compensations hitherto accepted, and required Lord Malmesbury to return to London for authority to agree to a full and unconditional restitution of British conquests. Malmesbury's reply, drafted by Lord Grenville, refused to resume negotiations with a power which did not observe the usages of civilised nations.<sup>2</sup> Talleyrand, who adhered to Barras, appears to have played a double part in the proceedings at Lille.

But the high-handed action of the French executive seems to have been partly intended to screen a corrupt overture to Pitt. An American gentleman named Melville arrived at Lille in August, and proceeded thence to Holwood, as bearer of an offer from the Director Barras to sign a treaty satisfactory to Great Britain, in consideration of a secret payment of 450,000*l.*, to be made after ratifications had been exchanged. Lord Malmesbury at first gave no credit to Melville, but Pitt saw grounds for considering the proposal authentic; and having consulted Dundas and Grenville, he wrote to the King on September 6 for permission to entertain it. His letter suggested that the money required might be taken, without danger of publicity, from the revenues of India and the Secret

<sup>1</sup> III. p. 344.

<sup>2</sup> III. p. 376.

Service Fund, and that the business of concluding and carrying through the bargain on the terms stipulated should be committed to Lord Malmesbury.<sup>1</sup> These secret communications seem to have been interrupted by Malmesbury's return to London in September, and Melville's return to Paris, later in the same month. But they were resumed on a somewhat different basis in October, by means of a letter from Boyd, a well-known banker, to Dundas. Grenville appears to have avoided taking any active part in them, and his letter to Pitt, dated October 8, shows that he concurred in them with great reluctance and misgiving. The affair fell through, as may be gathered from Pitt's letter to Grenville of October 18, in consequence of failure on the part of the French agents concerned in it to satisfy the requirements of the British Government; namely, clear proof of the authenticity of the proposal, and such a public declaration by the Directory as would enable Lord Malmesbury to return without discredit to Lille, where M.M. Treilhard and Bonnier still awaited him.<sup>2</sup>

A financial minute of Pitt, dated October 25, estimates prospectively the annual supply and expenditure for four years more of war; and shows strong faith in the efficacy of his Sinking Fund to prevent the growth of the National Debt.<sup>3</sup>

Letters from Mr. Pelham and Lord Camden, dated November 2 and 3, appear to have been written in anticipation of hostile motions in the British Parliament on the subject of military outrage in Ireland.<sup>4</sup>

On being fully apprized of the victory of the war party in Paris, the Austrian Government hastened to terminate its differences with the Directory by the treaty of Udine or Campo Formio. Interesting observations on this pacification, the relations of Austria and Great Britain, and the prospects of the Triple Alliance, may be found in a letter from Count Razoumousskoi to Count Woronzow, dated November 1.<sup>5</sup> In the same month Frederick William II., King of Prussia, died. A letter from Lord Elgin, dated December 10, and letters from George III., dated December 23 and 24, give views of the interior of the Prussian Court under the altered conditions of a

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<sup>1</sup> III. p. 369.

<sup>2</sup> III. pp. 378-381.

<sup>3</sup> III. p. 382.

<sup>4</sup> III. pp. 385, 386.

<sup>5</sup> III. p. 395.



new and virtuous reign.<sup>1</sup> But sanguine expectations of the British Government that the reputed influence of the Duke of Brunswick with the young King might be used effectually to restore the alliance of England and Prussia proved groundless. The language of Frederick William III. was patriotic and high-minded; but the direction of Prussian policy remained in the hands of Count Haugwitz.

The report upon these papers has been prepared, and the introduction has been written, by Mr. Walter FitzPatrick, who also edited the first volume on the Grenville collection issued by the Commissioners.

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<sup>1</sup> III. pp. 402, 405, 406.

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# THE MANUSCRIPTS OF J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE, PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

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## VOL. III.

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W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 1, London.—“The time for preparation is slipping away very fast; and after some examples that we have seen, we have no reason to hope that the opportunities of repairing what may now be lost will be numerous or long continued. If we wait for the conclusion of these necessarily tedious negotiations with the Court of Vienna, on a subject too where they are not pressed to decision by any very strong wish or necessity, we shall lose the season for raising any considerable force under the Prince of Condé on that side of France.

“My idea is that we should directly send a M. D'Artez, who is here and has been long marked out for the station we are speaking of both by the Duc D'Harcourt and others, with a commission to the Prince de Condé empowering him immediately to raise a regiment, naming the officers himself, and giving to M. D'Artez, who is already known to him, such commission as he may think fit, and as his former rank in the army may entitle him to. I would then send M. Lambertye, whom his Majesty has been graciously pleased to favour us with, to concert with Wyndham at Florence about raising a regiment in those parts; and if any place besides the dominions of the King of Sardinia can be found as a *dépôt* for that regiment, would send the Marquis de Miran to Turin to open there a rendezvous for all the well affected who either are already out of the country, or may be drawn from the provinces in that neighbourhood. There is every reason to hasten these measures, not only because the time now remaining to us is barely sufficient for the purpose, but because the effects of the present milder system will be to call back many into France who might be well contented still to remain out if they were furnished with the means of subsistence. My reason for proposing the Marquis de Miran is that he commanded in Provence for 15 years ending with the Revolution, and gave, in the last crisis, the most distinguished proofs of zeal and good conduct. This consideration is sufficient for giving him a preference over others that may have been on the Duc D'Harcourt's list, and for departing from a rule hitherto not uniformly observed, and certainly not necessary to be observed, of excluding from the command of regiments all above the rank of *Maréchal de Camp*. If there should be any objection to giving the corps to M. de Miran, he might be stationed at Turin as Lieutenant General to superintend the formation of M. Lambertye's corps, and any other corps that it might be found practicable and expedient to raise there. M. Lambertye too, who makes more difficulties than he ought to do considering his good fortune in getting a corps at all, may be sent with letters to the Prince de Condé, desiring the Prince either to keep M. Lambertye with him, and to send an officer of his own into Italy, or to let M. Lambertye go on as proposed, and keep his own officer for the quarter nearest him. Some

measures of this sort are absolutely and immediately necessary. For besides that we must have the force, Italy is in the most immediate danger, being so completely defenceless that there is nothing, I apprehend, to prevent the merest handful of French that should once pass the frontier from marching to the further extremity. The emigrant French, now dispersed in Italy, are in perfect despair on that account, and are driven by that despair to join in a wish which nothing else could dictate, namely a wish for peace. At the same time that that country may certainly, under proper management, be made to yield great means, not only for its own defence, but for that which may be very necessary for general success, offensive operations on that side of France. The first step is to begin raising there some force in our pay, and I know of no better way of doing so than those which I have pointed out. I reflect with great regret, and some shame, that steps for this purpose have not been taken sooner. One idea by the way occurs to me at this moment not unworthy of being considered, namely the landing there the Duke de FitzJames, with his officers, and possibly even another of the Franco-Irish regiments who have, I fear, but little prospect of speedy success in Ireland, and who would not find the same ill-dispositions towards them that may be apprehended in some parts of Italy against the emigrants. No objection would probably be made to them in the Pope's States; and we need have no jealousy of them, any more than the Corsicans would have if employed, where they will be sufficiently wanted, for the defence of Corsica.

"This is connected with the question of more direct communication with the Pope, which I cannot but wish to see effected, and speedily, though possibly not through the medium of the person who has so earnestly recommended it. Why should not Frederick North in his way to Corsica be directed to pass through Rome, with some letters of civility to the Pope? It will be a good opening of communication, and connected with the idea of it which you entertain.

"At all events I would send two of the Irish Colonels to fill up their regiments with French, Italians, and Corsicans, instead of attempting only to fill them up, as I fear will be the case, with Irish, whom they cannot get either without encroaching upon the success of other corps."

*Postscript.*—"I wish you would concert with Mr. Pitt a short letter to be sent to the coalition in Normandy by a person whom I have here ready to go, and who waits only for these credentials. A general assurance vouching for the person, and quieting them as to any views of conquest, is all that is wanted."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 3, [Stowe].—"I have purposely avoided of late correspondence with you upon political subjects, from the apprehension of any misconception which might make our situation even more painful than it has yet been; and your letter of yesterday has shewn me the necessity for that precaution; as nothing but the strongest misconception could have induced you to offer to me a picture so humiliating and so disgraceful as that which you have drawn for me, when you suppose me to have offered (by my last letter to my brother) to Mr. Pitt *the alternative either to share his measures, and to become responsible for them with him, or, to take at the same moment a line directly hostile to them.* I have not kept a copy of that letter; but upon revising it, you will see that the proposition is of two distinct parts; the first a wish to know whether there existed

an inclination, or even a possibility of enabling me to co-operate in the King's service in the Cabinet; and the second, a declaration, which I think I can give from recollection nearly in the words of the letter, that *if this proposition could be entertained, I am ready to come to town to receive from Mr. Pitt the communication of his measures of which I know nothing.* If I have stated this fairly, you will judge of the feelings with which I read from you a statement so widely different from what I meant to convey. I will repeat it in a few words. I felt myself disavowed by Mr. Pitt's arrangements and yours respecting Ireland; I am assured no such thing was meant; I persisted in my opinion of the impression respecting this transaction; and, notwithstanding your assurances, *I know* that I am well founded in this opinion. Mr. Pitt's letter and yours rejected one part of an idea calculated to remove this impression, and leant to the other, which I have declined, considering it so insignificant that it could not answer that purpose. The arguments in these letters for rejecting the provision for my son did not apply to a proof of consideration, or of the King's countenance, not beneficial from pecuniary objects. Any proof of that sort is in itself a *measure* calculated to remove impressions, arising from the Irish *measure* of which I complain. I held myself bound by considerations of affection, of habits, and of the public situation of the country, to endeavour to meet any disposition to remove from my mind the load which has been thrown upon it; and, with this view, I opened in my letter to Mr. Grenville an idea which could give me no profit, no power, no patronage, but much of everything that I disliked; and, in case the general idea could be entertained, I offered to come to town in order to learn and consider the measures to which I should be supposed and bound to accede in accepting such a situation. It is possible that upon this part of the explanation I must have separated and relinquished the idea; but I knew that one step would be clearly gained that would facilitate my union with Government, I mean the countenance it would give to my government and conduct in Ireland. It was also possible that the measures both respecting the great external and internal difficulties of this kingdom, and respecting Ireland, might have been such as I could accede to; and, in that case, much of the impressions which have arisen of the unkindness and disavowal marked to me (for upon this I am as well informed as you can be) by Mr. Pitt and you would have been done away. Such have been my impressions, and such the motives which dictated that letter. I saw many reasons which might defeat it; but I did not foresee in any answer from you a statement so injurious and degrading to me. It is not probable that Mr. Pitt should see the political difficulties to this idea less strongly than you do; and I cannot expect him to think more favourably of my conduct and of my character; and I therefore perfectly agree with you in thinking it useless to open this idea to him. But as your letter refers me to the stand made by Mr. Pitt and you in the course of that Irish negotiation against a particular demand as a proof of his and your consideration for me, I must protest most explicitly against this being urged to me in that point of view. Had it been so stated to me at the time, I should have claimed it as a right that it should not be considered (singly and by itself) upon this ground. And I must remind you what must be my impressions from the proofs now lying before me that this compact for, what I term, the surrender of Ireland to the Duke of Portland, and for the measures which disavow so grossly my conduct and government, was made above twelve months since; from the recollection that the only communication which I have had either

with Mr. Pitt or you upon this subject arose from a conversation which I forced upon him in the second week of October, and from a letter to Mr. Pitt of the 13th October, which remained unanswered for nine weeks, while he completed the whole of this measure.

"At some future time these reflections will, I am persuaded, severely pain you; but I sincerely hope you will not feel one half the misery which I feel of every description, from the cruel and unworthy treatment which I have received; but, till that time arrives, I feel that I have lost the affections of a brother whom I loved as myself."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 5.—"Mr. C. Bentinck proposes to take the first opportunity the thaw affords for going by the Elbe to his brother's estates in Germany, to learn from thence whether he can enter with safety the United Provinces and join his brother at the Hague, with the view of concerting such measures as may tend ultimately to rescue the United Provinces from their present state of subjection, and restore to them their antient and independent form of Government as re-established in 1787.

"That from his certain knowledge of the good dispositions of very many, and of the determination of his own family to avail themselves of every circumstance to re-establish the Government, he conceives that the arrival of such a person as himself, countenanced and avowed as he is known to have been by this Government, might be a great means of keeping all the friends and adherents of the House of Orange united; of even procuring them the additional support of the old aristocratic anti-Stadholderian party; of preventing any premature and inconsiderate attempts for their emancipation; his apprehensions being much greater on that side, than his opinion of their patience to wait for the proper occasion. He thinks it may be the means, at the same time, of transmitting correct and confidential information of the state of things and persons, as well French as Dutch, in that country.

"For the attainment of this object it seems desirable that he should have an authority in writing to assure the friends of the system meant to be supported of the readiness of this Government to co-operate in carrying into effect any well concerted plan of measures for that purpose. And should those operations be *completely* successful, and in that case *only*, he trusts he shall not be disavowed should their accomplishment have been purchased by engagements to the amount of from ten to twenty thousand pounds, or even any greater extent to secure that work.

"That the object of his journey is of so delicate a nature, and *may* involve so many of his friends in the greatest difficulties and personal danger if it is not kept a profound secret, that he wishes it not to be known to any, *without exception whatever, but* his Majesty and his Ministers that he has had any communication on the subject with those in power on this side the water; that he cannot insist too much and too strongly on this point, and on his journey *passing off* as an inconsiderate or ill-advised step, taken contrary to the wish of his friends; that secrecy is so much more necessary that it may be advisable for the execution of the plan for him to remain to all appearance quite inactive at the Hague, or perhaps even at his brother's house in the north of Germany, without perhaps being heard of for some months, and to all appearance seem entirely to have forgot that he has been in England; that, whilst he is absent, he will hear with more satisfaction, at least

for the present, that he seems forgot here, than of any praises that may be given him for his zeal, as too many expressions of that sort might render him perfectly unable to be of any service under the present circumstances.

“Should his plan meet with support, upon his receiving the necessary authority he will take the earliest opportunity the breaking of the frost will admit of to set out on his journey. Mr. Bentinck cannot help repeating his wish that the secret might remain (unless the enterprise is attended with success) with Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, and the Duke of Portland; as his plan does not commit the ministers concerned, and binds them to no one point unless attended with complete success. This last point, however, Mr. Bentinck must leave to the wisdom and discretion of the three persons above mentioned, to whom he submits this project.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1795, January 5, Dover Street.—“You will see in the last letters from Sir Morton Eden that the state of the Austrian arrangements with the Prince of Condé seems to put his passing into the King’s service entirely out of the question, especially as in his letter to the Duke D’Harcourt he states the impossibility of his taking any such step except with the Emperor’s consent.

“I have some doubts whether, in the present state of Italy, either M. Miran or M. Lambertye could succeed in raising French corps there, and whether we ought to incur the expense of making levies there where we never could turn them to any account, so at least as to enable them to act with any British force. These, however, are only doubts, and if yourself and those of the King’s other servants to whom the consideration of this subject more immediately belongs, are of a different opinion, no exertions of mine shall be wanting to forward the measure.

“If it is found that the Irish Brigades cannot be raised in Ireland, it seems that it would certainly be an advisable measure to send one or more of them to Italy with a view to their being employed in Corsica, which would not be liable to the same objections as might arise against the employing *there* persons who were *merely* French emigrants.

“If there is no inconvenience in sending Frederick North through Rome I will write by him to Cardinal Zelada, and he may judge on the spot whether anything can be done there from which benefit can be derived.”

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 6, Windsor.—“I am fearful of giving any fresh directions to Lord Grenville as to the journey of the Princess Caroline of Brunswick lest they should occasion some difficulty, and think therefore, as by the arrangements taken by General Walmoden and Lieutenant General Harcourt some decisive step can soon be taken, it may be better not to give any positive directions for a change of route; but Lord Grenville may consult Lord St. Helens whether, if the enemy should succeed in keeping possession of the Waal, it would be possible at this season of the year for the Princess to go from Osnabruck to Embden, in which case he should send notice of it to Lord Malmesbury; and Commodore Payne should have notice to remove from the Texel to Embden.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, January 11, Dover Street.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to inform your Majesty that he has this morning seen the Greffier Fagel who received in the night advices from Holland up to the 9th instant.

“No particulars are stated of the affair of the 30th, but it appears that the attack made by your Majesty’s troops on that day had been successful; and the French do not seem to have made any subsequent attempt to cross the Waal. The thaw begun on the 5th.

“On the other hand the lines between Breda and Gertruydenburg had been forced, and the Dutch troops which were in them had surrendered on the same terms as had been granted to the garrisons. Grave had also capitulated on the 26th ultimo.

“By a letter from General Walmoden and the British general officers, the Prince of Orange had been apprized that in their opinion it was impossible much longer to defend the Waal, and that it would then be necessary to retire behind the Leck. Strong representations had been made by the Prince of Orange, stating the danger to which this measure would expose the Province of Holland.

“It appears from an extract which the Greffier read to Lord Grenville of a report in Dutch from Prince Frederic of Orange, that Leerdam and Asperen had actually been evacuated by the British on the 6th, but that those posts had been re-occupied on the 7th.”

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 11, Windsor.—“The Dutch at Breda and Gertruydenburg have kept up their shameful former conduct. I am therefore glad General Walmoden and Lieutenant General Harcourt think of giving up the defence of the Waal and of retiring behind the Leck, as the safety of the troops under their command must otherwise be very precarious by the shameful conduct of the Dutch.”

## LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 13, Berne.—“I never shall be able sufficiently to express my gratitude for the favour of your much obliging letter of the 9th December by the messenger Courvoisier, or to say how truly happy I am in the choice you have so judiciously made of Mr. Wickham to replace me in this country as Chargé d’Affaires.

“The offer which your Lordship proposes to make me, when I have the happiness of seeing you, of one of the two northern missions is truly flattering and pleasing to me, and I shall accept, with the most heartfelt acknowledgments, of any post you may think proper to appoint me to. I honestly confess that I shall quit this country with pleasure, for my situation had become extremely irksome and painful from a variety of circumstances, better explained in a quarter of an hour’s conversation than by volumes of paper; although the main one was my connection with *Mounier*, and the provoking consequences of that most inconsiderate man’s overbearing conceit and unaccountable imprudence. Mr. Wickham, although well disposed to keep the connection open in as far as it may be advantageous to the public service, is now, in consequence of what he has himself observed of that gentleman’s *real* character, fully on his guard against him, and will, I hope, do me the justice to assure your Lordship that my dislike to him proceeds from no personal motive or pique, but from the



fullest conviction of his being a man in no manner to be trusted, full of pride and deceit, abominated by the Swiss in general, and a friend to England only in as far as he, like all his countrymen, considers that country as necessary to his personal advantage and secret views. I may add, *par parenthèse*, that if this Revolution has been attended with misery and wretchedness to nations and millions of individuals, that it has also been productive of some good in opening the eyes of men on the real character of Frenchmen, and of exhibiting to the world in its true colours that horrid mass of infamy, perfidy, and wickedness of every description, which had been so long concealed under the veil of politeness and urbanity, to the great misfortune, at all ages, of those who mistook the appearance for the reality. Sorry am I to say that I think there are but very few exceptions to be made amongst them, but how can it be otherwise with men who are become the agents of the Devil, and who, openly disavowing God and the truth, harden their hearts against every thing that has hitherto been held sacred among men. They are become like a second race on earth, and it may truly be said that the world is inhabited by two sets of human beings, by men and Frenchmen. And unfortunately these monsters are not confined to their own limits, for those who are expelled are as exceptionable as those who remain in France. But this digression is unpardonable, as your time must be more than fully engaged at this important crisis, and I therefore entreat your forgiveness for having thus given vent to those sentiments which experience and a long acquaintance with that shocking people have at length impressed invariably on my mind.

"If my return to England is not quite so expeditious as your Lordship, and indeed myself, could wish, I trust you may with your usual indulgence account for it in the extraordinary rigour of the season, a circumstance to be considered by a married man with two very young children, in the difficulties attending so long a journey at this time, and in the necessity of making certain arrangements in my private affairs which the hope your Lordship has given me of not returning to this country naturally calls for.

"The messenger has been detained thus long in consequence of the expectation Mr. Wickham has been in of being able to obtain some interesting intelligence from France; how far it has been realised I shall leave to him to explain to your Lordship in his private letter by the same conveyance. If anything is to be done however in that way, I make no doubt of his succeeding, for his zeal, activity, and intelligence are certainly very great. As I have nothing to mention in addition to what I have had the honour of saying in my official letter to your Lordship, I shall make no improper use of your time and patience, but conclude with the renewal of those assurances of lasting gratitude for your Lordship's goodness to me."

"*Postscript.*—That wig-block Stael openly announces himself in this country as a negotiator for the re-establishment of peace; and a journey which he is immediately about to take to Paris is much talked of here. Mr. Barthélemy is gone to Basle, and he has had several interviews with Monsieur de Stael as well as with Monsieur de Goltz, late Prussian Minister at Paris, who is likewise at Basle and lodged at the house of a distinguished magistrate of that town. Monsieur de Goltz, whom I knew at Paris, passed for a man in whom his Court had no sort of confidence, and as a person of very poor abilities. But perhaps his propensity to Jacobinism may, like Monsieur de Stael, have got him a similar employment upon the grounds of the old saying *set a thief to catch a thief*; for certainly no honest man can deal with the villains who rule France."

## W. WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 13, Berne.—“In my public letters I have omitted to say anything upon the subject of the expenses that, under the authority given me, I may probably incur.

“I left London at so short a warning, and the nature and object of my journey were kept so secret, that I had no opportunity of obtaining any information or preparing myself in any way against such an emergency; and as I saw and consulted with nobody but your Lordship, I find myself now under the necessity of throwing myself entirely on your goodness.

“If your Lordship means that I should draw upon a banker in London, as Lord R. Fitzgerald tells me that he has always done, I will say very fairly that I have not that credit at any banker's in London that will allow me to do so. I must therefore leave it to your Lordship's goodness to make the necessary provision for my credit, in what quantity and in what manner you shall think most right.

“With respect to my own expenses, my journey cost me exactly 170*l.*, including the purchase of an English post-chaise on the road. I have received one hundred pounds from Lord R. FitzGerald, and have immediate occasion for another.

“Your Lordship may be well assured that I should be full as careful of the public money as of my own, particularly of what were to pass through your Lordship's hands. I should, however, esteem myself particularly happy if you would be pleased to limit me in my expense to a sum certain.

“I am sure your Lordship would wish to let me be here, to a certain degree, on a respectable footing, otherwise my situation would be a painful one. When I say *respectable*, I mean nothing more than that which would allow me to give small quiet parties to a few friends.

“I know it is liked here, and that without it you are quite without consideration; besides, I believe a truer thing was never said than this, *que le petit souper est le tamis des secrets*.

“But, in this respect, whatever may be best for the public service, or shall be thought right by your Lordship will be always most agreeable to me, and you may be assured that I shall conform myself most exactly to it.

“There is another point upon which I shall venture to speak to you confidentially, and, if I take too great a liberty in so doing, you must remember that I am encouraged to it by the kindness which your Lordship has been pleased to show me. I am a family man, passionately attached to my own home, who never knew what it was to be away from his wife and child before; and I have need of the most intimate persuasion that some real advantage must arise from the separation before I can submit to it.

“I can answer, however, boldly both for myself and Mrs. Wickham that, if there be any real advantage to be obtained by her staying, or any appearance to be saved by it, that not a murmur will be uttered by either the one or the other of us.

“I have written a number of arguments *pro* and *con* upon the subject; will your Lordship have the goodness to put an end to the difficulty at once, and say to Mr. John King whether there be any real objection, or no, and he will make the proper use of it.

“I will say very fairly that I find I shall want both a friend and a secretary, and I know not where else to take either the one or the other.

"Your Lordship has thrown a responsibility upon me that makes me tremble. God grant that I may do no discredit to the confidence you have been pleased to place in me.

"I cannot conclude this letter without repeating my obligations to Lord R. FitzGerald. Far from observing anything like jealousy or distrust, I have ever received from his Lordship the most kind and attentive politeness in private, and the most generous and manly confidence in all public business in which I have had occasion to communicate with him.

"I assure your Lordship his conduct has made a lasting impression upon me."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, January 15, Queen's House.—"The original intention of remaining at Osnabruck till the situation in Holland was more settled was a very proper intention, and I am sorry that too sanguine an advice from Lord St. Helens and Lieutenant-General Harcourt changed the plan of Lord Malmesbury. Now there seems to be no other mode to be followed but the Princess's remaining at Osnabruck till the yachts can have a fair wind and the Elbe be open for their getting to Stade. I desire Lord Grenville will send those directions tomorrow; might it not be right to send a duplicate by Hamburg, as the packets have now orders to go there."

#### EARL FITZ-WILLIAM to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

Private and Confidential.

1795, January 15, Dublin Castle.—*Extract*.—"I shall send over a recommendation of Ponsonby as Secretary of State. He wishes to set out with that title, that the world may not think a new place is established for him; but, in a few months, he will relinquish that title, and let it and its duties be turned over to the Lord Lieutenant's secretary.

"I have settled the removal of Beresford who, having served 25 years in a Revenue Office, may have a pension chargeable on the incidents, to the amount of his salary. With this he is satisfied, and himself and family promise support. I also feel the necessity of removing Cooke and Hamilton, who are in too confidential offices to remain, when, in truth, one cannot give them one's real confidence. A thousand reasons, which I cannot detail, have compelled me to make up my mind to this measure, to which I felt strong reluctance; but I am satisfied it is right. The Solicitor-General will be removed to the Bench, and, I believe, thinks himself well taken care of."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to C. BENTINCK.

1795, January 17, Whitehall.—"As you have been so good as to undertake to proceed to Zealand, I wish to state to you in this manner the general outlines of the ideas which have appeared the most advisable under the present circumstances.

"The apprehensions that the French may have over-run a part or the whole of the province of Holland, make it very desirable that the well-disposed party in the Republic should, if possible, be collected in the province of Zealand so as to make a stand there, with such assistance as could gradually be sent to them from hence. With this view

it would be of the utmost importance that you should endeavour to communicate with the garrison of Bergen-op-Zoom, to induce them to hold out for some time longer in the hopes of such succour as it may be found practicable to afford them from hence. It would also be desirable that you should endeavour to ascertain how far the disposition of the different classes of the inhabitants of that province is such as would afford the prospect of their making such a stand as I have mentioned; and co-operating with such force as may be sent from hence in order to maintain that province against the French, and to retain the means of availing themselves of future circumstances which may arise to recover the other provinces.

"Your own discretion and knowledge of the country will enable you to supply many particulars which will arise out of these general ideas, but which I feel it unnecessary to detail to you. I will only add that we shall be extremely anxious to receive from you the earliest intelligence of the state of that country.

"The same considerations as are stated above apply also to the Brille [Brielle], the possession of which in the hands of the well-affected party would be of the utmost importance towards the recovery of the province of Holland."

*Holograph copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 18, Queen's House.—"Whether the memorial that accompany's this from the Marquis del Campo is in the style the Spanish Court would in former days have thought consonant with its dignity, or whether it does not better suit the personal character of the Ambassador it is not my purpose at present to decide; but as I think a well understood concert between Austria, England, Spain, Portugal, Sardinia and the Italian States essential to the restoring that system of operations which can alone promise real success against the enemies of mankind, I am glad the present memorial has been delivered, as it will afford a proper occasion for Lord Grenville's giving a proper answer, and assuring the Spanish Court that, as soon as we can secure a real co-operation with the Court of Vienna, we will openly enter into the communication of such a plan of operations as, by every part of the allies acting at the same time with vigour, may throw the common enemy into the most probable state of distress."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 20, Queen's House.—"I very much approve of the idea intimated to me by Lord Grenville that Mr. Elliot shall be sent to Yarmouth to compliment the Princesses of Orange on their safe arrival, and to offer their being lodged at Hampton Court; Kensington is so totally unfurnished that it would be impossible to lodge them there.

"I will send the Marquis of Salisbury notice that he may make the best arrangement for them the present moment can permit."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794 [1795], January 21, Queen's House.—"As the States General have offered to surrender at discretion, I do not see any advantage in the Stadtholder's having remained there; I therefore rejoice at his and

the two Princes his sons' safe arrival. I trust the necessary directions upon a *second* requisition from me to the Lord Chamberlain has been sent to prepare suitable apartments at Hampton Court. I have just given orders to the Lord Steward's Department for cooks to be sent there; and the Duke of York is gone this morning to the Princess of Orange. He will no doubt see the Prince at Colchester, and will advise their not hurrying up, that they may on their arrival be more suitably received."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1795, January 21, [Whitehall].—"The Duke of Bedford has this day stated the words of his intended motion for the information of the Lords. I enclose to you Cowper's note of them, which is, I believe, precisely the same with that which we had.

"Upon re-consideration, I cannot help thinking that any appearance of wishing to evade or alter so plain a proposition may have a bad effect in the country, and that nothing could answer so well as your taking those words and moving them as an amendment to Grey's motion, so as to mark the infinite difference between them. If the thing is possible to be done, the effect of doing this would be very good.

"I have been trying to incorporate these words into a form of resolutions according to our last night's idea, and my brother has been working with me. I really think we have succeeded, but of this you will judge.

"Return me Cowper's note, as it is an authentic document which may be useful if, on your taking these words, they should attempt to change them in the House of Lords.

"Nothing could be better than the ridicule which would attach upon them if this idea should turn out to be practicable; and, besides this, I really think the impression in the country which we desire to give, would be better given in this form than in any other."

*Copy.*

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 21, Deal.—"Since I had the honour of writing to you yesterday I have been on board, but finding it impossible even to get to sea, I went on shore again. From what I told the master of the cutter, I have no doubt he will go as soon as there is a chance. Your Lordship will easily believe how very much against my will I am detained here.

"I have met Captain Berkeley several times, and from his conversation and way of thinking, as far as I can judge upon so short an acquaintance, I have every reason to flatter myself we shall pull together very well; and that I shall derive every assistance I can wish from his support, as he is vested with such unlimited powers for the object we are going upon. I am happy to find I have been mentioned to him in such a manner that he is inclined to place confidence in me, independent of his being instructed to do so. Should I yet be so fortunate as to come in time, I cannot help flattering myself with success from the full powers of this officer, and the conciliatory language he is ordered, and seems of his own accord inclined, to hold. Under these circumstances, and with the chance of success that is given me, for which I am so much indebted to your Lordship, I am very impatient to sail."

[The MARQUIS of BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.]

1795, January 23 [Stowe].—"I passed some houses yesterday morning with my brother, in the very painful task of explaining to him my

reasons for thinking that, in the present unfortunate state of our minds, our mutual affection could not be promoted by an intercourse of a nature so very different from that which it has been my constant and earnest wish to cultivate; and I endeavoured to prevail upon him to state this in the terms the least painful to you; but, in consequence of his declining to charge himself with this explanation, I am obliged to repeat to you that the only intercourse which I can have with a brother, is that of confidence, esteem, and affection. And the transactions of which I complain have most cruelly convinced me that you no longer retain those sentiments towards me."

LORD GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1795, January 23, Dover Street.—"I can only say, in answer to your note, that as there is on my part no alteration in those feelings which I have always borne towards you, nothing can prevent my taking every mode of marking them to you, but the knowledge of its being disagreeable to you. I am very confident that the time is not distant when you will feel that such has been my uniform conduct towards you. In the interval, as the obstacle, whatever it is, to the continuance of our former habits exists in your mind only, it must be for you to decide on the degree and nature of the intercourse which you may wish to maintain with a brother, who will never cease to bear towards you the sentiments of steady and zealous friendship, and of sincere and warm affection. But, be assured that whatever temporary distance may be interposed between us by the unfortunate impressions which you have conceived, it can make no diminution in the eagerness with which I shall embrace any appearance of returning confidence, or any opportunity of manifesting towards you those sentiments with which I shall ever be your most affectionate brother."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 25, Queen's House.—"Agreeable to what I mentioned in a former note to Lord Grenville of my intention of going to Kew this day to make such arrangements as might lodge the Princes and Princesses of Orange till Hampton Court should be ready for their reception; I have been there and can now acquaint him that every thing shall be ready for their arriving there to dinner on Wednesday. I find two carriages can be found for their journey which I shall order to be sent to bring them to Kew."

LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1759, January 26, Dover Street.—"I return your Grace the paper from Mr. Erskine. The Court of Rome has long been pressing us to send there some accredited Minister, but the doing this is liable to objection from old prejudices which are better allowed to die away gradually. The possession of Corsica, if it remains with us, naturally affords a channel for this, and I think it would certainly be advantageous if Mr. North should pass through Rome in his way there, in order to settle some means of intercourse. The impatience of the Court of Rome has, I think, been a little increased of late by the conduct of Mr. Hippesley, who, though he has certainly been active and useful in a sort of volunteer negotiation for supplies for our fleet and army, has, I think, proceeded a little further than was necessary. Mr. North's presence would set all this right.

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to EARL FITZ-WILLIAM.

Private.

1795, January 28, Dover Street.—“I have received from Mr. Sackville Hamilton, for whom I have long entertained a sincere good will and favourable opinion, a letter mentioning his dismissal from his situation in Lord Milton’s Office. Feeling that in an arrangement of that nature I can have no right to interfere, however much I regret it, I have no other motive for troubling your Excellency with a copy of that letter and of my answer to it, except the desire of not maintaining any correspondence on such a subject without communicating it to you.

“The strong and natural interest which I feel in whatever affects the character of Lord Buckingham, and the reputation of his Government, to the measures of which Mr. Pitt and myself were parties, obliges me to mention to your Excellency the subject of the arrangements of the Revenue Boards, respecting which it is stated to me that a language is held in Dublin very contrary, I am sure, to your sentiments and intentions. I feel too entire a confidence in what you expressed on that subject when we met at Mr. Pitt’s, to have any other uneasiness respecting it than that which arises from the prevalence of these reports however ill-founded, and from the apprehension that they are countenanced by persons of weight and confidence. I am certain that, before any measure on that subject is decided upon, the fullest opportunity will be given to your colleagues in this country to consider its bearing, both on their own characters, and on the general interests of Government.

“I beg to assure you that there is no person who more sincerely wishes you every sort of success and satisfaction in the difficult task which you have undertaken than myself.”

*Copy.*

## SECRET REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE FRENCH NAVY.

[THOMAS ELDRED] to R. PITTMAN, Boston, U.S.A.

1795, January 29, Brest.—“I wrote to you from Dunkirk and Havre de Grace, which I hope came safe to hand, respecting the cargo which is to come to Havre de Grace in the spring, which I hope will come in time. On my arrival here, where I was in hopes to have made some purchases of ships, but found all those ships that were good for anything in a state of requisition for the Republic, and those that are not, have not any stores on board. I do assure you I found a deal of difficulty in getting through the country for the want of horses and provisions, for the country is in a state of starvation for the want of bread and all the necessaries of life; and for fifty leagues I was obliged to have twelve dragoons to guard the carriage for fear of the brigands. They say the people of la Vendée are near 150,000 in arms. If I am well informed there is at this time a truce for one month, for the National Assembly and them to see if they can come to some terms; and I must say two-thirds of the people in all Brittany are of this way of thinking; and I cannot tell what will be the consequence in the spring. The weather has been very severe for these five weeks past, and not broke yet. Captain West from Boston tells me that there is likely to be a war between England and our country. Should it so happen, we may expect great help from this country. They have a fine fleet, they say thirty-five sail of the line and twenty-five frigates at sea; and

the *St. Aspre* [*St. Esprit*] of one hundred and ten guns almost ready to come out of the dock after a thorough repair, and two of eighty guns and one of seventy-four now in the harbour fitting out. They will have forty sail of the line next cruise, with as many frigates and sloops of war, which I think is plenty to meet the British fleet. There are this day arrived seven sail of the line that parted from the fleet, with thirteen frigates and sloops of war. They have brought in four prizes, one called the *Russia Merchant* from Martinico; but I am sorry to say that they have not stores to fit the fleet out again, except they get a fresh supply. If you can bring any kind of naval stores, you may get any price for them. I am very sure there are not stores to fit out the ships that are in the harbour. There are some few Danes that have brought some small quantity of cordage, but nothing to speak of. They have several ships building, but not in a forward state. The other part of their fleet is expected every hour. I am sorry to say I cannot purchase a ship or two here, although since the commencement of the war to this day, there have been from two hundred and ninety to three hundred prizes brought in here, but that is the greatest number from the best information. I cannot get to L'Orient, but find there is nothing there that will answer. Therefore I shall go to St. Maloes and Cherbourg to make a finish. I shall write if possible from thence, but shall hope to see you at Havre de Grace in April. You will not let this letter be seen should you happen to be in England."

*Endorsed* by Lord Grenville.

*Secret*.—Brest, January 29th, 1795. Received February 12.

From E. Original sent to Lord Spencer.

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, January 31, Queen's House.—"I return to Lord Grenville the letter he has received from Field Marshal Conway with its enclosures; I certainly shall most willingly stand at the head of the subscribers to the proposed publication.

"Lord Grenville may be curious to know my opinion of the Prince of Orange after our interview. He seems to me perfectly well intentioned and a thorough honest man, if possible carrying his candour too far, and most willing to confess his not having conducted himself so well as he might; but rather fond of stating how much he was called forth on all occasions; and I think it is clear that had he had more decision in his character that matters could never have been in the present unpleasant situation. As to the Princess, however I was inclined to think well of her, I own her conduct at present heightens it much, for, though much hurt, she has a dignity that seems to make her situation still more interesting."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the DUCKE OF PORTLAND.

Private.

1795, January 31, Dover Street.—"I have the honour to return to your Grace the two letters from the Lord Lieutenant which you put into my hands yesterday. From the manner in which he speaks of the arrangement respecting Mr. Beresford, whom he seems to consider as perfectly satisfied with what has passed, it is impossible not to entertain a hope that the very embarrassing state in which that business now stands has arisen from some misunderstanding; and that, by the channel of communication which has been adopted, the respective sentiments and wishes of the Lord Lieutenant and of Mr. Beresford have not been



correctly conveyed to each other ; and I still allow myself to hope that it cannot be the Lord Lieutenant's desire that the King's servants on this side the water should concur in the forcible dismissal of that gentleman. I stated with great sincerity to your Grace last night that I feel it to be very much the duty of all those who are engaged, at such a moment as this, in carrying on the public service, to soften and diminish whatever difficulties may arise, and to do everything for this object that duty and honour will permit. And it is without any diminution of that sentiment that I think I ought not, in returning these letters to your Grace, to omit expressing the concern with which I see in one of them the intention of the Lord Lieutenant on the subject of the office of Secretary of State, an intention of which I was unapprized till I read that letter. When I have the opportunity of conversing with your Grace on these different points, I will mention, without reserve, what occurs to me on this ; and I only advert to it now in order to beg that, if the recommendation shall arrive in the shape in which the Lord Lieutenant has proposed to send it, no definitive step may be taken respecting it till I can have the opportunity of submitting to your consideration what I think material upon it.

"I cannot sufficiently express the regret I feel at these unfortunate and untoward circumstances, which seem likely to produce to us all so much embarrassment and difficulty at a moment when, I am sure, we are all actuated by the same wish of giving all our attention and labour to the public duties which press upon us here.

*Copy.*

#### SECRET INTELLIGENCE FROM BRITTANY.

1795, February 2, Falmouth.—"We have deferred offering any news derived from the prisoners who have made their escape from Quimper, until we could collect from the variety of reports such as are entitled to belief.

"The following circumstances have been communicated to us by a particular friend who left Brest on Thursday evening 29th, and arrived here the 31st ultimo. And as we can place an implicit reliance on his veracity, and know him to be well acquainted with the language and country of France, more than ordinary attention is due to his observations. He passed the last nine months at Quimper, and was in the habits of intimacy with many families.

"Charette is still at the head of a formidable force in la Vendée, and has refused in a late parley to accept the amnesty offered by the Convention on any other terms than his own, among which the restoration of royalty is the principal.

"The moderation of the present day is accompanied by a kind of apathy and indifference among the multitude, and, in *very* many instances with discontent. Although they suffer less from terror and apprehension, their natural wants have found no diminution ; poverty and famine advance upon them with rapid strides.

"The foregoing assertion has been often controverted, but can now be proved to a certainty ; and the subsequent has an equal claim to credit, that their fleetmen at sea contain disaffected officers. Many of the captains sought for and obtained letters of credit on England, and left Brest not so much with the fear as the expectation of being carried thither.

"Their ships, except six, had little provisions, were weakly manned, and so badly equipped that the *Républicaine*, a first-rate, went to sea with but one cable and anchor.

"Thus situated, it is not wonderful that their commanders should presage a woeful event, and certain it is that they embarked with this impression.

"Eight ships of the line and six frigates entered Brest harbour on Wednesday afternoon, but had the appearance of coming fresh from some other port more than from sea.

"They were the only ships of war in the harbour on Thursday evening.

"The French dread our fleet, and had it made its appearance before Brest during the last fortnight, a general consternation would have been the consequence."

*Copy.*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 5. London.—"I understand from a person to be relied on, that there is a M. de Tuisaye here, a *Chevalier de Malte*, and one intended for a commission in the new corps, who has great interest with the *Grand Maître*, and is in all respects a very proper person to be consulted with respect to dispositions, prevalent at this time in that country, for entering into connection with Great Britain. He will be to be heard of at any time at Mr. Saladin's, No. —, St. James' Place; and by what I hear of his character, as well as of the dispositions of the Government of Malta, it may be well worth your while to see him before he goes."

#### C. BENTINCK to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1795, February 5, Portugal Street.—"I enclose the minute of this morning with a copy. The trifling alterations you will, I hope, approve of, as they only make that more clear which was set down in some haste. I ask for a written authority to act upon this plan when I see the least hope of success. From the cordial and very flattering support given me at different times, if I had only verbal assurances of their concurrence, I should not doubt one moment the fulfilling of any engagement of this nature on the part of the persons concerned, or rather whom I wish to interest themselves in this plan. But I think it right, in point of form, I should have this written sanction from Administration which will serve as a justification of my views and motives to my friends on both sides the water, if it should ever be proper to disclose what passed on the occasion. Unless I see every appearance of success, I shall be very cautious how I even hint at the powers given me to any one abroad, that I may not endanger their safety, and that no one may be embarrassed by an unnecessary knowledge of my intentions; and I will certainly leave for the present my written instructions and authority for the undertaking the journey with your Grace, as it will be sufficient for my purpose that these exist, and I must take care they are not, under any circumstances, found upon me just at this period on the other side the water. I wish no person *belonging to the United Provinces* to be acquainted with this project, as far as I am concerned; but that I may be left at liberty to let them into as much of my design as the circumstances of the moment and the character and temper of different individuals may make it compatible with their safety to disclose the whole or any part of it; the least indiscretion might be attended with circumstances so fatal to my connections, and might make me lament for ever after, that I ever engaged in the business. I speak from

experience in scenes similar in some respects, but that certainly required less caution. I am sure you will not blame me for my anxiety on this point."

A. W. C. DE NAGELL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 7, Portland Place.—"En rentrant hier-au-soir chez moi, j'ai trouvé les deux lettres dont votre excellence a bien voulu m'honorer, et que j'ai envoyé au Prince d'Orange. Son Altesse Sérénissime était d'intention d'expédier aujourd'hui des ordres aux vaisseaux de guerre de la République, qui se trouvent dans les ports de la Grande Bretagne, et je ne doute pas qu'elle mettra toute la célérité possible à préparer des ordres pour les Colonies.

*French.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795], February 8, London.—"I have no difficulty in mentioning the subject of your letter to the Duke of York, and there can be no doubt of executing your plan, if you can point out any solid reasons for doing so. How do you propose to get the regiment transported from Portugal to Switzerland. I had already, at the instigation of Wyndham, suggested to the Duke of York the propriety of suspending his resolution as to Baron Roll's regiment, but the objection which I found it difficult to obviate rested chiefly on the apparent impossibility of recruiting it."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, February, London].—"I wished to see you *this evening*, to tell you what passed with Grattan, which makes the business more desperate than ever. I think I must send to see Windham, and therefore shall be glad if you will call here, at any hour you please. I have nobody with me but the Bishop of Lincoln."

EARL FITZWILLIAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 9, Dublin Castle.—"Upon my arrival here, I found the connections of Mr. Hamilton so incompatible with those of the persons whom I wished to call into the aid of my Administration, that it was impossible to retain him in the *very confidential* situation I found him. Of his merits I really have no doubt, and, after stating the cause of his removal, it is hardly necessary to express it. With respect to his situation, I do not think he will be very ill off; for, upon his removal from office, he comes into a pension of 1,200*l.* a year, and, after the 25th March, I mean to add to it 500*l.* more, either to himself or to any of his family, according to his own pleasure. With respect then to net income, I think he will be a gainer rather than a loser; his loss is, a house in town and country.

"As to the alteration in the Revenue Board, it has been simply confined to the removal of Mr. Beresford, whose power and mine were certainly incompatible; and I mean to send over a recommendation for the appointment of a new Board with the omission of his name; but here the matter rests. Whatever may be the reports in London of the conversations in Dublin I know not; but what I can assure you is, that not one word upon the subject of a systematic change in those Boards has ever passed before me, nor have I heard of any such conversations,

either in private or public, save only respecting the Treasury Board. As soon as we have gone through our ways and means, Sir John Parnell will bring forward his plan of improvement for that Board, the general outline of which has been settled between him and Mr. Pitt. It certainly is meant that the system of the management of the revenues should be considered, but nothing of the kind shall be carried into execution without a previous communication with your Cabinet."

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, February 12. Hanover.—"My letter on Office paper contains everything I know. I have marked it *private* because at this moment my official correspondence can properly only relate to the princess I am conducting slowly, but I hope surely to England; and indeed, at all times, I should not have felt it right or fair to enclose the Duke of Brunswick's letters in a public despatch. I have seen lately such remarkable proofs of his nervousness and irresolute mind that I really scarce can wish to see him at the head of an army. He was not a little so when we acted together in Holland, but it is grown upon him since to a great degree."

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 13, Hill Street.—"I send you a letter of M. D'Artez containing a proposal of his which, upon discoursing it over with him, I cannot but think deserving of some attention. He means it only as an experiment; the continuance of which, if successful, should be left to the Austrians. It would certainly be their business to begin it, but, if they will not begin it, as is probably the case, is it not better that it should be begun by us? M. D'Artez is of opinion (and his opinions seem so temperate and well formed that I feel a great disposition always to agree with them) that in the present state of thinking in France, a large defection in their armies might be effected by the use of the means which he proposes. At all events the cost could be but inconsiderable; and as soon as any considerable body should be raised, as much as might amount to a regiment, it might be transferred to the army of the Prince de Condé.

"Upon the subject of this army I feel great uneasiness. I have no idea that the Austrians, if left to themselves, will ever put that army in a state, or employ it in a manner, to make it produce its proper effect. Would it be impossible, though now it is rather too late, to make some stipulation in its favour, so as to require that, as part of the Austrian contribution of force, the Prince of Condé's army should be put on a proper footing, and be kept up to a certain amount? The proper footing will be, besides that of regular pay and clothing, the changing that shocking and prodigal system of using officers as common soldiers, and stopping the dreadful consumption which that system has made, and continues to make, of the flower of French nobility. This would be done by enlarging that army to its proper dimensions, and filling up the vacant spaces by those whom there may be hopes of drawing from the enemy's army and from the interior. To part of this purpose indeed the Chevalier D'Artez present plan is in some degree adverse; inasmuch as by giving commissions to officers from the other side, he lessens the number that would remain for those now serving. The only question is whether you

do not gain by the increase of the army, and consequent increase of commissions, more than you lose in that view in the increase of the number of persons to be provided for. There are, I confess, great difficulties. It would be a heart breaking thing to see a Republican officer, newly come over, confirmed in his commission, while hundreds of the old chevaliers were still serving as common soldiers, and liable to be commanded by him. It must be left to the judgment of the Prince of Condé; but, if he thinks the experiment may be made, I should be inclined to be at the expense of beginning it. The fatal adherence of Austria to her views of acquisition, which has hitherto ruined everything, and will but too probably do so in the end, it is in vain to say anything to. I suppose it is impossible to do anything even to mitigate that system. Our mouths are unfortunately stopped by our own proceedings in the West and East Indies. Is it impossible, however, to make them lay them aside for the time, and feel that even the purpose of acquisition will be better attained by not being pursued directly?"

*Enclosure.*

A letter from the Chevalier d'Artez proposing measures for encouraging desertion from the armies of Republican France.

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 13, Portugal Street.—“As Mr. Fagel means to sail from Yarmouth by next Wednesday's packet, and it is my wish to accompany him at least as far as Hamburgh, I shall be very anxious to be ready to set out for Yarmouth on Monday next in the afternoon; and to receive from your Lordship, before that time, the instructions and authority in writing which were the subject of our last conversation. I shall beg the favour to know when I may call for them in Dover Street, wishing to see you for a few minutes before I leave town.”

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 14, Queen's House.—“The arrangement now proposed by Lord Grenville in concert with Earl Spencer for the embarkation and safe landing of the Princess, as stated in the letter to Lord Malmesbury, meets with my fullest consent; I approve therefore that the further steps may be taken for putting this measure into execution; I have in consequence of it written a few lines to my sister.”

LORD GRENVILLE to C. BENTINCK.

1795, February 16.—

*Memorandum for Mr. Charles Bentinck.*

“1. In returning to the United States, it is wished that Mr. Bentinck should use his own discretion as to the time and manner of his reappearing at the Hague, so as to create the least possible suspicion of his having any political object or commission in view.

“2. When he is there, the first point seems to be to give to the friends of the old system such secret but confident assurances as would naturally result from Mr. Bentinck's perfect knowledge of the sentiments and views of His Majesty's Government with respect to Holland,

so as to confirm our friends there in the opinion that the re-establishment of the lawful Government, and of the former system of alliance, is an object to which the British Government looks with much anxiety; and in the accomplishment of which we would readily co-operate, whenever any favourable occasion shall occur.

“3. It does not seem to be by any means desirable that the dispositions of the friends of the House of Orange, or even those discontents which may be created among persons of a different description by the conduct of the French in the United Provinces, should be called into action till the opportunity shall be sufficiently favourable to afford the hope of solid and permanent success. In the interval, Mr. Bentinck’s attention would best be directed to the object of keeping alive this spirit; but without holding out, even to the persons best affected, the appearance of his having any commission from hence for that purpose; as any such impression might be highly dangerous to himself and his friends, and would tend in some degree to defeat the object which is in view. It would also be very useful that Mr. Bentinck should endeavour to find the means of transmitting from time to time confidential information of the occurrences, and state of affairs in the Republic.

“4. Whatever communications Mr. Bentinck may have to transmit may be safely conveyed through the King’s Resident at Hamburg; or by the means of some of the commercial houses at Amsterdam, whose correspondencies with London must certainly soon be renewed either directly, or through the medium of Hamburg. Mr. Bentinck is furnished with a cipher for this purpose, which is of such a nature as to be easily destroyed in case of necessity. His letters need not be signed, but it would be useful that, soon after his arrival, he should if possible point out to Lord Grenville a safe method of communicating with him.

“5. Matters being thus kept as far as possible in a state of readiness, the most advantageous moment for more active exertion would be that when, from any circumstance, the French should be compelled either materially to weaken, or wholly to withdraw the force they now have within the Republic. This may arise either from internal dissensions in France, or from the success of the allies in any part of the war.

“6. If at any such period a well-concerted plan could be formed by which the well-affected persons in the Republic could be brought forward, and the people at large induced to shake off the yoke of the French, Mr. Bentinck might then, gradually and with discretion, communicate to such persons as would be fit to be trusted with such a secret the fact of his being authorised by this Government to promise to such a plan every degree of support which circumstances could permit; and any pecuniary engagements which he might contract in order to promote the success of such an enterprise, to the amount of ten, twenty, or even thirty thousand pounds, would, in the event of a successful issue to the business, be readily fulfilled. If the enterprise were to fail there would of course be difficulties in answering a demand for sums to so large an extent, nor could it probably be necessary, as the engagements which Mr. Bentinck himself would make would naturally be for the most part conditional, and dependent on success. But, even in the event of failure, any reasonable expence which should have been incurred by him within moderate limits, would be readily defrayed by his Majesty’s Government, the nature of this commission sufficiently showing the confidence they place in Mr. Bentinck.

“7. Nothing is said here of the particulars of any plan of action, this being a point which must of necessity be regulated by local and temporary circumstances; but the two Provinces of Holland and

Zealand are naturally those to which Mr. Bentinck would look for the beginning of any enterprise of this nature, both from their own importance, and from the greater facility of affording them support or assistance from hence. This facility would of course be much augmented by any means which Mr. Bentinck might devise of availing himself of that favourable disposition which has lately appeared in a part of the Dutch navy; and which nothing but the untoward circumstances of the season appears to have prevented from producing effects which might have been of material importance.

"8. Mr. Bentinck may rely upon the utmost secrecy being observed here with respect to the whole of this business; and it is hardly necessary to recommend to him the utmost caution in all his communications, so as to prevent all discovery and, if possible, to avoid all suspicion."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1795, February 20, Dover Street.—"Published in the 'Correspondence of the Right Honourable William Wickham,' 1870, volume 1, page 21."

GEORGE, PRINCE OF WALES to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, February 21, Carlton House.—"I think if, instead of writing to Lord Malmesbury to write to Mrs. Harcourt, you were so good as to write a sort of official letter to her yourself desiring Lord Malmesbury to forward it, and acquainting him at the same time with the contents, it would have a better effect than leaving it to Lord Malmesbury entirely, whose letter might perhaps admit of the construction of an invitation, instead of carrying with it the authority which a letter in your Lordship's own hand cannot fail of doing."

*Postscript.*—"Pray call upon me for a few minutes tomorrow as soon after twelve as it may be convenient, should you not be going out of town."

GENERAL DE CLERFAIT to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1795, February 22, Mulheim.—"J'ignore si vous avez reçu toutes les lettres que je vous ai écrit relativement aux malheurs de la Hollande. La dernière était lorsque le Général de Walmoeden marchait et se retirait derrière l'Yssel que tous les chemins de la Hollande et d'Amsterdam étaient ouverts, et la communication coupée avec l'Angleterre, il devait envoyer un courrier, et il est chargé de ma lettre pour vous. Elle était du 17 de Janvier.

"Vous aurez appris aussi par Monsieur Pelier qui s'est retiré à Londres, que nous avons fait tout ce qui a été possible pour engager les Anglais et Hanoveriens à garder le Wahl. Le Comte de Walmoeden m'avait dit pouvoir le faire si j'augmentais les quatre bataillons qui étaient déjà à sa disposition, et qu'il avait placé à Wageningen, de quelques bataillons. Je le fis en envoyer d'abord quatre autres. On voulait attaquer l'ennemi et l'obliger à repasser le Wahl. Les dispositions furent faites, les troupes qui devaient attaquer là furent elles-mêmes dans l'endroit du rassemblement, le Général Alvinzi avait demandé qu'on employa de nos bataillons pour cette attaque, ils furent refusés. Depuis ce moment, on ne s'occupa que du passage du Lech. Mes prières et sollicitations ne furent rien, pendant qu'un adjutant du Général était chez moi pour m'assurer que, moyennant les secours que je donnais, détermineraient de garder la position de Seerdam et de Kuitenburg

entre le Wahl et le Lech qui était fort bonne, on se retirait, et repassait le Lech. Je me rendis à Deventer où nos troupes étaient rassemblées pour garder Pandern et le Wahl. Nous étions dans Arnheim, et les troupes Anglaises abandonnaient le Lech et marchaient derrière l'Yssel. J'écrivis dès mon arrivée au Général Walmoeden pour tâcher de le persuader de faire retourner ses troupes, marcher en avant, et qu'avec tous les bataillons que j'avais rassemblés, que j'attaquerais l'ennemi. C'est alors qu'il m'écrivit que ses troupes étaient harassées, et hors d'état de rien entreprendre, et que les Généraux Anglais lui avaient déclaré qu'ils ne pouvaient plus être d'aucun concours dans nulle espèce d'opération. Nous avons gardé notre terre le long du Wahl sans en perdre un pouce, et n'avons dû nous retirer d'une batterie fort avancée au-delà de Pandern, le onze, qu'après avoir repoussé l'ennemi deux fois. Mais les Anglais s'étant retiré d'un poste à la droite de cette batterie sans m'en avertir, l'ennemi arrivait le long de la digue qui tournait cette batterie, tandis qu'il l'attaqua de front, ou de se retirer en bon ordre et sans perdre un seul canon. Cette batterie était peu importante ; par tout où l'ennemi attaqua, il fut repoussé ; et même après que les Anglais eurent passé l'Yssel nous gardâmes le Wahl jusqu'à Pandern.

« Quelque malheureuse et prompte qu'ait été la retraite de l'armée Anglaise et Hanoverienne, je ne peux dissimuler les difficultés que le Général Walmoeden avait à surmonter. L'armée était fatiguée par une continuité de service très pénible ; extrêmement diminuée par les pertes qu'elle avait fait, et plus encore par les maladies ; le soldat dégouté et ne gardant l'ancienne discipline ; les habitants excédés des pillages et des excès énormes, qui se commettaient tous les jours, et prêts à prendre les armes contre eux ; le pays, en partie mal disposé, désirant l'arrivée des Français, et prêt à les séconder ; enfin les inondations qui font la défense de ce pays, gélé, et tous les pays ne présentant qu'une plaine de glace. Si on ajoute à cela l'indiscipline et la confusion qui régnait entre eux, on verra qu'il n'était plus maître de faire exécuter ce qu'il aurait voulu. J'ai, cependant, lieu de croire que voyant l'impossibilité peut-être de défendre la Hollande, il était dès longtemps résolu de l'abandonner, et de faire sa retraite vers l'Allemagne, et non vers Amsterdam, sans qu'il ait voulu me le dire, malgré les demandes réitérées que j'ai fait à ce sujet, même au dernier concert tenu à Utrecht, le 12 je crois, où il a encore dit qu'il n'était pas décidé, tandis qu'il l'était très fort ; ainsi que Milord St. Helens, qui y a assisté, lorsque je lui ai demandé pourquoi il n'avait pas fait sa retraite sur la Hollande, il est convaincu que les règles de la guerre et les circonstances pouvaient exiger, mais qu'il avait eu des raisons de ne pas le faire. Ces raisons sont la certitude où il était, qu'aucune ville ne les auraient reçu ; et que le reste de son armée risquait d'être écrasée par les habitants, tant on les avait en horreur.

« C'est à ce même concert tenu à Utrecht que le Stadhouder a fait proposer d'envoyer huit mil hommes pour les placer derrière la grande inondation (qui ne s'est jamais faite) et à Amsterdam. Le Général Alvinzi n'a pu y consentir sans mon avis, et lorsque j'ai su la disposition des choses, et des esprits, je n'ai osé le risquer, parceque ce nombre n'aurait pu sauver la Hollande, et risquait d'être perdu. D'ailleurs il n'aurait pu arriver. Il s'est restreint ensuite à deux bataillons et 1500 Hessais. Nos deux bataillons ont été en marche pour s'y rendre. Les nouvelles que le Général Walmoeden a reçu qu'on ne voulait recevoir aucunes troupes dans les villes l'a engagé à les faire arrêter. Ces nouvelles n'étaient que trop vraies. Un capitaine du grand état-major



de l'armée, nommé Kâp, que j'avais envoyé au Général Alvinzi avec la commission d'aller en avant pour faire les quartiers et savoir si ces bataillons pouvaient passer, est allé jusqu'Amsterdam, et le Magistrat a déclaré qu'ils ne les recevraient pas ; qu'il lui conseillait de faire retourner ces troupes, parcequ'il ne pouvait répondre de ce qui arriverait, n'étant pas maître du peuple. C'est lorsqu'il est allé pour faire retourner ces bataillons qu'il a trouvé le chemin occupé par les ennemis, qu'il est allé vers Helvoetsluys ; et aucun bateau n'ayant pu sortir à cause des glaces, il a été fait prisonnier. Le Général Golofkin, qui commandait à Amsterdam, lui en a donné des certificats qu'il n'a fait parvenir. Avec lui a été pris ce Prince de Salme qui a été longtemps à Londres, et était également en Hollande. On ignorait où il existait. Il m'a envoyé par le même Kâp la lettre dont vous l'aviez chargé pour moi. Le refus d'envoyer ce secours demandé pour Amsterdam, et l'impossibilité de le faire, est le prétexte que pourront trouver ceux qui voudront nous blamer. Mais outre qu'on n'a pas eu le temps de la faire, il est également certain que aussi peu de troupes auraient été forcées par les habitants mêmes de se rendre. Il n'en eut pas été de même si l'armée Anglaise et Hanovrienne s'y était retirée, et que nous eussions occupés l'Yssel.

“Plus de confiance en nous de la part des Hollandais, plus de droiture dans leurs procédés les ont sauvé. Mais avec quelle peine ne nous ont-ils pas donné les subsistances aux troupes qui étaient réellement en Hollande. Nous n'étions jamais assuré de huit jours. Ils étaient convaincus que leur Députés concluraient au moins une suspension d'armes. Ils attendaient ce moment pour nous faire sortir de leur territoire ou nous y affamer. Leur confiance aveugle les a perdu. Ils ont été attaqués et renversés sans se défendre. L'ennemi était à Utrecht qu'ils attendaient encore le courier qui devait apporter la paix. Les Anglais n'en étaient guère moins persuadés. Si le Stadhouder m'avait dit son état, avait voulu un corps qui se serait avancé à la droite des Anglais, et avait fourni ce corps des choses dont il avait besoin, je l'aurais donné ; et les postes qui n'ont pas été défendus, n'auraient pas été si facilement forcés. Jamais révolution n'a été aussi prompte. Six jours ont suffi pour que l'ennemi soit en possession de toutes les Provinces ; et toutes les places fortes ont ouvert leurs portes.

“Après la retraite des Anglais derrière l'Yssel, nous avions encore garnison à Arnheim, et nous avions couvert leur retraite. L'ennemi ayant fait marcher des troupes pour entourer Arnheim, et coupé à la garnison sa retraite sur l'Yssel, il fallut la faire retirer sur Doerburg, où nous avions nos magasins. Toute l'aile gauche resta à Deventer, Pandern, et partout où nous étions ci-devant. C'est à Doerburg que je tachai d'engager le Général Walmoe-den à rester à l'Yssel, qui était la dernière barrière qui couvrait la Westphalie et cette partie de l'Allemagne. L'état où il me dépeignit qu'était son armée lui rendait la chose difficile ; cependant il se déterminait. J'espérais que le dégel rendrait bientôt la défense de cette rivière très difficile ; il ne fallait que de la persévérance, et nous aurions réussi. J'avais le magasin de Doerburg à sauver. Les troupes Hanovriennes occupèrent Deventer, les Anglais Zivel et Campen, dont une partie cependant couvraient au-delà de Leins, et les autres assuraient vouloir y aller bientôt. Je fus à peine parti, que je reçus des lettres sur l'impossibilité de garder l'Yssel. Je priai de tenir ferme quelques jours ; je promis dès que le dégel s'annoncerait que je le garderais seul jusqu'à Campen. Je ne le pouvais plutôt, parceque le Wahl était gelé, et exigeait beaucoup de troupes pour le garder. Je faisais marcher des bataillons pour renforcer Alvinzi, et je m'engageais

lorsqu' ils devaient arriver, de prendre d'abord possession du Deventer et d'abord après de Zival et de Campen. Mais le Général Walmoeden m'écrivait en date du 30 de Janvier, que les Anglais avaient abandonnés sans ordre Zival et Campen ; qu'il avait envoyé des bataillons Hanovriens pour reprendre ces places. Si on les y laissait rentrer, ce qu'il avait prévu se vérifiait, et cela était tout simple. On trouva les portes fermées. Les bourgeois conseillèrent aux Hanovriens de se retirer, et ils s'en retournèrent. Ces villes avaient déjà appelé l'ennemi. Ces postes essentielles perdus, la droite des Hanovriens n'avait plus d'appui. Le Général Walmoeden quitta Deventer le 31 Janvier, et marcha derrière l'Ems. Nous avions autre chose à faire que de nous retirer également, et après avoir retiré tout le magasin de Doerburg, et celui de Zutphen, que j'ai oublié de dire que nous avions occupés aussi, en relevant les Hanovriens qui y étaient. Après y être resté quatre jours après leur retraite de Deventer, nous sommes marchés partie à Caufeld et Munster, et à la Lippe, où nous sommes. Mes efforts ont arrêté les Anglais et Hanovriens depuis le 17 jour de Janvier que nous avons quitté Arnheim pour venir à Doerburg, jusqu'au 31 de Mars qu'ils se sont retiré de Deventer et marché derrière l'Ems. Si le dégel était arrivé plutôt, je serais parvenu à le soutenir. Si les alliés avaient eu encore un peu de persévérance, je l'aurais également soutenu. Ils sont moins en sûreté, qu'ils ne l'étaient derrière l'Yssel, et ils en sont convaincu. Déjà les Anglais ont abandonné Cowerderd qui couvraient leur avant poste, sans en avoir reçu l'ordre. Si les chemins, qui sont dans très mauvais état, ou l'occupation de l'ennemi en Hollande, ne les empêche d'arriver, il est à craindre que les Anglais à leur approche ne se retirent, et n'aillent derrière le Wesel, et que les Français ne s'emparent de Bremen, et ne coupent, ou rendent bien difficile la communication avec l'Angleterre. Il ne m'est cependant pas possible de défendre l'Ems jusqu'à Embden, mais j'ai laissé beaucoup de troupes dans cette partie, et un corps assez considérable aux environs de Munster, destiné à s'avancer au cas de besoin jusqu'à Meppen pour soutenir l'armée Anglaise et Hanovrienne, qui se rassemblerait, j'espère, et aura la gauche à Meppen, ainsi que j'en ai prié le Comte Walmoeden. Et au cas qu'ils soient attaqués, ce corps près de Munster, lequel s'avancera à Bheren, arrivera facilement à Meppen, et y attaquera l'ennemi. Il faut pour cela que le Comte de Walmoeden concentre les troupes. J'espère qu'il le fera. Nous ferons tous nos efforts jusqu'à l'arrivée de l'armée Prussienne qui s'est mise en marche hier pour se rendre en Westphalie. Mais comme elle ne peut dans cette saison marcher que par des parties, et que sa marche sera une peu lente, la tête ne pourra arriver à Hamme que vers le 10 du mois prochain ; et jusqu'à ce temps l'ennemi pourrait faire des progrès. J'entre dans tous ces détails pour que vous ayez une idée de ce que nous avons fait, et de ce que nous faisons encore, afin que vous puissiez l'expliquer à qui l'appartient, puisque je ne doute pas que j'aurai des ennemis qui tacheront de faire sur moi une partie de cette affreuse catastrophe. Les lettres du Comte de Walmoeden suffisent pour me légitimer si on m'oblige ; mais je voudrais qu'on m'épargne de donner cette publicité. D'ailleurs je le crois trop honnête pour craindre qu'il ne m'ait pas rendu la justice que je crois avoir mérité.

“Je joins ici une lettre pour Son Altesse Royale le Duc d'York, où je n'entre dans aucun détail sur la Hollande et l'Yssel, où je lui dis, en général, j'espère que le Général Walmoeden aura bien voulu me rendre justice ; mais je lui donne plus de détail sur notre position actuelle, et sur ce que j'ai proposé à Walmoeden pour concourir à la défense de la Westphalie, et, par conséquent, de l'Electorat d'Hanovre. Je vous

prie de plaider ma cause envers ceux qui m'accuseront. Le court abrégé que je vous ai fait est sincère et véritable. J'en ai les preuves. Je les rendrai publiques s'il le faut, et si vous me le conseillez. Je vous enverrai des copies de tout ce qui a été fait et proposé, et certainement ma bonne volonté peut être démontrée. Ecrivez-moi donc ce qu'on dit; et faites usage de ce que je vous ai écrit vis-à-vis de ceux dont l'opinion m'intéresse beaucoup. J'attends de vos lettres avec bien de l'impatience; elles seront fort intéressantes pour moi. Sollicitez qu'on nous paye exactement ce qui est promis pour le mois de Janvier. On n'a voulu donner que cinquante mille livres sterlings au lieu de cent.

"Lorsque les Prussiens seront arrivés en Westphalie, nous nous rapprocherons de l'armée du Haut Rhin. On disait ces jours passés que le Duc de Brunswick commanderait l'armée en Westphalie, mais cela n'est pas encore décidé. Je sais bien ce que je désire, moi. Si je décidais ceux qui doivent commander, ce serait assurément de n'être pas du nombre.

"Je ne vous ai envoyé qu'une lettre du Comte Walmoeden. S'il était nécessaire de donner plus de conviction, je vous en enverrai d'avantage, et pour ne laisser aucune doute.

"J'ai déferé d'écrire au Duc d'York, avant de savoir l'impression que cet événement a fait à Londres.

"Si vous pouviez là, faire persuader de faire écrire à M. Brook Watson pour qu'il paye régulièrement. Il dit toujours ne pas savoir les intentions du Duc."

*French. Copy.*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795 [February 20-28].—"You will recollect that Tintinnac [Tintinniae] and De la Robrie [Roberie] are both to go to-night, and will have the goodness, therefore, to direct that the two letters, of which you were making out the drafts this morning, should be prepared and sent to me, if you like it, either in Hill Street or in the House of Commons.

"What you do think of sending Monsieur de Miran with a small salary to Turin, to be in the way of procuring intelligence, and improving any advantages that may offer in the southern parts of France?

"You will not forget letters to Trevor, Wyndham, and the Consul at Leghorn, to assist in the formation and transport of the corps of Baron de Roll, Dillon, and any other corps that we may raise in that quarter. I propose to send by D'Artez a copy of the capitulation with Baron Roll, and Mr. Wycombe, I think, should have instructions to close with any proposal of the same form made by persons who can be relied upon for fulfilling it. A regiment so raised, and passed over company by company, seems to afford the only hope of having a sufficient force in Corsica before an attack shall be made upon it."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, February 20-28, Downing Street].—"I have been trying to put together what, according to my ideas, should be the instruction on this unfortunate subject of Prussia, and have desired a Cabinet to be fixed for twelve tomorrow. I should wish much to see you first, and will be at leisure whenever you please at eleven. The more I think on the business the more uneasiness I feel at what you seemed likely to determine, and I want much to talk it over with you at large. I cannot help thinking that the real point of honour and duty in such difficulties as the present lies the other way; and, at all events, I am sure you

will not wonder at my anxiety to tell you all that on reflection strikes me."

#### OFFICIAL NOTE.

1795 [February].—"Sa Majesté Britannique ayant fait à son Altesse Sérénissime le Prince Stadhoudre la proposition de donner aux commandants des forteresses, des troupes et des vaisseaux appartenants à la République des Provinces-Unies l'ordre de se mettre sous la protection de sa Majesté, vu les circonstances dans laquelle la République se trouve par l'occupation de la Province de Hollande par une force ennemie, sa Majesté s'engage, de la manière la plus formelle, qu'elle tiendra qu'en dépôt tout vaisseau, forteresse, ou place quelconque, qui se mettra sous sa protection en conséquence du dit ordre, et qu'elle les restituera à la République des Provinces-Unies dès que sa Majesté et la République se trouveront en paix avec la France, et que l'indépendance de la République et sa Constitution légitime, garantie par sa Majesté en 1788, seront assurées.

*French.*

#### MINUTE of LORD GRENVILLE on the PROJECT of a NEW CONVENTION between GREAT BRITAIN and PRUSSIA.

1795, January-March.--"The three points proposed are—

1. "To supply bread and forage for 60,000 men\* during their continuance on the left bank of the Ems.

2. "To pay a given sum† after the Prussians have crossed the Yssel, and a further sum‡ when the French are compelled to recross the Waal.

3. "To guaranty the payment of a still further sum§ when the Government of the Stadtholder is restored in the North Provinces.

"The King of Prussia is to be required to break off the negotiations at Basle, to engage not to make peace without our consent, unless France restores all she has conquered from the different belligerent Powers, or at least from Great Britain or the North Provinces.

"In examining this question, it may be taken as a point on which there is no doubt that the sincere and active co-operation of the Prussian army in the next campaign, if it could be secured, would be fully worth the pecuniary compensation proposed to be paid for it.

"The points to be considered are these—

1. "Is there any probability of obtaining *such* a co-operation at the price now proposed, or indeed by any pecuniary sacrifice whatever?

2. "If not, then will the advantage of a doubtful and precarious support from Prussia be a sufficient compensation for the expense to be incurred, and the inconveniences to be encountered in making this proposal, and in carrying it into effect if it should be accepted?

"With respect to the first point, it depends wholly on a view of the present state and system of the Cabinet of Berlin. Some reliance seems to be placed on the supposed opinions of the King in favour of the war, and on his desire for military glory. But both these arguments were still more strongly and confidently urged last year, and the event showed that no solid conclusion could be drawn from them. He is either so unsteady in his own principles, or so much under the guidance of unprincipled men, or both, that all considerations of the nature above-mentioned, joined to the most solemn engagements of treaty were insufficient to prevent his withholding his military assistance during the summer, and opening a negotiation with France in the winter.

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\* Expense, say, 1,600,000*l.* for 12 months or 1,200,000*l.* for nine.

† 400,000*l.*

‡ 100,000*l.*

§ 1,200,000.

"With respect, therefore, to the King's personal character, and to the inferences to be drawn from any supposed opinions and views of his, these points stand precisely on the same ground now as they did last year, when the Prussian treaty was made and broken.

"With respect to the state of his Court, it is not pretended that any fresh ground of confidence can be derived from the character or views of any man about the King of Prussia. *Prince Henry* has at present the appearance of greater influence than he has ever had under this reign. But this, if it exists, will be used against us. Lord Malmesbury last year relied much upon the character and supposed interest of *Count Haugwitz*, but the event showed the insecurity of this ground of hope; since *Haugwitz* was the very man who, in subsequent stages of the business, was employed to vindicate the breach of the treaty he had made. Till *Möllendorf* had been tried, his integrity and favourable dispositions to the cause were much relied on. Since his appointment to the command every step he has taken has contradicted both those opinions. The *Duke of Brunswick* appears for the moment to be eager in the restoration of the former concert, and in the prosecution of the war. But till within these few weeks he has been so completely in disgrace at Berlin that, as Lord Malmesbury tells us, he hardly received civil answers to his letters, not only from the King, but even from General *Bishopswerder*. The best that can be hoped for from his influence is the momentary prevalence of one party or set of opinions over another. But to the maintenance of a permanent weight with the King of Prussia he is evidently unequal, since he has always failed in the attempt. Even to make the attempt he must be always with the King; and yet the best or indeed the only use to be made of him is to put him at the head of the army, keeping the King at a distance from it. *Lucchesini's* character and views need not be stated, since all agree that, in order to give any hopes of success to the present plan, he must be kept at a distance from the King.

"Under these circumstances there seems little ground of belief that the present dispositions of the Court of Berlin are favourable to our cause; and still less that they could be kept steady to any line we might wish them to pursue, and which should not exactly accord with their own views of their interest at the moment.

"Can we then make it so clearly and unquestionably the interest of Prussia to push the war against France, in conjunction with us, as to give any just ground of confidence on that head?

"The supposed inducements are those which arise from their pecuniary interest, from their situation as with respect to Holland, from the fear of Russia, and from the general apprehension of the prevalence of French principles.

"To examine these separately. First as to the pecuniary interest; it does not seem to be apprehended that even the whole amount to be received in the event of the most successful campaign would do more than to put into the King of Prussia's treasury, after defraying all expenses, a sum of from 500,000 to 1,000,000, and, in the event of failing in the ultimate object, the expense\* would probably more than balance the receipt.

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\* Last year 1,800,000*l.* was stated as necessary to pay bread and forage for 60,000 men, and other expenses for 30,000. This sum is therefore insufficient for the whole expense of 60,000. But 1,200,000*l.* plus 400,000*l.*, is only 1,600,000*l.*, so that at the end of nine months he would have received, even after passing the *Yssel*, 200,000*l.* less than he bargained for last year. If it is said that the calculation of 1,800,000*l.* took in 12 months, we must then add to the 1,600,000*l.*, 200,000*l.*, and the result will still give only 200,000*l.* to pay all the expenses of 30,000 men except the bread and forage.

"He is then to act for a speculation, more or less doubtful according to different opinions of the chance of success, but the best issue of which cannot give him more than about a million, while the worst event may leave him considerably poorer than at present. But it surely cannot be doubted that he might easily obtain from France, as the price of peace on their terms, at least as much money as he could, in the best event of the proposed bargain, obtain from us. And if you suppose him to conclude the bargain with us not meaning to keep it, he might get from us 600,000*l.*, or the value of three months' magazines, and the rest from France.

"His interest as to the state of Holland is indisputably very considerable. But may he not justly reason that he can have a connection with Holland only through the medium of one of the two great Powers, England or France; and that if he is to look to a political system with France, it is of great consequence to him to maintain instead of weakening the French interest in Holland.

"In the same manner, his fears of Russia may operate to produce either of the two effects of peace or war, according as he thinks he shall be stronger as with respect to Russia, by having France no longer an enemy, or by having Great Britain again *in some degree* a friend. And of the two the former seems the most reasonable supposition, and the most likely to operate as a motive for his conduct. It being evidently impracticable for us to obviate in his mind the effects of the steps we have already taken to form connections with the two Imperial Courts.

"On the subject of the danger of the prevalence of French opinions, it is evident that, whatever the personal sentiments of the King may be, his Government acts on no such persuasion; his whole conduct from the beginning of 1793 up to this time, and most of all at the present moment, being in direct contradiction to any such opinion.

"If, in addition to motives of personal intrigues, and of corruption in some of the individuals who surround the King, we are to look for any general or systematic principle prevalent in the councils of the Court of Berlin, it is unquestionably a rooted jealousy and hatred of Austria.

"Under this impression what object of interest can be supposed to be equally important to that Government with the preventing Austria from recovering the Netherlands? and what other clue will so naturally explain the whole political conduct of the King of Prussia since the commencement of the war, as a determination to prevent the acquisition of a barrier to Austria on that side, while that object was in question; and afterwards a determination to hinder the recovery of those Provinces.

"If this be, as I believe, the real principle of action at Berlin, it is evident that we cannot have from that quarter a cordial co-operation in our views; because they are directed precisely to the attainment of that which Prussia most desires to obstruct. And in that case not only the engagements now proposed will be found insufficient for the purpose of obtaining that co-operation, but it is unattainable by any pecuniary sacrifice which we can make.

"If then we cannot reckon with any reasonable ground of confidence on cordial and zealous co-operation from Prussia, either from a view of the present disposition of that Court, or of the system of policy which it is pursuing, shall we negotiate in the hopes of purchasing by money a doubtful and precarious support, depending only on the degree of precision with which we can limit the conditions and proportion the course of payment to that of the services rendered? It is urged in favour of this measure that, by the assignment of local positions for

the Prussian army on the maintenance of which our payments are to depend, we shall at least secure some support, though possibly less than we might claim; that we shall certainly prevent the immediate conclusion of peace, and probably delay if not prevent the invasion of Westphalia, and the interruption of our communications of every sort with the Continent. And it is said that these objects will be cheaply purchased at the expense which will thus be paid for them, or even at some additional charge, supposing our expense prolonged some time beyond the period when the assistance of Prussia ceases.

“To these considerations I oppose—

1. “The uncertainty of an assistance depending not on any mutual opinion of common interest in the same cause, but on stipulations which, while on the one hand they carry the open appearance of mutual distrust, must on the other hand be always inadequate to operate as a real check against ill faith.

“It seems to me to be beyond all doubt that, even while the King of Prussia were to keep his army in either of the two first positions specified in the proposals, he might, by collusion with the French, render its presence there of very little benefit to us, while it continued to act apparently in our cause; and, at the same time, keep us in a state of constant jealousy and alarm lest he should withdraw his force, or even turn it against us.

2. “The danger that by negotiating at all with Prussia under the present circumstances we alienate the Austrian and Russian Governments, with whom it should be our policy to endeavour to form the closest union; which can never happen while they are persuaded that we are ready at any moment to resume our former connections and intimacy with Berlin.

“The hope of uniting those three Courts in one common system is one which neither our past experience nor any view of their present situation and disposition towards each other seem to justify. If this cannot be done, the option must be made, and being made, must be adhered to.

3. “The danger that these proposals will be used by Prussia only as a means of obtaining better terms from France, and of maintaining a better countenance at Petersburg and Vienna on the subject of Poland. I differ from those who think that it is for our advantage to enable the King of Prussia to get better terms of peace from France. Because it is at least possible that without the operation and effect which the knowledge of your proposals may produce at Paris, the Committee of Public Safety either may not be disposed, or may not be able, to give him such terms of peace as he can accept without losing all weight in the Empire and in Europe. And because, it being evidently his object to follow up his own separate peace with measures for dictating a general pacification to the other belligerent Powers, whatever gives him weight and consideration assists this plan, the execution of which is evidently contrary to our interests. And even with a view to public impression here a pacification between France and Prussia, on just and reasonable terms, would be more injurious in its effects than one by which the Convention should manifest more plainly the views of ambition and aggrandizement by which it is actuated.

4. “The great danger of our contributing to support in Westphalia, at the expense of this country, an army which, even if it were to act in the first instance agreeably to our wishes by defending that part of Germany, would, on the very first appearance of success on our part in any other quarter, be infallibly so employed as to weaken and distress

our operations, and might probably in the end be turned against us, in order to prevent Austria from recovering the Netherlands.

5. "The unfavourable impression which this treaty must produce in Parliament when it comes to be discussed; because with the exception of the case which is hardly to be hoped, of the Prussian army driving the French beyond the Waal, the operations of that force would, in any other event, be infallibly considered as inadequate to the expense incurred. And if the case should happen, which I think the most likely, of our being again deserted in the middle of the campaign after such a treaty, the discredit it would throw upon Government must be such as to weaken if not destroy any hope of obtaining the support of Parliament for another campaign, supposing it should be found necessary to continue the war.

"Of these objections the greater part apply with at least equal force to the opening of such a negotiation as to the conclusion of the treaty. The overture cannot be concealed from the knowledge of Austria and Russia. The King of Prussia has in all cases an interest in making it known at Paris. And if disclosed there it cannot be expected to remain a secret here. Whatever impression therefore is to be feared from the effect of the treaty upon the conduct of the Courts of Petersburg or Vienna will equally be produced by a knowledge of the offer. The objection respecting the facilitating a peace between Prussia and France supposes the failure of the negotiation. And the difficulty here would (if not equally great) be very considerable, if we had to defend the making to the King of Prussia an humiliating and fruitless offer of fresh pecuniary assistance, after having broken off the treaty last year on the ground of his ill faith."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, March 2, Downing Street].—"I send you the draft I have made of the minute according to what I conceived to be the idea adopted yesterday. If it does not find you at home, I have desired it to be carried on. It would be useless to tell you on how many accounts I am miserable at what appears to be your determination. I am not at all sure, however, that the decision will not be different tomorrow, and if it is, tho' I shall feel comfort in one respect, I am not sure, that with my view of the question, I shall not be at least as ill satisfied as now.

"Whatever happens, I am sure your mind will go before any suggestions of mine in avoiding *éclat*, or any suspicion *at this moment* of the particular point in question, the premature knowledge of which would in every view be fatal. If the opinion of yesterday is confirmed, I see no way of attaining this end but your letting the dispatch be signed by Dundas or the Duke of Portland, and deferring the execution of your intentions till after the conclusion of the treaty, which must be also near the conclusion of the Session. It is impossible that such a thing as your quitting can take place at the same time with the change in Ireland, or while any material business is to be done here, without increased mischief."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1795, March, Dover Street.—"Feeling every hour more confirmed in my opinion of the effect which the decision of yesterday must



necessarily have upon my personal situation, I rather think it would be better that the King should hear it from me by letter, before I see him on Wednesday. But as I perfectly share in Lord Mansfield's dislike to manifestoes and protests, when people are acting in friendship and confidence towards each other, my idea would be merely to state the fact of the difference of opinion, and my sense of the impropriety of my undertaking to execute what I fear will be so detrimental to the great cause in which we are all embarked, and then to add only, in a few words, that I trust this change of situation will still leave me the means of being in some degree useful by contributing, at least as far as my abilities will enable me, to the support of his government, and manifesting on every occasion my unalterable sentiments of gratitude and duty to him.

"If you see no objection to this way of doing it, do not give yourself the trouble of writing. If you do, let me know it. I have as yet said nothing to any of our colleagues, nor will I till after Tuesday, unless you think it better I should."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1795, March 3, Dover Street.—"I enclose the letter which you sent me from M. de Miran. I have considered the subject, and I confess I cannot see how he can in any manner be usefully employed under the Foreign Department at a time when there seems so little prospect of *our* being concerned in any operations in the South of France, or indeed of anything useful being done in that quarter. This reason alone has prevented my seeing him, as I felt that I would have no proposal to make to him. How far his ideas of being put at the head of any French corps can be made practicable you are a better judge than myself, but I own I fear nothing of that kind can be of much service in that quarter of Europe."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, March 2-7, Downing Street].—"Our Meeting on the Bill is twelve to-day here. I have written to the Duke of Portland to propose a Cabinet at Burlington House at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 8 this evening. I send you a letter from the King which I have just received. In the first moment he seems to me to have suggested a line which may in some degree unite opinions.

"Be so good to return the King's letter or bring it with you."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 8, London.—"Comme je crains de ne pas réussir à avoir l'honneur de vous voir aujourd'hui, et que la nature des objets dont je désirerais vous entretenir me paraît aussi urgente qu'importante, je vais prendre la liberté de vous transmettre mes idées par écrit. Ce n'est point le Ministre de l'Empereur qui parle officiellement au Secrétaire d'Etat, c'est un honnête homme, et un homme d'honneur plein de confiance dans l'amitié de Milord Grenville, et pénétré de considération pour son caractère et ses talens personnels, qui ose lui parler avec franchise sur les circonstances du moment.

"Je suis trop intimement convaincu, Milord, que cette lettre ne vous passera pas, et que vous voudrez bien me garder le plus profond secret

sur ce que je pourrai vous confier, pour me permettre la moindre réticence envers vous. Soit que nous nous accordions à la fin (comme j'aime à n'en pas douter) ou que nous ne nous entendions pas sur l'affaire de l'emprunt que nos sublimes financiers n'ont pas même compris jusqu'à présent, je crois pouvoir vous assurer avec une connaissance certaine que l'Empereur est déterminé à continuer la guerre, et à y employer une armée de 200 mille hommes. Malgré les conseils et les demandes de paix dont on l'accable, Sa Majesté Impériale est fermement résolue à n'y jamais entendre que du consentement et de l'aveu de l'Angleterre. M. le Baron de Thugut est le seul Ministre qui fortifie mon souverain dans cette résolution, et comme il est en même temps le seul Ministre en crédit, et qui soit exclusivement écouté, il est, par cette raison même, précieux à la bonne cause. C'est du moins le jugement qu'ose porter ici le Ministre de la Cour de Vienne, employé dans les Cours étrangères, que l'idée d'une paix honteuse révolte, et qui désire la continuation d'une guerre dont il croit entrevoir l'issue la plus favorable, pourvu qu'elle soit conduite avec vigueur et sagesse.

“Le plus ou le moins d'accord qui s'établira entre nos deux Cours en conséquence de la tournure que prendra l'affaire de l'emprunt influera donc moins sur le nombre des troupes à employer, que sur le mode et la localité de cet emploi.

“Je ne vous cacherai pas qu'avec la certitude de la pureté de nos vues, et de notre bonne volonté, je tremble pour la succès de la campagne que nous allons commencer, et qui me paraît indubitablement la dernière que nos finances et notre population puissent nous permettre.

“Nous sommes bientôt au milieu du mois de Mars, et nous n'avons aucune connaissance du plan de campagne, parceque, selon toute apparence, on n'en a arrêté aucun. On vit du jour au lendemain, et la conclusion en sera peut-être un système défensif tout aussi ruineux pour nous que la guerre la plus active, et beaucoup plus utile à l'ennemi, à qui il offrira des avantages sans lui présenter des dangers. La paresse, le dégoût, l'ignorance, et peut-être la mauvaise volonté des conseillers qui environnent la personne de mon maître, pourront finir, à force d'importunités et de raisonnemens aussi peu conséquens que ceux qu'on fait sur l'emprunt, par lui faire adopter cette méthode dangereuse de combattre un ennemi dont l'activité et l'audace entreprenante ne se démentent que lorsqu'on l'attaque de la même manière dont il cherche à nous entamer.

“Agité et tourmenté de ces tristes réflexions, je cherchai depuis plusieurs semaines les moyens de prévenir le malheur d'une détermination si facile à prévoir, et j'étais sur le point de désespérer d'y réussir lorsque le hasard me fit rencontrer ici le général Français des Rosières, dont je connaissais depuis longtemps le mérite et les talens distingués. Quoique généralement peu prévenu en faveur des Français, je me crois obligé de rendre ici un hommage éclatant aux profondes connaissances de cet officier supérieur, dont la réputation et le nom sont connus en Europe.

“En m'entretenant plusieurs fois avec M. des Rosières j'eus l'occasion de connaître dans un très grand détail le projet qu'il pourrait proposer pour la campagne prochaine, et je fus singulièrement frappé de la grandeur et de la clarté de ses idées ainsi que, non seulement des possibilités, mais même des facilités qu'il présente pour l'exécution de son plan.

“M. des Rosières se contente du nombre de troupes que nous sommes certain de pouvoir mettre en campagne; la co-opération

Prussienne est absolument passée sous silence; il semble ne pas se flatter d'un grand secours à obtenir de l'armée de l'Empire; il donne des moyens de tirer un grand parti des diversions de l'intérieur, peut-être l'arme la plus utile contre l'anarchie Française. Il arrive au même but avec trois armées, par trois chemins différens, sans s'arrêter à des sièges dont il craint les longueurs, et qu'il sait éviter sans danger. Il s'occupe des vivres et des fourrages, et cette dernière considération, appuyée de beaucoup d'autres raisons du plus grands poids, le porte à déclarer qu'il ne faut entrer en campagne qu'au mois de Juin.

"Cette détermination nous donnerait le temps de soumettre ce plan à Vienne, et de parvenir, en la pressant, à faire décider ma Cour encore à temps, malgré toutes les lenteurs qui lui sont inhérentes.

"Il me semble donc qu'il serait à propos que le Ministère Britannique, après avoir donné l'ordre à M. des Rosières de lui présenter la rédaction de son plan, le fit examiner par quelques militaires Anglais de distinction, et, qu'en cas d'approbation, nous nous concertassions immédiatement ensemble pour l'envoyer à Vienne par un officier Anglais et un Autrichien que se trouve ici. Il serait d'une haute importance d'ouvrir les yeux à notre Cabinet sur son propre intérêt qu'il ne pourrait pas manquer de reconnaître. Les moyens d'obtenir une détermination prompte sont de présenter, d'une part, une grande fermeté, et de l'autre, l'appas d'un avantage que vous saurez deviner. Si vous voulez entrer plus en détail sur cet objet, vous daignerez me donner vos ordres. J'aurai l'honneur de me rendre chez vous, et de vous communiquer mes idées que mon zèle et mon désir du bien m'ont suggéré, et qu'il m'a semblé que le devoir ne me permettait pas de taire au point où nous en sommes. Pardonnez-moi cette longue épître. Votre amitié pour moi me saura gré de ma confiance illimitée, et votre bon esprit vous fera rendre justice au motif qui m'anime.

"Je ne me suis ouvert sur tout ceci qu'à M. Pitt que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir avant hier, et à qui j'ai dit que je me proposais de vous entretenir à fond sur cette matière, et dans l'étendue de la confiance la plus intime."

*French.*

C. GODDARD to W. WICKHAM.

1795, March 10, Dover Street.—"I am directed by Lord Grenville to acquaint you that as, in consequence of the dispatch which you will receive by this messenger, you may have occasion for money immediately, and possibly to the amount of thirty thousand pounds for the objects stated in that dispatch, you are at liberty, at any time after the receipt of this letter, to draw bills upon the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs here for any sum within the above limits. But as, in the uncertainty which at present exists with respect to the necessity which you may find for availing yourself of this permission, no steps can be taken here towards providing for the payment of such bills as you may draw, it will be extremely material that you should, as soon as you are able to ascertain the sum for which you have occasion, apprise Lord Grenville of it by letter; mentioning at the same time the number of bills which you may have drawn or be on the point of drawing upon Lord Grenville, the respective value of each bill, and their total amount. You will further observe that the bills should be made payable at a certain number of days (thirty at least) after sight, in order that time may be afforded for preparing the money for their payment; and, if six weeks can be given by you with-

out inconvenience to the service for which the money is granted, it would be still more advantageous with the same view."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

✓ 1795, March 11 [London].—"The nomination which has this day taken place of Lord Camden to the Lieutenancy of Ireland relieves my mind from recollections that have given me the severest pain. I have dismissed from it every part of those unpleasant impressions, and remember nothing that has passed for four months save the declarations of your affection to me. I had thoughts of employing your good little wife to explain this; but why do we want any mediation or any explanation? Who or what is to interfere between us upon such a subject? If these sentiments meet your's, let me know when I can call upon you, and assure you that I am, with very unabated and earnest cordiality, your very affectionate brother."

JOHN JAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 15, Royal Hotel, Pall Mall.—"When the last vessel which arrived here from New York left that place, intelligence of the conclusion of the treaty had been received. No letters by that vessel have as yet to come to my hands. I therefore presume she did not bring any for me. I cannot find that the treaty had then arrived.

"All the vessels bound from hence to New York have sailed except one, which will be ready early in April; and I purpose to return in her, unless some unexpected circumstance should occur to prevent me. As that may *possibly*, though not *probably* be the case, I think it best to be silent on the subject for the present; but the attention due from me to your Lordship induces me to apprise you of it."

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 19, Lord Grosvenor Street.—"I received this afternoon your letter dated the 17th instant, with the inclosure from Count Starhemberg.

"The plan of M. de Rosières certainly holds out some convenient circumstances, and I should advise your seeing Count Starhemberg as soon as you can, and desiring him to prevail on M. de Rosière to give his ideas in writing immediately for the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers.

"I have always heard M. de Rosière very highly spoken of, especially by my friend the Marquis de Bouillé, and although I must confess that I do not at present entertain any very sanguine hopes either of a spirited conduct on the part of the Court of Vienna, or of their making a moderately successful campaign, I shall be glad to see what can be said by an able officer upon the subject, and will give the best opinion in my power on the practicability of his propositions.

"I see no good in shewing Starhemberg's letter to Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas, but think that no time should be lost in procuring the plan in writing, in which state it will be much easier to judge of it, than by a conversation with Monsieur de Rosière."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, March 19, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to submit to your Majesty the minute of the opinion of your Majesty's

confidential servants respecting the measures to be adopted on the subject of any ships of war which may be fitted out from the Dutch ports."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure.*

1795, March 19, Downing Street.—

Present :

The Lord Chancellor, Lord President, Lord Privy Seal, Duke of Portland, Earl Spencer, Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Pitt, Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville.

"Upon consideration of the present state of Holland, and of the grounds which exist for believing that the French have taken possession of the Dutch fleets in the harbours of the Republic, and are taking measures for fitting out some of the Dutch ships of war to act against this country, his Majesty's servants agree humbly to represent to his Majesty that it may be proper that orders should be given in the most secret manner to the commanding officers of any of his Majesty's fleets or squadrons who may be likely to fall in with any such ships of war, to detain the same and bring them into the ports of Great Britain; and that the said officers should be authorized to use force, if it should be necessary for that purpose."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 20, Queen's House.—"The Minute of Cabinet which I have just received from Lord Grenville on the subject of the Dutch fleet meets with my fullest concurrence, and I approve of Lord Grenville's sending the necessary orders for that purpose to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty."

LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1795, March 21, Dover Street.—"I am ashamed of having so long delayed sending your Grace the enclosed. I have endeavoured as much as possible not only that the recital should be strictly and minutely accurate but also that it should be free from all colouring or aggravation of those points which we have so much reason to lament. I am anxious to know that your Grace thinks I have succeeded in this, and I hope that, if in any instance it strikes you that I have failed, you will point it out to me without difficulty."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure.*

MEMORANDUM OF LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March .—"When the union of the persons who are joined in the present Government was formed in July last, the office of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was destined to Lord Fitz-William, as soon as it should be found practicable to open a proper situation for Lord Westmorland in England. Before the means of making such an arrangement were found, the intention of appointing Lord Fitz-William as the successor of Lord Westmorland became known in Ireland.

The appointment was talked of as immediate, and it was reported that a complete change in the system of Irish Government, both as to men and measures, was intended. Some explanation having taken place here on these points in the course of the autumn, it appeared that Lord Fitz-William had, in fact, formed the intention of removing Lord Fitz-Gibbon from the office of Lord Chancellor, and a variety of other circumstances appeared to some of his colleagues to give too much countenance to the apprehensions of an intended change of system in Ireland. The removal of Lord Fitz-Gibbon was objected to on their part as being inconsistent with the principles on which the union had been formed here; and the same principle was stated by them as applying to the removal of the old servants of Government, and to any other measure which would have the appearance either of introducing a new system, or of casting imputations on the conduct of former Governments in Ireland.

"It appears that Lord Fitz-William conceives himself to have stated to Mr. Pitt, in one of their conversations during this period, his intention of removing Mr. Beresford, but not to have received any answer from him on this subject. Mr. Pitt has no recollection of any idea of Mr. Beresford's removal having been ever mentioned, or even hinted.

"After much discussion on the subject of Lord Fitz-Gibbon's removal, that idea was renounced, and the most explicit assurances were given by Lord Fitz-William that he had not in view the establishment of any new system in Ireland, but that he was desirous of strengthening his Government by the accession of Mr. Ponsonby and his friends, and the support of Mr. Grattan. A mode was, about the same time, found for carrying into effect a proper arrangement respecting Lord Westmorland, and these two points of difficulty being thus removed, it was agreed that a meeting should be held at Mr. Pitt's, at which all the other points that had occurred respecting Ireland should be discussed, in order that it should be considered whether they could be satisfactorily arranged, so that no further delay might arise to the appointment of Lord Fitz-William.

"This meeting was accordingly held at Mr. Pitt's on the ———.

"There were present, the Duke of Portland, Lord Fitz-William, Lord Spencer, Lord Grenville, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Windham. The points which were discussed at this meeting, and the conclusions adopted respecting them were as follows:—

1. "The appointment of a Provost; with respect to which it was agreed that the choice should be made from among the fellows of the College, although Lord Westmorland had already made a different recommendation. A doubt was started whether the person named by Lord Fitz-William was the fittest of that description; but the decision of this point was left to him.

2. "Mr. W. Ponsonby was proposed by Lord Fitz-William for Secretary of State. It was objected that this office ought to be annexed to that of Chief Secretary. The advantage of such an arrangement was strongly pressed. The inconvenience of having an Irish Secretary of State in the House of Commons of Ireland was urged; and this inconvenience was stated as likely to be greater in the case of a person of the description of Mr. Ponsonby, who might so naturally look to give to that office a weight and efficacy incompatible with the present situation of the Chief Secretary, and with the strength of the English Government in Ireland. In answer to these objections, Lord Fitz-William strongly urged the necessity of his bringing forward Mr. W. Ponsonby, for which he said there was no other opening. It

was then proposed to him that Mr. Ponsonby might be made Keeper of the Signet, and the office of Secretary of State be annexed to that of Chief Secretary. And this arrangement was, after much difficulty and discussion, agreed to by Lord Fitz-William.

3. "Lord Fitz-William proposed that Mr. G. Ponsonby should be made Attorney-General. To this the strongest objections were stated; the situation and merits of Mr. Wolfe; the natural claims of Mr. Toler the Solicitor-General; and the impropriety of bringing Mr. G. Ponsonby at once into the office of Attorney-General, a measure which, when coupled with the appointment of Mr. W. Ponsonby, would, it was said, countenance the opinion of a change of system in Ireland.

"It was admitted by Lord Fitz-William that Mr. Wolfe could not, with propriety, be removed except by such an arrangement as he should fully agree to, but an opinion was expressed that such an arrangement might, without difficulty, be effected by opening to Mr. Wolfe the first seat in one of the Courts of Law. But no idea was intimated by Lord Fitz-William of removing Mr. Wolfe from his present office against his inclination.

4. "Supposing that Mr. Wolfe were thus provided for, Lord Fitz-William stated that Mr. G. Ponsonby might properly be made Attorney-General; and urged his supposed unwillingness to serve as Solicitor-General under Mr. Toler. The propriety of this objection was not admitted, and, after further discussion, it was suggested that, supposing Mr. Wolfe removed to the Bench, an arrangement of a similar nature might be found which should be satisfactory to Mr. Toler. But it was still objected that, even in that case, the impropriety of bringing Mr. G. Ponsonby at once to the office of Attorney-General would not be removed, and it was at last agreed that Lord Fitz-William should endeavour, in the first instance, to make a satisfactory arrangement for Mr. Toler, in order that Mr. G. Ponsonby might be made Solicitor-General under Mr. Wolfe. There was some discussion respecting the nature of the arrangement to be proposed to Mr. Toler; and it was distinctly expressed, and agreed to by Lord Fitz-William, that the just claims of Mr. Toler were to be satisfied, taking them on the grounds of his situation such as it stood with Lord Westmorland, so that he should not be called upon to accede to any proposal to which there should not be just reason to believe that he would have acceded had Lord Westmorland continued to hold the Government.

"No mention was made at this conversation of Mr. Curran; nor was it known to some of the persons there present that Lord Fitz-William had ever thought of proposing that gentleman for Solicitor-General, till after Lord Fitz-William's arrival in Ireland, when that arrangement became the subject of public discussion there.

5. "In the reports which had reached this country of the language held by Lord Fitz-William's connections in Ireland, it had been mentioned that some additional offices which had been established by Lord Buckingham, particularly in the Revenue Boards, were to be abolished.

"This subject had once before been in discussion, and it had been explained by Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt that they considered themselves as parties to the measures of Lord Buckingham in Ireland, and could not, on that account, independently of other considerations, concur in any measure which should appear to reflect on him. In consequence of this explanation, Lord Fitz-William had disavowed any intention of doing anything injurious to Lord Buckingham's character, but the measure which was in question had not been satisfactorily explained.

"At the conversation now spoken of, Lord Fitz-William mentioned this subject, stating that he conceived that such an arrangement might be made by the appointment of a Commission of Accounts as might diminish the number of the Commissioners of the Revenue Boards; but without injuring any of the persons who then sat there, or appearing to throw any reflection on those who had proposed or concurred in the present establishment. Lord Fitz-William entered a little into the detail of this plan, but it soon appeared that he was by no means acquainted with the subject, which was, on the other hand, not thoroughly understood in its details (even as to the present state of those Boards) by any of the other persons present.

"It was then suggested to Lord Fitz-William that, on a point of that nature, it was impossible then to settle any plan or arrangement in this country. That, till after his arrival in Ireland, he could not even decide on the general propriety and still less the particular details of any such measure. That, after his explicit disavowal of all intention to introduce a new system, or to countenance imputations on the former Government of Ireland, his colleagues would willingly leave it to him to consider the subject, on such information as he might receive respecting it in Ireland; desiring only that, before any such measure was adopted, they might have the opportunity of deliberating upon it.

6. "Nothing was intimated in this conversation of any idea of removing Mr. Beresford, nor was even his name mentioned by Lord Fitz-William; although the different means which might be adopted for lessening the number of the Commissioners of the Revenue Boards formed a part of what he stated on the subject of those Boards.

"The appointment of a Primate, respecting which there was no difference of opinion, and some other subjects of less importance, having been also mentioned, the question of further concession to the Catholics was discussed, though not much at length. The subject was considered as one of much delicacy, and no decided sentiment as to the line which it might ultimately be right to adopt upon it was expressed by any person present. The result of the discussion was an unanimous opinion that Lord Fitz-William should inform himself in Ireland as to the state and disposition of the country in this respect, and should transmit that information, with his opinion, to the King's servants here; that he should, as much as possible, endeavour to prevent the agitation of the question during the present session; and that, in all events, he should do nothing in it which might commit the King's Government here or in Ireland without fresh instructions from hence.

"With this subject the conversation finished. At the close of it, Lord Fitz-William, who had brought to the meeting a memorandum of matters to be talked of, was repeatedly asked whether there were any other points to be discussed, or any new measures to be proposed. The answer was that he knew of none.

"Lord Fitz-William went immediately into the country, and, in a very short time after his return, he set out for Ireland. What has passed since that period between him and the King's servants is to be found in the correspondence."

*Endorsed by Lord Grenville. 1799, February 15. "This appears to be the first draft. The corrected copy is interlined with an addition in Mr. Pitt's hand, and a note is added to it by myself, stating its having been communicated to the different persons there mentioned."*

JOHN JAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 21, Royal Hotel, Pall Mall.—"On Tuesday next I am to dine with Mr. Vaughan at Hackney. Having hitherto availed



myself of only one invitation from that gentleman, an apology would not be kindly received.

"On Thursday and Friday I am not engaged; but as the one may be more convenient to your Lordship than the other, I forbear naming either.

"It is very desirable that some measures to facilitate the business in question should be concerted; the parties interested would be gratified, and the United States obliged. If America was set right as to the affair of the Indians, and relieved from West India judges and privateers not better than Indians, ill humour, having nothing to feed upon, would die away.

"A discerning minister, true to your Lordship's conciliatory views, and possessed, if possible, of your prudence and self command, cannot be too early at Philadelphia. I am convinced that unless your vigilance and interposition extend to whatever may affect the relations between the two countries, all will not go and continue well."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 24, Hamburg.—"I have been here above a fortnight, and put off from day to day the execution of the first part of my project, going to my brother's estates in Germany (Oldenburg). One of my brothers, who is there with his family, has been under great apprehensions of a visit from the French, and upon the point of leaving the place several times. From what they write, I find they knew even less than we have hitherto heard here of the state of things in Holland, of which I must have more accurate and detailed accounts before I venture to go. The communication between this place and that country has been very uncertain and irregular as yet from the severity of the weather, and the position of the armies. All correspondence, particularly of persons known to have been attached to the ancient Government, is still, and will for a long while continue to be narrowly watched. Since we left England we have not had a line from any part of Holland; by we, I mean Mr. Fagel as well as myself.

"Dutch newspapers we have had in abundance. From these it appears that the *Cabal*, who act in concert with the French, have, in imitation of their associates, established an entirely new form of government, introduced by the delusive declaration of the Rights of Man, founded on the loose basis of Universal Representation, with a Convention for each Province, and Committees of General Welfare; that from these Conventions they have replaced the Deputies to the States-General, still sitting at the Hague under that name; that, in every other respect they have established new forms, new names, and placed new persons in every department of the State, having abolished the Stadholdership and all hereditary distinctions; and thus entirely subverted the Government hitherto considered as most adapted to the disposition, the customs, and prejudices of the inhabitants of the United Provinces. Peter Paulus, who has been continued President of the Convention in the Province of Holland from fortnight to fortnight, seems to be the leading man; and has, with great art and ability, endeavoured to reconcile the people to this system by the way he has modified it, by the strain of religious enthusiasm that runs throughout the work, calculated to make a strong impression on a religious people, and well adapted to their notions. He endeavours farther to recommend this system by the apparent moderation and humanity of every syllable that comes from his mouth or his pen. But after all we have seen, who will venture to answer for the stability of a system established

under the auspices of the French Convention, and supported by their army, under whatever shape it may be introduced? Who will depend on a succession of French Generals as well-disposed as Pichégrou seems to have been? We know that Paulus is already taxed with aristocracy from his moderation, and that many of his supporters begin to be dissatisfied with his conduct. At any rate, however favourable these appearances of moderatism may seem, and though they have released several persons, as long as my eldest brother and the Pensionary are confined to a prison I think it would be madness to put myself in the power of these people, and I must suspend yet the execution of my plan. All the merchants' letters, some of them of as late a date as the 8th and 9th instant, agree in stating that they are much afraid of a famine in the Seven Provinces; the price of provisions is considerably higher, and their correspondents here have received orders to a great amount for a supply. Some of these accounts state that a part of the French army has marched to the frontiers, the rest having been dispersed in small detachments in different parts of the Provinces. But all the accounts I have seen or heard on this subject are too general to be of any great use.

"From the information I have, I do not think it advisable for me to proceed to the Hague just now. At the same time I hope to hear from England soon. If from better information it should be your Lordship's opinion that I may go, or if you can in any way remove the obstacles to my journey, or obtain my being admitted at the Hague, a line from you will make me waive any objections I might have; as I still see the chance of being of use if I could get there without being put in a prison. I hope to have a few lines on the subject from your Lordship through Mr. Frazer, as I shall stay here some time longer before I go to Varel, my brother's house in the Duchy of Oldenburgh. I shall stay at any rate till I hear from England. What I know of the man who has taken the lead, Paulus, makes me more desirous than ever of getting to the Hague. He is a man of great abilities and eloquence and, though very violent, not destitute of humanity and of principle. He has been soured by disappointment, and constant exclusion from office. Even in former times, he often in private expressed his sense of the necessity of a Stadholder in the Republic, when he was most violent against the Government and its abuses. He must become obnoxious sooner or later from jealousy of his elevation; or, when he refuses to give way to the folly or resentment of many of his supporters, they will endeavour to find a man more pliable. He will not like to resign his power. When he comes to try, he may see the impracticability of the new system. He may wish to clear the country of its invaders. And should the plans and the arms of the allies be attended with more success than lately, he may perhaps be induced to seek for support from our friends by re-establishing the Stadholder, if he finds a chance of being placed in a situation that may flatter his ambition, and which he may think more secure than what he occupies at present. As far as it is possible to judge without being on the spot, I think this may happen; and the more so as men of all sets and descriptions agree in their idea of the talents and disposition of this man in many points of view; and many of my particular friends have always entertained the opinion of him I have ventured to give. I must not take up any more of your Lordship's time for the present. I shall not lose sight of my project; and shall be glad if any means can be suggested to me that may hasten the execution of it, and hope to be favoured with a line in answer. Baron Kinkell is so good as to take this.

*Postscript.*—March 25. “We have had letters to-day from the Hague dated 19th instant. Mr. Fagel’s house has been searched (*une visite domiciliaire*) and all his papers seized, so that for the present he has no thoughts of returning to Holland; though I do not see how they can contrive to fasten any criminality upon him for any paper they may find, according to our ideas of justice. They certainly will if it suits their purpose.”

#### H. FAGELL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 28, Hamburg.—“Je ne pensais pas, lorsque j’ai quitté l’Angleterre, que je trouverais la communication entre la Hollande et Hambourg aussi complètement interrompue qu’elle l’a été pendant les premiers quinze jours que j’ai passés dans cette ville. Jusqu’au 24 de ce mois, les nouvelles les plus fraîches qu’on avait de la Hollande étaient du 20 Février, et à mon arrivée ici, je n’ai guères appris que ce que je savais déjà en partant de Yarmouth. C’est cette raison qui m’a empêché jusqu’à présent d’avoir l’honneur de vous écrire. Mais depuis deux ou trois jours, nous avons reçu, tant par la poste que par des voies extraordinaires, des lettres qui vont jusqu’au 20 de ce mois; et c’est pour vous rendre quelque compte de ces nouvelles que je prends aujourd’hui la plume.

“Les lettres particulières sont pour la plupart écrites avec beaucoup de circonspection, et il n’y est presque pas question d’affaires publiques. Mais il résulte en général de tout l’ensemble des nombreux détails contenus dans les *Gazettes*, que les principes sur lesquels le nouveau Gouvernement est établi, et d’après lesquels il agit, sont absolument semblables à ceux qui ont été adoptés en France. Les Assemblées provinciales d’Etats ont été changées en Assemblées de Représentants provisoires du peuple de chaque province. Et cette différence de dénomination est essentielle, parceque la composition de ces Assemblées est essentiellement différente de ce qu’elle était ci-devant. Les corps des nobles qui en faisaient partie ont été partout abolis; les Magistrats, qui formaient les Régences des villes, démis; de nouvelles Municipalités provisoires, dont les membres ont été élus par le peuple, mises à leur place; et dans la Province de Hollande, on a admis dans cette nouvelle Assemblée des Députés de plusieurs villes, bourgs, et villages, dont les Régences n’avaient pas le droit autrefois d’envoyer des Députés aux Etats. En un mot, l’Edifice *Gothique* et *Monstrueux* de l’ancienne constitution (pour me servir des expressions à la mode) a fait place à une construction nouvelle, dont les droits de l’homme font la base, et à laquelle les architectes Français ont fourni le modèle. Au reste, les Assemblées qui viennent de se former ne sont que provisoires, et la plupart ont été nommées pour deux mois. Il paraît que c’est dans le but de laisser l’administration entre leurs mains, jusqu’à l’époque où l’on aura pu organiser des *Assemblées primaires*. Celles-ci nommeront des Députés qui se réuniront en Convention représentant le peuple entier des Provinces Unies, et je suppose que cette Convention prendra aussitôt la place des Etats-Généraux. Effectivement jusqu’à présent, ceux-ci existent encore de nom, et c’est la seule des anciennes autorités constituées qui n’ait pas été formellement supprimée. Elle a cependant absolument changé de nature depuis que les Etats des Provinces qui y envoyaient leurs Députés, ont été abolis; mais on a senti que les relations de la République avec les Puissances Etrangères exigeaient que, pour le moment, le nom fut conservé.

“La Province de Hollande donne dans tous ces changements l’exemple aux autres, et garde cette influence prépondérante que sa population et

ses richesses lui ont toujours assurée. L'homme qui jusqu'ici paraît y avoir le plus de crédit est le fameux Pieter Paulus. Il vient d'être nommé membre du Comité de Marine, qui a pris la place des cinq Amirautes ; et comme il a déjà été Ministre de ce Département avant la révolution de 1787, et qu'il y a montré de grands talents, il sera fort utile à ce Comité. Le Conseil d'Etat, qui avait la direction suprême de tout ce qui avait rapport aux finances et à l'armée de la République, et dont les membres étaient nommés par les différentes Provinces, a également été supprimé, et remplacé par un Comité. Ces deux nouveaux Départements, surtout celui de la Marine, paraissent composés de gens habiles et entendus. La Marine entière a été cassée, sauf à ceux qui voudraient servir de nouveau à s'adresser pour cet effet au Comité. Il est question d'une mesure semblable pour l'armée de terre. En attendant l'on assure que la plupart des officiers de Marine et des matelots préfèrent de ne plus être employés. Je me suis informé de plusieurs personnes venues en dernier lieu de la Hollande, si l'on y travaillait aux chantiers, particulièrement à la construction des vaisseaux, la réponse a été uniformément négative. Les deux objets qui excitent le plus de plaintes sont, 1, l'introduction forcée des assignats, quoique jusqu'à présent, elle se borne au paiement de ce que les soldats Français achètent dans les boutiques ; et 2, la cherté des denrées de première nécessité, surtout des subsistances, laquelle augmente tous les jours.

"Jusqu'ici on paraît procéder avec assez de modération contre les individus, si l'on peut donner le nom de modérés à des procédés que, dans tout autre temps que ceux où nous vivons, on aurait trouvés avec raison violents et arbitraires. La plupart des membres des anciennes Régences n'ont pas été formellement arrêtés, mais ils ne peuvent sortir du pays, ni même s'éloigner de la ville où ils demeurent. Messieurs de Roon et Van de Spiegel sont toujours détenus. On m'écrit *qu'ils n'ont pas encore été interrogés* ; dans d'autres lettres il est dit *qu'ils ne sont pas encore relâchés*. Mais dans les papiers publics il n'est fait aucune mention d'eux, et nous ignorons encore quels ont été les véritables motifs de leur arrestation. M. de Kinsberge, qui était aux arrêts à la Maison de Ville d'Amsterdam, a reçu la permission, pour cause de maladie, de les garder dans sa maison ; mais l'ancien Fiscal de l'Amirauté Van der Hoop, est toujours détenu dans cette partie de l'Hotel de Ville où l'on emprisonnait autrefois les débiteurs.

"Le plus ou moins de contentement ou de mécontentement produit par le nouvel ordre des choses se modifie d'après les opinions qui prévalaient dans les différentes villes. Dans celles où il y a toujours eu beaucoup de patriotes, comme à Amsterdam, Haarlem, Leyden, on dit qu'il y a beaucoup de démonstrations publiques de joie ; dans celles où le peuple était attaché à la Maison d'Orange, comme par exemple à la Haye, il règne une grande consternation et une tristesse générale. Ce sentiment est augmenté par la cherté qu'on attribue avec raison en grande partie aux troupes Françaises. D'ailleurs celles-ci observent la discipline la plus exacte, et l'on en est généralement très content. Tous les avis s'accordent à faire envisager leur présence comme la seule chose qui maintienne la tranquillité publique, et empêche l'animosité mutuelle des partis d'écarter. Il n'y a également qu'une voix sur les bonnes qualités du Général Pichégro, dont la modération et la simplicité contrastent, dit-on, avec l'insolence ridicule des Représentants du peuple.

"Dans toutes les Résolutions, Publications, et autres pièces qui émanent du Gouvernement actuel, et parmi lesquelles il y en a plusieurs très bien écrites, il règne une grande aigreur contre l'administration précédente. Je remarque surtout, dans plusieurs de leurs procédés,

beaucoup d'animosité personnelle contre le Grand-Pensionnaire. C'est ainsi que l'assemblée actuelle des Etats Généraux a fait brûler l'original de l'acte par lequel les Sept Provinces se sont mutuellement garanti, en 1788, le maintien de Stadhoudérat Héritaire. Cet acte était l'ouvrage du Conseiller-Pensionnaire. Dans quelques-unes de ses publications le Gouvernement actuel réfute avec ironie les principes de l'administration précédente. Ils ont fait biffer des Regîtres de Leurs Hautes Puissances les Résolutions prises en 1792, en réponse aux mémoires remis par Lord Auckland et le Comte de Starhemberg, relativement aux auteurs de la mort de Louis XVI.

"Encore une chose qui est à remarquer, c'est que les nouvelles Municipalités ne sont pas toutes composées de même. Dans quelques villes on y a placé des gens tirés de la plus basse classe du peuple; dans d'autres, comme par exemple à Amsterdam, ce sont des hommes d'une classe moyenne, et parmi lesquels il y en a qui ont beaucoup de connaissances.

"Mon intention en me rendant ici était, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire, de me rapprocher de mon pays, pour être mieux informé de ce qui s'y passait, et de voir si je pourrais y réjoindre ma famille, sans m'exposer inutilement à des dangers personnels. Tout ce que j'ai appris depuis mon arrivée ici, l'arrestation de Messieurs de Roon et Van de Spiegel, la démission qui m'a été donnée le 17 Février, la manière dont on a mis le scellé sur mes papiers le 23, et plusieurs autres circonstances trop longues à détailler ici, qui me prouvent qu'on en veut aussi à moi, tout cela m'oblige à renoncer pour le moment à mon projet de retourner en Hollande. Ce n'est que depuis quatre ou cinq jours que la nouvelle de ma démission m'est parvenue. Ignorant qu'on avait pris ce parti à mon égard, j'avais cru devoir en prendre un vis-à-vis de l'Assemblée qui continue à siéger à la Haye, sous le nom d'Etats Généraux, et en conséquence, je lui ai écrit le 10 de ce mois, une lettre dont j'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-joint une traduction. Je suis trop jaloux de votre estime pour ne pas vous communiquer cette démarche. Je me flatte qu'elle aura votre approbation. Mon intention est de continuer encore quelque temps mon séjour dans cette ville, où je suis plus à portée qu'ailleurs d'avoir des nouvelles de la Hollande, et de me décider pour l'avenir d'après les événements, et surtout d'après la tournure que prendront les affaires dans ma malheureuse patrie."

*French.*

*Enclosing copy of a letter, in French, addressed by M. Fagell to the States-General of the Dutch Republic.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL CAMDEN.

1795, March 28, Downing Street.—"You will receive by this messenger the statement which I showed you the other day, and which has been communicated to all the persons present at the conversation there stated, who all perfectly concur in it. I have written a few lines to Mr. Pelham to apprise him that I have sent this statement to you, and that you will probably forward it to him. I think his letters give a favourable account of things on the whole. I earnestly hope that you will find the prospect improve upon you as you proceed."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 29, Queen's House.—"Agreeable to Lord Malmesbury's request of instructions for his conduct on the Princess Caroline's landing,

he is certainly to continue to attend her on her journey to London till she arrives at St James's; this is so perfectly understood, that I am certain none of the Prince of Wales's attendants can be imprudent enough to cause him any difficulty; they can only wait on her with a compliment in the name of the Prince and make part of her suite; but she must be under the care of Lord Malmesbury till lodged at St. James's. Mrs. Harcourt must also remain with her till she arrives at the said place.

"As it has been settled that the Princess should land at the first safe place the frigates can put her on shore, it has been impossible to send carriages for her journey; she must therefore travel in the most eligible method Lord Malmesbury can devise. When it is known which route she will travel and the day she can arrive in London, my carriages will be sent to the nearest stage to town to receive her and conduct her to St. James's."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 29, Berne.—"I know not how to thank you sufficiently for your very kind letter of the 24th February. Believe me I feel all the force of the obligations I have to your Lordship, and I will do my utmost to correct myself in all the articles you are so kind as [to] point out, though I fear I shall have need of your indulgence on many occasions besides those you have mentioned to me. In that of my handwriting I fear I must remain incorrigible. I write now every day so much and so quick that I do not see how it will be possible for me to make any amendment; indeed if my business increases as you make me believe it will, I must beg you to let me have some assistance, or I don't see how I can possibly go through with what I have to do in the course of the day.

"When I wrote to your Lordship respecting my allowance I did not foresee the amount of two articles of expense that exceed very considerably my calculations, I mean those of travelling and of correspondence. My bill at the post-office, exclusive of letters from England, is always more than two pounds a week, and, if I shall be obliged to travel a great deal, the expense will be very considerable.

"I am much embarrassed by a note I have received from Mr. Goddard, in which he informs me that *before I draw* for any money to be employed on secret service I must send over a receipt for the sum required, with a statement of the particulars, and *afterwards* wait till your Lordship shall have informed me at what time I may draw. I should hope that this rule will in some measure be relaxed in my case, otherwise I really know not how the public service must go on, as my own circumstances will not allow me to make any advance myself, and the nature and variety of the services required of me make it impossible for me to foresee either the quantity of the sum I may require in a given time, or the specific articles to which it will be applied. I have already expended near three hundred pounds of my own besides all my own expenses, so that, having returned Lord Robert FitzGerald the 100*l.* which he had advanced, I am several hundred pounds in debt, and must be obliged to provide for the public service in the best way I can, till I receive your Lordship's answer.

"I have made an indirect overture to M. Mallet du Pan, but I find that he is actually engaged in the service of the Court of Vienna. He told a friend of mine that he corresponded directly with the Emperor, but I know that he sent a *mémoire* last week to M. Thugut; the general object of it was to recommend a continuation of the war.

"I believe his temper is soured by disappointment, as he was as violent in his declamations against the Emperor a few days since for the slowness of his preparations, as he has ever been against the Court of London."

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 31, Lower Grosvenor Street.—"At the desire of Mr. Pitt I yesterday sent him the *projet de campagne* of Monsieur de Rosier, which he promised to transmit to your Lordship after he had read it.

"Monsieur de Rosier supposes the Austrian army to consist of two hundred thousand men, that of Condé of thirty thousand, the army of the Empire of fifty thousand, and the Hanoverians and Hessians under Walmoden of thirty-six thousand, exclusive of British cavalry, Brunswickers, and other troops.

"From this statement much is to be deducted, and I confess I am not sanguine that any serious impression can be made, or that the German armies will be able to maintain even the appearance of an offensive campaign. But as this appearance is very essential for the encouragement of our allies, and of the French Royalists, and for giving us any prospect of a creditable termination of the war; and as I believe that a better plan cannot be framed than that which is proposed by Monsieur de Rosier, nor one that is more likely to interest the Court of Vienna from its involving the security of Luxemburgh in its earliest operations, I should recommend it's being transmitted without loss of time to the Emperor. But as it is impossible for us to answer at present for our part of the co-operation by sending a large force into Brittany, it might not be prudent to depute an English officer of rank with the plan to Vienna (as Monsieur de Rosier proposes) lest by making the plan apparently so much our own, the Imperial Ministers should insist on our entering into an absolute engagement to perform the part which Monsieur de Rosier has assigned to us, as a preliminary step to their preparing to take any active measures on the eastern frontier of France."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 31, London.—"J'apprends dans le moment que vous expédiez un courier à Vienne dans la soirée. Si vous désirez que j'y écrive quelque chose, daignez me dicter mon langage; vous connaissez mon zèle et mon dévouement. Si vous chargez M. le Chevalier Eden de quelque nouvelle communication, permettez que je vous prie de m'en dire deux mots. Vous savez comme on est chez nous. On me ferait un crime de mon ignorance, et d'après vos bontés ordinaires pour moi, vous ne voudriez pas m'exposer à un désagrément que je ne mérite pas."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1795, March 31, Dover Street.—"Je n'écris que pour renvoyer notre Ministre à des instructions précédentes en lui faisant sentir toutes les raisons qui doivent nous mettre dans l'impossibilité la plus absolue de changer un arrangement déjà pris, soumis à la délibération du Parlement, et adopté pour base de toutes nos opérations financières pour l'année.

“J’ose espérer que ma lettre du 24 Février, soutenue par ce que vous aurez dit sur le même point, aura déjà rendu l’expédition du courier d’aujourd’hui inutile, mais je veux éviter, jusqu’à la possibilité d’un délai, quelconque faute d’explications de notre part.”

*French. Copy.*

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 31, Hamburg.—“La lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur de vous écrire par la dernière poste contenait un exposé général, quoiqu’imparfait, de la situation actuelle de la Hollande, pour autant qu’elle n’est connue. Le temps ne m’a pas permis alors d’y ajouter quelques circonstances qui me paraissent cependant mériter votre attention. Il est très possible que ces particularités soient déjà parvenues à votre connaissance ; mais comme il se pourrait aussi que cela ne fut pas, j’ai cru à tout hasard pouvoir vous les communiquer. Si vous ne trouvez donc rien dans cette lettre qui soit nouveau pour vous, vous y verrez au moins une preuve de mon empressement à vous faire part de ce que j’ai appris de plus essentiel sur une matière aussi intéressante.

“Rien ne donne une meilleure idée du but qu’on s’est proposé par les différents changements déjà faits, que le discours de Pierre Paulus à l’expiration de la troisième quinzaine de sa Présidence. Ce discours est très remarquable à plusieurs égards, et très bien écrit. Mr. Charles Bentinck en a fait une traduction qui donne une idée fort exacte de l’original, et que j’ai l’honneur de joindre ici.

“Au nombre des changements déjà effectués est l’abolition du Conseil des Colonies, lequel avait été nouvellement établi, il y a deux ou trois ans, à l’expiration du dernier octroi de la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales, et dont dépendaient les colonies de la République aux petites Indes, à l’exception de celles de Suriname et de Berbice, qui avaient des Directions particulières. Ce Conseil a été remplacé par une Direction Générale, divisée en trois Comités, à laquelle a été confiée l’administration de toutes les colonies de l’état en Amérique.

“J’avais l’honneur de vous dire dans ma première lettre que l’introduction des assignats, quoique fort circonscrite jusqu’à présent, donnait cependant lieu à beaucoup de réclamations. Cet objet a paru si important qu’après avoir nommé deux Ministres Plénipotentiaires pour se rendre à Paris, afin d’y traiter d’une alliance avec la France, on a adjoint à ces Députés deux commissaires nommés Pontoix et Meyners, destinés exclusivement à co-opérer avec les deux autres pour la partie des assignats, et à représenter conjointement avec eux l’impossibilité de donner en Hollande un cours illimité à ce papier-monnaie. Le premier de ces deux commissaires doit avoir été, à ce qu’on m’a dit, commis dans la maison de messieurs Hope d’Amsterdam.

“Il paraît évidemment par plusieurs circonstances qu’il y a du mécontentement dans plusieurs endroits, notamment à Amsterdam et à la Haye. Sur un rapport fait à l’assemblée des Représentants Provisoires du Peuple de Hollande, que des militaires et des personnes mal-intentionnés avaient tenu dans ces deux villes une conduite séditieuse, et avaient manifesté un esprit contre-révolutionnaire en témoignant par des démonstrations publiques leur attachement à la maison d’Orange, on a publié un édit sévère pour réprimer ces mouvements. En Zélande surtout on paraît peu satisfait du présent ordre de choses ; et la manière dont la Révolution s’y est faite, prouve clairement que les principes révolutionnaires y ont fait moins de progrès que dans les autres Provinces.



“Le nouveau serment que doivent prêter dans la Province de Hollande tous ceux qui sont admis à quelque poste que ce soit, est conçu en ces termes : ‘Je déclare reconnaître et respecter les droits ‘inaliénables de l’Homme et du Citoyen, tels qu’ils ont été solennellement déclarés par les Représentants Provisoires du Peuple de Hollande ‘dans leur publication du 31 Janvier 1795 ; et je jure de les maintenir ‘de tout mon pouvoir durant l’exercice de ma charge. Je jure aussi ‘que je serai fidèle au peuple de Hollande (dans le sein duquel je ‘reconnais que la souveraineté, proprement dite, réside) de même qu’ ‘à ses Représentants, et enfin, que je ferai tout ce qu’il convient à un ‘bon et fidèle . . . de faire. Je le jure.’

“Les différentes Provinces donnent successivement connaissance aux Etats-Généraux des efforts qu’elles font pour satisfaire aux réquisitions des Français ; mais ces réquisitions ne se bornent pas aux objets qu’ils ont demandés en entrant dans le pays. Le Représentant Alquier a remis un mémoire pour obtenir du bois et du cuivre pour des pontons, pour la valeur de 400 à 450 mille livres de France. Il demande qu’on fournisse tout de suite cette somme, sauf à liquider ensuite. Les arrangements nécessaires ont été pris pour satisfaire à cette demande. En général la volonté des Représentants et des Généraux Français sert de loi ; et malgré l’indépendance que le Gouvernement actuel affecte, lui-même ne cache pas cette vérité. Les Représentants avaient donné, le deux ou trois Mars, un mémoire pour recommander de la manière la plus pressante, la prompte organisation de l’armée de terre et de mer. L’assemblée de Hollande ayant pris connaissance de ce mémoire, a fait convoquer, le même soir, celle des Etats-Généraux, et y a fait déclarer par ses Députés qu’elle ne désespérerait pas que Leurs Hautes Puissances n’eussent établi à la place du Conseil d’Etat, un Comité pour les affaires de la Confédération Générale, et n’en eussent nommé les membres. Cela s’est fait sur le champ, mais ce qu’il y a de remarquable c’est que dans le discours par lequel les Députés de Hollande allèguent les raisons qui rendent cette prompte organisation de l’armée indispensable, ils disent : ‘Nous espérons que vos Hautes Puissances ‘sentiront l’obligation qui leur est imposée, et ne manqueront pas de se ‘soumettre à la *volonté* de la nation Française et de nos commettants.’ C’est sur la demande du Représentant Alquier que les Etats-Généraux ont résolu de désapprouver et d’annuler comme contraires au droit des gens, leurs Résolutions du 25 Septembre 1792, et du 16 Avril 1793, prises sur les mémoires de Lord Auckland et du Comte de Starhemberg. Il a été résolu de les faire biffer des Registres comme déshonorantes pour ces actes, et incompatibles avec les sentiments d’amitié et de respect que Leurs Hautes Puissances ont pour une nation grande, libre, et magnanime, telle que la Française.

“Je ne sais si vous avez vu la proposition des Députés de Hollande aux Etats-Généraux relative aux Commissaires envoyés à Londres pour réclamer les vaisseaux Hollandais, et à la conduite tenue par eux et par M. de Nagell. J’ai l’honneur d’en joindre ici une traduction. Je vois par les procès-verbaux des délibérations que les Etats-Généraux, sans adopter en entier les propositions de la Hollande, ont résolu de rapeller M. de Nagell pour lui demander compte de sa conduite, mais avec ordre exprès de donner à connaître au Ministère Britannique, avant son départ, que ce rappel n’a lieu que pour avoir de lui des éclaircissements relatifs à sa personne. Je suis curieux d’apprendre quel a été le véritable objet de la mission de ces Commissaires, et s’il n’y avait pas d’indiscrétion à vous demander ce qui en est, je prendrais cette liberté. Mon frère, qui

était Ministre de la République en Danemarck, a reçu des lettres de rappel, de même que M. Hartsinck qui était accrédité de la part de Leurs Hautes Puissances près du Cercle de Basse-Saxe.

“J’ai reçu des lettres fort intéressantes de M. de Reede, notre Ministre à Berlin, en date du 24 et du 28 de ce mois. Le résultat de ce qu’il me mande est que le Roi de Prusse est sur le point de conclure la paix avec la Convention ; que le projet, tel que le Comité de Salut Public le propose, est en neuf articles, qui sont, à ce qu’on assure, honorables pour le Roi de Prusse ; et que M. de Hardenberg, arrivé à Basle, vient de recevoir l’ordre d’accepter ce projet à quelques légères modifications près, en insistant que l’Electorat d’Hanovre et le Pays de Brunswick soient mis à l’abri d’une invasion. Depuis l’arrivée du dernier courrier de Basle, on regardait à Berlin les choses comme terminées, et l’on croyait que, du 20 au 25 Avril, on aurait la certitude de l’événement. Le Général Kalkreuth devait rester avec les régiments de Westphalie comme une espèce de corps d’observation, et dans quatre semaines, le gros de l’armée devait rentrer.”

*French.*

*Enclosure.*

ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT PETER PAULUS (English version).

1795, March, Hague.—“The time is now come that puts an end to the Presidency, to which this Assembly appointed me for the third time fourteen days since ; and I may look upon myself as entirely discharged from that situation, after the positive assurances then given me that it would not now again be conferred upon me. I congratulate the Assembly and myself, that during this period so many important resolutions have been taken, which give us a well grounded hope, that we shall at last establish the welfare of the people of Holland, and of the United Provinces, and that posterity will look upon all those who have been concerned in these measures as instruments in the hands of God to fix this Republic upon lasting foundations. The direction of the military force, by sea and by land, is at last settled ; and simplicity and uniformity in this department substituted to the old monstrous system that has produced so much mischief to the country. The same change has partly taken place as to the administration of our colonies, and whenever it is completed, and all the different parts of the *executive* power have taken a regular course, the nation will find no obstacle that can prevent a similar change in the remaining part of the ancient and defective form of Government, I mean the *legislative*, in such a manner that, by bringing back the latter to the greatest simplicity, it may be consistent with the principles upon which it has been thought necessary to establish the former. By this method, when the *executive power* has attained some degree of firmness, the shock which the change of the *legislature* may bring about will be attended with much less danger of bad consequences ; and we may flatter ourselves with the hope that, by the assistance of heaven, this undertaking will be as successful. This at least has been the plan I have endeavoured to pursue during the time I was President of this Assembly. I was of opinion that the *legislative part* of the Constitution, in its ancient external shape, ought to be made subservient to the change of the *executive part* in every department ; and that we might afterwards, under the shelter and protection of the latter, proceed to establish the *former*, without any apprehension of seeing the whole fabric fall in at once ; and I was of

opinion we should thus accomplish insensibly both the objects we had in view. I am, however, far from saying that the first object is attained, or that there is not a great deal left to do. But I know that a great deal has been done, and that foundations are laid, of which the wisdom of this Assembly will derive every advantage. I know by experience that there are men enough in this Assembly who can take my place to pursue this work, and who have proposed to themselves the same object, and that the whole Assembly will not want the resolution to complete this work. I am now on the point of leaving this place; and called upon to confine my activity more particularly to the navy of the State, which has long been my favourite occupation."

LORD ST. HELENS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 2, St. James's Place.—"Mr. Burges having informed me that you purpose sending notice to the Treasury that my appointments are to cease as on the 5th of this month, I am under the necessity of requesting, which I do most earnestly, that you will be so good as to see me for five minutes before this sentence be irrevocably pronounced."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 4, Kew.—"On arriving here Silvester has delivered to me Lord Grenville's letter enclosing the two he received from Lord Malmesbury. As the clearest method of sending directions for Lord Grenville [is] to answer the questions asked by Lord Malmesbury, I will state the orders I have given in consequence of the intelligence received from the Admiralty and Mr. Secretary Dundas.

"The Princess is to proceed as far as is thought right in the *Jupiter* and then embark in the yachts and be landed at Greenwich.

"Mr. Robert Greville is going with my equipage to Greenwich to bring the Princess from thence to St. James's; she will land about two this day.

"The Princess will come in my coach with Lady Jersey and Mrs. Harcourt; it is contrary to etiquette for gentlemen to go in the coach.

"In the leading coach Lord Malmesbury, Lord Claremont, Mrs. Aston, and Mr. Greville."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 8 [April 8], Queen's House.—"I can contrive to see Mr. Jay here at twelve tomorrow if Lord Grenville will bring him here exactly at that hour, as I am to visit the new married couple a little before one tomorrow and then go till Wednesday to Windsor, which will be the proper day for receiving the Address of the House of Lords, and half an hour latter that of the House of Commons; I desire Lord Grenville will settle this with Mr. Pitt.

"The compliment from the Lords must be made to the Queen on the Thursday before the Drawing Room, as also that from the House of Commons.

"As to those to the Prince and Princess I should suppose naturally Friday will be the day for that ceremony; but of course the principal messenger from each will enquire of the Earl of Cholmondeley the day most agreeable for their being received."

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, April 8, Dover Street.—“As Lord Grenville will have the honour of paying his duty to your Majesty tomorrow morning in obedience to your Majesty’s commands, he forbears troubling your Majesty at all in detail on the subject of the minute which your Majesty will receive from Mr. Pitt, conveying the opinion of the Cabinet as to the making fresh overtures to the King of Prussia. Nothing could be more painful to Lord Grenville than the necessity of differing from the rest of your Majesty’s servants at such a time as the present ; but the importance of the subject itself, and its immediate relation to the whole business of that department of your Majesty’s Government in which your Majesty has been graciously pleased more particularly to require Lord Grenville’s service and advice make it his indispensable duty to act according to the best opinion which he has been able to form upon it, and to which, after repeated reconsideration, he finds it impossible for him not to adhere. He is at the same time very far from presuming to press that opinion upon your Majesty in opposition to the sentiments of those whose opinion ought on every account to have more weight than his. He trusts to that goodness of which he has had so many proofs, and which he will ever acknowledge with the deepest and most heartfelt gratitude, that your Majesty will put a favourable interpretation upon that line of conduct which under such circumstances a conscientious discharge of his duty seems to require from him.”

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 9, Queen’s House.—“Lord Grenville will easily conceive that I must ever look on a difference of opinion between my Ministers on a material question with sorrow ; but far be it from me to wish that any of them should ever for unanimity concur in appearance when not dictated by conviction. Lord Grenville may therefore rest assured that his dissent on the present occasion will not in the least diminish my opinion of him. But I think he ought, at the same time, to be informed that however satisfied I was with the minute that proposed stopping the subsidy that had been paid for some months to the King of Prussia on his having completely failed in fulfilling the intention of the treaty, and that I had thought some weeks ago when the idea of renewing a pecuniary engagement was proposed, that those who prevented that measure were right ; but now that the Austrians are retiring entirely to the Rhine, the west part of Germany cannot be prevented long from falling into the hands of the enemy, unless by keeping the Prussians to aid in driving them back, and if possible moving forward to regain the united Dutch Provinces.”

## GENERAL DE CLAIRFAIT to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1795, April 9, Bockenbaim, Frankfurt.—“J’ai reçu aujourd’hui à trois heures après midi les dépêches que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’adresser en date du 24 du Mars. Les vents contraires ont empêché le courier de faire plus du diligence. J’ai expédié d’abord par courier le paquet au ministre, Baron de Thugut, et par la même occasion les incluses.

“Je crois que les Anglais ont fait une excellente affaire en se liant avec les Russes, qui peuvent encore, et seules, nous donner les moyens

de soutenir la guerre. Je crois l'accommodement des Prussiens avec les Français terminé, ou sur le point de l'être. Depuis plusieurs jours, toutes les lettres de Basle assurent que la chose est certaine. Le Major Mayring est arrivé aujourd'hui à midi, venant de Basle, allant à Berlin. Il s'est arrêté chez le Prince Héréditaire de Hohenlohe qui m'a dit avoir appris de lui qu'il y avait beaucoup d'émotion à Paris, et qu'on en était fort inquiet. Qu'on y avait appelé le Général Pichégru, qu'on croyait le plus propre par la considération dont il jouit à en imposer, et à donner de bons conseils. Le Prince de Hohenlohe a ajouté que ce Major Prussien Mayring était chargé de dépêches pour Berlin dont il *ignorait le contenu*. Il m'a, cependant, dit celle d'un ton à me faire croire qu'il soupçonnait ce qu'elles pouvaient contenir. Un négociant de Frankfort est venu me dire qu'il avait vu ce Major, et m'a assuré qu'il lui avait dit qu'il était porteur du traité conclu entre les Prussiens et les Français, et que ce traité était avantageux à l'Allemagne. Tout cela ne sont pas des preuves complètes, mais peu s'en faut ; et je crois qu'on ne peut plus douter que cet accord ne soit autant que terminé. Peut-être (et c'est le seul espoir qui peut rester) les circonstances actuelles s'opposeront à l'accomplissement de cette horrible déloyauté, si elle n'est pas consommée, ou l'annuleront si elle l'était, puisqu'il est certain qu'il y a beaucoup de disposition à une contre-révolution à Paris. Les nouvelles assurent que la Convention est au moment d'être renversée, et ne peut conserver plus longtemps son existence. Le manque de pain en est le motif ; et la faim n'écoute plus de loi, et ne se laisse pas arrêter par la crainte. Le mécontentement dans plusieurs provinces est connu, et se manifeste. On dit qu'il a gagné et fait des progrès à l'armée du Rhin. Si tout cela est assez avancé pour que l'explosion se fasse bientôt, les Prussiens pourraient porter toute la honte de leur infâme conduite, et on s'en tirerait avec honneur, et sans leur assistance. Puisse la fortune nous accorder et nous procurer tant de bien, sans lesquels notre position pourra être dans peu très critique et très désagréable. Les nouveaux arrangements nous mettent hors d'état d'agir dans ce moment. J'espère que vous aurez reçu mes lettres par lesquelles je vous instruisais de la marche de l'armée Prussienne en Westphalie, de l'ordre de l'Empereur à l'armée que je commandais de les remplacer. Enfin, d'après cet arrangement, les Hanovriens et Hessais sont vers Embden, les Prussiens en Westphalie jusqu'à Roer, l'armée de l'Empire avec les troupes Autrichiennes qui y sont depuis la Roer jusqu'au Main, et l'armée Impériale que je commande encore, près de Mayence, avec des gros détachements jusqu'à Basle. Le corps du Prince de Hohenlohe depuis Frankfort jusqu'à Gressen en seconde ligne, sans autre motif que celui de nous gêner, et ne voulant pas aller depuis la Roer jusqu'à la Lieg, qui lui était assigné. Voilà, non pas comme nous sommes encore, mais comme nous serons lorsque le mouvement sera achevé ; et il ne le sera que vers la fin de ce mois, parcequ'on a envoyé les ordres de Vienne trop tard, tandis qu'on pouvait, et qu'on aurait du les envoyer beaucoup plutôt ; puisque dans ce moment tout devrait être en place et prêt à agir. L'ennemi fait remonter toutes les troupes qu'il avait au Bas-Rhin, partie de celles qu'il avait en Hollande ; et toute se rassemble vers Mayence. Lorsque nous aurons nos troupes ensemble, nous aurons des forces considérables vis-à-vis de nous. Pourrons-nous délivrer Luxembourg ? Et cette forteresse *aura-t-elle des vivres* pour se soutenir aussi longtemps ? Je l'ignore ; et j'ai lieu d'en douter, et c'est ainsi qu'on se met dans l'impossibilité de rien faire de bon, par une apathie qui nous fait arriver trop tard partout. Il n'y a pas de ma faute. J'ai écrit et sollicité depuis plus de quatre mois pour qu'on fit un plan, qu'on en convint avec les Alliés, qu'on fit en

conséquence la distribution des troupes, et qu'on les porte où elles devaient agir, qu'on assemble des magasins dans endroits convenables, et qu'on s'assure d'avoir de l'argent. Pas une de ces choses n'est faite. On y songe depuis quinze jours, et on me demande mon avis, que j'ai dit longtemps avant que j'eus été prié. Vous voyez d'après cela que je ne peux vous dire ce que nous ferons, ni quand nous ferons. D'ailleurs les circonstances où nous nous trouvons ne permettent pas de décider ce qu'on pourra. Il faut que les nuages se dissipent, et certainement, d'après les moyens que nous aurons, nous tacherons de les employer de notre mieux. Mais ces moyens ne sont pas tels qui pourraient l'être, et qui devraient être, parce qu'on s'en est occupé trop tard. L'armée, malgré ce qu'elle a souffert, est encore belle, et en bon état; mais le terrain que nous avons à couvrir est bien étendu. Il le sera d'avantage encore si nous restons seuls. Dans peu de jours, je pourrai vous en dire d'avantage, mais je ne veux pas arrêter votre courrier aussi longtemps, et je préfère vous écrire encore bientôt."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, April 9, Dover Street.—"Lord Grenville has just been informed by Mr. Burges that His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales intends sending Major Hislop tomorrow night with letters to Brunswick. Lord Grenville not having received from your Majesty any directions for preparing any letters to the Duke or Duchess of Brunswick on the occasion of the marriage of their Royal Highnesses the Prince and Princess of Wales, he does not presume to trouble your Majesty with any drafts for that purpose, as he imagines from what your Majesty mentioned to day, that your Majesty will write those letters. But he thought it his duty to mention to your Majesty the circumstance of Mr. Hislop's going, as your Majesty might possibly not be apprized of it."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 10, Windsor.—"I was just getting on horseback when Sylvester arrived with Lord Grenville's note and box, but being more inclined to ride than to write, I delayed redischpatching him till now; I desire the two letters which accompany this may be given to Major Hislop."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 15, Hamburgh.—"Since I had the honour of writing to you by Baron Kinkell, we have had many accounts from Holland. Mr. Fagel's two letters gave your Lordship very circumstantial and accurate details of all the most material circumstances that came to our knowledge to the 20th of last month. We have had newspapers and printed accounts since down to the 4th instant, and there are letters here of as late a date as the 6th, though the regular communication is still very much interrupted and very unsafe, and most letters we receive come occasionally by Swedish and Danish messengers.

"Your Lordship will recollect, amongst the new arrangements, the establishing of the naval and of the military committee. I do not know yet what line the army has taken, or how far the officers of the army have accepted of the offers of service under the new Government, since the whole army was disbanded. The new plan for the army was not

submitted to the States General till the 29th of last month, but I have not heard the particulars.

"The naval committee (of which Paulus is a member) has been more active, and I enclose a list (Number 1) of the ships that were commissioned by this committee on the 27th March, with the names of the commanders. This list appeared in all the newspapers we have received; and at the head of it de Winter, who came back into Holland with a command in the French army, but who was formerly an officer in the Dutch navy. This man they have named Adjutant General of their navy, and he seems intended to command this squadron. In addition to this, a decree has been passed, and measures taken to prevent the exportation of all the articles employed in the construction of ships. What success they meet with in manning these ships I know not; though, from the exhausted state of their finances, I have no great opinion of it. This penury (I may say) appears constantly as a check upon all their proceedings, in many of their resolutions and decrees. In one of these (of some parts of which I enclose a translation, Number 2) they acknowledge their inability, without an immediate supply, of paying the interest of the national debt in the Province of Holland. Under the present suspension of trade and circulation, and under the pressure of the late calamities, it appears very doubtful to me whether even a Government possessing the confidence of a united people would find the funds necessary for any extraordinary expences. How little they possess this confidence, and how far the usual resources of revenue are drained, the means they resort to in hopes of replenishing their coffers will show. The provisional Representatives of Holland have passed in their own Assembly, and proposed to the States General, a plan for a forced contribution, more extensive in its operation upon all classes of the community than any that occurs in the annals of the Republic. The former plans did not include those whose property did not exceed 2,000 guilders, about 200*l*. But the circumstances of the two last loans are known to your Lordship. By this decree every person possessed of property to the amount of 500 guilders clear capital, pays one per cent. This proportion increases in a regular scale with the capitals, so that the capital of 100,000 guilders pays 4 per 100. This proportion increases again when the capitals rise above 100,000 guilders, so that a person whose capital amounts to 1,000,000 guilders is taxed at 13 per 100 or 130,000 guilders. So much for the general outline of this plan, which is of course accompanied with a variety of restrictions and exceptions. But as the operation of it must, from its nature and extent, be slow and progressive, they have been under the necessity, in the mean time, of endeavouring to obtain an immediate supply to answer the pressing demands of the moment by another decree which the provisional Representatives of Holland have passed, and recommend to the other Provinces for their adoption. I have already alluded to this decree Number 2, and enclose a translation of part of the preamble. By this act all the inhabitants of the Province of Holland are called upon to pay into the hands of commissaries appointed for that purpose, and authorised to give receipts in the name of the Government, all the gold and silver plate, or not coined, in their possession. These receipts bear interest. This expedient is represented as an anticipation of the great forced contribution. And it is further provided in the decree, that, should any person, when the great plan comes to be enforced, have paid more by this anticipation than the proportion of his capital he is bound to by the plan of forced contribution, the difference will be returned in hard money when the whole

contribution is paid. This law is, of course, likewise under a number of unavoidable restrictions from the nature of it. By what I have been stating, the Republic has no great reason to rejoice at the delusion which brought about the change of situation and of Government. These are not the only lamentable consequences of this event. In addition to the enormous demand they made at first for the use of their army, the shopkeepers are obliged by a decree to take *assignats* in payment from the French soldiers to a certain amount; and, by this decree of the provisional Representatives of Holland, offices have been opened in their name in several places where the shopkeepers are directed to exchange these *assignats* for receipts, forming a new forced paper-currency in the Province under the sanction of the provisional Representatives; and which become by this decree a legal tender in part of every payment, according to a proportion settled by the same decree. These receipts (of course) already lose 50 per 100. By this method the French have evaded their engagements, and are, in fact, levying heavy contributions in many parts of the country. All intercourse in the interior parts of the Provinces is still very difficult, as well as the communication with the neighbouring countries, from the fears and suspicions of the Government, and from other causes. There is a general stagnation of all kinds of trade. In many places the shops are shut up, at Utrecht for instance. By various letters it appears that the number of people thrown out of employment and without bread increases daily, and of course the general discontent. This has broke out in several places. By the last letters, four persons have been taken up at Amsterdam, and another at the Hague, and punished with whipping and imprisonment for riotous behaviour in opposition to the new Government. At Utrecht the Municipality removed a clergyman, but were obliged to replace him in consequence of a petition signed by a great number of persons of all parties. At Amsterdam and Leyden the Municipalities have written to the provisional Representatives of Holland, objecting to the new oaths. These letters have embarrassed the new Government considerably; and, in the letter of the Municipality of Leyden, it is expressly said that they applied to the Representatives on this point, because it had given great uneasiness to a considerable number of inhabitants in that place. I have given a few instances among many of the discontents that are said to prevail in almost all the letters I have seen here, or heard of, from persons of different and even opposite parties to some of their friends here. There are six or seven Dutch families here who have had letters to this purport; some of these were conspicuous against the Stadholderian Government in 1787. I have heard besides abstracts read of letters from Foreign Ministers at the Hague who have friends here. They all agree in representing the confusion and discontent to be very great and very general; and the embarrassment of the leading people as very considerable. Amongst these, Paulus is said in positive terms still to preserve great influence; which is looked upon as a fortunate circumstance, from his being supposed to be the great advocate of the system of moderantism and conciliation. At the same time it seems that to strengthen the Government, clubs and corresponding societies have been established in most places. The papers are full of advertisements to that effect.

“What the result of all this will be it is impossible for me to say, with the little information I can have as to the views of the Continental Powers. But, should a change take place in favour of the Allies, I am perfectly convinced that, at this moment, the discontent and disappointment are so great in Holland, that an army might march into that



Province and drive the French out of it with the same facility with which they came in ; whilst from the time that passed before the new arrangements were completed in Zealand, and from all that passed there, we can have no reason to doubt the aversion of that Province to the change that has taken place. At the same time I had rather see the country somewhat longer in its present lamentable situation, than to see an attempt to rescue it by any of the Continental powers if they were not almost sure of success, and determined to keep their ground and support their friends. In 1787, the money and intrigues of France made a foreign interference absolutely necessary to rescue the United Provinces from a state of apparent independence, but of real subjection ; the present situation of that country is infinitely worse, and requires a similar but still more powerful remedy. I wish I could see a chance of this. A very wealthy individual who lives here and has great concerns in Holland, and was violent against the Stadholderian Government in 1787, told a friend of mine that, if the French marched out of Holland, the most fortunate circumstance that could happen would be the Prussians taking their place immediately, as the only means of preventing bloodshed and incalculable mischief, and restoring tranquillity. By the accounts we have, it seems that even since Pichégu's departure, who left Holland the 22nd March, for Paris they say, the French troops have observed an exact discipline, and been the chief means of preserving good order.

"My intention is to stay here some time longer. I have no wish to go to the Hague as long as M. de Rhoon is in a prison, as I am not certain I should be allowed to see him if I was there, as long as he is not at liberty. He has applied to know the reasons of his arrestation, which to this moment have not been alleged, and to complain of his not being allowed to see more of his friends ; at least so the papers say, for I have no letters from him, and very imperfect accounts of him. I had a letter of the 4th instant which gives me hopes of his being released, though I do not flatter myself much of this taking place soon. M. Fagel, as well as myself, has no intention of returning to the Hague at present under the circumstances of the moment. I hope I shall have a few lines from your Lordship that I may be certain you have received my letters."

## II. FAGEL (Greffier) to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 15, Hamburg.—"J'espère que les lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous adresser le 28 et 31 du mois passé, vous sont bien parvenues, et que le paquet-boat à bord duquel les malles de ces deux jours ont été expédiées ne sera pas tombé entre les mains de l'ennemi. J'ai écrit en Angleterre par celui qui a été pris il y a trois semaines, et ces lettres sont sûrement perdues. La communication par Hambourg étant la seule qui nous reste, il est bien à désirer qu'on puisse la rendre aussi sûre que possible. Nous éprouvons sensiblement combien elle est plus tardive que celle à laquelle nous étions accoutumés en Hollande. Depuis que je suis ici je n'ai encore eu aucunes nouvelles de Londres, et nous remarquons qu'il s'écoule à-peu-près quatre semaines entre la date d'une lettre et l'arrivée de la réponse.

"Un courrier Suedois nous a apporté ces jours-ci des nouvelles de Hollande qui vont jusqu'au 5 de ce mois, et qui nous présentent le tableau le plus affligeant de l'état désespéré dans lequel notre malheureux pays se trouve. J'ai vu plusieurs lettres particulières, et il résulte de leur contenu que le mécontentement de tous les partis et de toutes les classes d'habitans est dès à présent monté à un point qui doit effrayer

les chefs du Gouvernement actuel. Aussi leur embarras et leur manque de moyens percent-ils visiblement dans les mesures qu'ils prennent. Ces mesures sont téméraires, et leur nouveauté seule suffirait pour les rendre désagréables à une nation qui tient aussi fortement que la notre à ses anciennes habitudes, à ses usages, et même à ses préjugés. Les changemens qui s'introduisent successivement dans la forme du Gouvernement sont tels qu'ils la rendront bientôt méconnaissable aux yeux du peuple. De là des murmures qui dès-à-présent sont universels. Les gens de tous les partis se demandent de quel droit des individus s'arrogent, sous le nom arbitraire de Représentans Provisoires du Peuple, le pouvoir de renverser toutes les anciennes institutions, et de tout modeler à neuf. Les patriotes modérés sont les premiers à clamer l'audace avec laquelle ces nouveaux Législateurs détruisent au lieu de reformer. L'excès et l'exagération des changemens qu'ils introduisent, inspirent naturellement de la défiance sur leur solidité et leur durée. Enfin des personnes, dont le témoignage n'est assurément pas suspect, et qui sont à même à tous égards de juger impartialement de ce qui se passe, affirment que cette Révolution porte en elle-même le germe de sa prochaine destruction. Comme je sais que Mr. Charles Bentinek vous écrit aujourd'hui en détail, je ne vous ennuyerais pas par des répétitions inutiles; mais vous trouverez dans les faits qu'il vous communique la confirmation de tout ce que je viens de vous exposer. Rien, par exemple, n'est plus oppressif et plus fait pour causer en Hollande un mécontentement général que la grande contribution qu'on va lever, et dont j'ai déjà vu le projet imprimé par ordre du Gouvernement. Ce sera une taxe proportionnée à la fortune de chaque particulier. Tous les habitans seront à cet effet divisés en classes, depuis ceux qui possèdent un capital de 500 florins, et qui payeront un pour cent de ce capital, jusqu'à ceux dont la fortune s'élève à un million et au-delà, et dont la contribution sera portée à  $13\frac{3}{4}$  per cent. Les classes intermédiaires sont toutes taxées à proportion, de manière par exemple que, pour un capital de 100,000 florins, ou 10,000 livres sterling, il devra être payé 5 per cent. Comme une mesure préalable, il a été décrété dès le 26 Mars que tout l'or et l'argent non-monnoyé, à l'exception de quelques articles peu essentiels, doit être fourni à l'État. Ce qui augmentera nécessairement le mécontentement, c'est la stagnation totale du commerce et de la navigation, et la circulation toujours croissante d'un papier monnoyé équivalent aux assignats. Quant à la stagnation du commerce, il suffit pour s'en convaincre de jeter les yeux sur les papiers publics Hollandais, où il est dit journellement à l'article du *Texel* et du port d'Amsterdam (autrefois remplis dans cette saison de vaisseaux entrans et sortans): *aujourd'hui il ne s'est rien passé*. Pour ce qui est des assignats, les petits marchands qui vendent en détail sont obligés de les recevoir en paiement de la part des soldats Français. Mais pour en prévenir la circulation, l'assemblée des Représentans de la Hollande a émis des *récépissés* que les Municipalités sont autorisées à délivrer aux vendeurs en échange des assignats qu'ils reçoivent. Or ces récépissés perdent déjà 50 pour cent. Les dispositions de la marine, et de l'armée de terre paraissent également peu favorables au nouveau Gouvernement. Les matelots murmurent de ce qu'on ne les paye pas. L'armée n'est pas encore organisée. On dit cependant que le plan de sa nouvelle organisation est déjà formé, et que les officiers de l'Etat-Major seront tous démis. Mais il ne suit pas de là que la Gouvernement actuel pourra compter sur le reste de l'armée, car la grande majorité des soldats qui la composaient a été de tout temps attachée à la Maison d'Orange. Un parti nombreux parmi ceux-mêmes qu'on appellait Patriotes, est mécontent du nouvel ordre de choses. Les chefs actuels

n'ont point consulté ceux de 1787, et la scission entre ces deux partis se manifeste et augmente de jour en jour d'avantage. Enfin il est encore à remarquer que le mécontentement universel produit par la conduite des meneurs actuels est d'autant plus dangereux pour eux que la Révolution, dont ils sont les auteurs, est regardée avec raison comme l'ouvrage d'une force armée étrangère. C'est donc à l'intervention de cette force armée qu'on attribue les changemens opérés dans la forme du Gouvernement, et de là résulte l'opinion générale en Hollande que ces troupes ne seront pas plutôt retirées que tout l'édifice croulera de lui-même. Tel est le résumé de rapports les plus authentiques et les plus exacts que j'ai pu recueillir sur la situation présente des affaires en Hollande. Cette situation est telle que, malgré l'activité avec laquelle le Comité de Marine a mis huit grands vaisseaux et plusieurs petits en commission, je doute que les forces navales de la République puissent être mises promptement en activité, ou qu'elles soient de longtemps formidables. Le préambule du décret relatif au fournissement de l'or et de l'argent non-monnoyé, indique clairement le but de cet armement, qui se rapporte à une guerre prochaine avec l'Angleterre. Cette puissance y est représentée comme se préparant à attaquer et à envahir la Hollande; et les vaisseaux nouvellement équipés doivent servir à la défense des ports de mer, et à la protection du commerce de la Mer du Nord et de la Mer Baltique. Je n'ai pas appris si ces vaisseaux sont destinés à former une escadre, ou à agir séparément.

"Comme il ne m'est pas encore parvenu de réponse à la lettre que j'ai écrite à l'assemblée actuelle des États-Généraux, et que je n'ai pas reçu non plus la résolution par laquelle cette assemblée m'a donné ma démission dans ma qualité de Greffier, je suis toujours dans la même incertitude relativement à mes démarches ultérieures. Quand j'aurai pu prendre une détermination quelconque, je prendrai la liberté de vous en faire part.

"*Postscript.*—"Il est essentiel qu'on ne donne pas trop de publicité au canal par lequel nous recevons de temps en temps des nouvelles. C'est par des couriers Suédois et Danois."

*French.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1735, April 17, Queen's House.—"One cannot but be hurt that the King of Prussia can have been so ill-advised as to conclude a treaty of peace with the common enemy; but I should not be surprised if, on his hearing how very confused the state of Paris now is, he should decline ratifying this disgraceful measure."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 22, Queen's House.—"I shall very willingly receive the Earl of Bute this day as Ambassador to the Court of Spain. I cannot at the same time avoid expressing to Lord Grenville some uneasiness at the intelligence received from the Duc de Choiseul of Spain being in treaty with the National Convention."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, April 22], Hollwood.—"By a letter which I have just received from Dundas, I find the Cabinet is not to meet till Tuesday. I therefore conclude, in such weather as this, you will not be inclined to

leave Dropmore, but as you must be in town on Tuesday, perhaps you will dine here that day. I have desired Dundas to send you the King's letter on the Prussian business, which is very moderate and rational. If the neutrality could be adopted for Hanover, without implying separate negotiation for peace, or giving jealousy to Austria, it might perhaps be the best step, with a view both of saving expense, avoiding unpopularity, and obtaining disposable force.

"How far it is practicable at all, and still more on decent grounds, depends upon knowing what has already passed with the Regency. This I hope to learn to-morrow; as I mean to go to town to assist at Dundas's German conference."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to C. BENTINCK.

1795, April 22, Dover Street.—"I entirely agree with you in the impossibility of your going to the Hague under the present circumstances, or indeed till your brother is released. My last accounts from Holland gave me some reason to imagine that this might soon happen, but I place little dependence upon them, and would by no means advise you to run any risk in that respect. The peace which the King of Prussia has concluded with the Convention, whatever may be its effects in other respects, seems to afford more security to your residence at Oldenburgh; and means may gradually open themselves of finding some communication with the Hague. There seems little reason to doubt that the effects of the French system are already producing that spirit in Holland to which they must necessarily lead. One must regret that this was not foreseen by those who might have prevented the mischief; but, as it is, the object must be to profit of the opportunities which the present state of things may offer; and I trust that, even in that point of view, the prospect is not unfavourable."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, April 23], Wimbledon.—"I send you a note I received from the King in answer to the one I wrote to him on the subject of the King of Prussia's conduct. I think it right, before the Cabinet meets, to see the two persons to whom the King refers; at the same time, I do not expect anything in addition to what we already know, except that perhaps we may learn with more precision than we have yet done what has been the exact line of conduct pursued by the Regency of Hanover, preparatory to the negotiation of Basle. I have appointed Baron Steenberg and Captain Berger tomorrow forenoon, and shall not therefore summon the Cabinet till Tuesday, at 12 o'clock. From the tenor of the King's answer to me, he is clearly prepared to receive any advice that may [be] given to him. It does not occur to me that we can possibly give him any other advice but to avail himself of the neutrality, unless we saw some means of affording more substantial succours than I am sure we can at present. We are more likely to diminish what he has than to add to the defence of Hanover and Osnabrug."

#### CONTROVERSY WITH DENMARK.

##### *Minute of Conference with Count Wedel.*

1795, April 23.—"Count Wedel began the conversation by expressing his hope that I could give him some satisfactory assurance on the

subject of his letter to me. I then stated to him at large the present situation of France; the evident distress arising from the want of provisions; the total impossibility of the Convention continuing to support the war under this difficulty, and the report of Boissy d'Anglas, which stated both that the importation of corn into France from the North last year had all been produced by purchases actually made in the North by the Government itself, and also that their great hope of relieving their present distress arose from similar supplies, of which they were in immediate expectation. That, under these circumstances, I was sure the Danish Government was too just to wish that the King should see those supplies passing by his ports, without taking the necessary measures to interrupt a commerce which, by the avowal of the Convention itself, had been carried on in a manner contrary to the treaties between England and Denmark, namely, by covering enemies' property under neutral colours, and which was of such importance in the present moment that it might be said to afford to the Convention the only possible means of continuing the war. But that while measures for this purpose were adopted, this Government was very desirous to render them as little as possible vexatious or inconvenient to the commerce of Denmark. That, in the course of the last year, I had received from him many complaints of delays and other inconveniences to which the Danish vessels had been subjected. That I had always endeavoured to remove them, but that many of them depended on circumstances which could not be remedied by this intervention. That the King's Government was now endeavouring to establish such general regulations as might remove the possibility of similar inconveniences in future, and that I had every reason to hope that our endeavours in this respect would be in a great degree successful. But that if, in the course of these transactions, any idea for the same purpose suggested itself to him, I wished him to state it to me, and he might be assured it should meet with the most attentive consideration.

"This communication was received by him with great apparent cordiality and satisfaction; and, in the course of what passed between us, he told me expressly that he was satisfied that if Count Bernstorff saw that appearances were saved he would desire no more.

"The points which he particularly mentioned in the course of the conversation were these.

"First, that the Order should not be general to take all ships laden with provisions and bound to France, but only such whose papers afforded some ground of suspicion.

"I forbore entering into this, because I foresaw it might renew discussion we had formerly had respecting the incompetence of the proof which he has frequently maintained as arising from the papers of a vessel being in due form and without any irregularity.

"Secondly, that no distinction would be observed to the advantage of America or Sweden in this respect. On this point I told him that if any distinction was made with respect to Sweden it would be one unfavourable to that Power, who was by the express words of a treaty, restrained from carrying corn to the enemy. And that, with respect to America, although I could not formally communicate to him our treaty with that Power previous to its ratification, I could tell him, in confidence, that the stipulation on that subject obliged us only to pay for the corn which we should stop; and that I could give him the most positive assurances that no distinction should be made unfavourable to Denmark as to the mode of treating their ships.

"Thirdly, as to the amount of the percentage to be added to the invoice, which he strongly urged should be increased; because, he said,

France had given 15 per cent. in such cases, and that the hope of a large profit in France made the merchant dissatisfied with a compulsory sale here.

"This point I took entirely *ad referendum*.

"Fourthly, as to the means of avoiding delays of every kind; in the unloading of the cargo; in the valuation of the sum to be allowed; in the release of the ship; and in the payment of the money awarded.

"On all these we entered into some discussion of the measures now in contemplation, which, in general, seemed to be satisfactory to him. But I desired him to consider whether he could propose any other ideas for the same purpose, and if he could, to let me know them.

"In the course of the conversation I expressed that my anxiety to prevent any disagreeable discussion between the two Courts from arising in the course of these measures was increased by the prospect which the present situation seemed to afford of bringing the two countries nearer. That difficulties had formerly arisen in this respect from our situation towards Russia; whereas, in the present moment, that consideration afforded an additional facility, circumstanced as we now were with respect to the Court at Petersburg. That the system which Sweden was so evidently pursuing, and which I was well assured could not be that of Denmark, was another circumstance which seemed to lead to the same conclusion. These hints seemed to produce their effect, and he entered with much earnestness into the subject of Sweden; mentioning M. de Stahl's negotiation at Paris for a subsidy, and the determination of his Court not to be led into a system so directly opposite to all its views.

"Our conference ended in the most amicable manner, and he promised to represent the whole subject at Copenhagen in the light in which I had stated it, hoping that I would co-operate with him here in preventing all grounds of uneasiness.

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 25, Hamburg.—"I sent the Duke of Portland by last post some details we had from a Comte de Gimel, an émigré officer in the Dutch service, who left the Hague the 9th and Amsterdam the 11th instant, and came by sea to this place. Not knowing M. de Gimel personally, I did not write to your Lordship; and left it to the Duke of Portland to send you the letter, if he thought it deserved any attention. I mentioned that this officer was very well known at Hampton Court.

"We have since seen here General de Geuzau, who likewise left the Hague the 9th, and came by Wezel, having obtained passes from the new Government and from the French Generals, and leave from the former for four months. M. de Geuzau's character stands so high in every respect that I have no doubt your Lordship will be glad to hear his account of the state of things in the Republic, when he came away. It is remarkable enough it should correspond nearly in every respect with what we had from M. de Gimel, but it is much more circumstantial.

"Soon after the surrender of Breda (the 24th January, I think) where M. de Geuzau was Governor, he came to the Hague, and there he was obliged to see Pichégu, having some points to settle with him relative to the troops that were at Breda. Upon his mentioning that he had left there two Commissaries of the Convention, who were just arrived, Pichégu said, *encore des Commissaires, nous en avons déjà bien assez*, or something to that purpose. He received many marks of attention and regard from this officer, and attributes chiefly to him, and

to some of the French commanders, that the army did not meet with a great deal of ill-treatment from the new Government. Having often seen Pichégru, he represents him as a humane well-disposed man, very unassuming, and talking very little because he sees he is observed; though he does not always conceal his dislike to the system he acts under. I have just mentioned an instance of this. M. de Geuzau was present another time when, a party of Dutch and French dining at the Danish Minister's, the conversation fell upon the late changes; some one in company said they were modelling their Government entirely on the French, Pichégru replied, they might have found a better model.

"M. de Geuzau confirms very strongly the details we have sent to England of the unpopularity of the new Government, of their divisions amongst themselves, and of the general aversion of the patriots of 1787 to the system of the day. He said the supporters of this system were already divided into three parties; that they were very much embarrassed by the French not having hitherto shown any disposition to treat with them as with an independent Government, and even refused lately their proposals of alliance, a circumstance which had given them great alarm. That they met with great obstacles in the execution of their plan. The Provinces had refused to meet in a National Convention of the Seven, insisting upon the ancient distinction of territory, and upon a federal constitution. That they were in no place more refractory than in Friesland. He even added expressly that they nowhere showed so much impatience for the restoration of the old Government, as in this Province.

"What seemed most to take up the attention of the Cabal when he came away, is the organisation of their army. It is to consist of 38,000 men, and to be divided and subdivided in the manner of the French army, with the same distinctions of rank for the officers. But they go on slowly, as there is a general reluctance to accept of the offers of service, of which General Geuzau mentioned instances, such as the officers of two regiments having *all* declined. He is afraid, however, this zeal will only last for a time. The habits, prejudices, and attachments of the army no doubt make all impatient of a change at this moment, and a great many will persevere in not accepting of situations. But many of the officers have only their pay to subsist upon; and so many tempting offers are held out to the soldiers and subalterns, that it is not probable they will hold out for ever. At the same time, he said, they (the new Government) could place little dependence on the army at this moment. How the Swiss cantons would dispose of their regiments was uncertain; they were in Friesland and Groningen. He confirmed the accounts of tumults in different parts of the country in opposition to the new system, at the beginning of April. They broke out the same day, on the rumour of the approach of the Prussians. I should not forget to say that M. de Gimel computes the troops of the French Convention within the Provinces at about thirty thousand.

"The friends of the old Government (the General said) were absolutely destitute of any intelligence from without, and in a state of painful anxiety as to the views of the Powers they suppose desirous of giving them assistance, and rescuing them from their oppressors. Their situation becomes more afflicting every day.

"Since I wrote this, I have seen a Dutch newspaper of the 18th instant stating the conditions upon which the Committee of Public Safety at Paris are willing to withdraw their army from a great part of the Seven Provinces. They (the Seven Provinces) are to pay the whole expence of the war *the French decared against them*, as far as the Dutch were concerned. The French are provisionally to keep the

keys of the Seven Provinces towards the Netherlands, and the best part of Zealand in their hands ; and the Seven Provinces are to pay twenty millions of florins immediately. On these conditions the French *are willing* to conclude an alliance offensive and defensive. God grant a concurrence of more fortunate circumstances than have lately attended the efforts of Great Britain on the Continent may rescue those unhappy Provinces from a situation so lamentable and ignominious ; and bring upon the authors of it, who have so basely sacrificed their country to its natural enemy, the punishment due to their treachery and their crimes.

“M. de Geuzau gave us great hopes of my brother being soon released, and did not think the Pensionary in danger of his life ; but he advised us strongly against going to Holland for the present, as he had no doubt we should be immediately apprehended on our arrival, and detained in prison for some time.”

#### GEORGE III to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, April 26, Windsor.—“I have received Lord Grenville’s note accompanying the two letters he has got from Lord Malmesbury on the sums he has disbursed in his late mission to Brunswick, and think Lord Grenville must take the usual method of attesting his disbursements to the Lords of the Treasury, as is practiced in other foreign missions where the expenses have been occurred [incurred] by directions through the Secretary of State.”

#### REPORT ON FRENCH AFFAIRS.

1795, April. Situation de Paris.—“J’ai quitté Paris le 13 d’Avril ; la ville et les faubourgs étaient ce qu’on appelle tranquilles, c’est à dire, pas en révolte ouverte ; car depuis le 17 Mars, la fermentation était, à la vérité, plus ou moins générale, mais continuelle.

“Le Gouvernement tout en assurant qu’il n’a pas peur, cache assez mal ses inquiétudes, qui sont d’autant mieux fondées qu’il a bien appris dans la journée du 12, de ne point compter sur ses canoniers et les gens-d’armes, la plus part parents ou amis de la sansculotterie, et de se défier extrêmement de la force armée des plusieurs sections.

“Une organisation nouvelle de la Garde Nationale, composée de la haute et moyenne bourgeoisie, une petite armée de reserve dans l’arrondissement de Paris a été jugé indispensable pour la sûreté de la Convention.

“Il eut environ 40 personnes tués ou blessés les jours du 12 et 13 Germinal ; on se fusilla en cinq endroits, et tira du canon en deux. Cent-soixante et quelques individus ont été arrêtés comme chefs ou complices actives, de la conjuration. L’indécision du Député Duhem, le hasard, et une heureuse confusion surtout, contribuèrent plus que les mesures du Gouvernement, à sauver la Convention.

“La nouvelle du traité de paix avec la Prusse fit une assez forte sensation le premier jour ; mais elle devint à peine sensible le lendemain. Les esprits et les assignats, rémoués considérablement pendant environ trente-six heures, retombèrent d’aplomb, dès qu’après une courte ivresse, on ressentit encore la faim.

“Malgré la famine et les misères de toute espèce, les 19 spectacles de Paris sont constamment remplis, et plusieurs heures avant l’ouverture, les bureaux en sont assiégés comme les boutiques de boulangers, où telle citoyenne se remet à la queue. En sortant de l’Opéra, on serait tenté de croire que les Parisiens n’ont que deux besoins dont ils ne



puissent absolument pas se passer, le pain et la Comédie. Depuis près de quatre mois, on ne permet plus de chanter dans aucun spectacle la célèbre Marseillaise, ni la Carmagnole ; mais à leur place un cantique, appelé le Réveil du Peuple, qu'on demande et applaudit avec une sorte de fureur.

**Subsistances.**—“L'égalité n'est pas tant une chimère en France, mais elle existe réellement dans une commune et affreuse misère. Depuis sept mois, les villes les plus considérables étaient réduits à une demie livre, les autres à un quart de livre, et souvent, à quelques onces de pain. Des milliers des pétitions, ou plutôt mille cris de famine, poussés de tous les coins de ce malheureux pays, étaient étouffés par un arrêté secret du Comité de Salut Public, qui ordonna de n'admettre aucun pétitionnaire de cette espèce à la barre, mais de les lui renvoyer pour ne pas donner des inquiétudes au peuple, et l'éveil aux ennemis de la patrie. Toute la sollicitude du Gouvernement était réservée pour l'approvisionnement de Paris, et toute autre considération lui fut sacrifiée. Cependant, malgré les efforts constants, et les sacrifices immenses de ce Gouvernement, malgré la multitude, les gains et les violences de ses Commissaires, dont tous les districts fourmillent, il lui a été impossible, depuis trois mois, de faire fournir seulement un quart de livre de pain à chaque citoyen par jour.

“La farine arrive par petit bateau ou par charrettes ; et distribuée à mesure, de manière qu'un boulanger reçoit quelques sacs à six heures du matin, un autre à dix, et autant dans l'après midi ; ainsi il ne reste probablement le soir dans le Magasin Nationale pas autant de farine qu'il en faut pour faire un petit paté ! La provision de biscuit qu'on avait d'abord annoncé comme immense, fut consommée en moins de cinq semaines. La distribution du riz devint à peu près inutile, parceque le pauvre et l'ouvrier manquait également de bois et de charbon. Il faut se mettre à la queue pendant douze ou quatorze heures, pour obtenir deux buches ou un seizième de charbon. Le fameux Bois de Boulogne et quelques allées de Tuileries ont été coupées, pour fournir à des besoins aussi pressants que celui de faire la soupe.

“La rareté des viandes est beaucoup moins sensible parceque, depuis très longtemps, l'excessive cherté de ce comestible a forcé la moitié des habitants de Paris, et de France, à y renoncer absolument. On mange des pommes de terre, des pommes de terre, et des pommes de terre ! Ceux qui fréquentent les cafés et les traiteurs, sont obligés d'apporter le pain dans leur poche ; on n'invite ses amis que sous la même condition. Toutes les marchandises, regnicules ou étrangères suivent le change des assignats ; et on trouverait rarement à midi, une étoffe au même prix, qu'on l'aurait achetée le matin.

**Muscadins.**—“La fameuse jeunesse de Paris n'est réellement qu'un ramas des polissons élégants, et d'assez méchants garnements, dont cette ville eut toujours une heureuse abondance. Ceux qui font, pour ainsi dire, corps, sont au nombre de cinq à six cents. Ils ont pour rendez-vous le Café de Chartre et le vestibule adjacent du Palais Royal, et pour costume, ce qu'ils appellent et croient même le costume Anglais, mais qui en est réellement une très ridicule caricature. Lorsqu'ils veulent faire quelqu'opération, ils vont recruter tant ce qu'ils peuvent trouver dans les rues, dans les cafés, et tout autre place de jeunes gens. Il se joint encore à eux une députation ou plutôt un détachement des forts de la Halle, et quelques milliers des déserteurs de la première réquisition dans les jours de crise. Le Gouvernement les a protégé et fait conduire en partie, par ses affidés. Entre un grand nombre des sottises, ils font ou disent par fois une bonne chose. Le Comité de Salut-Public crut

d'avoir besoin de leur forces et de leur enfantillages pour renverser le hôtel de Marat ; et si cela était nécessaire, il a très bien réussi. Le buste de Marat fut pendu ou écrasé dans tons les spectacles, et jété par la fenêtre de toutes les maisons (car je ne crois pas qu'il avait à Paris cent maisons dépourvues de ce nouveau Palladium) avant que la Convention osa mettre son cadavre hors le Panthéon.

« Ces messieurs s'arrogent et exercent en effet, la haute police des spectacles. Si à tort ou à raison, ils jugent un acteur atteint de Jacobinisme il n'ose plus paraître. Si une pièce n'a pas le bonheur de leur convenir, elle n'ose pas être jouée ; ainsi, dans une assemblée de plusieurs milles personnes, quelques polissons font la loi ! Voilà cependant la même faiblesse, la même indifférence ou plutôt lacheté qui a laissé guillotiner, noyer, et mitrailler cent mille hommes ! Ces sont toujours des Français.

*Esprit Publique.*—« Lorsqu'on, entend à chaque instant, en tout lieu, et par toutes les classes du peuple, les propos les plus forts et les plus injurieux à la Convention ; ne parler de République, de Liberté, et d'Egalité qu'en faisant les grimaces les plus expressives ; des Représentants du peuple qu'avec le mépris le plus affecté ; comparer les douceurs de l'ancien régime avec les calamités du nouveau ; témoigner de la manière la plus énergique les regrets de tant des sacrifices faits pour la Révolution ; lorsqu'on voit fouler au pied les couleurs nationales, traîner dans la boue le tableau des droits de l'homme ; couper, en moins de trois semaines, plus de deux mille arbres de liberté dans le seul arrondissement de Paris ; effacer des maisons les inscriptions républicains, chanter sur tous les théâtres des cantiques contre—révolutionnaires ; on peut conclure sans doute que l'esprit publique a considérablement changé, ou qu'il est beaucoup moins travaillé et comprimé. Mais ce serait bien mal connaître la frivolité, l'inconséquence, et la lacheté des Parisiens, si l'on en attendait des plus grands et des plus sérieux résultats, à même d'un plan sagement conçu et exécuté pour donner à tant des passions et des besoins l'évervescence ou le degré nécessaire, et surtout la direction convenable.

« On vend publiquement, et achète avec empressement les mémoires et la vie de Dumourier. J'ai vu quelques exemplaires des brochures de maison de Mongaillard ; mais l'ouvrage lu avec le plus grand avidité et, j'espère, d'utilité, est la collection des écrits périodiques de Mallet du Pan. Ils semblent faire le plus grande sensation même dans une partie de la Convention, et un Député m'a assuré qu'il avait été question de l'inviter à profiter du décret en faveur des ouvriers, artistes, et hommes de lettres émigrés !

*Convention.*—« La plupart des membres de la Convention sont si parfaitement convaincus de leur propre nullité en particulier, et de leur défauts de moyens en générale, qu'ils auraient consenti et consentiraient encore, sans beaucoup de répugnance, à remettre en des mains plus habiles, ou du moins plus hardies, des pouvoirs énormes, dont ils ne savent, et n'osent faire usage ; pourvu qu'ils puissent espérer leur sûreté personnelle pour prix de leur sacrifice et de leur modestie. Quoiqu'ils n'aiment ni estiment beaucoup l'Abbé Siéyès, persuadés cependant que c'est le seul d'entre eux qui possède une étincelle de génie, ils semblent attendre de lui seul, le salut de la patrie et le leur.

« Ce Siéyès est assez difficile à voir et à connaître. Il réunit les défauts d'un bel esprit aux vices d'un moine ; il est pereux et hypocrite ; il met beaucoup de mystère dans ses opinions et sa conduite, se pique, comme Robespierre, de la réputation d'un homme austère et incorruptible, et exerce, comme lui, une très grande influence dans la Convention ;

son opinion devenant celle des tous les figurants, qui n'ont jamais une à eux. Le Comité de Salut Public le consulte, quoiqu'il n'en soit plus membre; et le Comité de Sûreté Générale lui montre beaucoup de déférence, en incarcérant ou élargissant quiconque est demandé ou réclamé par lui.

“La grande majorité de la Convention est très persuadée que la Constitution de 1793 est absolument impracticable; que c'est une idole aussi honteuse et aussi méprisable que le fut le buste de Marat. Mais, ayant juré aussi souvent de soutenir l'une qu'ils ont été à la procession de l'autre, ces pauvres gens font mille singeries (je ne sais trop par peur, ou par un reste d'amour-propre) avant d'oser la renverser.

“En attendant les meneurs préparent un coup de théâtre, et les personnages travaillent nuit et jour à en faire une autre (à ce qu'ils assurent plus raisonnable) et qui rendra, s'il faut leur croire, tout le monde heureux et content. Nous donnera-t-elle du pain? se demandent les Parisiens.

“Le parti des ci-devant incarcérés et mis hors de la loi, sans s'embarrasser beaucoup des dissensions, se rend toujours maître des décisions en forçant les décrets par leur grande majorité. Il n'y a cependant entre eux que Saladin, Louvet, Isnard et Mercier, qui aient beaucoup d'esprit et qui soient travailleurs.

Saladin est un Royaliste décidé et capable de tout entreprendre, s'il était encouragé d'une manière convenable. Il dit, et paraît réellement, aimer beaucoup la nation Anglaise, il est très lié avec un Mr. Kearny, ci-devant prêtre et régent du Collège des Ecossais à Paris, par lequel j'ai fait sa connaissance. Saladin est pauvre; je suis sûr que, moitié par inclination, moitié par intérêt, ce Député se résoudrait à tout.

“Je n'ai pas eu assez d'occasion de voir Louvet, pour m'en former une opinion bien fondée. Il y a quelque chose de romanesque dans tout ce qu'il dit et fait; je le crois après tout un homme des circonstances. Isnard est, selon moi, l'homme de la Convention qui a le plus de mérite et de caractère. Je l'ai vu souvent chez la ci-devant Marquise de l'Angle, Allemande et femme d'esprit; il m'a paru réunir les plus grands moyens à la meilleure volonté de bien faire, et n'attendre que l'occasion favorable et décisive pour jouer un grand rôle et prendre l'ascendant que ses talents, son courage, et ses amis lui assurent d'avance. Je le crois, enfin, l'homme qui mérite le plus d'égard et d'attention; qui recevrait avec le plus de modération des propositions et répondrait le mieux à quelques démarches nobles et francs.

“Mercier, humilié, aigri et pillé jusqu'à son bonnet de nuit, vendrait à bon marché sa plume, et a changé prodigieusement d'opinion.

“André Dumont a été Terroriste; il est à présent Modéré, et sera tout ce que voudra Madame D—, femme d'un très riche négociant d'Amiens, actuellement au service de la République, en qualité de Trésorier-Général des charrais de l'armée. Ce négociant a fait passer plus de deux cent mille livres aux émigrés de sa province, le tout payable à leur rentrée en France! Je connais une dizaine d'autres Députés; mais les uns pas assez familièrement et les autres pas assez avantageusement, pour en parler.

“Je suis intimement convaincu qu'à l'époque du 28 Mars, les deux-tiers de la Convention en peut faits eux-mêmes la contre-révolution, s'ils avaient su comment la faire. Par une fatalité inconcevable, des puissances font la paix, d'autres reconnaissent la République au moment même que le Comité de Salut Public et la Convention avaient désespéré de la paix et de la République.

*Décret contre les Terroristes.*—“Après avoir traité dans le sein de la Convention même de canaille et de populace, ce qu'on appelait, il y a peu de temps, la portion la plus pure et la plus intéressante de peuple, le véritable souverain, on ne pourrait pas se refuser à la conviction que la Révolution marche à grands pas sur son retour, quand on ne connaîtrait pas le décret contre les partisans du Terrorisme ; c'est à dire, selon l'esprit du décret, et surtout selon l'esprit de parti, les instruments aveugles et les mains coupables des véritables Terroristes, et tous ceux qui, pour m'exprimer en terme technique, ont montré de l'énergie dans les grandes circonstances, ou se sont fortement prononcé pour les grands principes. Ce décret m'a fait le plus grand plaisir, et doit avoir les suites les plus heureuses ; mais, certes, s'il n'est pas intentionnellement contre-révolutionnaire, il est sous tous les rapports, morales ou politiques, un monument frappant d'une bêtise et d'une impudence atroce. De la bêtise, parceque ce n'est pas désarmer un homme que de lui prendre une méchante pique, que le plus maladroit peut remplacer en quelques minutes d'une autre, au même d'un instrument plus avantageux pour se défendre et plus meriteux [meurtrier ?] pour attaquer. De l'impudence, parceque ce n'est pas ce misérable sans-culotte, pas même les membres d'un Comité révolutionnaire, qui pouvaient ordonner ou empêcher un seul des milliers d'assassinats que la perfidie ou la lâcheté de ces fiers décréteurs a laissé commettre.

“Quoiqu'il en soit de l'intention du décret, il reste toujours vrai qu'il met à la disposition de tous les ennemis de la Convention, et par suite de la République, ces hommes pour lesquels et par lesquels seuls on sembla faire la Révolution ; les seuls qui aient réellement quelque bonne foi et du courage. Ces hommes auxquels on a si longtemps prodigué les promesses les plus extravagantes, et les flagorneries les plus absurdes, se voyent enfin trompés, trahis, et méprisés. Ils sont cruellement tourmentés par la faim, et la vengeance. Il ne leur faudrait peut-être qu'un chef, quelques écus, et quelques heures, pour renverser la Convention et la République.

*Liberté des Cultes.*—“Partout on a profité avec enthousiasme du décret sur la Liberté des Cultes. Un prêtre non-assermenté est censé une découverte précieuse, et grand nombre de ceux qui se tenaient cachés, se montrent sans crainte ; et les communes qui ont le bonheur de les posséder, les prennent sur leur protection spéciale. Nul part on ne permet à un prêtre-jureur d'exercer ses fonctions, à moins de réabjurer son serment ; ce qu'ils font ordinairement sans hésiter. Que ne jureraient-ils pas ?

“Dans les petites villes et villages toutes les églises sont rouvertes, et personne n'oserait travailler le Dimanche. A Paris, et dans les grandes villes, les églises sont encore fermées. On dit la messe dans des chapelles particulières ou dans des salons. Deux-tiers des boutiques restent fermées le Dimanche. La Décadi n'est plus célébrée, excepté par la Convention, les Tribunaux, et les Administrations, et ceux qui y sont attachés. Personne n'est encore assez fou pour aller dans le Temple de la Raison. On voit exposé une immense quantité d'utensiles du culte Catholique dans les boutiques des ferblantiers ! et il s'en fait un commerce considérable et lucratif. On baptise les enfants, on se fait marier par un prêtre, et on est enterré sans drapeau tricolore et sans Carmagnole.

*Armée.*—“La nouvelle organisation de l'armée ayant rendu les quartiers—maîtres—trésoriers susceptibles d'avancement comme les autres officiers, il en devait nécessairement résulter les plus grands inconvénients pour l'ordre et la comptabilité. L'ineptie des com-

missaires de guerre, la plupart jeunes gens sans la moindre expérience dans leur métier, ouvrit une autre partie aux abus et dilapidations de toute espèce. Aussi l'esprit de gaspillage et de rapine devint si générale, que d'après le relevé des sommes payées pendant l'an 1793 et 1794, sous titre de prêt des armées, il assert qu'elles auraient dû être au moins de 1,300,000 hommes, de tout grade ; tandis qu'il est prouvé par les pièces les plus authentiques, qu'elles n'ont jamais été à 900 mille hommes, ceux de réquisition en dépôt, non armés, et renvoyés dans leur domicile y compris. Il y a nombre des bataillons qui ont été entièrement renouvelés depuis leur formation, et qui n'ont encore jamais rendu aucune espèce de compte.

“ Le Général Landrin, dont j'ai fait la connaissance dans la maison d'arrêt de Paris, dans laquelle nous étions enfermés ensemble pendant huit mois, m'a assuré que, d'après les tableaux qu'il avait vu au Bureau de l'Agence de Guerre, la force effective de toutes les armées de la République avaient été au 1 Ventose (18 Janvier) de cinq cent quatre-vingt mille et quelques cent hommes, dont soixante-mille de cavalerie, et dix-huit mille d'artillerie. Que depuis le 22 Septembre 1793 jusqu'au même jour 1794, il était mort dans les hôpitaux ou ambulances, de maladie et suites des blessures, cent quatorze mille hommes ; que le nombre de tués, désertés, et égarés n'était pas bien connu, mais qu'on le supposait de cinquante-cinq mille. Que depuis le 22 Septembre jusqu'au 18 Janvier, trente mille hommes avaient quitté leurs drapeaux sans congé. Que plus de douze mille chevaux avaient péri pendant et depuis la dernière campagne. Ce Général Landrin fut, ainsi que Pichégru, bas-officier d'artillerie avant la Révolution.

*Armée du Comité du Salut Public.*—“ Déjà au mois d'Octobre, le Comité de Salut Public fit placer à Versailles, St. Germain, et autres endroits voisins de Paris, environ huit mille hommes, tant infanterie que cavalerie, sous la dénomination de dépôt. Il vint d'en faire venir quatorze mille autres de l'armée du Nord et Sambre et Meuse, sous le prétexte de protéger l'arrivage des grains et farines ; aussi il se trouve dans l'arrondissement de Paris au moins une armée de vingt-deux mille hommes.

*Marine.*—“ Les rapports des Représentants du peuple dans les ports, et des Commandants des Escadres sont remplies des plaintes sur l'ignorance et l'insubordination des officiers, la mauvaise espèce et l'indiscipline des matelots. On m'a assuré qu'un nombre considérable d'officiers Suédois et Danois allaient être employés sur les flottes, et que le Comité de Salut Public allait faire exécuter un plan d'attaque en grande masse, semblable à celui des armées de terre. J'avoue que je ne conçois rien à ce plan.”

*French.*

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, May 4, Vienna.—“ I avail myself of the return to England of the messenger to offer your Lordship my sincere thanks for your private letter of the 17th past, and to assure your Lordship that nothing shall be wanting on my part to promote celerity and vigour in the measures of this Government. I feel with your Lordship how necessary it is to urge them on. Their slowness and want of energy often render my situation very painful, but never more so than during the progress of the present business. For many weeks past a day has seldom gone by without my stating to M. de Thugut the utter impossibility of making any change in the conditions of the loan, and

urging him to come to some decision; but to what little purpose the event unhappily shews. And yet that he is desirous to pursue the war with vigour I cannot doubt.

"I sincerely lament his want of confidence in Count Stahremberg. At this moment it must be highly prejudicial to the interests of the two Courts; but the disposition and language of his family with regard to M. de Thugut are such as to give me little hopes of any change.

"I have more than once stated that the principal nobility are very virulent against him, and as the chief employments are in their hands, they find means often to thwart him; but possessing as he undoubtedly does the confidence of the sovereign, he might establish such a responsibility both amongst the military and throughout the several departments as would ensure success to his measures.

"His language as to the necessity of making, at this moment, some vigorous effort is entirely conformable to that of your Lordship. He, equally with us, laments the inactivity of the armies; and in his own justification, alleges that M. de Vins has the most positive orders to act offensively and according to our desire, *carte blanche* as to the mode; and that Marshal Clairfait, as your Lordship has seen by my late letters, has such instructions and incitements as are best calculated to make him act with enterprise and vigour. Both these officers are able and brave, but the late campaigns have shewed that the latter has not that decision of mind which is so necessary at the present important crisis. This is generally said, and yet the public opinion does not point out any General more capable.

"Mr. Wickham wrote to me some time ago; by the return of the post I assured him that I should be happy in his further correspondence, and in co-operating with him for the good of His Majesty's service, but I have not again heard from him."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1795, May 5, Dover Street.—Published in the "Correspondence of the Right Honourable William Wickham," 1870. Volume 1, p. 39.

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1795, May 9, Dover Street.—"I enclose your Grace a letter from Charles Bentinck, which I received yesterday. The accounts continue very satisfactory from that quarter.

"It is a curious fact that, in consequence of the letter written by the Duke of Brunswick to the King of Prussia, the latter has sent for him to Berlin. What this will produce it is difficult to guess."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to JOHN JAY.

1795, May 11, Dover Street.—"I cannot resist the desire I feel of availing myself of the opportunity of the first packet since your departure, to express to you how happy you would make me by allowing me occasionally to recall to your recollection in this manner one who will always entertain for you the most sincere esteem and friendship. I am particularly anxious to hear of your safe arrival, and that you have found your family and friends well. These are points paramount to all other considerations, but I know your return to your country will not be fully satisfactory to you unless you have also found the state of

public affairs such as to promise the continuance of good order and tranquillity. That it may be so, no one more sincerely wishes than myself, and it would be a great satisfaction to me to hear it from you.

"Since you left us, the news of the arrival of the treaty in America has reached us. We were singularly unfortunate in the loss of the *Tankerville* packet. By a strange negligence the November and December mails from hence were both put on board that ship without our having any notice of it from the Post Office; so that, while I thought we were sending duplicates by two different conveyances, we were in fact sending them by the same vessel. My letters to Governor Simcoe, which I have frequently mentioned to you, and my despatches to Mr. Hammond on the subject of the treaty, were on board the same ship; so that this accident has thrown us far back in the arrangement of many material points. I hope, however, that with attention, and a continuance on the part of the two Governments of the same disposition which actuated all our communications and negotiations here, the great work which we have begun will be carried to its full extent.

"I have not been inattentive to the points which remain to be settled here. One of the most material is, I flatter myself, at length in a train of being well arranged; I mean that which relates to the Admiralty Courts in the West Indies, which it is in contemplation immediately to diminish in point of number, so as to have them only at Jamaica, Barbadoes, Grenada, Antigua, and Martinico. Knowing, as I do, how much evil has been produced by the multiplication of these courts, I look to this reduction with very sanguine hopes. But I hope the regulation will not stop there, but that the effect of it may lead to render the practice of those which will remain more correct and cautious than I fear it has hitherto been.

"The impossibility of our receiving the ratification of the treaty till quite the end of July leaves us no chance of being able to propose to Parliament, during the present session, those matters connected with the treaty in which the interference of the Legislature is necessary. I know that the delay will be misconstrued on your side of the water, but it is unavoidable. I requested Mr. Pinckney, before he went to Spain, to write to America on this point, in order that the explanation of it might not rest merely on the communications of our minister there. You will be able to speak with still more knowledge and effect to the same point. Whatever does not depend on the repeal or alteration of existing laws will be immediately executed on the receipt of the ratification.

"The public papers and other communications will inform you fully of the state of affairs in Europe. The dispositions of the people in France are evidently turning very fast towards the establishment of some settled state of order, which may relieve them from the miseries of their present anarchy. In a similar situation in this country we experienced the advantage of a known and moderate form of Government, under which the nation had before been happy, and to which, therefore, it returned with enthusiasm, and almost with unanimity. The want of such a standard to resort to is now, as far as I can judge, the great obstacle to the restoration of order in France, and consequently of peace in Europe. Mild as their old Government was in its practice, it was attended with many circumstances, the renewal of which creates great apprehension and uneasiness; and there is no authority of sufficient weight to prescribe the form and limits of any change. Some of the belligerent Powers are, as you will have seen, too impatient to wait the result of this doubtful issue. To others, all idea of peace which shall not give better security than the signature of the Committee of Safety,

or the ratification of the Convention, seems delusive and dangerous ; and to this sentiment I profess myself strongly inclined. You are happy in America if you can avoid, as I trust you will, the dangers both of the war and of the peace."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1795, May 19, Dover Street.—"J'ai le plaisir de vous prévenir que notre courrier est enfin arrivé avec la convention pour l'affaire de l'emprunt, signée par M. Thugut, et ratifiée par Sa Majesté Impériale. J'espère que la ratification du Roi sera prête demain, ensorte que nous pourrons faire l'échange des deux instrumens Jeudi matin. Je serai au bureau sur les onze heures demain si vous avez, par hazard, quelque chose à me communiquer, ou à me demander."

*French. Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, May 25, Mulheim.—"Though I have not yet heard anything from the Duke of Portland, yet I feel that I ought not to delay a moment acknowledging your Lordship's very kind letter of the 5th instant.

"In the first place, laying aside all questions of personal obligation, I consider myself as so entirely committed to the Duke of Portland that, *in point of honour*, I could not give up even the place to which he first appointed me for any situation whatever in any other Department, or under any other person, without his full consent and approbation.

"In the second place, I will say very fairly to your Lordship that, as far as regards myself, I should prefer the place that his Grace seems disposed to offer me, or any other of credit or confidence at home, to any situation whatever out of my own country, even the most splendid and most honourable.

"On the other hand, having undertaken my present employment with the full consent and approbation of his Grace, and being sensible that the local knowledge and experience I have acquired here may be of real utility to his Majesty's service and the interests of my country, I do not hesitate to say that nothing less than his Grace's absolute commands should induce me to abandon my situation. It is not that I have the vanity to suppose that a much abler and a much fitter person for such a situation might not be found, but the advantages that seven months of hard labour and attentive observation have given me are not to be put into competition with any others in a moment like the present, when each day may bring about the most important alteration in the situation of public affairs, and may offer opportunities of which nothing but local knowledge and experience could enable any one to profit.

"I am perfectly aware, unless a speedy termination should be put to matters here, that in adopting this line of conduct I expose myself to lose all my best hopes. It is impossible either for me to wish, or for the Duke of Portland to gratify me in an expectation, that the place of Under Secretary could be kept much longer open. I will go further and say that, on his Grace's account, I ought not to desire it. I am aware also that my present situation is one of much personal responsibility and danger. But I feel that it is *my duty* to remain here, and I beg your Lordship to be persuaded that it is upon that single ground that I have founded my determination. It is indeed the only one that



could enable me to reason and act as I am doing at this moment when I am about to abandon the object that, of all others, would have been the most agreeable to me.

“With respect to my future destination, though I am aware that I shall come to your Lordship with a very ill grace, and by no means in a manner that will enable me to ask any favour, yet I rely so entirely upon the kind expression at the close of your Lordship’s letter that I venture to say without difficulty that if I must stay abroad, I should most particularly wish that America might not be the place of my destination. I will give your Lordship my reasons at large by some other occasion.

“I cannot sufficiently thank your Lordship for having sent me Mr. Flint. It is a relief to me of which you can have no idea.”

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, May 27, Hambourg.—“Je continue à profiter de la permission que vous m’avez accordée de vous donner de temps en temps de mes nouvelles. Celles que nous recevons de notre malheureux pays prennent de jour en jour un caractère plus affligeant. Vous aurez, sans doute, déjà vu le traité d’alliance dernièrement conclu entre notre Gouvernement actuel et le République Française. J’emploie le mot de *traité* pour ne pas tomber dans des longueurs, car d’ailleurs une transaction aussi inouïe, et aussi monstrueuse ne mérite pas ce nom. Ce qui m’en frappe le plus c’est l’impossibilité où il me paraît que notre nouveau Gouvernement doit se trouver d’en remplir de son côté les conditions. Les 100 millions, par exemple, qu’il s’engage à payer à la France en espèces ou en lettres de change n’existent certainement pas dans le pays, et je ne conçois pas d’où on les tirera. On aura beau imposer de nouvelles contributions; aucun habitant n’a le moyen de les payer. Le numéraire a entièrement disparu; et comme les rentes dues par différentes Puissances étrangères ne se payent plus, et que le commerce est dans un état de stagnation absolue, les sources de la richesse du pays sont pour le moment complètement tariées. Cette même cause empêchera l’équipement des vaisseaux de ligne et des frégates qu’on promet de fournir à la France pour la campagne de cette année. Avec cela il est incroyable que, dans un moment où toutes ces circonstances ont lieu, on déclare la guerre à la moitié de l’Europe. C’est obliger les Puissances qui auraient pu rester spectatrices indifférentes de ce qui se passe en Hollande, à prendre parti; c’est, par exemple, mettre l’Espagne dans la nécessité de ne pas relâcher les vaisseaux Hollandais qu’elle a saisis; c’est forcer l’Empereur, la Russie, à ne pas payer, du moins en Hollande, les intérêts de leurs emprunts. Par cette même mesure on sacrifie, pour ainsi dire d’un trait de plume, l’immense propriété Hollandaise qui se trouve déjà dans les ports d’Angleterre, et, à coup sûr, une grande partie de celle qui est encore sur les mers. En considérant tout cela attentivement, je pense que cette déclaration de guerre, surtout contre l’Angleterre, est peut-être dans ce moment un événement heureux pour nous; et, qu’en permettant au Gouvernement Britannique de prendre des mesures plus décisives qu’il n’a pu faire jusqu’à présent, elle accélérera le retour d’un autre ordre de choses. C’est du moins un espoir auquel on aime à se laisser aller, quand il n’en reste pas d’autre.

“L’esprit de parti, poussé jusqu’à la fureur, qui a seul pu dicter un pareil engagement, se déchaîne en particulier contre moi d’une manière à laquelle, en d’autres temps, je n’aurais jamais pu m’attendre. La lettre que j’ai écrite à l’assemblée actuelle des Etats-Généraux a servi

de prétexte pour se porter aux plus grandes violences. Le nouveau Gouvernement vient de faire séquestrer tous mes biens. On a fait l'inventaire de tout ce que je possède en biens fonds, et en meubles, et objets précieux de toute espèce, comme bibliothèque, tableaux, cabinets d'estampes et de desseins; et on y a mis le scellé en nommant deux notaires pour en prendre possession et administrer le tout. Cela s'est fait avec si peu de ménagemens que, dans le premier moment, on n'a pas même laissé à ma femme, et à une partie de ma famille qui demeure actuellement avec elle dans ma maison, l'usage des meubles les plus indispensables, ou qui lui appartenaient en propre. Cependant, sur sa réclamation, on a apporté quelque adoucissement à la rigueur du premier décret. Supposé même que je n'eus pas écrit la lettre qui a fourni le prétexte de ces procédés arbitraires, on n'en aurait pas moins commis ces violences; mais on en allégué maintenant pour raison le refus que je fais de rendre compte de ma conduite, et, en particulier, de la commission que j'ai remplie à Londres. La saisie de mes biens sera, selon toute apparence, suivie de leur confiscation, si je ne rentre pas en Hollande; mais, cependant, ma famille entière me déconseille toujours également d'y retourner. Je crois moi-même que ce serait une imprudence; et je suis déterminé à continuer encore mon séjour dans cette ville, ou dans les environs. Je crois que vous approuverez ce parti. Je dois, au reste, vous demander pardon de vous avoir entretenu si longtemps de ce qui me regarde personnellement; mais l'intérêt que vous avez bien voulu me témoigner dans toutes les occasions, et tout récemment encore dans la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 21 Avril, me fait un devoir de ne pas vous laisser ignorer des circonstances aussi essentielles pour moi. Je suis persuadé d'avance de la part que votre amitié voudra bien y prendre."

*French.*

BARON DE KUTZLEBEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, May 27, Muswell Hill.—"I have the honour to inform your Lordship that I have wrote to the Landgrave what you was pleased to desire of me, and I shall not fail to acquaint you immediately with the answer. I received on the 23rd instant a letter from the Landgrave, which contained one to his Majesty, in answer to the Prince of Wales's marriage. I gave it to Mr. Aust. He did not mention anything about *the negotiation with the French*; but I have seen a letter from Germany in town, which absolutely states that the Landgrave of Cassell, Darmstadt, and the Duke of Würtemberg, had taken the same measures with the King of Prussia.

"As it was impossible that any thing regularly could be settled about the pay for the Landgrave's troops, what pay to allow them according to the different countries where they had served, he always ordered me and Messrs. van Notten to demand large sums *on account of pay*. Those sums have been paid now and then. He lately ordered to demand 100,000*l.* sterling on account of the pay again, as likewise the subsidies due. I have reason to think that he wishes to get as much money as possible, and more than there might be due to him when the accounts are to be settled after the war, or when he thinks proper not to keep any longer his treaties with this country. I flatter myself your Lordship will pardon the liberty I take to advise you to take your measures accordingly, and as the circumstances may justify you, and to inform Mr. Pitt with it. I think the Landgrave might be tied down to keep his engagements with England, at least as long as you think proper he should.

"In a letter dated Cassell, March 26th, which I received April 11, he says he hoped I had received one of the 5th of January last, wherein he had informed me that the report of *withdrawing his troops from the service of Great Britain was false*, and that I had contradicted the same. I answered I had immediately informed your Lordship of it, and his Majesty as well as yourself never believed that there had nor could be the least foundation in such reports."

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, May 30, Hambourg.—"Actuellement que la correspondance ordinaire entre la Hollande et Hambourg est rétablie et que les *Gazettes* Hollandaises arrivent régulièrement deux fois par semaine ici, les papiers publics de cette ville rendent un compte assez exact de tout ce qui parvient en Hollande à la connaissance du public. En conséquence, je ne doute pas que l'on n'en soit également informé en Angleterre, et, d'après cela, il serait superflu que je vous donnasse des informations que vous recevez sûrement d'ailleurs. C'est ainsi que vous aurez sans doute déjà vu le traité d'alliance conclu entre la France et la Hollande; mais je ne sais si l'article additionnel, relatif au port de Flessingue, est déjà parvenu à votre connaissance. Il porte, 1. que les deux nations auront un droit égal de faire usage du port, des chantiers, de Flessingue. 2. Que chacune des deux nations aura séparément ses arsenaux, chantiers. 3. Que, dès à présent, la République Batave cède à la France la maison des Indes Occidentales à Flessingue, avec ses appartenances, de même que l'usage provisoire d'un des chantiers pour la construction des vaisseaux. 4. L'achat de tout ce qui est nécessaire pour les magasins, maisons, places, reste à la charge des deux nations. 5. Les fraix de réparation du chantier, du rempart, seront à la charge des deux nations; mais la République des Provinces-Unies en conserve la direction; seulement elle aura soin de prévenir la République Française des ordres qu'elle voudra donner. 6. Il n'y aura point de vaisseau amiral, ou de garde, d'aucune des deux nations dans le port de Flessingue. 7. S'il s'élève des contestations sur ce règlement, elles seront décidées par des arbitres dont deux Français, deux Hollandais, et le cinquième à nommer par les deux nations, doit être choisi par le sort. 8. Ce règlement doit être mis en train immédiatement après la ratification du traité d'alliance. Cet article, de même que toutes les autres stipulations du traité, tendent évidemment à faire de la République une province ou un département Français; et quoique la France ait tâché d'éviter l'odieux d'une pareille réunion en reconnaissant pour la forme l'indépendance de la Hollande, elle n'en reste pas moins maîtresse aussi absolue des Provinces-Unies qu'elle l'était déjà auparavant des Pays-Bas Autrichiens. Je ne conçois pas comment les Puissances du Continent qui traitent, dit-on, de la paix avec la France, pourront voir d'un oeil tranquille un colosse aussi formidable s'élever à leurs côtés. Et cependant, jusqu'ici, ces Puissances ne paraissent pas faire difficulté de reconnaître le nouveau Gouvernement qui s'est établi chez nous. Voilà du moins ce que l'on doit conclure de leur conduite à l'égard de nos ministres auprès d'Elles. M. Van der Goes Envoyé Extraordinaire de la République à Madrid, et M. de Haeften notre Ministre à Vienne, paraissent être en correspondance réglée avec notre nouveau Gouvernement. Le premier mande en date d'Aranjuez, du 15 Avril, que l'Espagne négociait alors avec la France, et que la négociation était en bon train. M. de Haeften annonce officiellement dans une dépêche au nouveau Gouvernement, qu'une alliance conclue entre la Russie et l'Angleterre a été communiquée

à la Cour de Vienne, et que celle-ci ne s'est pas encore expliquée sur la révolution qui a eu lieu en Hollande. Le Portugal a approuvé la conduite de son Ministre à la Haye, M. d'Aranjo, lequel y est resté après l'invasion des Français; alléguant pour motif de cette conduite que, comme l'Assemblée des Etats-Généraux continuait à siéger à la Haye, il avait cru ne pas devoir s'en éloigner. Au reste, la conduite de nos Ministres aux différentes Cours n'a pas été la même partout. Il y en a qui ont pris leur part d'une manière fort noble. M. d'Hogguer par exemple, qui était Ministre à Petersbourg, a envoyé de lui-même sa démission à l'Assemblée qui a conservé le nom d'Etats-Généraux. Il va, dit-on, établir une maison de commerce en Crimée, et l'Impératrice doit lui avoir accordé à cet effet plusieurs facilités.

"J'ai vu avec étonnement dans les nouvelles de Hollande arrivées hier que le Sieur Vitriarius est encore à Londres, d'où il mande que les cargaisons des vaisseaux Hollandais, détenus en Angleterre, seront vendues, et le produit de cette vente séquestré; qu'il se flatte de retourner bientôt avec les papiers de la Compagnie des Indes; qu'au reste, il y a beaucoup de mécontentement en Angleterre, et que la désertion parmi les matelots est fort grande.

"On m'a assuré hier que, suivant des lettres particulières de Hollande, le Commandant de nos vaisseaux de guerre stationés à Suriname, qui doit convoier en Europe les vaisseaux marchands de cette colonie, a écrit au Gouvernement qu'il avait appris l'invasion de la Hollande par les troupes Françaises; mais que, comme de pareils rapports se trouvaient souvent faux, il comptait relâcher en Angleterre avec son convoi, pour s'assurer de la vérité du fait."

*French.*

#### COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN AND AUSTRIAN ALLIANCES WITH GREAT BRITAIN, 1795.

TREATY OF PETERSBURGH,  
February 18, 1795.

TREATY OF VIENNA,  
May 20, 1795.

*Guaranty.*

*Guaranty.*

Great Britain and Russia guaranty to each other all states and possessions which they now possess or may acquire by treaty.

The case of wars between Russia and the Asiatic Powers is excepted on the one hand; and on the other the case of wars between England and any non-European Power. But in both cases if European Powers take part in the dispute, the *casus fœderis* exists.

By the 2nd secret article, the assistance to be furnished to Russia, in the case of an attack on the part of the Porte, is restrained to the reception of their ships into our ports, and the affording them such assistance as they may require; and, further, the keeping other Powers in check by a firm language and vigorous demonstrations.

Great Britain and Austria guaranty to each other all territories, rights, possessions, such as they now possess them, or shall possess them after the conclusion of a peace made by common consent, in conformity to the Convention of 1793.

*Nota Bene.*—By that Convention all the possessions of the two parties, such as they then stood, were mutually guaranteed; and an engagement was taken not to make peace (except by common consent) without stipulating for the restitution of all conquests made by the common enemy on each other's dominions; the war being for that effect to be vigorously prosecuted by the two contracting parties.

*Succours.*

Great Britain is to furnish to Russia in case of attack twelve sail of the line, from 74's to 50's.

Russia is to furnish to Great Britain in case of attack 12,000 men; namely, 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.

These succours may in either case be converted into money at the option of the party requiring, and the amount of such payment is fixed at 500,000 roubles per annum during the continuance of the war.

These succours may be recalled after two months notice, in case the party furnishing them should himself be attacked; and, in like manner, if the party required should be engaged in a war at the time when the requisition is made, he shall not be obliged to furnish the succours.

By the third secret article Great Britain is not obliged to send the succours stipulated except in order to be joined to a Russian fleet, which, together with the British squadron, shall be equal to the enemy's force in the Baltic.

The Russian troops are not to be sent out of Europe, nor to Spain, Portugal, or Italy.

If the stipulated succours are insufficient for the defence of the party attacked, the two High Contracting Parties are to concert on an augmentation of them.

*Navigation and Commerce.*

The Russian treaty contains no engagement respecting the neutral navigation in time of war, but there is an engagement to proceed to the formation of a treaty of commerce.

*Accessions.*

The two parties will concert respecting the admission of any Power who may be desirous to accede.

*Succours.*

Great Britain and Austria are to furnish to each other reciprocally in case of attack 26,000 men, namely, 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry, who are to be furnished within two months after requisition made for that purpose.

These succours may in either case be converted at the desire of the party requiring, into monthly payments at the rate of 4,560,000 Dutch florins per annum during the continuance of the war.

But by the separate article on this subject which it has been agreed to keep secret, it is agreed that if the Emperor makes the demand of succours in men, and Great Britain should be unable to furnish them so that the Emperor should be obliged to supply their place by other troops, the difference, if any, between the real cost of such troops and the sum above specified, shall be borne by Great Britain.

If the stipulated succours are insufficient for the defence of the party attacked, the other party shall augment them as the case may require, and shall even assist with all his forces if circumstances should render it necessary.

*Navigation and Commerce.*

The Austrian treaty contains no engagement respecting commerce, but there are two articles by which the carrying provisions, or military, or naval stores to the enemy, and also the sheltering privateers or armed vessels, or suffering prizes to be brought in, are prohibited. But there is an exception for existing treaties.

*Accessions.*

The two parties will concert respecting the invitation to Prussia to accede.

*Duration.*

The treaty shall last eight years, before which time the parties shall concert for its renewal.

*War with France.*

By a secret article Russia admits the present war with France to be a *casus fœderis* in so far as to agree to furnish 12 sail of the line on the footing of an auxiliary squadron. And to concert respecting the conduct to be observed towards neutral powers to prevent their supplying France. Great Britain engaging to make common cause in all wars which may result from such measures, and not to make peace in that case but by common consent.

By a declaration mutually ratified and exchanged by Great Britain, Austria and Russia in 1795, the separate alliances subsisting between the different parties were consolidated into a triple alliance, preserving the engagements of the several parties to each other on the same footing on which they were placed by those treaties."

*Duration.*

No duration is fixed to this treaty.

*War with France.*

The Convention of 1793 is confirmed, the stipulations of which as to the war are mentioned above.

## LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1795, June 3, Dover Street.—"I have the honour to enclose to your Grace a letter which I have received from Mr. McTavish. He was brought to me last year by General Clarke as the person best able to give me information upon the fur trade, and the other points respecting the interests of the two Canadas which might come under discussion in the negotiation with Mr. Jay; and I had every reason to be satisfied both with the information he gave me, and with the disposition he manifested to facilitate the arrangement of that business. I thought that he was entitled to this testimony from me, but, with respect to the particular object which he solicits, your Grace is of course the best judge how far it may be proper to comply with his wishes; and whether, even in that case, it may not be necessary that the application should come recommended in the first instance by the Governor-General, which, I think, was the rule which has been observed as to the other colonies, though it may perhaps have been departed from in the particular case of the Canadas."

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1795, June 4, Dover Street.—"I have this morning been informed that when the Attorney-General prepared his report for the Bodmin charter, some of the party adverse to Lord Camelford's interest applied

to him to be heard in support of a list of names for the charter, which he of course declined. I am very strongly pressed to urge the business forward, and I really see no advantage that could in any point of view result to Sir I. Morshead from its being delayed to the period of Lord Camelford's arrival in England, which must still be uncertain, though we hope he may be expected by the first India ships. He is not of age yet, so that when he arrives he can take no formal step, if any were necessary on his part; and his friends are, as I understand, decided in the resolution not to enter into any compromise. I cannot therefore but wish that the business could be brought on without delay, as it is now before the Council and waits only to be approved there, and to have the names settled.

"I have received a list of all the inhabitants of the borough, and, as far as I can rely upon the fairness of that statement, the proposed selection is made with judgment and propriety. With respect to the question of property in the neighbourhood of the borough, there is, as I understand, no sort of comparison between Lord Camelford and Sir I. Morshead, that of the former being very greatly superior."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, June 7, Dropmore.—"Lord Grenville trusts that your Majesty will excuse his breaking in upon your Majesty to-day with the despatches just received from Petersburg, as the conclusion of the alliance between your Majesty and the Empress and the state of forwardness of the Russian squadron are likely to produce so very advantageous an effect in the present critical moment.

"Lord Grenville begs leave humbly to offer his congratulations to your Majesty on this occasion, and to express his sanguine hope that your Majesty's efforts in this great cause will at length, under the favour of Providence, be crowned with that success which is so important to the happiness not only of your Majesty's dominions but of every civilized country."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 7, Windsor.—"I am sensible of Lord Grenville's attention in not detaining from me even on this day the agreeable account of the final conclusion of the alliance with the Empress of Russia, and that the Russian squadron must by this time be sailed for the North Sea. I entirely agree with him that at the present critical moment the knowledge of this event may be peculiarly advantageous, as the unprincipled conduct of the Court of Prussia has certainly greatly unhinged the political system which had been established; but the great northern power now standing forth will, I trust, compensate for the former loss.

"I hope no encouragement to any relaxation in our conduct towards Denmark from the present plan of Russia to regain that feeble ally; it is by a direct conduct in stopping all provisions and naval stores that we can alone subdue France."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 12, Windsor.—"The inconvenience of the Count d'Artois remaining any longer in my German dominions is very great; but on Lord Grenville's representation I will allow him to remain one month longer. If by that time he is not sent to the Vendée, it will be too

late for his being of any use there, and then there can be no objection to his joining his brother in Italy, for his being in my German dominions is not less improper than his being in England."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 15, Windsor.—"The last evening I received from the Duke of Portland the accounts of the death of the young King of France and the surrender of Luxembourg; the first must be an advantage to the cause, the Convention having lost the hostage in their hands that might have saved their persons. Now the lawful King is out of their power, and can head any rising in the country. I shall certainly stave off any proposal of sending Monsieur D'Ompèda to any congress at Frankfort, but doubt of Mull's being of sufficient rank to be employed in such a business."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 21, Harley Street.—"Monsieur Morice [Morris] qui a été ministre d'Amérique en France, détestant cette infame République des assassins, et également détesté par Elle qui enfin l'a fait rapeller de Paris, est arrivé ici de Hamburg.

"Il a passé chez moi aujourd'hui. Il n'est pas dans les principes de Pinkney, mais bien dans ceux de Monsieur Jay. Il est bien informé des affaires de France, tant intérieures qu'extérieures.

"Il ne reste à Londres que 8 à 10 jours, après quoi il compte de faire un voyage par toute l'Angleterre. Il demeure au Grand Hotel à Covent Garden, et ne me paraît pas disposé à se faire présenter nulle part dans ce peu de séjour qu'il fera à Londres. Mon attachement pour vous m'engage de vous informer de cela pour que, si vous voulez le voir et l'inviter à passer chez vous, vous puissiez savoir où le trouver; car je suis persuadé que vous pouvez avoir de lui des informations très utiles dans les circonstances présentes. Il y a une très importante que j'ai appris de lui, qui est que ceux gouvernant la France ont, depuis peu avant la mort du jeune Roi, fait des propositions secrètes au fils du Duc d'Orléans, tendentes à le faire Roi, et que ce jeune homme a rejeté cette offre.

"On m'a dit que le ministre de Suède nous a fait verbalement la communication que son Roi a accédé au traité de Basle entre la France et la Prusse. Je voulais vous le demander quand j'ai eu l'honneur de vous entretenir hier, mais je l'ai oublié. Faites moi la grace de me dire si cela est vrai, et dans quel terme cela nous a été communiqué par cet envoyé des Français du Nord."

*French.*

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 21, Varel.—"Not wishing unnecessarily to take up any of your Lordship's time, I have not given you a line since mine of the 15th and 24th April, both of which I enclosed to Mr. Goddard; and with the last a letter for Prince Frederick of Orange, which I hope Mr. Goddard received, as they went in Mr. Fraser's packet. Many events have, no doubt, taken place since that must affect materially the situation of the Republic. Many are of public notoriety; and those that are less so, and relate more particularly to that country, I knew to be in your Lordship's possession more fully even than I could have stated



them. From all these, we have every reason to think the disposition of the people throughout the United Provinces to be much the same, if not even more averse to the new government than at the time I wrote; and that we have every proof that the Cabal never can maintain, or could have maintained, their ground without the French army; and that with a well-directed, well-supported co-operation from the Continental Powers, we might flatter ourselves to see that Cabal overthrown in a short time. We have to lament that, from the secession of the King of Prussia, the capture of Luxemburg, and other events, that support appears yet to be distant; and in the meantime, being in possession of the government, the present rulers will not neglect anything that can establish their power, or render idle any attempt to subvert it.

"Since my last, I have passed some time with M. Fagel at a friend's house in Holstein. I left Hamburg the 27th ultimo to come here, where we are in a state of seeming neutrality, and where it is my intention, if I do not hear from England to the contrary, to wait for a more favourable opportunity to pursue my object. For notwithstanding my long silence, though I received yours of the 22nd April, I believe I need scarcely add that the restoration of the House of Orange, of the connection with England, and the breaking of the chains the present rulers of the Republic vainly endeavour to conceal, I am too much concerned to see effected, not to wish to be of use to those who have the same object at heart; and that I shall, at all times, be thankful for any suggestion your Lordship thinks may lead to the attainment of it. I must acknowledge that, at this moment, the situation of my brother continues to be a check upon me; and any correspondence with him or his friends, scattered about and watched as they are, is so insecure and attended with so much personal risk for himself, that I have not ventured upon it. I have taken care, however, he should know I was willing to come to the Hague if he wished it, or thought my presence could be of any use to him. The person wrote to (my brother not being allowed to correspond with anyone) sent me word it was my brother's desire and advice I should not think of it. If I had I should not have been long at liberty as I heard since, particularly after the declaration of war against England. I was happy to see by your letter you agree with me upon this point. By the late accounts we have there is some reason to think M. de Rhoon's release is not so far distant. M. de Reede, Madame de Rhoon's father, the Republic's envoy at the Court of Berlin, has endeavoured by means of his friends at Berlin to obtain that release. His last letter, dated the 13th instant, speaks of it so very positively that, however little inclined I am to give credit to anything that comes from Berlin after the conduct of that Court, I cannot help flattering myself he may have leave to come here. I shall be glad to see him out of the hands of his enemies, but will not give up the hope of our recovering our ground some day. In the meantime a prison of six months, so close as it was in the beginning, has been very severe for a man of his active disposition. In consequence of various applications particularly from M. de Reede at Berlin, it has been much less so for the last six weeks or two months. It was high time it should be less so, as his health began to suffer from the confinement. I only hope no rash or ill-timed plan will retard the moment of his release, or uselessly endanger his situation, which I cannot help considering as very critical still, from the number of persons who have again been taken up lately. M. Fagel is here at present. It is impossible to advise him to return; the conduct of the present rulers having been so hostile to him from the beginning that it would have been a folly to trust himself in their hands, and expose himself to the indignities and the sort of inquisition he must

have undergone when in their power. Your Lordship has seen the letter M. Fagel wrote, stating his intentions and the principles of his conduct. They have given him no answer, they have brought forward no accusation; and, after seizing all his papers previous to the receipt of his letter, without alleging any motives, they have now seized all his property; and he has been lately informed their intention is to proceed to confiscation, if he does not return directly to give an account of his conduct. Of these steps, and of the motives that led to them, they have given him no communication whatever. In the hands of men so evidently inimical, so violent and arbitrary in their proceedings, no one could advise M. Fagel to trust himself. His situation gives his friends the more concern that, having been absent at the time of the approach of the French, it was not in his power to take any precautions with respect to his property. Among other real objects of curiosity, the most valuable and complete collection of State Papers in the Republic, transmitted to him by his ancestors, a great many of which papers had no immediate connection with the present events, has thus fallen in unknown hands; and together with one of the most complete and considerable libraries, and collection of drawings and prints, to be met with in any part of Europe, formed in the course of above a century by a succession of men distinguished for their taste and their knowledge, as well as for their political talents and character, will most likely be dispersed or lost by the animosity of a few obscure individuals.

"I shall send this under cover to Baron de Frantz (*Ministre de sa Majesté Impériale, et Directeur de ses Postes à Breme*) and should your Lordship favour me with a line and think this a safe channel, I shall have the letter a great deal sooner than by Hamburgh.

"*Postscript, June 23.*—In consequence of some letters M. Fagel received from Hamburgh since I wrote the above, relating to his own affairs, he left us yesterday to go to that place, but we are in hopes of seeing him here again in a short time. A letter I had from that place mentions *assignats* being fallen there to a halfpenny for a *livre*."

#### MEMORANDUM ON THE STATE OF FRANCE, founded on the Reports of British Diplomatic Agents. May-June 1795.

"For the purpose of taking a distinct view of the distressed situation of France, it would be sufficient to recur to the debates of the National Convention, in which there are daily proofs that even the supporters of the Revolution, and those who are chiefly interested in endeavouring to alarm Europe with pompous descriptions of their internal resources, and of their still inexhausted means to carry on the present contest with at least a probability of success, are obliged to confess that the people are in misery and discontented, that *assignats* have almost totally lost their credit, that the manufactures are languishing, that it is with the utmost difficulty they can procure provisions, and that while their armies are gaining victories in the field, the interior presents nothing but discouragement and dismay.

"In the reports of their own committee we may see the approaching downfall of the Republic, we may hear them inculcating the necessity of giving France a regular and settled Government, of restoring order in their finances, and, what is still more material, of consolidating the Revolution by a general and immediate peace.

"Pelet in his speech to the Convention of the 8th of April, expresses himself in the words, 'No doubt but the Republic becomes exhausted by its bloody and expensive victories. The entrance of the French troops into Holland ought to have given peace to Europe. If we delay treating

with Holland, that Republic will in three months time be a charge to us, and its fugitive rich will increase the treasures of our enemies.

“ ‘It is now our duty to put an end to the Revolution in the interior.

“ ‘For these five years past the people have been duped by words. The erroneous system of our political economy is the source of all our sufferings. The scarcity of provisions causes objections to be made against the form of our Government. Our manufactures languish. Our maritime trade is destroyed. The military is our main object, and the armies the only consumers. The disproportion of our paper money, and the very nature of it, cause the great scarcity and dearth of provisions.

“ ‘The laws you have enacted concerning the division of property, the redeeming of ground rents, and the equal partition of inherited estates, encroach upon the rights of property, destroy the pasture ground, and occasion an immense diminution of all necessary articles: the consequence of which is that the specie we have left must be exported into foreign countries, to draw from thence those commodities which our own soil is unable to afford. The rapid and enormous rise in the price of all merchandise and articles of consumption strikes the mind with amazement and baffles all calculation. In the course of a month, a day, an hour, we experience an increase in the price of commodities which in a very alarming manner evinces a real scarcity, the want of public credit, an uneasiness on account of our present situation, and a dread of futurity.

“ ‘Whilst by the valour of our troops we triumph abroad, weakness and want of energy have crept into the interior. What is it, then, that creates alarms for the fate of France? Our fears arise from a conviction that as long as we have no certain settled Government, all our measures cannot possibly extirpate that anarchy which is inseparable from a provisional state of things, and from laws dictated by circumstances; which ultimately must plunge us into all the horrors of a civil war.’

“Such a picture of the weakness and instability of the present Government, would of itself be a sufficient proof that they are conscious of the impossibility of persuading the people to bear a continuation of their burdens, and that the state of France is now such that it merely requires energy on the part of the allies to bring the war to an honourable and successful issue. But it is not merely from the debates of the Convention that there exists such a reasonable ground to hope that the reign of the anarchists is drawing to an end.

“The reports of all the persons who have been lately witnesses to the state of desolation to which France is now reduced, and to the change of opinion which has universally taken place, are equally satisfactory. It will appear from them that *assignats* are daily falling in their value, and that it seems impossible to re-establish any part of their former credit. That many districts are almost totally without provisions, that the turn which the public opinion has taken in favour both of religion and royalty is now very decided, and is making a very rapid progress.

Mr. W[ickham], February 18.—“On the subject of finance we may perceive from a plan which was proposed to the Convention for the reduction of *assignats*, the specie in the National Treasury did not, before the invasion of Holland, exceed forty millions of livres.

Mr. W[ickham], March 18.—“At Genoa they had the greatest difficulty early in the month of March in selling their *assignats* at 18 per cent. About the same period a *Louis d'or* sold at Paris for 160 *livres*. On the 4th March *assignats* at Basle were at 15 per cent. On the 7th March

they were at  $13\frac{1}{2}$ ; but so totally was their credit gone that even at that price there were no purchasers.

Mr. W[ickham], March 28.—“From Berne we hear that *assignats*, notwithstanding some temporary fluctuations, gradually fall. Towards the latter end of March they were at that place as low as 12, and, notwithstanding the partisans of the Convention endeavoured to circulate the opinion that the Committee of Public Safety wished to diminish their value till they fell to nothing, the English minister in Switzerland is, from the best authority, satisfied of the contrary. He knows for certain that Johannot, a leading person in the Convention, soon after the invasion of Holland, wrote to his friends at Geneva to advise them by all means to purchase *assignats*, as there would be an immediate and rapid rise in their value. Those who followed his advice suffered most considerably.

Mr. W[ickham], April 1.—“From Basle we hear that at the beginning of April *assignats* had nearly lost all their value; and that in Alsace the bakers openly refused to take them.

Mr. W[ickham], April 6.—“The following fact will also tend to prove that, in addition to the depreciation in the value of *assignats*, the specie in the Treasury is almost exhausted.

“In the month of March a merchant of Hamborough arrived at Paris and demanded payment of two millions of *livres*, which were owing to him by the Republic. For several days they deferred the payment, under different pretexts; but the merchant becoming clamorous for his money, they entreated him to take the sum in *assignats*, offering at the same time to let him have them at the rate he choose. This he refused to do, and on his threatening to inform the commercial houses at Hamborough of the difficulty he was experiencing in procuring payment for articles which had been long delivered, they at last contrived to collect together the two millions in specie.

France, in Mr. W[ickham]’s, April 19.—“In the southern provinces the *assignats* had so totally lost their credit that the peace with the King of Prussia had no real effect upon their price. At Lyons a *Louis d’or* sold in April for 225 *livres*.

“The scarcity of provisions causes still greater distress.

Basle, 17th February, Mr. Trevor.—“The Inspector of the Magazines in Alsace declared openly that all the magazines were empty, and that others could not be formed, as there was no corn in the country.

“At Toulon the magazines were in February so nearly empty, that there were not provisions for the army and the fleet for more than a week. The people were buoyed up with the expectation of supplies from Holland, but in the mean time they were absolutely starving.

Mr. W[ickham], 12 March.—“In the beginning of March the scarcity of provisions was so great at Paris that they were under the necessity of drawing supplies from the magazines of the Northern army.

Mr. W[ickham], 28 March.—“Even in the armies, provisions are much more scarce than they were during the last campaign. The soldiers are worse fed and worse clothed. And as a proof of the scarcity of gunpowder, it is necessary to mention that, instead of sixty cartridges which the soldiers used to carry, they now have no more than ten.

Paris, April 1st.—“From the *National Gazette* we learn that at Paris on the 1st of April the allowance of bread was reduced from half a pound a day to a still smaller quantity. That the people assembled in groups crying in a mournful voice for bread. That the shops were shut; that despair appeared in every body’s countenance; and that all the horrors of a general famine seemed to be rapidly approaching.

Mr. W[ickham], April 6th.—“In the beginning of April the southern provinces had scarcely any bread; in the inns there was literally none.

“Towards the end of February the magazines at Strasbourg for the army of the Lower Rhine had grain in them for no longer time than three months. Of forage they had never more than what was sufficient for a week, seldom for so long.

The report of a person, sent into the southern provinces by Mr. W[ickham] April 19th.—“In Dauphiny, flour is so scarce that they are under the necessity of mixing it with beans to make bread. In the country between Marseilles and Lyons there is no bread in the inns, and travellers are obliged to get an order from the municipality, without which they could not procure the smallest portion.

Mr. W[ickham], 19 April.—“At Nantes there is scarcely any bread. A quarter of a pound is distributed every three days to the poor, and to the workmen. On the intermediate days a handful of rice and a small quantity of beans is distributed.

“In Franche Comté there is not a single magazine, nor the means of forming any.

“It is true that in that part of the country there are some provisions, but they cannot be bought for *assignats*.

“Nothing can be more satisfactory than the accounts which are received from all quarters of the change which is daily taking place in the minds of the generality of the people with regard to royalty and religion:

Mr. Trevor, 20th February.—“M. de Keppeler, a firm royalist, and who on account of his political principles, had passed eleven months in prison, is now appointed mayor of Strasbourg. The whole of the present municipality are likewise royalists.

Mr. Trevor, February 24th.—“In Alsace, all those who were suspected of republicanism were after the death of Robespierre, turned out of office, and were invariably replaced by men attached to royalty.

Mr. W[ickham], March 12th.—“At Rouen, at Orleans, and at many other towns, the people have at different times cried *vive le Roi*, and have cut down the Trees of Liberty.

Mr. W[ickham], March 28.—“With respect to the termination of the war in La Vendée, it is the general opinion even at Paris that the report of the national commissioners is by no means to be credited. All the letters agree in stating that the supposed peace is a mere suspension of arms. But it scarcely deserves even that appellation, as all persons wearing the national uniform are immediately put to death if they venture into that part of the country which is occupied by Charette's army.

Mr. W[ickham], March 28.—“In the districts bordering on the frontier of the Pays de Vaud the change of opinion is almost incredible. All Mr. Wickham's emissaries assure him that, provided any real force could be got together in their favour, there is nothing to which the people within may not now be led. The Jacobins are everywhere persecuted with a degree of violence which the people never showed against the *aristocrates*, except in their first moments of enthusiasm at the very beginning of the Revolution. The people complain very generally of their situation, and begin to compare it in many places with their state of existence in former times. In short, the public opinion is certainly going further than the Convention ever intended it should, and it is evident that it will soon be much too strong for them to manage.

“The Lyonnese royalists enter in greater numbers than ever, as well as many other emigrants of every description, and none of them are

molested except at Marseilles and Toulon, where the Jacobins are still in force. One gentleman who went from Berne wrote to his friends at that place that he was received openly by his tenants in his *chateau* near Dijon, and carried in a sort of triumph along the avenue leading to the house.

"The news of M. de Pr  cy's escape caused a very strong sensation on the minds of the people at Lyons, and appeared to have entirely revived their ancient affection for him. In that city many avowed royalists have been received into the municipality, and an inclination is very generally manifested to get their arms into their hands again.

Mr. W[ickham], April 4.—"Without having been in France, or without seeing the persons who are daily coming out, it is impossible to form any idea of the rapid change of men's opinions. Those who in 1793 were the most violent Republicans, are now decided Royalists.

"At Nancy the national cockade is torn and trampled under foot.

Mr. W[ickham], April 8.—"A Frenchman who has travelled over the greatest part of France reports that the majority of the people are Royalists, but that no one is willing to endanger himself by stepping forward, though they are at no pains to conceal their principles.

The report of a person sent by Mr. W[ickham] into the southern provinces, April 19.—"The estates belonging to emigrants are seldom sold; it is universally allowed that they ought to be restored to such of them as have not carried arms against France.

"In the southern provinces there is not a single person to be met with, who supposes it possible that the Republican Government can exist. A universal desire is openly manifested for the restoration of Monarchy. Besides the wish that the Dauphin should be placed upon the throne, it is thought right that *Monsieur* should be appointed Regent. In general the people are inclined to the constitution of 1791, with an augmentation of prerogatives for the King.

"The Reporter says that if England would restore her conquests, the people would willingly agree that the restoration of Royalty should be the first condition.

Mr. W[ickham], April 19.—"At Lyons the National Guard, consisting of 4,000 men, is composed of persons who served under M. de Pr  cy during the siege, and of emigrants who are decided Royalists. They are commanded also by Royalists, and by men in whom M. de Pr  cy places the greatest confidence.

"It is the general opinion of those who have lately been in France that religion will be the grand medium through which the counter-revolution will be effected; and it will appear that all the accounts relative to that subject are extremely satisfactory.

"Immediately after the fall of Robespierre the priests who had emigrated were invited by their parishioners to return, and, provided they had not taken the oath, were everywhere received with the most marked attention and respect.

Mr. W[ickham], March 18.—"In the environs of Paris mass is celebrated, and Sunday is observed with the greatest decency.

The report of a person sent by Mr. W[ickham] into the southern provinces, April 19.—"In the neighbourhood of Lyons churches are building.

"Throughout the whole country between Geneva and the Ant  bes, Sunday is religiously observed, and the decades are turned into ridicule. A marked preference is shown to the priests who have not taken the oath. It is the universal wish that religion should again flourish, and it is the general opinion that the Church estates will be restored.

"It is necessary to remark that, from the observations of those who have lately been in France, it is evident that whoever has religion is a Royalist; and the power which the priests have gained over the minds of the people is now so great that they oblige their parishioners to make a declaration in writing, that they will restore the estates they have bought, if they belong either to the church or to emigrants. They return to France in tribes, and are daily converting the people to their former principles. It is not, however, the constitutional religion which is re-establishing. The priests who took the oath are hated and despised, and are not suffered to return to their former parishes, unless they can prove that they were driven to such a step through fear and menaces.

"Various other instances might be adduced of the enthusiasm with which the inhabitants of France are returning to their religion, and of the respect with which their ancient priests are everywhere received. It is not only in the distant provinces that this may be perceived; but even in Paris, under the eye of the Convention, religious ceremonies are celebrated with more zeal and decency than before the Revolution.

"We have also other grounds for supposing that the present order of things cannot last. The state of parties at Paris gives just reason to hope that the Convention is now tottering.

Mr. Trever, March 12.—"It is divided into four different factions; the remains of the *Jacobins*, the *Independents*, the *Moderates*, and the *Federalists*.

"In the beginning of March the *Jacobins* in the Convention were reduced to about hundred members. The *Moderates* consisted of nearly one hundred and fifty. The majority of them had been friends of Danton, and were implicated with him in the massacres of September 1792. They have no fixed plans; some of them wish to re-establish Royalty and others are inclined to a Republican constitution. They are, however, to a man, desirous of putting an end to the Revolution, but they differ as to the means of doing it.

"The *Federalists* are the remains of that faction of which Brissot was formerly the head. At the death of Robespierre there remained one hundred and sixty-four in the Convention, and they now consist of more than two hundred members, as those who had been thrown into prison have been again restored to their seats. The Moderates at first took them as allies, but they are daily gaining an evident preponderance in the Convention. The generality of them are inclined to a constitutional monarchy, but they have no fixed plan whatever.

"The *Independents*, consisting of two hundred or two hundred and twenty voices, are the refuse of the other factions. In this party there are men of all principles who are ready to avail themselves of the first favourable opportunity that may offer.

"In these different factions there does not appear to be a single man of superior genius. Among the Moderates Tallien is the most distinguished. In 1790 he was M. A. de Lameth's secretary, who parted with him for incapacity. He then became the compiler of a newspaper, and in 1792 was a member of the Commune of Paris. No one treated the King during his trial with more wanton and marked brutality. He was afterwards sent to Tours, where he was guilty of the most atrocious enormities, and on his return to Paris, having during his mission amassed great riches, he entered into the plot against Robespierre for the purpose of saving his mistress, Madame de Fontenay, who was then in prison. The other chiefs of the Moderates, such as Fréron, Courtois, Legendre, Gaffroy, Clauzel, and Barras, are not worthy to be mentioned.

"Some of the *Independents* are men of talents, but they have neither plans nor union. *Carnot*, one of the members of the old Committee of Public Safety, is a man of business and has genius; but he is an intriguer and systematically cruel.

"*Merlin de Douay* is likewise an Independent. He was attached to the Duke of Orleans, is universally detested, but has some weight on account of his experience in the Commission of Legislation.

"*Bourdon de l'Oise* has courage, but without talents, and is a blood-thirsty revolutionist.

"Among the *Federalists* we may find more genius; some of them have been guilty of no other fault than that of weakness, and others are as infamous characters as any that have appeared since the beginning of the Revolution.

"*Boissy d'Anglas* is one of the most distinguished. A *bel esprit* and an admirer of modern philosophy. He was a member of the first Constituent Assembly, where he was totally overlooked. Attached formerly to Brissot, he was in considerable danger till the death of Robespierre, after which he became a member of the Committee of Public Safety, and has now acquired some degree of weight.

"*Alquier*, another member of the first Assembly, has more talents than Boissy d'Anglas, not for the tribune, but for the management of a party. He was formerly extremely intimate with M. de Lameth, and might be useful to a party who would undertake to restore Royalty.

"*Pelet de la Lozere* is a man of business, of a sound understanding, and useful in the committees.

"*Cambacères* may also be of use if the restoration of monarchy should ever be attempted.

"Of all the Federalists *Lanjuinais* is the man from whom most good may be expected. Outlawed in 1793, he was concealed in Brittany until the death of Robespierre. No man showed more courage than he did in opposing the King's condemnation. He is likely to gain great influence in the present moment; and it is said he has declared publicly that Royalty ought to be restored.

"None of the former Jacobins was ever so dangerous to Europe as the Abbé *Sièyès* may possibly become. Because he was not noble he destroyed the nobility; because he was not at the head of the Church he destroyed the clergy; because he is not King he wishes to overturn all Kings, and all governments which are not founded on his system. He will probably be the leader of those who look forward to an organized republic without Jacobins. That party has the majority in the Convention, but out of doors they are very inferior to the Royalists.

"The continuation of anarchy is destruction to the Revolutionists. Two months ago no one dared to speak of Royalty, and at present it is said openly that it must be re-established.

"The want of provisions, the discredit of the *assignats*, and the unwillingness of the people to continue in a state of suffering, are more dangerous enemies to the Convention than the armies of the allies.

"Hunger, misery, and despair, may overturn a government, but are bad foundations for a Republic.

"In vain will the Convention promise to the people the most salutary laws. They are in want of peace, of bread, of specie, and without these can be obtained, the Revolution must soon be ended."



## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, June 23, Admiralty.—“Orders have already been sent to release the ships laden with the articles you allude to, which should certainly not have been detained, and it might be right that the agent who is entrusted by the Treasury with the business of purchasing the cargoes of provisions should be authorised to release ships of such description immediately on their arrival. The reason for the detention and perhaps for the search of the vessels which were brought in by the *Albion*, I apprehend was its having been discovered that under the corn in those ships which were laden with that article, considerable quantities of saltpetre were concealed, and I suppose it was suspected that some articles either of provisions or naval stores might likewise be concealed under the bottles and other articles.

“We have lately had information from Riga of some ships about to sail from that port laden with deal planks of an unusual size and shape, calculated to be used in the construction of frigates, and I believe even line-of-battle ships, and consigned to the French, but probably with false clearances. I wish there were some means of getting rid of the exception in the Danish treaty in favour of deal planks, for on the present system of ship building in France, they are to the full as useful and necessary an article of naval stores as any oak timber can be.”

## J. B. BURGESS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, June 28, Downing Street.—“Your Lordship may have heard that Mr. Gouverneur Morris is arrived in this country. I happened to meet him yesterday at Count Woronzow’s, where I dined, and I not only was much struck with his conversation at dinner, during which he gave us the most interesting account of the present state of France, but I had a long *tête-à-tête* with him afterwards, which was sought for on his part, evidently in the view of communicating through me to your Lordship and the other Ministers his present political sentiments, and his desire of imparting to you the result of the reflections he has made in the course of four years’ residence in France. He began with congratulating me on the signature of the treaty, which, he said, he had no doubt would be ratified, though by a small majority, especially as Mr. Jay must now be arrived, and would be able to do away the very unfavourable impressions which had been made, and were still making, by Pinckney and Deas. He observed that the latter was doing everything in his power to misrepresent the intentions of this country and to promote animosity in America, where there were already too many people disposed to enforce his representations and to provoke hostilities; and he conceived that these would have a great weight in the Carolinas, where there were many needy and desperate adventurers, remote from the seat of Government, and always ready to proceed to acts of violence. After enlarging on this subject, he told me that, whatever the impression on his mind might have been when he went to France in 1790, the experience he had gained there had entirely satisfied him that no connection could be so advantageous to America as one with this country; that he now considered the salvation and prosperity of England as the object which every well-disposed man, of whatever country, ought to regard as essential for the welfare both of Europe and America, and of civilized society itself; that all these interests were now at stake, and that their preservation would depend upon the manner in which the present controversy should be brought to a conclusion.

He said that he had learnt in the few days he had been here several points which had afforded him great satisfaction, the principal of which were the alliance which had been formed with the Emperor, and the assistance that had been sent to the Royalists in Brittany. Those, he observed, if they were followed up as he had no doubt they would, could not fail in the present state of France to be attended with success; for the resources of that country were drawing fast to an end, the majority of the people were tired of the experiment which they had made, and the Government was universally despised. There could be but one end of the Revolution, namely a return to monarchy; but everything depended on the direction which that return should make. Were a Prince of the House of Bourbon seated on the throne, the principles on which the Revolution has been conducted would no longer be capable of disturbing Europe; but if by any means a Republic of any sort should finally be established, or if the Crown should be disposed of by election to any new family, those principles would gain strength, and the fanatical spirit of propagating them would become the only practicable system of Government. For this reason he had heard with satisfaction of the death of the young King, whose captivity and the certainty of his mind having been debased and perverted, had depressed the spirits of the well-inclined, and had prevented many from taking any measures for the restoration of Monarchy. That now the new King had great advantages, on the proper use of which he conceived everything would depend. If he asserted his right to the throne, if he did so with temper and moderation, holding out to the people a return of order and good government, and avoiding everything which might convey an apprehension of retaliation and revenge, the people would flock to his standard, and he would be enabled to ascend the throne of his ancestors. But, he added, in this case the interests of the country of France alone should not be considered. They are connected with those of England and Austria; and these are bound, for their own sakes, to take care that they are properly attended to. As Louis 18th must depend on them for being acknowledged King of France, they have it in their power to determine on the terms of their assistance. These, as the English Government has always declared, must be indemnification for the past and security for the future; and fortunately both of these may be united as upon former occasions, by stipulating for the payment of the required sum, and by taking certain cautionary towns as the security for its payment. He insisted that the latter was a point of the utmost consequence, not only as it would enable this country and Austria to keep a check upon France, but with a view to prevent the designs of Prussia, who was evidently aiming at the most alarming plan of aggrandisement in Germany, which could become successful only by an union with France, and with France left in possession of a frontier including Flanders, and extending to the Rhine and the Ocean.

"As I did not wish to trespass too much on your Lordship's time, I have given you a very short sketch of the observations which Mr. Morris made in the course of our long conversation; but it was impossible for me to do justice to what he said, or to go into a detail of the proofs and arguments by which he supported it. He concluded by telling me that he believed, when he was here last, he had been looked upon with a degree of doubt and perhaps of suspicion. He would not say anything on that, but he observed that, to a thinking man, the scenes he had witnessed must have been very forcible; that he had quitted France with sentiments of horror and abhorrence, and that he should esteem himself happy in being able, in any manner, to contribute to the success of this country, on the security and prosperity of which, he again

remarked, the interests of America so materially depended. He said that, though he had not had the honour of forming an acquaintance with your Lordship, he was ready to give you all the information in his power, and he believed he could, perhaps, give you more than any other individual could supply you with; that he would, if you thought proper, wait upon you whenever you pleased, and answer any questions you might ask; that he was also ready to tell you all he had learnt at Hamburgh respecting the conveyance of provisions to France, as well as the means which had occurred to him of rendering it ineffectual. He also said that though, when he was here before, he had abstained from appearing at Court, he now felt a great desire to be allowed to present himself to the King, as, from the signature of the late treaty, and from the sentiments he entertained towards his Majesty and this country, he conceived such a step on his part would not be unacceptable."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795,] July 6, Downing Street.—"In addition to the general account of the disembarkation at Quiberon Bay, it appears by a letter from Sir James Warren to Lord Bridport (which the latter enclosed in a private letter to Lord Spencer) that only a small party of the enemy shewed itself near the place of landing, who were driven off by a party of 700 Chouans. Our troops have been received with open arms. The people of the country were flocking in, and they had already distributed arms to between three and four thousand. We shall probably have further particulars soon, but this looks so promising that Lord Spencer, Windham, and myself, think no time should be lost in sending for the Count d'Artois. A dispatch is accordingly preparing to General Dundas, and a ship of the line and a frigate, which are on the point of sailing to convey the Austrian loan to the Elbe, will have orders to receive him and his train on board; but I imagine you will think it best that, besides the letter to General Dundas, there should be a communication either directly from you to the Count d'Artois, or through the Duc d'Harcourt; and if you approve of this, it will be desirable that you should write by the return of this messenger, as the ship will be ready to sail by the first fair wind. I am going out of town; you may as well, therefore, desire your letter to be sent to Huskisson to be forwarded with the dispatch."

#### THE DUKE OF PORTLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, July 10 [London].—"It really hurts me very much to appear to make any objection to a measure in the success of which you are at all interested, but you must make some allowance for prejudices and forgive the reluctance I cannot help feeling at consenting to such a mode of transferring property as seems to me to be about to take place by the grant of the Bodmin Charter, which, it must be admitted, is neither at the request nor conformable to the inclinations of either of the present possessors of the predominant influence in that Borough. Whether these gentlemen are usurpers or not I don't mean to inquire; one of them has been in possession of the influence which has given him one seat there for upwards of 40 years, and the other has had it for the last ten, and they now only incur the risk of losing it by a degree of indolence and neglect which, blameable as I admit it to be, I am not prepared to say is so culpable as to deserve to work a total forfeiture,

for so I conceive a new Charter would operate with respect to their influence. But as you understand that the basis of the application for a new charter is laid on the superior property of the person in whose behalf it has been made, I acknowledge that a considerable part of my objection to it would be done away, though not the whole of it. But, even in that case, I should wish that the old proprietors (for so you must allow me to call them) could be previously informed of the real cause of their having been passed over, and for this purpose I desired you to allow me to acquaint Mr. Anstruther with it, which I did on Sunday or Monday last, for the information of Sir John Morshead and my old friend Mr. Hunt, to whom I strongly feel such an attention to be due on my part. I expect to hear from Anstruther every day, and sincerely wish his report may relieve me from the embarrassment which this transaction has occasioned me."

LORD ROBERT STEPHEN FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, July 12, Chichester.—"I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 8th, acquainting me with his Majesty's gracious approbation of my appointment to the mission of Copenhagen in the room of Mr. Hailes. Your very great goodness to me on this occasion makes me feel somewhat ashamed of my importunity on a late one, but I am now truly persuaded that your Lordship has done every thing that is possible and kind by me; and the very handsome manner in which you have communicated this circumstance to me enhances the obligation in a very high degree, while it lays double claim to the unfeigned thanks which I have the honour here to return your Lordship."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, July 13, Downing Street.—"You will of course have received yesterday the bulletin of the surrender of Quiberon and its garrison. The accounts of the strength of the place and the shelter it affords for shipping make the preservation of this place an object of the first importance. They have determined us, without delay, to send off three thousand of the troops who can be quickest embarked; and this service presses extremely, as from some of the skirmishes that have happened, the steadiness of our Chouans troops cannot as yet be relied upon, if they are left much to themselves. Lord Moira has no hesitation, on seeing the accounts, in undertaking to follow this expedition, with the remaining force which we can give him, or prepare to follow him. The army (I mean the British part) may, on his arrival, be at first about 7,000 infantry, increased soon after to about 10,000, and by the end of next month to about 14,000 in the whole; and 3,000 cavalry, independent either of British from Germany, or of the foreign cavalry now ordered from thence. Lord Cornwallis is to be in town tomorrow, and I hope, if possible, we may agree on Lord Moira's instructions tomorrow, so that he may leave town on Wednesday, in order to hasten everything for the second embarkation. The first is, I hope, already put in train. I conclude you mean at all events to be in town tomorrow morning, and if you are likely to be at leisure about one, we may probably have the instructions drawn by that time. There seems again good reason to believe that the report of Hotham's action is not without foundation.

"You will receive, very unexpectedly, the account which arrived this morning of the death of poor Lord Henry Spencer. The messenger

brought a letter to Lord Auckland, who has since written to the Duke of Marlborough, probably to break the news, and Lord Spencer has also written to the Archbishop to inform him of it.

"The Duke of York has suggested an idea that it may [be] worth while to instruct Colonel Crawford (if Clerfayt wavers any longer respecting his operations) to repair immediately to Vienna, and take the chance whether the Government there can be brought to recall him, and substitute any nominal General in his room with the assistance of Mack (if he can be again brought forward), or of Meerfeldt, of whom he entertains a very high opinion. In the present critical state of things this seems worth thinking of.

"By letters from General Dundas there is a great appearance that the French are almost evacuating Holland."

#### THE PRINCE OF ORANGE to the KING OF PRUSSIA.

1795, July 22, Windsor.—"Je prie votre Majesté de vouloir bien excuser la liberté que je prends de l'importuner de nouveau par une lettre; mais je crois de mon devoir de lui communiquer une démarche que je fais, pour tacher de tirer ma patrie du joug humiliant et ruineux qui lui est imposé, et j'ose espérer que votre Majesté daignera l'approuver, et voudra bien avoir la bonté de m'accorder son appui pour la faire réussir. Votre Majesté n'ignore pas que la plus grande partie des officiers tant de l'armée de terre que de la marine de la République ont refusé de servir les usurpateurs du pouvoir suprême dans ma patrie, et que leur attachement à leur devoir, à la constitution légitimement établie, et à ma maison, leur a fait quitter les places qu'ils occupaient. Beaucoup de ces braves gens étant sans pain, et n'ayant pas le moyen de leur en fournir, j'ai dû m'adresser à sa Majesté Britannique pour être mis en état de les rassembler, et d'y joindre les bas-officiers et soldats qui viendraient réjoindre leurs officiers, afin de pouvoir prévenir que l'armée de l'Etat ne se débande pas entièrement, et ne soye hors d'état d'être utile quand les circonstances permettront de rentrer dans la République des Provinces Unies, et d'y rétablir un ordre de choses capable de pouvoir contribuer au bonheur, et à la sûreté, et à la propriété des bons habitants de ce pays.

"Sa Majesté Britannique ayant daigné m'accorder les secours pécuniaires, nécessaires pour cette formation, j'ai chargé mon fils cadet de se rendre en Allemagne et d'y rassembler tous les officiers, bas-officiers, et soldats de l'armée de la République, qui pourront le joindre. Je la supplie de vouloir bien donner les ordres nécessaires dans ses états pour que l'on facilite le libre passage à ceux qui viendront au lieu du rassemblement, et sortiront pour cet effet de la République. Ce rassemblement aura lieu à Oslabruck. Qu'il me soye permis de saisir cette occasion pour me recommander avec les miens à la continuation de sa protection, et pour la supplier de vouloir bien me donner son puissant secours pour rétablir dans la République des Provinces Unies, la constitution qu'Elle a bien voulu garantir; et qui n'a pas été détruite par la volonté du peuple, mais par une cabale de gens sans aucune qualification légale, soutenue par les armes Françaises."

*French. Copy.*

#### EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, July 25, Admiralty.—"I return you the enclosed papers communicated to me by your desire, to the contents of which I really do

not know what further can be said than that, as we are at present circumstanced both with respect to the enemy's supplies and our own, we are under the necessity of transgressing a little the bounds of strict propriety. The station in which our cruisers are stated to be is exactly that which it is most essential they should occupy, and, even though we have now several small squadrons cruising in that and other parts of the North Sea, we have in them these few days lost no less than from 11 to 16 merchant ships by means of two or three small privateers who have escaped the vigilance of our officers. All the accounts we receive so strongly prove the fact of the Swedes and Danes loaded with provisions, under whatever papers they sail, being invariably destined to ports in the dominion of France, that no doubt can remain upon it, and indeed the enclosed letters only appear to express a desire to keep up appearances. If you can suggest any restrictive instruction which could be given of which you could make a merit with M. Wedel without its preventing our attaining the very necessary object we look to, I should be extremely glad to concur with you in adopting it; but I own I do not at once see how that is possible."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, July 26, Dropmore.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty with the dispatches two private letters from Lord Bute and Sir Morton Eden. He is persuaded that your Majesty's goodness, of which he has had so many proofs, will induce your Majesty to excuse him if he so far exceeds the line of his duty as to submit to your Majesty the infinite advantage which might arise in the present moment, if your Majesty should judge it not improper to send your Majesty's Electoral Minister at Vienna such instructions relative to the points in discussion at Ratisbon as might take from the Court of Vienna all plea for inactivity on that ground:

"From a sense of the delicacy of his situation in this respect, and from an anxious desire to avoid any interference in a business which your Majesty might justly deem foreign to that trust with which your Majesty has been graciously pleased to honour him, Lord Grenville both in what he has said to Count Starhemberg and in what he has written to Sir Morton Eden has endeavoured to keep within rather than to exceed what your Majesty was graciously pleased to authorise him to express on that subject; and he is confident that a much greater effect would be produced by any commands from your Majesty to the same effect to your Majesty's Electoral Ministers at Vienna and Ratisbon."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, July 27, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville may rely on my sending proper instructions both to the Regency at Hanover, the ministers at Vienna, and the one at Ratisbon, as soon as Baron Steinberg arrives who embarked last Monday at Cuxhaven and therefore may be hourly expected; but to go any lengths that will remove the inactivity of the Court of Vienna I entirely despair, for though I shall do what I think right, that can never extend to the content of that Court whose apathy seems only equalled by her excessive pride and harshness of language, which must offend whoever is desirous of being well with her."

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795,] July 31, Downing Street.—“Lord Moira’s opinion of our prospects is much more favourable than I expected, and he is clearly eager to make the trial. I think I can see Lord Cornwallis here to-morrow before we go to Wimbledon, and therefore, as time presses, I mean to have the Cabinet summoned at one on Sunday. You will, I hope, be able to breakfast at Wimbledon early on Sunday morning. The nonsense of the newspaper gave us no farther trouble.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 2, Camp, Southsea.—“I write to you to express the satisfaction I feel at hearing that Lord Moira, after meeting Mr. Pitt at Hertford Bridge, openly said yesterday, at Southampton, that *his expedition* was to proceed, and it is likewise notorious that great exertions are made since that meeting to encrease his force. I neither know, nor guess his point of attack, but I am very glad that Government have not partaken of that paltry despondency which appeared to have seized all ranks of people upon this calamitous news from Quiberon, which I consider as indeed a very heavy blow, but by no means decisive even upon the struggle for Royalism; but most certainly (even if it were so) the question of continuing an offensive war upon those coasts, availing ourselves of every possible assistance, be it more or less, will not bear a moment’s doubt in opposition to the idea of a defensive war, which I hold to be *certain ruin*. I hasten to state this very shortly, that you may know one independent opinion upon the present crisis.

“At the same time, I wish you to know that Puisaye is universally execrated. All our navy officers say that his negligence could only be equalled by his cowardice, *he being the first on board the Pomona two hours before the Fort was taken*. Of this fact, which you may not have heard, I am assured beyond a doubt, and am *authorised* to state it to you. It is likewise said that Ministers have been told that the stores lost are not very considerable. If this is said (and Puisaye has writ to French at Southampton to tell that story) you may be assured that there is the most direct and positive evidence of two navy captains, both arrived from Quiberon, who are loud in stating that *the whole* of the stores of the *original* embarkation are lost, together with the cargoes of flour and rum of fifteen American ships. I mention this, because it is fit you should know it; particularly if it unmasks Puisaye, of whom every one, English and French, speak alike.

“I am very anxious for the Mediterranean news, and the more so because our navy people here say that the Bay of Frejus will not hold more than seven or eight ships, and that it is entirely open. I will beg you to order a bulletin to be sent to me as soon as you get your account. My wife arrived four days ago, and we are all very well. You, I know, are not curious in the article of shipping, but if you was, I would wish to tempt you to pass a few days with us.”

## GEORGE III to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 3, Windsor.—“I am sorry to find by Lord Grenville’s note and the enclosures he transmitted to me, that the Court of Spain has made peace with the French; the example is the real evil, for the efforts of Spain have been so very supine, that I cannot say any

material advantage has been derived to the general cause by its exertions; but I fear Naples and Sardinia may follow this bad example."

FREDERICK WILLIAM II., KING OF PRUSSIA, to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1795, August 3, Berlin.—"Je viens de recevoir la lettre que votre Altesse Sérénissime a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 22 Juillet. Elle connaît les sentiments que je lui porte, le vif et tendre intérêt que m'inspire sa famille, et le désir qui m'anime de contribuer autant qu'il dépendra de moi à réparer les malheurs et les torts dont elle a à se plaindre; mais je croirais mal répondre à la confiance qu'elle me témoigne si je lui déguisais un instant les inconvénients et les dangers qui sont visiblement attachés au projet qu'elle a formé de rassembler à Osnabruck les transfuges de l'armée Hollandaise. Sans parler de l'ombrage qu'en a déjà conçu le Gouvernement actuel des Provinces Unies, et des précautions qu'il a prises en conséquence, il existe une raison bien plus forte qui s'oppose aux vues de votre Altesse Sérénissime, c'est que le lieu du rassemblement est situé dans l'enceinte de la ligne de démarcation arrêtée par le traité de Basle. Cette ligne, qu'à la réquisition du ministère d'Hanovre, j'ai imaginée comme l'unique moyen de couvrir le nord de l'Allemagne, et que j'ai obtenu avec tant de peine, parce qu'elle entrave à tous égards les opérations de l'armée Française, n'a eu d'autre but que d'écarter les maux qui menaçaient les provinces voisines, et nommément l'Electorat de Hanovre, l'Evêché d'Osnabruck, et les Etats Allemands de votre Altesse Sérénissime. Il a fallu promettre, en retour d'une stipulation si onéreuse pour les Français, mais d'ailleurs si bienfaisante, la neutralité la plus stricte; et cet engagement serait rompu par la moindre démonstration hostile, et les Français ne tarderaient pas d'en tirer vengeance. Dans des telles circonstances, votre Altesse Sérénissime jugera elle-même qu'à moins de contrevenir ouvertement à mon traité de paix, je ne suis pas le maître de permettre dans mes états le passage des militaires Hollandaises qu'elle se propose de réunir sous la bannière du Prince Frédéric. Je sens très bien que son cœur généreux compatit au sort des braves gens qui se dévouent à sa cause; mais leurs faibles efforts sont-ils capables de lutter avec la moindre espérance de succès contre le parti dominant, et peut-on se cacher les maux incalculables que leurs mesures téméraires entraîneraient infailliblement, soit pour eux-mêmes, soit pour les pays des Princes qui les favorisent, après que Sa Majesté Britannique a fait déclarer encore récemment par son Ministre Electoral à la Diette de Ratisbonne, que si la pacification de l'Empire en corps venait à manquer, elle s'empresserait de profiter de la neutralité stipulée pour ses états Allemands par le traité de Basle, et d'en réclamer le bénéfice. Il serait douloureux de voir renaître les difficultés et des embarras sans nombre par des entreprises contradictoires, qui loin d'opérer le moindre bien, ne feraient qu'irriter les esprits, et détruire l'effet de moyens qu'on pourrait employer encore en faveur de votre Altesse Sérénissime à l'époque de la paix générale. Je souhaite que ces considérations lui paraissent assez fortes pour l'engager à modérer l'excès du zèle de ses adhérents, et à révoquer la commission dangereuse dont elle a chargé le Prince son fils cadet. C'est l'amitié qui me dicte ce conseil, et j'y suis d'autant plus autorisé, qu'il s'accorde avec les principes que j'ai dû adopter pour le retour de la paix."

*French. Copy.*



## WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 4, Mulheim.—“I came here in a light phaeton that would but just hold Mr. Flint and myself, having every reason to suppose from Sir Morton Eden’s letter that General Bellegarde would have been here before me. I see however where the mistake has been, and will rectify it immediately on my return to Lausanne.

“I shall at the same time send your Lordship the full history of Mr. Vincent’s correspondence, all the papers concerning which I had left behind me. The sum of the whole is that he is zealous, credulous to the last degree, honest but liable to be imposed on, and consequently not fit to be trusted with the management of money. He had formed a connection with some members of the Assembly and had gained some clerks of the Committee of Public Safety, but I fear they had imposed on him most grossly. Unless I see that the connection will be necessary to keep open the communication with Brittany, I shall break it off.

“Besides the measures mentioned in my public dispatch, I have spared no pains to increase the desertion in the army of Savoy. I have sent several very active agents there from Geneva, and Bayard has encouraged some of his young friends to go there as volunteers with the same intention.

“Everything is ripe for a complete insurrection in Savoy and the mountainous parts of the Jura, but nothing can be done without foreign assistance.

“If the two armies could be brought together upon Lyons, it seems to me impossible that the expedition should fail of complete success. If the insurrection in the Forez take place at the same time, the retreat of the army of the patriots acting on the east of the Rhine will be entirely cut off.

“Tessonnet and Ferronière have taken some very clever, active people with them. They will have the assistance of all the young men of Lyons, and the priests are at this moment actively employed in preparing the way for their arrival.

“I have received a very handsome letter from the Duke of Portland conveying assurance that the office of Under Secretary of State shall be kept open for me till my return. I know not how I shall ever be able in any way to justify the confidence that both his Grace and your Lordship have been pleased to show me.”

*Two Enclosures.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795.] August 9, [Camp, Southsea].—“Having passed two hours yesterday with the Comte D’Artois in the *Asia*, I wish to tell you how much I was pleased by his very moderate and proper language, so very different from that of the bulk of his countrymen. He professed the highest obligations to the King’s servants, and a determination to abide explicitly by their directions so long as they thought his services might be made useful in co-operation with any views of this country; but that, whenever he understood that he could no longer be made useful to any such views, he should then request, as the last of very many favours, a shallop to land him wherever any means presented themselves of making himself useful in a last desperate attempt. I took great pains to explain that I spoke no opinions but my own, and then told him that it was universally known that a large armament was fitting for the West Indies, which could only be taken from Lord Moira’s army; that, even if this

draught was replaced, some delay must occur; but that it was impossible but that a bystander must see that this peace with Spain must materially change the objects of the British force in this campaign, though I was confident that it would not change the general principles upon which this country engaged in the war. He spoke very reasonably upon all this, and with great cheerfulness of his personal inconveniences, which are really almost insupportable. For, the cabin of a small seventy-four, divided between him and Admiral Pringle, with one dining room in common to the Prince, Admiral, Captain, and seven French officers, gives him only one hole of about eight feet square to sleep and write in. If, therefore, the French expedition is either delayed or abandoned, you must do something with this unfortunate man; for the ship is so crowded that the misery is beyond imagination. He might be moved to the *Royal William* or some other very large ship; or he might, if the King's House at Lyndhurst is a privileged place, be removed to advantage there, as it is close to Lord Moira, and to his Frenchmen. Carisbrooke Castle (I mean Orde's apartments) are said to be privileged; from motives of humanity some measure must be taken upon all this. I sincerely give you joy of your Dutch capture; but the navy people are all agog to know whether they are prizes or not.

"Pray order any of your *news gazettes* to be sent to me, for I never get them. He found some London letters from the Duc D'Havr  in Spain, dated three days before the peace, assuring him from Alcudia that no such thing would take place."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 12, [Southsea].—"The post is this moment going out, but as it is probable that this letter will reach you before you see Monsieur de la Riv re, whom Monsieur is sending back to you, I wish to tell you that he is to bring you a letter from Monsieur, telling you that the news from France impose upon him the duty of putting himself at the head of the Royalists in that kingdom; that he wishes to know in what manner he may best co-operate with the views of England; or may engage in the attempt in such manner as may best suit the means which you may have to furnish; but, in short, he presses for a very explicit answer (and in my opinion in terms too peremptory) as to the time when, and the means (if any) with which you may wish to assist Charrette; and begging that some person may be named with whom he may discuss some *projet, soit Milord Moira ou quelque autre G n ral au quel on voudroit confier l'exp dition*. All this is the result, as I plainly see, of a conversation yesterday between Baron Rolle (his chief adviser) and Lord Moira, who affects to *fronder* upon every thing; and it likewise arises out of Charrette's letter to him, which is most urgent to him to put himself at their head, and promises mountains. The language likewise of Monsieur de la Riv re is most urgent, and has had a wonderful effect upon every one round him, by stating, *from his own knowledge and sight*, armies of which you will see the details in a *compte rendu* prepared for you; and stating Charrette at the head of a force sufficient to protect La Vend e, and to spare for an expedition north of the Loire 20,000 men, Sapineau 20,000, Stofflet 24,000; in short, either Riv re is the falsest of men, or Charrette is blind to his own strength, in not having yet moved; but he *vauts* for Monsieur. The letter is very civil to you, but I think Lord Moira (from some words I picked up) has urged him to make it peremptory. I write all this without a comment, but I think I am serving you to tell you all I

know about the measures and language of Monsieur, which has very much changed since Rivière saw him; for he now declares to me that nothing shall prevent his joining Charrette *en chaloupe*, but the prospect of co-operating with the designs (if any such exist) of our Ministers; that it is probable that their views may make it necessary for them to look to the West Indies as the more immediate object; and that, if so, he has to thank the King in the warmest terms for all his kindness, and to beg a *chaloupe* may be ordered to land him; and told me that he should, in that case, wish to be put ashore *alone* on the Isle Noirmoutier; that he knew this was the language of a desperate man, but that he was convinced that this was the moment in which all must be staked by him, and that his honour was engaged; that he should not complain if we gave him no troops for that he knew that Ministers meant fairly, and if they gave him none it was because they had not any to spare; and, in that case, he should beg for arms and powder, and that Charrette would undertake (which Charrette's letter to him states) to force a communication with our storeships and transports either at the Isle Noirmoutier, Sables d'Olonne, or St. Gil[les].

"You will, of course, keep all this a secret as having come from me, and, if I hear what may appear to me interesting, I will write again tomorrow.

"Colpoys with his five sail just hove in sight. No news as I am assured. Admiral Ford just arrived from St. Domingo."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, August 12, Mulheim.—"My mind is so entirely occupied by the magnitude of the business we have in hand, and the fear of leaving anything undone that might tend to further the important views of his Majesty's Ministers, that I really can think of nothing else night or day. I fear therefore I must beg your Lordship to excuse me if I acknowledge this last proof of your kindness in a very inadequate manner. . . . I am the more affected by what you have done because I cannot but consider it as a means of communicating to the public in the most open and honourable manner the satisfaction that his Majesty's Ministers had been pleased to express in my conduct.

"You may most safely rely upon my word when I assure you that there is nothing to be done in the interior but in concert with a foreign force. I know some very well-disposed persons on the side of Besançon who have declared their firm determination at all events to resist any attempt of the kind.

"The Court of Vienna (if her intentions are really good) must be made to understand this point and pressed to its execution night and day, otherwise the whole thing must be given up.

"If that Court will do its duty, I shall not be terrified even by the business of Quiberon, unfortunate as it is.

"Will your Lordship allow me to mention in the very strictest confidence that I have some reason to fear lest my observations on M. de Monciel and the Constitutional party may have been seen or repeated by some person connected with the party. It has been intimated to me that I have not represented them in a favourable light at home. Your Lordship is no doubt aware of the very delicate nature of many parts of my correspondence, and I am sure I have no occasion to recommend them to the strictest secrecy."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August [16], Camp, Southsea.—“Your messenger has just delivered me your letter and I am glad that my intimation was useful. I have, since I wrote it, received the *strongest proof* that Lord Moira is at the bottom of that epistle. I judged this from the change of style, and from accidental expressions, but I have been confirmed in it by an interview on Friday night with the Baron Rolle since his return from Southampton. The Baron told me that all they wanted in answer was an assurance that, as soon as the situation of our colonies and of our immediate concerns enabled the King's servants to ascertain the means applicable to any purpose on the coast of France, and the propriety of applying those means according to the information they might receive, immediate communication would be made of their intentions; and, if the circumstances did not admit of the strong assistance with troops, and in great force, which they much wished, that they would, in that case, endeavour to consult his wishes, by landing him with a small force (if he should wish it) or with such assistance in stores as might be useful to Charrette, or any other body with whom he might wish to concert his landing; but, that it was probable that no decisive measures could be ascertained sooner than a month. This was Baron Rolle's explanation, in consequence of doubts which I hinted to him on the style of Monsieur's letter, and I pressed him to send a courier to the Duc D'Harcourt or to the Bishop of St. Pol, that they might give this explanation to you, foreseeing that your answer must be dry, and venturing to foretell to him that *en ministre sage* you ought to give no other. Under these impressions, I do not imagine they will be much disappointed at your answer, and I rather think that they will embark with General Doyle, particularly as the personal inconvenience on board the *Jason* frigate, to which they moved yesterday, is really very distressing. I shall do everything to urge it, for I see no good, but much possible mischief from his continuance here. I write in a hurry, and, by mistake, upon a half sheet.

“I shall endeavour to see the Baron this evening.

“Admiral Harvey is sailed; *Prince of Wales*, 98 [guns], *Queen Charlotte*, 110 [guns], *Prince*, 98 [guns], *Colopus*, 74 [guns], *Orion*, 74 [guns]. The ships are ready for the West India troops except one, which is not yet come round from the river. For God's sake do not delay a moment in the sailing of this armament. The number to be embarked in these ships is 3,264. The ship not come round holds 460.”

## W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, [August] 16, [Hill Street].—“It will be very desirable that at M. de Moustier's return from Portsmouth, whither he is set off this morning, we should be prepared with such instructions as it may be thought proper to give him; and above all that we should make up our minds as to the degree to which we will, in point of fact, follow up our professions of assisting the Royalists; supposing that they should be still desirous, as I conceive they will, of receiving our assistance. I urge this latter point of consideration, because I certainly do not think that we have acted hitherto like persons really intent on giving that assistance which still, whenever the subject has been mentioned, we have professed to make part of our plan. In the instance of the expedition to Quiberon, everything was done in respect of supply that the circumstances admitted or required; but I cannot say the same of

the period either preceding or following. For these last six weeks stores have been lying at Portsmouth that had been prepared for that very purpose, and were of little value for any other. Arms have been lying there that are not of a quality and calibre to be employed in our service, yet I have never yet been able to obtain an order for their being put on board a ship, to take the chance of such opportunities of being landed as we have reason to think have actually happened, and as we have too much reason to apprehend are not likely to happen again. If the Royalists of Brittany should at this moment have received any supply, the importance of which it is impossible to calculate, they owe it to causes from which I am afraid we can take no credit. At all events, there is reason to suppose that if the stores now lying at Portsmouth had been sent out in time, they might have received them into the bargain; and so many more men have been added to their force as there would have been muskets included in that supply. All this might have been effected without the least interference with any other service; for I am afraid the service in question is not sufficiently popular to hope for any attention, as long as any of the others shall remain unsatisfied in any of their least considerable wants. It is the Cinderella of the fable, which is sacrificed in every instance to her more favoured sisters; but which may prove, like her, in the end, the only one really deserving of favour and affection.

"It is very important, if M. de Moustier is to go at all, that he should go as speedily as possible. It is necessary, too, that a reasonable degree of attention should be paid to his safety, and for this reason, as Admiral Harvey is coming away, that he should go in a frigate. On board this frigate it is very desirable that an opportunity should be taken of sending as many arms as she can conveniently dispose of; or perhaps that a transport or two should be sent with her. We know how long such preparations often are in being carried into effect. It is necessary therefore, if they are to be made, that they should be early determined on.

"I trouble *you* with the suggestion, first with a view to the paper to be prepared for M. de Moustier, and the conversation which you may wish to have with him; and then for the purpose of accelerating any meeting which, on other accounts, you may wish soon to be held."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 17, Camp [at Southsea].—"After I had written to you yesterday, Baron de Rolle called upon me and shewed me a letter to you from Monsieur, couched in terms that I think will please you. It accepts at once the proposal of going with General Doyle, and thanks the King in the warmest terms for the supplies which your letter announces, of arms, money, and stores. I found that your letter was supposed to be the most friendly *loyale et franche* that could be written; and if the Duc D'Harcourt had not accompanied it with a letter stating that you thought the style of the first too strong, they would have continued in the most perfect conviction that they had obtained all that they wished for. They had entirely given up all hopes of any enterprise till after the sailing of our West Indian armament; and all that they flattered themselves they might obtain was assurances that the very thing would be done in four or five weeks that is done now; with this difference only, that they imagined the delay of five weeks would have given the means of supplying more troops. Seeing that your letter was so *kindly* taken, I contented myself with

observing that they had an advantage of which I wished them to feel the full weight, and that was the advantage of knowing that whatever you had engaged to, be it more or less, they might be certain of seeing accomplished as far as depended upon you; and that I regretted that the Duc D'Harcourt, or the Bishop of St. Pol, had not been directed to give to you the explanation which they had made to me of the first letter, as it would have prevented, in all probability, the necessity of any conversation of the nature which had passed (as Rolle informed me) between you and D'Harcourt.

"I, this morning, went on board the *Iason*, and found Monsieur more delighted than you can imagine; and this was certainly his natural feeling upon it, for I went so early that Rolle had not been on board, nor indeed could any boat have gone (from the squally weather) before I saw him, and this I did on purpose. He told me how much he was *au désespoir* that his letter could have been supposed too pressing, for, that all he had ever dared hope for was for such an answer as you had written to him, knowing how much the Spanish peace and our West Indian news had deranged your plans; that the 4,000 men under Doyle *valoient bien* 16,000 six weeks hence; that it was not only his duty, but his inclination to seize the very first moment to endeavour to render himself worthy, if possible, of this mark of the King's goodness, and of his Ministers' good faith and exertions; that he was very sanguine of success, and that he was miserable that his messenger did not go yesterday, as it might be imagined that he had paused upon the offer made to him. He was pleased when I told him that Rolle had, last night, shown me his answer to you, and begged me as a favour to bear testimony to this fact, for that he could not bear to suffer in your opinion after the manner in which you had treated him. He dwelt very much upon those parts of your letter which mark so distinctly General Doyle's orders, and the nature of the assistance which he had to look to, namely, money, arms, and clothing; and he told me that this style was so very different from what he had met with in his other correspondences where all was promised, and nothing done, that he was more sanguine than if you had promised him more. He asked me what I thought of that part of your letter which speaks of the force as being only 4,000 *men under General Doyle*, for that he understood from Lord Moira that these 4,000 men were all *English*, and that, your letter not having said one word of the French troops now at Southampton and elsewhere, he had flattered himself that these 4,000 were *exclusive* of the Frenchmen; and that the emigrants of all sorts were to accompany him. I told him that I had likewise understood from Sir William Pitt that the *British* troops under Doyle were 4000, and if this was so, I had no doubt but that the French would be ordered to accompany him. He begged that I would mention this to you, and renewed a very earnest hope that the *cocardes blanches*, now at Bremerlehe, would be allowed to come away instantly, as he now more than ever should want officers *who had served*. He said that the details of stores which Lord Moira had shown to him were magnificent, and that the impression made by this unexpected attack would be most sensibly felt through every part of France. He said that he owed it to his family to leave his son behind him, and that he thought he followed the wish of Government in leaving him with Lord Moira; but that in case Lord Moira was to embark, and the King did not otherwise dispose of him, he implored me to take care of him, *en cas de malheur*, till his brother could send for him. He admitted that, upon re-perusing his letter, he thought it *trop fort*; but that he was urged from *every quarter* to write in the most pressing

terms, and that he hoped Ministers would not think his impatience unnatural, particularly when everything and everyone round him increased that impatience by the most earnest language, and by urging him to consider that this was their last stake, and the last struggle. He said that he should still permit to himself one representation upon this expedition, founded upon the universal opinion of all the French and English navy officers employed at Quiberon : and that was the necessity of having 400 English cavalry to be employed as *redettes* and advanced posts to the *English* port, wherever it was occupied. That, of course, he would not wish that such a corps should sail with him under the uncertainty of the present orders for Houdiac [Houdan] and Houat ; but that he knew so strongly the necessity of such a corps *for our security*, that he hoped that any application for this body to be kept ready for a second embarkation, would not be deemed an infraction of the rule he had proposed to himself of not urging for one man more than was proposed by Ministers for this object. I told him that I thought such a communication to Lord Moira or to General Doyle would be considered undoubtedly as originating in the motives he assigned ; and that I would mention the subject to you as one that he wished might be considered upon the grounds alleged by him ; and he said that he wished that the French cavalry now coming from Germany should not be considered as destined to this purpose, as it would be essential for him to give to Charrette every French horseman that could be collected, he being deficient in cavalry.

“He then spoke to me of the strange message which the Prince of Wales had sent him yesterday by Sir Sydney Smith, whom he appeared to think very officious, to apprise him of his intention of making him a visit ; and said that he was very much distressed about it, as the King might not perhaps have been apprized of it ; and that, in every point, he wished to follow the line which he thought the most pleasing to the King. I said that the King was so much in the habit of seeing the Prince of Wales acting from his own impressions, that he would not perhaps attach much importance to this step ; and that his line appeared to me very plain. He told me that he dreaded a private interview with the Prince of Wales, fearing that the Prince might not be in the secret of the measures proposed by Government, and that any language which he might hold afterwards might be imputed to communications on board the *Jason*, that he saw no means of explaining these fears, but that he trusted them to me in hopes that I would write to you what he could not on this subject. He added that he had ordered a vast number of French officers on board in order to make a private interview more difficult, and that he should make him no communication whatsoever. When he leaves England, he proposes, in the letter he writes to the King, to acknowledge the Prince's visit as an additional proof of the interest which his Majesty has been so good as to mark to him ; and he promises me a full detail of all that has passed between the Prince and him.

“He mentioned to me (what you had likewise told me of in London) the proposed coinage of Louis 18th ; and said that the impression to be made by this was so great, and that it was so essential to them, now that they were left more immediately to their own exertions, to avail themselves of all collateral aids, that he begged that this coinage (or even the copper coinage, if the other was not finished) might be sent to him as soon as possible. He likewise spoke upon the hopes given that some arrangement might be made for his brother's debts ; as circumstances might make it very necessary for him to look towards

Lyons (where there were very great dispositions for monarchy) or towards the Prince of Condé's army, and, at present, he could not leave Verona without risk of personal arrest.

"I have now put together the result of this long conversation; much of it he requested might be stated to you, which I promised, provided it was not expected from me to give any answer upon those points, as they ought to be discussed (if he wished for an answer) by some one properly authorised. He said he considered what had passed simply as *memoranda*; but he wished to convey to you through me his sense, which he should always retain, of the attentions, the frankness, and the real assistance he had received from you. Upon this he spoke very much at length, and with much apparent sensibility. He appeared to have found out that Lord Moira was not well with Ministers, and, once or twice, made an opening of that sort which I would not understand; but I have no doubt but that Lord Moira *urged* and *dictated* part of that letter which he regrets having writ.

"What I have done and said cannot, I trust, disserve you, and I am glad if these communications help you.

"Admiral Harvey came to again yesterday, with his sailing signal still flying. The Prince of Wales is this moment gone from Portsmouth. The transports from Southampton arrived this morning, and all will be ready by Wednesday. But, for God's sake, send some subordinate general with Doyle; for his force is too large for one officer, and, hitherto, no second general is named; and, in case of his death, the command devolves on Colonel Graham, who never saw a soldier or a shot but what he saw at Toulon."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795,] August 17, Wimbledon.—"The Duke of York has been here with me this morning, and tells me the King will not, on any account, agree to part with the Guards for the West Indies. He says the King wrote to me yesterday on the subject, but, by some strange inattention somewhere, I have not yet received his letter. We must do the best we can to devise a substitute. I must withdraw the Scotch brigade from the East Indies, which will afford, I hope, about one thousand. If success attends us at the Cape, it will be [a] hazardous expedient the doing so, as we have nothing else reserved to send there; but, with the impression which you know I entertain of the importance of St. Domingo, I think the risk must be run. The King has consented to allow us to draft Prince William's regiment, which will give us 800 good men. Still, however, there is a deficiency, and I cannot devise any possible means of supplying it except by taking two regiments in place of one from Gibraltar; and in order to enable us to do so, you must order Rolle's regiment to Gibraltar in place of joining the Prince of Condé.

"Before I see you again I trust you have formed some plan to get, as fast as possible, some thousands of German troops for West India service. I hope it is our last draught on that fund, and therefore you must not grudge giving a high price if necessary. We can get plenty of transports at Hamburg, and if I thought there was a chance of a good supply of Germans for the West Indies, I would send an agent over to see the transports properly fitted up for West India transports."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795,] August 18, [Camp, Southsea].—"I have a letter from Mr. Smith of Thame soliciting my interference with the Lord Chancellor



for the living of Aston Rowant near Thame for his son-in-law; and informing me that he had written to you *in order to be in time*. I had applied to the Lord Chancellor last week for Lillingstone-Lovel, upon the plea of it being within 2 miles of Stowe, and found it given to Lord Harcourt. I do not therefore like to expose myself to a second refusal. But, if you have, in consequence of Mr. Smith's letter, applied, and if you understand Lord Chancellor to be disengaged, I will, in that case, write an application for it.

"Lord Moira sent for the Baron Rolle this morning to Southampton. I will endeavour to know the result of this conference on Thursday, for he does not return till the night tide of Wednesday. The convoy from Bremerthe is said to be off, but it blows too hard at south-west for them to make Spithead. Harvey's signal is still out."

*Postscript.*—"Lord Moira recommended the Prince of Wales to visit the Comte D'Artois; but came here 5 minutes after the Prince was gone, and said *that it was very unlucky, for that he had a great deal to say to them both*. I believe he dined with the Prince at Sir H. Featherstone's, and sent for the Baron Rolle."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795,] August 21, [Camp, Southsea].—"I am just returned from on board the *Jason*, where, notwithstanding your surprise, you are certainly in very high odour, and Monsieur very loud in his *gratitude*. I am persuaded that this is unaffected, for it is certain that they did not expect the smallest effort to have been made for them till our West India armament had sailed; and the strongest proof of it is that the Comte D'Artois shewed me a letter written by him to the Duc de Bourbon, from Deal, stating the news which he had learnt upon his arrival in England, and his doubts whether it was expedient, under all the circumstances of difficulty which had presented themselves, for him to press the idea of coming to join him, till he could give him some assurances of what *l'Angleterre pourrait ou voudrait faire*. He is delighted with the arrival of his cavalry, who are more numerous than he expected, and with the assurances given him yesterday by Lord Moira that his emigrants are not included in the 4000 men ordered for his service. Lord Moira's three transports, which were wanting, do not arrive till this evening, but the transports are now working down to St. Helens, and, while I was there, Admiral Harvey sent him a note to inform him that they should certainly sail on Sunday morning, or perhaps to-morrow night. The wind is now perfectly fair, and, but for the unaccountable delay of the transports, might have carried them by this time half-way down channel. If they are still to wait for the other regiment that Lord Moira proposed to you to send, they will, I fear, lose at least five days more.

"Monsieur shewed me the King's manifesto from Verona, which is not quite so good as Lord Clarendon's from Breda. I think it full of verbiage, and of repetitions, and with some very exceptionable parts, such as the unnecessary mention of the Duc D'Orléans, which can only offend his family. The very vague proscription of all the judges and all the actors and co-operators in the murders of the King, Queen, and Princess Elizabeth, without leaving himself the means of pardoning any of the large number (not less than 500) whom this proscription includes, declaring that their crimes *passent les bornes de la clémence royale*, and finally the very silly and very indecent expression of *conquering France*. These appeared to me so striking that I could not help stating them to Monsieur, and he shewed me part of a letter which he had

already written to his brother, attacking those three identical points, and informing him of his intention of explaining some, and, in the Bas-Breton translation, altering the term *conquête*; but if he could shorten at least four-fifths of it, his brother's character as an author (for it is all his own composition) would gain by the alteration. His brother writes him word that he has heard of the Spanish peace, and that, within the last 24 hours, he had seen Monsieur de la Casas, who had assured him that Spain would redouble her efforts, and make exertions *plus vigoureux que jamais* in his favour. He added *that this transaction must inevitably totally change the relative situations of the two countries, in case of the success of these attempts.*

"I found that the Prince of Wales had been very curious as to the project of a descent, and had questioned Monsieur much about it, appearing wholly uninformed of what was going on, but speaking with great eagerness and apparent anxiety for the event. Monsieur vowed that there was nothing said that might not have been proclaimed at Charing Cross, and I rather think it was true, for the means of conversing are so few that unless he orders every one out of the great cabin (which he could not do as there was a large suite), everything is overheard. Lord Moira had sent for Rolle to Southampton to settle the French, who are to go on this expedition, for they were disputing their *droits de service*, and the arrival of the transports from Germany made many details absolutely necessary. I have some reason to think that this was the case; but more passed, for Rolle *à propos de botte* said to me this morning: *Il me paroit que Lord Moira fronde beaucoup vos ministres, and je crois entrevoir que cela pourroit nous nuire, si nous restons encore quelque jours à Spithead.* I write all this without any other object than that of giving you hints that may assist you.

"Many thanks for your offer respecting Smith. I agree with you that it is not *tant*. I am surprised at your hint about Jemmy, because he had, some years ago, spoke upon this very object, and declared he would not look to it. I support Dickenson, and I think he will carry it."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 24, Wimbledon.—"I send you the enclosed as I received it. I do not recollect the other application transmitted under my cover. Wherever integrity and industry are requisite I believe he may be fairly trusted, and his knowledge of commercial business I believe to be very considerable. At the same time I feel it unfair to the Duke of Portland to wish him in any other situation than where he now is, for I believe he is universally admitted to be one of the best magistrates that exists in the metropolis."

*Enclosing* a letter from Mr. Colquhoun offering his services as one of the commissioners to be appointed under the treaty of commerce concluded with the United States.

#### SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, August 26, Vienna.—"My best acknowledgments are due to your Lordship for your confidential private letter by my servant. I lost not a moment to make to M. de Thugut the communication contained in it, which gave him, he said, the greater satisfaction, as he has always thought the island of Noirmoutiers should be the object of our attack.

"I greatly regret that my representations in favour of the augmentation of the Prince of Condé's army have had such little effect ; but the cry against the *Emigrés* increases every day, and M. de Thugut is so decidedly against placing any exclusive confidence in them that of late, notwithstanding the intimate and confidential footing on which I am with him, my representations on that subject are always received with some degree of impatience.

"If your Lordship thinks proper to make any communication here relative to the corps of Dutch emigrants and deserters assembling on the northern frontier of Holland it would be very well taken, as M. de Thugut has repeatedly made inquiries about it, expressing always his wishes that the report may be true.

"By the next messenger I shall, I trust, be able to transmit to your Lordship a memorial about the Bank of Vienna. The delay has been occasioned by the long and severe illness of the person whom I have employed to draw it up."

#### BARON DE NANTAT to LORD GRENVILLE.

#### ACCOUNT OF A MISSION TO THE COUNT OF CHARETTE.

##### *Extract.*

1795, August 26, Portsmouth.—"Envoyé en France par *Monsieur*, et subséquemment par Milord Grenville pour porter des dépêches au *Général Charette*, prendre connaissance des forces des Royalistes de la Vendée, et des dispositions des habitants de ce pays-là, et de ceux qui l'environnent ; pour en suite me transporter à Paris, et ailleurs, et y servir la cause du Roi de la manière que les circonstances le permettraient, je dois rendre un compte exact de ma conduite dans l'exécution de ma commission, de mes observations, et des raisons qui m'ont porté de revenir de Nantes en Angleterre, au lieu de me rendre à Paris, comme il avait été projeté. Je vais rendre ce compte avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude, et avec beaucoup de franchise, même dans ce qui peut contrarier quelques idées reçues.

"Prévenu que Milord Grenville voulait m'envoyer à M. Charette, je frétai dans les derniers jours du mois de Juin, un sloop Danois nommé la *Marie Elisabeth* pour Nantes, et je me munis de passeports Américains pour pouvoir m'introduire comme négociant.

"Le 3 Juillet, je reçus par M. le Comte de Serens, les dépêches de Milord Grenville, et je mis à même de partir aussitôt.

"Le 4. M. Windham me fit demander d'aller chez lui. Ce Ministre me donna des instructions, et une lettre pour le *Général Charette*, et me dit que, désirant lui envoyer de l'argent pour ses besoins les plus urgents, il me serait remis des lettres de credit de Messieurs Ransom, Morland, et Hamersley, pour toucher à Nantes 10,000*l*.

"Le 6. Je reçus à 7 heures du soir les lettres de crédit qui devaient m'être données par ordre de M. Windham, et je partis immédiatement après avec le *Comte de Butler*.

"Le 17. À deux heures du matin je partis, laissant mon sloop à Pimboeuf, et j'arrivai à Nantes à 8 heures du matin avec le *Comte de Butler*.

"À notre arrivée à Nantes, nous nous rendîmes chez le *Citoyen Bridon*, ancien Capitaine de vaisseau marchand, que je savais avoir toujours été dans les charges depuis le commencement de la République, et pour nous en faire un protecteur, nous jugeâmes à propos de l'y engager par son intérêt. Nous lui dîmes donc, que nous étions *deux*

*Américains* qui désirant établir un commerce en France, étaient venus de Londrès pour faire un essai ; que nous aménions une cargaison, et voulions en refaire une autre de vins et d'eaux de vie ; que ne pouvant connaître le prix des marchandises dans un moment où le signe monétaire variait prodigieusement de valeur à chaque instant, nous le prions de faire nos ventes et nos achats, en acceptant un droit de commission sur les unes et les autres. La proposition se trouva fort du goût de Bridon ; il nous accueillit très bien, et prit pour comptant tous les contes que nous jugeâmes à propos de lui faire. Il nous dit qu'il y avait des formalités à remplir à notre arrivée, mais que ce serait d'autant plus facile que le citoyen Le Roi, son associé, était de la Municipalité et de service. A l'instant il nous mena donc à la Municipalité, au Comité de Surveillance, et au Département, où, présentés par lui, nous fumes bien reçus et admis sans examen. On nous fit seulement des questions, dont quelques-unes assez bizarres, sur l'Angleterre et les Anglais.

“ Depuis ce moment jusqu'à notre départ de Nantes, Bridon et Le Roy nous ont comblés d'honnêtetés, et ont mis beaucoup d'activité dans les affaires de la cargaison, qu'ils regardaient comme les leurs. Ils ont constamment repoussé quelques suspicions qu'on a voulu élever contre nous ; comme par exemple, ce qu' avait écrit le Commandant de Paimbœuf au Général Canelaux, que notre vaisseau ayant passé au milieu des flottes Anglaises, lorsqu' elles arrêtaient tous les autres, il devait être très suspect, et tous ceux qui étaient dessus sévèrement examinés. Il est vrai, qu'en peu de jours, nous avions mis ces deux hommes si fort en avant pour nous, qu'ils ne pouvaient plus nous laisser suspecter, sans devenir suspects eux-mêmes.

“ Les premières et indispensables démarches faites, je cherchai sans perdre de temps, à me mettre à même de m'acquitter de la commission dont les *Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique* m'avaient chargé envers le Général Charette. Je me trouvai très embarrassé pendant un moment, ayant appris que M. *Le Veneur* avait quitté Nantes dans la crainte d'être arrêté ; et aucunes des personnes auxquelles je demandais M. de *Brue d'Ivignac* ne pouvant me l'indiquer. On me disait qu'il y avait 4 ou 5 de Brue, mais qu'on n'en connaissait aucun sous le nom d'Ivignac. La crainte de mal tomber m'empêchait d'aller chez aucun des cinq. Il m'était fort difficile de m'éclaircir, parceque les questions que j'aurais pu faire n'étaient pas naturelles à un Américain, pouvaient me faire suspecter, et m'ôter tous moyens de remplir mon principal objet. Le même jour, je me déterminai cependant dans la soirée à aller voir la veuve d'un Capitaine de vaisseau marchand, nommée Madame *Cazal*, qui m'avait été indiquée à Londrès comme Royaliste. Je trouvai en elle une femme courageuse, et très zélée pour sa religion et pour son Roi. Elle m'entendit bientôt, et m'assura qu'elle ferait sans hésiter et sans crainte, tout ce que je lui demanderais, et qui pourrait être utile à la cause à laquelle nous étions dévoués, elle et moi. Et, en effet, elle m'a été très utile pendant mon séjour à Nantes. C'est elle chez qui j'ai déposé, et toujours laissé, tout ce que j'avais intérêt que ne fut trouvé ni sur moi ni chez moi.

“ Sur ce que je lui demandai si elle pouvait m'indiquer quelqu'un qui fut en relation avec le Général Charette, et par le moyen de qui je pusse lui faire tenir un paquet, elle me répondit qu'elle ne connaissait personne qui eut des rapports avec le Général, mais que sa sœur, Mademoiselle Charette, était à Nantes, et que sans doute elle avait des moyens de communiquer avec lui. Je demandai à voir *Mademoiselle Charette*. Madame *Cazal* me dit qu'elle se tenait cachée, et qu'on ne

savait où, mais qu'elle allait travailler à trouver un homme qui avait toute la confiance de cette demoiselle, et qu'elle ferait ensorte de m'aboucher avec lui. Effectivement, le soir même, elle le trouva, et me dit le lendemain, 18, à dix heures du matin, qu'elle le ferait venir chez elle quand je le voudrais. A ma demande elle fut le chercher sur le champ, et me l'amena au bout d'une demie heure ; je lui parlai. C'est un maçon devenu entrepreneur de batiments, nommé *Souriceau*, pauvre mais plein d'honneur et de probité, et entièrement dévoué à la cause du Roi. C'est lui qui a été de ma part trouver le Général Charette, et lui porter mes paquets, toutes les fois que je l'ai jugé à propos, qui m'a accompagné quand j'ai été parler à ce Général, qui a pris tous les moyens nécessaires pour me faire sortir de la ville secrètement, et y rentrer de même ; qui s'est chargé de faire tous les achats et envois de poudres ; et, en un mot, qui a fait tout ce qui a pu être utile, sans être jamais arrêté ni effrayé par les dangers qu'il y avait à courir, s'il était découvert ; c'est lui qui cache Mademoiselle Charette dans sa maison, et fournit le plus souvent à ses besoins.

"Lorsque je demandai à *Souriceau* de me faire voir Mademoiselle Charette, il me dit qu'il lui ferait part de mon désir, mais qu'on avait été si souvent trompé, et qu'il y avait tant de danger pour elle à laisser savoir où elle était, qu'il ne l'engagerait pas à me recevoir s'il n'avait pas connaissance de ce que j'étais, et de mes intentions. Je fus donc obligé de m'ouvrir à ce brave homme, qui dès qu'il m'eut entendu, et vu les paquets dont j'étais porteur, me protesta que je pouvais compter sur lui. Il me donna rendez-vous à dix heures du soir chez Madame Cazal, pour delà me mener chez Mademoiselle Charette.

"Effectivement il me conduisit chez elle à l'heure indiquée. Je trouvai en elle une demoiselle de 30 ans, d'un sens très droit, et très zélée pour la cause du Roi, mais très inquiète sur le sort du Général, son frère, dont elle connaît les besoins pressants. Quand elle connut l'objet de ma mission, elle me traita comme un ange tutélaire envoyé pour le salut de tous. Elle me dit que son frère était à Belleville, à 12 grandes lieues de Nantes ; et qu'elle allait me faire chercher quelqu'un pour lui porter mes dépêches, et lui demander un rendez-vous, où nous puissions avoir une entrevue, qu'elle regardait combien nécessaire. *Souriceau* qui était présent, assura que l'objet était trop important pour qu'il souffrit qu'un autre que lui en fut chargé. Il fut donc convenu qu'il partirait le lendemain matin, 19. Je lui remis en conséquence mes paquets pour le Général, et le chargeai de lui demander de me fixer le jour et le lieu où je pouvais me rendre pour le voir, désirant que ce fût le plutôt possible, et à peu de distance de Nantes, afin que mon absence de cette ville fut courte, et put être ignorée, comme il était nécessaire. Le 19, *Souriceau* partit, et je remis après mon entrevue avec M. Charette toutes démarches pour réaliser en espèces les lettres de crédit que m'avait fait remettre M. Windham ; espérant que ce général aurait à Nantes quelque correspondant, qui m'en fournirait les moyens. En attendant, je commençai à travailler, comme j'ai fait constamment depuis pendant tout le temps de mon séjour en France, à connaître, d'une manière certaine, l'esprit public, et l'opinion tant à Nantes que dans les cantons qui l'avoisinent, et même dans les autres provinces du Royaume ; l'état de la culture, et de subsistances actuelles et futures ; les forces de la Vendée, celles des Chouans, leurs relations, leurs dispositions. Je mettrai à la fin ce compte, le résultat de mes observations, que je crois pouvoir donner pour certain, parcequ'elles ont été multipliées, et que j'en ai adopté que ce que j'ai vu bien prouvée.

"Mon messenger *Souriceau*, ayant mis une grande diligence, rentra à Nantes dans la nuit du 21 au 22 ; et m'avertit le 22, au matin, que

le Général Charette serait le lendemain, 23, à la pointe du jour auprès de St. Philbert à 4 lieues de Nantes, où il m'attendrait ; et, qu'en conséquence, il fallait que je sortisse de la ville le jour même avant la nuit, afin d'être à 10 heures du soir à Ruzé, qui en est éloigné d'une demie lieue, et où je trouverais des chevaux et une escorte de cavalerie.

“Nantes, environné de tous côtés par les Vendéens et les Chouans, est en état de *siège*. Personne ne peut en sortir sans une permission expresse et par écrit, ni y entrer sans être très examiné. J'en avais point de prétexte pour demander à sortir surtout du côté de la *Vendée*. Il me fallut donc prendre des moyens pour le faire furtivement, en évitant les portes gardés ; et j'y parvins, parcequ'il y a dans la ville un grand nombre de Royalistes, qui se prêtent à rendre toutes sortes de services aux Vendéens, et à ceux qui veulent leur en rendre.

“À 6 heures du soir, en plein jour par conséquent, affublé d'un habit de maçon, des outils et un baguet de chaux sur les épaules, et conduit par mon fidel *Sourceau*, une toise à la main, je traversai la ville, et passai tous les ponts, excepté le pont Rousseau, qui est le dernier et le plus soigneusement gardé. Un peu avant d'y arriver, nous trouvâmes dans la rue un chirurgien (*M. Minx*) qui, sans nous rien dire, marchait devant nous, et nous conduisit par de petites rues et par des jardins, à une maison de campagne sur le bord du dernier bras de la Loire, et tout près du porte. Arrivé là, Madame de (Je n'ai pas su son nom, mais c'est une sœur de *M. de Monté*) à qui appartient la maison, me reçut avec empressement, et me cachait soigneusement jusqu' à la nuit. Je trouvai dans l'endroit où l'on me renfermat, un chirurgien qui venait des Chouans de la haute Loire, et allait pour soigner des malades à l'armée de Stoffel. Quand il fut bien nuit, en me faisant escalader plusieurs murs, on me conduisit de jardins en jardins jusqu' à un bateau, avec lequel je passai la rivière. La femme du batelier me conduisit à Ruzé chez Madame *Bascher*. C'est la mère de *M. Bascher* qui a débarqué à Quiberon, et qui de là a été rejoindre le Général Charette. Cette dame, ainsi que sa fille, me reçut avec empressement, et m'appris que *M. de la Roberie*, commandant de la cavalerie, était venu dans le village avec une escorte pour me recevoir, et me conduire ; mais que le hasard ayant fait sortir de Nantes un corps de troupes assez considérables, il avait été obligé de se retirer, après avoir donné l'ordre à un officier de la paroisse, de me faire fournir deux chevaux, et de me conduire.

“J'attendis les chevaux jusqu' à minuit. Alors je partis et courus par des chemins creux et bordés de haie ; et comme la nuit était très noire, mon cheval tombait très souvent, et entre autres au milieu de la rivière, qu'il me fallut passer à gué au pont *St. Martin*. J'arrivai à la pointe du jour, le 23, au petit camp de cavalerie où je devais trouver le Général. Il n'y était pas encore rendu, et n'y vint qu' à 9 heures du matin. En l'attendant, je m'occupai à causer avec les soldats du camp, et les officiers que j'avais trouvés couchés dans les granges d'une maison voisine, appartenante à *M. de la Roberie*, et qui a été brûlé. Les entretiens que j'eus avec les uns et les autres m'intéressèrent infiniment. Ils me firent connaître les forces de la Vendée, son organisation, sa discipline, ses moyens de subsistance. Je fus infiniment content de l'esprit qui régné généralement dans cette armée. Officiers et soldats protestent qu'ils ne mettront pas les armes bas que le Roi ne soit sur le trône, et qu'ils réprendront tous leur sang plutôt que de reconnaître la République. Leur assurance fait plaisir, ils ne craignent rien, et se croient invincibles. J'ai admiré la naïveté avec laquelle ils racontent leurs victoires sans se

faire valoir, et leurs défaites sans honte et sans les dissimuler. Les officiers m'ont paru très absolus, et les soldats soumis et respectueux. Tous ont la plus grande confiance dans M. de Charette, et le plus grand attachement pour sa personne, quoiqu'ils le craignent infiniment. Tous les chevaux, que j'ai vus, sont beaux et bons et dans le meilleur état.

“ Nous étions tous réunis dans la maison de M. de la Roberie, lorsque le Général arriva, accompagné de 4 ou 5 officiers. Tout le monde courut à lui et l'entoura. Je remarquai avec plaisir cet empressement, et l'impression que chacun éprouvait en le voyant. Il reçut tout le monde sans fierté, mais avec dignité. Je perçai la foule pour aller à lui, et le priai de vouloir bien recevoir un *maçon* qui venait lui rendre l'hommage. Il me répondit que ce *maçon* verrait que les *Brigands* n'étaient pas sauvages. Il ne me dit plus rien ; mais après dix minutes il me propose de passer au jardin. Là me prenant la main, qu'il me serrait tant que nous marchâmes, il me conduisit dans un cabinet couvert, où nous commençâmes une conversation qui dura 8 à 9 heures, en plusieurs reprises. J'en rapporterai le plus intéressant, avec la plus scrupuleuse exactitude ; et je supprimerai ce qui l'est moins pour éviter d'être trop long, me réservant d'en rendre compte verbalement, si on le désire ; assuré que je suis, que le tout est si bien gravé dans ma mémoire, que de longtemps rien n'en serait effacé.

“ Je commençai la conversation.

“ “Général, vous avez vu les dépêches que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous apporter, et j'espère que les offres et les assurances qu'elles contiennent, vous auront fait autant de plaisir que j'en ai eu à vous les porter.”

“ Charette : ‘ J'ai le plus grand plaisir avoir quelqu'un qui a la confiance de *Monsieur*, et celles des *Ministres du Roi d'Angleterre*. Je lui donne toute la mienne, et je me conformerai à ce que vous me direz.’

“ “ Je ne viens point, Général, pour vous rien prescrire ; ce ne serait pas répondre aux intentions de *Monsieur*, qui a infiniment de confiance en vous, et qui d'après tout ce que vous avez si glorieusement fait, s'en rapporte entièrement à vous. Je suis seulement chargé de vous le renouveler de vive voix, ainsi que les assurances que vous donnent *Milord Grenville* et *Mr. Windham* dans leurs lettres, et de prendre connaissance de votre position politique et militaire, de vos besoins, et des moyens de vous faire parvenir ce qui vous sera destiné.’

“ Charette : ‘ Mais croyez-vous bien, Monsieur, que les *Ministres Anglais* veulent me donner des secours.’

“ “ Oni, Général, et c'est parceque j'en suis convaincu, que je me suis chargé de venir vous l'annoncer.”

“ Charette : ‘ Ah ! ils m'ont abandonné pendant deux ans, dans un temps où j'aurais pu, avec peu de secours, finir la guerre, par le rétablissement de la Monarchie.’

“ “ On a tenté plusieurs fois de venir à vous, et on n'a jamais pu y parvenir, parceque vous n'aviez pas de port sur la côte.”

“ Charette : ‘ Que ne me faisait-on savoir où l'on viendrait, et j'y aurais été au temps fixé. Mais comme je ne pouvais pas me soutenir sur la côte, tandis que la République avait des forces maritimes, je n'ai pas voulu perdre des hommes précieux en attaquant des ports, sans avoir la certitude que cela était nécessaire au moment même.’

“ “ En tout, Général, les circonstances sont changées et je crois le gouvernement Anglais bien résolu à vous soutenir *efficacement*. De plus, quand deux *Ministres* du caractère de *Milord Grenville* et de *Mr. Windham* se sont mis à même de vous écrire eux-mêmes, pour vous l'offrir de la part de Sa Majesté Britannique, vous y pouvez compter.”

“Charette : ‘Puisque vous, qui étiez sur les lieux, me l’assurez, e l’espérerai donc ; mais croyez-vous qu’ils m’envoient quelques troupes ?’

“‘Je ne crois pas, Général, que le Gouvernement Anglais en ait assez dans le moment à disposer pour vous en envoyer ; et même Mr. Windham me l’a dit la veille de mon départ, en m’assurant que vous auriez d’ailleurs tout ce qu’il vous faudrait, et que vous demanderiez.’

“Charette : ‘Ah ? s’ils m’envoyaient seulement deux mille hommes de troupes *Françaises* ! Ce n’est pas pour le nombre des hommes que je désire ce secours, mais pour qu’on sache, pour qu’il se répande, que j’en ai reçu, afin de soutenir la confiance de mes soldats, et des habitants des pays qui m’environnent, qui n’attendent qu’un moment favorable ; et que je puisse leur fournir des armes.’

“‘Vous aurez, Général, de tout ce qui vous est offert, dès que vous aurez fait connaître en Angleterre ce qu’il vous faut. Mr. Windham m’a même chargé de vous dire, si vous ne le saviez pas encore, qu’un vaisseau avait déjà reçu l’ordre de se porter à la côte avec 20 mille livres de poudre, pour vous les délivrer.’

“Charette : ‘Il est vrai qu’il en est venu un, il y a 10 à 12 jours ; mais comme je n’étais pas prévenu, on n’a pas répondu à ses signaux. Il a mis à terre 5 à 6 émigrés qu’il avait pris à Quiberon après la descente. Ces Messieurs sont venus m’avertir. J’ai aussitôt porté 6 mille hommes à la côte, mais le vaisseau n’y était plus, et n’a pas reparu depuis.’

“‘Si vous les y tenez, Général, d’un jour à l’autre, vous le verrez reparaitre, ou quelques autres ; surtout après que vous aurez répondu aux Ministres.’

“Charette : ‘Je ferai rester mes troupes à la côte, quoique mes soldats soient très nécessaires pour lever la récolte que j’ai un grand intérêt de mettre en sûreté.’

“‘Mr. Windham m’a aussi, Général, donné à mon départ, des lettres de crédit sur une maison de Nantes, pour toucher 10 mille louis, et vous les remettre. Je m’occuperai de suite à les réaliser et à vous les faire passer le plutôt possible.’

“Charette : ‘C’est de la poudre, des armes, et surtout un Prince pour être à la tête des armées Royales, qu’il me faut ; quant à l’argent, ce n’est pas ce que je demande.’

“‘Général, ce désintéressement est bien digne de vous, mais enfin il faut de l’argent pour faire la guerre.’

“Charette : ‘Je suis habitué à ne payer mes soldats qu’avec des coups de baton quand ils ne font pas leur devoir, et je ne veux pas leur donner une habitude différente qui les gênerait.’

“‘Mais, mon Général, même en ne les payant pas, si vous pouviez au moins leur fournir les choses qui leur manquent, vous pourriez mieux disposer d’eux.’

“Charette : ‘Ils m’obéissent tout de même, parce qu’ils ont confiance en moi, et qu’ils savent bien que je ferais fusiller celui qui n’obéirait pas, et qu’aucun de leurs camarades n’oserait refuser de le faire, si je l’ordonnais. Je ne demanderai pas d’argent, cela me répugne.’

“‘Eh bien, Général, comme il est absolument nécessaire pour le bien de la cause générale que vous soutenez si bien, que vous ayez de l’argent, et abondamment, j’en demanderai pour vous, et vous en auriez. En attendant, je vais tacher de toucher à Nantes les 10 mille louis ; mais d’après les informations que j’ai prise sur la maison *Babu*, elle est très républicaine. Je n’ai pas voulu la voir avant d’avoir conféré avec vous, imaginant que vous aviez quelque banquier ou négociant à Nantes avec qui vous aviez des rapports, et qui, sur votre indication, pourrait faire les fonds et vous les faire remettre.’



“Charette : ‘Je n’ai aucune relation particulière avec personne de Nantes, quoiqu’il y en ait un bon nombre qui s’intéressent à moi, et à la cause pour laquelle je combat. Ainsi faites par vous-même et de votre mieux ; mais employez tout ce que vous pourrez recevoir à acheter *de la poudre*, et prenez des moyens pour me la faire tenir promptement, car c’est ce dont j’ai le plus de besoin ; le besoin le plus pressant (en me serrant la main).’

“ ‘Permettez, Général, que je vous demande à présent quelles sont vos forces, en quel état elles sont, et ce qui vous manque ; afin que je puisse, quand je le saurai, en rendre un compte exact au *Roi*, à *Monsieur*, et aux Ministres d’Angleterre, et vous seconder avec tout le zèle dont je suis capable.’

“Charette : ‘Assurez le *Roi* de ma fidélité, de mon dévouement à son service ; et *Monsieur* de mon respect, de mon attachement à sa personne, et de mon extrême désir de me voir sous ses ordres. Assurez les deux Princes, que je verserai jusqu’à la dernière goutte de mon sang, s’il le faut, pour rétablir le Roi sur son trône ; et que tous les officiers et soldats de mon armée pensent de même. Vous pouvez aussi les assurer, ainsi que les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, que j’ai de ce côté de la Loire, 80 mille hommes armés pour défendre le pays ; que dans les 80 mille hommes, il y en a 50 mille que je puis mener partout où il faudra pour y planter le drapeau blanc ; et qu’il n’y en a pas un qui ne soit aguerri et éprouvé par 120 combats au moins.’

“ ‘Dans le nombre vous comprenez, Général, les armées aux ordres de Messieurs Sapineau et Stofflet ?’

“Charette : ‘Oui, je les y comprends ; mais je réponds que si j’ai des armes à distribuer, et un Prince à notre tête, il aura dans deux mois 200 mille hommes à ses ordres. Les offres et les demandes qui me sont faites, ainsi que la confiance qu’on me témoigne, m’en donnent l’assurance.’

“ ‘Vous avez, Général, de la cavalerie.’

“Charette : ‘Oui, il y a, en tout, 3 mille hommes bien montés. J’en ai dans ma division 1 mille ; j’aurais des chevaux pour monter 1 mille hommes de plus, parcequ’un grand nombre de mes cavaliers en ont plusieurs ; mais comme ils seront pris à l’ennemi, c’est leur propriété, et je la respecte. Si je pouvais les acheter, je doublerais ma cavalerie ; il me faudrait aussi, cependant, des sabres et des pistolets—vous verrez mes chevaux (je les ai vus).’

“ ‘Général, il vous faut donc de l’argent, et puisqu’on vous en offre, il faut profiter de ces offres.

“Charette : ‘Eh, sans doute il en faut, mais je vous le répète, je ne puis me déterminer à en demander. Je demanderai des habits ; des souliers pour mes soldats qu’en manquent ; des armes pour ma cavalerie, qui sera augmentée par beaucoup de jeunesse de Nantes, dès que je pourrai la monter et l’armer ; je demanderai aussi les armes pour l’infanterie ; afin d’armer tous ceux qui veulent me rejoindre. J’ai besoin aussi de vivres pour pouvoir les nourrir ; mais c’est surtout *de la poudre* qu’il me faut, car j’en manque absolument. J’ai cru devoir rompre la paix apparente que j’avais faite, et publier la proclamation que vous avez vue ; je puis être attaqué d’un jour à l’autre, et je n’ai point *de poudre*.’

“ ‘Vous en avez donc bien peu Général ?’

“Charette : ‘J’ai des soldats qui ont 50 cartouches, d’autres 30, plus ou moins ; mais j’en ai un grand nombre qui n’en ont point du tout. Ceux qui en ont les ont prises à l’ennemi au péril de leur vie ; je n’ose les leur ôter pour les distribuer ; et, mon ami, (en me serrant la main) je n’en ai pas pour chacun de mes soldats, l’un portant l’autre, *plus de deux* !—faites m’en donc venir promptement.’

“ ‘Je ne puis, Général, encore partir de Nantes, puisque mon vaisseau n’est pas prêt, et que j’ai bien d’autres objets à remplir. Mais il faut,

sans tarder, envoyer quelqu'un en Angleterre, comme Milord Grenville vous a demandé.'

"Charette : 'Oh ! si les Anglais m'avaient fait parvenir la moitié de ce qu'ils ont donné à M. de Puisaye et envoyé avec lui à Quiberon, quelle différence ! J'aurais pu passer la Loire pour me porter en Bretagne, où je suis appelé ; et toute la province serait sous les armes ; au lieu que l'expédition de Quiberon ne produira rien de bon ; *Je vous le prédis.*'"

"Vous avez, Général, des nouvelles de ce qui s'y est passé depuis la descente ?—quant à moi je l'ignore.

"Charette : 'Oui, j'en ai ; il m'est venu 5 à 6 officiers qui étaient à la descente, et qui sont partis de Quiberon 8 jours après qu'elle a été faite ; entre autres M. Bascher et *M. Charette de la Colinière* que vous avez vus. Lorsqu'on est arrivé, et qu'on a eu fait la descente, le drapeau blanc a été arboré dans tout le canton, et les habitants sont accourus demander des armes, et des munitions. On en a distribué un grand nombre à tout ce qui soit présenté, sans les connaître, sans savoir qu'ils étaient, ni d'où ; sans en tenir d'état, et sans les organiser en aucune manière, en sorte qu'on a peut-être armé des ennemis, et qu'on n'a tiré aucun parti des bons. Croiriez-vous bien, M. le Baron, que M. de Puisaye, au lieu de profiter du premier moment d'enthousiasme, de laisser les troupes avec lesquels il était venu dans la presque île pour garder ses provisions, et de se porter de sa personne dans l'intérieur du pays pour rassembler ce qu'on venait d'armer ainsi que tout ce qui le reconnaît pour chef, et tomber, sans perdre de temps, sur le peu de troupes républicaines qui étaient séparées dans le pays, afin de détruire les unes et d'empêcher les autres de se rassembler et de venir fermer la sortie de Quiberon ; croiriez-vous bien, dis-je, que M. de Puisaye au lieu de cela, est rentrée dans la presque île, disant qu'il ne pouvait s'éloigner des troupes qui étaient destinées à sa garde ! Croiriez-vous bien, encore, que M. de Puisaye, lorsque *d'Hervilly* a pris le fort Penthièvre, au lieu de se trouver à l'attaque, était loin de là, sur le bord de la mer, à manger tranquillement des huitres. A présent, on ne peut plus sortir de Quiberon, et le zèle des Royalistes de la Bretagne en est bien refroidi.'

"Je ne puis, Général, vous dire que tout ceci est au mieux, mais *Milord Moira* va venir en Bretagne, et j'espère qu'il réparera tout.'

"Charette : 'Mais *Milord Moira*, en qui j'ai beaucoup de confiance d'après tout ce qui j'ai appris de lui, trouvera à la côte des troupes ennemies au grand nombre ; au lieu que si M. de Puisaye s'était conduit comme il le devait, ces troupes républicaines auraient été tenues éloignées.'

"Vous avez bien raison, Général, d'avoir la confiance en Milord Moira ; il a celle de tous les Français qui le connaissent ; il est plein d'estime pour vous ; il prend le plus vif intérêt à vos succès ; et, la veille de mon départ de Londres, il m'a spécialement chargé de vous dire que, dès qu'il serait à la côte, vous pourriez lui demander ce dont vous avez besoin, et qu'il vous l'enverrait sur le champs, sans avoir besoin d'attendre des ordres d'Angleterre. Et il m'a ajouté, *je ne lui demanderai pas même un port pour y envoyer ce qu'il me demandera ; je me soucierai peu de perdre quelques transports en les faisant échouer, pourvu que M. de Charette reçoive des secours.* De plus, Général, je suis certain que pour le bien général, toutes choses à part, vous vous concerterez avec M. de Puisaye.'

"Charette : 'M. de Puisaye ne m'a fait part ni de son projet de descente en Bretagne, ni de ses moyens, ni de son arrivée.'

"Cependant, Général, M. Windham vous a écrit, et il m'a chargé de vous le dire que M. de Puisaye désirait agir de concert avec vous, et que, pendant son séjour en Angleterre, il s'était occupé de vos intérêts comme des siens.'

“ Charette ‘ M. de Puisaye pendant qu’il est demeuré en Angleterre, m’a écrit une seule fois, il y a 4 à 5 mois, pour me mander que si je voulais m’adresser à lui, j’obtiendrais par lui tout ce que je voudrais des Ministres Anglais. Je n’ai pas cru devoir accepter sa protection qu’il m’offrait . . . il m’aurait peut-être beintôt offert de ses faux assignats ! . . . et aucuns moyens fallacieux ne peut convenir à un loyal chevalier Français. Je ne connais que les armes et du courage ! ’

“ ‘ Quoiqu’il en soit, Général, j’espère que, mettant toutes considérations personnelles à l’écart, vous agirez de concert avec M. de Puisaye, puisque le bien du service au Roi l’exige. Je suis, de plus, chargé de vous dire que c’est l’intention du Roi et de Monsieur.’

“ Charette : ‘ Je respecte l’intention de mes maîtres, et je m’y conformerai. Je seconderai M. de Puisaye, mais je ne pourrai jamais accorder ni mon estime ni ma confiance à un homme qui s’est toujours malconduit ; et qui dans la seule occasion où il s’est trouvé, a fait le Jean f—.’

“ ‘ Cependant M. de Puisaye peut être très utile, parceque, d’après ce que j’ai su en Angleterre, et ce qu’on m’a dit à Nantes, il a du crédit sur bien du monde.’

“ Charette : ‘ Oui, sur quelques chefs de Chouans, ou quelques personnes qui tendent à devenir chefs ; mais il n’en a point sur le peuple des campagnes dont il n’est pas connu. Quand on a publié son arrivée en Bretagne, les paysans se disaient les uns aux autres dans leur langage, *quel est cet homme, que veut-il faire ?* ’

“ ‘ Je crus voir que le Général était fatigué de cette conversation et je changeai de sujet.

“ ‘ Je pense, Général, que vous avez besoin d’officiers.’

“ Charette : ‘ Certainement, j’ai besoin d’officiers ; j’en ai de très bons, de très braves, et très zélé, mais ils sont presque tous très jeunes. J’en ai tant perdu qu’il m’en faudrait bien plus qu’il ne m’en reste, surtout pour la cavalerie, et pour les détails de l’armée.’

“ ‘ Général, vous en aurez tant que vous voudrez. Il y en a en Angleterre un grand nombre de très bons, qui depuis longtemps désirent de vous rejoindre, et qui sont très empressés de servir sous vos ordres. Mais avez-vous de l’artillerie ? ’

“ Charette : ‘ J’ai des canons de campagne, et quelques-uns de 12 ; mais je ne puis en faire usage, parceque je n’ai pas de poudre, ni canoniers pour les servir. Il me faudrait aussi des chevaux et des harnais.’

“ ‘ Quand on a des officiers d’artillerie, on a bientôt formé des canoniers, et surtout avec des matelots.’

“ Charette : ‘ Mais, je n’ai pas du tout d’officiers.’

“ ‘ Il y en a en Angleterre 30 à 35 qui ne sont pas employés ; parmi eux se trouve un Colonel très en état de vous former promptement un corps d’artillerie. C’est M. de *Quefville*.—Il y a aussi quelques ingénieurs. Tous doivent être prêts à partir à votre première demande, parcequ’avant de quitter Londres, j’ai parlé à M. Windham du bescin que vous deviez en avoir, de la nécessité de les rassembler d’avance, et que ce Ministre a donné l’ordre devant moi pour qu’on fit venir chez lui le lendemain le colonel d’artillerie, et l’ingénieur en chef.’

“ Charette : ‘ Des ingénieurs me seront aussi très utiles.’

“ ‘ Vous en aurez, Général, et comme j’espère vous rejoindre, mon fils et moi vous en serviront. A présent, Général, trouvez bon que nous en venions à un objet bien essentiel. C’est vous que le Roi et Monsieur regardent comme le Général en Chef des armées Royales de la Vendée, et à qui ils veulent formellement en donner le commandement. C’est en conséquence que, chargé de témoigner la satisfaction de sa Majesté et du Prince à Messieurs de Sapineau et Stofflet, je dois me concerter

avec vous pour déterminer si je le ferai directement moi-même, ou si je vous prirai de la faire.'

"Charette : 'Je leur ferai part au tout, et cela suffira.'

"Général, je me conformerai à ce que vous me prescrivez, et m'en rapporterai à vous. J'espère, au surplus, que je puis rendre compte que ces Messieurs vous obéissent, et que la plus parfaite intelligence régne entre eux et vous.'

"Charette : 'Je vais vous parler franchement à ce sujet, parce qu'il est nécessaire que vous connaissiez bien l'état des choses à présent. *M. de Sapineau* est un homme loyal, qui pense bien, et qui veut le bien ; mais, quoique ne manquant pas de capacité, il n'a la force ni de rien faire par lui-même, ni de soutenir ce qu'il a cru devoir résoudre. Il est livré à son entourage, et son entourage ne vaut rien.'

"*Stofflet* est la bravoure et la loyauté même ; mais né dans une classe obscure, il n'a eu aucune éducation, et n'est capable de rien combiner de lui-même.'

"Lorsque j'ai cru mon honneur engagé à rompre la paix avec la République, parcequ'on m'avait trompé, et que le Roi n'était point rétabli, j'ai communiqué mes raisons et mes résolutions à *M. de Sapineau*, qui m'assura qu'il ferait comme moi, et ne se séparerait pas de moi. Cependant, aussitôt que ma proclamation a été publique, *M. de Sapineau* a député à Paris *M. de Béjary* pour protester au Comité de Salut—Public, qu'il n'était pour rien dans ce que j'avais fait, et qu'il ne demandait qu'à entretenir la paix qui avait été conclue ; il a entraîné *Stofflet* à adhérer à cette députation. *Béjary* a fort bien rempli sa mission ; mais on dirait qu'il s'est laissé gagner par les Républicains ; car il m'écrivit que le Comité de Salut—Public est dans la meilleure foi, et dans les meilleurs dispositions, et m'engage à revenir sur ce que j'ai fait. Voici sa lettre. (Je la lus, et en vérité on la croirait dictée par le Comité même). 'Le Général continue, 'Je l'ai lue à mes officiers rassemblés, et leur ai demandé s'il y avait quelqu'un parmi eux qui pensât que je dusse me rendre aux instances de *M. de Béjary*. Aucun n'a été de cet avis. Je vous avoue que cette communication était de ma part un épreuve pour savoir s'il y avait dans mon armée quelqu'un qui ne pensât pas bien, ou qui n'eût pas la fermeté nécessaire ; si j'en eusse trouvé quelqu'un, je l'eusse chassé aussi-tôt.'

"Comment, Général, Messieurs de Sapineau et Stofflet vous reconnaissent pour Chef, et ils ont pu faire une semblable démarche sans vous ! J'aime à penser qu'ils n'ont voulu que gagner du temps. Mais enfin, ils ne devaient agir que de concert avec vous. Est-ce dont qu'il est à craindre qu'ils se séparent de vous ?'

"Charette : 'Non, ils savent bien qu'ils ne le peuvent pas, parceque leurs armées me sont dévouées, et qu'elles obéiront à ce que je leur ordonnerai. D'ailleurs, je suis sûr que Stofflet fera comme je voudrai, et qu'il commencera la guerre quand je le dirai. Cependant, comme il serait très fâcheux d'en venir à des extrémités avec des gens qui ont assurément très bien mérité, la présence d'un de nos Princes est absolument nécessaire dans cette armée, pour que son autorité fasse un tout des plusieurs parties séparées.'

"J'espère, Général, que vous aurez bientôt *Monsieur* ; que l'Angleterre se rendra à ses instances réitérées, et qu'elle portera ce Prince à la Vendée. Milord Grenville vous l'annonce dans sa lettre. Mais comment *M. de Sapineau* a-t-il pu envoyer à Paris *M. de Béjary* qui passe pour un homme de mérite ? Il me paraît que c'est un homme sacrifié."

"Charette : 'Certainement, c'est un homme perdu. Le Comité de Salut—Public continuera à le caresser, tant qu'il pensera qu'il peut empêcher Sapineau et Stofflet de reprendre les armes ; mais, cependant, le fera surveiller, et s'il veut sortir de Paris, il sera arrêté ; tout comme il le

sera au moment où la guerre sera commencée. Mais ce qu'il y a de bien plus extraordinaire, c'est que *M. de Scépeaux*, que j'avais envoyé il y a longtemps de l'autre côté de la Loire, et qui commandait les Chouans entre Nantes et Angers, s'est rendu lui-même à Paris, au moment qu'il a su la descente des émigrés à Quiberon, pour assurer le Comité de Salut Public qu'il n'était pas d'intelligence avec eux, et qu'il voulait observer la paix qu'il avait faite avec la République ! Il ne sortira jamais de Paris, non plus que Bégary ; mais sa conduite ne fera pas qu'on le plaigne.

“ Ce que vous m'apprenez là, Général, est bien extraordinaire ! Un Chef quitter son armée pour aller se jeter au milieu de ses ennemis ! Il est donc fol ! mais son absence ne nuira-t-elle pas aux affaires ? Qui conduit à présent son armée ? ”

“ Charette : ‘ J'ai envoyé mon oncle, *M. de Fleuriot*, pour commander dans ce pays-là ; mais, je vous la répète, un Prince est nécessaire ici, absolument nécessaire. ’ ”

“ ‘ Il y a longtemps que j'en suis convaincu, Général, et je le vois plus que jamais, parceque vous me faites l'honneur de me dire. Mais quelles forces ont les Chouans ? ’ ”

“ Charette : ‘ Les Chouans sont tous les habitants de la Bretagne, d'une partie de la Normandie, du Maine, de l'Anjou, et surtout, des bords de la Loire depuis Angers jusqu' à Nantes, et au-dessous. Mais ce n'est pas organisé ; cela ne forme pas un ensemble. Il y en aurait bientôt si nous avions un Prince à notre tête. Tous les ordres partiraient de lui, tout le monde lui obéirait ; tout irait après une même impulsion, et agirait de concert. Combien nos forces ne seraient-elles pas augmentées par là ? Ah ! M. le Baron, faites donc en sorte que *Monsieur* vienne promptement. ’ ”

“ ‘ Général, je vous le répète, *Monsieur*, depuis deux ans, brule du désir d'être à la tête des braves Royalistes ; mais il ne peut y venir que quand la cour d'Angleterre, l'intime allié du Roi, jugera à propos de l'y faire transporter. Vous voyez par ce que vous écrit Milord Grenville, qu'elle est déterminée à le faire, dès qu'elle sera assurée que vous avez assez de force pour que la sûreté d'une personne aussi intéressante pour toute l'Europe, ne soit pas compromise en venant parmi vous ; et j'espère, en conséquence, que les Ministres se décideront à passer *Monsieur* à la Vendée aussitôt après l'arrivée de la personne que vous enverrez à Londres, si le Prince n'est pas déjà parti avec Milord Moira. ’ ”

“ Charette : ‘ Ah ! qu'il vienne ce Prince chéri ; nous lui ferons tous un rempart impénétrable à l'ennemi, et il sera en sûreté au milieu de nous. De plus, tout ce qu'il y a de noblesse émigrée s'empressera sûrement de l'accompagner, et nos forces en seront augmentées. Elles le seront aussi infiniment par sa présence ; et je vous assure encore que si nous sommes pourvus de ce qui est nécessaire, il aura bientôt une armée immense. Si le Roi pouvait venir aussi, cela déciderait tout-à-fait l'affaire. Oh ! combien nous désirons qu'il puisse juger par lui-même de notre zèle pour son service. ’ ”

“ ‘ Général, le Roi connaît votre zèle, et rends à ses braves Vendéens toute la justice qui leur est due. Je ne doute pas qu'il n'ait le désir de rentrer dans son royaume par la partie où son autorité n'a jamais été méconnu, et où la Monarchie Française n'a pas cessé d'exister. Mais je ne sais si les circonstances le permettront à *Sa Majesté*. D'ailleurs, elle est si loin dans ce moment, qu'elle ne pourrait être dans ce pays-ci qu'au bout d'un assez longtemps ; mais, en attendant, *Monsieur* qui a toute la confiance du Roi, et qui en a reçu tout pouvoir, le remplacera. ’ ”

“ Charette : ‘ Que ce soit donc bientôt ! Mais en attendant, de la poudre mon cher ami, ou à moins, de salpêtre. ’ ”

“ ‘ Vous avez donc, Général, des moulins à poudre ? ’ ”

“ Charette : ‘ Oui, j’ai les moyens d’en faire, j’ai du soufre. ’ ”

“ ‘ Mais, Général, du plomb pour les balles, en avez-vous ? ’ ”

“ Charette : ‘ J’ai du plomb encore pour quelque temps. ’ ”

“ On vint avertir le Général, que l’on avait servi le dîner. Il me fit dîner avec *M. de la Roberie* et 27 de ses officiers. Pendant tout le repas, qui n’annonçait rien moins que la disette, la conversation fut *gaie, franche et ouverte*. On m’y exprimait souvent le désir de combattre l’ennemi, et de voir le Roi et les Princes de son sang. On me fit sur ces augustes personnes, et en particulier sur *Monsieur*, beaucoup de questions, aux quelles je répondis comme je le devais, en me livrant à l’impulsion de mon cœur.

“ Sur la fin du dîner, on annonçait que neuf canoniers du château de Nantes venaient d’arriver pour servir dans son armée, et qu’ils avaient été précédés par cinq autres. Arriva aussi un jeune gentilhomme de Nantes. Le Général lui ordonna de se pourvoir d’un cheval et d’armes. Un officier présent dit qu’il lui donnerait un sabre et des pistolets, et qu’il lui ferait trouver un cheval. Je remarquai dans la conversation que plusieurs chefs de divisions annonçaient des projets, d’une manière qui me persuada qu’ils n’attendent pas toujours l’ordre du Général pour entreprendre ce qu’ils jugent à propos. Cela me déplut, et m’engagea à parler généralement, mais avec force, de la nécessité que rien ne se fasse dans une armée que d’après le Chef. Je suis assuré d’après ce que m’a dit ce Général, et d’après ce que j’ai vu, que l’on obéit exactement lorsqu’il *commande* ou qu’il *défend* ; mais je crois que la position où il se trouve, l’empêche d’ordonner ou de défendre toujours ce qu’il croirait pour le mieux. Après le dîner, j’engageai le Général à venir au cabinet du jardin, et lui observai qu’il n’y avait pas un instant à perdre pour envoyer ses réponses à Londres. Et que puisque je ne pouvais pas encore répartir et emmener son envoyé, il fallait faire partir sur les champs, pour l’Angleterre ; le Général me répondit.

“ Charette : ‘ Mais par quel moyen puis-je envoyer tout de suite en Angleterre ? ’ ”

“ ‘ Général, j’y ai pensé en vous attendant. J’ai appris que vous aviez dans votre cavalerie des fils de pêcheurs de Pimbœuf, et que leurs pères sont des gens très sûrs. Votre envoyé ira chez l’un d’eux, qui demandera une permission pour aller pêcher à l’embouchure de la Loire, et de prendre deux matelots. L’envoyé sera un de ses matelots. La barque qui les portera, sortie de la rivière, longera la côte sur le soir, et se rendra dans la baie de Quiberon, où [est] le commodore *Warren*, à qui votre envoyé portera une lettre de votre part, et la demande de le faire conduire tout de suite en Angleterre par un *avis*. Je connais assez le zèle du Commodore pour être sûr qu’il le fera, sans perdre de temps, et que par ce moyen vos dépêches arriveront promptement. Demandez, Général, à *M. de la Roberie* quels sont les hommes en question ; c’est avec lui que j’ai arrangé tout cela. *M. de la Roberie* appelé, dit que la chose était possible, et même facile. Il nomma les hommes, et en répondit. D’après cela, le Général résolut de faire partir le lendemain, et que ce serait son cousin *M. Charette de la Colinière* qu’il enverrait. Je pris la liberté de lui observer que *Milord Grenville* demandait quelqu’un très instruit de l’état de la Vendée. Il me répondit que quoique son cousin ne fut auprès de lui que depuis dix à douze jours, il était très au fait de tout, et qu’il aurait avec lui un entretien dans lequel il lui dirait tout ce que serait nécessaire. ’ ”

“ Ensuite, le Général me dit.

“ Charette : ‘ Qu’est-ce donc qu’il faut que je remette à mon cousin pour porter à Londres ? ’ ”

“ ‘Mais Général, il me semble qu’il faut que vous répondiez aux lettres qui je vous ai portées.’

“ Charette : ‘Faisant partir demain matin, je n’ai pas le temps de répondre à toutes. Vous présenterez mon hommage à *Monsieur*, vous lui rendrez compte de mes sentiments, et de ma position, d’après ce que je vous ai dit. Je répondrai à M. le Duc d’Harcourt et à M. le Comte de Serens par une autre voie ; mais qu’est-ce qu’il faut que j’écrive aux deux Ministres ?’

“ ‘Général, je crois que vous devez répondre aux honnêtetés contenues dans leurs lettres ; les remercier des offres qu’ils vous ont fait de la part du *Roi d’Angleterre* ; les prier de présenter vos remerciements à *Sa Majesté* ; leur exposer votre position et vos besoins ; et enfin, leur demander ce que vous désirez.’

“ Charette : ‘Je n’ai pas leurs lettres ici. D’ailleurs je ne connais pas les Cours ; je sais me battre, mais je ne sais pas traiter les affaires de politique. Faites-moi ces deux lettres.’

“ ‘Général je ne crois pas à-propos que je les fasse. Si je les fais, on le connaîtra sûrement, et les Ministres pourront croire que je vous ai engagé à présenter mes idées qu’ils connaissent, au lieu des vôtres. Votre style militaire fera un beaucoup meilleur effet.’

“ Charette : ‘Eh bien ! dites au moins à mon secrétaire ce qu’il faut qu’il écrive.’

“ Le secrétaire appelé, je lui dis très en détail ce que je crus qu’il devait écrire. M. Charette de la Colinière vint, quand il fut prévenu de sa mission. Je lui dis aussi devant le Général ce qui je pensais de la conduite qu’il devait tenir. Il nous quitta, et je repris ma conversation avec le Général.’

“ Vous avez traité, Général, avec des membres de la Convention, ce qui me fait croire que vous devez avoir des intelligences avec quelqu’un d’entr’eux, et avec quelques autres personnes à Paris. Si vous en avez, je vous prie de m’en faire part, et de me les donner, en vous déclarant qu’il est très utile, et même nécessaire que vous me les donniez.’

“ Charette : ‘Je n’ai point eu de rapports avec d’autres personnes de Paris que les membres de la Convention qui sont venus dans ce pays-ci m’offrir la paix, et traiter avec moi. Ce sont *Ruelle*, *Gaudin*, et les autres ; mais depuis que j’ai vu qu’ils m’avaient trompé, et qu’ils ne tenaient pas ce qu’ils m’avaient promis, je n’ai plus voulu avoir de relations avec eux. Il faut, à-propos de ces gens-là, que vous sachiez que quoique je fusse en quelque sorte forcé de faire la paix, puisque je n’avais plus de poudre, et que mes soldats manquaient de tout, je ne m’y serais jamais prêté, si *Ruelle* et *Canclaux* ne m’avaient assuré qu’ils voulaient rétablir le Roi, et que je faciliterais ce rétablissement en m’entendant avec eux, et me prêtant à une paix, qui faciliterait l’exécution de leurs vues, les quelles n’étaient pas différentes des miennes. Ils m’ont trompé, et lorsque je l’ai vu, je n’ai plus pu supporter l’idée que mes Princes et l’Europe entière pouvaient avoir de moi, en me voyant en quelque manière reconnaître la République. J’ai fait ma proclamation pour détromper tout le monde sur mon compte.’

“ ‘Général, quelques respectables que soient les raisons qui vous ont porté à faire cette proclamation, si j’étais arrivé avant que vous l’ayez publiée, je vous aurais demandé de la différer, et d’attendre que nous vous eussions procuré tout ce qu’il vous faut pour faire la guerre avec avantage ; mais ce qui est fait, est fait.’

“ Charette : ‘Après ma proclamation, j’ai enlevé à l’ennemi du côté de Montigu un camp de 2700 hommes qui me gênait ; mais depuis, je n’ai fait qu’enlever quelques petits convois. Je n’entreprendrai rien d’important avant que la récolte soit entièrement faite, et je ne crois pas que les

Républicains viennent m'attaquer chez moi, parcequ'ils savent bien qu'ils n'y viendraient pas impunément. Cependant procurez moi de la poudre.

“ J'ai en l'honneur de vous promettre, Général, que dès que je serais à Nantes, je m'en occuperais, et vous pouvez compter sur mon zèle pour tout ce qui vous intéresse. Mais avant de vous quitter, je dois vous dire que Monsieur m'a chargé de faire savoir en France que l'intention du Roi était bien plus de pardonner que de punir, et que tous ceux de ses sujets qui reconnaîtraient leurs erreurs, et qui rentreraient dans leur devoir, il les recevrait comme un père reçoit ses enfants égarés, et empêcherait qu'il ne leur fut fait aucun mal. Il est facile de conclure de cette disposition de sa Majesté que, pour se conformer à ses intentions, il faut éviter, en faisant la guerre, de répandre le sang lorsqu'il n'est pas absolument nécessaire d'en répandre ; ne pas refuser quartier aux prisonniers qui se rendent ; et surtout, empêcher les vengeances particulières, et les assassinats qui ne sont pas dignes de la cause que nous défendons, et qui la déshonorent.”

“ Charette : ‘ Je ne demande qu'à épargner le sang ; et dans ces derniers temps j'ai fait quelques centaines de prisonniers ; mais si on traite sans pitié mes soldats, lorsqu'ils en tombera quelques-uns entre les mains de l'ennemi, il faudra bien que j'use de représailles.’ ”

“ Quant aux assassinats, je les empêche tant que je puis, et je fais punir ceux qui en commettent, quand je les connais ; mais il est une espèce d'hommes aux quels je ne puis obtenir que mes soldats fassent grâce, quand ils les rencontrent ; ce sont les habitants de la Vendée qui se sont retirés parmi les ennemis, qui les ont excités à porter le fer et la flamme chez nous, qui ont servi de guides aux républicains pour y pénétrer, et qui ont été les premiers à mettre le feu et à faire égorger leurs propres parents et leurs amis. Nous les désignons par le nom de *patauds*, et je vous l'avoue, je pense qu'ils ne méritent aucune pitié.”

“ Mon Général, on se répand toujours d'avoir fait du mal, et jamais d'avoir évité d'en faire. Je suis sûr que c'est d'après ce principe que vous agirez. Enfin, Général, veuillez bien me dire où les secours qu'on pourra vous envoyer, ou même *monsieur*, pourront aborder pour que vous puissiez sûrement s'en recevoir avec vos forces.”

“ Charette : ‘ À *St. Jean de Mont*, et depuis *St. Gilles jusqu'aux Sables d'Olonne*. J'ai porté six mille hommes vers cette côte, et je les y tiendrai constamment. Je vais le mander, et vous pouvez l'assurer.’ ”

“ Si vous aviez *St. Gilles même*, Général, ce serait bien plus commode pour venir à vous à cause du petit port qu'y forme la rivière de Vic.”

“ Charette : ‘ Quand j'aurai reçu de la poudre, je serai bientôt maître de *St. Gilles*, et de toute la côte.’ ”

“ Le secrétaire apporta les deux lettres qu'il avait écrites à *Milord Grenville* et à *M. Windham*. Je les lus, et j'avoue que je les trouvai fort différentes de ce que j'avais dit, et qu'elles me parurent insuffisantes. Je voulus engager le secrétaire à les refaire, mais il me dit qu'il n'y avait pas assez de temps. Je n'insistai plus, et me contentai d'engager à donner à M. Charette de la Colinière une instruction bien claire, et qui put le mettre à même de satisfaire les ministres surtout ce qu'ils lui demandaient. Le Général eut la bonté de me presser de rester pour causer encore avec lui ; mais je lui représentai la nécessité de mon retour à Nantes pour qu'on ne s'aperçût pas de mon absence, et le priai de me laisser partir. Il me fit donner des chevaux et trois cavaliers pour me conduire. Après avoir pris congé de lui, je montai sur des chevaux de *Brigands*, qui me conduisirent à Ruzé en trois heures,



quoique les quatre lieux qu'on y compte, en vailent plus de six. J'éprouvai que ces chevaux ne se sont arrêtés ni par les haies, ni par les fossés.

“J'arrivai chez *Madame Bascher* d'où j'étais parti. Je ne pus rentrer ce soir-là, parceque je ne pus faire avertir mon *batelier*, et qu'un *pêcheur* que je fis demander ne se trouva pas chez lui. Le lendemain 24, je fus mené à la pointe du jour chez un *meunier, bon Royaliste*, qui se chargeait de me faire rentrer à Nantes en me menant avec lui comme son garçon. Il m'habilla en conséquence, mais, en suite, ayant réfléchi que tous les meuniers qui entraient par le *pont Rousseau* étaient connus *du consigne*, il craignit qu'on connût que je n'étais pas du nombre, et qu'on m'arrêta, et il me pria d'attendre au soir. Je passai la journée chez lui, où il me traitait de son mieux. Quand il fut nuit, on me conduisit chez un *pêcheur*, qui me prit dans son bateau, me remonta la rivière en évitant les vaisseaux armés, et me déposa sur les quais au milieu de la ville à 11 heures du soir. Après avoir été tranquiliser Mademoiselle de Charette sur mon voyage, je me rendis chez moi avec la crainte que mon absence n'eût causé quelques suspicions; mais le Comte *de Butler*, avec sa présence d'esprit et son adresse ordinaire, avait trouvé des prétextes pour la couvrir aux yeux de notre hôte très républicain, et empêcher qu'elle ne fut connue de nos commissionnaires, que leur zèle avait porté à vouloir me voir plusieurs fois.

“J'observerai que, dans mon voyage, j'ai offert de l'argent à toutes les personnes que j'ai employées, et qu'aucune n'a voulu en accepter. Tous m'ont dit que je servais la cause du Roi, qu'elles remplissaient leur devoir en me secondant, et qu'elles seraient bien fâchées de recevoir de l'argent pour cela. Je m'occupai dès le lendemain 25, ainsi que le 26, à réaliser les lettres de crédit que j'avais sur la maison Babu, et à faire chercher de la poudre pour le Général Charette. Je trouvai quelques centaines de livres de poudre; mais je ne pus me procurer aucuns fonds sur mes lettres de crédit. La maison Babu, lorsque je les lui présentai, me répondit; *nous n'avons plus de commerce, nous n'avons plus de crédit au dehors, et, par conséquent, nous n'avons pas de payements à y faire. Nous n'avons donc pas besoin de fonds chez l'étranger. D'ailleurs, quand nous voudrions vous faire dix mille livres sterling, en numéraire, la chose nous serait impossible.* Ce fut aussi à-peu-près la même réponse que je reçus de toutes les personnes auxquelles je m'adressai pour le même objet, et je me suis adressé à tous les négociants, ou capitalistes de Nantes aux-quels on supposait du numéraire.

“Le 27 au matin, après avoir réfléchi et délibéré avec le Comte de Butler, je crus qu'il était à propos qu'au lieu de penser à rien faire d'ultérieur, et d'aller à Paris, je me rendisse en Angleterre. Mon opinion fut déterminée en considérant :—

1. “La malheureuse affaire de Quiberon du 21 dont je venais d'avoir connaissance. Les suites qu'elle pouvait avoir, et les nouvelles mesures qu'elle devait forcer de prendre.

2. “La position de M. Charette, et le besoin urgent de secours, dans lequel il se trouvait.

3. “La crainte que l'envoyé de ce Général eut rencontré quelque obstacle qui l'eût empêché d'arriver en Angleterre.

4. “L'espérance que le rapport de ce que j'avais vu et observé, pourrait déterminer le Ministère Anglais à prendre un parti utile, et même nécessaire dans la circonstance.

5. "La nécessité de faire connaître sans délai à *Monsieur* le véritable état des choses en France, le parti qu'on en pouvait tirer en ne perdant pas de temps, afin que ce Prince fut à même agir, ou faire agir, comme il le croirait à propos.

6. "La difficulté de sortir de Nantes et de me rendre à Paris, les Chouans ne laissant aucune route libre, et arrêtant, ou tuant, tout ce qu'ils rencontrent de voyageurs; en faisant usage des moyens que j'avais de passer parmi eux, j'étais sûr de devenir suspect, parcequ'ils n'accordent cette liberté à personne.

7. "La persuasion qu'il n'y avait rien d'utile à faire à Paris en ce moment, où les *meneurs* se voyant avoir des avantages de tous côtés, seraient moins affecté de craintes personnelles, et par conséquent, peu disposés à se prêter à mes vues.

8. "Et enfin, la nécessité d'employer tout ce que j'avais d'argent à acheter de la poudre pour le Général Charette, puisque je ne pouvais pas tirer parti de mes lettres de crédit, ce qui m'était tout moyen ultérieur de voyager.

"J'espérai donc que le Roi et *Monsieur* approuveraient mon retour en Angleterre, lorsque je leur aurais rendu compte des raisons qui m'avaient déterminé.

"J'écrivis à M. de Charette la lettre ci-jointe No. I, et Souriceau partit le soir-même pour la lui porter. Le même jour 27, nous dinâmes, le Comte de Butler et moi, chez un officier municipal. A force de vanter la beauté de l'aspect des campagnes qu'environnent Nantes, nous le portâmes à nous donner une permission pour entrer et sortir librement par toutes les portes, et cela pendant dix jours. C'est une faveur et une marque de confiance qui n'est accordée à aucun habitant. Nous profitâmes de cette permission dès le soir-même pour reconnaître les *fortifications* de la ville, et nous examinâmes très exactement celles qui sont depuis *le Cours* jusques aux *Capucins*, situés au bas de la ville, sur le bord de la Loire. Le 29, je sortis sur le soir avec le Comte de Butler pour examiner les fortifications qu'on a faites sur la *route de Paris*. On nous avait bien recommandé de ne pas nous éloigner, si nous ne voulions pas être pris par les Chouans; mais nous ne les croyons pas aux portes de la ville.

"A une portée de fusil de celle de Paris, pendant que nous regardions attentivement le terrain et observions comment on pourrait attaquer Nantes de ce côté, cinq hommes qui étaient couchés dans le grand chemin, se levèrent, montrèrent des armes, et nous demandèrent où nous allions. Nous leur dîmes que nous nous promenions, et que nous allions rentrer dans la ville. Alors ils nous assurèrent que ce ne serait pas de ce jour, ni peut-être de longtemps. Il ajoutèrent qu'ils étaient des Chouans, et qu'il fallait venir parler à leur capitaine. Nous leur observâmes, qu'étants étrangers, nous n'avions rien à de mêler dans les querelles des Français. Notre qualité d'étranger les fit persister dans la résolution de nous emmener, parceque, disaient-ils, nous fournissions des vivres à leur ennemi. Il fallu donc les suivre. Après quelques centaines de pas, ils nous firent quitter la grande route pour nous mener par des bois. Comme il est très certain que, parmi les Chouans, il en est beaucoup qui pour avoir la dépouille des gens qu'ils prennent, les fusillent sans les conduire à leurs chefs, nous jugeâmes devoir nous faire connaître, et leur dire qui nous étions, d'où nous venions, et ce que nous faisions; en leur observant que si nous ne rentrions pas dans Nantes le soir même, notre absence pouvait faire le plus grand tort aux affaires du Roi, et à eux-mêmes. Ils nous répondirent que cela pouvait être très vrai, et qu'alors nous serions amis; mais que leur capitaine en jugerait; et, qu'au reste, il ne nous serait fait aucun mal. En

marchant nous nous familiarisâmes, et nous étions assez bien ensemble. Lorsque nous arrivâmes, après avoir fait une lieue, à une maison de paysan, où nous devions trouver le *Capitaine Chouan* ; mais il n'y était pas venu, et avait fait dire qu'il ne viendrait pas. Alors nouvelle instance de notre part pour qu'on nous laisse rentrer dans la ville, et grand embarras de la part de nos Chouans ; les uns voulaient nous mettre en liberté, les autres nous garder, et quelques-uns nous mener à sept lieues de là où était leur quartier-général. Enfin ils se réunirent à la résolution de nous mener à une demie-lieue plus loin, chez quelqu'un en qui ils ont confiance, et qui déciderait de ce qu'il y avait à faire ; mais auparavant de partir, nos *arrêteurs* voulurent nous faire boire avec eux. Ils firent porter du vin, et nous bûmes tous à la santé du Roi, de Monseigneur Comte d'Artois, et des Royalistes. Nous voulûmes alors leur faire accepter quelques louis d'or, mais ils les refusèrent. Cependant, sur les instances du Comte de Butler, un d'eux reçut un louis, et les autres allaient peut-être en faire autant, lorsque des femmes qui étaient présentes, s'écrièrent que si nous étions des honnêtes gens et Royalistes, on devait nous rendre service sans nous faire payer ; que c'était infâme de recevoir notre argent, et qu'il fallait le rendre. Dès lors, nous ne pûmes en faire accepter ; et nous eumes beaucoup de peine à faire garder le louis reçu, encore ne fut-ce qu'en disant de l'employer pour acheter de la poudre.

« Enfin, en exécution de l'arrêté du conseil, nous fûmes conduits chez *M. Le Mane*, homme bien né, et très bien pensant. Quoique nous n'eussions sur nous rien pour nous faire reconnaître, comme j'étais en rapport à Nantes avec quelques amis et parents de M. le Mane, en lui racontant plusieurs particularités, je lui eus bientôt inspiré de la confiance. Il assura donc nos Chouans, dont la troupe s'était grossie chez lui, que nous étions des Royalistes venus en France pour leur préparer des secours, et qu'il était important qu'ils nous fissent rentrer tout de suite à Nantes. Ils résolurent donc, en buvant encore à la santé du Roi, de nous faire conduire, et même escorter, parceque, dirent-ils, nous pourrions tomber entre les mains de quelques-uns d'entre eux qui nous feraient peut-être une mauvais parti. Du moment que nous fûmes reconnus, les Chouans nous témoignèrent beaucoup de la confiance, et ils nous auraient obéi en tout ce que nous aurions voulu. Ils nous témoignèrent le plus grand désir du rétablissement du Roi, et d'avoir un Prince de son sang à leur tête. Nous partîmes avec 4 hommes, que nous fîmes beaucoup causer en chemin, et dont nous tirâmes quelques renseignements. Nous remarquâmes avec plaisir que lorsqu'ils entendaient quelqu'un, et qu'ils criaient *qui vive*, on répondait sans hésiter '*Royaliste*,' même dans les endroits où l'on pouvait rencontrer des patrouilles républicaines. Nos conducteurs nous firent aboutir chez un blanchisseur qui loge sur le bord d'une petite rivière à 150 toises du poste de la porte de Paris. Ils lui demandèrent de nous prendre dans son bateau et de nous entrer dans la ville ; mais il s'y refusa, parcequ'il lui aurait fallu passer le long d'une chaloupe canonnière et du porte. Il nous donna un lit, et le lendemain 30, il nous passa la rivière un peu loin, et nous indicat des chemins détournés par lesquels nous rentrâmes à Nantes sans difficulté.

« Nos hôtes avaient été fort étonnés et inquiets de nous voir absenter une nuit, sans les avoir avertir. Mais nous leur fîmes un conte tel que nous voulûmes, et ils nous en crurent.

« Le 31, je reçus la réponse du Général Charette : et comme elle ne remplissait pas mon objet, je me déterminai à lui récrire. Le 1 d'Août, je fis partir Souriceau pour lui porter ma lettre No. 2. Le même jour

1 Août, je parvins à trouver *M. le Comte de Bruc d'Ivignac*; et je le vis ainsi que Madame de Bruc, chez Madame la Comtesse de Kerambar. *M. le Comte de Bruc* est un veillard qui a la moitié du visage rongé par un cancer, qui le fait cruellement souffrir; mais si son corps est affaibli, son âme a conservé toute sa force. Il est très religieux, extrêmement zélé pour le service du Roi. Il m'assura qu'il ferait pour l'objet dont j'étais chargé tout ce qui dépendrait de lui, et que pour ce qu'il ne pouvait pas faire lui-même, à raison de son état, il me donnerait un homme en qui je pouvais prendre toute confiance.

"Madame de Bruc est une femme très courageuse, et dont le zèle égale celui de son mari. Elle a été longtemps en prison, et n'en a pas été intimidée pour la suite. Elle a depuis assisté tous les prisonniers suspects, et en a fait sauver plusieurs. Elle avait, dans les derniers jours de mon séjour à Nantes, pris des moyens pour faire sauver *M. de Belle-vue*, un chef des Chouans mis en arrestation en même temps que *M. Cormatin* et les autres ont été arrêtés à Rennes, mais au moment de l'exécution, *M. de Belle-vue* s'est refusé à sortir de prison, et a préféré, je ne sais pas pourquoi, d'être jugé; comme il l'a annoncé dans une lettre que j'ai lue, adressée à Madame de Bruc. Cette dame m'a rendu tous les services qu'elle a pu. Elle a un fils de dix-huit ans, qui est avec les Chouans, aide-de-camp de *M. le Veneur*. J'ai promis à la mère, sur sa demande, de demander les bontés de *Monsieur* pour le jeune homme.

"Le soir du même jour, je trouvai chez *M. de Comte de Bruc* l'homme de confiance qu'il m'avait promis. C'est un fermier à son aise, nommé *Buron*, qui s'est retiré à Nantes. J'ai vu en lui un loyal homme, entièrement dévoué au Roi, et aux honnêtes gens, zélé, courageux, et sous un extérieur froid, très actif et capable. Depuis que je l'ai connu, jusqu'à mon départ, il s'est donné beaucoup de peine pour me faire placer mes lettres de crédit, et pour trouver de la poudre; mais il n'a pas été plus heureux que moi dans le premier objet. Voyant qu'il y avait impossibilité de me faire avoir des fonds, il m'a donné 200 marcs d'argenterie, sur ma parole d'en compter la value en Angleterre à un émigré de ses amis. Aussitôt que j'eus cette argenterie, je la remis, avec les 400 louis que j'avais porté de Londrès, à Mademoiselle de Charette sur son reçu, pour qu'elle fit payer la poudre achetée, mais nous n'en avons eu que bien peu, car comme c'est celle de la République qu'on nous a vendue, et que ceux qui la vendent s'exposent beaucoup, ils le font payer très cher; 8" la livre, en argent.

"*Buron* m'a dit qu'il devait toucher de l'argent peu de jours après mon départ, et m'a promis de le faire passer tout au Général Charette, ou de l'employer suivant ses ordres. Il m'a assuré aussi qu'il se procurerait six mille livres de poudre dès l'arrivée d'une personne qu'il attendait tous les jours à Nantes. Je l'ai abouché avec Souriceau, afin qu'ils prennent de concert les moyens et d'acheter des poudres, et de les faire tenir au Général. Ces deux hommes précieux sont fait pour travailler ensemble, et s'entendent parfaitement, parcequ'ils sont, tous les deux, pleins d'honneur, et du même zèle pour le service du Roi.

"J'autorisai *Buron* à tirer sur moi à Londrès des lettres de changes pour toutes les sommes qu'il fournirait au Général Charette, ou pour lui; et je promis de les acquitter, espérant que les Ministres de sa Majesté Britannique, d'après les intentions qu'ils m'ont manifestées lors de mon départ, voudront bien me mettre à même de remplir mes engagements à cet égard.

"Le 3, Madame la Comtesse de Bruc m'apprit que *Le Veneur* était l'agent-général des Généraux Sapineau et Stofflet, ainsi que de tous les chefs des Chouans, pour la correspondance; qu'il était à l'instant dans un château à 4 lieues de Nantes, où elle correspondait avec lui, et où

elle devait dans peu de jours, envoyer un cheval à son fils. Cette dame en me parlant de la manière dont étaient les chefs entr'eux, m'engageait à écrire à M. Le Veneur. Je trouvai les raisons qu'elle m'en donna déterminantes ; j'écrivis sur le champ la lettre No. 3, et elle se chargea de la faire parvenir le 7.

“ Le 5 au soir, je reçus la réponse du Général Charette, et un pouvoir d'agir en son nom ; l'un et l'autre datés du 4.

“ Souriceau ne l'avait pas trouvé à Belleville, et avait été obligé de le suivre à l'armée du Centre, où il s'était porté pour conférer avec Messieurs de Sapineau, de Stofflet et autres. C'est de là qu'il m'a écrit. Lorsque Souriceau fut au moment de repartir pour m'apporter les dépeches de M. Charette, le Général qui, à ce que je vois, n'aime pas à écrire, le chargea de me dire qu'il était très content de son entrevue avec les chefs de l'armée, et que tout allait bien.

“ Il est si nécessaire pour l'intérêt du Roi que Monsieur s'ait parfaitement instruit de tout ce qui peut influer sur ses déterminations, que je crois devoir tout dire sur les hommes comme sur les choses ; et c'est ce qui m'engage à placer ici ce que j'ai observé du Général Charette. M. de Charette est un jeune homme de 35 ans ou environ, d'une figure agréable, d'un maintien aisé et très décent. C'est *l'honneur, la loyauté* et la *bravoure* personnifiées. C'est vraiment un *preux*. Je ne lui ai pas aperçu beaucoup de connaissances acquises, et il ne m'a pas paru très propre à embrasser les détails des grandes affaires. Il parle de la guerre même plus en partisan qu'en Général. Cependant comme avec très peu de moyens, il a fait de grandes choses, des choses vraiment étonnantes ; qu'il a su se faire obéir, aimer, et craindre ; qu'il a su organiser et, en quelque façon, discipliner une armée qu'il ne pouvait payer, et qu'il a acquit la confiance tant de cette armée, que des habitants des provinces voisines, qui le regardent comme invincible, il a certainement de grands talents, et peut être infiniment utile. Cependant, comme il n'a pas commandé d'armée régulière, et qu'une grande partie de ses succès peut être due à la connaissance parfaite que lui et ses officiers ont du local où s'est fait la guerre, il peut devenir nécessaire qu'il soit aidé dans bien des circonstances. Pour y parvenir sans inconvénient, il est à propos de lui donner quelques personnes qui aux connaissances nécessaires joignent assez de liant et d'adresse, pour le diriger sans qu'il s'en aperçoive, ensorte qu'il croye n'agir que d'après ses propres idées, lorsqu'il n'agira le plus souvent que d'après celles d'autrui. J'ai vu au travers de la modestie qu'il montre, qu'il sentait le prix de ce qu'il a fait, et le compte qu'on doit lui en tenir ; j'ai vu qu'il verrait avec peine, et supporterait difficilement, qu'on lui donna quelque supérieur autre qu'un Prince, et que même on prétendit le diriger.

“ Lorsque j'ai vu ce Général, je n'ai distingué que M.M. de la Roberie, deux frères de l'infortuné jeune homme qui a péri au printemps dernier en retournant à la Vendée. L'un de ces Messieurs est commandant de toute la cavalerie, et l'autre est chef de division. Il m'a paru que le Général avait beaucoup de confiance en eux, et que les soldats en font le plus grand cas.

“ Ayant fini le 5, tout [ce] qu'il m'importait de finir à Nantes, j'en partis le 6, à dix heures du soir, dans un bateau pour aller rejoindre mon sloop que j'avais fait descendre à quatre lieues au dessous pour n'être pas retardé. Avant de partir, je fus présenter mes hommages à Mademoiselle de Charette, et je remis 10 louis à Souriceau pour le dédommager du temps que je lui avais pris, et des dépenses qu'il avait faites, tant pour des voyages que je lui avait fait faire, que pour le chirurgien qu'il était obligé d'employer, parceque ses courses brusques à cheval l'avaient grièvement blessé.

“ En prenant congé du Comte de Bruc, le respectable viellard me dit, les larmes aux yeux, *je ne désire de vivre qu'assez de temps pour voir le Roi rétabli sur son trône ; présentez, mon cher Baron, à Monsieur, mon profond respect, ma fidélité, et mon dévouement.* Je le lui promis, mais j'eus bien de la peine à m'exprimer, tant j'étais émue. Il était temps que nous quittions la ville, car il y avait peut-être plus de 100 personnes qui savaient qui nous étions, et pourquoi nous étions venus. M. de Charette m'avait fait dîner avec un grand nombre de ses officiers qui ont leurs parents et leurs amis à Nantes, et y avait mandé ma venue, mon nom, et le sujet de mon voyage. Les Chouans qui nous avaient pris, et à qui il avait fallu nous faire connaître, en avaient fait part à leurs amis, et ceux-ci à d'autres. Je partis de Nantes avec la plus vive impatience d'arriver promptement en Angleterre, où j'espérais trouver *Monsieur* ; mais il n'a pas plu à la Providence d'accomplir mes désirs. J'ai constamment eu des calmes et des vents contraires ; en sorte qu'il m'a fallu vingt jours pour faire une traversée qui en du ne durer que quatre ou cinq.”

*French.*

FRANCIS DRAKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret and Confidential.

1795, August 28, Genoa.—“ It was with no small degree of mortification that I gave your Lordship in my last despatch, No. 19, so unfavourable a statement of the situation of affairs in this country, and I regret that I must again repeat that, from the best combination of circumstances which I have been enabled to form, it appears to me but too evident that no further progress will be made by the Austrian army in the Riviera of Genoa during this campaign. General De Vins himself told me in one of his late letters *que la position que l'ennemi a prise sur les montagnes du Cap de St. Spirito est presque inattaquable ; je dis presque, car si je pouvois espérer qu'en le chassant d'ici la besogne sera faite, j'y réussirai encore ; mais en le chassant de la position présente, je ne gagnerois autre chose que de leur voir prendre une autre sur les montagnes derrière Albenga, tout aussi forte que la présente ; et pour arriver jusqu'à la Comté de Nice, ils auront encore trois ou quatre positions l'une plus forte que l'autre. Il faut donc faire quelques autres combinaisons, et attendre quelque chose des événemens.* This letter, which I quote in the General's own words, could not but give rise to suspicions that there was not at least that degree of activity in the Austrian operations which might be wished, and those suspicions have been since corroborated by what I saw and heard during my late residence at Vado.

“ In my conferences with the General, I frequently took occasion to express my regret that an army of at least forty thousand men, including Austrians and Piedmontese, should have gained so little on an enemy of certainly not more than half that number, weakened by desertion and sickness, disgusted by the want of a sufficiency of provisions and clothing, and dispirited by their first defeat. To these observations the constant answer was that the positions which the enemy had taken on the mountains were so strong as to render the superiority of numbers of little avail ; that the only point where they were attackable was on his right on the side of Ormea, for until Ormea fell, he could not advance without exposing his right flank ; that he had frequently sent orders to Monsieur de Colli, who commands in that district, to attack, but these orders were never obeyed.

“ On this language of the General I have the honour to observe to your Lordship that, in admitting the General's assertion with respect

to Ormea to be just, as it undoubtedly is, the question naturally arises, why the General has continued Monsieur de Colli in the command, after such a refusal of obedience to the orders of his superior officer. For your Lordship has already been informed that the King of Sardinia has placed Monsieur de Colli entirely under General De Vins's command. When I touched upon this to the General he endeavoured to explain it away by asserting that he would long since have removed Monsieur de Colli if he could have found a proper person to replace him. I confess that this explanation itself convinces me that the whole is nothing less than a pretext for the General's inactivity, for it is absurd to suppose that the whole Austrian army does not furnish *one single* General capable (not of forming a plan of operation for himself, but) of executing a plan traced out to him by General De Vins. I must also add that, as the taking of Ormea is of such great importance, there is no reason whatever why General De Vins should not have directed that operation in person, since his presence is not certainly more necessary at Vado than at any other point of his line.

"I beg to be understood that I do not mean to throw any share of this blame on General De Vins. I am fully persuaded that that officer's natural disposition, his inordinate ambition, his great love of military fame, and his desire to distinguish himself, would lead him to active operations; and I believe that he only follows the line of conduct which has been traced out for him by the Cabinet of Vienna; and the general principle of this line of conduct is, I believe, not to risk on any account the loss of men. I have been informed that Monsieur Thugut asserts that the General has *carte blanche* to act as he pleases; but though this information comes from very good authority, I think it my duty to state to your Lordship my firm belief that this is not the case, and that the General acts purely in obedience to the orders which he, from time to time, receives from Vienna. I wish to be as explicit and as clear as possible in what I now assert, for reasons which I have already mentioned to Mr. Wickham, and which doubtless, ere this, will have come under your Lordship's eye. It has been too long the system to bandy us backward and forward from the Austrian General to the Court of Vienna, and from the Court of Vienna to the Austrian General; and it ought therefore clearly to be understood that the Court of Vienna *alone* is and must be accountable for the inactivity of its Generals, and that it is there and from thence only that we are to require and look for a better system.

"I have already had the honour to state to your Lordship my fears that the Court of Vienna does not consider the re-conquest of Nice for the King of Sardinia as an object of sufficient importance for it to risk the weakening of its army, and, therefore, is not inclined to make any efforts on this side further than such as will tend to secure the Milanese. As this latter object is now attained, I am apprehensive that the Austrian army in this country will remain in its present situation during the remainder of the campaign. Monsieur Thugut, indeed, holds a different language at Vienna, and says, with a certain degree of assurance, that the Austrian army will be soon at Nice. Upon this point it may not be amiss to mention to your Lordship that Monsieur Thugut held out assurances, of the nature I have just alluded to, to the Sardinian minister at Vienna, at the very time that he wrote a letter to General De Vins to express a *hope that the General would be able to maintain his present position during the ensuing winter*. The first of these two circumstances I learnt from the Marquis de Marsan, a Piedmontese officer in the confidence of the King of Sardinia; and the latter from General De Vins himself. Your Lordship will be best enabled to judge

if the conclusion to be drawn from the comparison of them anyways impeaches the good faith of Monsieur Thugut.

"As I did not wish to leave any means untried of prevailing on General De Vins to advance, I thought it necessary to impart to him in confidence the substance of the instructions which I had given to the emissaries whom I have sent into Provence; and I did not fail to place in the most conspicuous light the advantages which might be drawn from a proper concert and co-operation between the Austrian army and these persons. The General, however, treated the plan with a sort of ridicule, asserting that no dependence whatever could be placed on the well-disposed persons in the interior of France, and, consequently, that all plans of operation framed on such a basis must fail of success. I observed to him that the plan in question did not deserve to be treated lightly, because, taking it at the worst, it could not produce any *bad* consequences, and it *might* produce many *good* ones. There was no necessity to place an implicit reliance on any eventual active measures of those well-disposed persons in Provence, nor did I myself ever entertain any hope that the Provençals could be brought to break with the Convention until they saw the means of doing it securely under the influence of an Austrian army on the Var; but, if by their machinations any impediments could be thrown in the way of the Convention, either by preventing the levy of the requisitions of men or grain, or by disorganising the Conventional troops, one great point would be gained; and this point I had reason to hope from the abilities and talents of the persons I had employed, might be effected. This language, however, drew nothing from the general further than a sort of assurance that he might possibly endeavour to form a second Vendée in Provence by disembarking on the coasts of that country a certain Monsieur Bonnot and a company of French emigrants. I do not know this Monsieur Bonnot, but I understand that he is a man of abilities, and that his company, which consists of about 200 men, are very warmly attached to him. Should the general carry this idea into execution, I can foresee no other effect from this partial and isolated scheme than the destruction of Monsieur Bonnot and his corps, and a subsequent dejection of all the well-disposed party in Provence.

"The next means of attack which I adverted to in my conversations with the General was that of landing in the rear of the French army, whilst simultaneous attacks were made on every other point of the enemy's position. I stated to the General the great importance and advantage of contracting his front by advancing towards Ventimiglia; and I assured him that I was authorised by Admiral Hotham to declare that no interruption should be given by the Toulon fleet to any debarkation he might choose to make; and I was convinced that Captain Nelson, with the *Agamemnon* and the ten ships under his command, would give him every assistance in this operation. As I firmly believe that this is now the only plan which the general can be brought to accede to, I urged him to the adoption of it by every argument which the subject suggested to me. The general appeared but very lukewarm. I pressed it, however, with all the force I could, stating to him at the same time that a speedy decision was necessary, as, after the month of September, the season for executing the maritime part of the plan would be at an end. The general at length promised that he would give the plan a due consideration, that he would set out that evening to examine the situation of the enemy's line, and that, upon his return, he would concert with Captain Nelson the necessary measures for the execution of it, if he should think it practicable. These assurances were given in so cold



a manner that I do not place much reliance upon them ; and it is very possible that, if any plan of operations should be the result of the general's journey, it will be such a one as will be wholly inexecutable, and formed purposely with a view to getting rid of the question altogether.

"Though I have stated it as my firm persuasion that the system of the Austrian Cabinet in this country is *now* a *defensive* one, I do not mean to be understood that the Austrian army will in no possible case act *offensively*. Should any favourable occasion occur of attacking the enemy with a prospect of a great advantage, and without the risk of much loss, General De Vins will undoubtedly avail himself of it ; but this makes a part of every system of defensive operations, and this exception does not entitle General De Vins's plan of campaign to be regarded as an offensive one. Two months have already been lost in perfect inactivity, and whilst the General is waiting for this favourable occasion the season for military operations is advancing towards it's conclusion. Great stress has been hitherto and is still laid upon the system of starving the French army, but that system has not succeeded, and the late pacification between Spain and France renders its final success at least very dubious if not wholly impossible. When I first had the honour to state to your Lordship, in my correspondence of last year, the importance of the position of Vado Bay for effecting this purpose, it was at a time when the French had no naval force in the Mediterranean. But since that period magazines have been formed at Toulon and Marseilles, from which the French army is now supplied without it's being possible for us to prevent it. I have stated these circumstances to General De Vins, and I have endeavoured to convince him that, however well founded this hopes of forcing the enemy to abandon the Riviera from a want of provisions might have been when he first took possession of Vado, these hopes will become perfectly illusive in a very short time, for, by the late pacification, the French will have access to the ports of Spain. They will consequently be enabled to bring corn from Africa along the coast of Spain to Marseilles, and other ports of their coast, without its being possible for our ships to intercept it, particularly during the autumn and winter months ; and there is no doubt but that they will also draw grain from Sicily, Sardinia, and other countries, through the merchants of Barcelona, who must henceforward be considered in the light of any other neutral merchants. If then the enemy can form magazines anywhere upon the coast of Provence, there is no doubt but their army will be supplied with bread in spite of all our exertions to prevent it, though probably with some additional trouble and expence to them. That the General still flatters himself with these hopes is clearly apparent from the orders he has just issued to his cruisers to *seize* all vessels *actually* bound to Spain with corn ; orders which, in my opinion, are extremely imprudent, because they must naturally give great offence to the Court of Madrid without producing any advantage whatever to the cause ; for I have already mentioned that the French armies will in future draw their supplies from the *westward* and not from the *eastward*. When the General mentioned these orders to me, he appeared very desirous that his Majesty's ships should act upon a similar system, and should not confine themselves merely to detaining ships which were bound for France under pretence of being bound for Spain. I observed to him that this was so strong a measure, and involved in itself so many considerations of the most important nature, that I could not take upon me to advise Captain Nelson to adopt it ; but that a question of such magnitude,

must necessarily be referred to the consideration of his Majesty's Ministers at home, who alone were competent to decide upon it. It may be here proper to acquaint your Lordship that I have mentioned this matter to Captain Nelson, and I have strongly advised him to take as much care as possible not to give any just cause of offence to the Court of Madrid, in the execution of the service in which he is now employed.

"Having now gone through the several topics of my conferences with General De Vins, nothing remains for me to add but to assure your Lordship that I shall return to Vado to renew my instances if I should see the smallest likelihood of their being attended with success; and I shall take the same care as I hitherto have done to keep the General in good humour. I again beg leave to repeat that I consider the General as wholly blameless in this business. I have not the least doubt but he acts in implicit obedience to the orders of his Court, and, if there is any insincerity in his language and assurances, it must be attributed to the same cause. I shall send a copy of this despatch to Sir Morton Eden, and I have no doubt but that Minister will, with his usual ability, endeavour to bring the Court of Vienna to a more vigorous and a more active system of operation.

"In my last conference with General De Vins I touched lightly upon the project which I had the honour to lay before your Lordship in my dispatch No. 5; but, as I perceived that he held it in the same cheapness in which he generally holds all projects of which French Royalists make a part, I dropped the subject. I am convinced that this project would fail of its effect unless it should previously obtain the full sanction and concurrence of the Court of Vienna.

"We have had here for some months past the Prince Augustus of AreMBERG (more commonly known by the name of Count la Mark) who came hither with the ostensible view of going to the Spanish army in Roussillon. He deferred his departure for Barcelona under various pretexts till the late pacification; he is in correspondence with Monsieur Thugut, and I am afraid he does the common cause no service with that Minister, as he is very much inclined to a pacification between Austria and France, and as he probably writes in that strain to Vienna. The private and personal object the Prince has in view is, I believe, the regaining possession of his estates in France. He has been very assiduous in his advances towards me, but as I knew him formerly to be an intriguer of the first class, and as I positively know that he sees in secret the French Consul Lacheze, I have treated him with civility but without the smallest degree of confidence."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 28, Wimbledcn.—"It may be procrastinated by circumstances a little longer or a little shorter time, but it is perfectly clear that if Hanover is neuter (which it certainly is) we cannot on any pretence be justifiable in keeping up an idle army of thirty thousand men in Hanover. Half the sum might perhaps induce the Empress of Russia to give us fifteen or twenty thousand land forces to join her fleet under our command. With such a force we could reconquer Holland, in place of treating about it when peace comes. If set about immediately, perhaps there is still time to get them round before the Baltic is shut up. It would be a noble stroke, and, in conjunction with St. Domingo, give us everything either for peace or war we could wish."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 28, Winchester.—“I have been requested by the Duc de Serrant to make him known to you; he will be in town tomorrow, being charged by Monsieur to say all he feels of his obligations to you, and of his desire to be guided by your wishes in everything. This I was likewise directed to urge to you by Monsieur, with a great deal of what I really have neither time nor spirits to write. But as Monsieur de Serrant has much to say, I would not delay writing to you and recommending him as a very well-disposed man, much in Monsieur’s confidence, and very capable of guiding him right.”

## W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 29, Walmer Castle.—“I received your letter this morning, and agree most clearly with you that it is worth risking money (I should say *more* than a little) to take the chance stated by your German correspondent. I think too that although we cannot undertake positively for anything in the French King’s name, we might at least offer an asylum here and large rewards to any of the members of the Convention who would take the steps requisite for giving success to the plan. Perhaps we might also engage that we would make it a condition of our future co-operation with the French King, that he should, in case of success, make such provision for the security of the persons concerned, and give such rewards in France as the occasion may require.

“It may be doubted whether more ought to be desired in the first instance, than prevailing on the primary assemblies to negative the proceedings required under the new Constitution; and whether it may not be best (if the plan succeeds) to defer any direct attempt for Royalty till the Convention have felt the embarrassment of the disappointment of their present project. The making provision for the Duc d’Angouleme is not without inconvenience, but it cannot be avoided, and he must, I conceive, be taken off Lord Moira’s hands, and sent to some palace. If Hampton Court can receive him in addition to the Statholder, it would be the best place.”

## LORD AUCKLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 30, Eden Farm, Bromley.—“The Princes and Princess of Orange are at this place. Their political prospects are at least gloomy. But I hope I am mistaken when I incline to fear that the continent of Europe must soon be left to its fate, and to the result of events which we can neither foresee, nor prevent, nor produce. To the many who, like me, are uninformed, it is become very doubtful whether the great expenses now incurring in Germany tend to purposes likely to compensate for their inconvenience.”

## W. WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 6, Mulheim.—“I have the honour to forward to your Lordship several very important dispatches from Mr. Trevor, Mr. Drake, and Mr. Jackson, together with the copy of one that I have received from Sir Morton Eden in answer to mine of the 12th August. Your Lordship will learn from them, that all hope of any co-operation with the Royalists, or of any effective assistance (other than a diversion) being given to them is now entirely out of the question.

"As to a diversion (though I hope I am mistaken in my opinion) I do not scruple to say, that I am myself persuaded it will not take effect at all.

"I repeat to your Lordship that I do not believe that the Austrians will dare to attempt the passage of the Rhine in face of the force that is now assembled against them, though I am far from believing it to be as formidable as it is represented.

"It appears from Sir Morton Eden's dispatch of the 22nd, that the Court of Vienna had even then taken the alarm on account of the reinforcements that were assembling in Upper Alsace, the intelligence of which, to have reached Vienna at that time, must necessarily have left this side of the country so early as the 15th or 16th. Now at that date I can venture to say that no reinforcements of any real consequence had arrived there. From the 20th to the present day, troops, artillery, and ammunition have been arriving daily, and the enemy has been incessantly employed in fortifying every point and post that they consider as likely to be the object of an attack; so that, if the reports of their generals gave reason for alarm when there was so little occasion for it, what have we to expect now when the situation of the enemy is really such as to require not only a superior force, but great military talents, and the most determined exertion, before one can hope to make an impression upon it.

"When I passed through Basle there were 40 pieces of cannon before their camp at *Hasinguen*, which had been stationed there for some days with the horses constantly harnessed night and day.

"They are adding to the strength of that position every day, and are fortifying all the gorges of the hills on the side of Porentrui, that flank the road leading to the camp.

"They are taking positions and entrenching themselves in several parts of the forest of Hoetz and are tracing lines and camps upon the hill. In short, they seem to leave nothing undone that may tend, if not to render the passage impracticable, at least to make the Austrians believe that it will be so.

"On this side after every public, I might say ostentatious, demonstration of an immediate and powerful attack, I find that the heavy artillery, without which the passage cannot be attempted, will not arrive in less than ten days at the soonest. Before that time the enemy will, in all probability, have really made such preparations that the attempt must be abandoned in good earnest.

"With respect to the passage by the territory of Basle, which I find Colonel Craufurd has recommended as a last resource, I am almost certain that the Court of Vienna will not venture to attempt it.

"For my own part, I am satisfied that it is now too late to think of such a thing; the political reasons your Lordship will find detailed in my dispatch, but I consider the enterprise itself as by no means an easy one.

"From the conversation I had with the Austrian Generals here, I am persuaded not only that that point had never been considered by them, but that they knew nothing at all of the country, and that they had imagined the passage to be over plain ground.

"They seem to have forgotten that the gorges of Porentrui, by which the passage was heretofore effected, are now occupied by the enemy, and that the only road by which they can march passes directly under the ramparts of Basle, and within reach of the enemy's batteries on the hills opposite to the town. Add to this, that they could only march in one column which, supposing it to pass safe through this defile, will, on

coming out of it, find itself exposed immediately to the fire of both Huningen and the camp of Hasinguen under which it must form.

"I don't by any means intend to say that this is not a position that may be forced, but it certainly presents many more difficulties than they were originally aware of; and I don't doubt, when they come to examine them, that they will magnify the danger in proportion to the surprise it will occasion, and another messenger will be sent to Vienna with new representations of the difficulties; but I repeat to your Lordship that I do not believe the Court of Vienna will dare to attempt it, and I rather think they are right, for, in case of a defeat, or even a check, the enemy will not scruple to follow them by the same road; and even should the Austrians be successful, I have no doubt, as soon as the snows fall, that the French would make a powerful diversion by passing through Switzerland into Swabia with a large force drawn from their southern armies.

"I shall wait upon the Austrian Generals to-morrow at Fribourg, in consequence of an invitation from General Bellegarde, when (as nothing can be expected on the side of Franche Compté) I shall submit to their consideration the passage lower down, where, I understand, it is infinitely more practicable, and where alone it can be effected by surprise.

"I mean below Fort Louis. I shall, however, only suggest this plan in case I find them undetermined to pass higher up.

"This is but a melancholy account I have to convey to your Lordship, and but ill-calculated to encourage one to persevere in any attempt to support the Royalists in the interior of the Kingdom.

"However, after the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's dispatches, and the information you have been pleased to give me of his Majesty's intention with respect to the coast of France, I do not think myself by any means at liberty to suspend the execution of the measure that has been previously taken. I have therefore, in furtherance of the execution of those instructions, placed the sum of 10,000*l.* at the disposition of MM. La Tour, Imbert, Columbez and Jessonel. A part of it has already passed to Lyons.

"I send your Lordship enclosed a receipt for that sum which I have drawn for upon Messrs. Bethman and Company. Some arms and powder have been purchased, and are now safe within the frontiers, but in no great quantity.

"Three thousand pounds are sent to Lyons, and the rest is to be distributed at Bourg en Busse, Macon, and Mont Brison, and is mostly in the hands of the priests.

"No more is wanted at present, and I shall keep a cautious hand upon any further expenditure. The 30,000*l.* left at my disposal will, I should hope, cover everything. M. Imbert, who may be most entirely depended on, has engaged that no money at all shall be wanted at Lyons after they shall have once declared themselves. How soon that moment will arrive it is impossible for me to say. It can only be determined by circumstances that no human prudence can foresee.

"A decided success in the Vendée appears at this moment the only event that is likely to make such a measure advisable, unless the coalition should become general throughout the whole of this side of the country, an event that would seem to me far from improbable, and which, I think, would certainly take place if the armies were not in the way. . .

"I returned here at the particular request of Colonel Craufurd and the Prince of Condé. His Serene Highness seems to entertain a hope that I shall be able to have some influence upon the operations of the Austrian Generals, in which I fear he will be entirely disappointed.

"I found him very low-spirited at the present situation of things, and it has not been in my power to give him any consolation. I have, however, carefully concealed from him the contents of Sir Morton Eden's dispatch.

"Deserters arrive here constantly but in small numbers; the difficulty of passing the Rhine being almost insurmountable for them."

"I found Colonel Craufurd absent, and shall remain here till his return.

"The army on the other side has accepted the new constitution, but without any particular mark of satisfaction. We wait with great impatience for the result of the first meeting of the primary assemblies.

"It is clear that the Convention is apprehensive of the consequence. I have not information enough to enable me to form any conjecture.

"From what Mr. Trevor communicated to me I presume that the Prince of Condé must have been mistaken when he informed me that the King had desired his manifest to be published here, without communicating it to Colonel Craufurd or myself. I therefore asked his Serene Highness to explain that matter to me. He said that the order to him was peremptory to publish it without suffering any communication to be made to anybody, and that he had construed this to relate to Colonel Craufurd and myself; whereas he had since reason to believe that it was meant to be confined to the Austrian Generals. He repeated to me, however, in confidence that he had very strong assurances from Verona, by the same conveyance, of the suspicions entertained there of the intentions of the British Government."

*Copy.*

#### W. WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 7, Fribourg.—"I have just left General Bellegarde, with whom I have had a conversation of some hours. The difficulties of every kind are still greater than I had expected; but he assures me that *their orders* are positive, and that they are determined to put them in execution should the passage cost them ten thousand men. The reports of the engineers as to the difficulty of passing anywhere between Basle and Strasburg are extremely unfavourable. They have sent another officer to reconnoitre the whole course of the river a second time, and General Bellegarde told me that, if his report was as unfavourable as the others had been, they should turn their attention very seriously to the passage by Switzerland.

"I asked him whether they had considered the difficulties of such an enterprise, physical as well as political. He answered that they had, and that a very competent person was at this moment employed in examining the position. That he was aware that it was by no means easy, but that *he had rather scale the higher Alps than cross the Rhine*. That if they lost men, they should at least have the satisfaction of destroying a number of the enemy; and that a victory might have a happy effect both for the moment and in its consequences. In short, he said, if the Court of Vienna would permit it, that he should be most strongly for advising the measure.

"I proposed to him the plan of passing lower down. He said the idea was certainly a good one; but that they should, in that case, abandon the project for which I had been before so strenuous an advocate, and which he was himself as much disposed to approve as I had been.

"I asked him if he really thought the project still feasible. He said, as much so as ever it had been; excepting that the enemy would have

stronger force to oppose to them at the beginning of their enterprise. I asked him what he thought of contenting themselves with Schlestat, Huninguen, and New Brisac. He said *that would not enable them to maintain their winter quarters on the other side. They must have Belfort and Pozenbrug.*

"I asked him if such was really the opinion of the Court of Vienna. He said, *he had no reason to believe it otherwise* ; but that if the Court of Vienna meant to abandon all hope of co-operating with the Royalists, he thought they had much better pass lower down, inasmuch as the passage was not only much easier, but might be now effected by surprise. He repeated to me, over and over again, the strongest assurances that they were determined to pass at all events. It was impossible, however, to do anything in less than a fortnight, as they had *neither magazines nor money*. He said that they had artillery enough for the passage, though not enough to enable them to commence a siege immediately.

"Some other Generals with whom I conversed, particularly General Sporek, told me that the affair was too hazardous to attempt without knowing their object. General Lauer said it was extremely difficult, but they only wanted their *pont d'or*.

"I had a long conversation with General Wurmser, who told me he was determined to go on; but that he really did not know to what purpose. He asked me what the Prince of Condé intended to do. I answered that that depended on his Excellency. 'Why does not he go to Lyons?' said the General. 'We will give him troops; we have enough, if you will pay for them. They will be much better than any he can raise.' I told him, in answer to this remark, that if he would conduct the Prince there, and leave him 15,000 men, I could *almost* answer for taking them immediately into British pay; and that I thought I might engage for half that number, if he would conduct the Prince to Besançon, and leave him master of the place with 15,000 good Austrian troops. He said the latter proposition was well worth attending to; and asked if I would conclude the bargain. I asked him, in return, if he had full powers to undertake the enterprise; and there the conversation ended, the General giving me no answer.

"I do not scruple to recommend the subject to your Lordship's consideration. An offer of that sort, at a moment when the General might be elated with success, might possibly have the effect desired. All the Generals tell me that he is extremely desirous of distinguishing himself on this occasion.

"I have promised to come over again before I leave Mulheim, and your Lordship may be assured that I will omit no argument that may tend to urge them to vigorous action."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, September 9, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty the communications which he yesterday received from Count Starhemberg. He humbly takes the liberty to request to be honoured with your Majesty's directions with respect to the answer to be given to that part of them which relates to the transactions in Germany, with respect to which your Majesty will observe that the Court of Vienna appears to rest its future conduct entirely on the line which may be observed by your Majesty's Electoral Government, particularly on the subject of separate treaties of peace

concluded by the members of the Germanic body. This subject appears the more important and pressing, in the present moment, by reason of the treaty concluded by the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel.

"Lord Grenville hopes that your Majesty will not disapprove his having immediately, on receiving the account of that treaty, written to the Treasury, to suspend for the present, all further payments on account of the subsidy treaties with the Landgrave."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 10, Weymouth.—"I have received Lord Grenville's note transmitting the communications which he had received on Tuesday from Count Starhemberg, who seems always more eager for immediate answers than the tardy conduct of his Court can call for.

"The unpleasant minute of Cabinet I received yesterday for withdrawing the British cavalry from the Continent so clearly shows that this country means to leave the German Empire to shift for itself, that I cannot, till I have maturely weighed the situation in which every German Prince is placed by this change, give a decided answer as to the step I shall think best to take as Elector."

#### The MARQUIS of BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 13, [Southsea].—"I enclose to you a letter from George Nugent, upon which I know that you will do whatever is right, or whatever you can with propriety. Hewitt and Hutchinson have each had their *new corps* completed by draughts for this very service, as a *douceur*; and Nugent has had his 85th (senior to both) actually draughted into Hutchinson's six weeks ago, so that not only there is no plea for sending Nugent, his regiment not being ordered there, but, on the contrary, he is deprived of his men, and consequently of part of his profits, exactly in the moment in which he is ordered. As to his wish to be Major-General, I fear that it cannot be; but, if he is to go to this cursed service, it will not surely be expected from him (senior to all the brigadiers) to go without his regiment, and that corps draughted from him, while Keppell, Hutchinson, Myers, Hewitt, Howe, Whitelocke, all junior to him, and all serving or ordered for the West Indies as brigadiers, have their regiments completed. This might be obviated, or rather compensated to him, by giving him the local rank of Major-General, which can injure no one, as Bernard, his only senior, does not go, and the precedents of this local rank are numberless. However, upon all this, I would not upon any consideration press you beyond what may be really convenient for you.

"I return you Mr. Lipscomb's letter. He is a lieutenant in the North Hants. Tom has been with me for the last week, and has made some heavy hours roll very pleasantly. My wife is, thank God, recovering, and gets strength upon the sea, where she is not fatigued. We have just now packed off the Prince of Orange to Southampton. I wish you could keep your strange animals in their cage, for they do no good travelling about."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1795, September 21, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to submit to your Majesty the draft of a despatch to Sir Morton



Eden, in conformity to the ideas which Mr. Pitt had the honour to lay before your Majesty at Weymouth. Lord Grenville thinks that if Mr. Pelham could be induced to go to Vienna, to assist in the execution of these instructions, it might much facilitate the service; and he will therefore, if your Majesty should be graciously pleased to approve it, see Mr. Pelham for that purpose."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 22, Weymouth.—"When Mr. Pitt was here he mentioned the idea of sending Mr. Pelham to Vienna as the most ready means of coming to some agreement with that supine Court; I certainly cannot object to it now formally proposed by Lord Grenville. Did I think much good can be got from thence, I should be eager for the appointment, as I am certain he would do his utmost; but I cannot say that the experience we have had can make one very sanguine as to any real vigour being produced while the present directors continue in the Austrian Councils."

#### THE DUKE OF PORTLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1795, September 23, Welbeck.—"The subject of the despatch of Sir Morton Eden has occupied so much of my thoughts that but little consideration is necessary to induce me to give my entire assent to the propriety of requiring of the Court of Vienna a full and confidential explanation of her sentiments and views upon the two great points of war and peace; and I can certainly have no difficulty in adopting without reserve every one of the arguments you have made use of to induce that Court to make the most vigorous exertion in this, as also with a view to another campaign. But neither your Lordship nor any other of our colleagues will be surprised at my not expressing the same degree of readiness to become a party to a renunciation of the existence of monarchy in France. Perhaps I express myself too strongly, but I know not how otherwise to interpret the communication proposed to be made to the Court of Vienna, that his Majesty by no means feels the establishment of monarchy *a sine quâ non* preliminary of any negotiation with France. I certainly may and very much wish I may be mistaken, but I cannot but fear that this declaration will be so understood, construed, and received by all nations, and by none more eagerly than our own; and that instead of its proving encouragement to the exertions of our allies it will be looked upon as the signal of our abandonment of one of the principal, if not the best security, that existed against the overthrow of civil society. I beg you not to imagine that I am sanguine enough to flatter myself that we shall not be obliged to acquiesce in the present or some such form of government as now prevails in France, that is that we shall have to make peace with a Government which is not and does not consent to become monarchical; but what I question the propriety of is the explicitness of a declaration to that effect, an invitation to an adherence to the present wretched system. At the time that we are supplying the Vendée with provisions, arms, ammunition, clothing and money; that we are equally endeavouring to set the Prince of Condé's army on foot; that we send a minister and mentor to Lewis the 18th; that *Monsieur* is landed in France from on board and under the protection of our own fleet; that his eldest son is actually resident in this country; and in short that all the French nobility are imme-

diately under our safeguard and patronage, there seems something unaccountable in our choosing that particular moment to invite the enemy to make us a proposal which, *primâ facie* at least, implies the abandonment of all those unfortunate persons and the sacrifice of the interests and existence of the soundest and best part of France. I own it does not occur to me how this step is particularly suited to induce the House of Austria to increase either its efforts or its confidence, or how it is to guard us against the repetition of those attacks to which the evacuation of Toulon in particular exposed the then Government of this country. But my intention was to confine myself strictly to the consideration of the necessity and propriety of making such a communication as is proposed to the Court of Vienna, because we are certainly not tied down by any public declaration that I recollect, or prevented by any other means from entering into negotiation with any form of government which may exist in France, which may, in our opinions, afford a reasonable prospect of bringing about a safe and honourable peace. In all other respects I have no doubt in acceding to every part of your instructions, and, having occasion to write to Mr. Pelham the day I received your Lordship's, I did earnestly urge him to comply with whatever wishes you might express to him in an interview which, I told him, I had just learnt from you your having solicited of him. I very much admire the caution of not letting M. Monneront come farther at first than Dover, and am glad that our friend King is appointed to converse with Mr. Majent. An idea prevails and, I believe, is strongly credited by Mr. Burke, that several considerable people in France wish to place the Duke of Orleans on the throne, and that that plan is carried on in concert with some of the most active of the Opposition here. The latter I can't give any credit to, nor can I fancy any very good reason for the probability of the former part of the report. I shall certainly be in town on Tuesday."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, September 27, Southsea.—"I was not very sanguine in my hopes that George Nugent's letter might give any opening for the completion of his wishes, and I am perfectly satisfied that you could do nothing in it, particularly as I find that orders had been sent to his 85th, consisting of officers and about 300 men, to embark for Gibraltar, where they will be completed with draughts to 600 men, and will embark for the West Indies. Under these circumstances much of his grievance is done away. I have written to him to try to reconcile him to his disappointment respecting the local rank of Major-General, which, as senior of all the brigadiers, he wished to obtain.

"I have been worried out of my life by my important nonsenses, which have detained me here *très malgré moi*, but, as they are now all settled, I look towards Stowe, and shall be there on Tuesday, the 6th, in hopes of enjoying a few quiet hours with Tom and with you. Pray endeavour to arrange so as to manage this, and you shall have the choice of my nursery, if that will tempt you and your little woman to come to me. Adieu; we are all well and prosperous. No news except that the Cork and Gibraltar detachments are preparing to sail. As usual, I am a *frondeur* for the delay of your West India armament."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1795, October 7, St. James's Square.—"I send you the article as proposed by Mr. Jay respecting the American trade to the East Indies.

I should be much obliged to you to consider whether any objection occurs to you in form or substance, and particularly to advert to these points.

1. "Can the King stipulate for this during the existence of the charter?"

2. "If the consent of the Company must be had, can the Directors give that consent, or must the Proprietors be consulted? And, in either case, should the treaty be made in the King's name or the Company's?"

3. "Are there any articles of import or export that should be excepted from the general liberty of commerce?"

4. "Is it worth while to insist on the stipulation that the Americans shall not trade direct between Asia and Europe? If it is, how can that point be enforced?"

5. "Are there any advantages which ought to be stipulated in return, either for the interest of our East India Company at home, or for that of our dominions there?"

"If anything else strikes you, I shall thank you to state it."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR MORTON EDEN.

*Private.*

1795, October 10, Downing Street.—"I have stated to you in my dispatch the principal object we have had in view in sending Mr. Jackson to you, which is to convince the Austrian Government that matters are now brought to a point, where some distinct explanation of what we are to expect in future is become absolutely necessary; it being quite impossible that things can continue on their present footing. I feel that it may be unpleasant to you to assume a tone of so much complaint and peremptoriness towards a Minister with whom you live on personal good terms; but you will, I am sure, see with us the absolute necessity of it. In our present situation, we might possibly not find it very difficult to make either war or peace with advantage, if Austria will set her shoulders to the work in earnest. If the system of this year continues, we may both find ourselves in a situation not to be able to make either.

"You know that Mr. Jackson has the character of the King's Minister at Madrid; so that you will have no difficulty in carrying him to M. Thugut; and his presence will certainly be useful to support you in many disagreeable things that you must say. I hope you will be able to send him back soon, and with something explicit and positive; and, what is still more, that the effect will follow immediately; for without that, the credit of Austria will be very low here indeed.

"I have written to Sir Charles Whitworth to apprise him of these overtures, and to request that the Russian Minister may be directed to support you. His orders will, I conclude, be such as to put all ideas of peace at a distance; but, in that case, the Court of Vienna will naturally ask whether Russia, when she dissuades peace, will assist in the prosecution of the war."

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 11.—"It becomes very urgent as well as important to come to some determination as to the supply of stores and money where we can give nothing else to the unfortunate Royalists; who are still contending with zeal and energy, unconscious of the changes that are

taking place, and still supposing that they have a country behind ready to support their efforts at least by feeding their wants; and to prevent, for a long while to come, the powers of the Convention from being wholly turned to their destruction. We shall really risk something more than injury to a cause which includes all other causes, if, as long as we maintain the war, and till we formally apprize the Royalists that they must no longer count upon our support (a notification by the way which our former declarations hardly leave us the liberty to make) we do not continue to afford them all such assistance as we cannot show to be actually out of our power. As it stands at present, orders are preparing to a large amount, and with reasonable dispatch, for clothing and other necessities of that sort; powder is sent, or on its way, to the amount of more than 1,000 barrels (eight or nine thousand would not be too much, supposing the thing to go on) and authority is given to send by opportunities, as they occur, such additional quantities as the stores at Portsmouth may furnish, and the demands of other service can spare. Arms will be supplied, not in large quantities, but in such as the numbers manufactured and the demands for other service can admit; and, lastly, 50,000*l.* has been sent out with General Doyle, exclusive I believe of 10,000*l.* intended for the payment of his own army, and which is now in great part expended; and 50,000*l.* more has lately been sent out by the *Robusta*. This is the whole, I believe, of what has hitherto been done; and this, for the present moment, and for Charette's army, may be sufficient; though certainly it is at this moment that that army may be most pressed, and when a large sum of money ready to be instantly applied might produce an effect, either of obtaining good or averting evil, which could not be hoped from tenfold such sums at a later period. But we must recollect that Charette's army is only a part of the Royalist force; and of that force which even his success and safety requires to be maintained. There is the whole of the force under Puisaye, including Scepeau's army, which has now elected him as their chief. There is a large district under M. de la Vieuville, whose conduct has been in the highest degree meritorious; and another still larger district, and under the direction of a person equally meritorious, M. de Frotté. Neither of these three armies can well receive assistance directly from *Monsieur*, nor with 100,000*l.*, pressed as he is likely to be, could he well spare any. I would, if my own judgment were to direct, send without a moment's delay a sum of money to each of these. A very moderate or inconsiderable one would be sufficient; 20,000*l.* to Puisaye and 10,000*l.* to each of the others, or even 10,000*l.* to Puisaye and 5,000*l.* each to the other two. Nor would there be any difficulty of finding agents to whom I should feel no hesitation of trusting. To Puisaye indeed it should be conveyed from Quiberon. To M. de Frotté means might be found of conveying it from St. Marcout [Marcouf] opposite to which at the distance of not many leagues is his headquarters. With M. de la Vieuville a constant communication is kept up, as you may have observed, from Jersey. To none of these should I feel the least scruple of confiding sums to a much larger amount, with a full confidence of their being fairly applied to their proper purpose. M. Frotté is man strongly recommended, and who has shown himself perfectly devoted to the general cause. M. Vieuville, with the same proofs from conduct, is the heir of property in Brittany to a great amount. Of Puisaye, though I have often had reason to complain of rather too great magnificence in the expenditure of public money, I have never had the smallest reason to doubt of the integrity and correctness

as to all views of private emolument, or of idea of appropriating any part to himself.

"Money is now almost the only means by which we can assist them ; for arms in great abundance we have not to send, besides the difficulty of conveying them into the country. They all agree that with money a great deal is to be done in gaining both arms and powder from the Republicans, as well as in gaining the Republicans themselves.

"Without such assistance, all those who are here, Allègre, Boisberthelot (the two persons that went into France previous to Puisaye's expedition) and Prigent, who though of inferior condition has merited by his services that some attention should be given to his opinion, all agree that the cause in that quarter must die away. Puisaye, in his letters since his landing, speaks with great confidence of the force and spirit still remaining in the country, and of the means which he has of co-operating with Charette, but strongly enforces, in order to give effect to them, the necessity of pecuniary aid. The utility indeed of this seems to be clear. It cannot but do good as far as it goes ; and what is the comparison between the value of 50 or 100 thousand more in the expenses of this war, and the chance even of the effect that may be produced by it ?"

#### THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1795, October 14, Brunswick.—"Je saisi l'occasion du départ de Son Altesse, le Prince Frédéric, pour remercier votre Altesse des marques de souvenir dont Elle m'a honoré par le Prince Héritaire. Les affaires d'Allemagne ont considérablement empirées ; l'ennemi est le maître des deux rives du Rhin, à l'exception de Wesel, d'Ehrenbreitstein et de Mayence. Ces deux dernières places sont cernés par les Français. Manheim est tombé par capitulation, et les armées Impériales se sont retirés sans coup férir, jusque derrière le Mayn. Une petite affaire qui a tournée à l'avantage des Autrichiens près du Neckar à Lahnbourg, a coûté un couple de mille hommes à l'ennemi, sans avoir aucune influence sur la totalité des affaires. L'Electeur de Cologne a retiré son contingent ; celui de Bavière a fait un traité de neutralité pour le Palatinat ; et le but de l'ennemi, de forcer un Prince après l'autre à faire la paix particulière, lui réussit en plein. Le mal est au comble, et si la ligne de démarcation, fixée par le traité de Basle, n'était strictement observée par les Français, tout l'empire serait en proie à la dévastation de l'ennemi. Les clubs gagnent beaucoup en Hollande, et il y aurait déjà eu des scènes sanglantes, si les ennemis, par une affectation de modérantisme, ne balançaient l'influence populaire. Il ne m'appartient pas de faire des réflexions sur les désastres que l'Europe éprouve, mais sûr est-il que si enfin les Puissances ne finissent pas par s'entendre entre elles à la pacification, après n'avoir jamais pu y parvenir durant la guerre, elles assureront la Révolution Française, la destruction de la Hollande, la perte de la Belgique, et le renversement de la constitution Germanique."

*French. Copy.*

#### THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK to the PRINCESS OF ORANGE.

1795, October 14, Brunswick.—"Je dois des obligations infinies à votre Altesse Royale des informations qu'elle a daigné me faire parvenir par Son Altesse le Prince Héritaire. Personne n'est plus à même de la mettre exactement au fait de la position affligeante où le Continent se trouve, que les Princes ses augustes fils. Je dois naturellement m'en

rapporter à eux, et je ne puis y ajouter que la réflexion douloureuse qu'après que l'Angleterre a abandonnée la Prusse aux intrigues, et au parti anti-Anglican en adoptant, au lieu d'un ton amical, conciliataire, et doux, celui de la hauteur et de la menace, elle a ébranlée sans le vouloir l'existence politique de la Belgique, de la Hollande, et de l'empire Germanique. Si la cour de Londres ne se rapproche pas de celle de Berlin, si des vues personnelles empêchent d'employer sur le Continent des hommes qui connaissent la situation de l'Europe, les hommes qui la gouvernent, leurs moyens, et leurs faiblesses, elle ne fera que servir la France dans ses projets, consolidera cet esprit révolutionnaire qui gêne partout, se verra coupée du Continent pour longtemps, et se trouvera hors de portée de rendre les services qu'elle voudrait. Ce ne sont pas les menaces qui opéreront sur les esprits, je ne saurais le répéter assez. L'ennemi commun saisira avec toute l'adresse possible les fausses démarches du Ministère Britannique ; et la hauteur dans les négociations et dans les procédés ne lutte jamais contre l'adresse, et ne fait que donner des armes à eux qui ne tendent qu'à éloigner l'Angleterre des affaires Continentales, en jouissant du renversement du Stadthoudérat.

Voilà tout ce qui m'est permis de dire dans la situation désolante où nous nous trouvons, et dans laquelle l'égoïsme, l'esprit de parti, et les influences de toutes les petites passions nous ont plongé."

*French. Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 16, Sittingbourne.—“I came here last night to meet Dundas in order to talk over the instructions which he had prepared in consequence of a minute of Cabinet made last Wednesday, for withdrawing the British troops from Isle d'Yeu [Isle Dieu.] You will receive with this letter the draft, and Doyle's despatches, and I dare say you will agree with us that there can be no doubt of the propriety of the measure. At the same time this will so change *Monsieur's* situation and expectations, that I think we ought on no account to be parties to landing him on the French coast (if he is not landed already) unless, after a further explanation, he still insists upon it. In particular we are, I think, bound to explain to him that the present crisis at Paris, though on the one hand it may lead either to a continued state of distraction, or to a new order of things more favourable to his prospects, yet, on the other hand, may possibly produce some established form of Government with which this country may think it necessary to treat, provided it should find them inclined to negotiation on a footing consistent with our honour and interest, and that of our allies. That we should still see the restoration of monarchy with infinitely more satisfaction than any other result, and that, at all events while the war continues (which may be necessarily prolonged by the pretensions of the enemy, even if the objections which have hitherto existed to the state of their Government should be removed) every effort will be used on our part to continue supplies of arms, clothing, ammunition, and money for the use of the Royalists on different parts of the coast ; but that, feeling it possible that there may be such an issue of the present crisis as may lead sooner or later to negotiation with some form of government different from monarchy, we have thought it right to apprise him of what may eventually be our line of conduct, in order that he may have under his view all the circumstances which may guide his decision. It would certainly have been desirable not to have made any such communication without hearing again from Paris, from whence there were no

accounts at Dover yesterday, later than those of the 6th. But the measure of withdrawing the troops and of setting Admiral Harvey's fleet more at liberty (especially after the bad account of the Mediterranean convoy) is so urgent that it cannot be delayed; and it seems impossible to execute it without such a previous explanation as I have suggested. If you agree in this idea, I think the only mode of making the communication would be directly by a letter from you to *Monsieur*, to be transmitted through General Doyle; as it does not seem desirable to trust either the General, or the Duc d'Harcourt, with the state of our opinions on so delicate a point.

"I return you Windham's letter; and you will see from what I have already written, that I fully agree in the general propriety of supplying the Royalists largely while the war continues, and (though there may be some risk of our aid being misapplied) I think it well worth the experiment to extend the supply to all the quarters which Windham suggests.

"I had received a duplicate of Lord Auckland's paper, but have not yet read it. I shall get through it in my way back to Walmer to-day.

"You will receive a dispatch from General Dundas containing a communication from Prince Frederic of Orange respecting the Prussian —. I dare say you will agree in thinking that general assurances from the Court of Berlin are entitled to no regard, and ought not in the least to change our plan of bringing away the Dutch troops. Probably you will have some communication with the Stadholder on the subject."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 17, Windsor.—"As Lord Grenville seemed so anxious to change his Under Secretary I am glad he has been able to arrange it to the satisfaction of Mr. Burges, and I trust he will find that assistance in Mr. Hammond he appears to expect."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 18, Walmer Castle.—"After considering all that you state, Dundas and I cannot help retaining our former opinion, that nothing can justify the risking our own troops being landed on any part of the coast of France. If Charette comes down in force enough to secure the temporary possession of any proper point, it will enable us to land the supplies, and the French troops, without exposing ours to any hazard. If ours were to be previously landed in order to co-operate in an attempt for securing such a point, the supposition implies an enemy in force to contend with, and if the enterprise fails, the possibility of re-embarking is very precarious. I do not, therefore, see how more latitude can safely be given than in the instructions as they now stand. I shall certainly be in town on Tuesday by dinner, and shall be very glad to see you at any time in the evening that suits you. If possible, however, we should wish this despatch to go on Monday.

"I have written to Long, to procure 100,000*l.* in dollars, which cannot, however, be in time to go by this conveyance, but may [be] sent with some supplies of fuel which are preparing. I confess my objections to any idea of dissolution at present are not at all abated, but of that we may talk when we meet.

"The pressing demand for the return of Harvey's fleet is to be added to all the other considerations. Any protection however to Isle d'Yeu

[Isle Dieu] from occasional cruises may still be afforded, and *Monsieur* and those with him must judge how far that species of protection is sufficient."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 24, Stowe.—"The enclosed appear to me so essential, that I send them to you. I am convinced that Doyle was right in not establishing himself at Noirmoutier, where he would ultimately have been forced; and therefore all the reasoning on the defenceless state of the island is nonsense; for, had he been even invited to land there by the inhabitants, the same reasons which have now decided him not to attack it, would have weighed equally against accepting the surrender of it. I write to the Bishop to state *my private* doubts upon Charette's conduct, which does not tally with the professions which *I have seen*; and this opinion will possibly show him how little those who were the most sanguine for a descent, expect from a project of the same nature in the spring. As to the personal situation of *Monsieur*, it has occurred to me that a diplomatic character from the Emperor or King of Sardinia might, under the act of Queen Anne, be his best protection against debts; for it will be impossible to suffer him to pass his winter at Spithead, and many political reasons may make it wise (and perhaps necessary) to keep up the appearance of protecting him, and the means of assisting by his presence any (very improbable) exertion from the interior to the western coasts of France. But, in all events, I can venture to assure you that, personally, he is worthy of every attention that you can give to his melancholy situation, and beyond this I do not think it fair to urge you.

"I take it for granted that with the *troupes Anglaises*, all the French are to return; surely it would be wise to avail ourselves of them for the West Indian armament as a second embarkation; or, if you are in time to order them to Cork instead of Spithead, they would be in time to sail with the foreign troops embarked from Stadt, and directed to sail under the care of the *Canada*, now at Spithead, but ordered to Cork to collect the St. Domingo armament. I mention this because much dissatisfaction must arise at re-landing the foreign force, and I believe that in numbers (including those now in England) they will exceed the number allowed by law. The disaffected 400, who were sent back four weeks since, should all be *ordered* to be draughted into the foreign corps serving in the West Indies; and the consequence would be, that they would desert as soon as they found they were to be sent to that service, and you would get clear of them.

"As to Abercrombie, I really pity most sincerely your feelings upon a delay so grossly scandalous and criminal, wherever the blame may really fall. I understand, and from the best authority, that there is no confidence whatsoever in his army, and that, amongst a thousand horrid consequences of this delay, it is not the least important that the officers and men have had leisure to frame to themselves every mischievous apprehension that can arise from disaffection to this service. The ordnance are still unprepared; when I last heard from Portsmouth only three of their ships from the river had got round. You must make some examples, for no service can go on in this manner.

"I returned on Friday morning from Addlestone, very much delighted with my little woman, and with the most explicit assurances from Lady Caroline Leigh. Still, however, as nothing can be done till the appeal is heard, some months must roll over before the marriage can take place. I have no doubt of the cordial co-operation of the



family, but much of the integrity or good wishes of *your baronet*, Sir Francis Buller. I have found very great assistance from Talbot's prudence and discretion in his management of the old lady, and am more obliged to you than I can express for the means of rewarding him. I have told him of your goodness, and he is overjoyed. When would you have him come to town?

"The plants will be sent so as to arrive at Dropmore on Sunday morning next; if, therefore, you are tied by the leg to London you must order accordingly.

"I have determined to attend your summons for Thursday, though *très malgré moi*, for I cannot say how much I hate to leave this place, but we must all put our shoulders to the wheel.

"Have you any great dinner, and for what day, as I have a great jack, *now alive*, at your orders; but write by the return of post to say whether you will have it."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 25, Windsor.—"By the communication from Lord Grenville of the Marquis del Campo's private letter to him I am informed of the latter's wish of receiving the Queen's portrait instead of the usual present in money on his quitting his embassy. He has done this in a more polite manner than one should have expected from him, and therefore, on my part, I cannot but permit you to indulge him in his request. You are therefore to order the picture to be prepared by Cosway, and to have it set in diamonds by Duval to the amount on the whole of the money he would have received in the usual manner."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, October 27, Windsor.—"I am much pleased at Lord Grenville's attention in having instantly forwarded to me the two French papers arrived this day, as they certainly show that Marshal Clairfait has forced the French to retire at least to the Rhine, and give good reason to suppose that when the German mail arrives we shall have a full account of the French being completely beat by the Austrians. No one will more sincerely rejoice than me at such an event, as no one more forcibly feels that unless the French are thoroughly reduced no solid peace can be obtained, and no attempt ought to be encouraged of opening a negotiation, which ever has the effect of destroying all energy in those who ought to look forward to the continuance of war."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 6 [Stowe].—"The letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, reached me this morning. The Duke of Portland has, I fear, misconceived the bill, for there is nothing in any of the clauses that can enable me to raise any men as an *immediate* augmentation to my regiment, with a view of their being taken as part of the county quota. I enclose you a copy of the clause for that purpose which I sent to Mr. Pitt, but the Bill was gone up to the Lords. I can have no interest, but on the contrary, a great deal of plague in the business, and if the clause cannot impede and may assist your ballot, I cannot conceive why you may not give me the means by law of assisting the public in my own way. However, *liberavi animam meam*, and, if you do not think it *tanti*, I most certainly shall not employ any other friend to move it as an amendment in the committee in the House of Lords. 211101 250

"When shall I send you your beech, and do you want any sheep.

"I have likewise sent you a clause enabling volunteers to offer to serve for sub-divisions or districts instead of supplementary militia. Mr. Pitt's clause obliges volunteers to *enrol* as supplementary militiamen, to swear as such, and to train for 20 days, *seriatim*, in any part of the county, instead of training once or twice a week in their towns. This clause will not repeal the others."

*Enclosure.*

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1796, November 4, Burlington House.—"I have had the honour of laying before the King your Lordship's letter of the 24th ultimo, and am commanded to acquaint you that His Majesty does the most ample justice to the motives which have induced your Lordship, at this important crisis, to offer to contribute personally to the internal force of his kingdom by augmenting the militia of the county of Buckingham at your own expense, and to forward the objects of the Legislature by carrying that augmentation into effect as speedily as possible.

"Your Lordship must not wonder that his Majesty was fully prepared for such a testimony of public spirit and liberality on the part of your Lordship, any more than that he should always recollect it with grateful satisfaction.

"The Bill for an augmentation to the Militia which is now depending in Parliament will be found, I trust, to contain clauses so well adapted to the object your Lordship has in view that, I flatter myself, it will obtain the sanction of your approbation, and enable you to fulfil the intentions you have so generously avowed.

"I am persuaded that Mr. Pitt will have explained to you the reasons which have hitherto delayed the acknowledgments I now offer you for the honour of your letter, and that you will do me the justice to believe that no one can be more disposed than I am to manifest every sentiment of respect and esteem for your Lordship."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795] November 8, Stowe.—"I have sent no requisition to our High Sheriff, because I see that the City of London have not prepared or even mentioned any petition to Parliament for the new bills which we think so essential; and no other county is yet called. We agreed that it would be best to wait for the City, as much of the mischief of seditious meetings is more immediately within their limits, and therefore the complaint of such an evil ought to originate with them, before that string is touched in the country. If I should have been misinformed (for I have read the City address) you will be so good as to send me a messenger with your high commands, who may be here before I go to bed; and the High Sheriff shall have his letter the next morning, fixing it for Wednesday the 18th; but, if not, I shall wait for the City meeting before we fix ours. Adieu. If you are not stoned in your way to Guildhall, let me hear one line from you on Tuesday, to say that you are well."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1795, November 11, Whitehall.—"Vous avez certainement reçu par ces malles les détails des succès brillans et très importants que le

Maréchal Clerfaye a gagné, surtout dans l'attaque du Camp Français au-devant de Mentz, où le courage de l'armée Autrichienne et le bon esprit qui l'anima se sont montré d'une manière qui non seulement leur fait le plus grand honneur, mais qui ne manquera pas d'avoir les suites les plus importantes, *pourvu que l'on sache profiter du succès qu'on a eu*. Recevez, je vous prie, mes compléments et félicitations à cette occasion. Vous savez si ils sont sincères. Vous n'ignorez pas depuis combien de temps je soupire après l'occasion de vous faire un pareil compliment, et combien je m'intéresse à la gloire de la monarchie Autrichienne, et à tout ce qui peut avancer ses intérêts, si intimement liés à ceux de mon souverain et de ma patrie."

*French. Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, November 12,] Millfield House.—"Je reçois dans le moment la lettre que vous me faites l'honneur de m'écrire. On ne saurait être plus sensible que je ne le suis aux attentions obligeantes dont votre amitié ne cesse de me combler. Les succès de M. de Clerfaye sont, en effet, aussi grands qu'ils étaient nécessaires. Vous n'ignorez pas la partialité que j'ai toujours eu pour ses talens et pour son caractère personnel. Je me flatte que nous allons profiter de la victoire. J'ai deux raisons pour le supposer, la pleine liberté accordée au Maréchal d'agir selon sa volonté, et l'expérience heureuse qui doit avoir anéanti son irrésolution, le seul défaut qu'on puisse lui reprocher. Au milieu de ces triomphes il s'est donné la peine de m'écrire de sa main un journal précieux qui me démontre que, depuis le 12 jusqu'au 29, nous avons eu une chaîne de victoires. Puisse-t-elle se prolonger. Je le désire et le crois véritablement."

*Postscript.*—"Les malles m'ont apporté des instructions de Vienne qu'il faut que j'aie l'honneur de vous communiquer. M. Erskine s'est plaint de moi au Pape, à ce qui paraît. Je ne m'attendais pas à des démêlés avec le Saint Père. Je passerai demain au bureau vers midi pour tenter fortune."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795], November 12, [Stowe].—"I enclose to you a draft of our address which you will alter if you do not like it; and you will in that case mix the ingredients as you please, except only that I would not wish to carry our requisition for your two Bills further than can be collected from the concluding words of this address, which you probably will think strong enough. But, whatever you determine upon, pray settle it with the Duke of Portland, and let me have the answer or the new draft by Saturday's post. We have fixed on Saturday the 21st as being more convenient than Wednesday. I cannot say how pleased I am with your Bills. I again beg that you will command my attendance if this puissant minority of eight should make you wish me to come up, and take a part in a measure which I approve so very highly, and which, as far as I can collect, is generally called for except by *messieurs les intéressés*. I trust that you have taken care, at the moment I write this, to check the meeting advertised for this day at Copenhagen house. I see your mails have arrived, and I know your clerks have other fish to fry than to write *précis* for idle fellows like me; but you courtiers should pity the booby ignorance of country gentlemen."

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795] November 13, [Stowe].—"I return you the map with very many thanks, and have been occupying myself with tracing the very singular operations of Clairfait, who appears, in his pursuit of Jourdan to the Lahn, to have risked very much, if the latter had been strong enough to have checked the Austrians; for, in that case, the French army entrenched before Mayence, by crossing the Rhine below that town, would have taken Clairfait in reverse. His pursuit, however, with a part of his army as far as Cologne, whilst he returned with the other part, and attacked the entrenched camp, appears to have been one of the most brilliant blows ever struck. The difficulties of that last attack must have been beyond all calculation, and the loss to the French irreparable for very many months; and God knows they can, in their present state, very little afford to lose days, much less the months necessary to collect a force and materials for any similar attempt. I am sorry that Wurmsers attempt did not succeed more completely, for it appears equally well combined. I take it for granted that Mannheim will fall; and Clairfait's movements will accelerate Pichégru's retreat, and the surrender of that town; and it is probable that the garrison will be cut off from retreating to rejoin Pichégru; but, beyond this, I do not venture to hope for anything further, unless on the lower Rhine; where, I hope, they will be dispossessed of Dusseldorff, as that success will have its effect much more completely in the minds of the Hollanders and Brabanters than a victory in Suabia. And I cannot help indulging some hopes of a change of sentiment and of measure if the Rhine was completely Austrian, and a port so essential and so near was occupied by the Austrians.

"I wrote to you yesterday to enclose the draft of the address, which I trust you will return to me by to-morrow's post. I enclose a proxy which you will enter whenever you will; but I hope before the House of Commons' Bill makes its appearance in the House of Lords, I shall be able to bear my testimony to the wisdom of measures which I have so long and so earnestly wished for; and, in all events, I am glad to put my conscience on that and every other point ostensibly into your keeping.

"I have been obliged to send Frogatt to the printer of the *True Briton*, November 12, for the manuscript of a most impudent forgery, signed Nugent Buckingham, and offering 500*l.* reward for a paltry libel upon the whole race of Grenvilles, which I would not give 5 farthings to have kept out of every newspaper. I am only hurt at the possibility of being conceived to be so egregious a fool; for as to political sins, or indeed as to any other than are usually announced in a newspaper I am very callous. In point of fact I never heard of any such libel, nor has it ever existed save in this newspaper. I cannot say how happy I am to see the triumphant support given to your Bills. I believe most firmly that nine-tenths of the people are with you in sentiment upon the necessity of such a measure. You will probably pass them by commission the moment they are ready, for you see by all the Jacobin newspapers that the lecturers and societies are (what the jockeys term) running against time; and I think you should not, after recognising the necessity of protecting the King, suffer him to go to Parliament till the law is actually passed."

## LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1795, November 13, [London].—"I enclose you a letter I have received from Sir C. Malet. I believe I once mentioned to you that

I have no other reason for being interested in his favour than that he is of an old family in Somersetshire, and, as such, was known to my mother's family, and, I believe, originally sent out by their assistance. I have therefore no pretence or desire to solicit for him in this instance, but I should be glad to be enabled to answer his question as an attention due to a man of whom, as far as I remember of India affairs, we have always had reason to think well."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, November 14, Windsor.—"I cannot sufficiently approve of Lord Grenville's having declined taking the step of seeing Baron de Wimpffen till he had communicated to me the object of his coming. In the course of the summer I was astonished at the Duchess of Brunswick mentioning in a letter to me a desire of such an alliance, but knowing the brutal and other unpleasant qualities of this Prince, I could not give any encouragement to such a proposal. I therefore desire Lord Grenville will fairly tell him that I shall not consent to his request, and if he will not take a gentle hint, I have no objection to his adding that, after the very unhappy life my unfortunate niece led with him, I cannot as a father bequeath any daughter of mine on him."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, November 19, [Stowe].—"I have received your two letters and have altered a very loyal address from the corporation and *inhabitants* of Buckingham so as to meet your ideas, and we have just had our meeting, and signed it. The address from the county cannot be easily altered, because I have sent copies of that which was settled to several persons, and it would be difficult to alter it now, particularly as I have sent it to Sir J. Lovett, and have stated it to him as approved by his *respectable correspondent*. But I think that a petition to the House of Commons might likewise be proposed, and, if you agree with me, you had better prepare one and settle it with the Duke of Portland; and, if his friends understand that he acquiesces, the thing may be proposed by some other person less connected with Government than I am, and I will most heartily join in the support of it; but you must prepare it and send it down by a messenger to Aylesbury, directed to me, that I may have it engrossed and ready against the meeting. I shall be there by eleven o'clock.

"It seems clear that Fox conceives it necessary to keep the mob quiet, and the leaders, Mr. Thelwall and the others, probably acquiesce in order to engage the Whig Club to assist them. But when they see the whole thing desperate, you will have a serious struggle, and I do not doubt *your* firmness. I have taken care to have an attendance of friends at Aylesbury, and, under the idea of a meeting for a yeomanry address, I have requested that four or five might attend out of each troop besides the officers. This will add to our appearance, as the best part of the Aylesbury troop will attend. I enclose you the address which is to be proposed to them. I have set an Aylesbury address on foot, so that from our county you will have your share of loyalty."

*Postscript.*—"One advantage will arise from separating the petition from the address, and that is that the measure is more marked, and in case any attempt should be made hereafter to call a meeting to consider

the Bills now in Parliament, it is parried by this petition which may be drawn so as [to] point at these very Bills.

"Pray show Captain T. Grenville the yeomanry address."

PRÉCIS of CORRESPONDENCE to and from BERLIN from September 4 to November 24 (*sic*), 1795.

London, September 4.—"Balau converses with Steinberg, who disapproves the *rassemblement* of Osnaburg. Blames the Duke of York, and laments the stay of the *émigré* corps in Hanover.

London, September 8.—"Speculations on the probability of a rupture between Great Britain and Spain.

London, September 11.—"A treaty of subsidy is negotiating between Great Britain and Austria.

London, September 11.—"Steinberg answers a note of Balau's; tells him that all the *émigré* corps are on the point of embarking, but says nothing of the English troops. Affairs of Corsica.

London, September 15.—"Reports of an approaching session. Supposed negotiations for a loan. Flourishing state of commerce in England. Irish affairs. Defenders.

London, September 18.—"Desandrouin returning to Vienna. The treaty of subsidy not settled, but he carries the proposals. Parliament to meet soon; 26 millions to be borrowed. American treaty suspended.

London, September 22.—"Affairs of Corsica; the British party the weakest there. Reports as to the cause of the passage of the Rhine by the French; said that the line of neutrality was violated by them and Prussian soldiers killed.

London, September 25.—"Steinberg repeats to him an official letter which he is to write him, stating that the King has ordered the Regency of Hanover to communicate to Berlin: 1, that all *émigré* and foreign troops shall leave the electorate; 2, that no more such troops shall be raised there; 3, that His Britannic Majesty adheres without reserve to the neutrality and engages to observe it carefully. The existence of the British troops in the electorate is not contrary to the neutrality because these troops have no hostile destination, but being to serve only for the safety of the states of the King, and his neighbours; they will commit no hostility, but will suffer none to be committed against them. Reasons upon this communication. Steinberg seems to apprehend that the French will attack the electorate.

London, September 29.—"Arrival of Monneron and reports of peace; seized with avidity by the public, who are tired with the war. One million taxes must be raised to pay interest of the intended loan.

Berlin, September 1.—"Extensive preparations making on the Lower Weser by Great Britain for an attack on Holland. Alarm on this subject at Berlin. Danger that the French will attack Hanover and Osnaburg. Has directed his ministers to inform the Regency that if attacked they will be left to their fate.

Berlin, September 7.—"Justifies the Prussian Minister at the Porte from the accusation of too close a connection with the Swedish and French missions. Russia has lately expressed her satisfaction at his conduct. Triple Alliance between Great Britain, Russia, and Austria is not completed. The Emperor makes overtures through Denmark for the peace of the Empire, and possibly for his own; and insinuates there that he has not acceded to the Triple Alliance.\*

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\* This last fact is certainly false. G.

Berlin, September 13.—“Impolicy of the manifesto of Verona. Doubts of the success of Wurmser’s intended operations. Invasion of the Empire by the French. Prussian territory and line of neutrality respected by them.\* Increased danger of the north of Germany. Has declared at Hanover that if the *rassemblement* continue he must either act by force to enforce the neutrality, or declare the line of demarcation void and of no effect. Balan is to make the same communication to Steinberg.

Berlin, September 21.—“Acknowledges letter of 4th September, which gives hopes that his representations will have their effect. Reports that England is inclined to peace. Trevor’s journey to Lausanne supposed to be for a conference with Barthélemy.”

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, November 30, Windsor.—“I rejoice at the surrender of Mannheim, and defeat of Pichégu by Marshal Clairfait, as I trust it will encourage the Court of Vienna to make such real efforts this winter as may enable *Clairfait* to open the next campaign very early. Indeed I think no problem in Euclid more true than that if the French are well pressed in the next year, their want of resources and other internal evils must make the present shocking chaos crumble to pieces.”

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, November—December] Brightelmstone.—“If I had received your summons a few days sooner, I should have been able to make my arrangements so as to have obeyed it; but as I mean to leave this place for the season on Sunday or Monday, and have all my children with me, who are also to be packed off on the same day (and some must be stowed in my carriage) it is impossible for me at so short a notice to change my order of march. I will endeavour to get off on Sunday, and to be in London by dinner. If you should remain at Dropmore on Monday, let me know on Sunday night. If you come to town on Sunday or Monday, either you or Pitt can probably give me a dinner. Whatever questions occur to either of you which you think I can answer, you might note down at Dropmore, and send to me. Pitt knows the outline of my opinion on the present state of the question; nothing has happened to vary it much since I saw him at Walmer. If you mean to argue (which I suppose you must) that the present Government of France is more *treatable* than that which existed during the last session, your main difficulties will be to prove that it has more appearance of *permanence*, and that its views of ambition and aggrandisement are either lessened, or become of a less dangerous tendency.

“There can be no doubt that most of those mischievous principles of universal application to all Governments are entirely renounced by the new Constitution, which I have carefully compared with that of 1793; namely, Equality, Natural Rights of Men, Insurrection, Right of daily or rather hourly Revolution; the *duties* of men on the contrary are now declared to be founded in nature; the maintenance of *property* is a duty; no club government; no exercise of political rights but by legal assemblies; no mobs. There are also many provisions in the new Constitution which tend to give permanency to any Government formed under it; but my objection on this head is the force which has been

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\* This fact is also false. G.

employed to compel the people to adopt this Constitution, and the characters of those who have been thrust down the throats of the people by the decrees of 5th and 13th Fructidor.

"This species of violence leads to an argument against the permanence of the Government exactly of the same nature as that which was used against the system of terror. I know Pitt will say that it is the stability of our *treaty* and not of the *Government* to which we are to look; and that the cry in France being now for peace, any and every Government must maintain the *treaty* of peace. Is this a safe argument?

"Remember to let me know what your motions are; I shall probably be in town by five o'clock on Sunday."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December, 1, Varel.—"Since my last (of the 24th) by accounts from various quarters, I have every reason to be confirmed in my opinion that the discontent is daily increasing in the Seven Provinces, and of course the weakness of the present Government. They have for the present suspended all proceedings against the persons they have so long detained in prison, the man who was appointed Attorney General to carry on the prosecutions having declined to act.

"A friend of ours, Mr. Van der Haer, one of the most popular and active members of the late Government in the Province of Friesland, where he has a strong party with which he corresponds, and which he influences, said a good deal to me this morning with respect to the corps to be formed under Prince Frederick, and I thought his observations deserved some notice. We had some conversation on the same subject, when the orders came from General Dundas to discontinue all recruiting for this corps. He said that, though at first he was concerned this order had been given as tending to check the desertion in the army of the Republic, which at any rate was an advantage, the reasons which had dictated the order, which he did not know, might be very satisfactory; that he wrote to his friends to desire them not to think England withdrew her support, but that the change of situation from the successes of the Austrians and other causes very likely made it more desirable the well-intentioned should remain in the country where their presence might be of great use if it became necessary to act. He understood from the person with whom Prince Frederick desired him to correspond that a second order was arrived from England to pay the corps from fortnight to fortnight, and that there were reasons to expect this payment would shortly be entirely discontinued and the corps dismissed. He observed that, though he never expected so much from this corps as many people did, having once been collected under the protection of England, and many of the persons that compose it having been induced to leave the country in consequence of its formation, there would be a great hardship in leaving them in this situation without support or protection. That it would lessen the dependence of the army on the House of Orange, and hurt the reputation of Prince Frederick, whose name had contributed to bring them together, and who would incur great unpopularity and a good deal of odium from their sudden dismissal; and, lastly, that besides lessening the confidence on the support of England, and furnishing a handle to her enemies, there was some chance of throwing, by the step I allude to, a very great number of officers and other men connected with every part of the Republic, into the power of Prussia, who might not, perhaps, be sorry in this manner to court popularity at the expense of England, which could be no



advantage to the cause. Talking with him of the Court of Berlin, he said that he had consented to communicate with that Court, and more particularly since the Hereditary Prince was there, because he had been given to understand in the most positive manner that they acted in concert with England; that he went on upon this idea, but that he never could reconcile himself to any plan that might exclude England; that, whatever circumstances might take place, his constant endeavours would be to thwart any means that might occasion or prolong the separation of the two countries; and that he should be happy to communicate to his friends everything that might forward the views of England in opposition to France, and that I might name him where I thought it could be of service. I thought it right to say so much, as Mr. Van der Haer is a man of considerable property, connected with some of the most independent people in his Province, and a tried, zealous, and able partisan of the House of Orange; and influences by far the most considerable party in Friesland, to whom we may attribute that things are so well managed there. I thought it right to state this to your Lordship, as it is possible you may think this gentleman, who is exceedingly active and quick, may be of service. And it is impossible to act more fairly and to be a better Englishman than he is. As to his hopes from the Court of Berlin I cannot say I share them; nor shall I believe anything will come from that quarter favourable to the cause unless I hear so from my friends in England. Had I more to say than I have I should act with the greatest reserve and caution with respect to that Court, though I am open to conviction if I am told by my friends in England that I am mistaken. At the same time I am thankful for the good offices of those persons at Berlin who have taken steps with respect to M. de Rhoon which have certainly contributed to save him from worse treatment. But hitherto I have not felt inclined to say a syllable to anyone I know there but as far as related to M. de Rhoon, at the time we were most uneasy for him. Nor shall I depart from the line I have taken unless I hear to the contrary from your Lordship or some of my friends in England who are acting on the same system.

"I cannot help observing that I have not been favoured with a line from your Lordship since the end of April. I know, however, how very little time you have left for any private correspondence."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 4, Varel.—"I closed my last (of the 1st inst.) by mentioning how very cautious I was of being drawn into any correspondence at Berlin relating to the affairs of the Seven Provinces, any farther than taking notice of the situation of M. de Rhoon at the time we were most uneasy on his account. That very situation and our former connections with that Court might otherwise easily have led me to communications on the subject, particularly as some of our friends, one of whom I took notice of, are in the supposition that some concert does exist between the two Courts (of London and Berlin) with respect to the United Provinces. I have but too many reasons to entertain my doubts as to this supposition, whatever it may arise from; and shall continue to observe the most perfect silence, and induce others to do so as far as I can, on the hopes of assistance from that quarter in all correspondence with our friends within the country, unless I hear to the contrary from your Lordship, or by your orders. I speak with diffidence, as I am aware my information is imperfect. But I do not like what I hear of the language held at Berlin, where blame is thrown upon every-

thing that comes from England, with an evident jealousy of her interference, and of the successes of the Austrians, the only circumstance at this moment that could possibly have led to a change in our favour. I should be very happy to know something more positive on this point, that in case some reserve may still be proper, I may continue to pursue the line I have taken; or even open the eyes of those who are going on with the idea of a concert; and that we may thwart any measures calculated to exclude England, and gradually to throw the Republic into the arms of her enemies. If this could be the plan of the Court of Berlin I should not only wish to see her checked, but I should see with pleasure that steps were taken by the powers in alliance with Great Britain to prevent her interfering in any shape whatever in the affairs of the United Provinces. At the same time that, if it was possible for once that that Court should take a fair, decided, and consistent part, they certainly have it in their power to terminate shortly the oppression and misfortunes of that country.

“I have the following circumstances to add to what I have mentioned before with respect to the disposition of the people. The clubs at Leuwarden, and throughout Friezland, are so dissatisfied with the Representatives that they have said openly they would proclaim the Prince, and would rather submit to his authority than to such a set of men. The Representatives place so little confidence in the military that, with a few exceptions, they are not allowed to appear in the streets with their sabres. In collecting the votes of the inhabitants upon the question whether a National Convention for the Seven Provinces should take place or not, the well-intentioned kept away in most places, and in others not a man appeared to give a vote; and in the generality of meetings, not above one, two, or eight and ten at most, appeared for the affirmative. This I have from Mr. Van der Haer, whom I met lately, and it is confirmed by others.”

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 8, Varel.—“The alarm spread among the adherents of the present Government of the United Provinces by the late interrupted successes of the Austrians was easily foreseen. They are aware how fatal the interference of England, aided by such powerful means, is likely to prove to their unsettled authority; and they are now endeavouring by all imaginable artifices to excite suspicions and jealousies of those two Powers, should they have it in their hands, by the overthrow of the present system, to settle the affairs of the Seven Provinces according to their own views. It is not my intention to detain your Lordship with the detail of all these idle artifices; and, should the fears of cabal be realised by their fall, the event will show the falsehood of all their insinuations and assertions. But, as they were taken notice of in a number of letters from our friends within the Republic, I thought it right some answer should be given to them for their satisfaction. I had some conversation on the subject with Mr. Van der Haer, whom I mentioned in my last, his friends having alluded to this subject in their letters. I suggested to him several points upon which I thought he might lay a stress with safety and effect, and inclose a translation of a letter he wrote in consequence to his friends within the country, among many others written with the same view; in some of which he insists still more strongly on his confidence on the support of Great Britain, and her efforts to restore the independence of the Seven Provinces, and reunite them with all their possessions under the auspices of the House of Orange. I should

not say so much about Mr. Van der Haer if I did not know that he may be of great service to the cause by his zeal, his indefatigable activity, his quickness, and the number of considerable persons in his Province and in the Republic who place confidence in him. His popularity in his own Province is founded upon the only true ground; he has not, like so many others, endeavoured to gain a momentary influence by flattering the passions of the multitude, but he has constantly endeavoured to gain confidence by a fair and open line of public conduct, and by his adherence to his principles; and in this he has succeeded so far that, should the moment come, he is assured of the *most active* support from a very great number of persons in his Province, who are all ready to declare at a moment's notice, but will not stir without his directions. This party is so strong within itself, and by its connections in the neighbouring Province of Groningen, as to [be] well worth attending to. I have to regret that, by the circumstances of the moment, I am deprived of all free communication with the persons in the Province of Holland who might be of the greatest service to the cause there; and, still more so, by the intimacy and confidence that subsisted between them and the party I have been alluding to. I should not forget to mention that Mr. Van der Haer came into the government of his Province (Friesland) in the year 1779; and that from that moment to this hour he has always been firm and consistent, from habits and principle, in his attachment to the House of Orange and the English interest; that he resisted for three months the proposals of a separate peace with France, and left the country at last, not to be a party in the capitulation, and with the intention of co-operating to the utmost of his power to bring about the deliverance of his country; and that he had previously taken all the necessary measures with his friends for that purpose, as he intimated to the Prince of Orange as soon as he left his Province. By the bye, I do not believe he ever received an answer till some months afterwards, when Prince Frederick came over. Mr. Van der Haer and his friends are, many of them at least, men of affluent circumstances, who act from attachment to the cause, and to the House of Orange, and aversion to the usurpers and their system. As Mr. Van der Haer is somewhat awkward in his appearance and manners, with a degree of formality, and some provincial habits, I am well aware there are persons who may throw some ridicule upon him; but this does not alter what I have been saying, and will not prevent his being of great service, if properly guided. I mentioned in my last that he had gone on with the idea of some concert between London and Berlin. He said since that, without entering into that question, he should be very glad if, whilst they were hesitating and putting off at Berlin from day to day, the Austrians, acting in concert with England, made a sufficient progress to bring about a change without any other assistance. And he agreed with me that, should they recover the Netherlands, nothing was more likely to happen, even before the arrival of any troops to support the well-intentioned, such was the general disposition of the people. He has taken care that his friends at least should be prepared to look upon the Austrians as friends. There are other persons of my acquaintance who have done the same, and I, for my part, shall carefully avoid naming the Prussians unless I hear from your Lordship to the contrary. I need scarcely say that the hints I gave Mr. Van der Haer for his letter are chiefly an application of the principles of a work too generally known and celebrated in England to make it necessary to name the author to your Lordship. This at any rate can do no harm, though I am well aware that general reasonings, however excellent, will not alone

operate counter-revolutions. I depend much more on the divisions of the present rulers amongst themselves, on the evident symptoms of confusion and despondency in all their proceedings, on the decided and growing aversion of the people, confirmed daily by all the accounts we receive. This aversion will break out sooner or later. It is to be hoped the moment will not be left to chance, but that things may be so managed that it may happen at the same time in all the chief places in the country. I am only sorry I have it not in my power to be of greater service to the cause; and I beg your Lordship will not believe I attach much importance to the little I have had to communicate, but will consider it as a proof that I do not lose sight of my object, and shall neglect no opportunity that may offer of being of more use than I have been hitherto, from the unfavourable circumstances of the moment, which deprive me of the assistance of many of our friends, and oblige us to some caution as long as things remain in this situation.

"I shall be thankful for any suggestions your Lordship may think of service; the more so as it is very long since I have been favoured with a line."

*Enclosure.*

M. VAN DER HAER'S LETTER.

1795, December 5.—"I have received yours of the 2nd December, and had received similar representations from other people. I am glad I find myself enabled to repel and, by your means, to point out to the well-intentioned the machinations encouraged by narrow views with respect to England. I can assure you upon my honour that the English Government has no other object in view by its interference than to restore our Republic to her integrity and independence. That they will endeavour to bring this about by all means, even by sacrifices; and that the conclusion will demonstrate the truth of this. In fact the system of commerce and navigation gradually adopted in England is as liberal as her system of politics is superior to the French innovations; and her enlarged views are far above the narrow-minded system of our merchants.

"England is not the friend of monopoly. In England the prevailing opinion is that a country whose prosperity depends chiefly upon its manufactures, and the superiority of its productions, finds the greatest advantage in a free trade; but that this must be established gradually to prevent the ruin of those whose existence depends upon the old exploded system of monopoly. England feels that rich neighbours are more like to afford a market for her produce; and that even the shipping of her neighbours may be advantageous in time of peace, and necessary in time of war. In time of peace because a part of her capitals are more advantageously employed in manufactures than in any other branches of trade; and in time of war because, by means of neutral ships, her manufactures and productions may be exported with little risk, and without heavy insurance, and the sailors employed more advantageously to man the fleet. Upon this system is partly founded the treaty of commerce with France; upon this system is founded the last treaty of commerce with America, by which even the trade of the East Indies is left open to that nation under certain conditions. With respect to Holland, the leading people in England are not likely to wish to take from Holland what persuasion of the greater advantages of other branches of commerce has induced them to grant to other nations; and the carrying trade, and all the advantages Holland derives

from this chief branch of her trade, may even be of service to England in our hands, for many of the reasons above assigned. With respect to the Colonies, the object of Great Britain is equally fair. I can assure you she has engaged herself of her own accord to restore all these possessions with the restoration of the Republic, should they fall into her hands; that it was the intention to have done so had a part only of the Republic been saved; and that she has accordingly acted in this as a good ally. But I must beg in general you will not compare an Englishman with a Frenchman. This is comparing light with darkness.

"As to the *rassemblement*, this will all come round, and from that point it is not fair to draw any conclusions unfavourable to the cause. This is enough. I can assure you, and all the well-intentioned, that you may depend upon the good faith and cordiality of England; and all the contrary reports must be looked upon as the last efforts of an enemy who feels his approaching fall, and will be still more convinced of it before long."

*Copy.*

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 11, Varel.—"When I mentioned in my last letters the existence of a strong and popular party in the Provinces of Friesland and Groningen, conducted by men of property, and known by their attachment to the House of Orange, and to the ancient form of government, and with a considerable share of activity and talents, it was not my intention to stop there. I should not forget taking notice first of a circumstance which increases the confidence that may be placed in them. Mr. Van der Haer, and a friend of his upon whom he relies implicitly, and may as far as I can judge from every circumstance, but who does not know anything of my correspondence, are two of the chief persons of that party. They both possess a large landed property in the Province of Friesland, which they have left for the purpose of carrying on a correspondence with their friends and relations within. Hitherto the correspondence has been conducted with so much fidelity and secrecy on the part of those who have been employed in it that their property has not only been left untouched, though no doubt the Revolutionists would have been happy in a pretence to seize upon it; but that I do not believe that any one person connected with this party has yet been exposed to any inconveniency from their proceedings, though certainly attended with some degree of hazard. Having mentioned this material circumstance, I shall come to the point I have in view.

"I have seen, as I mentioned before, by a number of letters that the animosity of the nation against the revolutionary government is so great, that nothing but the fear of the French, and the uncertainty of external support, has hitherto checked the inclination of the country to rise against their oppressors. This fear of the French is giving way gradually to more manly sentiments with every fresh defeat of the Republican armies; and with the opinion that begins to prevail strongly in all parts of the country, that the Powers engaged in the war will take the first favourable opportunity of putting an end to the influence of the French of the Seven Provinces, and to the usurpation which is founded upon it. But how this is to be done is what the information and conjectures of the people within seem to be divided upon. Some look to Austria; others speak with confidence of Prussia; some *even* of Russia; though all look to England as the spring, the soul, of all that is going on. The conviction of her superiority more than counter-

balances the bad effects that might otherwise result from the artful reports that are industriously spread by her enemies, and encouraged by her pretended friends. So far all is well in one respect, that the inhabitants look to foreign assistance with impatience, though not without anxiety. I have seen lately a letter from a person employed in the correspondence, dated early in December, which mentions that in Guelderland, Overysse, Groningen, Friesland, and Drenthe, all is going on so well that, should a small corps of Prussians march towards the frontier with the *rasselement* were it armed, and should the King of Prussia only say that the Prince of Orange had ceded to him Loo, Soestdyk, Oranjewoud, and the palace of Leuwarden (the property of the Prince in these Provinces) under certain conditions, and that he (the King of Prussia) insisted upon being put in possession of them in the state they were in previous to the departure of the Prince of Orange, this semblance of support, without marching a man into the country, would give so much confidence to the Prince's friends that a change might be brought about without the least effort. Whether this would be a proper mode of interfering whilst a treaty and a guarantee exist, of which the operation may be *ostensibly* considered as only suspended by an imperious necessity, but which furnish a strong direct and consistent plea for interfering from public and not private and personal considerations, seems to me not to admit of a discussion. At the same time I do not pretend to say that there is not great probability of the event turning out in the manner alluded to. But why should the Prussians interfere at all? Why should we run the risk of being again deceived? Why should the United Provinces again be placed under an influence which experience has proved to be pernicious, and to afford so little security? And how do we know that they will act in concert with England when not subsidised? and when they do not consider themselves as bound by treaty, and bound by the most solemn engagements? I speak *sub spe rati*.

"I take the advantage of the present situation of things to be this; that as all parties within the Seven Provinces, except the Revolutionists and their few adherents, look to an external military force acting in concert with England for their deliverance from oppression, with a good deal of indifference, according to some, whether Austrians, Prussians, or Russians if they do but succeed, England has the choice among the powers really disposed to take a part. Were I to follow my inclination, and the impulse of the moment, I could wish the Prussians quite left out. I should even be happy if they were prevented interfering in any shape whatever in the affairs of the Seven Provinces. This would be more easy as though a good many people look to them from their late influence, from the journey of the Hereditary Prince of Orange to Berlin, from the habit of looking upon them as necessary to succeed, yet I am convinced no one would regret they were excluded; and no set of libels and hand-bills ever were so violent and malicious as what are actually circulated in the Republic against the Court of Berlin, without sparing the first personages of that Court. Under these circumstances the moment is perhaps very favourable to exclude them entirely; and it would be a proper return for the breach of their engagements, though certainly a very mild retribution. Whether it will [be] advisable or practicable to leave them out is not for me to determine. But, should it be thought so, and should the further successes of the Emperor's arms give a certainty of support from that quarter, should M. de Clerfaut's army recover the Netherlands and approach the frontier of the Seven Provinces sufficiently to be able to co-operate with the well-intentioned, I am sure the four Provinces

above-mentioned will declare for the Prince of Orange on the first appearance of support. M. Van der Haer, whose friends are armed and ready, told me that, should the moment come, he would undertake the business in the Provinces of Friezland and Groningen with a few thousand Prussians or Austrians, particularly if done in concert with England. As he is able, writes well, and is in the habit of drawing up papers and resolutions, and perfectly versed in all the forms of the Government, and with a great deal of popular eloquence, he would be of great service in the first moment. He is so sure of his friends' support that, should the time come, he offers to go with the detachments and to conduct them, and answers for the event. The possession of these Provinces, the immediate calling together of the States-General which would be the consequence, and the apparent certainty of all the other Provinces, the majority at least, following the example very soon, are so evident that I shall say no more on this point than repeating my wish that the further successes of the Austrians may soon enable us to try the experiment. I know that at Utrecht things are in that situation, and the chief people so tired out, and so impatient of a change, by the accounts even of persons who were formerly violent enemies of the House of Orange, that the Austrians would be well received; and my second brother who is here, and was in the Government and States of that Province would, I am sure, without hesitation accompany any Austrian troops that were sent on that expedition, that they might be received and looked upon as friends.

"Your Lordship may easily imagine that I would not lightly recommend any measures of this nature. I speak in the supposition of the Austrians not only making further progress, but being in a state to keep their ground. I would not lightly recommend it were it only for the risk I should expose M. de Rhoon and other persons to who are in the hands of their enemies. But should the French *be entirely cut off* from the United Provinces by the Austrian army, I should not hesitate a moment pressing the measures I allude to, as I am sure from what has passed that, far from their venturing upon any act of violence against M. de Rhoon, he would soon be out of their hands and at the head of his friends.

"I have to add that few things would make me more happy than to be authorised by your Lordship to go to M. de Clerfait's headquarters and to mention to him all I have taken the liberty of saying in this letter. I should be happy to receive letters to that officer with instructions authorising me to communicate with him on the subject; and, were I not afraid of being taxed with presumption, I should press this much more seriously on your attention. The confidence and good opinion shown me at various times by your Lordship and some of his [your?] colleagues will serve as an apology for having said so much. *The paper I had the honour of receiving before I left England, which I have constantly kept in view to guide me in the line I have pursued,* will account sufficiently for the language I hold in this letter. The line I have been, in a manner, instructed to take I shall continue to persevere in unless I hear to the contrary. I should be very happy if the latter part of the above observations was thought to deserve any attention, and if I had thus the opportunity of being more active than I have been hitherto. Should I be thought too sanguine, I have to beg your indulgence for having unnecessarily taken up so much of your time.

"I have taken every precaution not to let any part of this transpire, and to touch with the greatest prudence the subject of the interference

of Berlin, which is the more delicate for me as it no doubt may have some influence upon M. de Rhoun's position. I have had the more reason not to trouble myself much about the prevailing idea that the Court in question will interfere in concert with the other powers, that, for the moment, this idea clearly serves our cause by intimidating the adverse party. M. Van der Haer, to whom I have only suggested doubts on the subject without endeavouring to undeceive him, is strongly impressed with the existence of a concert, but still more with the conviction that no good can arise from the interference of that Court without that concert between London and Berlin. In this system he has been invariable. Nor does he look upon the former conduct of the Prussian Government as giving them a right to dictate to the friends of the House of Orange the time or the means by which is to be brought about a change which becomes every day more pressing and more necessary; and, if put off much longer, must end in the total ruin of a country, the inhabitants of which are the victims of a weak and inefficient Government and a concourse of the most disastrous circumstances.

"I have been so cautious that though Mr. Van der Haer, knowing the confidence shown me in England at different times, authorises me as well as my brother to name them and dispose of them according to the views detailed in this letter, they do not know exactly what I have written nor that I have written to your Lordship. I have *purposely* satisfied myself with proposing to them the outline of what I have been stating as likely to happen; and they assured me positively, and I know I can depend upon them, that they will be ready at all events to take the part I have mentioned.

"Here the matter rests in suspense and unknown to any one. I earnestly beg an answer from your Lordship. If you decline you will hear no more of it, nor will any inconveniency whatever arise from the refusal to any other measures that may be depending. I shall even be happy in any suggestions to the contrary which may be of service to direct our friends. If the proposals should meet with your approbation I shall be glad at any time to receive further orders. I have every reason to think that every enterprise may be kept in this suspense in the Provinces I allude to for a few months longer, without any great inconveniency, provided we receive from time to time some information to enable us to keep up the hopes of our friends. I thought this letter of too delicate a nature to be trusted to the post. I have sent it to Mr. Fraser by a safe hand, begging he will forward it by the earliest opportunity. If the answer is not in cipher, I wish it may not be sent here from Hamburgh by the post should it contain anything that might involve the safety of my friends, or be imprudent to divulge.

"I have to beg your Lordship will observe M. Van der Haer (Van Campen van Nieuwland) whom I have been mentioning is a different person from M. de Haren, another member of the former Government of the same Province. They have both been here ever since January last. I have not for many reasons let him, Mr. de Haren, into the confidence, though both zealous for the House of Orange. It would have been attended with great inconveniency from a variety of reasons. Mr. de Haren, besides, is by no means popular in his Province. He is too apt to be suddenly elated or depressed with good or bad news; and I am not sure he would have kept the secret with that degree of strictness which, if not required by the importance of the subject, is, at any rate, so essential with respect to the safety and property of many of our friends, that the least doubt on the subject is a sufficient reason for silence.



"I shall be very impatient of an answer ; and indeed could wish to receive from time [to time] some communications on the subject of my letters from your Lordship or Mr. Goddard, as it certainly would enable me to be of more service.

*Postscript.*—"I think it necessary to add that, should the further successes of the Austrians authorise us to entertain the hope of their being carried to the extent mentioned above, so as to leave no doubt of their being able without any further assistance to effect the overthrow of the present Government, in that case I should be happy to see Prince Frederick of Orange with the Austrians, and at the head of the enterprise I take the liberty of suggesting ; and that he should have all the honour and popularity attending the success. In that case I need scarcely say that M. Van der Haer and my brother are at the Prince's orders to dispose of them according to emergencies. In that case it may be right for me to give up the idea of my going to M. de Clerfait's army, though I should be equally and even more ready to go if it was wished."

#### M. REGNIER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 15, London.—"J'ai prié Mr. Aust de vous annoncer une note sur les hommes qui se trouvent aujourd'hui à la tête du Gouvernement en France. J'ai l'honneur de vous remettre cette note. Vous me permettrez de vous l'adresser directement. J'ai l'intérêt qu'elle ne soit connue que de vous. Je me flatte que vous approuveriez mes motifs, si vous m'accordez la faveur de vous les faire connaître.

"L'étendue de pouvoir accordé au Directoire Exécutif, l'état dont on l'a environné, vous ont sûrement fait juger que l'ambition de ceux qui le composent doit être satisfaite, et qu'il n'est aucuns moyens de séduction possibles auprès d'eux ; la connaissance de leurs caractères me semble devoir vous confirmer cette opinion. Les ministres, par les motifs contraires, offrent bien plus de prise. Une autre considération importante et qui ne vous a sûrement point échappé, c'est que le Directoire étant un être collectif, dont les délibérations, les résolutions, et la responsabilité sont communes, on n'aurait rien obtenu tant que tous les membres ne sont point d'accord de se laisser gagner. Chaque ministre, au contraire, est seul ordonnateur dans son département, et tout se passe dans le secret.

"Si, ce que je ne présume pas, la crainte rendait les ministres sourds aux propositions qui pourraient leur être faites, on doit tout attendre des premiers commis. Il en est plusieurs dont, moi, je répondrais.

"Je désire que la note que j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, puisse vous prouver mon désir de vous être agréable. Je vous demande votre indulgence. Vous êtes fait pour sentir qu'il est des développements que je n'ai pu me permettre dans la crainte de vous fatiguer par les détails."

*French.*

#### *Enclosure.*

#### DIRECTOIRE EXÉCUTIF.

*Barras.*—Gentilhomme de Provence, révolutionnaire par système et par sentiment. De la force et de la détermination dans le caractère ; peu de talents ; d'un esprit médiocre. La nature lui a donné de la rudesse et de la sévérité, la Révolution l'a rendu féroce et sanguinaire.

"Il était dans la seconde Assemblée Nationale au parti républicain ; mais il n'y joua aucun rôle jusqu'à l'arrivée des Marseillais à Paris,

époque à laquelle il s'associa à tous les crimes que cette horde commit dans la capitale. Son influence en Provence lui fit donner une mission près de l'armée qu'on envoya contre Toulon. Ses liaisons avec Fréron et Tallien le firent comprendre dans la liste de proscription de Robespierre. Une certaine audace dans les résolutions, un grand courage dans leur exécution, placèrent Barras parmi les chefs du parti qui précipita Robespierre.

" Il est difficile de se rien promettre d'un caractère arrogant, qui s'irrite des obstacles, dont la seule ambition, celle du pouvoir, se trouve satisfaite.

" *Carnot*.--Ancien officier dans le corps du Génie, distingué par ses talents militaires. Le besoin qu'on avait de lui pour la conduite de la guerre l'a seul soustrait au sort de tous les autres membres du Comité de Salut-Public de Robespierre. Il a des principes exagérés, un caractère haineux et vindicatif. On aurait pu tirer parti de son mécontentement s'il n'eut point été nommé au Direction Exécutif; mais une fois placé là, il s'emparera du Département de la Guerre, et s'y livrera entièrement.

" *Rewbell*.--Homme sans talents et très opiniâtre. Il est convaincu que le Cabinet de St. James entretient de nombreux agents en France auxquels il attribue tous les mouvements qui se manifestent contre l'ordre actuel des choses.

" *La Réveillère L'Époux*.--C'est un homme attrabilaire, craintif, et sans ambition de fortune ni de pouvoir; proscrit par Robespierre pour avoir protesté contre la journée du 31 Mai, 1793. Sa rentrée dans la Convention fut remarquable par son opposition au parti Jacobin. Dans les derniers moments de la Convention la peur l'a jetté dans le parti qui voulait ramener la terreur.

" *Le Tourneur*.--Homme extrêmement médiocre, ancien officier auxiliaire de la marine, et qui par cette raison se croit propre à rétablir la marine Française.

## MINISTRES.

### *Affaires Étrangères.*

" *La Croix*.--Homme de beaucoup d'esprit, très instruit en finances et en administration. Dès sa jeunesse, il fut distingué par M. Turgot, qui se l'attacha comme principal secrétaire à l'Intendance de Limoges. Il lui confia la place de premier secrétaire du Contrôle Général lorsqu'il fut appelé au Ministère des Finances. La Croix fut accusé d'avoir reçu de l'argent pour faire accorder la direction du spectacle de Lyons. M. de Maurépas demanda son renvoi à M. Turgot, qui le défendit longtems. Il céda enfin aux importunités, et La Croix fut renvoyé la veille du jour où le Roi fit redemander à M. Turgot le portefeuille des Finances. C'est à l'espèce d'acharnement que la Cour montra alors contre La Croix qu'il faut attribuer sa conduite révolutionnaire. Sa haine personnelle pour le Roi lui a fait voter la mort de le Prince.

" La nature des connaissances de La Croix, et ses travaux antérieurs le rendaient plus propre au Ministère de l'Intérieur ou à celui des Finances. En homme sage, il a évité ce dernier poste; en homme habile, il a fait nommer au Ministère de l'Intérieur Benezek, dont il dispose entièrement. La Croix n'est exagéré que dans sa haine pour les prêtres. Il ne croyait point à la durée de la République, et il s'attendait à une fin sinistre. Il le disait à ses amis.

“ La Croix a des mœurs, un caractère sage, un extérieur calme que rien n'émeut, et qui le rend impénétrable. L'amour de l'argent est la seule passion que je lui connaisse. Il y a sacrifié dans tous les temps ; et dernièrement encore, il a eu besoin de tout son talent pour sauver l'homme dont il s'était servi lors de sa mission pour la vente des meubles des maisons Royales. Il n'est pas douteux qu'on le déciderait avec de l'argent. Il y a dans le Département deux Secrétaires-Généraux et un chef de Bureau, dont je suis assuré.

• *Ministre de l'Intérieur.*

“ *Benezeck.*—Homme adroit, souple, pusillanime, la crainte lui a fait prendre un masque patriotique que la vanité lui fait quitter quand il croit pouvoir le faire sans danger. D'abord agent subalterne des États de Languedoc, ensuite Directeur d'une Compagnie de Commerce, dont les capitalistes ont perdu une partie de leurs fonds et dans laquelle Benezeck a fait sa fortune ; il s'est trouvé placé dans l'administration du Département de Versailles au moment où la Convention se forma. Peu de temps après, La Croix, ministre actuel des Affaires Etrangères, fut chargé de la vente des meubles du Château de Versailles. Cette circonstance le mit en rapport avec Benezeck, et des intérêts communs les lièrent étroitement. Benezeck n'est pas sans talents, il est surtout homme à petits expédients. Il aime beaucoup l'argent, mais la crainte qui le domine rend difficiles et même dangereux les moyens de lui en proposer, si l'on n'emploie pas les personnes qui peuvent le décider, ou par lesquelles il paraîtra se laisser tromper.

*Finances.*

“ *Faitpoul.*—Gentilhomme auquel les circonstances avaient fait accepter une place de Secrétaire-Général au Comité de Salut-Public. Il est opposé à la Révolution ; il a des obligations à un homme dont je disposais ; mais ne le croyant point destiné à une place importante, j'ai pris peu d'informations sur son caractère.

*La Guerre.*

“ *Aubert-Duboyet.*—Ses prétentions au bel esprit et à la philosophie l'ont jetté dans la Révolution. Il était dans la seconde Assemblée Nationale, du parti modéré ; il a depuis été employé dans l'armée du Rhin, et chargé de conduire la garnison de Mayence dans la Vendée. Il a été fort caressé par le parti Tallien, qui lui fit donner le commandement de l'armée des côtes de Normandie. Je ne sais pas à quel point tous les honneurs l'ont rendu Républicain. Il y a dans le Département pour Secrétaire-Général un certain Méhée intrigant décidé, homme d'esprit mais très immoral, et qui ne demande qu'à être acheté.

*La Marine.*

“ *Trugut.*—Ancien officier de la Marine Royale, dans laquelle il fut admis par faveur, étant fils d'un simple capitaine de port. Il passait dans son corps pour bon théoricien ; mais on ne croyait pas trop à son courage ; il perdait facilement la tête dans l'action. Il est souple, insinuant, adroit, et d'un caractère faible. L'ambition et le désir de la fortune lui ont fait embrasser la Révolution, dont cependant, il n'a point approuvé les excès. C'est un comme que son intérêt déterminers toujours.”

*French.*

## W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 22.—“I send you a cover with two enclosures, one a small account of M. d'Ivernois, which perhaps belongs rather to the Treasury.

“I mention, however, upon this occasion, a suggestion of his of the advantage that this country might derive, or more properly the common cause, by the possession of some periodical work on the Continent, in which the intentions and conduct of the allies should be fairly set forth; and a proposal for this purpose of assisting, at a very small expense, a work about to be established on that plan by a Mr. Pictet of Geneva, a man well known in the literary world, and who, he says, is perfectly well-disposed to this country. The sum which he conceived to be necessary to enable Mr. Pictet to carry his plan into execution is so small as not to be an object of a moment's consideration; and I cannot but think that the advantage of such a work which, without being under the direction of Government, might in general be in conformity to its views, would be very considerable.

“The last object which I have to mention, and the second of the two papers enclosed, is a collection of memorandums from M. de Moustier relative to his mission, and which you may like to look over previous to your seeing him. They are drawn up, as you will probably think, with too much diplomatic formality; but from this, after having given in that respect a cast of his art, he seems perfectly willing to relax.

“Some of his provisions seem to me perfectly good. It will be certainly right to settle some rate at which we would be willing to purchase the possession of the places which he enumerates, and to enable him, either by a deposit in his hands or by a credit on certain houses, to make good the necessary payments. A similar provision should, I apprehend, be made, under certain restrictions, for the securing pay to any of the Republican troops. I have no apprehension for my own part that M. de Moustier is not perfectly to be trusted. His fault is that he is apt to be too busy, and to suppose that when he is not idle, he must be doing good.

“Upon this occasion, and with a view to the prospects that are every day opening in that country, I cannot but lament what seems to be the determination of the Cabinet that no derangement is to be made, however inconsiderable, of the general naval service for the sake of keeping possession of Quiberon. The fleet once withdrawn, it is perfectly possible that the enemy will take possession of it, and by stationing a few ships in proper places, and assisting them with gun-boats and batteries on shore, make it impossible for us ever afterwards to have any use of that station. How far this will be advantageous for the mere naval service may well be a question; but I am sure if the consequence must be, as it must, the total interception of all means of communicating with and aiding the Royalists, the general loss to the interests of the war will be such as no naval advantages, were they ten times greater than they can be hoped to be, will ever compensate. Unless it shall be the opinion of naval officers, which the accounts that I have received formerly from French naval officers does not lead me to expect, that the enemy may always be dislodged from there, I, for one, must protest strongly against that station being given up. Should the enemy, upon Admiral Harvey's coming away, slip in a few ships of the line from Orient, there is an end of all hopes of landing M. de Moustier, and much more, any of the stores which it will be desirable to send with him. There will be an end, too, if they cannot be displaced, of any

further effectual support to be given to the enemies of the Republic in that quarter."

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1795, December 26, Berlin.—"The anxiety I feel to put your Lordship accurately in possession of the sentiments of this Court, on the several questions to which your Lordship directed my attention, has led me to be extremely prolix in my public letters. I must trust for your indulgence, in consideration of my motive. In those letters I have only given the opinions which I received directly from the Ministers, but the tendency of them has been confirmed to me from various quarters.

"As to the dispositions of the individual members of Government, of the King, and of his secret advisers, they remain, so far as I learn, what your Lordship knows them to have been. Count Haugwitz, the only efficient minister, not absolutely untrue to the principles on which he concerted the negotiation with Lord Malmesbury; Count Finckenstein and Baron Alvensleben having no decided line in regard to the danger from France, and supporting M. Struensee's firm opposition, founded on the wants of Treasury. M. Bischoffswerder and other personal friends of the King agree in this with M. Struensee; and the general temper of the army is against the war with France. The King himself is, evidently, a well-wisher to the cause of the allies, and would be happy that his army should bear an active part in accomplishing their object.

"Neither the Ministers nor the King made any direct mention to me of a subsidy from England; and I can assure your Lordship that I have not made the most remote reference to it. On comparing, however, what I collect from all quarters, I can have no doubt that, if it is wished to secure to the coalition the assistance of Prussia, it will be found requisite to afford some pecuniary aid, or hold out some positive indemnification, without which any favourable dispositions which exist here can certainly not obtain a decided superiority.

"Perhaps your Lordship may perceive some benefit from desiring M. Woronzow and M. Stahremberg to write to the Austrian and Russian ministers residing here, and to state the degree of confidence and concert in which the three Courts now act. I suggest this from no disappointment in this respect since my arrival; as Prince Reuss came to me immediately, and has repeatedly, within this week, brought me what he considered as material intelligence; and I have no doubt to meet also with confidence from the Russian mission, when I become more acquainted. But a line from these Ministers in England, stating how *they* are treated, would probably be more effectual than any assurances I can give, as a claim to a communication of their information. I did, indeed, wait on Count Stahremberg and M. Woronzow in London for this purpose; but Count Stahremberg has forgot to write Prince Reuss, and I was unfortunate in not finding M. Woronzow at home.

"There is little doubt of the good wishes of the Empress of Russia for the restoration of the Stadholder. But is it your Lordship's opinion that we have to expect so far the co-operation of the Emperor for bringing forward the King of Prussia on this occasion, as to justify my making every communication upon it to the Austrian Minister?"

C. BENTINCK to Mr. GODDARD.

1795, December 29, [Varel].—"The following abstracts from different letters lately received will confirm what has been lately communicated from this place. The commission sent by the new States-General to the provinces of Friezland and Groningen in order to bring them over to the plan for a National Convention adopted in Holland, has completely failed in those Provinces, where the plan has been rejected. The perplexity the new rulers are under is so great that they apply in these Provinces to the members of the ancient government for support and protection.

"General Dumonceau and others have been at Leuwarden. 12,000,000 gulden have been required for the defence of the country, besides 1,000,000 by the West India Committee, and no money is to be found. The Ministers of the Cabal write from Paris that the French Government were determined to conclude a peace at any price. That *they would not lose sight* of the alliance with Holland. *But* that they must call back their troops, as they wanted them themselves.

"That it was strongly reported some negotiation was going on at Paris between the Prince of Orange and the present Government to bring about a change. (This seems very improbable.)

"The French have left the Nieuwe Schants in Groningen, and been replaced by a Dutch garrison.

"A professor at Groningen has received a letter from his father, who is a member of the Committee of General Confederation at the Hague, which contains the following remarkable expressions. *The game is up; the ancient constitution will be re-established. May we but obtain our pardon from our enemies.* A schoolmaster at the same place received a letter from the father of one of his pupils recommending his son and answering for the usual payments, *though he (the father) will be under the necessity of leaving the country.*

"Van der Steeg, a leading revolutionist at Groningen, has been sending part of his property out of the country; 30,000 gulden have been seized at Delftziel.

"The Dutch papers talk of the revolts in the French armies. Some of the French troops in Groningen refused lately to march to the Rhine, if some of the Dutch did not go with them. Neither of them show any inclination to fight the battles of the new Government.

"A friend of ours in Friezland had made a plan to bring off about 80 English seamen, whose ship was wrecked on that coast. He had given out they were Americans, had actually secured fishing boats for that purpose, and a pilot who spoke English. But it was discovered. He afterwards spoke to the French Commandant in the Province, and, by his means, prevented their being put in a common prison, and procured every attention to be shown to the officer or officers. What is singular is that the person I am speaking of is still in Friezland unmolested.

"In different parts of the country the inhabitants refuse to contribute for the payment of the armed force. In Friezland the national guards who, as I have mentioned in a former letter, have refused to march to the frontier, alleging they were only levied for the internal tranquillity, now refuse to take the oath that forms a part of the new plan for their organisation. The disputes between the military, the national guards, and the inhabitants on the one part, and the Government on the other, become more frequent every day. The hopes and exertions of the friends of the old Government in those parts of the country I am acquainted with are still more encouraged by those divisions. At Out-

kirk the tree of Liberty having been blown down, an Orange tree has been substituted."

*Enclosing* extracts from letters reporting the state of public feeling in some of the Eastern Provinces of the Dutch Republic.

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December, London.—"Je connais trop mon pays et ceux qui le gouvernent pour n'être pas certain que le Ministère Autrichien sera singulièrement frappé de la lecture du message du Roi porté hier par M. Pitt à la Chambre des Communes. Vous jugez bien qu'il faut que je me hâte de lui donner à cet égard des explications, s'il est possible avant que les papiers ne lui parviennent.

"Mais toujours fidèle à mes principes, je ne veux mander que ce que vous approuverez. Donnez-moi donc vos ordres, en peu de mots, ou par écrit; mais, en vérité, daignez ne pas oublier qu'on me prendrait pour un sot si je me taisais tout-à-fait vis-à-vis de ma Cour dans cette occasion. Il faut rassurer ou expliquer."

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795, December, London.]—"Il est bien cruel à moi de vous tourmenter toujours; cependant permettez que je vous demande la restitution des remarques que mon amitié vous a confié. Je connais trop Milord Grenville et Monsieur Pitt pour avoir la moindre inquiétude sur l'usage qu'ils en ont fait, et ma confiance aveugle dans toutes les occasions leur prouvera à tous les deux combien je suis pénétré de ce sentiment. J'écris ce soir par mon courier absolument dans votre sens, et je crois très utile à la bonne intelligence et harmonie nécessaire entre nos Cours, que la mienne soit prévenue à temps du véritable sens du message du Roi, et du langage des Ministres, qu'on ne manquera pas (surtout si nos ennemis s'en mêlent) d'interpréter de mille manières différentes."

*French.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795 ?] December 31.—"You do me indeed but justice in supposing me very deeply affected from so many considerations by the accounts of Lord Camelford's misfortune. I could not have imagined that even in the island of Barbados, notoriously the most lawless and ill-affected of any of the West Indian Islands, a jury could have been found to have stated on their oaths the melancholy result of an affray on the very old and very disputed question of impressing, as a *wilful murder* on the part of Lord Camelford. I know enough of the constant disputes on that subject in all our islands, and more particularly in Barbados, not to be surprised at any such affray; and at any violence, even of the most violent kind, offered to the navy officers who may have engaged in that duty. I would therefore risk everything upon the opinion that he was 'sinned against' before he was driven to the extremity of killing a man (even if he did kill him) in his own defence. But no guilt on an affray of such a nature can be qualified by the term wilful murder, unless by a prejudice and an inflammatory persecution, as violent as it is illegal.

"Any further legal proceedings must be had in England; for I feel confident that Admiral Harvey's discretion as well as his justice (and particularly with the question that must arise from Lord Camelford's

rank) will unless the whole affair is made up, send him to England. But, upon the whole, I should be inclined to think that it will wholly blow over; and I am the more sanguine in these hopes from understanding that Governor Ricketts has not officially noticed it (though it happened on the 7th) in his letters of as late a date as the 14th; which, of course, he would have done for instruction on the difficulty arising out of Lord Camelford's peerage. Perhaps it may be wise to consider *that* question (I believe there is no precedent) and if the lawyers think that the inquest and verdict is removable by *certiorari* to the King in Parliament, directions may be given (grounded on the rumour of such an inquest and verdict) for removing it. This may be done by secret instructions to the Governor, who may, at the same time, be ordered not to interfere by this procedure unless Lord Camelford should, by any circumstance, be in custody of the civil power of that island. I have writ what has first occurred to me; but, if it could be of any relief to your mind that I should come to London or to Dropmore to converse upon it, or for any other purpose, you know that I am ready at a moment to do anything that you or your good little woman can wish, or that could assist Lady Camelford. The trial is indeed severe to those so near to him; but I feel the whole is so much exaggerated, that I am less anxious than I should have been at seeing the transaction stated more coolly and less exceptionally."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, January 3, Wimbledon.—"Sir. J. Warren arrived yesterday. By his account the Royalists in Poitou, Brittany, and part of Normandy are in great force, and the Republican troops remaining are said to be only 14,000, and those much inclined to desert. He supposes it scarce possible, till spring, to land any considerable articles on the coast of Poitou, but very easy to do so from Jersey, on the northern part of Britany and in Normandy. In the latter the Royalists are said to be at Avranches. He does not think that there would be any difficulty in attacking the enemy in Quiberon Bay, if they should take possession of it, or that their doing [so] could prevent us from landing supplies in some parts of that coast. And he seems to suppose that a considerable quantity of arms and clothing, and a *very* moderate supply of money, is all that is wanting to ensure their driving the Republicans out of these provinces. By the help of small sums of money, he supposes most of the Republican force will be led to desert. We have appointed a meeting with him and Windham at twelve to-morrow, and I mean afterwards to appoint Montier [Moustier] who has sent to desire to see me. The chief difficulty, I think, will be, whether frigates can now be sent with safety, without a greater naval force to support them, at least till we have further intelligence from Brest and L'Orient. This business, and that of an Irish Secretary which is not yet brought to a point, prevents the possibility of my coming to you at present. I therefore hope we shall meet in town on Tuesday or Wednesday at latest.

"Dundas and I have been talking over the state of our West India prospects, after the repeated disasters which tend to retard and weaken the expedition, and we are both strongly impressed with the idea that, advanced as the season will be before operations can commence, we ought now (with a view either to war or peace) to make St. Domingo our first object of offence, after securing what we still retain in the Leeward Islands. You will receive the drafts of instructions formed on this idea, on which I shall wish much to know your opinions.



"I send you some French papers, lest they should not have reached you. The accounts they contain from the army leave us in great suspense. The finance seems going on as one could wish."

"That part of the instructions which relates to the Spanish part of St. Domingo is of course a matter of a good deal of delicacy, especially in the very unsettled state in which the discussion seems left at Madrid. But this point will not affect the general question, which ought to be the principal object of our operations."

#### THE DUKE OF PORTLAND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, January 4, London.—"I have been assured from a very authentic quarter that it is Mr. Windham's intention to quit the diplomatic line entirely, and that he is determined, at all events, to desire to be removed from Florence without delay; this would make an opening which, if I could see filled by my son-in-law, Mr. Greville, would give me great pleasure. I say no more; the confidence with which I rely in your good intentions, and on the reasonableness of my expectations, prevents my importuning you with any argument or apology for the liberty I have taken."

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, January 8, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville will direct the letter that accompanies this for the Duchess of Brunswick to be sent by the messenger who goes this night for Brunswick with the agreeable account of the safe delivery of the Princess of Wales of a daughter. I suppose letters of notification to the usual Courts must be prepared so as to be sent by the next mail."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO W. PITT.

1796, January 25, Dropmore —"I received the accompanying papers here this evening. The signification of an order to me from one of my colleagues, through his under-secretary, to execute in future a part of his business for him is new in form. But I hope I have both temper and understanding enough to consider such a proceeding in its true light, and to look only at the substance of the proposal made to me, as it affects the public service and the cause in which I am embarked. I had hoped, on the footing on which I have lived with Mr. Dundas, that it could never have been necessary for me to come to an official and formal explanation with him on the duties annexed to our different stations in the King's service. But, on the present occasion, I must say to you, as to the head of the Administration in which I bear a part, that nothing short of a direct order from the King annexing this business to the Foreign Department, will make me undertake the conduct of it; as indeed I conceive such an order would be also absolutely necessary to justify the different Departments of the public service, who now act under the orders of the Secretary of State for the War Department, in obeying such instructions as they may receive not from him, nor even from the Secretary of State for the Home Department, but from the Foreign Office.

"My reason for declining this task is, I hope, sufficiently obvious, and such as no mortal can ascribe to a desire of shifting on other shoulders a business which is become difficult and critical, and become so, in part, by the manner in which it has hitherto been suffered to proceed. In communicating with the Duke de Harcourt in explaining

to him and either through him, or more directly to *Monsieur*, or to the Royalists the general political views of this Government respecting them, and the engagements which we can contract with them, or which we may be under the necessity of contracting with their enemies, I conceive I go to the full extent of what the duty of my situation can either require or authorise. But as to undertaking the detail of their supply and the direction of that part of it which depends on the Ordnance, Victualling, Clothing, Navy, and Transport Departments, I know myself unequal to it. I possess none of the details, I have no means of acquiring them. I have no right to interfere in them except as a Cabinet Councillor, and I cannot, because I ought not, make myself in any degree responsible for them.

"If such an undertaking had been proposed to me in the original division of the State Office, I should, for these reasons, most unquestionably have declined it. I must do so much more now, when I have taken upon myself the duties of a different employment, one which, God knows, is a burthen amply sufficient for any talents I can lay claim to. I have already said that nothing but the King's commands, regularly signified to me, will alter that determination; those I am not at liberty to dispute, having entered into his service in a time of prosperity and ease, and being little disposed to raise difficulties under different circumstances.

"I wished to avoid even the appearance of peevishness either at the manner of this thing or at the thing itself, and have therefore returned the papers not through Huskisson, as I received them, but through you. I must request you to give them back to that Office to which they belong, and, in so doing, you are of course at liberty to communicate the whole or any part of this letter as you shall think best; my object being not to raise or to foment dissensions, but to execute honestly what I have undertaken, and not to undertake what I know I cannot execute."

*Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, January 28th, Lausanne.—"Though my letter of this day's date is sufficiently long, yet I shall venture to add some observations to it of a private nature that I should particularly wish not to be seen by any but his Majesty's Ministers.

"1st. It was stated in the famous debate of the 13th, that no confidence whatever could be placed in the commanders of the *cordon* on the frontiers, as they were all in the pay of the British Minister.

"The fact is that, without being *all* in pay, the Colonels Roland and Arpean, and the Major Ronsillon (the three gentlemen entrusted with that important charge) are most entirely devoted to me, and there is no service how difficult or dangerous soever it might be that, in a case of urgency, they would not immediately render to the cause in which his Majesty is engaged. This is perfectly well known at Bern, and I was myself well aware at the time that I secured their services that it would be impossible to keep it secret. But I knew, at the same time, that the most violent democrat in the Council of 200 would not dare to propose the removal of any of them, the tranquillity, if not the entire preservation of the Pays de Vaud depending most notoriously upon the tried conduct, talents, courage, and fidelity of these three gentlemen.

"2nd. The Avoyer de Steiguer though extremely alarmed in the first moment for the business of the gunpowder, which he had imagined to be

much more serious than it really was, wrote immediately to Major Rousillon (whom he supposed to have purchased it on my account) to desire that he would convey *his merchandise* through the county of Neuchâtel for about three weeks to come, *before which time all alarm would have subsided, and the transit would be as free as ever again.*

“Upon this occasion I should wish to observe that all the powder and ammunition that I have sent into the interior has been either purchased at Geneva and forwarded from thence immediately, or has been deposited at Geneva and entered there as property of some inhabitant of that place before it has passed the frontiers of France. So that, in point of fact, this Canton has never been committed by my means. The Avoyer’s letter to Major Rousillon was founded upon mere conjecture.

“3rd. The comedy of the Banneret Fischer’s mission terminated in his passing two nights quietly in my house in consultation with M. Précy and myself upon the safest means of passing *our merchandise*, and the safest hands through which it might pass when my removal to Berne should render my communication with Geneva more difficult. Such is the country in which I now live. There is nothing that may not be done here with adequate means, provided it be of a nature that will admit of its being done *quietly*, and without giving an alarm. But for the constant clamour of the *French* mission, and the perpetual and indiscreet babble of the *French* emigrants, it would scarcely be known that his Majesty had a minister in Switzerland.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, January 30, Downing Street.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to submit to your Majesty the draft of a dispatch to Sir Morton Eden, which was this day read and approved at the meeting of your Majesty’s confidential servants, as a measure which the circumstances and situation of public affairs appear to render necessary and expedient. Considering the great importance of the subject, Lord Grenville does not presume to take this step without previously submitting it to your Majesty’s consideration, but he would not discharge his duty to your Majesty if he did not take the liberty to add that, as far as he is capable of forming a judgment upon the subject, such a declaration or communication as is there mentioned, especially if it can be made jointly in your Majesty’s name and that of the Emperor, could not but produce the most advantageous effects both at home and abroad. If it should, in the result, produce from France such an answer as it seems most reasonable to expect, from what is known of the views and dispositions of the present rulers there, it would, as Lord Grenville hopes, give additional energy and animation to the public mind here, and would probably lead to much discontent and demur in France. If, on the contrary, it should lead to the opening a negotiation on a footing consistent with the honour and interests of your Majesty and your allies, the present exhausted state of France, though it is yet not such as to preclude the possibility of another campaign on their part, would yet afford a reasonable ground for expecting terms of peace highly advantageous and honourable, particularly to your Majesty’s dominions.

“Lord Grenville is by no means insensible that to these considerations others of great weight may be opposed, as is natural with respect to a subject so extensive in its nature and so important in its consequences. In humbly submitting to your Majesty those arguments and that opinion which prevail in his judgment, he discharges the duty which he owes to your Majesty, and he trusts to the experience which

he has so often had of your Majesty's goodness for a favourable interpretation of them. If your Majesty should on the whole be pleased to authorise him to send the despatch in its present form, it will, he presumes, be necessary to make communications of a similar import (as far as the difference of circumstances may permit) to your Majesty's other allies, and Lord Grenville will in that case lose no time in executing the business in that shape."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, January 31, Windsor.—"I have this morning received Lord Grenville's note accompanying the draft of a dispatch to Sir Morton Eden, read and approved yesterday at a meeting of the Cabinet, which [in] the circumstances and situation of public affairs appeared to them to be necessary and expedient. I do not in the least mean to make any obstinate resistance to the measure proposed, though I own I cannot feel the utility of it; my mind is not of a nature to be guided by the object of obtaining a little applause, or staying off some abuse; rectitude of conduct is my sole aim. I trust the rulers in France will reject any proposition from hence short of a total giving up of every advantage we may have gained, and therefore that the measure proposed will meet with a refusal."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, February 1, Varel.—"I transmit to your Lordship two reports, relating chiefly to the Province of Groningen and to the eastern frontier of the Republic, which I have had from Mr. Van der Haer, the person I have frequently mentioned before. I have received them with the express leave of communicating them wherever I thought they might be of service, as well as everything I hear from him. The Report, No. 2, dated Groningen January 19th, is drawn up by an engineer. The one, No. 1, dated Leer the 18th, is not; though I have every reason to think the writer a very intelligent man. What I have been saying, and their not being drawn up at the same time, will sufficiently account for the statements varying somewhat from each other, as the position of the troops in that quarter has of late been constantly changing. The result of all these reports is that the French are not as yet in any great force in those parts of the Republic; that they are however directing their attention towards them, though at this moment, the whole of the frontier I allude to is not in a state of defence. What I receive from time to time I shall continue to transmit, as no doubt the situation may vary from day to day. I have omitted some reflections on the points of attack, which were annexed to the Report dated January 19. They would be of little use without the necessary guides; and I am happy to say, if a time should come to act, not only any further report may be had that may be required, but it will be easy to procure proper guides. In a great many parts of Groningen, and most parts of Friesland, we are sure of the co-operation of the inhabitants. It seems that in the town of Groningen they are nearly divided; and it should not be forgot that our friends (excepting about three thousand of Mr. Van der Haer's in Friesland) are without arms, so that nothing is to be expected without a sufficient body of foreign troops marching into the country. The strength of this body of troops must depend upon the future operations of the French. The suspension of arms will no doubt enable them to take measures against an attack from without,

if it enters into their plan, and unless the Austrians should open the next campaign with the vigour and success which have marked the last. *In the actual state of things*, I must not be so sanguine as I was in some of my last.

“Mr. Van der Haer has constantly stated to his friends in the Provinces of Groningen and Friesland his confidence of support, but he has always represented it as somewhat more distant than he himself anxiously wishes it to be, that his friends might not be discouraged by disappointment or delay. At the same time he has taken his measures to be ready, at all events in those parts of the Republic where he may be of use, as I have mentioned in former letters; and he has written to the Hereditary Prince of Orange, and to Prince Frederick, to represent in the strongest terms the inconveniences and mischief that will arise from delay and disappointment.

“Our apprehensions at this moment are shortly these: 1. What I have taken notice of before, that the French will make use of the opportunity to prepare against an attack. 2. That too many delays and disappointments will discourage our friends, unless we receive *some positive assurances* to keep up their hopes. 3. That in the meantime a *National Convention* (one and indivisible) will be established under pretence of framing a new constitution, but in fact vested with arbitrary and unlimited powers. We are afraid that, notwithstanding the opposition of Amsterdam, Friesland, and Zeeland, the destruction of the Federal Government will take place, and that the whole authority will be vested in a National Assembly before any constitution is even thought of that might guide the new representatives, and that might give some chance of checking the abuse of such monstrous powers, and in this manner a *revolutionary Government* will be established.

“That there is some intention of this sort the Report of the Commission appointed to examine into the conduct of the State prisoners gives reason to apprehend. It is therein stated that, according to the existing laws, and the rules of conduct prescribed to courts of justice in practice under the ancient government, they have no grounds of accusation against these prisoners. But that sound policy, natural justice, the imprescriptible rights of man, and revolutionary principles would no doubt justify further proceedings, which they must defer to the period the National Convention of the whole Republic meet, who would be the best judges of the most proper mode of prosecuting any further enquiry.

“I earnestly hope, particularly if our apprehensions are founded, that the Austrians will penetrate into the Netherlands before long and be able to maintain themselves. That when the French are cut off, *or sufficiently occupied on that side* a considerable military force may fall upon them on this. I am sure, as I have said in former letters, that at this moment, under these data, a very decisive blow might be struck. But, unless a much more considerable force could be brought to act upon the point I allude to than we have hitherto any reason to expect, I take it for granted I am still to look upon the further successes of the Austrians as necessary to bring about any measures for the emancipation of the United Provinces; though I feel strongly the mischief and scenes of violence with which they are perhaps threatened, should the necessary efforts from without be delayed much longer.

“Mr. Van der Haer and his friends are entitled to every commendation for their spirit, perseverance, and exertions. The man who takes a chief part in Groningen, and is, I believe, well thought of by the Princess of Orange, is highly respected by our friends for his talents, activity, and courage; and should Mr. Van der Haer and his friends be

in any wise instrumental in rescuing the Republic from its ignominious state of subjection, I am sure the most perfect concert will subsist between these two Provinces; and influence and authority will be acquired by a set of men who will remain fast friends of England. I only wish the object was thought of more immediate importance in the great scale of Europe. M. Van der Haer and my brother (who was in the Government of Utrecht) know that I write to England on the subject, but I can depend entirely on their discretion, and on their not naming me *anywhere* without my permission.

"I cannot help observing that I have not had a letter from your Lordship since that dated April 22. Yet a few lines from a person in a high situation, let the expressions be ever so general, always give encouragement and confidence, and enable to speak more positively to the persons concerned. In that point of view, as far as I have had any opportunities of interfering, I have derived great advantage from the paper I had the honour of receiving from your Lordship, which I left in England. For above four months Mr. Van der Haer has taken few steps or written few letters which he has not previously concerted with my brother and with me. This is not known, though at different times we have had a great deal of company here; and must not be known anywhere on account of M. de Rhoon's situation, which obliges us to more caution than would otherwise be required. I take the liberty of expressing my wish that I might receive a letter containing some handsome expressions of M. Van der Haer, which I might repeat to him. It is the only acknowledgment I know that *we* can make him.

*Postscript.*—"On January 13 there was a tumult at Leuwarden which ended in the arrestation of seven members of the Municipality. About the same time there were some riots at Groningen; all with a view of forcing the representatives of Groningen and Friesland to give their consent to the meeting of the National Convention for the Republic (one and indivisible) at the Hague. At Groningen they have succeeded. The seven members taken up at Lieuwarden were for this measure against the Republicans and against the Federal Government. At Groningen several persons attached to the ancient Government were ill-used. Messrs. Engelhard (father and son), Ficaal Brugmans, and others ran some risk. Everything seems quiet again. The tumults have not had at Groningen all the effect intended; on the contrary they seem to have made our friends more active, and more determined to risk a great deal in order to overturn the present system.

"They write from Hamburgh that Messrs. Voorda and Valkenaar who conduct the prosecution against the Prince of Orange, have given it as their opinion that the Prince ought to lose his head."

*Enclosing reports of the state of the defences, and the distribution of armed forces along the eastern frontier of the Republic.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, February 8, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to submit for your Majesty's consideration the drafts of dispatches to your Majesty's ministers at Berlin, Petersburg, Vienna and Switzerland, which have this day been read at the meeting of your Majesty's servants and approved by them. If your Majesty should be pleased to approve of Lord Grenville's sending these instructions, the messengers might go by to-morrow's mail, as it seems material that no time should be lost in executing those parts of them which more immediately press in point of time. From the tenor of some of the secret papers which your Majesty will receive with these drafts Lord Grenville is very

apprehensive that no cordial co-operation can be looked for from the Court of Berlin."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, February 9, Queen's House.—"I have read Lord Grenville's draft of instructions to the Earl of Elgin in consequence of the letters received from him of a supposed change of language at the Court of Berlin, as far as an appearance of being willing to take again part in the coalition against the common enemy. I perfectly agree with Lord Grenville that at present no reliance can be placed in this opinion, but that every idea of a subsidy being furnished anew from hence to effect that salutary purpose cannot be thought of; but I cannot approve of any hint, though ever so indefinite, that bears any allusion to the Court of Vienna giving up the Low Countries and obtaining Bavaria; this would destroy every real utility of Austria to Britain, but, what is much worse, be disposing of the country of a Prince because less able to defend himself. This is so immoral and unjustifiable a proceeding that I cannot but in the outset protest against it, and in the same manner against the King of Prussia's acquiring any territory from the Bishoprics in Westphalia

"I do not expect the Court of Petersburg will quite approve or admit of the reasoning stated in the dispatches to Sir Charles Whitworth, as to seeking a negotiation with the present rulers in France, or the rejecting the idea formed in the North to bring the King of Prussia anew into the coalition. As to the former I perhaps agree with Russia, and nothing but the opinion of my Ministers would have made me not reject the idea, which I certainly can now only not protest against; yet, at the same time, not seeing as they do, cannot wish the measure to succeed; and indeed look on the French as too haughty to give any answer but such as will unite every opinion of the impossibility of treating with them at present.

"What I have alleged against the exchange of Bavaria and the acquisition of territories in Westphalia in the dispatch to the Earl of Elgin holds equally against the same objects in that to Sir Morton Eden.

"As to the communication to be made by Mr. Wickham, Lord Grenville must think that I wish to pass that over in silence, as I do not expect it will meet with the answer some expect, and that I never would have entered into the war but on a fair supposition that we meant to go through with it."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, February 9, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has this day been honoured with your Majesty's commands upon the subjects of the drafts which he had prepared of instructions to your Majesty's Ministers abroad. Nothing can be more mortifying to him than to find that on every occasion, especially on points of such importance, his opinion and the advice which his duty leads him humbly to submit to your Majesty do not entirely accord with your Majesty's sentiments. Lord Grenville does not presume, unless your Majesty should please to require it of him, to intrude upon your Majesty's time with any more detailed reasoning upon the point in question. And his only motive for now troubling your Majesty was the doubt whether it was your Majesty's pleasure that he should send the despatch agreeably to the opinion formed

yesterday after much consideration by your Majesty's servants, and humbly submitted to your Majesty by Lord Grenville, or whether your Majesty's intention was that Lord Grenville should stop the messengers and again bring the subject under the consideration of your Majesty's servants.

"Lord Grenville begs leave to add that he has not thought himself at liberty to make any communication of your Majesty's note except to Mr. Pitt, and that he shall feel it his duty to govern himself in that respect by your Majesty's commands. And he hopes your Majesty will believe that nothing but the strongest sense of duty, added to the great importance of the subject, could lead him to press your Majesty to the adoption of any measure which does not perfectly and entirely accord with your Majesty's sentiments."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, February 9, Queen's House.—"I certainly have not expressed myself clearly if what I wrote to Lord Grenville carries an idea of postponing the dispatching the messenger with the instructions that have been drawn up with the concurrence of the Cabinet; I therefore consent to his proceeding according to their advice; but I should not have acted either openly or honestly had I not expressed my own sentiments on the subject, and no reasoning of Lord Grenville on this subject could move me from what I think the line of morality, though perhaps not of politics. I always choose to act on simple principles; Italian politics are too complicated paths for my understanding."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1796, February 9, Cleveland Row.—"I am too much fatigued with the press of business which the sending off these two messengers occasions, to be able to add anything to my public letter to you, nor indeed does it occur to me that there is anything very material to be said that I have there omitted.

"You will see that we are slow of belief with respect to Prussian co-operation, and that after what passed two years ago we are resolved that the service shall precede the payment. On the other hand, I apprehend our friends at Berlin will insist no less steadily that the payment shall come first, and will mean to reserve it to their own discretion whether after that the service shall come at all; so that I doubt we shall not easily agree. Some good may be done in France and in other parts of Europe by the public manner in which they talk of all this at Berlin; but that very circumstance seems to prove that they mean only to alarm France, and to carry some point with her."

*Copy.*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, February 18. [Whitehall].—"I am led now to speak of a subject of higher importance, I mean the general situation of the Royalists; the views that we have on that part of the war; and, above all, the relation in which we stand to this description of persons; the question on all which becomes every day more critical and anxious.

"My own firm persuasion is that, even at this hour, supposing the war to go on, if the endeavours of this country were fairly laid out



(short even of assistance in men, though that is certainly what I should wish) in support of that cause, that a great portion of this side of France is recoverable from the Republic; and possibly a great chance given of the downfall of the whole system.

"But there is another view in which this question is not less important, nor concerns us less nearly.

"If we do not proceed with respect to these people in a way different from that which we have followed hitherto, and in which I fear we are still proceeding, it is not the notice that we are now giving that will acquit us in the eyes of God or man of having been cruelly wanting in that assistance which even our own declarations, and still more the nature of the case itself, authorised them to expect at our hands. With respect to the notice which we have sent, I would wish you to consider whether it does not make the matter rather worse than better. We have given them an assurance which we do not care to take ourselves. We have promised them supplies in general; but when a specification is called for, we find that we know ourselves too well to venture upon any particular sum, however limited.

"What we have done hitherto has certainly no correspondence to any idea that either friend or foe would have formed of the extent of the assistance which we might have been expected to furnish.

"Of the money sent into that country, the whole that I can trace, from the beginning of the war down to the present time, and conveyed in any way, is not more than seven or eight and twenty thousand pounds. The quantity of powder I have not by me, nor do I know exactly the account. But the greatest quantity that has been thrown in, at any one time, was somewhat less than 400 barrels by the zeal and activity of Sir S. Warren, spared from his own ships; and upon the remains of which the army of Charette, that army which has resisted the armies that Spain could not resist, is now subsisting.

"We have undertaken two expeditions, one of which failed indeed with circumstances infinitely afflicting, but not in a way by any means to render it useless, nor in the smallest degree to invalidate any grounds on which it was undertaken, and which might recommend other attempts of the same sort. The second attempt was undertaken with only negative failure; and that after being delayed and reduced in a manner to leave it but little title to expect success.

"If such is the state of this question with respect to the Government in general, there are circumstances that make it bear upon me individually in a manner still more delicate and distressing.

"A variety of little causes have contributed to put this service almost entirely under my care. I have had it because nobody else would. I have become insensibly a sort of foreign minister for the Chouans; an office of which I am not going to boast; as, I am afraid, it appears to many analogous to one that one has sometimes heard of, called king of the gipsies.

"This office, however, I should be perfectly disposed to execute with all possible zeal, and with no fear of its disgracing my pains, if I were possessed of the *means* of executing it. But if the only duties of this character are to amuse these unfortunate people with evasive excuses, and to hold out promises which I have no hope of performing, you will see that, without speaking with any spleen or peevishness, it is impossible that I can continue in the situation. I must, in some way or other, make known to them that I can no longer serve them, and must not be instrumental, either actively or passively, in leading them into opinions which I cannot hope to see realised.

"I wish, therefore, most earnestly, that you would lend your hand in bringing this to a point. It would be easy for me personally to take care of myself; but I certainly cannot 'let this cause down the wind' without feeling that its 'jesses are my dear heart-strings,' nor is it easy to clear myself without the risk of mischief beyond that which would be necessary to my own safety.

"Our parting last night without anything being said upon this subject proceeded possibly from each person's waiting for someone else to begin. But I must confess that, though I shall be very glad to discuss it, I feel great repugnance to being the proposer. Both because I cannot hope any good from the proposal, unless it is considered as a general concern, and equally proper for anyone else as for me; and because there is a degree of ridicule in appearing pertinaciously to attach to any object or opinion a degree of importance, which one cannot get others to share.

"I beg pardon for this long letter, by which I may have tried, I fear, both you and myself."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, February 18, Varel.—"In my last letters I sent your Lordship some very circumstantial accounts of the force and state of defence of the frontier of the Republic on this side, of the disposition of the inhabitants chiefly in the Provinces of Friesland and Groningen, and of the violent measures by which their apparent consent was obtained to the favourite plan of those who have assumed the government in the Province of Holland, namely, the National Convention of the whole Republic. The enclosed abstracts of letters, numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, relating chiefly to the disposition of the people, and to what passed since the 29th ultimo, confirm what I have said in former letters, and show that I have not exaggerated in stating it to be so very favourable. The paper number 1 is ante-dated January 18, for reasons which it is unnecessary to detail, but was written after the violent scenes that took place between the 22nd and 29th instant, of which I sent Mr. Goddard the details by my letter of the 5th and 9th February. By this paper it appears that, in addition to the 3,000 farmers and country people Mr. Van der Haer can dispose of upon an emergency by his own immediate influence, he is assured of the support of between 2,000 and 3,000 more in those parts of the country alluded to. The letter number 2 confirms in general the good will of the people in the strongest terms, with some circumstances of what passed in Friesland after the 29th ultimo. By the letter dated Leer, February 15, number 3, it appears that the authority of De Bere and his committee was of short duration, and that it was not meant they should reap the fruit of their violence. Number 4, a letter I had from Mr. Van der Haer, who was gone to Leer in Oostfriesland to confer with some of his friends, contains still more circumstantial details of what passed in consequence of the outrages of the infamous De Bere, with his infamous committee. These abstracts confirm strongly what I have said in former letters of the disposition of the people; and it seems De Bere's appearance and violent proceedings had excited so much indignation and resentment that he was attacked, pelted, and pursued by the mob, and at last forced to fly the country in disguise. Those who employed him did not judge it expedient or practicable to protect him from the general fury.

"The persons employed by Mr. Van der Haer have shown the greatest firmness and resolution in a very perilous moment. It does not seem that their arrestation is attributed to any other reason than the

personal hatred of De Bere against Mr. Van der Haer, the man who manages Mr. Van der Haer's affairs being one of them, and several of them his known friends. The prisoners are now released; and it appears clearly by the steadiness and tranquillity with which Mr. Van der Haer's friends kept their ground to a man, that they were not under any apprehensions of their correspondence with him having been discovered. I expect Mr. Van der Haer back here shortly; if not I shall hear from him, having his express leave and desire to communicate what I hear from him where I think it may be of service.

"Mr. Van der Haer concludes his letter by saying that he has reason to expect that he will be able to carry our plan into execution. To explain what is meant I should first take notice that one of the first things Mr. Van der Haer did after he came here, his correspondence with his own *tried* friends being established, was to gain over some of the Representatives who were disgusted with what had passed, and dissatisfied with the turn things were taking. By means of these persons, who have acted it seems with great firmness and fidelity, he was able, with the assistance of his own *tried* friends, to influence considerably the deliberations of the representatives of Friezland. He felt all resistance from the people in the actual state of things was fruitless, if not even dangerous to the friends of the ancient Government. At the same time he saw that it would be an advantage if, without tumults or commotions, it was practicable to delay and embarrass the proceedings of the Representatives in Friezland, in order to gain time, and to retard the execution of the plans of those who have assumed the the government of the province of Holland, by preventing the concurrence of Friezland. In this he succeeded for many months, and so far that some of the resolutions adopted by the Representatives of Friezland were drawn up here by Mr. Van der Haer himself, a circumstance they certainly do not suspect. As long as the attention of the French was taken up with the successes of the Austrians they did not take much notice of the refractory spirit of the Representatives of Friezland. But your Lordship may have seen by my former letters that since the suspension of arms (whatever effect the events of the campaign I speak of may have had upon their conduct in this respect) the French, in concert with their friends in the province of Holland, seen to have made it a point, at one time, to carry this measure of the unity of the Batavian Republic, as they term it. This being the case, and as they seemed determined to employ the most violent means if necessary, all opposition, all resistance became useless. It was necessary to give way, and in the actual state of things the people cannot be kept too quiet; and Mr. Van der Haer uses all his endeavours to make them feel the necessity of laying bye for a better opportunity. But at the same time something must be done. *This is the plan we agreed upon*; that he should gain over or get to be named some Representatives of Friezland (to the National Convention) that he might depend upon, influence, and direct, and some of Drenthe, which he thought practicable; and that these might, without making use for the moment of the disposition of the people, carry on at the Hague in the National Convention the same system of delay and resistance carried on with so much success in the Assembly of Representatives in Friezland; that they should endeavour to communicate with and to gain over to this plan some of the Representatives of Amsterdam to the National Convention (one and indivisible) Amsterdam's aversion to the measure being well known; and that these Deputies, with all the accession of strength they could obtain from other quarters, should embarrass and

delay as much as possible all the deliberations without coming to any extremities. This will answer the double purpose of gaining time, in case hopes should be given before long of assistance from without; and of obtaining more general information of the transactions in the Republic than *we* have had hitherto, as Mr. Van der Haer intends to secure a correspondence through the channels this will open. In this manner we have a chance of making a stand and gaining time; whilst the *known* friends of the ancient government and of the House of Orange, without running any very great risk, may, at the same time, exert themselves in keeping up the hopes of our friends where the opportunity offers. This is the plan of Mr. Van der Haer alluded to in his letter."

*Postscript.*—February 19.—"Mr. Van der Haer returned last night. I am happy to confirm that all his friends, as well as other persons that were taken up, are again at liberty. As a proof of the sincerity of the persons who have entered more lately into Mr. Van der Haer's views and wish to aid in the restoration of the House of Orange, I should not forget to say that they have written and signed letters to him which put them entirely in his power; and they have not required of him that he should put his name to paper any further than he may choose it. In the late disturbances they have been tried, and have behaved with great decision, as I mentioned.

"Mr. Van der Haer is in regular correspondence with the Princess of Orange; but we take it for granted that what I write to England can never hurt the cause, as I hope I should be stopped by your Lordship if I ventured on too far. And it goes no further than my brother whom I mentioned before, (who was in the States of Utrecht lately, and presented the petitions for the restoration in 1787, at a time when our success was doubtful) and Mr. Van der Haer, that I write upon this subject. Mr. Van der Haer seems to think that all the resolutions taken in Friezland in consequence of the last tumults are set aside. I have my doubts whether it will be the case with those relating to the National Convention.

"The report that the military belonging to the *Rassemblement* had been ordered to leave Oost Friezland originated from a mistake. This is contradicted. However the Court of Berlin may act in other respects, they give every facility and assistance to the correspondence of Mr. Van der Haer, and other persons who may have the same object. Should that Court take a decided part in our favour, they certainly may shorten the duration of all the calamities that afflict the Republic.

"I hope your Lordship and Mr. Goddard have received all my last letters. I take the opportunity of Mr. I. Fagel returning to Hamburgh to enclose this to Mr. Fraser."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1796, February 19, Cleveland Row.—"I received your letter yesterday evening. I do not enter into the particulars of what had passed respecting the communication to the Royalists, because I am much more anxious to assure you that no idea ever entered into my mind that the thing was any other than a misunderstanding, in the strict sense of that word. One impression had been left on my mind and a different one on yours. It seems immaterial now to enquire how the misunderstanding had been produced, because I can, with the greatest truth, assure you that I never had a thought of its being intentional on your part, and I flatter myself you entertain similar sentiments of me.

"What is much more important is that the business itself should be put into its proper train, and that we should realize the promises we are holding out. I believe you are not ignorant that some difficulties have arisen upon this point. But they are of a nature that ought not to affect the substance of the business, and I trust they will not. I saw the Duke de Harcourt yesterday, and received from him a note which I have put into circulation. I have requested from him some explanation as to the sum which they wish, and the manner in which they would employ it, and I hope the whole may be soon arranged. It certainly shall be so as far as can depend on me."

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, March 3, Whitehall.—"I find from Huskisson that you have ordered a thousand pounds to be given at the same time with the last copy of the note, and that Canning supposes that an equal sum has been given with each of the others. If any part of this is meant as furnishing the persons concerned with the means of paying the expenses of their fitting out, it is probably much more than is sufficient; especially as the usual allowance, calculated indeed upon a footing of great economy, has been given to all those who have been destined for that service. A larger sum put into the hands of Serent or the Duke de Harcourt would even do harm, by enabling them to send over a number of persons not under the control of those who can best judge, perhaps, who are those that are likely to do good when they shall arrive in the country.

"If it is meant only to furnish them with a sum to be taken with them as an earnest of what is meant further to be done, and a supply of the immediate wants of the Royalists, it is much better that all this should be added to the common stock, and make part of a larger sum which has been ready since the day before yesterday to be transmitted to the Prince de Bouillon, the moment that Serent and his companions shall be ready to go.

"I suggested to Mr. Pitt the day before yesterday, that it would be desirable to give to Serent a power similar to that which was formerly given to Tintinnac, and the copy of which I was looking for in the Office.

"The paper was, I recollect, nothing more than a general assurance that the person entrusted with it was authorized to say on the part of the British Government that a liberal consideration should be had for any person who should render any service of the sort there described; to which might be added either a written or verbal instruction of the general extent to which such engagements, should they come to be specified, might extend. I cannot but think that this would be desirable, even with the prospect which we have of having soon there a person of our own. But there is no reason why Serent should wait for this, if there is any doubt about it; or why he should not set off, as he told me he intended, this very day. Indeed there is no reason that I know of, except his wish, I suppose, of having the money with him, why he might not have set off from the moment that you had spoke to him, or arranged with the Duke de Harcourt that he should go.

"I have sent you part of the above particulars by the desire of Huskisson, who was otherwise at a loss what to do about the 1,000*l.* which Canning had directed him to give.

"The moment Serent is ready there is a sum, part of 10,000*l.*, that will be sent to the Prince de Bouillon as the first payment of the 30,000*l.* that he is to have as soon as it is forthcoming. A part of the 10,000*l.*

had better be kept to be exchanged for a small sum in *Louis* (about 1,000) which Dutheil, I understand, has got, and more that he thinks he can get."

*Postscript*.—"I shall see the Duke de Harcourt this morning, and will tell him that Serent must get off without further delay."

C. BENTINCK TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, March 4, Varel.—"Want of time and of an opportunity will prevent my sending many details to-day of what passed in Friezland since the flight of De Beer, since the overthrow of the Committee of Reform and the return of the Representatives who fled, of which I took notice in mine of the 18th ultimo, and in former letters. These Representatives, having recovered their authority, had set at liberty all the prisoners taken up by orders of their Committee, and cancelled all the decrees passed during the time it sat excepting those relating to the National Convention, which they had indeed annulled *pro forma*, but passed afterwards in another shape. It seems now, by a letter dated Leuwarden, February 23, and by accounts we heard to-day, that the authority of the reinstated Representatives was of short duration. The French troops having again left Leuwarden on the morning of the 23rd ultimo, the Committee of Reform was re-established, and many of the Representatives and of the inhabitants had again fled. The confusion and disgust and alarms occasioned by these repeated changes of actors and of scenes amongst the partizans of the revolution themselves, are not likely to give it strength or stability. It is more likely that they will aid those who wish to destroy their work. It is impossible not to be very anxious for those within who are exposed to so many risks, and are forced to be the inactive spectators of proceedings they disapprove of, and of all the calamities of their country; and it is more than ever to be hoped vigorous and decisive steps may soon be taken to put an end to all their sufferings."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR MORTEN EDEN.

*Most secret*.

1796, March 8, Downing Street.—"I have received your letter marked private, on the subject of Count Starhemberg; and I shall certainly endeavour, as far as possible, to conform myself to Baron Thugut's wishes on that head. He must, at the same time, be sensible that this is not without its difficulties from the knowledge which Monsier de Starhemberg has of the intimate concert now subsisting between the two Courts, and from the means which he possesses of learning through various other channels what has passed, or is passing, in communications between them.

"While I state this difficulty, it is a justice I owe to Count Starhemberg to say that, in what I have seen of his conduct here, I have always found him apparently disposed to promote the objects of the union of the two Courts, and of the success of the great cause in which we are embarked."

*Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private*.

1796, March 17, Berne.—"Inclosed I send your Lordship a second letter of Bayard's as a supplement to the one that I sent the other day

in sympathetic ink. If this young man arrives in time I shall send him to England as a messenger with the answer from Mr. Barthélemy. All his friends are alarmed for his safety and I have had letters from several quarters requesting most earnestly that I would not suffer him to return into France at least for some time. Your Lordship will learn more from him in a day upon the points with which he is really acquainted than from any other person I ever yet had the luck to meet with. He will besides entirely supply all the information of which you have been deprived by the misconduct of M. D'Artez."

*Enclosure.*—An unsigned letter in French from Verona, giving an account of the writer's movements.

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, March 17, Berne.—"Let me earnestly entreat of your Lordship to throw these letters into the fire as soon as you shall have read them. You will readily divine that they are from B.

"If the Directory have really confidence in their troops, or only hope to be able to strike a blow *in the first moment*, they will give an evasive answer to your proposals. If not, they will accept them; but I do not think that they will dare to refuse them altogether unless they should have some hope from this intrigue of M. de Poterât at Vienna, which I cannot believe.

"I should wish to reason upon the subject just now, but I am really so completely worn down with fatigue that I feel I am not equal to it."

*Enclosures not preserved.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, March 17, Berne.—"I have some satisfaction in sending your Lordship the enclosed letter from the Chevalier de Contye one of the best persons attached to the Prince of Condé. The person alluded to by him is General Danican."

*Enclosure.*

1796, March 10, Buhl.—"La personne que vous m'avez adressé m'est arrivé ici. Avant hier, elle a vu le Bourgeois et causé avec lui, il m'a paru qu'il en avoit été très content; cette personne, monsieur, a eu raison de se réclamer de moi, car il y a 25 ans que je la connois, et je dois lui rendre la justice de dire qu'au commencement de la Révolution, elle se montra fidèle à son roy, et qu'aux journées du 5 et 6 Octobre, 1789, elle fût à Versailles, et se mit dans le rang, avec les gardes Suisses, pour y défendre le roy, contre les brigands conduits par M. de Lafayette; voilà ce que je sais. Il m'a dit vous avoir mis au fait de sa conduite depuis qu'il a joué un plus grand rôle, que celui dont j'avois connoissance. Le Bourgeois l'a gardé fort peu de tems, car il est parti hier à deux heures pour continuer sa route.

"L'on attend des nouvelles de votre ami *Baptiste* ce soir ou demain. On a annoncé que le banquier avoit vu son correspondant." *French.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, March 17, Berne.—"The inclosed letter from M. Pelin seems to me to merit a great deal of attention. This man, if I am rightly

informed, gains every day a stronger hold upon M. Thugut, particularly with respect to the affairs of France. All that one can learn with certainty from this letter is that he wishes people to write to Vienna in a certain sense. But, if I am well informed from elsewhere, he is constantly meditating upon the project of a compensation to the Court of Vienna for the Low Countries. That some such project exists, and that the war against France is only now considered as subservient to other purposes I am myself most entirely persuaded. There are so many *little facts* that tend to prove it, that I have not now the shadow of a doubt remaining on my mind. I wish I could bring your Lordship better proofs than my own intimate persuasion. Your Lordship, however, must have remarked that that persuasion has not been taken up hastily, or without much attentive observation."

*Enclosure.*—A letter in French dated February 8, 1796, expressing high esteem for the courage, character, and ability of the person to whom it is addressed in Switzerland; and suggesting that he should, after the example of Mallet du Pan, develop in a series of letters to any one of the leading Ministers of the allied Powers, his ideas in regard to the means of concluding peace with France.

*Endorsed.*—Copy of a *very private and confidential letter* from M. Pelin, at Vienna.

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, March 23, Windsor.—"In consequence of the letters the Princess of Orange has received from the King of Prussia both she and the Prince think they cannot longer decline the hereditary Princess of Orange and her child going to Berlin. As they are the proper judges of what part they should act on this occasion, I could not but tell them the natural steps that they should take if such was their decision; on this ground Nagel has written to you for a packet boat, as no frigate would conveniently carry so large an assemblage of women, and to Earl Spencer for a frigate to convoy the packet."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, March 25, Hamburg.—"I left Varel last Friday, and came here at the request of Mr. Tagel that I might pass a few days with him before he sets out for Switzerland. *I shall return next Sunday*, and take the opportunity of my being here to write a few lines by Mr. Fraser.

"It has been our singular good fortune that, during the commotions and changes that took place in Friezland at the four different periods of the 13th and 26th January, 12th and 23rd February, which I took notice of in former letters, our friends have not been discovered, or I believe even suspected. They have been able to pursue their object with unwearied assiduity. They have gained strength by the divisions of the partizans of the revolution; and they were so confident of the fidelity and prudence of the persons with whom they act, that not one of those we placed most dependence on has fled; and one of them who had been taken up from the personal animosity of some of his adversaries, in the conviction that no discovery could be made, had the resolution to resist the wishes of the populace who had collected to rescue him from prison, advising them to disperse, to be under no apprehension on his account, that he was sure of being cleared and set at liberty. This man is again out of prison, and now loudly complains of



the injustice done him, and continues to exert himself. By Mr. Van der Haer's means we have obtained a new correspondent in the province of Groningen, and now we may depend upon the Ommelanden as much as upon Friesland. This friend of Mr. Van der Haer passed a few days with us, and is gone back to Groningen to make some stay and to instruct our friends; and it is to this person, who was a member of the old government of Friesland, that we are indebted for the acquisition of the additional correspondent at Groningen, who is a man of property, very much beloved in his own province, and not easily intimidated. Our friend left us the 9th March, and the 12th we had letters from him, and from his friend at Groningen, giving very favourable statements of the disposition of the people who, in Ommelanden, are nearly to a man well-disposed. I shall not send many details of all this unless it is wished, or any more ample information was required. We can at any time obtain this, and find guides if wanted. And, under *the data* of former letters, I will answer for what I have said in those letters, and for our being able to extend our plan and the operation of the party I have spoke of, *though somewhat slowly without the means* I have asked for in mine of March 1st to be put into the hands of the two persons I have there spoke of, who, in that case, will I am sure make no difficulty of accounting to me for the use of them. I therefore beg, if more dispatch is thought necessary, or if it be thought of consequence to give every degree of strength and effect to the activity of our friends in the provinces I have alluded to, that I may be enabled to give them the assistance I have required in the firm persuasion that it will be of the greatest service at this moment; and that, at any rate, an offer of this sort coming from England will strengthen our interest. *I beg to know what your lordship's intention is upon this point.* We shall pursue our object in the meantime to the utmost of our ability."

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, March 26, Hamburgh.—“After I had closed mine yesterday I received a long letter from Mr. Van der Haer, the friend of ours I have so frequently mentioned before, expressing in very strong terms his anxiety for his friends within under increasing dangers and oppressions, and insisting strongly upon the necessity of speedy and effectual assistance from without to prevent the total ruin of the country. Our friends continue firm and united, and determined to come forward and to act the moment they receive orders, and are assured of the support they have now so long been led to expect. Mr. Van der Haer and his friends are only afraid they will not be allowed quietly to lay bye for an opportunity; that their adherents will be forced and exasperated by ill usage into a fruitless resistance, or obliged to fly the country. One of his friends in consequence of a quarrel, being lately set upon by some of the armed revolutionists, was forced to leave the country. Fortunately it is not material this man should be there. Those who will be most wanted, should things require vigour and decision, have kept their ground, and have hitherto escaped all discovery. At the same time it appears that the revolutionists at present do entertain, or pretend to entertain, suspicions of their enemies being at work. But by the hints they throw out, and by the persons they name, it is evident they do not know anything of the proceedings of our friends, as we have no communication with the persons they allude to. A circumstance very much in our favour, at the same time that all the letters Mr. Van der Haer received since I left Varel from every one of his correspondents contain

the strongest proofs of their activity, resolution, and perseverance. It is to be observed that, though this party has no doubt been increasing in strength for these many months, it has existed and acted above a twelvemonth; and it will be fortunate indeed under the present suspense and difficulties if no discovery is made, as the impatience of our friends increases daily. We are afraid that, by so many repeated delays, they will place less confidence in the assurances they receive, or despond entirely; and, in that case, it will not be easy to wind them up again. The correspondence is daily more narrowly watched and more hazardous. Under all these circumstances Mr. Van der Haer begs I will again press upon the attention of my friends that, however necessary the means should be proportioned to the end, dispatch is no less so if England, whose object is avowedly as it is her interest to expel the French out of the Netherlands and the United Provinces, wishes to recover them and re-establish the House of Orange before the French have completed, in the total impoverishment of the country, the system of rapine and extortion they are carrying on with so much method, and under so many pretences. Mr. Van der Haer eagerly wishes that, should the Austrians advance to the Meuse, the Powers who have guaranteed the institution of the Seven Provinces under the auspices of the House of Orange should march a force considerable enough to carry the point, and to strike the decisive blow under the general disgust and disunion that prevails at this moment on one part, and the avowed embarrassment and perplexity of the leaders of the Batavian Convention in consequence of the lamentable statement they give themselves of their finances, and the disorganised or inefficient state of their military force. The arrival of the two Princes of Orange in these parts, and the journey of Prince Frederick to Vienna, raises great expectations; and, if followed by any decisive and well combined measures, these expectations will not be disappointed. A considerable force, and dispatch, combined with any vigorous measures of the Austrians towards the recovery of the Netherlands, will afford every probability of success. It is high time to rescue the Seven Provinces from the situation they have been thrown into by a delusion and an infatuation unfortunately too general at the time to be resisted by those who foresaw the consequences, in order not to leave the cat a chance of strengthening themselves by being much longer in possession of the Government.

“Fortunately for the tranquillity of society the political distempers that have done such incalculable mischief carry along with them the principle of their cure, and men, however at variance formerly, not only wish for a change, but loudly express their wishes from all quarters to see the sudden and pernicious innovations of the revolutionists, French and Batavian, give way to that order of things established under the auspices and protection of the House of Orange; founded upon experience, adapted to the habits, customs, and attachments of the country; and, if not a model of imaginary perfection, which no human institutions can be, at least practicable in the execution, compatible with the tranquillity of society, mild in the practice as well as the theory, and affording security to the lives and property of individuals, and encouragement and protection of every branch of industry to every source of national prosperity. I have stated the purport of Mr. Van der Haer’s letter, and of the communications he has received. If further details are wanted they may be had at any time, as well as any information of the changes that may take place from time to time; and, by furnishing Mr. Van der Haer and his friends with the means, the operation of the party I have so often spoke of may be shortly extended, I have no doubt, out of the two provinces they influence. But I hope to receive

further orders on the subject. In the meantime we shall endeavour to keep that party together ready at all events, and to strengthen it as far as lies in our power. We shall keep them, if possible, from acting openly till we receive the necessary orders and assurances of support. We shall ever remind them if necessary, and I trust with effect, that they are never to lose sight for a moment of the *joint views* of England and of the House of Orange, *whose union* is as essential to our ultimate success *as that of the individuals of that House amongst themselves*. It is only as far as the conduct of the Court of Berlin is compatible with these views that we can expect or wish for support from that quarter. We shall endeavour not to put ourselves in the power of that Government any further [than] we can help. I put the necessity of this sort of caution in as many points of view as I can with prudence. If they will not do us any good they may still do us great harm in the present state of things; and I most sincerely wish we might, by an unexpected turn of affairs, succeed without that Court, if they are determined at Berlin not to take a decided unequivocal part consistent with former engagements, when they might so easily and so powerfully contribute to draw the Seven Provinces out of their present calamitous and ignominious situation."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, March 1, [April 1] Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to acquaint your Majesty that the Count de Zeppelin is arrived in England, with letters to your Majesty from the Duke of Wurtembergh and the Hereditary Prince.

"When Lord Grenville first saw M. de Zeppelin, he opened to Lord Grenville no other business than that of a negotiation about the Wurtembergh troops at the Cape, which the Duke was desirous of offering for your Majesty's service there; an offer which Mr. Dundas seems to think it would not be advantageous to your Majesty to accept.

"Yesterday Lord Grenville received a note from Count Zeppelin saying that he had only opened to him a part of his commission, and desiring to see him again to execute the other orders which he had received. Lord Grenville having accordingly seen him again this morning, Count Zeppelin put into his hands the copies of letters from the Duke and Duchess of Wurtemburgh and from the Hereditary Prince which Lord Grenville has now the honour to transmit to your Majesty.

"After this Count Zeppelin read to Lord Grenville a letter addressed by Count Zeppelin to some other person on the subject of what had passed respecting the Prince's former marriage, and tending to exculpate the Prince's conduct in that respect. This letter, together with some other papers of the same tendency, he requested Lord Grenville to lay before your Majesty.

"Lord Grenville judged that the only fit line for him to pursue on this occasion was to take the papers, assuring Count Zeppelin that the whole should be laid before your Majesty, to whose decision Lord Grenville had only to refer himself without expressing any opinion or intimating any upon the subject. He only thought it right to mention it to Count Zeppelin as his opinion that, as the subject was not entirely new to your Majesty, it would be both more respectful to your Majesty, and in all respects better for the Hereditary Prince himself, that the demand of a formal audience to deliver the letters should not be pressed until your Majesty had considered the papers which Count Zeppelin was charged to submit, and which he had delivered to Lord Grenville.

"Count Zeppelin agreed in the propriety of this, but said that, if your Majesty should not be disposed to give a favourable answer in the first instance, his master was desirous of obtaining your Majesty's permission to make a journey to England, in the hopes of removing any unfavourable impressions which your Majesty might have respecting him."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 3, Windsor.—"I have this instant received Lord Grenville's note accompanied with the copies of the letters Count Zepelin has received, and the request when the Count may deliver the letters to me. I thought I had already explained fully to Lord Grenville my disinclination to enter into any conversation on the proposal that has been entrusted to that gentleman; but that I had sent abroad for information whether my opinion on the Prince of Wurtemberg is well founded; which, if it is, no power on earth can get me to admit of his marrying any daughter of mine. That information I cannot receive for some weeks as yet, therefore I must decline for the present receiving the gentleman; and I cannot help fairly expressing that the opinion of the Duke of Brunswick will certainly have no weight with me on so serious a matter, his ideas and mine being in no degree similar."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, April 5, Windsor.—"I am much pleased at Lord Grenville's having selected part only of the papers arrived yesterday for my perusal this day and keeping back the rest till to-morrow. I confess when the load is too great I find that I cannot retain in my mind any part of the contents, and therefore am always better pleased when the contents are not so voluminous; indeed the whole mode of carrying on public correspondence is so much more diffuse and undigested than thirty years ago, that I do not think it has made public subjects of discussion so clear as when foreign ministers thought the matter of their dispatches and not the length of them their true merit."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 10, Windsor.—"I cannot see any objection to the proposed draft of an answer proposed to be transmitted by Mr. Wickham to M. Barthélemy on the subject of the insolent paper received from France. I confess I am not in the smallest degree surprised at the tenor of the French paper, as I had when the measure was proposed thought it would in effect not be in another style; and I should have hoped the courage of this nation had not been so sluggish as to require this insolence to bring it to its proper tone.

"The printing these three papers and delivering them to the foreign ministers is very proper; I should suppose no time will be lost in communicating them through Sir Morton Eden to the Court of Vienna."

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 11, Varel.—"I inclose a letter (Number 1) Mr. Van der Haer received from a person of his acquaintance, whom he has employed in sounding the disposition of the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces; and a paper (Number 2) with some reflections upon this

letter, with very satisfactory accounts of the increase of our strength, and with a project for putting the islands of Vlie, Ter Schelling, Ameland, and Schermonnik-Oog in the possession of Great Britain. Mr. Van der Haer not writing either French or English, I have translated these papers word for word as nearly as I could, and forward them thinking they are entitled to some attention.

"The well intentioned friend alluded to in the letter Number 1 is Rammel the French Minister of Finance. The writer of the letter has been acquainted with him these many years. They had many conversations at the Hague, soon after the entrance of the French, on the subject of the Stadholdership. Rammel professed himself to be for the re-establishment of that form of government in Holland, and of the monarchy in France. Both Mr. Van der Haer and Mr. Humalda have seen a number of letters from him which are too strong if he is not in earnest, as they put him, Rammel, in their power; the acquaintance who has the letters being ready to give them up at any time if he found he was deceived by Rammel. One of these letters contains strong expressions of his wishes to see the Monarchy and Stadholderian government restored; and besides the writer of the letter saved him by his presence of mind from a scrape he had got in by one of their letters having been intercepted. At the same time we are well aware how little dependence should be placed on persons who act under the present government of France, and of the caution required on this head. But we thought it right to mention Rammel, with these circumstances relating to him, that it may be of service to those who are in a situation to judge of his sincerity, and how far he may be useful, which we are not called upon to decide. I have underlined the most material passage in this letter, and must leave it to your Lordship to determine how far this communication may be of any service. The whole, as Mr. Van der Haer says, may be a fiction to excite mistrust between parties whose concert is apprehended; though we have so many reasons to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Court of Berlin, and to suspect many parts of it.

"With respect to the plan for taking possession of the four islands, we wish it chiefly to be combined with any effort that may be made from the land side by a military force to support our friends within, and in such a manner as to give more effect to this. At the same time it may be very practicable to obtain possession without waiting for this co-operation on the land side.

"I am very anxious to receive some communications from England in answer to this and to former letters, to enable me to encourage the exertions of our friends still further. They have now kept together a very considerable number of persons near 14 months. They have, in the course of that time, been gaining strength. They now form a strong party, who may be depended upon in case of an emergency. Under these circumstances it is not surprising they should every moment be asked 1, what the object of their activity is to be; 2, whether and when they will be called upon to act; and 3, how far they may depend upon pecuniary assistance (if wanted). These questions I have been asked. Upon the former, the paper I received in England has supplied me with a general answer; upon the third, I have still to beg I may know what your Lordship's intentions are, as I could wish to transfer to Mr. Van der Haer and Mr. Humalda his friend, the two persons I have mentioned in mine of the 1st March, some part of the discretion reposed in me, which they are not acquainted with. It is of no use to me, but will be to them, as everything goes

through their hands; and hitherto they have gone on at their own expense.

"It is now above a twelvemonth since your Lordship gave me the paper on the assurances of which I have gone on. Until I hear to the contrary I shall think it right to persevere in hopes of receiving some communications on the subject which, by enabling me to give Mr. Van der Haer greater certainty as to the time he is to expect support, and the assurances he may venture to give his friends, may put it in his power to direct them according to the joint views of England and the House of Orange. Any communication from England will in his idea answer this end; and, if he is enabled to give these assurances positively, his friends place confidence enough in him not to require he should disclose the quarter from which he has them, any further than he may think proper. At the same time to support his influence, and to preserve this confidence, he should not advance more than he can reasonably hope to fulfil; and some further communications become very necessary in the very hazardous and critical situation of our friends within.

"In the mean-time we shall supply as well as we can the want of more positive information, and we shall exert ourselves to the utmost to keep up the hopes and incite the activity of our friends, in the persuasion the moment may come yet to derive some advantage from their efforts. We only regret our influence is hitherto limited to these few provinces.

"The faction supporting the National Convention (one and indivisible) have recovered their ground in Friesland. That province however had not yet sent any deputies to the Hague, though I think they will soon. But I hope some favourable event may take place before the leaders of the Convention acquire any considerable strength by being in possession of the Government.

"I should not forget mentioning that I think the passage in the letter, Number 1, relating to the restoration of the Stadholderian Government in the person of the Hereditary Prince, with more limited authority, scarce deserves any comments. There no doubt may be persons who have entertained such an idea. But I am convinced the Hereditary Prince is incapable of coming into a compromise of this nature, or of separating his interests from those of the other individuals of his house; and I should be surprised if such a project should come into the head of any person at all acquainted with the disposition of the Seven Provinces. Notwithstanding the Prince Stadholder's inactivity, want of decision, and jealousy of all those who acquire influence and popularity however firmly attached to his cause, that Prince is a great favourite with the people at large by his affability and his popular manners. This is by no means the case with the Hereditary Prince. But, were it otherwise, I am convinced the idea of excluding his father will never come into his head.

"The best understanding seems to prevail between the Hereditary Prince and Prince Frederick. When the latter left the Continent on his return to England, he named a person to whom Mr. Van der Haer was to send the information he had to communicate, and this person had orders to send duplicates of the letters to the Hereditary Prince and to Prince Frederick himself; and we have observed with pleasure that the language of both these Princes in their letters is the same.

"What the intentions of the Court of Berlin may be I will not pretend to determine, nor do I believe they would be very scrupulous about any measure they thought might suit their political purposes. But, if their project is entirely to detach the Seven Provinces from Great Britain, and to throw them into the arms of France, and to make the Hereditary Prince their instrument to bring this about, I can only say, if we have

any certainty on this point, if we are told so from England in the name of the Prince Stadholder or the Princess of Orange, or by your lordship, or any of his friends, we shall not only be on our guard, but we shall think it right to interrupt all communications with Berlin, and even with the Hereditary Prince if he is not proof against the artifices of that ministry. If I am told so from authority, I will answer for Mr. Van der Haer and his friends breaking off all correspondence, particularly if the Prince Stadholder wishes it. And though Oost Friesland offers many advantages for the correspondence, other channels may be found as expeditious. What the Prince Stadholder's intentions are Mr. Van der Haer cannot know, as that Prince has never answered any of his letters. Mr. Van der Haer wrote to the Prince Stadholder that he came to Varel, at the request of M. de Rhoon, to be of service to the cause soon after the French entered the country, and before M. de Rhoon was imprisoned. But unless we receive positive orders, we shall not take any hasty step of that sort, nor give credit to all the rumours that are spread. At the same time Mr. Van der Haer and his friends will not put themselves in the power of the Court of Berlin any further than they can help. They now see and feel that they have placed too much dependence on that Court, as all that comes from that quarter falls so short of what they expected."

*Postscript.*—April 13.—"Since I wrote the above we have had a visit of some of our Friesland friends. The Deputies of Friesland to the Convention at the Hague are now named. We are not advanced in the plan I mentioned in mine of the 18th February respecting the use we should endeavour to make of some of the Deputies when at the Hague. Mr. Van der Haer thinks still it will be very feasible, and we shall not give it up. We are only concerned that, from many circumstances, we are forced to proceed so slowly. One of our Friesland friends assured us, in case of an enterprize, of the support of an officer in that province who has above 400 men of the cavalry of the present Government at his disposal; and will declare for the Princes if an attack should be made, or if he should receive orders. This man has frequently insisted upon taking his demission, but our friend has persuaded him to remain contrary to his wish, that he might not become useless. Our friend is going back to Friesland to day."

*Two Enclosures.*

#### *Enclosure Number 1.*

VAN DER HAER VAN CAMPERS NIEUWLAND to C. BENTINCK.

1796, April 10, Varel.—"I will not delay communicating the enclosed letter to you, which I beg you will transmit to the English Government.

"It is a letter I have received from a person of my acquaintance who has been in correspondence for many years with Rammel, who is at present one of the French ministers. He has the original of many letters of Rammel in his possession, which will oblige Rammel for his own safety and preservation to be more *tenax propositi* than could otherwise be expected from a Frenchman.

"It is unnecessary to request secrecy with respect to Rammel's name. The English administration will be sufficiently convinced from the nature of the case that all the use to be derived from the man must depend on this secrecy. In this persuasion I shall confine myself to observe upon this letter that, whether it give a true statement of the conduct of Prussia, or whether it be a French artifice to excite suspicions

and mistrust between England and Prussia, the communication appeared to me to be of consequence ; in one case as a caution to England, in the other that we may prevent the bad effect it may have upon our friends in the Seven Provinces.

“ In the first supposition, England and the Emperor may perhaps safely conclude a peace with France on condition that, if France does not interfere in the government of the Seven Provinces, England will not meddle with the internal Government of France. In this manner the Republic of the United Provinces may be emancipated without the interposition of Prussia, and English gold may perhaps produce greater effects in France than foreign armies have done hitherto.

“ My attachment to England is known to you by my consistent conduct ever since the year 1780, when I first came into the states of Friesland ; and by the steps I took when I was forced to leave my country, that I might have a chance of being of service, conformably to the principles I have ever persevered in. You may therefore easily imagine how happy I am to inform you that M. Van Viersen (a member of the late Supreme Court of Justice of Friesland) has offered himself to me to forward my views for the deliverance of our country by the help of England. He offers his own personal services and 4,000 people to join our party in the country, which amount in Friesland alone to about 5,500 people, ready on the first signal to support an enterprize from without. I cannot help noticing the advantage of this increase, independent of numbers, arising from these 4,000 men occupying the frontiers of Friesland towards Groningen, where they may act, whilst my strength chiefly lies on the South of the Province along the seacoast. In this manner the enterprize may be supported on both sides of the Province, and the measures of resistance will be divided and weakened.

“ The violent proceedings to which the well-intentioned within the country are exposed, particularly in Friesland, will not admit any longer of the state of uncertainty and inactivity they are in ; and it is for this reason I have formed a plan with my friends to give England an opportunity of supporting those who look to the re-establishment of the union between the two countries with impatience, and with hopes it may never be again interrupted.

“ *The project is*, that England should take possession of the islands of Ter Schelling, Vlie, Ameland, and Schiermonnik-Oog ; which would be the more practicable from my being able to give assurances of the favourable disposition of the inhabitants, of the good will of the garrisons, and of the bad state of defence of these islands.

I.—“ If England wishes it, but is not inclined to send any troops for this purpose, we only wish to be allowed to take into English pay 500 men of the *Rassemblement* at our choice, who shall land them in these islands from Costfriesland in small boats. Being landed there at the time to be fixed, they should find two English cutters, and, for each island, five pieces of cannon and the necessary ammunition.

II.—“ As soon as possession should be taken of these islands, they should be declared a conquest of Great Britain.

III.—“ The provinces of Friesland and Groningen should immediately be declared to be in a state of siege, which will prevent any neutral ships from passing through the passage called the *Wadden*, between the islands and the coast of Friesland and Groningen, without being exposed to the batteries of the islands.

IV.—“ That Great Britain should send some cruisers at the same time before the entrance of the Texel, in order to interrupt the whole navigation of Amsterdam, Groningen, and Friesland.



V.—“That Great Britain should send a squadron before Zealand when *Groningen, Overysse, Friesland, and Drenthe* are attacked on the land side, in order to divide the attention of the enemy and encourage still more the well-intentioned in their project of insurrection.

VI.—“That the forces to act on the land side on entering the territory of the Republic should declare that they act in support of the ancient constitution, in virtue of the guarantee of Great Britain.

VII.—“That the passage between the islands and Friesland is not only within gun-shot of these islands, but that it is nearly quite dry at low water. That the *dominium eminens* of this passage belongs to Friesland.

VIII.—“That by the Treaty of Neutrality of Russia, Friesland and Groningen being declared in a state of siege all neutral ships are excluded from passing.

IX.—“That the Court of London, the moment the islands are taken possession of, should give official notice to the merchants at Bremen and Hamburg that the navigation through the passage called the Wadden was interrupted for the reasons above mentioned.

X.—“That one of the cutters should be placed at the entrance of the Vlie, the other above Schiermonnik-Oog.

XI.—“In order to account for the seeming contradiction between the articles II. and VI., I should observe that the islands should be provisionally declared a conquest of Great Britain in order to block up Friesland and Groningen as an enemy, and to interrupt the whole commerce of Holland upon the principles of the Treaty of Neutrality; but that on the land side the troops should act in virtue of the guarantee, in order the more to animate the well-intentioned in their efforts.

“This is what I wish you to submit to the English Government, with my request that they will give it some consideration, and with assurances that it is a plan of friends of England who offer it only as an expedient, highly advantageous to both parties, which seems to deserve some attention; upon which it is their request to receive offers from England by which they may be governed.”

#### *Enclosure Number 2.*

##### *Extract.*

1796, April 7, Leer.—“I have to inform you that I am advanced far enough in the execution of our plan within the provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Overysse, and Drenthe, to bring about at a moment's notice a counter-revolution in favour of the Stadholder, and the writing to be circulated is ready for the press. But I am at a loss from what quarter I am to lead the well-intentioned to expect with confidence that external support which will be required to give effect to these efforts, and which must determine and direct them. This uncertainty makes me the more anxious at this moment from the following expressions of a letter I have received from my well disposed friend in the Directory at Paris; ‘*assured of the support of the well-intentioned in our country, my friends and I are convinced that peace must be concluded with England and the Emperor, notwithstanding the consequences it is expected will follow within this Republic (France), and we are ready to conclude, not looking upon the fate of Holland as of consequence enough to stop us. My opinion on this last point is known to you. But the Prussian Ministry are exerting themselves to the utmost, by means of our party in the Directory, to prevent the conclusion of this peace without the interference and approbation of Prussia.*’ I think it right to send you the sense of this passage word for word, and to add the most

material parts of my answer, namely this. I desired my friend to be persuaded that the Prussian Court had expected to find in the power of France, supported by the resources of Holland, the means of humbling Austria; and had accordingly not scrupled being faithless to the coalition. But that seeing Holland was now lost, and forced to submit to the ascendancy of Great Britain, whilst France was exhausted, and not a match for Austria powerfully supported as she is, the Prussian Ministry had no object but to prevent by their interference in the negotiation for peace that the alliance of Great Britain, Austria, and Russia should entirely preponderate, and make the Constitution of Holland subservient to their views; which would not only break the connection between Holland and France, but make France a useless ally for Prussia. Lastly, I added that the French would not find Prussia a more faithful ally than the other Powers had found her.

“Many of the Anti-Stadhouderian aristocracy in Friesland and Holland are advising the present patriots with great eagerness to restore a Stadholderian Government, with more limited authority, in the person of the Hereditary Prince of Orange, as being more attached to the Prussian Court, in order to maintain the connections with France and Prussia. I need scarce observe to you that this conduct of those persons is very wide of the true object to be attained.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 12, London.—“Je viens de voir M. Boyd. Il sortait de chez M. Pitt. Le résultat de leur conversation relativement à l'emprunt a été qu'on ne pouvait pas encore prononcer la promesse de la garantie, mais que d'ici à quelques semaines, la chose serait peut-être possible. Monsieur Pitt a dit au banquier qu'il serait à propos que je fusse muni des pouvoirs de ma Cour pour terminer immédiatement dès que la chose serait décidée, sans perdre de nouveau le temps à la postillionnade éternelle d'ici à Vienne. Il serait donc à propos que vous eussiez la bonté d'écrire à M. Eden pour qu'il les demande pour moi de votre part au Baron Thugut. J'écirai dans le même sens de mon côté, mais, comme notre bureau a toujours l'air d'avoir peur *d'acheter chat en poche*, ou d'être trompé, j'ai imaginé un moyen pour prévenir tous leurs scrupules. La maison Boyd me donnera, vendredi prochain, sa soumission et son plan pour l'emprunt, en exposant distinctement ses conditions, et exprimant la latitude qui pourrait résulter en plus et en moins dans le prix selon l'époque où il se ferait. Ayant une fois ces conditions sous les yeux, on n'aura plus qu'à me mander, *signez dans tel ou tel cas, nous approuvons les conditions, ou les réjettons entièrement*; et alors ils seraient obligés de renoncer à l'emprunt. Du moment où je serai instruit de leur dernier mot on pourra conclure dès qu'on annoncera *la garantie*. Il serait à propos que vous eussiez la bonté de prévenir également sur les conditions politiques que vous exigeriez, au cas que vous en exigiez. Je crois que vous approuverez mon idée; elle mène promptement au but qu'on se propose. J'espère avoir l'honneur d'en causer avec vous avant Vendredi, mais je désirerais que [vous] voulussiez bien donner dès aujourd'hui des instructions à ce sujet à votre Ministre à Vienne.”

*French.*

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 14, War Office.—“As the objections are thought to be so strong against the permitting, however negatively and indirectly, the

coining of *Louis* in this country, I have endeavoured, as the only means remaining, to obtain a supply from Hamburg ; and have for that purpose caused a letter some time ago to be written to Walkiers the banker, and obtained an order to Sir Richard Strachan who is going with the Princess, to receive on board whatever quantity Walkiers may have been able to collect. But I doubt lest some difficulty should be made, unless your Lordship will let Mr. Fraser be written to, in order to satisfy M. Walkiers that the proceeding has the sanction of Government ; as the only security of Walkiers for the delivery stands at present upon a letter which he has received from Woodford, backed by the instructions which he will find given to Sir Richard Strachan.

"May I beg the favour of you to let such a letter be written to Mr. Fraser as may recognize, at least, the connection between the instructions given to Sir Richard Strachan and the letter which he has received by my direction. I shall take care that the sums which he shall be required to remit, shall not exceed what has been allotted to the service in question. I shall be very glad if it prove near as much, and unless it does so, I fear it will be necessary to signify to the Royalists that the engagement which we have made, is one which cannot be carried into execution, and must be retracted.

"The distress in which they are at present for powder, and every thing else but zeal and numbers, is so great that, unless some more active means are taken for their relief, the fate of their leaders and of their party must be same (and from the same causes) as that of Charette and the Royalists of the Vendée."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

Private.

1796, April 15, Downing Street.—"I have received your letter, and am anxious to explain to you the difficulties which seem to stand in the way of the mode which you propose for transacting this business. By the Civil List Act, which regulates the issue and account for secret service money, all sums for that purpose must be issued by the Treasury upon applications from one of the Secretaries of State or the First Lord of the Admiralty, whose receipt is filed in the Exchequer in order to render them accountable for the money so received, and who must discharge themselves by oath in the manner prescribed by the Act. Whatever relates to the mode of procuring the money seems to belong much more properly to the Treasury than to the Secretary of State, except in the single case where he is obliged by circumstances to authorize the drawing bills from abroad.

"But, I apprehend, it would be a step liable to very just exception if, in a concern of so much delicacy as the issue and application of secret service money, I were to step so far out of the regular official course as to authorize one of the King's Ministers to make himself, and through him me, responsible to Mr. Walkiers for the expense of procuring this coin, on terms of which I am necessarily ignorant, and for purposes the detail of which cannot properly pass through me ; although if I charge myself with the money I can only discharge myself by swearing to its application.

"The regular mode seems to me that the Treasury, being informed by Mr. Dundas that such a sum will be wanted in *Louis d'or* at Hamburg for his Majesty's secret service, should authorize some person to contract in their name with Mr. Walkiers or any one else as shall be thought right, for the expense of procuring the *Louis d'or* on terms to be previously settled ; and that this expense, whatever it may be, should

be issued to Mr. Dundas as foreign secret service money, and the money afterwards received on board and applied *under his orders* to the purposes for which it is destined.

"I hope it cannot be necessary for me to say that all this is stated not for the sake of any question of etiquette, but on account of the obvious necessity of not departing from the ordinary forms established by practice and by law, in matters so very delicate as those which concern the issue and application of public money ; where the particulars of the expenditure cannot be brought forward, like all other public expenses, with regular vouchers, but must be accounted for upon the oath of the persons to whom alone by law the money can be issued in that form."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO WILLIAM WICKHAM.

Private.

1796, April 15, Cleveland Row.—Original published in the *Correspondence of the Right Honourable William Wickham*. 1870, Vol. I., p. 342.

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 22, Varel.—"I have not anything very material to mention this day. I have received a report from Mr. Vau der Haer, whom I have frequently mentioned, which two of his friends have sent him relating to the forts of Couverden and Bourtang, and the approaches towards Munsterland. By this report it appears that these forts are not in a state of defence, that the works are in a ruinous state, the approaches quite open, and that the garrisons in those forts and districts do not amount to above one thousand men (French), that these troops are dissatisfied, and there seems even to have been some desertion amongst them ; the writers of the report, who relate chiefly what they have seen and heard themselves on the spot, having met 35 of these French deserters. This is the abstract of this report, which I have not time to translate to-day. Further details may be had at a moment's notice by those it may concern, as well as the necessary guides if wanted.

"We are more impatient every day to see a chance of some advantage being derived of the favourable disposition of the country."

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 27, Somerset Place.—"I return you Sir Charles Malet's letter, together with one from Mr. Scott, by which you will perceive that I have had communication with him on the subject. I agree with Mr. Scott that Sir Charles's letter to you is childishly and peevishly wrote, and, if I had not other proofs to my own mind perfectly satisfactory, I should be disposed to doubt his abilities to the extent I have supposed. I am not, however, at all hurt personally, as Scott seems to suppose I should be. In truth, he has not the shadow of a pretence for being out of humour, but a very useful and meritorious servant ought not to forfeit the benefit of his services by allowing himself, in an unguarded hour, to get out of humour. I have therefore seen Mr. Scott this morning, and have suggested to him the propriety of appointing him one of the Council at Bombay ; but, at the same time, to write out a handsome paragraph respecting his services at Poonah, and, if he would rather choose to remain there during the present unsettled state of Mahratta politics, to express an approbation or rather a desire

that he should do so, and, in that case, to make his emoluments at least equal to what they would be if he was a Member of Council."

*Enclosure 1.*

C. W. MALET to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, August 8, Bombay.—"This is purposely to relieve you from any trouble that you may have been disposed to take in promotion of the objects which I took the liberty of submitting to your Lordship's adoption, in a letter that I had the honour of writing you under the 30th June, via Bussorah, assuring your Lordship of my willingness to benefit by an option of succeeding to this Government, to the Chiefship of Surat, or to a seat at the Supreme Council, or the Council of this Presidency. But least so early a change of opinion on points of so great importance should subject me, in your Lordship's opinion, which I highly respect, to an appearance of levity, I will not hesitate to confess that, on a further consideration of the late appointment to this Government, my feelings are so much hurt, and that zeal with which I have hitherto pressed forwards to hold the most honourable place amongst my contemporaries, so depressed by the humiliating appointment of a junior, drawn from another Presidency, that my repugnance to become a suitor to the authors of what to me appears so unjust a degradation is invincible.

"It is true, my Lord, that, by this dereliction of your powerful patronage in pursuit of the above objects, great inconvenience and prejudice to my interests may ensue, but I cannot hesitate to sacrifice such considerations to the public respectability of my character, established on the official records of the three Presidencies in every Department of Government during the long period of twenty-five years' service, distinguished by the most flattering approbation of the Court of Directors and crowned by the honourable distinction of our gracious sovereign. In a word, my Lord, I feel my degradation proportionate to what, in my eye, appears the undue exaltation of another, and I apprehend that, with chilled affection and frozen zeal, my services would in future rather be measured by the treatment they have experienced, than by that energy with which hitherto I have, and should in future wish to exert myself. A certain reciprocity of attention is due even in the relation of servant and served; and, though obedience at all events is incumbent, as long as the relation subsists, yet the more delicate energies of zealous attachment are generated only by the genial warmth of liberal confidence and generous protection. Those withdrawn, mutual estrangement will, I apprehend, ensue; and, though not frequently acknowledged, must be attended with the most pernicious effects to public service, by introducing on our part a narrow spirit of reserve and self-interest, on the other of vexatious jealousy and coercion. My principles of action will, I hope, enable me to combat the obvious tendency of such a predicament during my further stay, which the critical posture of affairs may, on public and private grounds render necessary in this country; which will not, I trust, expose me long to the danger of losing the consolatory reflection that, though my employers have been *unkind*, my services (merit out of the question) have been irreproachable."

*Enclosure 2.*

D. SCOTT to HENRY DUNDAS.

2796, April 27, London.—"I return Lord Grenville and Sir Charles Mallet's letters. Sir Charles, I think, reflects more upon you than any

person, indeed so much that I don't think he should have any further mark of favour. He has had most uncommon marks of favour, far beyond any person so situated before; and, in return, he ascribes the whole to his own merit and gives ingratitude for what he has received. If the Court were to see some lines of the enclosed letter, they certainly would never offer him a place in Council. I shall, however, as you seem to think it right, propose tomorrow Mr. James Stevens and Sir Charles Mallet as Council and James Rivet as provisional Council."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, April 29, Varel.—"The accounts of our friend, whom I have so often mentioned, has received to day from the person who is authorized to correspond with him, are more favourable than they have been yet. The march of a corps of troops, Prussians, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers, *to cover the line of demarcation*, the concert that seems to subsist at least upon this point between Courts supposed to be at variance, the hopes given our friend that we shall see the Duke of Brunswick at the head of this corps, and the reputation this gives to many of the suspicions and rumours spread with respect to the views of one of these Courts of which I have taken notice in my letter of the 11th and 13th instant, all these circumstances lead us to expect a change in our favour; and I am happy to think that, though I judged it right to state what I heard of those rumours and suspicions, I have not given an implicit credit to them, but, on the contrary, observed great reserve upon that head, and even lately discouraged them; and so I shall continue to do unless things turn out very differently from what there is reason to expect at present, and I heard to the contrary, as I have mentioned in former letters. The instructions our friend received with respect to the use he is to make of the information sent him will be strictly attended to, and not a step of consequence will be taken without orders being given, to prevent the mischief that might result from anything hasty or premature.

"The turn affairs are taking is a very satisfactory answer to many parts of my letters, but is not to some points I have touched; and I cannot help observing that I have not had any answer from your Lordship to any of my letters, nor indeed received a line since last April; and yet I have written very regularly for the last six months. I still think it right to persevere, if I do not hear to the contrary. But it cannot be expected I should go on with the same confidence and the same effect if I receive no communications whatever from those to whom I have uniformly looked for them, and if I do not meet with that support I have been led to expect. I offered before I left England to speak to two other persons, one of whom is still there, with respect to my intentions. They are nearly related, and highly interested in the events I allude to. I beg to remind your Lordship I was told in Dover Street, before I left town, it was not necessary, nor have I done it. I have not lost sight of my object, which was to act in such a manner that, in case my brother should obtain his liberty, I might go to the Hague if he wished it. I shall persevere in the line I have taken. In the meantime I am not apprehensive that my friends will suppose I have lightly advanced more than I can justify; but I should be concerned to appear to them to be totally forgot, or to have lost the confidence of those whose good opinion they know I set great value upon, and whose support will enable me to be of greater use to the cause, and to my friends, than I can otherwise expect to be."

## LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1796, April 28, Cleveland Row.—“J’ai reçu hier de la main du Roi l’incluse, avec l’ordre de la vous renvoyer. Le contenu ne m’a nullement surpris. J’avais toujours cru que M. l’Ambassadeur se trouverait infiniment mieux là-bas qu’ici. J’espère cependant que Madame la Comtesse ne s’empressera pas de profiter de l’invitation, puisque je doute qu’elle trouverait autant d’agrémens à la société Parisienne que M. del Campo.

“Ces nouvelles d’Italie sont affreuses par les conséquences qui peuvent en résulter, à moins que le Directoire n’ait fut exagéré les choses. Il faut que je vous vois pour dix minutes ce soir. Pouvez-vous passer chez moi sur les huit heures ?”

*French. Copy.*

## WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, April 30, Fribourg.—“In obedience to your Lordship’s commands, and I have seldom received or executed any with more pleasure, I have shewn to the Greffier Fagel every civility and attention in my power.

“I had known him many years since at Geneva ; I am besides very particularly attached to his uncle, M. de Salgas, with whom he is now going to stay, and I had actually written to him at Hamburg before I received your Lordship’s letter to request that he would take up his abode with me on his passage through Berne. I have obtained from the Secret Council, to whom I thought it wiser to make my application than to the Senate, that he shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of the *Comité des Etrangers* during his residence in the canton.

“I have also to acknowledge your Lordship’s very obliging letter of the 15th instant. I will take care in future to attend to the hint you are so good as [to] give me with respect to *inclosures that I may wish to have destroyed*. Your Lordship must no doubt be reminded from time to time that you sent me abroad without giving me the smallest time to inform myself of any one particular regarding the regular routine of business. In that respect I have however always made myself perfectly easy in the assurance that, whilst the main part of my business was well and carefully attended to, your Lordship would not only overlook such little errors yourself, but that you would explain and excuse them to others.

“I am most seriously alarmed about this miserable business in Italy. Its consequences will be very extensive. If the Piedmontese would continue to *fight*, I should rather consider it as an advantage, as much so as the passage of the Rhine proved to be last year. The French would find their grave in Italy, and the interior would be free from troops. But all hopes of that kind seem unfortunately to be over. Your Lordship will perceive that Mr. Trevor’s No. 32 is wanting. It was sent by a courier of M. d’Hauteville’s and has never reached me.

“Your Lordship will perceive by my public dispatch that I had not neglected the department of Cher. I will do my utmost to distribute the money I may send into the interior so as that it may produce effect, but there will be no end to the expense if every partial insurrection that may take place this spring and summer must be separately supported. I see M. de Précy will do nothing but upon a great scale, and that he will require his operations to be preceded by a much more con-

siderable expense than the one proposed last winter ; but, as the die is now fairly cast, I presume that it would be thought right not to adhere too rigidly to the old proposals, provided he will make an attempt fairly and *bonâ fide*.

“What are we to think of the Directory suffering Pichégrou to come to Strasburgh ? And what are we to think of this delay in his arrival ? And what are we to think of the King’s arrival at the very moment that the other was expected ? I assure you I am half disposed to be superstitious about this business since the *rencontre* at Riegel. This project has always been my favourite one, though I never deceived myself with respect to the difficulties by which its execution must necessarily be accompanied. I presume, of course (if I perceive any reasonable hope that an attempt will be made), that I should be unbounded in my offers of money.

“Cochon, the new Minister of the Police, was the person from whom I received the papers that I transmitted to you last year (I think) by the messenger Schaw from Mulheim containing the general view of the then projects of the French Government, most of which have been fully realized. He was then member of the Committee of Public Safety. I cannot prevail upon the person who procured them for me to return to Paris. Cochon must be paid high, but he will do anything and betray anybody for money.”

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, May 1, Berlin.—“May I beg to recall to your Lordship the hopes you very obligingly gave me while in London, of having permission to be absent from Berlin a part of the summer, in case no particular business required my attendance here. I can assure your Lordship that I have no disinclination to be *employed* here, or any where else. But foreseeing no prospect of business where a Secretary of Legation would not be equally useful, I should be much indebted to you for leave, if not to go to England, at least to make occasional excursions from hence. I have been near two years much of an invalid ; and though greatly recovered, still my physicians recommend strongly the use of sea bathing or mineral baths this summer. And it would be a very particular mark of kindness if your Lordship could enable me to execute their directions, provided no material objection occurred.

“I enclose an official application which may be useful, in case your Lordship approves of my request.”

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, May 1, Berlin.—“Having at present a safe conveyance to Cuxhaven, I beg leave to state to your Lordship some observations which I have collected on the conduct of business here.

“At this moment, Count Haugwitz is the only minister capable of forming, or carrying through any system of politics. But, even in matters where the Foreign Department is exclusively concerned, he cannot act independently of Count Finckenstein, and Baron Alvensleben ; hence, that degree of caution, that wavering, and occasional variations which are to be perceived in every plan of this Cabinet. Besides Count Haugwitz is excessively artful, and knows perfectly where his interest requires that he should yield to circumstances. In affairs, on the other hand, connected with the internal administration



of the country, the Grand Directory (composed of twelve Ministers) necessarily comes to be consulted. And the strange opinions of some, and the secret influence of which others are susceptible, often throws very unexpected obstacles in the way of business. But in all matters, General Bischoffeswerder's weight is felt, and in most M. Rietz also interferes. The influence of the former is what it long has been. Perhaps since his marriage he is more liable to receive impressions; and no doubt, the French have, in some instances of late, conveyed partial ones. But he does not attempt directing or carrying through any extensive plans. All he does is giving or keeping up ideas in the King's mind. M. Rietz, formerly *valet de chambre*, and now Private Treasurer, has very great weight with the King. He is much attached to the person of the King, and to the interests of the country; and anxiously opposes every measure which he considers contrary to either. Hence his uniform opposition to every recommendation given in favour of the exportation of corn from the Prussian territories. At the same time many matters naturally occur where his notions must be very defective; and of course, he is open to the impressions which may be thrown before him.

"It will readily occur to your Lordship that, under circumstances where it is not meant that the British Minister should act the part which Mr. Ewart carried on here, or attempt establishing a directing influence at Berlin, public character is not what is most useful either towards procuring information, or conveying with effect any occasional impressions. On the contrary, much benefit would be derived from habitual intercourse with the society and connexions of M. Rietz, and persons in similar situations about Court. Many instances might, I am confident, be found for applying money to purpose. But this can only be by persons of a rank in the line inferior to that which I hold. On these grounds in particular, as well as from the general advantages of such a person, I should venture strongly to recommend to your Lordship the residence of a Secretary of Legation here.

"As to sources of secret intelligence I beg to mention a circumstance which has lately happened. Among the offerers for exporting grain to England a man of the name of Lentze (partner in the house of Hammer and Company at Magdebourg, and brother to the Deputy-Steward of the Household), struck me by the accuracy of his information on all matters connected with his object. He gave me an opening to suggest his undertaking to furnish me habitually with intelligence here; but he told me that, being of respectable connexions, and in a respectable line, he could consent to nothing of the kind unless he was vested with some ostensible character which would screen him from all persecution from this Government. He pointed out the situation of a Consul to Magdebourg and Stetin, with permission to reside chiefly at Berlin; a situation for which we would ask no *appointments*, considering that the advantages which the nomination would give him in the line of his profession, and the allowance which I should make him for his secret services, a full compensation for all his time. He accordingly gave me the enclosed memorandum.

"I should be happy to know your Lordship's wishes on the subject. I do not really conceive much use in the naming a *Consul* as long as there is a Minister here, and all commercial business is transacted at Berlin. But whether in the case of M. Lentze, or of any other substantial merchant here, such a nomination (even if, in itself, indifferent to England) might perhaps be turned to great advantage under the present circumstances of this Court. And it is in that view that I convey M. Lentze's suggestion to your Lordship."

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, May 2, London.—“J’ai écrit ma Cour dans le sens dont vous m’avez parlé, et conformément à ce que je vous ai promis. La dépêche qui a rapport à l’objet dont nous nous sommes entretenus, est entièrement écrite de ma main, et personne dans le monde, exceptez celui qui l’adresse et celui à quelle est adressée, n’en aura connaissance. Permettez que je profite de cette occasion pour vous remercier de la confiance que vous me témoignez, et de la délicatesse de votre procédé. Croyez que rien de tout cela n’échappe à mon cœur et à ma sensibilité. Je tâcherai de mériter de plus en plus les sentimens flatteurs dont vous m’honorez. Les miens pour vous ne varieront jamais. *Respect, estime, et amitié la plus tendre* sont ma devise envers vous.

“Oserais-je vous demander s’il est survenu quelque changement dans vos projets? Vous m’aviez fait l’honneur de me dire Jeudi que votre courrier partirait le lendemain; je me suis hâté de finir ma besogne, et vous ne l’avez pas expédié. Je ne suis nullement pressé, mais je vous supplie uniquement de daigner me faire avertir du jour de l’expédition pour que j’envoie mes paquets au bureau. Permettez aussi que je vous demande un moment d’entretien pour un de ces jours; j’ai quelque chose à vous communiquer dont on pourra peut-être tirer quelque parti.”

*French.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1796, May 6, Dropmore.—“My brother has mentioned to me the conversation which he had with Lord G. Cavendish, and afterwards with your Grace, on the subject of a county meeting in Buckinghamshire which it is in contemplation to call with a view to ascertain the disposition of the county towards Lord Tichfield. I hope you will excuse the liberty I take of troubling you with a few lines upon the subject from the motive which leads me to do so, which is no other than the most anxious desire to prevent, if possible, anything that could have the appearance of contest, or opposition of sentiment or interest, between your grace and those with whom I am most nearly connected; and *that* most particularly on an occasion where the difference, if any, would be confined to the manner of conducting the business, and would not, I am certain, in the smallest degree apply to the main point itself of Lord Tichfield’s re-election.

“Although from his former engagements with the county, it would not be proper for Lord Buckingham to take any active steps in supporting the choice of any person whatever as a colleague to Mr. I. Grenville, yet I am sure I speak his sentiments when I say that he is sincerely desirous that the representation should continue as it now is, and *that*, by that means, all danger of contest or uneasiness in the county should be avoided; and I think I know the county well enough to be able to say with confidence that if Lord Tichfield contents himself with renewing the offer of his service, in the same form in which he first made it, not the slightest opposition is to be expected.

“But your Grace cannot but be sensible that there have, on former occasions, been great differences of opinion as to the propriety of county meetings in Buckinghamshire for the nomination of members. Any such meeting has been, as I believe, invariably opposed by our family; and we have been successful in establishing the contrary practice. The last time that there has been any question of such a meeting was in 1779, on the death of Lord Temple. The meeting was then not called by the sheriff (whether he refused it or not I really do not

recollect), but by some of the gentlemen of the county. Lord Buckingham and my brother Mr. Grenville (who attended the meeting) opposed, not the particular candidate who was in view, but the idea of nominating a candidate to the freeholders at large by a meeting which must necessarily be (in so long a county as our's) a very inadequate representation of the opinions of the county. And in fact no nomination was made.

"Whether our opinion in this respect, or the practice of other counties is best seems hardly worth enquiring now; but I am confident Lord Buckingham would conceive that both his honour and his interest are concerned in opposing any alteration of the established practice of this county in that respect. If it were any common case I should say that, in this situation of things, the matter must take it's course. Lord Tichfield's friends, thinking a meeting the best course for his interest, if they do think so, would try to call the meeting. Lord Buckingham, consistently with his uniform conduct and declarations, would oppose it. But it is impossible for me not to feel that, however the opposition might, and I am sure would in Lord Buckingham's intentions, be confined to that point only, the impression it would create universally would be that of hostility to Lord Tichfield's election; and I hope I do not do wrong in judging from my own feelings of the desire which your Grace must have to avoid giving any such impression. At all events, I thought I should not do what was right either towards you or to Lord Buckingham if I did not bring the matter under your consideration in that point of view in which it may possibly not have struck you.

"Although, of course, it does not belong to me to suggest any mode of proceeding to Lord Tichfield's friends in this county, I cannot help adding that the objections I have stated do not, as far as I can judge, appear to apply in any degree to any discussion as to Lord Tichfield's standing which might take place at a meeting of *his friends*, whether called for the purpose, or such as they are in the practice of holding from time to time."

*Copy.*

C. BENTINCK to C. GODDARD.

1796, May 6, Varel.—"I enclose an abstract from a letter of a very well known and wealthy merchant at Embden, to a friend of his who lives in this neighbourhood. The letter contains a strong confirmation of many details I have sent, and is worth reading in many respects. What makes it still more curious is that both the writer and his correspondent are connected with the Dutch Patriots of 1787, as is easily seen by some expressions of the letter. It was sent us by the person who lives in this neighbourhood, who thought the letter might deserve our attention; and this shows how much the minority of that party is cooled, our sentiments being so well known and so uniformly and openly avowed. I shall be obliged to you to give it to Lord Grenville. The latter part of the letter may perhaps be thought to deserve more attention than all the rest. The writer is just returned from Holland."

*Enclosure.*

ABSTRACT OF A LETTER FROM EMBDEN.

1796, April 28, Embden.—"I arrived here last Tuesday in the afternoon. In Holland, and in Friesland in particular, things bear a strange appearance. The divisions between the *Moderate* and *Jacobin* Patriots are increasing into the most violent hatred, and are more

inveterate than those which took place before between the Orange party and the Patriots. The Moderate Patriots whilst they were in the Government, did not find the task so easy as they had expected. They saw they could not get through it without the assistance of the deposed members of the ancient Government who were attached to the House of Orange. They accordingly made overtures to them from time to time, wishing for a union, and would willingly have shared their authority with them. In this manner some reasonable plan might have been adopted; but, now the Jacobins hold the reins, in my opinion all is lost. In Friesland this set are completely masters; the Representatives are all notorious Jacobins. They depose in all the towns and villages all those who were employed under the ancient Government, and those who are well-disposed. They choose others in their room by elections of the inhabitants, or rather of the Jacobins. From these elections the Orange party and the well-disposed Patriots are kept away by the oath required from those who vote. The oath is such that neither of these descriptions of persons can take it, the former on account of their attachment to the Prince, the latter from fear of the consequences. Of course none come to these elections but Jacobins of the worst sort. It is easily imagined that the persons they choose are very unfit for the situations. For instance at *Harlingen*, where the election took place at the time I was there, among other persons named for the municipality were a baker, a man who keeps a pastry-cook shop, a tailor, a wood-merchant's journeyman, two shop-keepers of the lowest class. One of them had been servant to a Jew, and sold cakes about the street at a farthing a piece; another was a bricklayer; and one of them could neither read nor write, who was afterwards displaced on account of his gross ignorance. In *this large town* not above 70 of the lowest inhabitants met in the church, and, supported by the Declaration of the Rights of Man, chose these respectable persons to govern them; the remainder of the inhabitants, kept away by the oath required, were obliged to submit. In *Leeuwarden the Capital*, the hangman's son, a worthless fellow who had fled the country for thieving, and another man who carries turf about the town, are now among the municipality. All persons of any character are dismissed from their offices, and may think themselves fortunate if they are not thrown into prison, as has already been the case with many good patriots. If the choice in other provinces turns out as it has here, I foresee some Marat *et* Robespierre as the consequence. The hot Jacobins are *partly* patriots of 1787 who left the country at the time of the revolution, and are mostly hot-headed *aventuriers*, and being at that time deranged in their circumstances, and since totally bewildered, have dissipated what little they had left. These fancy they have now a claim upon their country and are entitled to all offices of profit, under the supposition that an office and the capacity to fill it go together. They wish to drive the Prince's friends out of the country, and to dispose of their property to pay the 100,000,000 to France, and for extraordinary expenses which they expect to run very high; and no doubt they will not forget their own purse whilst the Administration is in their hands. The best patriots meant to forget the past, to divide equally the extraordinary burdens which they were forced to impose whilst in power. The *Enragés* made use of this as a handle against the *Modérés* to bring about their fall. They now wish as much as the Orange party that the Revolution never had taken place. They are persuaded the French deceived them, take their money with great politeness, and, when done, will leave Holland to its fate. The French, on the other hand, see that nothing is to be done with the phlegmatic Dutchman but to take his money; which I have from French

officers when no Dutchman happened to be present. Most of the new-appointed officers are dissatisfied, nor is much to be expected from the Navy. The sailors on board the ships, who had received promises of better treatment, find themselves disappointed, ill-used, and starved, desert on all occasions, and even endeavour to carry their ships into English harbours. There is an end of commerce and of manufactures, even a want of the raw materials to carry them on. Peasants and citizens must learn the use of arms, which first amused now tires them; and punishments become necessary to force their submission in this instance. At Amsterdam they were at first punished with fines for not appearing; their non-appearance is now punished with imprisonment, which does not please the free Amsterdammers. All are dissatisfied, the rich as well as the middling classes. The poor never suffered more. All hope for a change, though no one sees where it is to come from. The French they wish out of the country, were they even to be driven out by the Prussians; so some of them speak. The opening of the Scheld gives great discontent; and with the loss of the East-Indies, it is the death blow of Amsterdam. Here is a rapid sketch of what I have seen and heard. Some respectable merchants have more than once expressed their wishes to me rather to be under the government of the King of Prussia than to continue under such a government. I have been three times in the gallery of the National Convention, strangers must be quiet with their hats off. Mr. Bicher of Amsterdam was President, which he went through tolerably well. Applications for offices were nearly all I heard, and a project for the education of children, which was well enough. Good speaking I did not hear. They discuss slowly, and do not interrupt the speaker. Van Zon an attorney, a fat but active man, has great influence over the National Convention. He has obtained a permission to sell ships. When he wishes to get any request or memorial of his to be favourably received in the Convention, he goes the evening before he presents it to the President in order to explain it, and to show the legality of what he asks; and, when referred to any of the committees, he knows how to instruct the leading members in those committees, and in this manner to obtain his ends. I believe he gets rich in this employment. I shall be glad to know whether he will get my ship, detained at Harlingen, released, as he has strongly led me to expect."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, May 13, Varel.—"I enclose the last accounts we received as I had them from our friend, the person I have so frequently mentioned, who has sent them to the person authorised to correspond with him. These are confirmed by all we hear from other quarters, and we have every reason to believe that in Guelderland, Arnheim alone perhaps excepted, in North Holland, in South Holland, and in all its large and populous towns not excepting Amsterdam, the disgust and discontent are carried on as far as in the provinces to which I have chiefly directed your attention. I have confined myself to these provinces because the information we had through the channels I have mentioned, from our vicinity and other circumstances I have noticed, was as direct and authentic as I could wish; and what relates to other parts of the country I knew would be communicated more fully than I should be able to do, where it would be requisite, and would of course reach you. I can with confidence repeat all I have said with respect to the provinces I have alluded to. Far from losing, we are gaining ground daily; and we have frequent proofs of the perseverance and resolution of our friends, whose hopes and confidence the person I have so often

mentioned in preceding letters succeeds in keeping up ; and whose activity I have no doubt he will be able to suspend till a time comes to direct it with safety and effect to the object we may have in view. We beg to know whether it is wished that the principal members of the ancient Government of the provinces I have chiefly noticed should follow the example said in the enclosed to be set them, and apply to the Courts of London and Berlin, or either of them, to put the guarantee in force and give effect to the Treaty of Loo. We should not wish this to be done without being assured of receiving a satisfactory and ostensible answer of some sort ; as such an application would hurt those who might propose it and get it signed if it did not meet with the reception expected, or was left unanswered. But a syllable from you, or from persons authorised to write to our friend, and he has no doubt of obtaining such an application, in due form and at a moment's notice, from a considerable number of the most popular and best disposed members of the ancient Government of the provinces I have chiefly spoken of.

“Not having heard from England, I console myself with the hopes that what I have mentioned has been thought to deserve some attention from many of the communications our friend has received ; and what he received by the last post in particular supposes the knowledge of a few circumstances he transmitted to England only. We observe, with great satisfaction, the language held and the hopes given to bear the appearance of a regular and well digested plan of conduct, in which all the most material transactions find their proper place ; and which all the different persons employed forward, as far as it is intended they should, without knowing of each other any further than required. From this we expect the best result, and some parts of the plan may fail, some of the persons fall off, without endangering the rest. At the same time I am no further apprehensive at this moment of anything of this sort than from the accidents to which all situations of this kind are liable. I shall drop these conjectures, however convincing in my mind, in hopes of receiving more positive information from England. I earnestly request an answer to the points I have touched in former letters. What I have suggested, though not wanted by the persons I have named themselves, who are far above any considerations of this sort, will at this moment be of essential and immediate service. Not having any answer, and wishing to go on to the utmost of my power, I have desired our friend to hold out promises of reward and gratifications wherever necessary to insure success ; that I would be answerable to him for being enabled to fulfil them sooner or later ; and that those who desire the end must desire the means ; that, at any rate, we might expect some time or other to find it amongst our friends. I had the less scruple to say this as I know from all I have seen I shall have no reason to repent having advanced so far. At the same time what I have suggested is very necessary at this moment, and will enable the parties concerned to use more dispatch. It has been mentioned to me lately how necessary it was, and it cannot be put in better hands than those I mentioned. At the same time we are happy to think that the further perseverance and activity of *our friends* do not depend solely or chiefly upon any support of this sort ; though, no doubt, they would derive great advantage from it.”

*Enclosure.*

#### ABSTRACTS FROM LETTERS.

“A letter dated May 1st says that the National Convention of the Batavian Republic has again decreed that the tax of one sixteenth

throughout those provinces should be levied; that one of the Groningen Representatives writes that the situation of the finances, more particularly of the province of Holland, is quite hopeless and offers no prospect of redress; that the principal of the debt indeed was still to be considered as mortgaged on that province; but that the other provinces must pay their share of the annual interest, and Groningen in particular that of 24,000,000 as her share, and the whole produce of the land-tax, the chief source of revenue of the province, would be absorbed for this purpose. He adds that the second term of the 4 per cent. was fixed for the 26 instant, but that many persons had not yet paid their share of the first, as has been said before; and that they will delay and resist to the utmost of their power in order to embarrass the finances still further, and in hopes of being rescued yet, without which they feel all these efforts must be fruitless.

"A letter, dated May 5, states that the committees of the National Convention demand 60,000,000 for the expenses of this year, without knowing as yet where these are to be found owing to the general distress of the finances. That, having made a requisition of horses, they are now to make a requisition of men, and preparatory exhortations for this purpose are circulating.

"A third letter, dated May 5, from a person likely to be well informed, mentions that all the reports of the members of the National Convention insist upon the deplorable state of the finances, and contain open acknowledgments of this truth; and that the general wish is the restoration of the ancient Government; and there is every reason to expect that many wish eagerly to tread back the dangerous road they have taken, feeling now the impossibility of attaining their object. The province of Groningen had sent up complaints to the National Convention against the oppressive quartering of troops, there being 5,600 French and 3,300 Batavians in that province; that Delfziel has been lately provided with a great many cannon, most, if not all, of iron. On the other hand it is confidently reported that all the French and Bavarians will be encamped together near Zutphen, and in other places; and no other troops remain in Groningen but the Chasseurs of Trip amounting to about 600. That money is so scarce in the public coffers that the Representatives themselves do not receive their salaries; and that, in Friesland, the Receivers in the particular districts had orders to pay in what they had *partly collected* of the 4 per cent. tax. Such was the scarcity of money that, at Amsterdam, the merchants went to Change to hear the news, and from habit, but not for the sake of business; that the accounts spread with so much industry of the successes of the French army in Italy did not meet with all the credit and produce the effect expected, and the heads of the Government were very desponding. That they had seen a very well drawn up paper with an application to England and Prussia as guarantees, and signed by many Hollanders of distinction, which they had not ventured to send to their correspondent."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, May 14, Somerset Place.—"Lord Camden is not aware that Colonel Craufurd is your correspondent and not mine, but, in place of writing to him that answer, I have told Mr. Stewart that I would transmit Lord Camden's letter to you, and that I was persuaded I would meet with the same disposition of your part to attend to Lord Camden's wishes, as he could have met with on my part, if the business had rested with me."

*Enclosure.*

EARL CAMDEN to HENRY DUNDAS.

1796, May 7, Dublin Castle.—“I have prevailed on Mr. Pelham to make an application to Colonel Crawford, with whom he is upon the most intimate terms, to admit my nephew Major Stewart to belong to his suite, whilst he remains with the Austrian army; and I have just seen a letter from him, in which he is so good as to say he will receive him if he (Major Stewart) was allowed to come under the sanction of the English ministry as attached to his *mission*, (though without pay) otherwise the Austrians might make difficulties. I venture to hope that you will assist this object with your influence, as it is one which, from the regard and affection I feel towards my nephew, I am particularly desirous of accomplishing. I have desired him to call on you and to deliver this letter to you, and you cannot oblige me more than by promoting the object of it as much as you can, and by giving him the Ministerial sanction which may be necessary for his joining Colonel Crawford.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1796, May 17, Cleveland Row.—“It is probable that Parliament will be dissolved on Friday next, and I have therefore thought it right to transmit to you the forms of a proxy and of a signed list, in order that you may make use of either of them, as you shall think best, for voting at the election of the 16 peers for Scotland in the ensuing Parliament.

“I send the list of those who seem to me, as far as I am at present informed, most likely to be supported by the major part of the Scotch peerage, but this list is of course liable to variation from different circumstances. If you should prefer voting by proxy (to the sending a signed list) I should imagine that either Lord Glasgow or Lord Moray would be peers on whose attendance you might rely.

“I expect to be able to write to you more at large by another opportunity as to the question of your absence from Berlin. I will only say at present that it appears to me very doubtful whether, under the existing circumstances, the business of that mission can with propriety be left to any person in an inferior station to that of the King's Minister there.”

*Copy*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

*Private.*

1796, May 24, Cleveland Row.—“I am much embarrassed what to do in the present circumstances respecting Count Starhemberg, as I do not think myself at liberty to apprise him of the intention, which I suppose to be entertained, of charging some other person than himself to negotiate the convention, which, for the reason I have stated in my public dispatch, must inevitably be reserved to be concluded here. I confess it does not appear to me that there is any great difficulty or delicacy in the arrangement of the business on the side of Austria, and I should therefore much prefer to have to treat with him than with a stranger. I am not blind to his faults, but as long as he is continued Minister here, it is surely better that he should be treated with the usual marks of confidence due to his station than that these should be withheld from him. His father is certainly a *frondeur* as to all that is



passing, but I have no reason to believe *him* much attached to his father's politics; and, if the thing can be done without too much difficulty, I should wish to see him entrusted with this business, rather than to have to encounter the difficulties and jealousies which would arise from any competition with him in this respect.

"I cannot conclude this letter without repeating what is said in my public dispatch about the possibility of separate negotiation. I am seriously alarmed on the subject, not doubting that, if the Milanese is thought irrecoverable by force, M. Thugut would willingly sacrifice the Netherlands to regain it by treaty. The great object is to make him feel the infinite advantages which he will have in treating jointly rather than separately; and to this I am confident you will direct your utmost attention. I trust the thing will not happen, but, if it did, the early knowledge of it would be of the utmost possible importance."

*Copy.*

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, June 10, Varel.—"I do not know whether I may consider the answers the person I have so frequently mentioned has received as being at the same time answers to my letters. If so, I have some reason to be satisfied for the present, notwithstanding the silence observed with respect to me, which I can assure Lord Grenville, though I should be extremely happy to receive a line to clear up the obscurity I am in, will not prevent me from pursuing my object, as far as opportunities may offer. I have only to regret they are not more frequent and more important. My brother returned from his tour last Thursday week night. All the accounts he brings from the frontiers of Utrecht and Guelderland are as favourable as can be, and confirmations of what you heard before. At Utrecht, in the province of Utrecht, all is well disposed, the clubs of that city alone excepted. These are armed. We heard again to day that General Bournonville had again insisted upon the Representatives of the same province giving up the idea of obliging the members of the ancient Government to refund all the emoluments they had derived from their employments since 1787; General Bournonville saying it was contrary to the capitulation. M. de Schubart, the Danish envoy, is said to have obtained the French general's interference, Madame de Schubart's father being a member of the late Government of that province. I mentioned in mine of the 31st ultimo that two members of the late Government of Friesland, M.M. Scheltinger and Basseleur, were summoned before a committee of the Representatives. They appeared on the 20th May before that committee, and, being questioned with respect to the mode of indemnifying the fugitives of 1787, they answered with great firmness and decision, declining most positively and in a high tone any interference on their part, or any assent whatever to a measure they thought so unjustifiable; avowing the share they had in the judicial proceedings against the fugitives, and in bringing them to their trial; and asserting that, in the whole of their conduct, they had acted in conformity with their oath, the laws and constitution of their country. I think it right to mention this circumstance I had forgot amongst many others which shew there is some spirit left in the country. By our last accounts few volunteers offered to march to the frontiers of the Seven Provinces; not much above 250 had offered in the whole province of Friesland. We have not heard any more lately of the project of drawing forces and encamping them towards this side. On the contrary some of the troops had been marched away; but they

are continually marching and counter-marching. Our friend who was to go to D——, as I mentioned in my letter of the 17th May, and had been delayed, set out on the 28th following.

"We have received an account of the state of the navy, by which it appears that not a ship has been built or launched since 1794, one very small vessel excepted; and they had about 2,500 seamen less than in 1794. I do not send the list, as I take it for granted it is needless, and I expect something more accurate of the kind from the person I have frequently mentioned. We could get a man who has been three months on board the fleet, who is still in Holland, and has offered himself. We heard of him very lately. This man has no acquaintance with any one I mentioned in former letters. I think it right to mention it; if he could be useful I beg to be told so, or if I am referred to any one with whom our friend is in correspondence we will leave it to him. I need scarcely say again, by our friend I mean the person I have so frequently mentioned."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, June 13, Vienna.—"The instructions carried by Baron Muller, and by the messenger that followed him on the 18th, will, I trust, have nearly anticipated your Lordship's wishes on the subject of the negotiation for the loan. I fully feel the unpleasant situation in which your Lordship is placed with regard to Count Starhemberg, and it is my great aim to remove it. I despair however of being able to restore him to that degree of confidence with the Austrian Minister which is so much to be desired. I see many of his dispatches; they are in general very trifling; but I must do him the justice to say that they contain nothing contrary to the system existing between the two Courts.

"Of M. de Thugut I have spoken so fully in my dispatch of this day, that I have only to add that he has, at times, not been without apprehensions of our making a separate peace; and, besides the public detriment, he has more than once intimated the distress and embarrassment and which such an event must reduce him personally. Should the calamities increase to such a degree as to force him from his post, I do not know who might succeed him. It is generally allowed, except by his immediate enemies, that it would be difficult to find any person of sufficient abilities and experience to discharge the duties of the office. If M. de Thugut quitted in quieter times, which I believe has long been his intention, Count Cobenzl, now at Petersburg, would probably be his successor.

"I will not further intrude upon your Lordship's time, but will only add that, however melancholy the prospect is, M. de Thugut does not despair; and that my utmost endeavours shall be unremittingly exerted to retain this Court steady to the principles of the coalition."

C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, June 14, Varel.—"I enclose abstracts from two letters containing the last accounts we have received from our neighbourhood. The letter dated the 7th June is chiefly military. Of late I have either suppressed entirely, or noticed but very shortly, all details of this nature; and having once given your Lordship ample statements, and mentioned that it was in our power at any time to obtain further information, if wanted, as far as related to the strength and movements of

the French and Bataves on this frontier, I take it for granted that, if the accounts we receive might be of any service at any time, we shall be told so, and instructed how to dispose of them. I have thought it the less necessary to say much about military details as, by the time any of them get to England, the last details we receive here often make the former perfectly useless. It is sufficient your Lordship should know how far our information extends.

"All accounts of this sort besides (excepting the plan relating to the four islands enclosed in mine of the 11th April) have been regularly transmitted to the person named by Prince Frederick, who has orders to forward them to the Hereditary Prince.

"Having no information whatever, and no hopes given from England of any immediate assistance, however convinced we are she will not lose sight of us, and however desirous of her co-operation in any plan that may be formed, it is not surprising the attention of the partizans of the House of Orange, at least on this side, should be chiefly directed to the Court of Berlin since the arrival of the Hereditary Prince at that place. M. Van der Haer receives the strongest hopes from the Hereditary Prince of a powerful interference, notwithstanding all public reports to the contrary; with so many positive assurances as leave no doubt of its being the intention to act the moment a favourable opportunity offers. The person who is authorised by the Princes to correspond with M. van der Haer has been at Brunswick frequently, and some of the letters are written from that place; and, by many circumstances which have come to our knowledge, we flatter ourselves the Duke of Brunswick is not only consulted, but even that he often directs the Princes and those who act under them. For some months past the communications M. van der Haer receives are very regular, bear all the marks of a plan being formed, and are in many respects very satisfactory. We observed some questions were asked at different times within a fortnight or three weeks subsequent to some of my letters to your Lordship, particularly after I had mentioned the plan relating to the four islands; a circumstance, whether accidental or not, which struck us, as we had not mentioned the plan to any one but your Lordship. I wish I could flatter myself I might look upon the answers M. van der Haer receives as being at the same time answers to what I have communicated to you at different times.

"However that may be, Mr. van der Haer is told that 40,000 men will be collected on this side, mostly Prussians and Hanoverians; that the Duke of Brunswick will command them; and that, whatever may be the ostensible language of the Court of Berlin, these troops will be employed for a very different purpose from covering the line of demarcation. At the same time he is desired only to say for the present to his friends within the country, that they are to march for the purpose first mentioned; with assurances that, however things may apparently turn out, the interests of the Republic and of the House of Orange will not be forgot.

"From what I have been saying your Lordship may easily imagine we are insensibly becoming as Prussian as we were in 1787; being again led to expect, in a great measure from the Court of Berlin, our deliverance from a situation implicitly worse than all the calamities we were threatened with at that time. I hope some concert has taken place between London and Berlin; that we shall not be disappointed in our expectations; and that, either a sufficient force will be brought together to act upon this frontier and keep its ground at all events, or such a force as may, in case the Austrians should penetrate into the Netherlands, seize the opportunity of coming to the assistance of our

friends within. The moment never was more favourable from all we hear of the disposition of people of all ranks and descriptions; which leave no room to doubt that those who may come to drive the French out of the Seven Provinces will so far meet with great facility and be received with open arms; even if they were not so sure as we are that they may depend upon the co-operation of numbers within, and more than indifference on the part of many members of the new Government towards their new friends and allies, as they call themselves.

"We have great hopes from the firmness displayed by England and by Austria, and the efforts they appear to be making to retrieve the losses in Italy. But they will have their hands so full at Vienna with the exertions required to recover the Netherlands and Lombardy, that we look with anxiety and impatience to the assistance that may come on this side from Berlin, or from any other quarter, at a moment when the efforts of the French will no doubt be chiefly directed against the Austrians.

"Whatever may be the event of the campaign, a time seems again to be approaching fast when it will be of consequence to have ascertained precisely the disposition of the people in the chief places of the Republic, secured the co-operation of as many of our friends as may be willing to run some risk, and to have the means of giving them notice of any steps which may require their co-operation or keep up their hopes. I mentioned (in the postscript dated the 13th of mine of the 11th April) a visit we had from some of M. Van der Haer's friends; and, in mine of the 17th May, I mentioned that one of these persons was to set out for Amsterdam. He was stopped by the riots from going. We have heard from him since, and he set out from Friesland for that place on the 28th May as I mentioned before. Having every reason to think that there is a regular plan of active interference for the emancipation of the United Provinces, and to expect M. Van der Haer, that he may execute the part assigned to him, will be informed of the details as it becomes proper to divulge them, I was very anxious his friend should go to Amsterdam to speak to as many of our friends as he might think advisable when there. The person in question is gone accordingly. At my particular request, we have given him the same *data* we are going upon here. I have sent him letters for three of our friends, which will not expose them to any inconveniency should they fall into the wrong hands, and which contain a sufficient hint if they choose to take it. The person in question is very well acquainted with Amsterdam; is not easily dismayed, having given proofs of it by his stay in Friesland during the late disturbances; and all that time sent us regular communications of all that was going on. I do not know how far the persons I have directed him to, or his own acquaintance, will choose to enter into our views. A shock so violent as the one we have experienced does operate so differently, and sometimes so strangely, upon men's dispositions; and it is so long since I have seen any of my acquaintance at Amsterdam. If they choose to take a part, I am confident they may depend upon the prudence and resolution of the person we have sent to them, who is firmly attached to M. de Rhoon, has given strong proofs of his loyalty, and may be particularly useful at this moment from being in the habits of intercourse with all classes of people, having lived most in a province the nature of whose Government requires more popularity of manners than any of the seven. He has taken a man with him who has been in the habits of corresponding and of mixing with the lower orders; and, whether or not our friend finds means of gaining sufficient confidence to secure the co-operation of any considerable number of people to be ready at the moment it might be wanted, at any rate I flatter myself we shall get accurate information of

the temper and spirit that prevails at Amsterdam; and, I hope, secure regular communications of what may be going on there. We can depend upon our name or M. de Rhoon's not being imprudently made use of; and upon his running no risk from this person's journey, whose own anxiety for M. de Rhoon's situation will make him observe all possible caution. This we have recommended to him, and had I not been perfectly easy upon that point I would not have ventured so far. I have told our friend I would willingly defray the extraordinary expenses his journey might put him to; and, indeed, as he went at my request, I cannot expect, though he is very much interested in the event, that he should be alone at that expense; or at the expense of returning here, which he will if practicable, or if not attended with too much risk, as he will be under the necessity of returning to Friesland some time hence. There are a few persons whom I could wish to have it in my power to give pecuniary aid to; one, amongst others, who has great influence over the Jacobin clubs in Friesland, who has rendered great service, and has been the means of preventing mischief, and may prevent still more. He has been partly gained by promises, he seems able, and I could wish to put it in M. Van der Haer's power to give him pecuniary aid; the more so as he influences, or is like to influence, some of the Friesland members of the National Convention. I now beg to refer your Lordship to what I said of my wish to be enabled to offer M. Van der Haer and his friend as far as one thousand pounds, if they want it for purposes similar to those I have mentioned. I still request to know to whom I might apply for any part of that sum, for the use of which M. Van der Haer will account to me; as I wish of course not to appear in any transactions of this nature any further than I can help; and that it should pass through M. Van der Haer's hands, and be known to him and to his friend M. Humalda only, that I have given any assistance of this kind. I earnestly request I may know your Lordship's intention on this point. Though M. Van der Haer is not at a loss for himself, the hopes of a change in our favour being delayed from day to day, some assistance of this nature will be required to carry on the correspondence, and for other accidental expenses; and it is but fair our friends should expect it from us. He has desired me to suggest it, and I hope I shall be enabled to give him a satisfactory answer, or to refer him to those who will.

"I take the opportunity of a relation of ours going to England to enclose this to the Duke of Portland, and am more anxious than ever of receiving a line. April 22, 1795, is the date of the only letter I have received from your Lordship since I left England. I hope I need scarcely add that, unless I hear to the contrary, I shall persevere and try every chance of forwarding any plan that may promise success, and that I may, to the best of my judgment, suppose consonant with the views contained in the paper I had the honour of receiving before I left London."

Postscript, June 15.—"A letter from Groningen, dated the 9th instant, confirms the accounts I am sending, with the addition that the French were quitting entirely the provinces of Friesland, Groningen, Overijssel and Drenthe."

*Enclosure.*

ABSTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE PROVINCE OF GRONINGEN.

1796, June 6.—"In consequence of the violent tumults at Amsterdam, General Bournonville has made use of the unlimited command given him lately, and has sent a corps of Hussars and about 1,000 infantry to that city to put an end to all further commotions. This measure has occasioned severe debates in the National Convention, and

has been noticed by some of the members as no less violent than the march against Hattem and Elburg in 1786. The step taken by the French general, and the vast power given him, has indisposed the Patriots to such a degree that the arming of the nation will not take place; and Bournonville is suspected, and even openly accused, of acting the part of the Rhingrave de Salm, and of being corrupted by English gold. It is a matter of fact that, in this province, not 300 volunteers have offered themselves to the new Government since the plan for arming the people has been made known, and these are daily falling off, and expressing their disgust. The last payment of the 4 per cent. has been levied with an unexampled rigour by military execution, which occasions the greatest resentment; the more so as another 4 per cent. is to be levied, which will no doubt be raised with no less violence than the former. All this, though it costs us dear, is attended with this salutary effect, that some of the most considerable Patriots, and all those who have anything to lose, complain bitterly of the present Government, and openly express their wishes for the return of the old Government, lately so hated by some of them. These are no hazarded expressions of mine, but truths I can vouch for from my own certain knowledge. Nor is it the language only of malcontents who have failed in dividing the places amongst themselves. It is so much the general cry that, in case the province was freed from French troops, the revolution might (would is the expression in the letter) be effected of itself. The Dutch soldiers are so well disposed that, when the festival for the French victories in Italy was celebrated, all the cavalry here and the whole battalion of Bataves, notwithstanding the efforts of some of the officers, and amongst others Captain Starke, to animate them with different sentiments, refused to dance round the tree of Liberty, and turned their backs upon all the rejoicings; a few *chasseurs* only excepted of the corps Trip, who were mean enough to join in the dance, and have by their behaviour incurred the contempt of their fellow soldiers. What regard are these honest fellows not entitled to, as a common soldier seldom gains or loses by a change. What the intention of the French may be in thus leaving this province entirely, is a riddle. It seems certain that all the French troops have quitted the posts from the Zout-Kamp along the Dollard, and Eems, the Nieuwe Schans, the whole Westerwolde, and even the Beurtang; and that, in this manner, the whole frontier from the Zout-Kamp to the Bourtang is intrusted solely to about 500 *chasseurs* of Trip, Dutch; and that even a company of artillery, the only artillery in the province, which was chiefly distributed along the frontier, has already received orders likewise to march out. The French general, they say, has given assurances that, within six days, all the French should leave the province. This seems to turn out so, as they are all gone excepting two squadrons of Hussars; so that there were no troops remaining in the town of Groningen but a battalion of Bataves. They all march towards Zutphen where a camp is to be formed. Others are of opinion that some of them will direct their march upon Coeverden to take possession of a height of some importance in that neighbourhood. It is singular enough that the province should be thus entirely abandoned, and I have my doubts sometimes whether it may not be intended to leave us to the mob, as has been done in Friesland."

*Postscript.*—"12,000,000 of paper money are to be put in circulation in Holland."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, June 15, Berne.—"I cannot sufficiently thank your Lordship for your attention to the affair of the regiment at Watteville. I fear it

is now too late to think any further about it. D'Erlach has been summoned to appear before the C.C.; this was a matter of course, but it should not have been done till half the regiment had followed him. I own that my zeal to accomplish this object was not without a sentiment of vanity. As an Englishman, I enjoyed with real satisfaction the idea of getting from France at the same time with her colonies, her very best regiment to assist in defending them against her.

"I am not afraid of the offers made to the Court of Vienna; if she makes war ill, she has generally made peace worse, and always the last. I am still less afraid of the final event of the campaign in Italy, but the recall of the Austrian troops from the Rhine has proved a most fatal business, and will still I fear be productive of infinite mischief. *Before* that event I think the affairs of the allies never stood upon so solid a ground. I speak of the day that the Austrians broke the truce.

"If the successes of the French should continue, I should submit it to your Lordship very seriously whether I might not, under pretext of a leave of absence, remove somewhere nearer home; to Frankfort for instance, or Mannheim. I have little doubt but that a *demand* respecting my residence here will soon be made. I know that individuals of this country resident in Paris have written to that effect here; and should the *demand* take place, though I have not a doubt but that it would be resisted, yet the private wishes of individuals would be conveyed to me requesting me to *consider* the unpleasant *remonstrances* to which my residence here exposes them. The people at Paris imagine that I have ten times better correspondence than I really have.

"I cannot help sending you the enclosed that I have this moment received from M. Imbert. It will convince your Lordship how wholly unmanageable these people are, and how impossible it is to do anything with them. M. Imbert and M. de Pr  cy have been repeatedly threatened to be denounced to the King as his enemies counteracting the efforts of his loyal subjects, and at the same time to the Directory as counter-revolutionists.

"The enclosed extract of a letter from D'Antraigues to Duvergne du Praile is so curious that I cannot help sending it to you. D'Artez is D'Antraigues' correspondent, and the Swiss he alludes to are Saladin and Divermois. Saladin wrote to his friend here some time since that my credit had been materially affected by the Spanish peace of which I had given no information. He even cited the Duke of Portland as his authority. I should wish your Lordship to show D'Antraigues' letter to his Grace."

*Two enclosures.* Of little political interest.

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, June 16, Berlin.—"It is impossible for me to convey to your Lordship to what an extent my situation is irksome in regard to the subject of my this day's despatch. On the one hand, the information has come to me from six or seven channels which, as far as I can conjecture, could have no combination together, nor any interest in deceiving me. I have even had sums of money given to the persons in M. Caillard's family; and from them have obtained full confirmation of the general proceeding. On the other hand, I have only found one among those of the Foreign Ministers who are the best informed here, at all apprized of there being anything of the kind in agitation. And the unfortunate impression under which Sir M. Eden acts (that this Court can be turned to no use, will in no case act otherwise than against us, and will never be applied to by Austria) this fatal impression has

carried him so far as not to keep me at all *au fait* of what might have proved highly beneficial to my situation here, particularly in this conjuncture. Had it not been so, I might readily have got at the truth of this matter.

"Still however the confidence I am led to place in what I have learnt makes me feel it incumbent on me to send it to your Lordship; for, even should the proposals of this Court have been kept secret at Vienna, the mission of the Marquis Gallo to Basle, and the retrograde movements, and present situation of Prince Charles's army on the right of the Rhine, will alone be sufficient to satisfy your Lordship's mind in regard to the doubts which I have no means of removing.

"Your Lordship may rest assured that I shall not lose a moment in communicating any further material intelligence I may be able to collect on this matter."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, June 18, Windsor.—"Monsieur de Luc having received intelligence from Geneva that the French meditate attempting an invasion of this island if they succeed in obliging the Court of Vienna to make peace with them; and thinking it improper he should keep this information to himself; I have advised him to go to Dropmore and communicate what he has received to Lord Grenville. I own I do not give great credit to the account, as I am convinced, however the idea may be adopted, that whilst we are masters of the sea, if attempted it will not succeed."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, June 23, Walmer Castle.—"In addition to the extracts of Crawford's dispatches, I have received Paris papers to the 19th, which speak (though vaguely) of an Austrian peace, and there are verbal reports to the same effect from Calais and Dunkirk. They are however as yet very little worthy of credit, though after all that has passed, one cannot hear them with indifference or with total disbelief. If such an event has really happened, it will simplify very much our plans, although it will leave upon our hands a very arduous contest. We must know in a few days whether there is any foundation for the report. Should it turn out otherwise, and Austria not have taken any steps for separate negotiation, I think it clear that we must execute with the utmost expedition our intention of advancing money as far as the first three hundred thousand pounds, but not agree to go farther without receiving an explanation as to the Austrian plans for their defensive campaign, and still more particularly and precisely as to their plan of peace. I am also clear that (unless there happens some unexpected turn in the state of things) any idea of our enabling Austria to act with any effect beyond the present year is out of the question. In this situation it would be inexcusable not to try any chance that can be tried, honorably and safely, to set on foot some decent plan of pacification; and I can conceive no objection in the mind of any of our colleagues to see whether the arrangement to which you have pointed can be made acceptable both to Austria and Prussia. But though I think it should be tried, I do not flatter myself with much chance of success. On the whole my notion is that most likely, either now or a few months hence, we shall be left to sustain alone the conflict with France and Holland, probably joined by Spain, and perhaps favored more or less openly by the Northern powers. But with proper exertion we can make our party good against them all. If however there should be any appearance of this situation taking place soon, I believe it will be right to meet Parliament as early



as possible. Austrian loan will, on such a supposition, be out of the question, and strong measures must be immediately taken to procure a large addition of seamen, and of fencible troops for home defence. Such steps cannot be taken too soon, in the event I am supposing, in order to prevent the impression of danger gaining too much ground, before preparation is made to meet it."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1796, June 23, Cleveland Row.—"I have postponed answering your private letter of the 1st of May till I could see a little more clearly into the turn which things were likely to take, particularly with respect to the army of observation and its effects upon French and Austrian measures. It is true that precisely in the present moment you have no active employment at Berlin beyond that of watching the strange scene passing there, but the circumstances of the times are so critical that every hour may bring forward business of importance to be transacted there, and I really should think that it would be very improper that the King's Minister to that Court should be absent from it under the present circumstances, on any other ground than that of the most urgent and indispensable necessity.

"I have reason to believe that I shall very shortly have the means of sending you a Secretary of Legation who will, I trust, be acceptable to you."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1796, June 28, Cleveland Row.—"The important subject of your dispatch of the 16th is certainly one to which too much attention cannot be paid, and every information which may tend either to confirm or to remove your suspicions will be highly interesting to us. For my own part I confess that, in putting different circumstances together, I believe the scheme to be rather desired by Prussia than as yet adopted by Austria. Gallo's mission has certainly the Neapolitan peace for its principal object, and I do not think he would have been chosen by the Austrians to treat for them; and the movements of the Arch-Duke's army are sufficiently explained by the step taken of sending troops from the Rhine to Italy without looking for other reasons.

"It must however be observed that if this conjecture is right for the present, yet the circumstances in which the Court of Vienna is now placed may vary their decision in this respect from day to day. I consider the currency of this report at Berlin as a strong indication of the desire of that Government to bring about such an event; and when that desire exists there, the impression favourable to it may soon be created at Vienna, notwithstanding the natural reluctance which the Austrians must feel to any plan which supposes a confidence on their part in the good faith of Prussia.

"This is all mere speculation; for any practical purpose my despatches by this messenger contain all that we think can be done, and I am very sure that no attention will be wanting on your part."

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, January–June.—"The result of our deliberations last night having rather disturbed my slumbers, I have taken the opportunity to read the enclosed paper which was left with me yesterday by M. Botterel,

and which it will be desirable to send to-morrow to the Duke Harcourt, in order that he may read it and forward it to Monsieur. I wish you may be able to find time to read it over, and I shall send it accordingly, so as that it may reach you by the time you are up. You will see by this how perfectly limited in its extent the party is that has acted against Puisaye, and how perfectly unwarrantable their conduct has been.

"If it were of any consequence now, as I am afraid it is not, to think what should be done upon this occasion, I should certainly be of opinion that not only great injustice would be done, but great injury to the cause, by substituting anyone in the room of Puisaye, though I see no disadvantage, but on the contrary benefit, by a person's going over who should assist on the part of the Prince, in enforcing the measure which, as you will see at the end, Puisaye and the council have very properly recommended."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, July 4, Berne.—"I had intended to have written to your Lordship more at large upon the subject of M. D'André's proposals and the various points with which they are connected, but I was yesterday taken so ill that I was not even able to finish my more important dispatch respecting the naval armaments in Holland. I must therefore reserve the subject for another occasion. *After all*, I believe I could say little upon it that will not present itself immediately to your Lordship when you shall read the articles themselves.

"With my original instructions in my head it is impossible for me to mistake the intentions of his Majesty's ministers, and it will be no difficult matter to apply them to any new circumstances that the present, or indeed any future situation of things can well present.

"I think that the period we have all to look to now is the renewal of the third portion of the *Legislature*. The part that the Directory has to play is so extremely difficult that I cannot well foresee how it can *possibly* keep a majority in the two assemblies after the new election shall have taken place. It *certainly* cannot without having recourse to some violent measures. If the opposite party be prudent, quiet, temperate, and above all silent, it seems to me possible that they may succeed, but not otherwise.

"I am not quite sure that our own situation will be much bettered by the change; but upon that point I mean to write much more fully when my head shall be more clear.

"The *memoire* enclosed in the same dispatch certainly came from some of Tallien's friends. It is extremely curious, and the whole turn style and manner of the thing is clearly Jacobin. The Duke de la Vauguyon declined receiving it as a *proposal*, but desired the person who had brought it from Paris to give him an account of what he had seen there, and, in the course of the conversation, the subject of the *memoire* was introduced and fully commented on.

"The Abbé Brottier seems at last to have been roused by my repeated complain's and reproaches on the subject of his negligence in procuring me no intelligence from Paris. He has taken as his associate a M. Ville Hamin, an active and intelligent man thoroughly acquainted with Paris, and disposed to do whatever he can to serve us. Since this association has taken place I have begun for the first time to receive something in the shape of information from that quarter. I will not be sparing of money as soon as I see that it is likely to be well employed. If your Lordship really wishes to send any money to Paris, I can undertake to send as much as ever you please, but it will always cost very dear.

"I wish your Lordship would say whether there is any objection to my writing in *white ink*; if there be not, I shall continue it; as it would be often impossible for me, with what I have to go through, to finish my letters in time for Flint to reduce them to cipher. I shall of course never use that method but in a private letter, and it seems that it never can be suspected from a Minister writing to his Court, especially where there is something written in cipher in the body of the letter.

"Mallet Dupan has just been here to inform me that he has received letters from Paris assuring him of two points; the *first* that the Directory are determined to undertake the expedition against England at all risks; and that they are *purging* the armies to get together a collection of the most determined *brigands* whom they hope to sacrifice in the attempt. The *second* that all well-disposed persons are indignant at the conduct of the Cabinet of Vienna, and are determined to rally round the Directory. He added that he was himself persuaded that the French had some person sold to them in that Court who had influence enough to direct the greater part of the measures that were adopted. I know not what to think of it, but one would be often apt to believe that he is not mistaken."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 5, Varel.—"I mentioned in my last (of the 14th June) that one of our friends was gone to Amsterdam at my request, and for what purpose. He is since returned, having found no disposition to take an active part with us in the persons I gave him letters for, one of them excepted. This person, who is a particular friend of my brother's, was already, as I thought, in regular correspondence with England, and his information has of course reached your Lordship; and I have no doubt all my brother's friends at Amsterdam will have been sufficiently informed and instructed by this person. It is quite enough for me to say that it appears from the accounts we received that the disposition of the inhabitants is as favourable at Amsterdam as in those parts of the Republic I have chiefly noticed in my letters; and that, for want of money and materials, and from the party animosities amongst the crews, and ignorance of the officers as to the military part of the service, the navy, in the actual state of things and in the hands of the usurpers, will not be the means of their doing any great mischief, or of their operating any very great diversion. This has turned out as I always thought it would. At the same time I hope and trust the few ships they have will be narrowly watched, and not be suffered to obtain any advantage whatever. The person who has been at Amsterdam for us would be ready to go there again at a moment's notice, if he could be of any service.

"In the provinces we have chiefly directed our attention to, things go on as well as we can wish; and since the French have withdrawn their troops, some of our own friends became so impatient that they insisted upon rising against the usurpers, and declaring for the House of Orange; and I have no doubt that they would have succeeded in these provinces. But, as effectual measures are preparing for driving out the enemy and delivering the country from the state of oppression to which they have reduced it, it would have been the height of imprudence to risk all the probable consequences of a hasty attempt, however successful, unconnected with the powerful support we are so strongly led to expect from without. M. Van der Haer, being determined not to leave anything to chance, and to abide strictly by the orders he receives from the person authorised to correspond with him, wrote in the strongest terms

to all his friends to represent to them the consequences of their precipitancy ; to say that he would not be answerable for any steps taken without positive directions from him in the manner agreed upon. He wrote thirty letters by one opportunity, all adapted to the temper and dispositions of the various persons to whom they were directed, all tending to raise their hopes and expectations, but to connect their efforts with the measures taken by our friends without, and with the orders he may at any time receive. The answers he has had to these letters are perfectly reasonable and satisfactory, and promise the best result should the events of the campaign bring on the favourable moment we have now been so long expecting with impatience and anxiety.

“The communications M. Van der Haer receives from the person authorised to correspond with him, continue to be dated from Brunswick. One of the letters, dated June 22, says, ‘there seems to be no appearances towards the line of demarcation, the French having left the frontier on that side ; and yet the Duke of Brunswick’s time seems very much taken up, and he appears very seldom in public. His activity at this moment, and his having taken the command of the army said to be intended for the protection of that line, and other circumstances of the same nature leave a fair presumption of that army’s having been collected for a very different purpose from what it is given out to be. In Holland the Prussians are expected in consequence of an agreement between Berlin and Paris. The anxiety of the usurpers appears in their countenances, and the conduct of Bournonville towards them confirms this notion. From all this we may soon expect a change in our favour.’ Some of the letters from the same person speak still more positively as to the intentions of the Court of Berlin of acting in our favour, but say little or nothing positive as to the time or manner. Letters of the 24th and 28th June, from the same quarter, continue to speak of the march of Prussians and other troops, mention their impatience of hearing that the Dutch West India colonies had received the English succours they expected before the arrival of the fleet which sailed from Holland in February. These letters likewise speak with exultation of the late successes of the Austrians between the Lahn and Sieg, which have amply made up for the defeat they met with on that side on the opening of the campaign. They add that the accounts from Italy were much better and gave great hopes. Other letters and circumstances all bear the appearance of the operations of the Duke of Brunswick’s army being combined with the movements of the Austrians, and the events of the campaign. I cannot help observing the regular information M. Van der Haer has received for a long time past, which indicates a well digested plan being agreed upon and steadily adhered to ; and the change of language with respect to England which struck him as well as myself, having been very much surprised at one time at some of the expressions used in letters to him, whose opinions with respect to England are so well known, and so constantly avowed in the most explicit manner. Some of these expressions appeared very strange to us, and did raise suspicions as to the source from which the information of his correspondent might come, and as to the object in view, which did not seem consistent with that of the paper I received before I left England. M. Van der Haer expressed his surprise and dissent pretty strongly at times ; insisting on the impropriety of some of the passages in question at a moment the House of Orange had found refuge and the strongest support in England, where he thought they would not continue so long had they not a well grounded hope of being of use to the Republic by prolonging their stay. Whatever may be the reason, the language with respect to England is changed, and is now as different

and as satisfactory as can be; and, happily for us, our suspicions will, we hope, prove unfounded, as the Court of Berlin seems determined, though somewhat late, to act in concert with England and Austria, and to give effect to the guarantee.

"Since I wrote last, M. Van der Haer has had a letter, dated June 29, from the acquaintance of his who is in correspondence with the person in France I have named in mine of the 11th April last. The letter contains the *following passages*—

1. "In answer to your's of the 23rd instant, I have to say that my last from Ramel is dated the 11 Prairial [29 May] which a lawyer from Arras left with me. This lawyer was going to Hamburgh. Ramel lays great stress in this letter upon the bad state of the finances, the 100 *livres* in *mandats* being already fallen to 14 in specie. He says that the evils arising from this cause could not be remedied. The operations in Italy were all intended to obtain ready money for the necessary payments of the contractors, who refused supplying the armies in the least if not paid in specie; whilst the Republic was forced by the Decree to issue the *mandats* at par. The deficit of millions, which it was impossible to raise by any methods, entirely unnerved the administration, left them without strength, and would inevitably enable the Jacobins to carry through their plan of a constitutional King of the House of Orleans. He thought this event would certainly take [place] in the month of Messidor (by the end of June or beginning of July) with the usual scenes of cruelty, which induced him to be upon his guard. The villain Siéyès was the head of this plot.'

2. "I think it right to inform you that the change of Representatives in Friesland, the secret direction of the French influence in the National Convention, is so far in my favour that it is at my option to get the sentence against me cancelled as contrary to law, and to take a leading part in the National Convention, having yesterday received explicit propositions on these points. I need not say to you I had rather go to Egypt than that my activity should be of service to these rebels. But I must at the same time assure you that, if it were wished, I should be ready to risk my head. I am willing to approach the helm in order to steer the vessel in that stormy sea to the satisfaction of the House of Orange. I think the above communication the more pressing as it is possible I might in this manner be of great service in forwarding the plans of Great Britain and of the line of demarcation; unless it was thought I might be better employed with the influence I may have within the Republic, at the head quarters of the latter or in any other way. I shall wait for the information you may choose to ask upon the subject; and you may freely take upon yourself to say that I shall think myself bound to the execution of what may be required of me. No one but yourself knows the least thing of what I have been mentioning, as it requires the utmost secrecy with respect to every one but the persons concerned.'

"This offer comes from a very able man, perfectly versed in all the intrigues that may make him fit to deal with that description of persons who compose the majority of the Batavian National Convention. He is a very dangerous man, and, had he been disposed to take a part with the Revolutionists of the Seven Provinces, he might have done great mischief; not being very scrupulous as to the means, and being very corrupt. But he is too clever and too well informed not to see that the work of the Revolutionists cannot stand; and that there are greater hopes of rewards from the resources of the Allies than from the bankrupt anarchy of Paris. M. Van der Haer employed him with success in 1787, and he served him (M. Van der Haer) with fidelity. By the letters M. Van der Haer has from him, he is entirely in his power; and

were he, when in Hoiland, inclined to play a double game with his employers, M. Van der Haer might soon make him repent his having ventured there. In Oostfriesland, where he is, his person might be secured at a moment's notice by saying a word to one there who knows him, so that there are checks enough upon him if wanted. Knowing this man as I do, I have been very careful of avoiding any correspondence or any interview with him. He once sent me some plans and projects, which I gave back to M. Van der Haer, desiring him to be told it was not in my power to be of any service to him, however desirous I was to see his talents employed to serve the cause, and however highly I thought him entitled to attention; and that I did not doubt but what those who knew him would put it in his power to make his activity servicable, as they ought. In my brother's situation, I less than ever choose to put myself the least in the power, or to trust to the discretion of persons of this description; and much less to commit myself with a man of so dangerous a character, whom I cannot pay better than anyone else may. At the same time I am well aware that, at a moment like the present, and in the internal state of the Republic, such a person may often be of the greatest service. He knows the world, writes and speaks well, is of the most active mind, full of resources, and of great presence of mind under difficulties; and, with his versatility, will take up any part he may think most likely to be of service to his employers. I agreed with M. Van der Haer that he should continue to correspond with him in order to have him at his disposal should he be wanted; that he should employ him to write and to get intelligence for him, and give him assurances of rewards should a change take place. He certainly may be usefully employed, though prudence requires he should not be trusted too far; and M. Van der Haer took care he should know how confident he was of the ancient Government being restored, but not from what quarter he (M. Van der Haer) expected the assistance to come. Had I had the means of paying the expenses required, I should certainly have made use of this man; and though I should have avoided seeing or being named to him, I should certainly have taken upon myself to have desired M. Van der Haer to have sent for him to come here, and to have settled some plan of conduct for him to connect still more the work in Holland with that of the other provinces, in such a manner as not to have counteracted other measures that may already have been taken to facilitate the great work. But this would have required a greater command of money than we have at our disposal. Had I known where to apply to for the sum I wished to be enabled to dispose of in case M. Van der Haer might want it, I should have desired him to have applied a great part of it to this purpose. All I have been able to do has been to tell M. Van der Haer, a good while since, that I had a hundred pistoles at his disposal at any time he might want them for his correspondence; and these I have accordingly advanced him lately at his request. Promises of favour, in case of the ancient Government being re-established, will go a great way, and will no doubt be easily realized as they ought; particularly as M. Van der Haer is as sparing of them as possible, and his chief dependance is not, as it ought not to be, upon persons influenced in this manner. But, in the case I am alluding to, and with this man, these promises are not sufficient if it is wished to employ him in the manner he offers; and the situation of the country deprives those who know him of the means they might otherwise have found for the purpose.

"Under these circumstances I submit the proposals of this man to your Lordship, begging to know whether it may be of service to let him go to the Hague and to become a member of the National Convention, furnishing [him] with the means of paying his expenses and

of transmitting intelligence ; and, in case your Lordship declines the offers, that they may be referred elsewhere, or at least some satisfactory answer given.

"I beg to refer to the letter dated April 22, 1795, the only letter I have received from your Lordship since I left England, and to my project of going to my brother's estates, and to the Hague, where I foresaw many difficulties and delays, though I did not know at the time M. de Rhoon would be so long deprived of his liberty. And I can assure you that, independent of that reason for going on with the utmost prudence and reserve, I have often felt the greatest impatience at being under the necessity of proceeding so slowly, and of confining our efforts within such narrow limits. *As it is*, I do not think myself at liberty to leave this place, flattering myself more from day to day I may receive letters which might require my being here ; M. Van der Haer relying upon my staying, and being more or less under an engagement to him not to go as long as he thinks I may be of service to him and to our friends.

"The communications from Brunswick give me hopes our proceedings, as far as they go, will not have been quite useless. In many instances they serve so perfectly to answer what I have transmitted to England at different times that I should be happy to hear from your lordship I may consider them as such. However that may be, having received the assurances I have, which I am sensible I ought to rely upon as firmly as if they had been given within these few days, it is right for me to go on even if I was less concerned than I am personally for the defence of the rights, rank, and situations of so many of my friends and near relations, and to show there were men within the Republic who continued struggling through every difficulty with the hopes that help might come yet before it was too late.

"When I first came here I was forced to own I had no authentic information ; but I mentioned my intention of persevering as I was situated, though I have been left so long without communications from my friends in England. It was right I should say all I thought might be of service ; and if I have unnecessarily taken up your Lordship's time, it is not because I attach any very great importance to what I may have sent over at different times, which may very likely be lost amidst the multiplicity of more important transactions which your Lordship is engaged in, but because it was a duty incumbent upon me after the assurances and encouragement I had received. The war with England, the detention of some of my friends, the absence of others, their dispersion which had not taken place when I left London, are all circumstances, amongst many others too many to enumerate, I have to lament ; and which have deprived me of the opportunities and support I might otherwise have found, and will, I flatter myself, apologize for my not having done more. I think myself as much as ever answerable to the Prince of Orange, and to your Lordship, and the Duke of Portland, for the faithful discharge of the duty I have imposed upon myself ; and I am convinced that, sooner or later, the adherents of that illustrious House will get the better of a set of men no one can trust or respect, and of a system incompatible with the habits and character of the inhabitants of the Republic, and ruinous in the extreme to the dearest interests of the country. This persuasion, and the perseverance which is in some measure the result of the former, no one ever has taken, or even can take from me ; and I flatter myself I may soon find I have not been too confident.

"I have not lately thought it necessary to send over many particulars which have been sent regularly to Brunswick. I can confirm again in

the strongest terms what I have said in former letters of the dispositions and temper of the people. A general animosity prevails throughout the United Provinces against the usurpers and the French; and in many parts of the country a plan exists, to my knowledge, for directing this spirit to a salutary end.

*Postscript.*—"Lestevigor and Pasteur are gone to Paris, some say with orders to complain of Noel and Beurnonville; others say it is to accede to a treaty of alliance between France and Spain. I cannot vouch for the truth of these reports. I send this to Mr. Bouwens the agent at Cuxhaven, which is only 7 German miles from Varel."

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to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 11, Altona.—"I trust that your Lordship will speedily and safely receive this letter with Mr. Frazer's despatches, for I shall leave it with him. Its object is to say that I have not forgotten my promise, and that I should have dated it from Berlin (for which place I set out tomorrow morning) if I had not been detained by the necessity of breaking in my young horses. This is, you know, particularly urgent before committing one-self to them in order to traverse a sandy desert. Your Lordship is well informed of what passes in France. It is therefore impertinent to tell you that amidst a plenty of other things (horses excepted) there is a plentiful scarcity of money. This is sensible to a degree you can scarcely believe; but I learn from a man of credit, whom I am well acquainted with, and who is just arrived, that the first bankers cannot, in less than two or three days, furnish as many thousand *Louis*. He himself lately lent Perregaux on such an occasion 20,000. The greater part of the coin is in the hands of the husbandmen from whose grip the Government is not strong enough to wrest it. And whatever may be said, do not believe that the taxes are paid. They are not, neither is it practicable to collect them. The Treasury is empty, and every day brings with it the difficulty of the day; more especially in providing pay for the troops. You know the Directory had asked 20 million banco from Hamburg. The impossibility of paying has been demonstrated to them, and also that they are equally interested with others in the neutrality of that city. You will know also the success of Mr. Sieveking's mission. He has I am told prevailed on the Directory to mitigate the amount, and change the form of their demand. It is, I understand, reduced to two or three millions banco, which the commerce of Hamburg is to supply by discounting drafts on Holland. These last are in part of the balance due on that contribution which you recollect to have been imposed as the *price of Batavian liberty*. Sieveking has, I am told, undertaken that if the merchants in general decline to contribute, the business shall be done by himself and his friends. But it seems that neither the commerce of the city, nor yet the particular connections of her Ambassador, are disposed to make that sacrifice; and therefore the termination of the present squabble may meet with difficulty and delay. I am inclined to think that an Order of the King in Council directing all officers of ships in his Majesty's service to afford protection to the Hamburgheezee, would have considerable effect, not only by encouraging the merchants to resist demands like the present, but also by stimulating the French Directory to a more wrathful conduct. Their first step would probably be to confiscate the ships they have detained, which (whatever harm it might do to others could do them no good) and would totally deprive them of all resource in this quarter. Moreover the high tone taken by France might strengthen whatever steps you may hereafter direct at Berlin,



because the Prussian Cabinet will hardly be pleased with such overbearing interference in the affairs of Lower Saxony."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, July 19, Berne.—"Whatever confidence you have reposed in my opinion of the situation of the interior of France may be very safely transferred to M. de Précý. I recommend him therefore most earnestly to your Lordship as a faithful reporter of almost all that I could have to say upon the subject. I am sure that he will be found highly worthy of your protection and good offices.

"The season of partial insurrections is over. I am persuaded that they can no longer be attempted without certain destruction to their authors, and great mischief to the common cause. Nothing is now to be expected in that quarter, but from a return of the whole body of the people to their senses, and *above all*, an union of parties against the Jacobins. When that great event may be expected to take place God only knows; certainly *not* whilst the Directory can find such immense sums by stock-jobbing, and by the plunder of their neighbours.

"The conduct of the French Princes, their Ministers, and agents affects and afflicts me more than all the rest; when one has seen them so nearly, and so much behind the curtain as I have done, one is really tempted to believe that God has willed this tremendous revolution among other purposes for *their* particular correction as a national example, and that it will not be terminated until they and their wretched system shall have in great measure disappeared. I am led to make this exclamation (among other reasons) because I have very lately had communication of instructions given to the Royalists in Brittany, to M. de Précý, and the agents at Paris to beware more than ever of giving an implicit confidence to the *Ministers and agents* of the British Government, as there was every reason to be mistrustful of their real intentions, and because I have the certain knowledge that the Prince of Condé has been very severely reproached since I left Riegel on account of the confidence he appeared to place in me.

"All this looks so like a preternatural infatuation that I tremble whenever I think on it. It is neither sense, ability, knowledge (excepting knowledge of the Revolution) that is wanting, and yet they do precisely every thing that they ought not to do.

"I fear in my communication with your Lordship that I have not dwelt sufficiently on the force and the number of the difficult obstacles that always opposed themselves to anything in the shape of a counter-revolution, but the dread of becoming tiresome by frequent repetitions of the same thing, joined to the immense *detail* with which I have been constantly charged, and the rapidity with which the most interesting and important events have succeeded each other on every side, has often rendered it impossible for me either to say what I wished, or to know exactly what I wished to say.

"My situation here becomes every day more critical. I shall send by M. de Précý a great number of my papers, and shall provide for the security of the remainder. I am now endeavouring to prepare matters, in case of my departure, in such a way as that I may keep a correspondence open with this country.

"The presence of Baptiste has produced an excellent effect in the neighbouring provinces. M. de Précý will communicate to your Lordship some information on that subject."

*Postscript.*—"The chiefs of the Clouans are arrived here, as it is said, with abundance of bank notes. I send your Lordship enclosed a manuscript account of M. Précy's retreat from Lyons, which you will find to the last degree curious and interesting."

— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 28, Berlin.—"The object of this Court is to possess the King's electoral dominions, and they will accomplish it unless you can reduce their power to a second order. The German Empire still exists in name, but in fact it is annihilated; those who calculate on former establishments, neglecting present circumstances, will be the dupes. They may slumber behind the entrenchments of mouldy records, but the point of a Prussian bayonet will awaken them. Events in Italy and on the Rhine have thrown everything into confusion at Vienna. France may derive every advantage from it. Perhaps she will. This Cabinet now holds the fate of Europe in its hand. If you mean to have their cordial assistance, you must give them a consideration of permanent value. If France dictates peace to Austria, Prussia may perhaps risk taking Hanover, and holding it under a French guarantee. That will depend on the occupation which can be found for the Empress of Russia. She is not immortal. I believe it is possible to make an arrangement which will bring you to a solid and useful peace. If Prussia receive the King's electoral dominions on condition that you get the countries lying north of antient France and west of the Rhine, including Dutch Flanders with Flushing and Berg-op-zoom; if Prussia give Cleves and Prussian Gueldres to the Stadtholder, creating Holland into a monarchy, and receiving the Dutch American possessions; if the Emperor receive Bavaria, and the Elector of Bavaria in lieu of it the German territory along the Rhine in possession of France, the Emperor leaving (for the present at least) his possessions in the Milanese to the King of Sardinia, you surrendering to France her possessions in the East and West India's, but keeping the Cape of Good Hope and Trincomalee; if these things be done, Prussia becomes your friend from the double tie of interest and apprehension. Once get her at sea and you will know how to deal with her. The same thing may be predicted as to France, so far forth as you would hereafter work upon her fears. If on the contrary you possess yourself of all her transmarine dominions, from that moment she, confining herself to a marine merely military, you are reduced to that dependance in which hitherto she has been held to you, because in a marine war you may lose much and can gain nothing. I am persuaded that this Court may be brought to concur heartily in such a plan, which, by the bye, Russia will certainly dislike; unless indeed an exchange could be made as a peace-offering to the Empress, giving her Finland for Norway, to be taken by Sweden at the expense of Denmark, which would suit this Cabinet so much the better as a dispute with Denmark would favour projects against Hamburg, Lubbeck and Mecklenburg; reserving the entry into Holstein for the moment when Denmark should be sufficiently embarrassed in her affairs to render it a mere parade instead of a campaign. Should a proper understanding take place between the Courts interested, on the matters above mentioned, it seems to me that Prussia might come forward and offer her mediation on the following conditions. 1st. The *status quo* in Europe at a certain day past, and in Asia and America a certain day to come. 2nd, the full acknowledgment of that form of Government which the French may think proper to adopt, and a renunciation of all claim to interfere in their affairs.

3rd, the inviolability of the rights of property. The first point would cut off all claims and clamours of retribution by merging precedent dominion in the rights of conquest. The second, indifferent in itself, and coupled with the first, would serve as a lever to raise the army and people of France against the Government, if the mediation should be refused, and the force of Prussia be in consequence once more exerted, or (if you please) once exerted against France. The third point would enable this Cabinet to draw on the negotiation into length, so as to exhaust your enemy in and through his finance; because new points of discussion might continually be raised, and would serve as the ground of retribution to many emigrants, perhaps to all; and even obtain some valuable compensation to the Bourbons for the Royal Domain. Among the many circumstances which seem to call for decision, that which may principally interest you is the desire of France to preserve to herself one enemy, and that you should have that unpleasant preference; also the necessity which the Government lies under of employing its armies until they shall be reduced to safe insignificance. Your fleet may preserve you from invasion, or, cutting off all supplies from the desultory corps thrown on your coast, may operate their destruction. In so doing you would not deserve the Directory. At the same time I cannot but think that forty to sixty thousand victorious Frenchmen preaching Republicanism in Britain would be very troublesome. But although you would preserve the kingdom from injury, perhaps from attack, I do not see how you could protect His Majesty's German dominions. If peace be dictated to Austria, France and Prussia will find employment for Russia in Turkey, in Poland, and in Sweden. Denmark will be awed into acquiescence or be robbed of her Holstein. You are cut off completely from all means of communication with your allies. In short you must depend on the goodwill of Russia, where her interest is only secondary, and even as such remote. If I were to dwell longer on these subjects I should write a dissertation instead of a letter, and weary you with the details which will readily suggest themselves without my meddling."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, July 28, Berlin.—"My conversation this morning with M. Alvensleben was most confidential. He is (I am aware) suspected of strong prejudices against England; and he is certainly not of weight to carry any opinion of his own in opposition to Count Haugwitz. Still, however, I should conceive his good will not immaterial; and, if I am to credit what I heard and saw today, that would not be so difficult as might be imagined. I have known him many years; and, independent of any general good opinion he professes to entertain respecting me, he has, further, a belief that I am a well-wisher to Prussia. On this tone he spoke much today. He dwelt much, and with tears in his eyes, on the private conduct of the King of Prussia; and said, with warmth, that it was shocking to foresee to what dangers and mischief his country may thereby be exposed. He told me that he was miserable from the moment he had heard of this excursion to Pymont. That it was by no means connected with business. That, on the contrary, business would be much retarded by it, and that the motives (those I formerly wrote to your Lordship) which had given rise to it, and the attendants the King took with him, every thing concurred in making it in the highest degree impolitic.

"I am sorry to have to say that some very unpleasant circumstances have already taken place here since the King's departure, strongly characteristic of the whole matter. A principal actress had during the winter been mistress of M. Rietz, and, of course, constantly in the King's private society. Madame Rietz, on her return from Italy, persuaded the King to give her an order to banish this woman from Berlin, which was done on the evening after the King left this. Accordingly M. Rietz, who attends the King, only learnt it by express from Madame *Baranives* (the actress), and he, before his wife's coming to Pyrmont, obtained a counter-order from the King in virtue of which Madame *Baranives* was recalled and brought back to Potsdam. Now a third order is arrived; and the woman is set out again on her travels. In a small place as this is your Lordship must be aware of the effect of this tyranny and indecision. I feel ashamed to trouble you with similar anecdotes, but really they are the leading occurrences before me.

"Your Lordship will receive a letter by this conveyance which Mr. G. Morris has very particularly recommended to me. From previous acquaintance with him, I was no ways astonished at the ability, extensive knowledge, and observation, with which he discussed the great political questions of this present crisis. At the same time I confess that, having had occasion to hear a good [deal of] reasoning (as I once mentioned to your Lordship) from persons whose *taste* leads them to attend to such enquiries, I did not pay very particular attention to Mr. Morris; the more so as I found his reflexions were more weighed than his information on the existing relations between different courts; and as he did not seem to have calculated difficulties any more than he was called upon to encounter them in his theories. But I perceive, that he has created much more impression here. Count Haugwitz has listened to him much. Count Kalitcheff and Prince Reuss have conversed with him repeatedly. Several other Ministers of the country have entered into discussion with him, and it is evident that his observations and statements have staggered them much. He has probably written your Lordship his views, at all events, they are far too general and extensive for me to state them. I am at the same time convinced that the strong opinions he holds forth in regard to France, and his superior abilities will give great weight to any impressions which your Lordship may wish to convey through him. I have been somewhat at a loss in not knowing whether he had any authority to speak in behalf of England. I sincerely wish he had.

*Postscript.*—"In the hopes of the arrival of a Secretary of Legation, I have delayed going, as I much wished, to some baths in the neighbourhood which were prescribed for me. I can assure your Lordship that I have suffered very severely of late from rheumatism; and although I have used violent remedies, they have afforded me but a partial and momentary relief. Where I am advised to go is within 30-hours journey of this, and, independent of the facility I consequently shall have to be here at the shortest warning, I have put things now on such a footing as to render it very simple, for a person of attention and judgment, to learn every material transaction that can be got at. I, therefore, earnestly trust your Lordship will enable me to improve this season, in order to remove what may otherwise be a most unpleasant companion to me through life."

LORD GRENVILLE to C. BENTINCK.

1796, July 23, Cleveland Row.—"Mr. Hammond will probably have the pleasure of seeing you, and of expressing to you the circumstances

which have prevented my writing to you in the unsettled and doubtful state in which public affairs have been placed by a course of events which has materially altered our situation and prospects since you left England.

"It appears to me that it would still be very useful that you should have the goodness to procure such information as may be within your reach respecting the state of the Dutch Provinces. But I should strongly dissuade any attempts to act in the interior there, unless combined with the movements of an external force. Nor is it possible that any assurances can be given from hence respecting the final issue of affairs, beyond those of our wishes for the restoration of the Stadtholder, if the course of events should render it practicable."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, July 29, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour most respectfully to submit to your Majesty a minute of the meeting of your Majesty's confidential servants yesterday evening, together with the draft there referred to. If your Majesty should be graciously pleased to approve of Mr. Hammond's journey, the credential letters and full powers may be submitted for your Majesty's signature tomorrow evening, and Mr. Hammond would be ready to set out on Monday or, at farthest, on Tuesday next."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 30, Windsor.—"I have just received Lord Grenville's note, accompanied by the copy of the Minute of Cabinet of the most serious kind ever deliberated upon, as it contains no less than the outlines for a treaty of peace by which, without in the least explaining what sacrifices this country is to make of its conquests out of Europe for obtaining that object, we offer that in Germany the dominions of the Princes may be given up for the advantage of Austria, and consequently rendering that power more dangerous to the various small Princes of which the German Empire is composed, to tempt her to yield the Netherlands to Prussia, which she has often said she looked upon as a burthen not an advantageous possession. I am certain no one of my Ministers can be surprised that I feel great repugnance at the idea of giving up any conquests made by this country, and still more when it is so vaguely stated that the King of Prussia may suppose this goes to any extent to obtain the object of an immediate peace; but unpleasant as that may be, that is a point that is for the consideration of this country, and necessity may oblige one to submit; but what right England has to give away the rights and interests of other Princes, who have either by England or Austria been brought forward into a business their own inclinations did not covet, I cannot either see a shadow of justice or the pretence of interference; and whether the violence of France or the encouragement of Britain effect this, I must look on it as equally hard on the individual, and subversive of every idea that ought to actuate the stronger to support not oppress the weaker.

"If Vienna looks on the Netherlands as a burthen she may, on a peace, yield those Provinces to Prussia, and that Court may accept it; and, should the King of Prussia be wise enough, he might in return give his new acquired Margraviates of Anspach and Bareuth to Austria, provided for the county of Sayn, which on the death of the present

Margrave comes to me, I should be indemnified by getting the Bishopric of Hildesheim whenever the present possessor shall die or resign; these are reasonable exchanges which the necessity might authorize; and if the two Margraviates do not in value equal the Netherlands, as the support of them would be less expensive than ought to be taken into the calculation; but, should that not do, the King of Prussia might make up the difference by some addition from his Polish acquisitions being given to Austria.

"I have here stated very roughly but with the frankness that I think it right on all occasions ought to accompany the opinions of an honest man, my sentiments; what I fear is that too general a language will raise the demands of both Austria and Prussia, that therefore we ought to be explicit as to the interest of the smaller Princes, and indeed of the Elector of Bavaria, whose situation is the more to be attended to as there is no power that has not sooner or later declared his and the interests of his successor the Duke of Deux Ponts should be attended to. I certainly as well as this country must lose for ever all character in Germany if I could enter into such a bargain; and in my more particular situation as a member of the German empire I certainly must at the Diet protest against so unjust a measure.

"Lord Grenville must easily acknowledge that my having seen two negotiations for peace, and on both occasions the treaty fall so far short of the first project, that such loose ideas as far as regards the foreign possessions of this country and, in my mind, such unjust as to the concerns of every one on the Continent but the two great powers of Austria and Prussia, cannot but alarm me.

"I desire Lord Grenville will show this to Mr. Pitt that the instructions for Mr. Hammond may be drawn up conformable to this; I am certain it must be felt that I am going as far as possible without giving up all claim to that uprightness which I trust will ever attend my conduct.

"I should have mentioned the Prince of Orange, but I trust every one feels his dominions must be secured to his family, and, if not restored to his situation in Holland, that we are bound out of the advantages gained over the Dutch to grant him for himself and his successors an ample equivalent in money."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, July 31, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has had the honour to receive your Majesty's note of this date which, in humble obedience to your Majesty's commands, he has communicated to Mr. Pitt.

"It is with the deepest concern that they have seen that any part of the ideas which they have felt it their duty, in common with the rest of your Majesty's servants, humbly to submit to your Majesty as most conducive to the interests of your Majesty's kingdoms, has not met with your Majesty's full approbation.

"They beg leave humbly to submit to your Majesty that there appears no probability that peace can be concluded with France without the sacrifice of some part of the conquests made by your Majesty's arms out of Europe, and that the shewing a disposition to reasonable concession in that respect is necessary with a view to a general concurrence at home in such measures as may become indispensable for the further prosecution of the war. It had been felt by your Majesty's servants that any attempt to particularize those sacrifices in the present moment might commit your Majesty too far in the first instance, without giving any

security against the enemy's urging higher demands in the sequel of the negotiation.

"The same consideration may perhaps afford a sufficient reason for abstaining in the first overtures to the King of Prussia, from entering as much into particulars as had been proposed. But it appears to Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville that whatever may be the steps of such a negotiation, the ultimate result must probably be the same.

"They beg leave humbly to submit to your Majesty their opinion that the manner in which the Netherlands shall be settled at the peace, and particularly the keeping those provinces, if possible, out of the possession or dependence of France are so important for the interests of this country that they ought to form the primary objects of attention in any discussion respecting a continental peace.

"They now see little hope of obtaining this point, either by negotiation or by force, without the intervention of the King of Prussia in concert with your Majesty and the Emperor

"And it is not to be expected that such intervention can be procured without securing to that sovereign power a considerable acquisition of territory in the Netherlands, or in Germany.

"In whatever way this acquisition is arranged it seems almost certain that Austria can be reconciled to it no otherwise than by the accomplishment of the views which that Court entertains respecting Bavaria.

"It does not belong to your Majesty's servants to judge especially, in the first instance, to what degree, or in what manner the Elector of Bavaria should be indemnified for this sacrifice. But it should seem that the restitution of the Palatinate, which has been lost in great measure by his want of energy and zeal in the common cause, and which he could never recover but by the assistance of the more considerable powers, ought reasonably to be taken into the account.

"It seems, however, probable that the means of indemnifying that Prince, and any other of the Princes or States of the Empire from whom any sacrifices might be required, would be found in measures similar to that which has naturally presented itself to your Majesty's mind on the subject of Hildesheim; measures by which the tranquility of Europe was restored at the peace at Westphalia and the foundation laid of the present system of the Empire.

"Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville have submitted these points to your Majesty as affecting the interests of this country, and affording perhaps the only means by which France can be prevented from acquiring at the peace a preponderance that may be fatal to Great Britain.

"But even if your Majesty's servants could so far overlook these considerations as to recommend it to your Majesty to abstain from all intervention on this subject, it still appears highly improbable that the complicated interests which must come in question in the negotiation of a Continental peace can ultimately be settled in any other manner than by arrangements of the nature of those proposed in the minute submitted to your Majesty. It seems indeed certain that this could not be the case except in the single event of an unqualified submission on the part of all the powers on the continent to any terms which France might dictate.

"Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville humbly submit these considerations to your Majesty as the result of the fullest and maturest deliberation on this important subject. If your Majesty should condescend to require any further explanation upon them, they humbly hope to be honoured with your Majesty's commands for attending your Majesty, or for furnishing such explanation in any other manner that your Majesty may be graciously pleased to direct; only begging your Majesty's permission

to add that the exigency of the present crisis appears to them to press in the most urgent manner for the adoption of measures calculated to give effect to the ideas above stated."

*Draft.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 31, Windsor.—"As I cannot say either the letter from Mr. Pitt or the paper from Lord Grenville in the least remove my objections to an unexplained diminution of the conquests made by this country, or to consenting to the giving up Bavaria to Austria, whose conduct by the dispatches I now return appears highly blameworthy towards the whole German Empire, I desire if both are at Dropmore that they will be here by two this day; if not that Lord Grenville will come at that time."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1796, August 2, Downing Street.—"Mr. Hammond will communicate to you the object of his journey to the Continent, and the result of what may pass between the King of Prussia and him. I hope that when he comes to Berlin he will find you well enough to be able to act jointly with him in the execution of that part of his commission which is to be executed there. I have, however, sent a provisional leave of absence, because what I heard of the state of your health made me think that it might be absolutely necessary for you to avail yourself of it, but it will be much more satisfactory to me, as I know it will be to your own feelings, if you can remain at Berlin while this business is pending; conceiving it as I do to be one of the most important objects, and in the most important crisis, that perhaps ever fell to the lot of public men to conduct."

*Copy.*

— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, August 5, Berlin.—"They tremble here at the knout, so that could they persuade themselves the *Autocratrice* would live 10 years, her wishes would be their law. The success of the French excites apprehension, and if vigorous counsels prevailed, you would probably hear of an army in Saxony under Moellendorff, as the prelude to an offer of mediation, without consulting any of the belligerent Powers. As far as I can judge, they have hitherto sought for little things by little means, but now wait the proposals which may be made to them. Whatever these may be, the adherence of Russia will greatly facilitate the adoption of them. They try to persuade themselves that France, from internal divisions, the defect of finance, or pure goodwill, may leave them unmolested. It has been suggested to them that if she keep possession of Flanders, give up her Colonies, and preserve a military marine, she will fear nothing from Britain, who can never afterwards be considered as a weight against her in the general scale of Europe. It would seem that this idea had not before presented itself, for it excited serious reflection. On their hope of quiet, either from the interior quarrels or exterior goodwill of France, it has been observed that the former would (as in ancient Rome) become the constant motive to foreign war; and that France, like Rome, the enemy of all nations, (especially those under kingly Government) would grant to this as to any other monarch the blessings of her friendship, till the moment marked for his destruction. On the finances a great deal has been said,



which may, however, be compressed into the maxim that a country may have much iron though it should have little gold, wherefore the French, by imitating the institutions of old Frederick, may from their great population maintain a numerous army, even supposing the climate and soil to be as ungracious as those of Brandenburg. In effect, I have no doubt but that France, whether she fall under the dominion of an usurper (the natural termination to her present state) or whether she form herself into some tolerable shape of Republic, may become dangerous to the liberty of all Europe. Should military despotism take place, that cheap, simple, and severe Government will find abundant resources in the soil, climate, and industry of so fine a country. If, contrary to all expectation, a vast and outrageous Democracy should prolong its existence, the defence of each citadel may be confided to its inhabitants, and, by the aid of customs and excise, a sufficient revenue may be collected to maintain an offensive army of at least one hundred and fifty thousand men. The appetite for contributions must grow by what it feeds on, and the seducing illusions of equality will enfeeble, if not destroy, the resistance of other Governments; especially of this, whose people seem anxious for the opportunity of revolt. This has been represented to the Ministers here; and moreover that France, having no lever but Poland to move the north, a re-establishment of that country must become a leading object of her policy. That the possession of Italy, which when covered by her arms against the inroads of Austria, is in its natural state, and the derangement of the Emperor's affairs will leave the new Republic full room to turn her arms northward. In this case her ally the Turk would gladly contribute some purses, and make a powerful diversion; not to mention that one harsh condition dictated to the Emperor may be the surrender of Galicia, with the breach of his engagements to Russia and England. That this last, should France be able to effect a change in the administration (a thing which seems to be concerted with your Opposition), might join in wishes, if not in act, to wrest the dismembered parts of Poland from the present possessors, and unite them under some practical Government. These and other such considerations have excited here a desire to put matters on a better footing; but, in weak minds, vague hope and childish apprehension fill up the space allotted to the firm resolves of manly decision; so that, before they can be propelled to action, some greater counter-fear must be excited and some danger more immediate must threaten. A word from Russia will have great weight. It has been said to me that, however desirable a certain arrangement, France would not probably consent to give up her conquests, especially Flanders. I thereupon endeavoured to show, first, that she might be forced into it by a due train of political measures without firing a shot; and, secondly, that if a recurrence to force should become necessary, its effect would be prompt and efficacious; because negotiations having been drawn into length during an armistice, the mediator would be master of the moment and the means of impressive hostility; and because the disorder of the French finance would then be most sensible when, the resource of contributions cut off, they should be obliged to support their armies in procrastinated positions far from their frontier. I cannot say absolutely that it is in your power to decide this Cabinet, but I believe so. By the bye, the want of money has been mentioned, and thereupon a mode of getting it *à la Française* was pointed out. Moreover they have been led to suppose that you also would soon be distressed in your finances, but it has been observed to them that circumstances may permit you to diminish your expenses, and, of course, leave you in a situation to extend to your allies such pecuniary aid as shall be indispensable. I ought to

have said somewhere (and will now say it here) that the character of this people, formed by a succession of rapacious Princes, is turned toward usurpation. The war with France was disagreeable to them because it melted down the accumulations of old Frederick, and did not present an immediate accession of territory. But the war with, or rather against Poland was not unpopular, because the moral principles of a Prussian go to the possession of whatever he can acquire. And so little is he the slave of what he calls vulgar prejudice, that, give him opportunity and means, he will spare you the trouble of finding a pretext. This liberality of sentiment greatly facilitates negotiation, for it is not necessary to clothe propositions in honest and decent forms.

"It is not impossible that the Imperial troops may be at length victorious, and, in such case, the French army, if hotly pursued, may be destroyed. Such at least is the opinion which common sense dictates, and which, in a conversation with old Moellendorff, he strongly confirmed. He went so far as to say that sixty thousand men well commanded could not fail to force the French back over the Rhine. With the weight of such an authority, I also am disposed to believe the same thing; but I do not believe in the *well-commanded*, and indeed had made up my mind to a part of what has happened when Prince Charles was appointed to succeed Clairfayt. These reiterated misfortunes may perhaps impel the Imperial Cabinet to the nomination of an abler chief with discretionary powers; and certainly the French, so far advanced without magazines, are in a critical condition. The fortune of war, therefore, may restore the affairs of the allies, but how far it may be prudent to trust that capricious Goddess is not for me to decide.

"I have said that this Court would accomplish their object unless their power could be reduced to a second order. I was impressed with the practicability of such a plan in the spring of 1795, and since I have been here my belief amounts almost to conviction; but the most favourable moment has gone by, and the difficulties are increased. Little can be expected from Austria, though everything may be hoped from the feebleness of the Prussian King and Cabinet. Is it to be attempted? On that question I may observe that you might count on the cordial aid of your Imperial allies, who will not so readily concur to aggrandize the house of Brandenburg, and may oppose the exchanges mentioned in my last letter. These however are, to the best of my judgment, most advisable for England, because they furnish the probable means of wresting the Low Countries from France, and securing the independence of Holland, so far at least as Holland can be independent. The plan I contemplated for reducing Prussia was to erect a new but hereditary kingdom of Poland, with a constitution as free and energetic as the moral state of the people may admit, such kingdom to consist of the country ceded by the last partition to Austria, and the whole of the Prussian acquisition, together with the Prussian Silesia, a corner of Lower Lusatia, the new mark, and that part of Pomerania lying east of the Oder. I have no question but that two hundred thousand Austrian and Russian troops would speedily have effected this, with the aid of Kosciuszko and his Poles. With this, as with every other arrangement for permanent peace, I couple the possession of Bavaria by Austria. But, under such hypothesis, there would result a solecism in British politics. While as Englishmen you must seek and seize the means of reducing French power and influence, you must, as Germans, wish for their increase, in order to secure your Hanover against the Imperial pretensions. Hence an oscillation of measures dependent on personal character. It is sufficient to present this idea, improper to pursue it. The arrangement suggested for Flanders would obviate such expensive

inconsistencies, and present one clear distinct object. Indifferent to the fate of the German Empire, you might choose your allies according to your immediate interest. The aggrandizement of the two Empires on the side of Italy and Constantinople would be useful to you, by forming two naval powers in the Mediterranean to balance your constant enemies France and Spain; for Spain seems irrecoverably attached to her neighbour by the relation of weakness to force. Whether your population could resist through a long struggle the weight of a people spread out from the Alps and the Rhine to the pillars of Hercules, is a question I will not presume to decide. Experience has taught me a sincere faith in the fallacy of human opinions, and more especially of my own."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, August 8, Hamburgh.—"I am extremely concerned to begin my official correspondence with your Lordship by so unsatisfactory an account of my present prospects; but really every exertion of Mr. Fraser's and mine has ended in nothing more than in the very scanty intelligence which I have been able to state in my public letter of this date. I, however, flatter myself that, for the reasons I have there assigned, your Lordship will approve of my seeing the Duke of Brunswick previously to my proceeding to Berlin. For various reasons I have preferred going to Nienberg. It is pretty nearly in the direct road to Brunswick, and if the Duke should have returned thither, I shall learn it immediately, or be able to proceed onwards to Minden. But, above all, I shall be certain of meeting at that place with one of the Mr. Boles, who receives some emoluments from your Lordship's office for his *services in the Post Office there*, who has written to me once or twice, and from whom, without entering into *any unnecessary explanations*, I can learn with certainty the places of residence not only of the Duke of Brunswick, but of the King of Prussia, should he have altered his intention of returning from Cassel to Berlin.

"Before I conclude this letter, I beg leave to express to your Lordship my sense of the confidence which your Lordship has placed in me by entrusting this important commission to me, and my hope that, if I fail in the execution of it, you will be persuaded that the failure is not to be ascribed to any want of zeal or exertion on my part."

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, August 11, Minden.—"I was in hopes to have had a secure opportunity of communicating to your Lordship the result of my conversations with the Duke of Brunswick, by recommending my letter to the particular care of Mr. Bode at the Hanoverian post office at Nienberg; but having been disappointed in my expectation of meeting that gentleman, I am under the necessity of deferring writing upon the subject until my arrival at Berlin, where I hope to be on Monday at the farthest. The *détour* I have made in coming hither has been amply repaid by the kind reception I have experienced, and by the interesting communications which have been made to me."

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, August 15, Vienna.—"Our situation becomes every day more arduous. I have long thought that the efforts of this country would be

unavailing unless the Empress of Russia stood forward as a check on the Court of Berlin. I remain of that opinion, and think that no consideration can bind the Prussian Government to act with good faith, unless the Empress of Russia not only guarantees its engagements, but becomes interested in the execution of them by taking an active part in the war.

"The Foreign Ministers here are informed through M. Desandrouin not only of the pecuniary advances made by us to this Government, but also of the substance of Mr. Hammond's instructions, whose mission originated, he says, in suggestions made by M. de Jacobi of the readiness of His Prussian Majesty to return to the coalition, or to effectuate a peace that would be satisfactory to the allies, for the consideration of some territorial acquisition, and of a sum of money at the peace. M. Desandrouin received his information, as I am assured, from the house of Boyd. The facts were related to me by one of the foreign Ministers and confirmed by Baron Thugut, who earnestly requested me not to omit mentioning them to your Lordship. M. de Thugut wrote some time ago to Count Stahrenberg to apprise your Lordship of M. Desandrouin's being informed by Messires Boyd of the pecuniary advances."

#### COUNT STARENBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, August, York Farm.—"Je me suis acquitté dès hier au soir de votre commission pour M. de Woronzow. Il sent comme vous et moi combien le procédé de sa Cour est affreux et déplacé, et il en est peiné comme il le doit. Je lui ai fait part de vos désirs au sujet du retardement à apporter au départ de l'Amiral Russe et de sa flotte. Cet officier n'est point sous les ordres du Comte de Woronzow ; il a reçu directement de sa Cour l'instruction d'être rentré avant la mauvaise saison, et il ne dépend, en conséquence, que de lui de fixer le moment de son départ. Si M. de Woronzow s'en mêlait directement ou indirectement, il risquerait de se compromettre inutilement vis-à-vis d'un homme aussi bête que méchant, qui lui veut personnellement du mal, et qui ne manquerait pas de profiter de cette occasion pour lui faire beaucoup de tort à Petersbourg.

"Cependant comme notre ami Woronzow désire sincèrement le bien, et, par conséquent, d'ammener la réalisation de tout ce qui peut être agréable au Ministère Anglais, voici le moyen qu'il m'a indiqué, en me priant de vous en parler comme d'une idée venant uniquement de moi, et qui, par conséquent, doit rester secrète entre nous deux. Ce gros amiral bête et méchant est, néanmoins, brave, mais pardessus tout intéressé à l'excès. Il serait à propos que les subalternes de la marine lui fissent entrevoir la probabilité d'avoir incessamment plusieurs affaires et combats avec des frégattes Hollandoises qui seraient pour lui un attrait de cupidité et de gloire ; et il faudrait ensuite que Milord Spencer lui fit en même temps la demande polie de rester encore le peu de semaines pendant lesquelles il ne risque rien. Ces deux expédients, flattant également son avarice et son ambition, l'ébranleraient certainement ; et il serait bien aise de se faire un mérite de sa prétendue complaisance. Il ne manquerait pas dans ce cas de consulter M. de Woronzow, qui certainement lui conseillerait de se prêter à vos désirs. Voilà le résultat de ma petite négociation particulière. Votre bon esprit vous fera juger aisément de l'importance dont il est pour M. de Woronzow que ceci reste absolument entre nous."

French.

## LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1796, August, Dropmore.—“Comme je ne suis retourné ici que très tard hier au soir, il m'a été impossible de répondre plutôt à votre lettre que j'ai trouvée sur ma table. Je ne puis guères vous donner la moindre espérance d'obtenir des secours plus étendus. Ce que nous faisons est déjà beaucoup pour la situation actuelle des affaires, et vous savez que nous n'avons pas même cru pouvoir prendre d'engagement positif pour la continuation de ces avances.

“J'aurai le plaisir de vous voir Mardi. Je crois que la déclaration sera approuvée conformément à votre minute. Votre courrier pourra fort bien partir Mardi. Avant cela, nous saurons le résultat de la négociation de Hammond, dont je ne me promets pas grande chose.

“La flotte de Richéry est sortie avec celles de Solano et Langara. L'amiral Mann n'y était pas, ainsi il n'y aura pas eu de rencontre, et l'on ne regarde pas ici la guerre comme déclarée, quoiqu'on s'y prépare comme de raison.

*Copy.*

*French.*

## GEORGE HAMMOND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, August 17, Berlin.—“I have very little to add to my public letter of this date, except to express my hope that your Lordship will have the goodness to overlook any inaccuracies that may appear in the statement of my conference with Count Haugwitz; but, really, the conversation on his part was, in general, such a mass of contradictions, that I have found it almost as difficult to reduce it to any kind of order as to bring him to any definite point. I, however, think it right to remark, as some justification for him, that he appeared to Lord Elgin and myself to be unprepared for the discussion, and that, consequently, his objections may have been as much the effect of embarrassment as of any hostility to the measure proposed.

“I hope your Lordship will approve of my reserve on the subject of the indemnification for Prussia, as I thought that, if the business should fall to the ground, it would be more honourable for His Majesty's Government for me to have confined myself to general insinuations, and that, if it should proceed, every argument of that nature could then be urged with increased effect.

“I cannot avoid repeating what I have said in my public letter respecting my inability to hazard any conjecture on the ultimate result of my mission here; since I am extremely anxious to receive your Lordship's instructions as to the course which I am to pursue in the event of that result being unfavourable, and since the situation of Europe is such that, unpleasant as my continuance here would be to me in that event, and anxious as I may be to return to that station which your Lordship's kindness has rendered so agreeable to me, I shall feel it an act of duty to remain here until I shall receive your Lordship's instructions, or permission to return to England.

“However different the issue of my mission here may be from the Duke of Brunswick's expectation, I have thought it but justice to him not to suppress any of his opinions, in the recital of my communications with him at Minden.”

## W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, August 19, Wimbledon.—“I find I could not without inconvenience come to you both to-day and next Saturday, and, as you may

want me then, I think it better to put off my visit to-day. I went through our list of officers with the Duke of York yesterday, and I enclose the names which we extracted for service in Portugal; and which he seemed to think preferable to Germans. To these must be added some artillery and engineer officers, which we will desire Lord Cornwallis to select.

"I think it might also be useful to accept a proposal which I understand Jarry has made to you of going, in conjunction with some English officer (which last point seems necessary to prevent jealousy of him as a Frenchman) to visit the ports, in order to suggest his ideas of defence, and to report to us the state of the country. I have also conversed with Lord Spencer, on the subject of naval assistance. He thinks that more cannot be said in the present moment, than an assurance of our endeavouring to combine the protection of their ports and trade as much as possible with other essential objects, which it will be practicable to do in a considerable degree; but that we cannot tie ourselves down for any length of time to keep any given force at Lisbon, at least till some arrangement is made for withdrawing the Mediterranean fleet. On this last point nothing can well be decided till our present suspense as to the fate of Italy is in some measure removed, which it probably must be in a few days or perhaps a few hours.

"It would, I think be very useful to call upon Almeida for the farther details which he offers to state with respect to the application of the proposed loan. If that can be properly arranged, I see no difficulty in the measure."

#### C. BENTINCK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, August 19, Varel.—"Since I wrote last I have had the pleasure of receiving the letter Mr. Hammond left for me, which flatters me with the hopes of seeing him; I have accordingly wrote to him to say, that pressed as he might be for time, he may not find it convenient to come here, but that I could wish him in that case to appoint the time and place that we may meet on his return to England, as I must be anxious to see him from what is said in the letter.

"By the letter I allude to I am happy to be confirmed still more in my resolution of going on; as your Lordship will see it to have been invariably my intention by my last of August 12, as well as by former letters. I am perfectly aware from many circumstances how difficult it was to give any regular answers to my letters. It is encouragement enough for me to know that our endeavours, as far as they go, have not been thought quite useless. We have to regret that we are necessarily so slow and so limited in our operations. But our perseverance may be relied upon. We shall endeavour to find out and animate those who are least likely to be discouraged by delay and disappointments, that our strength may depend as little as possible on events, though no doubt they must always influence more or less the dispositions of the country. I am happy to say that, hitherto, under all the checks we have met with, we gain instead of losing ground; and, whatever may be the course of events, we shall, I flatter myself, keep a strong and faithful party together, who will wait with patience and with firmness for a favourable opportunity, which, in the present strange and unsettled state of affairs, may arise when it is least expected from the necessity the Continent of Europe will at last be under of resisting with vigour and unanimity the alarming progress of the republicans; or from the internal vices of the French

Government, the principles of discord and of dissolution which it contains, and the ruined state of its finances; causes which may undermine it much sooner than may seem likely in the midst of their military successes. I beg your Lordship will excuse these few general reflections, which I am led into from feeling how much the situation of the Seven Provinces must ultimately depend on the final issue of the great contest; a circumstance, much as it is to be regretted that it may delay the term so much to be wished for, and leave that country yet for some time in a state of helpless subjection and suffering, carries along with it this consolation, that it seems scarcely possible any settlement consistent with the safety and independence of Europe should take place without the United Provinces being, at the same time, rescued from the ignominious yoke of the Revolutionists.

"By the annexed extracts your Lordship will see we have no reason to be dissatisfied with the disposition of the inhabitants, should the moment come which may be thought likely to lead to their deliverance. What is most difficult is not, *as yet*, to keep up their courage; but to induce them to wait with temper and patience, and to prevent the effects of idle reports of whatever nature, of apparent contradictions from the variety of accounts they receive from abroad. We latterly heard from our correspondent at Amsterdam that what they heard from England was not so favourable as what was sent from hence and from the East (as they express themselves). We agreed M. Van der Haer should answer that, whatever might be wrote to them from England by their friends, he begged they would be convinced they had very good reasons there for what they stated; that they should place implicit confidence on their friends in that country; that he had no doubt all would be cleared up to their satisfaction; that they should not enter into discussions with their English friends on the apparent contradictions of the accounts from different quarters: that they should not endeavour to penetrate further than it seemed the wish they should; but that it ought to be their endeavour, to the utmost of their ability, to reconcile in the most probable manner these various accounts, and use them to keep up the hopes and perseverance of the well-intentioned; and that they should rest satisfied that all would end well.

"Your Lordship will observe that most of our communications have been sent into the country by M. Van der Haer, and in his name. As it is known that he is in correspondence with the Princes, we have agreed that, on account of M. de Rhoon's situation, and for other reasons, my name and that of my brother (who is with us) should appear as little as possible where we could not trust to the discretion of our friends. At the same time it is but justice to M. Van der Haer to repeat what I have said in former letters, that, far from wishing not to share the responsibility with him, both my brother and I are willing to take the whole upon ourselves if any blame could possibly attach to M. Van der Haer's warm and honest endeavours to serve his country and his friends, and to the indefatigable exertion of his talents; even if we were not to set the value we do on his faithful and steady friendship for M. de Rhoon, at whose request he came here, and who has lately expressed his wishes from W—— that we should give him all the assistance in our power. You may imagine how cautious we wish to be that M. de Rhoon's name should never appear at this moment, and that he should not ever be supposed to know what we are about. We have therefore agreed that, excepting M. Van der Haer, no one should know exactly how far we (my brother, who is with us, and I) take a share in all this; or be acquainted with the particulars of my correspondence in England, whatever they may suppose, though we are sure of its meeting

with the approbation of all our friends within the country; and we have agreed that every assurance and communication of a delicate nature should be forwarded by M. Van der Haer. Were M. de Rhoon here, and I wish he were, we should not be obliged to so much caution, though, no doubt, a great deal would still be necessary in the critical situation of the Republic. I shall be very impatient to see Mr. Hammond, and to hear the result of his journey.

*Postscript.*—"Since I wrote this we have received the accounts of the advantages the Austrians have obtained in Italy, and of the siege of Mantua being in all probability raised. This will not lessen the hopes and confidence of our friends. We wish they may yet be as successful on this side. I should not forget to say that M. Van der Haer has written two pamphlets lately, partly at my request. One of them is an abstract from a work entitled, *Intérêts de la Monarchie-Prussienne*, as far as relates to the United Provinces, which we thought would produce a good effect at this moment. The other is an answer to the charges brought forward by Messrs. Voorda and Valkenaar against the Prince of Orange, as far as relates to his residence in England, and to the orders there said to have been given to the colonies; which M. Van der Haer proves not only justifiable by every principle of the law of nations, but to have been the Stadholder's duty as head of the union, and in virtue of his oath."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE HAMMOND.

1796, August 23, Cleveland Row.--"I have received your letters from Hamburg and Minden, and wait with great impatience for the account of your arrival at Berlin, though I could have much wished that it had not been there that your negotiation was to be opened. Since you left us the prospect of affairs has been daily growing more gloomy, and I am sorry to see that, in proportion as it does so, the animosities between Vienna and Berlin are increasing. The day will unquestionably come when the latter will see its error, but that day will, I fear, be too late to remedy the consequences of it. I collect from your private letter that the Duke of Brunswick has at least given you good words and good advice, but too many obstacles are in his way to make it possible for him to give real assistance, unless at the head of an army, and that a victorious one. It is a comfort to me to know in this state of things that what can be done you will do.

*Postscript.*—"You will have found Morris at Berlin. I have received many letters from him filled with ideas not wholly dissimilar to those on which we are acting, though carried, as is usual with him, into a much wider field of speculation than I should like to see opened. Great use may, however, I believe be made of him there. His language and manners are well calculated to produce an impression there. His leanings are all favourable to us, and you are not ignorant how much they may be improved by attention and a proper degree of confidence. I write to him by this messenger."

*Copy.*

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, August 23, Berlin.--"Had Mr. Hammond determined on returning immediately to England, I should not have troubled you by letter with repeating my anxiety for the arrival of a Secretary of Legation here. Mr. Hammond's own observation has enabled him to



judge of the benefit to be expected from the attendance of a person in that capacity at a Court where business is carried on as it is at Berlin. And he authorises me to say that he will explain to your Lordship on his return to London his concurrence in sentiment with me on that subject. In the meanwhile, the present state of affairs is such that I every day regret not having the advantage which I could hope to derive from the assistance of a Secretary of Legation."

## NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.

### MINUTE of LORD GRENVILLE. (Copy sent to the King.)

1796, September 2.—"It is proposed to write to Count Wedel Jarlsberg desiring him to transmit to the Danish minister at Paris a note to be by him communicated to the Directory, asking a passport for a person to be sent from hence to open discussions on the subject of peace. And in case of their agreeing to this, to desire that he will send over the passport to Count Wedel; or, if it should be refused, that he will enable Count Wedel to communicate here the answer which may be given him on the subject.

"If the answer is affirmative, it is proposed that Mr. Jackson should be sent to Paris with instructions to the following import.

"He is to be furnished with a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, stating that he is authorized to discuss the means of terminating the present extensive war.

"He is, in the first place, to propose that, for the purpose of opening a negotiation to this effect, Ministers should be sent by Great Britain and France to any neutral place that may be agreed upon; where they may also be met by a Minister from the Emperor, if his Imperial Majesty shall think fit.

"If this proposal is objected to, he is to offer to discuss at Paris, conjointly with any person that the Emperor may think proper to send there for the same purpose, the means of concluding a general peace on just and honourable terms.

"Whatever answer may be given on the other points of these proposals, it is probable that an objection will be raised to the idea of a joint negotiation with Great Britain and Austria, and that the sentiments expressed by the Directory on this subject in their answer to Baron Degelman's note will be again brought forward.

"To this Mr. Jackson is to answer distinctly, that the interests of Great Britain cannot be so separated from those of the Continent. That no peace can be concluded between Great Britain and France, nor even any progress made in the negotiation, without constant reference to the manner in which it may be proposed to arrange the affairs of the Continent, and particularly the interests of Austria, to whom His Majesty is bound by a community of interest, as well as by the ties of good faith. That such a mode of treating has always been found to be the only effectual mode of restoring peace to Europe, when engaged in general or extensive wars. That if, therefore, the Directory sincerely wish peace, they cannot refuse acceding to the only proposal which can produce that object.

"It is indeed probable that France will find herself under the necessity of acting in the same manner with respect to Holland, in consequence of her engagements with that Republic. And although this point is not to be brought forward by Mr. Jackson in the first instance, it will be easy for him to put these with whom he treats under the necessity of explaining themselves upon it; and he will then make the

obvious use of such a declaration, by contrasting it with the objection attempted to be raised against treating jointly with the King and his allies.

"He is to remark that the proposal now made does not preclude the possibility of direct and immediate discussions between Great Britain and France respecting their particular interests in relation to each other, in the same manner as took place in the negotiations previous to the peace of 1763, and at various other periods; but that such discussions can never be brought to their final issue unless as combined, in the manner above stated, with the negotiations with Austria; the terms to which the King might be willing to accede being liable to be materially varied both in their nature and extent by the different arrangements that may be made of the affairs of the Continent.

"If the French Minister should positively refuse to accede to the proposal of discussing the subject of peace of this footing, Mr. Jackson will endeavour to bring this point to as clear and distinct an issue as possible; and will be careful to reduce the proposal to writing agreeably to the principles here stated, and to require the answer of the French Minister in the same form.

"If the business should be brought to this issue, Mr. Jackson should suspend any further step till he has fresh instructions for his guidance.

"But if the Directory should not start this difficulty, or should not ultimately insist upon it, he is then to regulate his conduct according to the following instructions.

"If the Directory accept the proposal of sending Ministers to a neutral place, Mr. Jackson is to declare his readiness to accede on his Majesty's part to any such place that may be agreed upon by Austria and France.

"If the Directory express a desire that the negotiation may rather proceed in the channel in which it has been opened, Mr. Jackson is then to declare himself ready to receive from the French Government any statement of a basis for negotiation, or any other communication which that Government may have to make on the subject of peace, and to transmit them to his Court for consideration. And if any such communication should be so made, he is to dispatch a messenger with it to England.

"If the French Government should decline making any such communication, Mr. Jackson is to be careful to mark this, as well as the other stages of this discussion, by written memorials and answers; and having so done, and the negotiations being distinctly brought to this point, he is to deliver a memorial (which it is meant he should take with him from hence) and which will contain the general ideas of a basis for negotiation to be proposed on the part of this country.

"This paper will state that the interests of all the leading Powers are so intimately connected with each other that a general arrangement, at least as far as relates to all the Powers actually engaged in hostilities, must of necessity be resorted to, as it has always hitherto been, for the purpose of putting an end to an extensive and complicated war. That, as a part of such an arrangement, his Majesty is willing to restore such proportion of what his Majesty has conquered from France out of Europe as may, on fair discussion, be judged reasonable, in consideration of advantages to be procured to his allies. That the nature and extent of these must, of necessity, be varied by the result of the discussions which will take place on the other parts of such general arrangement. That, with a view to such discussion, his Majesty thinks that either of the two accustomed principles in such negotiations (the *Status ante Bellum* or the *Uti Possidetis*) might be taken as the first

point from which the discussions might be commenced, making the deviations from it reciprocal, and, as nearly as might be, equal on both sides. But it is evident that, in either case, those deviations must in the present instance be very considerable, in order to reconcile the interests and engagements of the different parties concerned. And in proportion as any arrangement founded on these principles may provide for the interests and just claims of his Majesty's allies, his Majesty would be willing to compensate any concessions made for that purpose by France, by a proportionable sacrifice of the advantages which he has acquired during the war.

"Whatever answer may be returned to this offer, Mr. Jackson will transmit it home, waiting for fresh instructions upon it before he takes any further step; especially as some answer will probably by that time have been received from Vienna to the first intimation of the measure in question, and of the line intended to be adopted; which intimation it is proposed to make as full and explicit as possible.

"With respect to the effect and application of these principles, it is proposed that our offers may be as follows; namely, that Great Britain, in return for the adoption of the *status quo*, strict as with respect to Austria, should agree to apply the same principle as with respect to herself and France; reserving the Dutch possessions which have been conquered in the war as an indemnification for the alterations which have taken place in the political state of Holland. It would even not be too much to consent in the course of the negotiation to let France retain on these conditions the whole of St. Domingo, and to restore to the Dutch their West India possessions, keeping the Cape and the conquests in the East Indies. And as an *ultimatum* (though not to be offered without fresh instructions from hence) this restitution might even be extended to the Dutch Spice Islands, and all their East India possessions except Ceylon, the Cape, and Cochin.

"By such a peace France would keep Savoy and Nice, all the conquered countries on the Rhine not belonging to Austria and the Spanish part of St. Domingo, in addition to all her former possessions. Austria would recover all she has lost by the war. And Great Britain would retain the most valuable of her conquests.

"But France may perhaps absolutely refuse to restore the Netherlands to Austria, and the latter Power will be more ready to relinquish them than any other of its possessions before the war, especially if any prospect is offered of indemnification or compensation elsewhere.

"It is impossible to foresee the various projects that may be brought forward to effect this purpose. The different degrees of concession to which this country might accede with respect to her conquests can only be regulated by the consideration of such proposals as may come in question on this subject.

"The objects to be attended to in such discussions would be, the preventing the power of Austria from suffering material diminution, and the placing the Netherlands in a situation of as little dependence as possible on France. And in proportion as these points were more or less satisfactorily obtained, we might agree to yield more or less of the concessions above stated.

"Supposing the *Uti Possidetis* taken as the basis of negotiation, great care must be used to explain that this is no otherwise proposed or accepted by his Majesty than as establishing a ground for such reciprocal cessions, to be made by Great Britain and France, as would provide for the future safety of Europe, and particularly for the pretensions which Austria is justly entitled to form. But with that caution

the negotiation might be regulated by the same principles, and brought to the same issue as in the other case.

"The other allies of the King would be provided for according to either of these principles of negotiation. But provision should be made for some indemnification to the Stadtholder for the loss of his situation in Holland; and this might very justly be annexed as a condition to the restoration of any part of the Dutch possessions."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 4, Weymouth.—"Yesterday I received Lord Grenville's letter forwarding the written project of opening a negotiation of peace at Paris by sending Mr. Jackson thither for that purpose. The avocations of the day prevented me from reading the paper in time to return it by the regular daily messenger, which I think rather advantageous as it enabled me to put it into Mr. Pitt's hands and permit him to communicate it to the Chancellor and the Duke of Portland, both of who approving of it, it has now been looked upon as equivalent to a minute of Cabinet. I certainly do not object to the trial; but should have liked it better if the preparations for an active campaign had been first prepared and this been the subsequent step, as it would have come with more dignity; but as perhaps others think the refusal which most probably will ensue may rouse men's minds and make them more ready to grant supplies of men and money, I do not object to the mode proposed being adopted.

"The conduct of the Spanish Ambassador cannot be more absurd; the answer to him highly proper."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 4, Weymouth.—"I am not sure that I shall not be at Dropmore before this letter reaches you, but, lest I should not, I wish to say that the King accedes readily to all we have proposed, and the Chancellor and Duke of Portland perfectly concur in it. The sooner the letter to Wedel goes the better."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 5, Wimbledon.—"I am just arrived here, having called at Dropmore in my way and learned that you are in town. I must be here early tomorrow morning to meet the Duke of York; and therefore should prefer remaining here in the interval, unless there is anything material in which time would be saved by my coming to town. In that case let me know, and I can be with you at any time in the evening. I conclude you will have received my letter from Weymouth this morning, and the King's answer, and will, in consequence, have sent your letter to Wedel. If I am not wanted, I shall go tomorrow to Hollwood to dinner, and from thence to town next morning. Perhaps, if you can not get so far as Dropmore, you can meet me at Hollwood.

"The Duke of Portland has taken a notion that he can persuade the Duke of Devonshire to be Privy Seal. I do not at all believe it, but have encouraged him to try."

## The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, September 6, Berlin.—“I am sorry to have omitted mentioning to your Lordship, by the messenger who left this on Sunday, that Captain Anstruther is now with the Arch-Duke Charles, and might be of use there, in case the melancholy account of Colonel Craufurd’s death should be true. I am in the greatest hopes that the account is false, because I have no confirmation or even mention of it in any letters which I have seen from the army. Should it however prove to be true, I beg leave to name Captain Anstruther to your Lordship as an officer whom Sir Ralph Abercrombie, and afterwards General Dundas, selected as their confidential aide-de-camp; both from his military talents and from his superior judgment and ability. His father’s apprehension of the yellow fever prevented his going to the West Indies with Sir R. Abercrombie, when Sir Ralph offered him the situation of Adjutant-General to that expedition. He has been with me all the winter, and been accordingly kept *au-courant* of affairs, as far as this Court put them in our way. He is in the 3rd Regiment of Guards; and very favourably known to the Duke of York as a military man.”

## GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, September 6, Hamburg.—“I cannot but hope that, for the reasons I have formerly stated, your Lordship will not disapprove of my determination to leave Berlin without waiting for farther instructions. But if any doubts could have remained in my mind as to the propriety of this measure, even after the uncivil conduct of Count Haugwitz at our last interview, they would have been effectually removed by my knowledge of the interesting overtures which Count Kalicheff was instructed to make to the Court of Berlin, and by the apprehension lest Count Haugwitz might endeavour to represent my continuance at Berlin in such a light to Count Kalicheff as to excite some sort of suspicion in his mind, or might use it as a pretext to delay returning that immediate answer to the Russian propositions on which the Empress has so peremptorily insisted. The conduct which the Court of Berlin may in any given case pursue is, from the contrariety of sentiment subsisting between the King and his ministers, so little capable of being predicted, that it is somewhat hazardous to risk an opinion on the subject; but I must confess that I am rather sanguine in my belief that the language which the Empress has employed in her letter to the King of Prussia, and the nature of the *indirect* menaces which she throws out, are most admirably calculated to produce the effect of bringing that monarch back to a participation in the coalition against France.”

## P. BOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, September 8, Philadelphia.—“I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the adoption of the treaty has had a very perceptibly good effect upon the minds of the people of this country. It [was not to be expected that the principles of men who aim at disorder and confusion as their only hope of aggrandizement, were to be reformed by this measure; but the Administration by a steady

adherence to the spirit of the Constitution, has acquired an importance and energy which it did not previously possess; and many influential characters, who had been wavering and undecided, as to the political part they were to take, now zealously support the Government, as the best and most secure policy they can pursue.

"Though the treaty has not yet been called into full operation, considerate men, rightly, contemplate the benefits which are to flow from it, than which no one point seems to be of greater moment, than its tendency to retain this infant country in a state of peace with the most powerful empire in the universe, and to secure to it all those benefits, which to a commercial country must follow from a strict and tenacious observance of its neutrality.

"The only causes of complaint, which now exist, proceed from the capture of American vessels, and the impressment of seamen navigating them; inconveniencies to which this country must be liable, as long as the enterprising spirit of so many of its traders, forcing the prescribed channels of commerce, renders a rigid scrutiny indispensable; and until some mode shall be devised to correct those deceptions in respect to our seamen to which a similarity of language and of habits so seriously expose us."

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 9, Park Street, Westminster.—"Upon inquiry today of Canning, I find that 7000*l.* is all the money that is expected. Unless this is exclusive of three thousand some odd hundred which I understand has been protested, the sum will fall short even of what is wanted in the first instance.

"When I spoke to Dutheil about the method of sending Tr[yon] over, he talked confidently of means that he possessed of sending him either by Calais or Havre, as often as he had a mind. But it seemed to me that this was the confidence of a man who was to try the experiment in the person of another, and not in his own. And I am convinced that the plan which I mentioned to you will be infinitely the safest, as well as the most commodious.

"For this purpose, however, we shall have occasion for at least 1000*l.* which, unless the sums advanced for the main object shall become hereafter more abundant, cannot well be deducted from thence. It is merely a question of getting the money, for the payment of it is but a very small advance beyond what is due or may reasonably be asked on another account, namely, the following:

"Tr[yon] in his last journey has laid out about 250*l.*, of which he brings a perfectly detailed and satisfactory account. In his former journeys also, which have been numerous though separately much less expensive than this, in which he travelled all the way post, he has laid out considerable sums beyond what have been advanced or repaid to him; and which, he says, have exhausted the little fortune which he brought with him out of France. Of these he has given me an account from time to time; though I have never had the means of doing more than to advance to him what was necessary for the outfit of the journey in which he was immediately engaging. The whole, if allowed, would amount to a sum of some 700*l.*

"It would be a very advantageous way of paying him to enable him to take a share in this commercial association, the profits of which would, at the same time, go a great way towards defraying his future expenses. The moment therefore that you can procure me 1000*l.* beyond what shall be absolutely wanted for remittances, I will establish

him in the proposed situation, and take his receipt for all antecedent demands. I will also endeavour to effect it upon better terms, if I can.

"In talking to me of the details of his last journey, he explained incidentally one of the numerous occasions for which money is to serve, even in the present state of the Royalists.

"While he was at Rennes, the discovery took place of which much has been said since in the correspondence of the Prince de Bouillon, of one of the houses of correspondence in that city.

"The woman escaped for the time by a miracle, but her house and all her property is confiscated. Had he been possessed of any sum beyond that which he considered as appropriated, he would have allotted a part of it towards relieving the person in question in the ruin to which she was reduced.

"In case, too, of persons arrested, a sum reasonably applied is perpetually the means of saving them; and the knowledge that such means are in the Royalists' hands, besides the benefit in the instances themselves, is of great service generally to the cause. M. Cointre, who was suspected at Jersey of having purloined the money entrusted to him, but who, on the contrary, has been arrested and denounced for having delivered it, may have a chance of being saved by means of the very money which he has delivered.

"As I have no means at present of forwarding M. Tryon's mission by staying in London, I shall be absent for a few days.

"You will have the goodness only to ensure the payment of the three or four thousand pounds protested, in addition to the 7000*l.* promised, and, if possible, to enable Tr[yon] before his departure to establish himself as a partner in the projected association."

#### C. BENTINCK to C. GODDARD.

1796, September 9, Varel.—"I have not written since the 23rd ultimo, not thinking the intelligence we have received in the mean time worth transmitting. Our letters assure us however that the changes which may have taken place in the neighbouring provinces are more in our favour than otherwise; but they are trifling. Our friends express their invariable confidence on the efforts which they are led to expect from without, and their impatience to know whether any change is likely to take place in their favour before next winter.

"A report prevailed lately in the province of Groningen that the King of Prussia had acknowledged the Batavian Republic. This report did not seem to discourage the well-intentioned, as *they* observe, the conditions of the recognition could not be very favourable to the Revolutionists, who are very much out of humour with some part of the conduct of their own friends, which they conceal from the public, as well as the terms of the recognition, if it exists.

"There are few troops in the province of Groningen and on this frontier. The troops that were encamped near Zutphen and Zuidlaasen have been suddenly marched off to different parts of the country. I have not anything more material at this moment, not wishing to take up any of your time with the multitude of idle reports which we, of course, hear from day to day. It is right to repeat however that, as far as we know, the disposition of the country cannot be more favourable than it is; and I shall regret the winter's coming on again without an opportunity having offered of putting it to the test, though we are aware that at this moment we are, and must be from the turn affairs have taken, but a secondary object, till the very alarming progress of the Republicans on the continent of Europe has been checked in a

decisive manner. I am very anxious to hear something of the person who brought the letter for me, and beg you will have the goodness to mention this to Lord Grenville."

#### BARON THUGUT to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1796, September 10, Vienna.—"Vous êtes déjà informé par l'Ambassadeur de sa Majesté résidant à Petersbourg de la résolution que vient de prendre l'Impératrice de constater son zèle pour la défense de la cause commune en fournissant un corps effectif de 60,000 combattants; M. le Comte de Cobenzl vous a instruit en même temps des arrangements pécuniaires avec l'Angleterre, dont la Russie fait dépendre l'exécution de ce dessein.

"En combinant ces déterminations récentes de la Cour de Petersbourg avec ce que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me mander en dernier lieu, du rappel subit de l'escadre Russe, l'on serait tenté de penser que cette dernière mesure avait été employée pour préparer d'avance le Ministère Britannique, par l'appréhension de la perte d'un renfort non indifférent de ses forces de mer, à plus de facilité pour les propositions que la Russie se voyait sur le point de faire relativement à la marche des troupes destinées à co-opérer à la guerre de terre.

"Quoiqu'il en soit, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de regarder comme un objet de l'importance la plus décisive, tant pour l'intérêt général de la coalition, que pour les intérêts particuliers de l'Autriche et de l'Angleterre, que les demandes de la Cour de Petersbourg soient accueillis à Londres, et que le Ministère Britannique s'y prête avec condescendance par les sacrifices qui sont en son pouvoir.

"Il est évident que, si l'on parvient à s'assurer de l'assistance franche et loyale de la Russie, il en résultera un nouvel ordre des choses, et un changement total dans la situation générale des affaires de la coalition. La triple alliance reparoîtra dans tout son éclat, et reprendra dans l'opinion publique le poids que les soupçons répandus avec tant d'art par la Prusse du peu d'accord entre les trois Puissances contractantes, avaient si fort affaibli. La prépondérance de l'union des trois Cours alliées réprimera les attentats des malveillants, elle encouragera les bien intentionnés que leur pusillanimité retient de manifester leur sentimens, et en considérant tous les effets qu'on peut attendre d'un concours réel et sincère de la Russie, l'on peut raisonnablement se flatter que la France, épuisée malgré ses prétendues victoires, trompée d'ailleurs dans son espérance de nous forcer à la paix pendant le cours de la campagne actuelle par la témérité de ses entremises, non seulement sera obligée à rechercher elle-même une pacification honorable pour les Alliés, mais que même sa détresse fera éclore peut-être des événemens à apporter des changements à son Gouvernement monstrueux, et à substituer un autre régime quelconque moins dangereux pour les autres Puissances, et qui promette à ses voisins un repos plus durable.

"Quant à l'Angleterre en particulier, il est impossible qu'elle ne sente vivement toute l'utilité qu'elle retirera de la co-opération effective de la Russie à la cause commune. La nécessité de se procurer cet avantage décisif devient d'autant plus urgente pour la Cour de Londres, qu'elle est menacée d'une rupture avec l'Espagne; que la connaissance seule de la détermination prise par l'Impératrice d'unir ses efforts à ceux du reste de la coalition arrêtera peut-être, s'il en est temps encore, l'explosion des projets iniques du Cabinet de Madrid; et que, dans tous les cas, l'accroissement que recevra la masse générale des forces de la coalition par la jonction de celles de la Russie, fournira même à la



Grande Bretagne plus de moyens de punir une Cour d'loyale de son agression perfide.

“D’ailleurs il ne faut plus se dissimuler que, quelques fussent à l’avenir nos succès, il ne resterait guères d’espérance que l’Autriche et la Grande Bretagne à elles-seules réussissent désormais à rompre la monstrueuse intimité entre La France et La Hollande, ni à remettre le régime des Provinces Unies sur l’ancien pied par le rétablissement de la Maison d’Orange ; mais dès que l’on se sera assuré des secours offerts par la Russie, il existe la plus grande vraisemblance que l’énergie que nous serons à même de déployer dans nos opérations, fera bientôt la loi à la France sur cet objet également au quel la Grande Bretagne avec raison met tant d’importance.

“Le Cabinet de St. James nous a fait connaître, à différentes reprises, la disposition où il était de sacrifier une partie des conquêtes faites par ses armes dans le cours de la guerre, afin de nous ouvrir, dans une pacification commune, la voye pour obtenir des conditions convenables. Sa Majesté a apprécié sans doute, comme elle devait, une pareille offre, digne de la loyauté de la Grande Bretagne, et de son fidèle attachement aux stipulations des traités ; mais, si les propositions actuelles de la Russie sont accueillies, tout permet d’espérer que les affaires prendront, sous peu, une tournure qui, dispensant l’Angleterre de la triste nécessité de restituer ses conquêtes pour procurer à ses alliés des conditions tolérables, ne la gênera plus dans le choix de celles qu’elle voudra garder à la paix.

“Je ne m’étendrai pas ici sur le besoin intime et extrême que nous avons nous-mêmes de l’assistance la plus active de la Russie. Nous ne saurions plus nous cacher que, sans cet espoir, la situation des choses ne présente nulle probabilité d’une paix qui, dans la supposition même la plus favorable, ne fût plus ou moins humiliante ; et qui, en rappelant continuellement la honte de nos défaites, et celle d’avoir reçu la loi du vainqueur, ne fut destructive de la considération de la Monarchie ; considération d’un prix inestimable aux yeux de la saine politique, accoutumée d’apprécier les objets d’après les bons principes, et non d’après le désir peu noble et irréfléchi du repos, des jouissances du moment.

“Nous ne disconvenons pas que les sommes demandées par la Cour de Petersbourg ne puissent paraître très fortes à Londres, mais elles seront, sans contredit, bien employées si les espérances qu’on peut fonder justement sur la co-opération efficace de la Russie se réalisent ; celles d’un changement entier dans la position des affaires de la coalition, présentement si peu florissante ; d’une paix honorable dont les Alliés pourront se flatter de prescrire les conditions ; du raffermissement enfin de la prospérité générale de l’Europe, dont les bases, depuis quelque temps, se trouvent si fort ébranlées. Après avoir déjà fait à ces grands objets tant de sacrifices, il ne semble guères possible que l’Angleterre veuille se refuser à un dernier moins considérable, et qui, cependant, paraît seul pouvoir conduire au but que les Alliés poursuivent depuis longtemps par tant d’efforts.

“S’il est incontestable qu’il n’y a nulle comparaison à faire entre la confiance que méritent les promesses de l’Impératrice, si jalouse de sa gloire, et celle que peuvent s’attirer les engagements contractés par une Cour se mettant habituellement au-dessus de tous les principes de la bonne foi, il semblerait difficile d’imaginer qu’on put hésiter à Londres d’accorder à la Russie les mêmes sommes à peu près qu’en 1794 l’on a prodiguées avec autant de libéralité que d’inutilité à la Prusse ; et qu’on voulût rejeter les propositions de la Russie dans le même moment, pour ainsi dire, où l’on s’est cru justifié à Londres par le

mauvais état des affaires de la coalition à recourir une seconde fois à la Cour de Berlin, en hasardant même l'offre d'une *acquisition territoriale considérable*, offre capable d'entraîner dans ses conséquences des inconvéniens bien plus graves que des sacrifices en argent quelconques.

“Cependant, quoiqu'il nous ait été déclaré bien positivement que les sommes exigées par l'Impératrice ne soient pas susceptibles d'aucune diminution quelconque, nous sommes toutefois disposés à conserver l'espérance que, dans un cas extrême, la Cour de Petersbourg, convaincue d'une impossibilité absolue et réelle de la part de l'Angleterre pour satisfaire à ses demandes en totalité, se prêterait peut-être à des modifications, et à des arrangemens tendant à faciliter l'accord à établir, pourvue que le Ministère Britannique veuille bien entrer avec franchise en des explications amicales pour chercher des points de rapprochement, et pour démontrer au Cabinet de Petersbourg que les difficultés tiennent à la nature des choses, et non à aucun manque de bonne volonté ou d'une juste appréciation des secours proposés.

“Si, comme nous aimons à le croire, la manière de voir du Cabinet de St. James à l'égard des secours de la Russie, est conforme à la nôtre, il est de la dernière importance que, sans la perte d'un seul instant, il soit procédé aux arrangemens à prendre à ce sujet. Les distances sont immenses, le rassemblement et tous les préparatifs préalablement nécessaires pour la marche des troupes Russes, exigent un temps considérable; la plus grande partie des non-succès de nos opérations jusqu'ici n'a été constamment que la suite des rétards dans les concertations à prendre entre les Alliés; et les nouveaux délais qu'on mettrait à s'assurer, en façon quelconque, de l'exécution des offres de la Russie, seraient infailliblement cause que, les troupes n'arrivant pas à temps, et les opérations manquant encore d'ensemble, les fruits des nouveaux sacrifices auxquels l'Angleterre se sera déterminée, ne répondrait nullement à ce que la bonne volonté actuelle de la Cour de Petersbourg permet d'en attendre.

“L'intention de Sa Majesté est que vous présentiez toutes ces considérations au Ministère Britannique de la manière la plus instante; que, conformément à l'intimité existant entre les deux Cours Impériales, vous concertiez avec M. le Comte de Woronzow toutes vos démarches, ensorte qu'il ne soit négligé aucun motif de persuasion pour porter le Cabinet de St. James à des déterminations analogues aux desirs de la Russie; et afin que, dans le cas où, contre toute attente, il s'élèverait des difficultés, l'on soit au moins bien convaincu à Petersbourg qu'il n'a pas dépendu de notre zèle de les applanir.

“Au reste, il est sans doute superflu d'observer ici que les sommes à accorder à la Russie ne doivent entraîner aucun retard ou diminution pour les avances et secours pécuniaires qui nous sont promis; loin de là, il est d'une nécessité absolue que notre emprunt, conséquemment à ma dépêche du 7 du mois dernier, soit porté à 5 million, ou pour le moins à 4½ million livres, somme égale à celle de notre emprunt de l'année passée; attendu que les évènements qui ont eu lieu depuis quelque temps, nous ont occasionné des dépenses aussi énormes qu'inattendues; que le nouveau changement des circonstances et l'arrivée prochaine des troupes Russes font pressentir la possibilité d'une prolongation quelconque de la guerre; et que, d'un autre côté, le règlement de notre emprunt ayant été retardé jusqu'ici, nous prévoyons bien qu'il ne serait guères faisable de proposer un nouvel et troisième emprunt dès les premiers mois de l'année prochaine.

“Nous ne balançons pas de prévenir avec franchise un allié en qui nous mettons la plus grande confiance, que la pénurie de nos finances

est au-delà de toute expression ; que nous sommes exposés au danger de manquer de numéraire pour fournir au prêt des troupes ; de voir, par conséquent, les armées se débâter ; et que, ne pouvant courir le risque d'un pareil malheur capable d'entraîner le bouleversement total de la monarchie, nous serions probablement obligés malgré nous, et en frémissant sans doute, à prêter les mains à une paix quelconque, si l'Angleterre refusait de subvenir à notre détresse.

“ Nous sommes arrivés à la crise qui doit décider du sort de la coalition. La richesse de l'Angleterre ne saurait manquer de ressources lorsqu'il s'agit des intérêts les plus essentiels de sa prospérité. C'est en se traînant dans des demi-mesures que les alliés se sont épuisés par la prolongation d'une guerre, dont les divers événemens ont menacé et menacent encore l'Europe d'une subversion complète. Il s'agit plus que jamais de redoubler de moyens pour parvenir à une paix honorable ; et il ne sera pas dit que l'Angleterre ait jamais à se reprocher d'avoir, au moment même qui offrait pour l'avenir une perspective plus favorable, renoncé aux fruits de tous les sacrifices passés, faute d'énergie pour faire un dernier effort.”

*French. Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1796, September 11, Dropmore.—“ I return you the letters you enclosed to me. I understand from M. Dutheil distinctly—what, indeed, the *memoire* of the agents clearly shows—that they only ask 7,000*l.*, including the 4,400*l.* protested on account of the inaccuracy of the mode in which it had been drawn. If for the separate object of sending Tryon back, or of furnishing any immediate sum to Puisaye, Mr. Pitt is willing to allow any further advance, I can have no objection to it ; but that is a business with which I must not mix the allotment of the 7,000*l.* to be remitted to the King's agents. If I am not careful to keep this sum distinct from all other appropriation or use, we shall relapse into confusion.

“ Dutheil has engaged to remit this money directly to Paris, which is both a safer and a more expeditious conveyance than by a commercial enterprise through Hamburg. I did not know that he had proposed to Tryon to return by the same channel. The advantages or danger of such a plan must, of course, be left to be decided upon by Tryon himself.”

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 11, Park Street, Westminster.—“ My idea of Ramsay's mission is that he shall be sent as a military man for the purpose of gaining information, with the assistance of our Minister, relative to the military state of the country, and of conveying to the Government, with the same assistance, our ideas of the sort of succours which we can best afford them.

“ On this last head, he will have to explain to them the nature of the corps which we propose to send, and the footing on which we mean them to be ; and by these explanations endeavour to get the better of that sort of apprehension which they are at present disposed to entertain of French troops.

“ On the other hand, by learning something of the state of their officers and of their army, and forming a better judgment of both than Mr. Walpole will probably have been able to form, he will be enabled

to tell us how far it is important to press upon them the acceptance of the corps which we are now speaking of, and which, it must be remembered, are the only ones that we have to send. My own idea of the Portuguese service is that it will not suffer by the introduction of two such regiments as Mortimart and Castries, and such corps of French officers as may be furnished by the cadres, and recruited from the numerous French and Walloons, that will not fail to desert from Spain, or that are already in Portugal. The superintendence of an officer of ours will be a great security for the good behaviour of these corps, and a great means of preventing misunderstandings between them and the natives.

"If this measure is thought right, the sooner Ram-ay sets off the better. The powers that he should have must be more than I can give him, though they need not be such as to excite any jealousy on the part of Mr. Walpole. They must only be such as to ensure him an introduction to the ministers in person, though accompanied, whenever it is wished, by our Minister. Ramsay is the last man to use his power in a manner that could give any offence.

"Should this first attempt succeed, and the jealousy entertained of French corps be found to be a prejudice, it is probable that the force to be furnished in this way may extend to something very considerable, and produce a body of troops at the head of which it may be right to put some one of higher authority. A body of six or seven thousand men, headed by good French officers, would go a great way in the defence of Portugal. It is always, too, with me a secondary, but not immaterial consideration, that it spares the dreadful example of casting out, without the slightest means of subsistence, the remains of that body of people who have sacrificed everything to their attachment to royalty.

"I mentioned to your Lordship the business of Antony. If you think it worth while, it would be easy to seize the papers of one of the persons whom he is said to have engaged, and who is going for Hamburg in a day or two; though I don't know that more is likely to be discovered than that Antony is a double spy, and that many persons here, having no means of subsistence, are willing to enter into France upon any terms—which is a proceeding that, as it seems to me, can neither be prevented nor blamed."

C. BENTINCK to C. GODDARD.

1796, September 13, Varel.—"I mentioned in my last, of the 9th instant, the reports which prevail in our neighbourhood of the King of Prussia having acknowledged the *Batavian Republic*. These reports seem to gain credit; they are again mentioned in our last letters with the addition of Prussia's having acceded to the alliance of the French and Batavian Republics. Some of the fugitive representatives of Friesland are gone to Paris, others are at Groningen and in this neighbourhood. It is from the correspondence of these people that these reports seem to originate. It is added that the conditions are not to their taste, and they seem out of humour. However this may be, and whether the whole be a fiction or not, it gives great uneasiness to the well-intentioned, at least to all our friends, who do not expect in that case that the deliverance of the country will so soon take place, or if it should apparently, that in reality their situation would be at all changed for the better. I cannot help translating word for word the passage with which one of our friends concludes his last letter. He says: 'Our situation becomes daily more critical, and should our deliverance really take place shortly, it will by no means be complete

or satisfactory. Our letters from ——— and other circumstances make me think that, if anything is passing or should be concluded between France and Prussia apparently for the advantage of our Republic, this will happen without the knowledge of the Prince, without the co-operation of England; and that by their giving the Hereditary Prince a part of Brabant, it will be with the object to tear us from our old and faithful ally England, which is of so much importance to us. Thus our commerce and navigation will be annihilated, and we shall lose our possessions in the East and West, and we shall be forced to look for ever after for safety and protection to the authors of all our misfortunes, and the common enemy of all Europe. This wretched prospect makes me quite desponding. God grant my apprehensions may be ungrounded.' By this passage you may see that the reports I allude to gain credit; and by this language, which is that of all those within the country we have any communication with, you may see at the same time to what quarter they steadfastly look for the return of order and prosperity. At the same time, no authentic accounts we have lead us to countenance rumours of this nature, which, if founded, would again put off any immediate hopes we might otherwise have of affairs taking a more favourable turn; though we should not, even in case of their being founded, despair of the final issue of the contest being fatal to the supporters of a system we think so contrary to the real interest of the country. I thought it right to state all this, though I am not fond in general of repeating all the various reports that are in circulation.

"Our last letters mention again the breaking up of the camps in the neighbouring provinces of the Republic, and some of the troops have been dispersed into the provinces of Overijssel, Friesland, and Groningen.

"The decree for setting aside the established religion occasions the greatest discontent, and is but slowly carried into execution in some of the provinces.

"I mentioned in mine of the 19th August to Lord Grenville some circumstances relating to a correspondence with Amsterdam, and our answer to some of their communications. We have since heard, and the answer I am happy to say has been found satisfactory, and produced a good effect.

"I shall continue to write very regularly, though I do not receive any communications from England, which would, however, be of great service at this moment to direct me. I shall go on to the best of my judgment, begging this to be shown."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 15, Hollwood.—"A direction was sent from the Treasury yesterday to the Commissioners of the Customs, to let no Spanish vessels quit our ports till farther order. The only regular step is certainly an Order of the King in Council for an embargo. And I rather doubt whether the formality of a letter from the Secretary of State—which will not, in fact, be a sufficient authority—is not better avoided. I state this, however, only as a doubt; and if, on considering it, you remain of your former opinion, I should wish you to send the letter.

"Any of the persons in your list would do perfectly for a mover or seconder. The best chance, I think, would be Lord Exeter, and Lord de Dunsterville. I do not recollect any separate sum being lately destined for Puisaye, except 3,000*l.* which was advanced to Windham,

I think about a fortnight ago. A letter was sent to him at the same time releasing him from any obligation he might conceive himself under to remain in France. If any farther advance to a moderate amount seems necessary, and Tryon can point out safe means of conveying it, there certainly can be no difficulty in giving it.

"I left directions last week to enquire about the stamper, but in the number of things yesterday omitted to ask for the result. Lord Buckingham's offer sets an example which, if followed, would have the best effect; but I am unwilling to suggest any specific mode till some general plan is digested for giving such efforts as much effect as possible."

#### C. BENTINCK to C. GODDARD.

1796, September 16, Varei.—"A friend of ours, who came here within these few days mentions that there are not above four or five thousand French troops within the frontiers of the United Provinces. He mentions that even a part of the weak garrisons of Amsterdam and the Hague had been marched away, notwithstanding the representations made by the Government against this step, more particularly with respect to the latter place. A great many seamen had been punished on board the Dutch ships for expressing too loudly their attachment to the House of Orange. The greatest animosity subsists between the French and the armed citizens, whom the former treat with contempt. In Amsterdam some people openly rejoice at the disasters of the French, and with impunity. Our friend, during his stay there, was at a club where the Orange party meet. There were about a hundred persons in the room, when one of the members came in mentioning loudly the late successes of the Austrians with great demonstrations of joy. Our friend even expressed his apprehensions to some of them that they might get into a scrape by their want of caution.

"C. L. Byma writes to Staal, a Friesland patriot, that the reign of the patriots is over, that he expects, however, they may be allowed to remain quietly at home; and he is said to be a sanguine man, and the last who loses all hope.

"Blann, the ex-minister at Paris, has written, they say, to one of his correspondents that the French Directory is quite under Prussian influence; that it is to this influence and to his aversion to the old Government he attributes the ill-usage he has met with at Paris.

"This is all I have to say for the present. Our friends continue firm, though in our neighbourhood every measure is taken to intimidate them, above sixty persons being at this moment in prison on various pretences, though we have not to reproach ourselves any of them are owing to any imprudence on our part; but it is the natural consequence of the situation the country is in and of the too sanguine disposition of many individuals who will not listen to the cautions given them. We are not without great hope that these arrestations will not continue long, for many reasons which it would be too long to detail. We flatter ourselves the brilliant successes the Austrians have lately had, which we have heard many details of this day, will make the usurpers more mild in their proceedings than they might otherwise be.

"I heard to-day from the person who left a letter for me lately, and whom I hoped to have had the pleasure of seeing; but, as he is on his journey home, and has fixed no place for meeting, I must give up that hope, however reluctantly. I flatter myself, however, I may receive a few lines from some of my friends, which may make up for the disappointment."

## LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1796, September 18, Dropmore.—“I have the greatest hopes that the account respecting Colonel Craufurd may not be confirmed. But if it should unfortunately be true, I am afraid that it would be impossible for me to recommend Captain Anstruther to succeed to the station which Colonel Craufurd filled; and which, as you will easily suppose, is one which is more sought after than almost any other employment the King has to give.”

*Copy.*

## C. BENTINCK to C. GODDARD.

1796, September 20, Varel.—“What we have heard since I wrote last (September 16) confirms what I have said of the measures taken within the Provinces to prevent any foreign correspondence hostile to the National Convention; and it seems a very serious alarm prevails amongst the usurpers and their adherents, by the plan of a requisition of all the inhabitants between 18 and 40, that they may be armed; an expedient, however, which, in the present disposition of the country, will give but little security to the new Government. All persons coming into the Provinces are of late very strictly examined, at least on this frontier; a Prussian postillion having, within these few days, been stripped at the Neuwe-Schantz, that his clothes might be searched.

“Huber, one of the former Friesland representatives, writes from Paris that an agreement has been concluded there with respect to the Seven Provinces between France and Prussia, very contrary to the wishes of the new Government of those Provinces. The letter where this is said has been intercepted by some of the Committees. This, and other reports of the same nature which I have noticed in former letters, may account for their suspicions; and I hope the late successes of the Austrians, and their further progress, may produce still more serious apprehensions and consequences than what may result from the intricate and equivocal conduct of the Prussian Government.

“We are under considerable anxiety at this moment for one of our friends, and for a person he employed at different times to forward letters to the person who is here, and whom I have so frequently mentioned. They have both been taken up. I know not the particulars as yet, nor do I know whether this happened on mere suspicions, as was once the case before, without any further consequences, or whether any letter have been found; at any rate, I flatter myself there will be means to prevent any serious mischief. The arrestation of these two persons has made it advisable for two of our friends to absent themselves for a time, till they hear how the matter turns out. They took care to give notice to all those it might concern, that they might be on their guard; and though these two persons will certainly be missed, we have reason to flatter ourselves this unpleasant incident will neither create confusion, nor interrupt the communications we receive from time to time. I shall be very anxious until the persons in question have got safely through this business, but I am as ready as ever to take upon me any share or the whole blame of what we may have done here, as what has happened is the natural consequence of the situation the country is in, and of too much zeal and too much contempt for their adversaries on the part of the persons in question; though I have certainly cautioned them often enough, and prevented

things of this sort from happening more frequently. The persons most concerned have immediately applied to our friend here for advice, and he is exerting himself to set all to rights again. I am very impatient to know that all is ended well; and, in the meantime, I thought it right to say so much on the subject for fear of misrepresentations.

"Having been deprived of the pleasure of seeing Mr. [Hammond] as I mentioned in my last, it will not appear surprising I should be more impatient than ever to hear from my friends in England, and to know more particularly from what quarter we are to expect external support. The favourable turn military operations have taken of late give me some hopes that the expectations I had formed when I left England may still be likely to be in part realized. Should the moment arrive we have so long wished for, it may be very necessary we should know (1) what external force is likely to march to that part of the country we have chiefly directed your attention to; (2) that we should have some direct communication with the person who commands. These are two points you may very likely clear up. Our friend wrote to Prince Frederick (by the channel the Prince pointed out) in June last, at my request, to say that he was ready at any time that Prince might wish it, to send him any information within his reach. Our friend had lately the pleasure of receiving a line in answer from the Prince, dated Amberg, August 13th. This letter only came last Friday, the 16th instant, so that it was above a month coming. This seems strange, and our friend here has had no letters since the 24th ultimo from his correspondent who is at Brunswick, though many circumstances have occurred in the interval well worth taking some notice of, at least no less so than many that were in the preceding letters of the correspondent in question. I am at a loss how to account for this silence, and for the delay in forwarding Prince Frederick's letter; and this makes me the more desirous of receiving some answer from my friends upon the two points I have laid some stress upon in this letter. In the meantime to prevent any inconveniency arising from similar delays whether accidental or intentional, which I shall not pretend to determine, and as Prince Frederick asks for the information offered, we have agreed our friend should send his letters to Prince Frederick by another channel, by which they will, I hope, go more expeditiously. I cannot help wishing for my part, that I was referred to some leading person acting with the external force to which we are to direct our attention, that I had even a letter for that person to make use of at my option should the moment come, and that I may thus be assured of receiving from time to time the necessary communications. At the same time I beg again to assure those who have placed confidence in me, that I do not wish to attach any very great importance to our proceedings; but, as far as they go, I could wish not to omit mentioning any circumstance which is likely to contribute to our success; and I cannot help repeating again, what I have said in former letters, that we are confident we could extend our plan a great deal further, and indeed to most parts of the Republic, if we received orders to that purpose, and the means were given our friends as I have stated before now. If our offers are not accepted of, and even if we receive no answer, we shall rest satisfied with having done our duty by saying all we thought necessary; and with the hopes that measures have been taken with the same view, to which our efforts will be made subservient, and which make it useless we should go beyond the limits we have been obliged to confine ourselves to. I must refer again to what I have said in former letters on that subject, and on our wishes that our conduct should at all times meet with the approbation of the persons in England who must at all



events, sooner or later, contribute so essentially to re-establish the House of Orange in their former authority; and the Republic on a footing compatible with the real interests of the country, and with the honour of that House which is inseparable from them. Our friends within the country are entitled to the highest commendations for their perseverance and good humour under the many delays and disappointments they have experienced, and the personal risk which attends their situation. I speak only of the parts of the country I have chiefly alluded to, though I am very far from wishing to take away from the merit of others.

"The last accounts of the Austrian army continue to be equally favourable. I see by the *Times*, a paper we receive here, that Mr. Thomas Grenville is going to Paris; if anybody is really going, I am happy he is the person."

#### NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.

##### NOTE.

"D'après la note qui m'a été communiquée, il paraît que mes propositions n'ont pas été comprises.

"J'ai offert de faire admettre les propositions qui pourront être faites (pourvu qu'elles reposent sur des bases acceptables dans les circonstances actuelles) en remplissant vis-à-vis de moi la totalité des conditions dont j'ai fait l'ouverture à Mr. ———.

"Je n'ai aucune autorisation avouée, ni mission *ad hoc*. J'ai seulement la persuasion de réussir dans ce que j'entreprendrais.

*French.*

*Endorsed.*

Received this through Mr. Dundas, September 21, 1796.

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 22, Kew.—"I sincerely rejoice at the continuance of the good accounts of the Austrians, which must soon annihilate the French army, which has been sowing destruction in Germany."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, September 23, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a letter which Count Wedel has this morning delivered to him, and also the copy of dispatch from the Danish *Chargé des Affaires* at Paris, which Count Wedel left with him. Notwithstanding the insolent tone of the answer received, there is an ambiguity in the purport of that answer which seems to create some difficulty as to the manner in which it ought to be considered, so as to leave no pretext or subterfuge to those who may wish to mis-represent the subject here. Your Majesty's servants are to meet this morning, and Lord Grenville will have the honour to submit to your Majesty such ideas as may, on discussion, occur to them."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 23, Windsor.—"After the highly insolent answer to the Danish *Chargé d'Affaires* on our demand for a passport that a

person may be sent to treat at Paris, I cannot suppose any one can be so lost to the sentiments of self-respectability to think any other measure necessary than the letting Parliament know the offensive turn given to what *some* might think an humiliating step taken by this country ; if such a communication will not rouse the British lion he must have lost his wonted energy."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, September 23, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to acquaint your Majesty, that your Majesty's servants, in considering the answer received from France, thought it would be of the utmost importance to bring to a distinct issue the ambiguous and evasive manner in which the Directory has couched its insolent refusal of a passport ; in order to leave no room for those misinterpretations by which attempts will certainly be made to deceive the people of this country into opinions inconsistent with the safety of any independent state. Every step that can conduce to this object is of such infinite importance in the present situation of affairs that no considerations but those of great and material interests ought to be opposed to it. Under this impression the note has been prepared which Lord Grenville has now the honour to submit to your Majesty, and which it is proposed to send by a flag of truce directly to France. There can be little expectation that a measure of this nature can now conduce to the re-establishment of peace, which the present dispositions of the Directory appear to set at a great distance. But it will clearly prove the existence of those dispositions, and will, in that respect, be highly advantageous to the interests of your Majesty's dominions. Such at least is the best opinion which Lord Grenville has been able to form, and which he now ventures most respectfully to submit to your Majesty's consideration."

*Copy.*

#### P. BOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, September 24, Philadelphia.—"When I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship, by the last mail, that part of the debate which was then published, upon the subject of the treaty with Great Britain, I did not apprehend that I should, so soon, have the satisfaction to enclose the sequel of that interesting debate to your Lordship. It has just made its appearance, and I take the earliest means of conveying it to your Lordship.

"I also beg leave to enclose to your Lordship the address of the President to the people of the United States, apprizing them of his intention to retire from public life."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 24, Windsor.—"As Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt think a farther step of humiliation necessary to call forth that spirit which used to be characteristic of this island, I will not object to the proposed declaration being sent by a flag of truce."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796], September 25 [Stowe].—"I am recovering and if good news can make me well you have taken care to contribute to it. If Jourdan

is indeed driven across the Rhine, I cannot imagine how Moreau is to get back from Munich to Bale, Brisack, or Strasburgh; and yet at one of those places he must cross the Rhine, for he cannot dream of falling back into Wurmser's line of retreat, with the Austrians pressing on his rear, and the garrisons of Manheim and Philipburgh pressing on his flank. As to Bonaparte, I am satisfied that he cannot advance whether Moreau be pushed or not; for he is not, and cannot be, prepared to garrison Italy against a revolt and against Naples. Surely some operation might be attempted while we remain masters of the sea, by transporting Neapolitan troops in aid of our own to make a diversion on the coast, and by that to assist Wurmser."

"I have writ a long letter to my brother Tom respecting *the plan* which I have so much at heart. I am happy to find that you feel the importance of it as much as I do. I am every hour (and I study it every hour) more satisfied of its practicability even without troops, though there is no difficulty in collecting 1,000 men from Chatham, and embarking them in two India ships fitted as transports, and now in the river; and these troops might receive orders for Ireland, or for Scotland, and might sail under those ideas. I see more advantages from the attempt even if it should fail than I can venture to commit to paper; but I think that *my friend* is sure of forcing his way, and equally sure of his retreat with the troops, and less so (though not hopelessly so) without them; and this is my idea after every consideration I can give to it.

"After these details, I hope you are satisfied with Frogatt's embassy. Part of your arrangements have depended upon my son, to whom I have explained my wish for your accommodation, and nothing could be more kind."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 29, Windsor.—"I am much pleased with the account from Leipzig transmitted by Lord Grenville as it so fully states that General Moreau has been defeated on the 11th of this month at Munich, which seems also by what [we] have heard, to be accompanied with further successes of the Archduke on the banks of the Lahn. I cannot but help flattering myself that Divine Providence has employed the wicked French as much as it thinks necessary, and that we shall now [see] that nation meet with the fate which has on former occasions [befallen] those who have adopted such depraved ways."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 2, Wimbledon.—"I have your note enclosing the paper respecting the militia, which I understand to be from Lord Buckingham. I shall take an early opportunity of speaking with the Duke of York on the subject of it, after which I would wish to have a *private* conversation with your brother, at which Mr. Pitt ought to be present. If he is much occupied at the moment, I shall meet with Lord Buckingham myself. Government will, in my opinion, be liable to just censure, if they do not, very early indeed after the meeting of Parliament, state to Parliament for the satisfaction of the public what is intended for the internal safety of the country. If satisfaction is not given on that point, it will be in vain to look for either approbation or support in the conduct of any operations abroad. At the same time you are aware that all discussions and propositions respecting the militia belong to the Duke of Portland's Department, and, of course, I must be delicate in encroaching upon it."

— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 5, Vienna.—“I took the liberty of troubling your Lordship frequently from Berlin. Appearances have mended much since that period, and I can venture now to offer my congratulations on the success of the campaign. Prince Charles has done well, and if those opposed to Moreau act with as much judgment and vigour, he will not be able to escape. At least he must suffer much loss. The Imperial armies may yet repossess themselves of the Low Countries this autumn, and being masters in the field, may even take by blockade some of the French fortresses, which are in general, I believe, unprovided with magazines. It is not however my object to consider these circumstances, or conjecture probable events, but to communicate an observation I have frequently had occasion to make. Your enemies spread everywhere the idea that you oppose a pacification with a view to aggrandize yourselves in the two Indias, regardless of the blood lavished on the continent of Europe. This, as you will easily suppose, excites ill will; but yet, from the nature of your Government, you are led to insist in Parliament on the advantages gained by the British nation, and to show that these result from diversions made by its allies. Such arguments are turned against you abroad, and become the excuse of those who have abandoned you. They are made use of here to render the war unpopular, and with such success, that, if public opinion were of much weight, the Court would have been greatly embarrassed. In the Seven Years’ War English enthusiasm was raised by the danger of the Protestant interest, and of its *immaculate* hero, the King of Prussia. At an earlier period the beautiful, persecuted, magnanimous Maria Theresa was the object of adoration. But in these cold calculating days it is not easy to stimulate exertion at home without exciting envy abroad. You best can judge whether it be prudent, after insisting that the war in its prosecution as in its origin has been defensive, to declare that *the principal object of it now is to protect the German Empire and the Low Countries*. That the dearest interests of Britain are eventually connected with that defence and protection. That far from ambitious views, you look only to the security of yourselves *as the result of that security you seek for others*. That a faction, aided by French armies, having turned against you the resources of Holland, you had been compelled *for the defence of your Oriental possessions* to seize those posts from whence they would otherwise have been annoyed. That in like manner you had been obliged to attack the French islands for the purpose of saving your own, *not merely from capture but from utter devastation*. Such declarations would have a good effect throughout Germany, already undeceived with respect to the French possessions. Moreover, should you be embroiled with Spain, it would strengthen you in the North to declare, after dwelling on the unprovoked aggression of his Catholic Majesty, that it justifies you in demanding (as a condition of peace) that he open his American dominions to the commerce of all *who now are, or hereafter may, be joined with you in the war against him*. This kind of crusade will not indeed be so wonderful as that which was produced by the preaching of Peter the Hermit, but it may answer better purposes.”

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 5, St. James’s.—“If Lord Grenville on consulting Mr. Pitt shall, on the whole, think Lord Malmesbury’s situation in this

country not too elevated for treating with the French Convention, I shall not obstruct his being sounded with regard to the Commission, but should not think he will accept it."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 6, Kew.—"It is with infinite satisfaction I learn from Lord Grenville's note that Earl Bathurst so eminently distinguished himself in moving the last afternoon the address in the House of Lords; his talents are certainly known [to] those that are acquainted with him; if he can conquer his natural diffidence he cannot fail of making that figure which would be particularly agreeable to me from my regard for the memory of his grandfather."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796, October], London.—"Ayant vu Monsieur Pitt depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire mon billet ce matin, je ne chercherai pas à vous tourmenter inutilement à moins que vous ne me donniez des ordres vous-même; mais je serai cependant bien aise de vous entretenir avant Vendredi. M. Pitt juge qu'il est utile de faire parvenir à Vienne aussi promptement que possible des paroles de consolation et d'amitié, qui expliquent en même temps pourquoi l'emprunt Impérial n'est pas arrêté, en annonçant qu'il le sera vraisemblablement bientôt. Si vous n'aviez pas le projet d'envoyer un courier Vendredi à Vienne, j'en expédierai un. Sinon je profiterai du vôtre, ce que je préférerai, parceque nous sommes de pauvres gens."

*French.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, October 14, London.—"I have to apologize to you for not having mentioned this morning how much it was in my wishes to take with me a *confidential friend* to Paris, but I was then far from being sure that Mr. George Ellis, the *only* person in whom I could place entire confidence, and who has so often been with me on similar occasions, could or would accompany me; he has since very kindly consented to do it, and I do not now lose a moment in entreating your Lordship's permission to be allowed to entrust him so far with the great objects of my mission as to enable me to have recourse to his opinion and judgment on those many points of difficulty and dilemma which must inevitably come in the course of it, and on which I should otherwise be compelled to act without any reference or consultation whatever.

"It will be of such real and, I may say, necessary comfort to me to have a person on whose friendship I can entirely depend, and to whose tried judgment and ability I can recur, at the same time that it would add so greatly to my hopes of acting in a manner conformable to the spirit of the instructions you have given me, that I am sure you will not think my feelings as an individual extraordinary, or my request as a servant of the public unreasonable.

"I need hardly explain to you that Mr. Ellis will go on *no other capacity* than as *my* private friend; but even in this light I should perhaps have had some scruple to mention him to your Lordship at this last moment of my stay in England, had I not this evening had an opportunity of seeing Mr. Pitt, and of receiving from him assurances

that I might do it without hesitation, and that he was confident you would be good enough not to object to an arrangement so essential to my comfort."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1796, October 16, Dropmore.—"As I think that this may probably still overtake you at Dover, I write to say that we have received dispatches from Vienna, the tenor of which, though not unsatisfactory as to the spirit of union and concert with his Majesty which prevails there, still leaves us in much uncertainty with respect to the objects which that Court may preferably urge in case of detailed negotiations for peace. In this state I do not think it useful to add anything to your instructions, but I would not leave you unapprized of the circumstance, as the knowledge of it will naturally induce you to use, if possible, still more care than you would otherwise have done, not to let any hint or insinuation drop from you that may have the remotest tendency to commit us in this respect. It is perhaps unnecessary for me to recall to your recollection that, by the convention signed with the Court of Vienna in the beginning of the war, the King is bound not to make peace without the consent of Austria, except on the terms of procuring for that power the restitution of all it may have lost in the war. I mention this to you merely as a thing to be kept in your own mind; the effect and application of this stipulation to the present state of things must be matter of detailed instruction to you if the negotiation proceeds."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, October 17, Dover.—"I have this moment received your letter of yesterday's date from Dropmore. I had prepared everything for sailing at ten o'clock this morning when the tide serves, and as you find no reasons in the dispatches from Vienna to delay my departure or alter my instructions, I shall (unless the wind changes) leave this place at that hour, and, I hope, reach Calais before the evening.

"I shall bear carefully on my mind what you say to me relative to the engagements we contracted with the Court of Vienna at the beginning of the present war, and also to what appears to be the present feelings and temper of that Court. On this and any other point I will act up to the best of my judgment, and endeavour to obey your instructions to the utmost of my power."

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, October 18, Calais.—"I have told strictly the truth in my official letter. My reception here has been, on the part of every person employed by the French Government, as civil and, I may say, as full of attention to the character with which I am invested as it could possibly have been before the Revolution. They were even studious in their expressions of respect, and the first thing said to me was '*Quoique c'est l'usage de conduire tous ceux qui arrivent chez le Commandant de la place, cependant, par respect pour votre caractère, nous avons reçu des ordres de venir chez vous demander votre passeport, et faire tels arrangements que vous jugeriez convenable pour faciliter votre prompt arrivée à Paris.*'"

"The only safe inference which can be drawn from this kind of reception here is that my mission is not likely, as far as relates to the common forms of reception, to be attended with any disagreeable circumstances, as it is to be presumed that the Directory themselves will not at Paris act in contradiction to the orders they have given here.

"I intend sending on immediately some of the persons with me to prepare for me apartments at Paris, where I expect to be myself on Friday. My correspondence from thence shall begin as soon, and be as regular, as is in my power."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, October 19, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour most humbly to submit to your Majesty a minute of the opinion of your Majesty's confidential servants on the measures to be taken under the present circumstances respecting the Mediterranean fleet and the island of Corsica. If the idea which is there very generally stated should receive your Majesty's most gracious approbation, Lord Grenville will lose no time in sending off the necessary dispatches to Naples, Vienna, and Petersburg, meaning, however, to open the latter part of the plan in the first instance to the Court of Petersburg only."

*Copy.*

#### MINUTE OF CABINET.

*Enclosure.*

1796, October 19, Cleveland Row.—"At a meeting of his Majesty's confidential servants at Earl Spencer's.

"Present.

"The Lord Chancellor.  
Duke of Portland.  
Earl Spencer.  
Earl of Liverpool.

Mr. Pitt.  
Mr. Secretary Dundas.  
Mr. Windham.  
Lord Grenville.

"It was determined that it should be humbly submitted to his Majesty as the unanimous advice of this meeting, that in the present state of Italy it is expedient that his Majesty's fleet should be continued in the Mediterranean, and that the measures for the evacuation of Corsica should be suspended.

"And that a proposal should immediately be made to the Court of Petersburg that proper measures should be taken in concert by his Majesty and the Empress, for obtaining the consent of the people of that island to transfer the sovereignty thereof to the Empress, on such conditions as may secure to the commerce of his Majesty's subjects in peace, and to his fleets in time of war, those advantages which his Majesty's situation there entitles him in such case to demand from the Empress; and as may also provide for the interests and prosperity of the island."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 20, Kew.—"Lord Grenville; I never received a minute of Cabinet that more heartily met with my approbation than [than?] the one now before me for ceding Corsica to Russia; I know the object is a favourite one of the Empress, and therefore I am of opinion care should not only be taken to secure the ports being at all times kept open for us, and that our trade shall be favoured over all

other nations as to ease of port duties, but it should secure an additional fleet of ships for prosecuting the war."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Private.*

1796, October 21, Cleveland Row.—"A duplicate of the despatches which I send this day by your servant will be delivered to you by Mr. Eaton, who proceeds in a cutter to Elsinore. I have thought that the services of this gentleman might, in the present moment, be very useful to you, particularly with respect to the execution of any of the *secret measures* alluded to in one of those letters. I trust however that zeal in this respect will be tempered with due discretion. I have also authorized him to hold general language of the King's disposition to unite his interests *entirely* with those of the Empress. But I trust that both you and he will feel that there is a wide difference between the most faithful execution of those assurances to their utmost extent, and the taking any express or *implied* engagements to become parties in offensive measures against powers or states of whom the King has no cause to complain.

"My wish was to have named Mr. Eaton to the Secretaryship of Legation at Petersburg, but I am embarrassed with some engagements that I know not well how to arrange in the present moment, though I think it likely that this nomination will ultimately be made."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, October 23, Paris.—"I hope that I have proceeded thus far in my mission without mistake or blunder, but I confess I have the feeling of an unsteady head on the edge of a high precipice.

"I must entreat of you not to be disappointed if I do not send you *early* intelligence as to the state and temper of this country; you may rely on my being most assiduous to obtain safe and accurate information, but, without being on the spot it is difficult to form an idea how impossible it is to select the true from the false.

"If I was absolutely compelled to give an opinion, I should say the negotiation would go on, but I should be most sorry to be bound by such an opinion.

"The wearing of the national cockade is so universal in the streets and so unpleasantly enforced by the populace that it is impossible to appear in them without it; the Government by no means insist upon it, and certainly it never shall be worn by any persons belonging to me when I am acting in an official capacity. But it would inevitably make them and me liable to the most disagreeable species of insult were they not to put it on when they walk out in a morning.

"The weakness of this Government, when opposed to the temper of the people, is such that, was such an event to happen, it would not be in their power to give me satisfactory redress; and I trust I do not judge wrong in supposing that, by exposing myself to it, much more serious and degrading consequences might be produced, than by the simply conforming to a general usage, presented by popular custom and not at all dictated by the Government.

"I have not yet seen Del Campo. But as I find Mr. Talbot (with whom I have every reason to be satisfied) is well acquainted with him,



I shall endeavour through him to discover the degree of credit he is in here and the part he is acting.

"From my receiving so early an answer from M. de la Croix, it is evident they are in a hurry either to begin the negotiation or to send me from Paris."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 26, York Farm.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer, ci-joint, la copie d'une lettre que M. de Müller a reçu d'un de ses amis actuellement aux Pays-Bas. Il va sans dire que si vous faites quelquel usage de ces renseignemens, vous voudrez bien ne pas nous compromettre vis-à-vis de notre Cour en disant que vous les avez reçû de nous. Quoiqu'il en soit, il semble d'après le contenu de cette lettre que les Flamands sont, on ne peut pas plus, fatigués du joug des Français, et, en même temps, au moment de se résigner à recevoir le dernier coup qui doit les accabler, si on ne le prévient pas par une mesure quelconque. Il me serait impossible sans ordre préalable de ma Cour de prendre vis-à-vis d'eux le moindre engagement; mais n'y aurait-il pas moyen de leur faire entendre sous main que l'Angleterre prendra tous les moyens possibles pour les faire rentrer sous la seule domination que puisse convenir à leurs intérêts? Cette espèce d'assurance donnée actuellement, jointe à l'exaltation et à l'espérance fondée que leur inspirent les succès de l'Archiduc, encourageraient l'énergie prête à se déployer, et les empêcheraient au moins de céder immédiatement aux instances, jusqu'à présent sans menaces, que le Directoire Français fait pour l'exécution du décret qui ordonne la sécularisation des biens du clergé. Vous n'ignorez pas que la réalisation de cet arrêt est celle de l'extinction totale d'une des premières ressources de ce bon pays, qu'on s'est toujours obstiné à méconnaître à Vienne, depuis les fautes de Joseph II.

"J'attendrai votre réponse pour donner des espérances à ceux qui en attendent. Je pourrai me servir utilement à cet effet des mêmes personnes auxquelles j'ai écrit dernièrement, et dont les détails sur l'état et les dispositions véritables du peuple Belge seront encore plus authentiques que ceux que vous recevez aujourd'hui. Mais daignez songer qu'il est urgent de ne pas perdre de temps si on veut prévenir des malheurs réels qui reflueront indubitablement sur le futur possesseur de la Belgique.

Songez, en lisant ceci, que c'est un ami qui écrit à son ami, qui veut comme lui le bien de la maison d'Autriche, auquel elle ne songe pas encore elle-même.

*Enclosure.*

#### — to BARON DE MÜLLER.

"J'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler des nouvelles apportées par deux exprès des Pays-Bas; ils étaient adressés aux principaux agens du clergé Belgique, stationnés en deçà du Rhin. J'eus l'occasion de rencontrer ici leur chef, le chanoine de St. Gudule Vaudorselaer, connu par le rôle qu'il a joué lors de la révolution Brabançonne. Je m'entretins avec lui. Il me dit que la mission de ses exprès avait pour objet de l'informer ainsi que ses collègues de la suppression du clergé régulier aux Pays-Bas. Il me fit beaucoup d'observations sur cet événement. Voici celle qui m'a paru la plus importante sous le rapport politique. La vente, m'a-t-il dit, que le Directoire a résolu de faire incessamment des biens du clergé, par petites parties et à vil prix,

fixera, si elle a lieu, la majorité des Belges, bien pensans encore, à la cause de la Révolution Française, par le motif le plus fort aux Pays-Bas, par celui de l'intérêt. Ces biens, poursuivait-il, ne manqueront pas d'acquéreurs ; la diminution générale des fortunes, la quantité immense de papiers Français dont les Belges sont pourvus, le besoin et l'occasion de trouver des indemnités faciliteront l'aliénation des possessions ecclésiastiques, aliénation secondée d'ailleurs par le silence et le peu d'intérêt de la Cour de Vienne à l'égard des Pays-Bas. L'indifférence de la Cour, ajouta-t-il, empêchait bien des Belges à se conduire en vrais prosélites de la bonne cause ; il ne se dissimula cependant point que la Cour pouvait avoir des raisons d'en agir ainsi ; mais, suivant lui, rien ne s'opposait à ce qu'elle fit sentir indirectement aux Belges, dans quelques pièces officielles et publiques, qu'elle les considérait encore comme ses sujets, qu'elle s'intéresse à leur sort. L'Angleterre, continua-t-il, par un disposition plus relative à son intérêt mercantile, qu' à toute autre circonstance, savoir, par celle qui autorise le commerce entre les Iles Britanniques et les Provinces Unies, à reveillé dans celles-ci tous ses partisans, et tous ceux du Prince Stadthouder.

“ Dans le cours de mon entretien avec ce chanoine, j'ai pu remarquer aussi qu'il était chargé d'une correspondance avec quelqu' agent du clergé Belgique à Rome. Je ne puis plus douter qu'il n'ait la commission de tenir exactement ses committans au courant des nouvelles des armées Autrichiennes. J'eus l'occasion de presumer le plan de conduite que s'est prescrit, dans ces circonstances, le clergé des Pays Bas. Il paraît décidé à s'opposer autant qu'il le pourra indirectement à l'exécution de la suppression, il s'attend que ses efforts à cet égard seront inutiles, et, dans ce cas, il empêchera et retardera autant que possible les ventes ; qu'il est résolu du suivre et d'observer avec attention, disposé à saisir avec empressement le premier instant opportun pour se réintégrer dans les possessions qu'on lui aurait ravies. Déjà il s'occupe d'allarmer les classes du peuple sur leurs propres intérêts par de nombreuses affiches et billets, et je sais qu' il regrette qu'aucun personnage marquant ne veuille se mettre à la tête des mécontents qu'il forme. ‘L'or pourrait en armer beaucoup,’ me dit le chanoine, ‘mais le tout devrait être combiné avec la Cour. Comment le faire ?’ ajoutait-il, ‘la Cour accueillerait-elle nos démarches ? La route de Vienne nous est fermée ; il n'y a plus de chancellerie des Pays-Bas ; l'Archiduc n'annonce plus de mission à traiter avec nous ; il a effacé de ses titres celui de Gouverneur-Général des Pays-Bas. Il y aurait de l'inconvénient de traiter directement avec le militaire’ ; il s'échappa d'avantage. ‘*Je suis connu*’ dit-il, ‘*des plusieurs membres du Gouvernement qui sont à Vienne : je n'hésiterais point de traiter avec ces Messieurs.*’ Il s'étendit en outre sur l'effet avantageux à la coalition qui produirait une descente de la part des Anglais sur les côtes de la Flandre, presque dégarnie de défense dans ce moment ; mais il faudrait, selon lui, qu'elle se fit d'accord avec l'Archiduc, et avec des moyens capables d'inspirer de la confiance aux Belges disposés *dans cet instant* à tout entreprendre pour secouer le joug des Français, et ne différants de le faire que par l'incertitude où ils sont d'être puissamment secourus. Je vis bien que son intention était que je fis connaître ce qu'il me disait, quoiqu'il affecta de me parler confidentiellement ; je ne néglige donc point de vous en instruire.”

*French. Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 27, Windsor.—“The dispatches which Lord Grenville received in the night from Lord Malmesbury and which he has now

sent to me, certainly give not the smallest insight as to whether the negotiation will be commenced or whether it may not be instantly broken off; if I could allow myself to form any opinion where I will do the author justice, no ground for any seems to be given; I should think there seems too much reserve, unnatural to a Frenchman, for any intention to remain behind of entering into negotiation."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, October 31, Windsor.--"I have perused the dispatches arrived this morning from Lord Malmesbury which Lord Grenville has forwarded to me. I perfectly concur in the opinion that there is not the smallest appearance of the negotiation advancing, which, as I never thought the present an advantageous moment for concluding peace, cannot but give me pleasure."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 6, Windsor.--"The last evening I received the inclosed paper from Lieutenant-General Harcourt, which had been sent to him from Scotland for my perusal by that *busy* man Sir John Hippesley. I should not have taken notice of any paper through that channel, as I did on a late occasion, when to my great surprise, through Major-General Manners, he communicated to me the retreat of the French out of the Duchy of Wurtemberg, but as by this paper Lord Grenville will see not only that Baron Reiger is to arrive in the course of this month to conclude the treaty of marriage, but that the Hereditary Prince proposes to be, the 13th of December, at Hamburgh. As to the former there can be no objection to it, as the business need not be hurried; but I desire Lord Grenville will write to the Hereditary Prince at Vienna, that the season of the year is too boisterous for me to wish his risking to come over till towards the end of April, for that I could by no means think of permitting my daughter, who is an uncommon bad sailor, to embark till in the month of May; and his so long stay in this country could but be inconvenient to all parties."

*Enclosure.*—Copy of a letter in French from the Hereditary Prince of Wirtemberg to Sir John Hippesley.

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, November 6, Cleveland Row.--"Lord Grenville has been honoured with your Majesty's commands respecting the letter to Sir John Hippesley on the subject of the proposed journey of the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg. He has the honour humbly to acquaint your Majesty that he received yesterday a letter from Baron Reiger, announcing his arrival and desiring to see Lord Grenville for the purpose of presenting to him the copy of his credentials. Lord Grenville had appointed to-morrow morning for the visit, and he will, if your Majesty should be pleased to approve of it, take that opportunity of making the communication directed by your Majesty, which he humbly submits might be better made in that manner than by a letter, as M. de Reiger is now here. If, however, your Majesty should judge it otherwise, Lord Grenville will not fail to write on Tuesday in obedience to your Majesty's commands."

*Copy.*

————— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 6, Vienna.—“Were it evident that peace would take place, what I am going to say might well be spared, but I believe in another campaign. In that case Spain will become a party against you, and the everlasting bone of contention, Gibraltar, may perhaps be her object of attack, unless she should adopt the plan proposed last war of conquering it in the West Indies. You will probably endeavour, on the other hand, to make serious impression on her American dominions; and, in so doing, must contend with a climate more dangerous than your enemy. Two modes have presented themselves to my mind; one which I mentioned cursorily to Sir Morton Eden has probably occurred to your Lordship, namely, transporting some Lascars from India to Mexico. These would indeed find an open country, but the extent of it and other causes would render the impression less permanent than you would desire. The other mode is more simple. The Emperor might furnish some troops from Croatia and other unhealthy places, who are inured from infancy to baneful exhalations. These, under the pretext of garrisoning Gibraltar and attacking Cadiz, would keep your enemy in alarm; but, once beyond the Straits, they would rapidly run down the longitude, and arrive at such point of attack as should be deemed most advisable. If, as is said, the Pope means to declare a holy war against France and *her allies*, he might give you a detachment of monks, supplied with the due quantity of bulls and such-like ammunition from the Vatican. These, in the bigoted country you have to deal with, would produce great effect; and this appears to me the cheapest and best mode of opening to yourselves the direct commerce of Mexico and Peru, which, added to the acquisitions already made, would fully indemnify you for the expenses incurred, and to be incurred, in the course of the contest. I suggested to Baron de Thugut the other day that it might produce a great effect on the French armies, should this Court give an Office to the different foreign ministers, *intended for publication*, in which, premising that circumstances now permit the Emperor to declare fully his intentions without wounding his dignity, a short recapitulation should be made of the manner in which he had been compelled to make war by the aggression of the enemy, mentioning the proper facts *as of public notoriety*. It might then go on to declare that he wished for nothing but to establish the general peace of Europe, repossessing himself of his own and recovering for the Empire what belonged to it; and that, if he should for these purposes be forced to act within the antient territory of France, it must be attributed merely to the obstinacy of those who seek from ambitious views to prolong the war. He said that as England had undertaken to negotiate a peace for the allies, this step, however useful in itself, might interfere with your views. Before I close this letter I must testify the pleasure I felt in reading the King’s speech. It is excellent.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 8, Wimbledon.—“I was extremely sorry on calling yesterday at your house to learn the unfortunate cause of my not finding you at home. You will, of course, be anxious to know the result of my investigation on the subject of re-enforcing Portugal. It turns out better than probably you imagine. Having, in the consideration of it, acted upon the principle that the honour and interest of the

country were both much concerned in the support of Portugal, I have not allowed small or even considerable inconveniences to prevent me appropriating a brigade of 1,800 excellent British troops to go immediately from Gibraltar to the aid of Portugal. I have selected them from the troops which have all along been employed in service at Corsica, and I believe they are as good as any troops can be. By the returns yesterday received from Corsica, it appears that the foreign corps serving there amount to 2,600 ; the French corps and artillery to go from this amount to 1,400 ; and the brigade of British from Gibraltar will amount to 1,800, making in all a body of 5,800, which, allowing for accidents, may certainly be taken at good 5,000. I am very happy we have it in our power to give them anything so respectable. I hope to see the Duke of York here this morning. He intended yesterday to offer the command to General Charles Stuart, who, I believe, will do it exceedingly well ; and, having commanded the troops at Corsica with great *éclat* and popularity, would in that respect peculiarly suit. If he does not go, General de Barghe, I suppose, will be ordered from Gibraltar, where he will come from Corsica, along with the troops, after evacuation. He, likewise, is reckoned an exceeding good officer."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November [10-12], York Farm.—“ Vous m'avez permis d'oser vous offrir le portrait du jeune héros, à qui l'Europe doit en vérité son salut. J'ai l'honneur de vous l'envoyer ci-joint. Permettez, qu'en même temps, je vous demande un moment d'entretien quand vous le jugerez à propos. Un courier qui m'est arrivé de Vienne m'a apporté de quoi vous entretenir, et des pouvoirs pour conclure même ce dont nous parlerons, si nous convenons de nos faits.”

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1796, November 13, Dropmore.—“ Recevez, je vous prie, mes remerciemens pour le portrait intéressant du jeune héros qui a tant contribué à nous préserver [de] tous des maux qui menaçaient l'Europe. Vous verrez dans la *Gazette Officielle* de demain le détail de ses victoires du 19 à 21 d'Octobre. Puissent ses succès ultérieurs répondre à la sincérité de nos vœux pour tout ce qui peut contribuer à sa gloire, et à la prospérité de la Monarchie Autrichienne.

“ J'ai reçu par le courier du Chevalier Eden des dépêches dont le contenu ne peut que m'affliger sensiblement. Comment est-il possible qu'on ait cru à Vienne que, dans un moment pareil, nous aurions eu la sottise puérile de ne pas charger notre Ministre de nos véritables et dernières intentions sur les ouvertures qu'il devait faire ?

“ Je suis très empressé de vous voir, parce-que je ne puis tarder de renvoyer le courier pour abrégé un délai très nuisible sous bien des rapports, et qui, certainement, ne peut ni nous donner des moyens que nous n'avons pas, ni augmenter une bonne volonté dont nous croyons avoir donné assez de preuves pour être crus sur notre parole. J'aurais bien voulu qu'on vous eut épargné la tâche très inutile de me solliciter encore pour l'augmentation d'un secours déjà porté au-delà de tout ce qu'on aurait cru possible, en envisageant de bonne foi la situation financière de ce Gouvernement, telle que vous avez du, sans doute, l'exposer à votre Cour.

“ Je souhaite de me donner encore quelques jours avant de retourner en ville pour reprendre le cours de mes occupations ordinaires. C'est

pourquoi je me flatte que vous voudrez bien me permettre de vous recevoir ici, soit demain soit Jeudi, à telle heure après midi qui vous conviendra le mieux.”

*French. Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November [13], London.—“Je suppose que vous venez en ville aujourd’hui et, dans ce cas, je vous supplie d’avoir la bonté de me voir un instant. Pour éviter que *l’appointement* que vous pourrez me donner ne me parvienne pas à temps, je vous prie de l’envoyer au bureau où je me rendrai à midi, et où je l’attendrai. Il serait, je crois, fort à propos d’envoyer un courier à Vienne pour y parler de l’emprunt, de l’arrangement prochain, et *to comfort them*. J’ai écrit, il y a deux jours, à M. Pitt pour lui demander des avances, et de faire honneur aux intérêts de notre dernier emprunt qui échoient Samedi prochain. Ce dernier point est bien important, puisqu’il y va de notre crédit, et aussi de celui de l’Angleterre qui nous a cautionné.”

*French.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, November 13, Paris.—“I shall be most extremely anxious to receive an answer to what this messenger carries, although I think it very likely, after what has passed to-day, that I shall have a message from the Directory to leave Paris before he can possibly return.

“Although I feel a consciousness of having done right, and that I have on no occasion, either in my language or behaviour, afforded the slightest pretence for supposing I was not most sincere and hearty in my wishes and endeavours to promote the success of the negotiation, yet the object at stake is of such immense magnitude that it fills my mind with doubts and apprehensions.

“I trust I shall receive no fresh instructions from you between the time this messenger leaves Paris and his return, as, circumstanced as the business now is, it would be extremely difficult for me to know how to act.

“I cannot conjecture what can have given rise to so sudden a change, for, although I never was inclined to believe the Directory desirous of peace, yet everything led me to believe that it was their wish to protract the negotiation, and wait for a more favourable occasion for breaking it off than that they have created themselves.

“It is possible from M. de la Croix’s last note that they may refuse me leave to dispatch messengers; I shall endeavour to avoid bringing this question to an issue till I hear from you, but it would be such a manifest infraction of *les droits des gens* as to authorize my immediately leaving the country.

“I have not thought it necessary to send a messenger to Vienna with an account of what has passed. It relates only indirectly to them, and, besides, although I do not give the least credit to it, there is a strong rumour here that they are negotiating a separate peace.

“The only news from the armies is to be found in the paper called *Les défenseurs de la patrie*.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 14, York Farm.—“Je reçois dans le moment la lettre que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire; je me rendrai demain à vos ordres entre midi et une heure.

“On vient de m’envoyer des instructions de Vienne pour obtenir, s’il est possible, quelque chose de plus de vous. J’ai les pouvoirs les plus étendus de conclure immédiatement la convention qu’on désire beaucoup que vous vous prêtiez à faire actuellement. Je vous exposerai nos véritables besoins et j’aime encore à me flatter que l’urgence des circonstances, et notre conduite vraiment admirable, vous feront trouver des nouveaux moyens pour aider les seuls véritables et utiles alliés que vous ayez.”

*French.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, November 15, Paris.—“It is of such infinite consequence that you should be in possession of every possible information I can convey to you at this very critical period of the negotiation, that it is with the greatest pleasure I accept the kind offer of Mr. Ellis to return to England for a few days.

“He is fully acquainted with everything that has passed, and you may rely with perfect confidence on the soundness of his judgment and on the acuteness of his discernment. You will hear from him, as far as our observation and information go, an exact and true description of the temper and state of this country; and you will be enabled to judge from the account he gives, of the means the best calculated to produce the end we wish to obtain. I have endeavoured to transmit this to you in my official correspondence, but I have done it so imperfectly and in a manner so unsatisfactory to myself, that I am made very happy in being able to perform the most essential part of my duty in a way which will leave no uneasiness on my mind least any circumstance or reflection, important to be known, should have been suppressed, overlooked, or misrepresented.

“I am anxious Mr. Ellis should follow the messenger who left Paris on Sunday night closely, since I am fearful that what I stated in my letters by him was so put as to lead to a belief that the negotiation was nearly irrecoverably lost. I certainly had reason to think at that moment that it was the intention of this Government to end it. I am since convinced that a great deal which I placed to the account of system and design ought to be put to that of inexperience and inaptitude in business; and it is to enter into a full explanation on this point and on others naturally arising out of it, to answer any question you may wish to ask, to convey to you, in a word, at once the whole of our knowledge and observations, and consequently to prevent the adoption of any false measures from omissions or incorrectness in my reports, that Mr. Ellis undertakes the journey. All I have to add is my wish, both for my own sake and for that of the business, that he may return *very soon*.

“I thought it advisable to ask M. de la Croix myself for Mr. Ellis’s passport, and to intimate to him at the same time in general terms the motive which induced him to return to England, and I did it with a view to prevent suspicion and jealousy inseparable from characters like those which form this Government, and also to make him feel how much I was in earnest in my endeavours to promote the success of the negotiation.

“I must do Monsieur de la Croix the justice to say that he was extremely pleased with this communication, and expressed himself in very handsome terms on my making him what he called a voluntary confidence, since I had certainly a right to despatch any person to England at any time without assigning a reason for so doing.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 15, Stowe.—“I find that there is a very general expectation of a riot about Wednesday or Thursday next, when the petitions are to be presented; I trust you are prepared with cavalry. In 1792 (about this time) George Berkeley, by my private advice, put two six-pounders in the storehouse on the Parade amongst the rejoicing guns, and lodged 150 rounds of grape for each gun, under the care of the storekeeper there. You could easily know from Lord Cornwallis whether they are still there, and a few artillerists might be ordered to attend at the Ordnance Office (or there) without giving suspicion. I was much gratified with the account of your battle with Lord Thurlow, but this is not the first instance in which he has shrunk from Parliamentary attack. You see that our meeting is fixed for Saturday; can you come on and take your bed here? Do you know of any attenders? for I fear that, unless a point is made, the meeting will be very thin.

“*Postscript.*—I find that I have 18,000*l.* in money in the Exchequer; the other Offices not quite so much each, but above 60,000*l.*, which is too much to be left to the mercy of the mob in Westminster Hall, with only an inch-plank door for its security.”

GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 16, Windsor.—“No one more cordially laments the occasion which prevents Lord Grenville’s coming to town this week; but in the actual state of public business, I can without detriment to it, consent to his further absence. I thought by this time a messenger must have arrived from Paris with the account of what steps had been taken by Lord Malmesbury in consequence of the instructions he has received on the strange mode adopted of publishing every matter relating to the impending negotiation.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 16, York Farm.—“Je vais l’avoir l’honneur de vous rendre compte, confidentiellement comme je vous l’ai promis, du sens des instructions que j’ai reçu de ma Cour par le dernier courier qu’on m’a envoyé. Daignez vous rappeler de votre côté que tout ceci est uniquement de vous à moi, et que vous n’en ferez d’autre usage que celui d’en prendre une connaissance complète.

“On commence par me témoigner l’étonnement qu’on a éprouvé de ce que, précisément après m’avoir donné l’ordre d’insister ici sur une augmentation absolument indispensable dans le montant des avances mensuelles que nous recevons de l’Angleterre, on a vu M. le Chevalier Eden faire des propositions fort au-dessous de ces mêmes avances. On en a dû conclure qu’apparemment il s’était glissé quelque méprise dans les ordres envoyés au Ministre d’Angleterre à Vienne, et on me demande l’explication la plus prompte à cet égard. Il me sera aisé de la donner actuellement en conséquence de notre dernière conversation; mais je ne puis m’empêcher d’avoir l’honneur de vous observer encore que si, au moment du départ du courier, vous aviez daigné me donner part des instructions que vous envoyiez à M. le Chevalier Eden, en ne trahissant jamais le secret de l’amitié, j’aurais peut-être pu vous éviter le désagrément du moment, en vous prévenant de l’effet certain que produirait votre nouvelle mesure. Ma seule amitié a osé dans le temps vous en porter ses plaintes; vous avez bien voulu rassurer mon sentiment; mais ignorant absolument le terme fixé à votre ministre, je n’ai rien mandé de positif à ce sujet à ma Cour, et il était, par conséquent,



très simple qu'on en fut surpris à Vienne, qu'on crut que M. Eden avait l'ordre de marchander, et que l'on fut même mécontent de la modicité des offres qu'il était difficile de prévoir. Il me semble qu'il l'était tout autant de croire que nous dussions, pour ainsi dire, être punis par une diminution remarquable faite dans nos avances, du bien que nous avions procuré à la cause commune en portant la Russie à s'engager à envoyer un corps de troupes contre l'ennemi ; car il est certain que le principe établi de ne partager qu'une somme de trois millions entre la Russie et l'Autriche, sans satisfaire la première, devait donner à la seconde une sorte de sujet de se plaindre, puisque ce serait à ses dépens qu'on aiderait l'activité nouvellement prononcée de la cour de Pétersbourg. Il devait être aisé d'en déduire que notre pénurie réelle et non factice (comme celle que le Roi de Prusse a mis si souvent en jeu) ne nous permettant d'agir qu'en proportion des secours que nous recevions (quoique ces secours n'aient jamais été des subsides) nous nous verrions forcés d'agir avec une efficacité proportionnée à la manière dont on voulait nous restreindre, et que, par conséquent, tout ce que l'on donnerait à la Russie, *seulement et uniquement* à nos dépens, serait de toute nécessité autant de diminué sur le nombre de nos troupes, l'étendue de nos efforts. L'exemple de ce qui vient de se passer doit, ce me semble, prouver à l'Angleterre que tout arrangement qui produirait ces conséquences ne serait point conforme à ses véritables intérêts. Après m'avoir déduit avec beaucoup de clarté et de précision ce que je viens de vous rapporter, on m'enjoint exactement, par ordre exprès de Sa Majesté, d'envoyer incessamment un courier à Vienne porteur d'explications exactes sur les véritables dispositions du ministère Anglais à l'égard des secours qu'il veut nous accorder, et d'après lesquels nous devons régler notre manière future de poursuivre la guerre. Le désir de Sa Majesté Impériale étant de se préparer *à temps* à deployer dans la campagne prochaine, qui sera *la sixième pour nous*, une énergie capable de parvenir à réaliser le grand but des alliés de dompter l'opiniâtreté de l'ennemi, et d'accélérer le moment désiré d'une paix solide et durable, il faut qu'elle s'explique de la façon la plus franche sur l'exacte étendue de ses besoins. On m'ordonne, en conséquence, d'insister absolument, 1°. sur une première avance de 600,000 livres sterling, à obtenir dès les premiers jours de 1797, pour nous mettre en état de faire des préparatifs nécessaires, et toujours négligés jusqu'à présent *faute de moyens*, d'ouvrir la campagne avec une vigueur analogue à la manière dont on termine celle-ci. 2°. Sur une augmentation du montant très insuffisant des avances mensuelles offertes par M. Eden. Je vous confierai qu'après m'avoir enjoint de tâcher d'obtenir 250,000 livres par mois, on me permet d'acquiescer, en dernière analyse, à un offre de 200,000 livres. La connaissance profonde que j'ai de l'état de détresse où se trouve le ministère Anglais, de sa bonne volonté envers nous, et, en même temps, la confiance que ma Cour me témoigne, me feraient prendre sur moi de ne pas m'arrêter à une différence peu importante ; mais, si vous persistiez absolument à croire ne pouvoir pas vous relâcher des bornes étroites que vous venez de vous prescrire, je serais obligé, à mon bien grand regret, d'en rendre compte immédiatement, ayant à ce sujet les ordres les plus pressans. Daignez croire qui même dans ce cas je rapporterai avec cette scrupuleuse exactitude dont je me suis toujours fait un devoir, et qui m'a valu vos bontés, tout ce dont vous me chargerez. Il va sans dire, je crois, qu'après avoir eu le bonheur de contribuer par ma part de soins et de travail à la réalisation de l'heureuse intelligence qui subsiste entre nos deux Cours, je chercherai toute ma vie à écarter de mon mieux jusqu'au plus petit léger image qui pourrait menacer de la troubler, même pour un seul instant.

“Après m’avoir donné ses instructions dans toute leur étendue, M. le Baron de Thugut termine par ces mots ;

“Le service de Sa Majesté exigeant de donner toute la stabilité possible à ce nouvel arrangement, il est nécessaire de le consolider par une convention formelle qui, dans ce moment, est devenue aussi indispensable qu’elle a du sembler superflue il y a quelque temps. Sa Majesté vous permet en conséquence, M. le Comte, de faire usage des pouvoirs dont vous êtes déjà muni pour procéder immédiatement à la rédaction et signature d’une convention, dans la quelle les secours pécuniaires que l’Angleterre nous accordera seront réglés.”

“Dès que nos serons d’accord sur les premiers principes j’aurais l’honneur de vous esquisser les points essentiels de cette convention, conformément aux ordres que j’ai reçu, ou je prendrai la liberté de vous faire la demande de ceux que vous déterminerez, et qui ne pourrait certainement pas manquer d’être analogues à ceux que ma Cour désire. Agréez tous mes hommages. Ce n’est pas d’aujourd’hui que mes sentimens vous sont connus. Je vous ai parlé avec la confiance d’un frère ; mais je sais que vous avez assez d’amitié pour moi, pour m’en savoir gré sans jamais me compromettre.

“Quand il ne s’agit que d’un million placé à l’intérêt du salut de l’Europe, contre la différence de sa ruine ou d’une paix honteuse, la sagesse et la générosité du Ministère Anglais pourrait-elle balancer ?

“Sans parler ne nos victoires, 100,000 hommes de troupes de complément, et l’armée d’Italie renouvelée trois fois cette année, peuvent donner la mesure de nos efforts et de notre manière d’agir.”

*French.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 17, York Farm.—“J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer, ainsi que nous en sommes convenus hier, l’esquisse des points principaux de la convention à rédiger, et qui porte absolument et uniquement sur les bases et les principes dont nous nous sommes entretenus. Si vous l’approuvez, comme je l’espère et le désire, il ne s’agira plus que de donner à cet ouvrage le vernis et les formes diplomatiques pour procéder immédiatement à la signature. J’ai déjà, je crois, eu l’honneur de vous prévenir que j’avais à cet égard toutes les instructions et pouvoirs nécessaires.

“Permettez cependant que je prenne la liberté de vous rappeler encore ici quelques observations que j’ai crû utiles de vous soumettre pendant notre dernier entretien. 1<sup>o</sup>. L’urgence dont il est que ma Cour soit informée au plutôt de la réalisation de vos bonnes intentions à son égard. J’ai sur cet objet les ordres les plus pressans, votre bon esprit vous en dira les raisons, et vous me pardonnerez en conséquence d’oser vous importuner encore pour vous prier de hâter autant que possible la conclusion de nos négociations. 2<sup>o</sup>. L’extrême importance dont il est pour nous que nous touchions une somme très considérable dès les premiers jours du mois de Janvier. M. de Thugut insiste sur un montant de 600,000 livres ; peut-être trouveriez-vous plus convenable de répartir cette somme entre les mois de Janvier et de Décembre, mais il est hors de doute que ce point est absolument essentiel. J’en suis tellement pénétré que, quoique mon chef m’ait donné le terme de 200,000 livres par mois comme son *ne plus ultra*, je prendrais plutôt sur moi d’acquiescer à un secours mensuel un peu moins considérable (si cette différence était légère) pour obtenir avec certitude la somme de 600,000 livres au commencement de 1797.

“Vous voudrez bien remarquer encore que la manière dont j’ai rédigé la proposition de l’article répond entièrement à ce que vous m’avez dit hier, et vous laisse le champ le plus vaste.

“L’article séparé que je propose, et qui, comme tout le reste, est absolument soumis à vos lumières, a pour but, ainsi que j’ai eu l’honneur de vous le dire, d’assurer à M. de Thugut les époques exactes surquelles le ministère Anglais nous fera ses payemens. Il va sans dire que les lenteurs et même les dangers possibles des remises entre la maison Boyd et Vienne ne peuvent regarder aucunement le gouvernement Britannique ; et me trouvant actuellement à la place du directoire pour ce genre de besogne, je ne manquerai pas de prévenir ma Cour à ce sujet, et de rectifier les idées fausses qu’on peut lui avoir donné à cet égard.

“L’Article 2, qui fixe la terme de l’ancien arrangement auquel le directoire avait part au mois de Novembre, répond encore à ce que vous avez paru désirer. C’est le point de démarcation nécessaire. M. de Müller se mêlera encore de la rentrée des avances de Novembre calculées sur l’ancien pied ; celles de Décembre ne seront plus de son ressort.

“Il serait bien agréable à ma Cour encore que vous voulussiez écouter à un article secret que je ne fais que vous proposer, et sur lequel je n’insiste nullement, qui porterait en substance qu’à l’époque que vous fixerez vous-même quand vous le jugerez à propos pour l’emprunt que nous ferons, afin de vous rembourser les avances, vous consentirez que cet emprunt soit porté au moins à la somme de 4,600,000 livres. Vous en concevrez vous-même la raison, qui n’a d’autre but que de pas voir alors cet emprunt peut-être employé dans sa totalité à n’effectuer que des remboursements, sans qu’il en soit rien versé dans nos caisses. Encore une fois ceci n’est qu’une proposition à laquelle je ne tiens point du tout irrévocablement. Votre sagesse en jugera.

“J’attendrai vos ordres pour me rendre chez vous. Daignez de grace ne pas perdre de vue que c’est doubler le prix du service que vous rendrez à un allié reconnaissant, que de l’aider promptement.”

*French.*

*Enclosure.*

#### PROJET.

“Sans entrer dans le détail des formes diplomatiques, et du préambule ordinaire, toujours les mêmes dans tous les traités et toutes les conventions, je me bornerai à esquisser ici le sens des principaux articles qui devront, ce me semble, former la base essentielle de celle qu’on se propose.

1° “Par le premier article les deux puissances alliées renouvelleront solennellement tous les engagements réciproques contractés par les traités et conventions précédentes.

2° “Le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, pour aider son allié à subvenir aux fraix énormes que lui occasionne la masse des efforts qu’il déploie contre l’ennemi commun, prend l’engagement de lui fournir, à commencer du mois de Décembre prochain, le secours d’une avance de 200,000 livres sterling par mois ; l’arrangement préalable, pris il y a quelque temps, d’après lequel on fournissait à Sa Majesté Impériale un secours mensuel de 150,000 livres devant cesser avec le paiement du mois de Novembre, qui sera le dernier fait sur l’ancien pied.

3° “L’ouverture de la campagne de 1797 mettant Sa Majesté Impériale dans la nécessité absolue de faire des dépenses beaucoup plus considérables pour mettre toutes ses armées en mouvement, et préparer les moyens de leur procurer immédiatement la plus grande activité, le Roi son allié consent à lui fournir pour le mois de Janvier

*seulement*, indépendamment du secours mensuel de 200,000 livres sterling énoncé dans l'article 2, une avance extraordinaire de 400,000 livres de plus, formant un tout de 600,000 livres pour l'avance du mois de Janvier.

4° "Sa Majesté Impériale, sensible à la nouvelle preuve d'amitié qu'elle reçoit de Sa Majesté Britannique, prend l'engagement de rembourser exactement toutes les sommes qui lui ont été avancées jusqu'à présent, et qui pourront lui être encore avancées par la suite, en conséquence de la présente convention, en ferant servir à ce remboursement les fonds d'un emprunt que Sa Majesté Impériale ouvrira à Londres pour son compte au moment qui lui sera indiqué par le Roi son allié, lorsqu'il croira pouvoir donner sa garantie au dit emprunt.

5° "Sa Majesté Impériale, intimement convaincue des sentimens de sa Majesté Britannique à son égard, et de son désir sincère, dont elle lui donne une nouvelle preuve en ce moment, de l'aider de tous les moyens qui sont en son pouvoir, consent à ce que, si l'empire des circonstances ou des raisons importantes l'exigeraient, on suspendit le payement des avances convenues en totalité ou en partie, pourvu toutefois qu'on en informât Sa Majesté Impériale trois mois d'avance dans le premier cas, et deux dans le second."

*French.*

#### ARTICLE SÉPARÉ.

"Sa Majesté Impériale devant être informée aussi exactement que possible de l'époque de la rentrée des fonds qu'elle recevra de la part de l'Angleterre, on versera ces avances entre les mains de la maison chargée de leurs remises tous les premiers de chaque mois. Si quelque raison devait retarder ce payement de quelques jours, on en prévientrait le Ministre de Sa Majesté Impériale à Londres, pour qu'il puisse en informer sa Cour."

*French.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 18, London.—"Par une suite de ce système de franchise et de sincérité que votre touchant amitié a bien voulu encourager toujours, et qui ne m'a jamais permis de vous rien dissimuler, je ne puis vous cacher aujourd'hui combien j'ai été douloureusement affecté dans la journée d'hier d'apercevoir la réserve que vous avez jugé à propos de mettre vis-à-vis de moi dans vos ouvertures au sujet du montant de nos avances, et des subsides que vous allez offrir à la Russie. M. Thugut m'a donné des ordres positifs, et ne se contentera pas des notions vagues que je puis lui donner, et s'il apprenait, comme j'ai lieu de le supposer, des détails plus circonstanciés de M. le Chevalier Eden, il jugerait avec raison que vous n'avez pas en moi la confiance que mon zèle, ma discrétion, et la manière ouverte et franche avec laquelle je vous ai toujours fait part des choses les plus secrettes, devraient me mériter. Vous n'ignorez pas d'ailleurs que, connaissant certainement mieux les dispositions et les intentions de ma Cour que M. le Chevalier Eden, j'ai entre mes mains des moyens de persuasion qu'il ne peut avoir, et que j'emploierai sans cesse dans l'occasion par l'intime conviction où je suis de la nécessité de la durée d'une alliance aussi utile, à laquelle j'ai eu le bonheur de travailler moi-même.

"Daignez donc rassurer un honnête homme qui vous aime, qui a droit à l'estime et à la plus grande confiance du ministère Anglais, et qui a eu l'honneur de vous répéter souvent que le moindre *hint* de votre part lui suffira, quand il croira ne vous être plus agréable.

*Postscript.*—Il va sans dire que ceci est de vous à moi, ma manière d'agir vous prouve mes sentimens. Elle doit réussir auprès de ceux qui pensent comme Lord Grenville."

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 20, York Farm.—"J'ai remis avant hier à M. Pitt, en conséquence de la conversation que nous avons eu ensemble la veille, le projet qu'il m'avait demandé. Comme je ne doutais pas, ainsi qu'il me l'avait promis, qu'il ne vous le communiquât immédiatement, j'ai cru pouvoir me dispenser de vous en envoyer la copie ; mais daignez permettre que j'ose vous supplier de hâter cette besogne autant que possible. Vous en sentez l'urgence comme moi. Je viens de recevoir des nouvelles instances de Vienne à ce sujet. Agréez tous mes hommages ; j'attends vos ordres avec la plus vive impatience."

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796, November.]—"J'écris aujourd'hui à ma Cour pour la prévenir des raisons qui ont arrêté la conclusion de notre convention, mais comme néanmoins il serait possible (comme je l'espère) que ces raisons ne subsistassent plus dans peu de jours, nous reprissions notre négociation, je crois parer à tous les inconvéniens, et surtout à celui qui résulterait infailliblement de la pénurie dans laquelle nous devons nous trouver, en prévenant M. de Thugut que, *si les bruits publics se trouvent faux, notre arrangement retardé se fera immédiatement, et qu'ainsi il pourrait tirer d'avance 200,000 livres s'il ne se sent pas coupable de ce dont les Français l'accusent*, jusqu'alors sa traité arriverait ici après la convention déjà signéé : bien entendu qu'en cas de paix séparée, ou de quelque marche qui y conduirait, il ne pourrait être question de rien. Il me semble que cet expédient (sans compromettre personne et sans faire courir aucun risque) pare à tout, et particulièrement aux retards qui seraient la conséquence naturelle et fatale de la mesure juste, sage et prudente que vous prenez actuellement. Il va sans dire que j'écris en chiffres. J'adresserai ma dépêche à notre ministre à Hambourg, qui l'enverra par estafette. Agréez mon hommage. Je ne doute pas que vous n'approuviez mon idée ; elle est fondée sur nos principes communs."

*French.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 22, Windsor.—"Unless it had been judged right on the receipt of the captious notes written by La Croix to Lord Malmesbury to have made them the cause of breaking off the negotiation, which would have best accorded with my sentiments ; for forbearance when too long pursued has too much the appearance of a degree of caution, nearly approaching timidity ; I cannot object to the mode of wording the fresh note to be given by Lord Malmesbury. As it does not appear that Mr. Ellis's arrival has been attended by his bringing any dispatch for Lord Grenville, I much like the having mentioned his language in the dispatch, as it takes off any sting if attending his journey, as the whole now stands recorded and cannot be alluded to any future stage of the business. I am almost unwilling to have stated

this remark, but the many politicians I have dealt with makes me always not only look to the apparent object produced, but see whether anyone not ostensible lies behind."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1796, November 22, Cleveland Row.—"Mr. Canning will, I hope, have explained to you the melancholy occasion which prevented my acknowledging your private letters, at the time that my last dispatches were forwarded to you. I think you have judged perfectly right about the national cockade, which is, like every other part of the dress of yourself and your suite, absolutely *sans conséquence* except when you are acting in an official capacity, and the only way to create difficulties on such points is the appearing to attach to them an importance which they have not.

"It is impossible for anything to be more satisfactory to my feelings than the footing on which you have left the business in the different notes that passed between you and M. de la Croix, and I should have been truly sorry if you had thought so literal an adherence to the instructions of taking their answer *ad referendum* could be necessary as to have prevented you from giving an immediate answer to the impertinent questions put to you. Any delay in that respect would have given the impression of a doubt on your part with respect to the ground on which you stood.

"I have not the smallest reason to believe that the Court of Vienna has any thoughts of separate peace. It is indeed so evidently her interest to treat only in conjunction with us that I think it scarcely possible for France to hold out any temptation that would even make her waver in this respect.

"Mr. Ellis's conversation could not but be highly interesting to me. What he says rather tends to confirm the impression in my mind, which indeed I imagine is the same which you and he also feel, that the Directory wish to get rid of the negotiation, though they are frightened when it comes to the moment of breaking it off.

"We hear that the capture of Lucas's squadron has made great impression in Holland. If you hear any Mediterranean news of importance, whether by land or sea, it would be very desirable that you should send it over as soon as you can ascertain the facts.

"I have seen to-day a packet of letters from Sir Sydney Smith. I am uneasy lest we should not appear to do all that is due to a naval officer of his rank in the service, when placed in such a situation. You do not mention him in your last dispatches. I enclose some letters for him which I conclude you will find no difficulty in forwarding to him, and I rather think the best way of doing this would be by claiming a right to send either Mr. Talbot or Mr. Swinburne to him with them. There is no instance here, not only of an officer confined in prison, but even of any private soldier or sailor, to whom the French Commissary has not the freest access."

Copy.

Enclosure.

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR SYDNEY SMITH.

1796, November 22, Cleveland Row.—"I cannot transmit to you the accompanying letters without adding a few words from myself,

merely to assure you of the strong interest which I personally feel in your unworthy treatment, and of the decided resolution of those who join with me in this sentiment not to suffer the matter to remain on its present footing.

"What has passed in France respecting you is a disgrace to a country calling itself a civilized nation, and it is still more so when contrasted with the liberal treatment which the French prisoners have experienced here during the whole war, even at the moment when Robèspierre's Government had passed a decree for the murder of all persons in the situation of becoming prisoners. This, I suppose, will hardly be renewed at this time, but the rigour and indignity with which you have been treated differs from it only in degree, and not at all in principle. And the effect of such conduct, if adhered to, must be to bring similar rigour upon their own prisoners here who are in so much greater number, and to aggravate beyond description the calamities of war which they profess themselves desirous of terminating.

"I know that your generous feelings would lead you to regret that your sufferings should be made the cause of misfortune and calamity to others. But this sentiment, which it is honourable for you to entertain, cannot diminish the duty incumbent on us to protect the King's officers from such unworthy treatment, by those means which the fortune of war has put abundantly in our power.

"This will be conveyed to you through Lord Malmesbury. Be assured that your situation was one of the first objects of his instructions."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, November 25, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to submit to your Majesty the draft of a dispatch, with its inclosure, which Lord Grenville has prepared in consequence of the opinion of your Majesty's servants, and which, if your Majesty should be graciously pleased to approve of, he proposes sending it to-morrow by a messenger to Vienna. Lord Grenville trusts that the favourable accounts received this day from Italy will very much tend to remove difficulties which might otherwise have occurred on this subject, and to place the whole state of affairs in a much more favourable situation, whether for the negotiation of a peace or for the continuance of the war.

"Lord Grenville this day saw Baron de Reiger. It appears from his account that there is a very little probability that a letter would still reach the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg at Vienna. Baron Reiger said that he conceived what might perhaps best suit your Majesty's ideas under this circumstance would be, that the Prince on his arrival this autumn should stay only till the marriage treaty could be settled, and that he should then return again at the period, whatever it may be, that your Majesty might be pleased to fix for the celebration of the marriage. Upon this subject Lord Grenville could only undertake to receive your Majesty's commands.

"He begs leave humbly to mention that, if your Majesty should be pleased to approve of this arrangement, it might be proper that the necessary orders should be given for the reception of his Serene Highness in such a manner as your Majesty may be pleased to appoint, and also for the frigate to bring him over."

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 26, Windsor.—“Lord Grenville cannot be surprised when I have, from the first moment of any idea of treating with France being proposed, uniformly shewn my disinclination to a measure which undoubtedly at this hour so manifestly destroys the solid ground on which the war was undertaken, the truth of which never was more clear than at the present period. I certainly, therefore, while I do not mean to oppose the sending the project to Vienna, certainly hope the Directory will break off the negotiation ; for when the scene in Italy is so much improved as well as in Germany, another campaign must be with pleasure looked to by those who like me dread any intercourse with a French Republic.

“Seeing how clumsily my directions had been executed by the Duke of Portland towards Baron Reiger, I have got the Duke of Gloucester to write to the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg to shew him how much better it would be for him to defer his journey ; but, should that not succeed, he then certainly ought to make but a short stay, and not return till the marriage is to be concluded. I cannot give any directions as to what is to be done till Lord Grenville can collect for me information in the case of the late Prince of Orange. I am totally ignorant where he was lodged ; but must premise if it was at Somerset House, that I have now no apartment where I could place him, therefore, in that case, some house must be hired for his reception ; but I doubt if in this case it would be necessary ; he can only come here on the present occasion as *incognito*, and any particular attentions of that kind ought, it seems, naturally to be postponed till he comes in his public character.

“I wish Lord Grenville would look back for the treaty of marriage of the Princess of Orange, and of the Duchess of Brunswick, and have a *précis* made of them, that it may be settled how that for my daughter is to be prepared.”

## LORD MALMESBURY to W. PITT.

Private.

1796, November 28, Paris.—“It gives me much satisfaction to hear from Canning that you approved my sending over Mr. Ellis, and still more to hear from Ellis himself of the very kind reception he met with from you.

“My official letters are to-day very voluminous, but I hope that the general substance of what they contain will be satisfactory.

“I trust now that it will be considered as proper to send me the *projet* of a treaty, with instructions as to those articles on which I may make concessions or modifications, and as to those on which I am to insist ; without some latitude of this sort I shall find this Government a very impracticable one to deal with.

“I still remain convinced that the Directory had rather we should furnish them with a pretence which would enable them to make the continuation of the war popular, than conclude a peace ; but peace is at present so much the cry and wish of the country, that unless we do furnish them with this pretence, I firmly believe they must either consent to it, or risk the overthrow of their Government.

“In saying this I not only explain the motives for every part of my conduct since I have been here, but also express my opinion what I conceive it ought to be as long as I remain. If you think me right, you will, I am sure, concur with me in the necessity that I should be authorized to begin the negotiation without any farther delay, and that



in a manner to make it impossible for the Directory to misrepresent the sincerity of our pacific intentions.

"If you think me in the wrong, I am still more sure that you will forgive my writing freely and openly my sentiments to you.

"The solemn assurances I have received from M. de la Croix on the not publishing what may pass between us in the next stages of the negotiation, will, I hope, be considered to be as binding as any which I could have drawn from him had I run the risk of corresponding with him on this very delicate subject.

"The Netherlands will be the great obstacle in our way. If we do not pertinaciously insist in these being restored to the House of Austria, or if the Emperor will look to an equivalent elsewhere in lieu of them, I incline to think that on all other points we shall find a much more accommodating disposition than we expect. We must certainly make up our account to hear a great deal of offensive and vapouring language in the progress of the business, but if we obtain our end, this may I presume be overlooked, and I am most ready that it should be understood not as addressed to the country at large, but to me in particular, on whom it does not produce the smallest unpleasant sensation.

"It would be entering into a very wide field to discuss the consequences that would follow if Belgium was to remain annexed to France. Perhaps they may, on deliberate reflection, be found to be less serious than is generally thought; and certainly, when we consider the situation of the countries which surround the Austrian Netherlands, the present state of Holland, and that in which it is probable and perhaps desirable it should remain, the cession it has made to the French of Maestricht and Venlo with the districts round them, and of Dutch Flanders, the annihilation of the Bishopric of Liege and of the Ecclesiastical Electors, I scarcely see a possibility of the Netherlands being again put on the same footing relative to England in which they stood before the war.

"I am still in hopes there is good news from Italy, though they are somewhat diminished by an article from Milan in one of this morning's papers in the pay of Government."

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, November 28, Paris.—"It was with infinite concern that I heard from Mr. Canning of the melancholy event which so naturally employed your whole mind, when the last messenger but one was sent to me from your Office.

"It is a real comfort to me to find that you are satisfied with what I have hitherto done, and I hope the contents of the official letters I wrote to-day will continue to be approved; they seem to justify the reasons which induced me to send Mr. Ellis over to England.

"I hope you will now have no difficulty in sending me over the plan of a treaty, and allowing me a sufficient range in my instructions to enable me to get fairly into the negotiation. I think if this once happens we cannot fail of getting honourably and advantageously out of it, let the event be peace or war.

"Should the Emperor consent to an equivalent in lieu of the Austrian Netherlands, I do not see at this moment any very insurmountable obstacle in the progress of our work. And in regard to England I imagine that, considering the state of the countries which border on them, it is next to impossible ever to place the Austrian Netherlands again in the same beneficial situation they were in before the war.

"I beg you to believe that I enter most fully into your feelings about Sir Sidney Smyth, and that it was solely from the idea that I could have obtained his release in a less official way than that I was directed by you to do, that I delayed so long giving in my last memorial on this subject. The last words I said to M. Delacroix yesterday evening were on behalf of Sir Sidney, and he promised me to press the Directory for a speedy answer.

"I have means of communicating very freely with Sir Sidney, although I have not seen him. Mr. Swinburne will, I hope, be admitted to him to-morrow. If he is, he shall carry your letter; if not, it shall get to him through another channel.

"I am ashamed at the bareness of my news and intelligence; but Mr. Ellis will tell you how very impossible it is for me to get safe and true information here, and how much I should lose if I was to be suspected, with any degree of proof, that I was employing indirect means to obtain it.

"You have never mentioned whether you are satisfied with the Neapolitan peace, and I am much puzzled what to say to M. Pignatelli on this subject.

"My Portuguese colleague does nothing. Was he a man of activity he would be very useful to me."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796, November-December.]—"La dernière malle m'a apporté une dépêche Allemande chiffrée du Baron de Thugut, dans laquelle il me presse de nouveau sur la nécessité d'arrêter au plutôt l'arrangement des secours pécuniaires; et il me témoigne sa surprise de ce que le courier, porteur de la convention que, dans d'autres circonstances, nous avions vous et moi annoncé comme prêt à être expédié, n'était point encore arrivée à Vienne. J'ai lieu de supposer, d'après ce que l'on me mande, que le courier que vous avez envoyé à M. Eden pour annoncer le nouveau retard survenu à l'occasion des embarras de la Banque, était parvenu à sa destination; mais comme on ne me fait à ce sujet aucune plainte ni reproche, j'ai lieu d'espérer que la confiance bien placée que nous avons dans l'amitié, l'honnêteté, et les talens de nos amis, l'a emporté sur les autres considérations, et prévalu audessus de toutes les craintes que cette cruelle information aurait pu produire. Mais je ne dois pas vous cacher que l'on m'ordonne absolument d'insister qu'il soit clairement énoncé dans la convention (qu'on croyait alors devoir porter sur une base d'avances) *que les deux mois soient comptés du moment de la déclaration du Chevalier Eden à Vienne*, dans le cas où il serait question de prononcer un jour un statement d'avances. Une circonstance assez particulière encore c'est que M. Thugut m'ajoute, *vous avez beau me vanter les avantages de semblables avances qui, à la vérité, épargnent quelques intérêts; je préférerais un arrangement qui porterait sur un emprunt, puisqu'alors nous ne serions pas ainsi dans la dépendance, et dans le cas d'être privés de secours d'un moment à l'autre.*

"Jugez d'après cela de ce qu'on dirait à Vienne d'une convention pour un emprunt dans laquelle on spécifierait qu'on pourrait nous arrêter les remises de cet emprunt. On jetterait feu et flamme j'en suis sûr. J'ai écrit dans ce sens par le dernier courier, et je suis persuadé qu'on m'en voudra singulièrement. Je m'en remets à votre justice et à votre touchante amitié pour moi. L'une et l'autre vous feront juger, sans aucun doute, combien il serait déplacé d'admettre cette condition, qu'au fond, rien

ne nécessite ; et qui fera naître chez nous les soupçons et le mécontentement dont pour ma part (quoique je serais très prêt à me sacrifier pour le bien réel) je ne tarderai pas à ressentir les effets. Il n'entrera jamais dans nos têtes peu financières que, quand nous avons souscrit à un emprunt, il puisse être possible que nous n'ayons pas la totalité de ce que nous avons emprunté, et de ce que l'on nous a garanti. Nous causerons encore sur cet objet la première fois que j'aurais l'honneur de vous voir. Tout ceci est, d'ailleurs, confidentiel et de vous à moi, quoique je n'ai aucune objection à ce que vous en parliez à M. Pitt. Je me propose de lui écrire demain pour lui représenter que nous sommes à sec ; qu'immédiatement après l'arrangement, il nous faudra des fonds ; et qu'ainsi, il serait à propos que la restitution des avances déjà perçues fut renvoyée plus loin. Peut-être pourrait-on destiner à cet usage l'époque des derniers *installments* au rentrées. Excusez ma franchise et mon griffonnage. L'un et l'autre vous prouve et mon attachement, et la manière dont je compte sur vos bontés."

*French.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 3, Stowe.—"I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken in sending your messenger who returns to London with a letter to Coutts, desiring him to insert my name in the list for 10,000*l.* ; and I shall be ready with the first payments, and must *me tirer d'affaire* for the rest (as you and, as I suppose, every one will) by bringing to market that which I should imagine will be depreciated by the number of sellers below all calculation. However, be that as it may, it is certainly necessary and fit that I should 'be *made* a volunteer' and after having completely failed in every plan and device to persuade Government to accept my money in the shape of raising men for them, and having been most egregiously trifled with in that proceeding, I am not a little amused at the necessity of sending an express (at the risk of freezing him) to save me from the imputation of being as frozen in my patriotism, as this poor devil is in his fingers. Seriously however, I am delighted at the facility with which this very important and new plan has been acquiesced in. The pinch will probably show itself (and possibly to an unpleasant extent) at the first transfer day ; but the effect will probably be electrical upon Lord Malmesbury's friends at Paris.

"I have no faith in your Kehl news ; but I have the greatest expectations from Italy ; and the effect of Alvinzy's success will be decisive upon much more than the possession of one hundred miles of country, more or less.

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1796, December 6, St. Petersburg.—"There remains so little to add to my dispatch by this messenger, that I feel it incumbent to apologize for the additional trouble I now give your Lordship. Were I to give way to my feelings, I could have much to say on the subject of the regret I cannot but feel at the important change I now experience. I hope and trust however that this change may not strike at the root of those interests which ought ever to unite the two countries. Every expression which falls from the Emperor should convince me of the contrary ; and my only apprehension arises from those attacks which I see daily made against all the measures of the late Empress. We must, however, hope for the best, and, at the same time that I beg leave

to repeat the assurance of my constant zeal and attention to His Majesty's service, I venture to bespeak the continuance of that confidence and protection which I have so constantly experienced from your Lordship under more favourable auspices."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1796, December 10, Cleveland Row.—"Mr. Ellis, who returns to you to-morrow with the instructions which have been prepared in consequence of your last dispatches, will be able to state to you verbally the little which is to be added to them. I flatter myself they will be found so full that nothing can be wanting to forward the negotiation except a disposition on the part of the Directory which I am persuaded does not exist, though the publick opinion at Paris may force them to go great lengths in appearances. You will observe that we are very strongly impressed with the impossibility of listening to any idea of leaving the Netherlands to France, and indeed I must say that, without carrying our point at least to the extent of obliging France to relinquish that possession, I do not see what solid advantage England would gain by a treaty which must contain the sacrifice of so many conquests.

"While I am upon this subject I cannot help mentioning to you *in confidence* that I have reason to believe that the Prussian minister at Paris has reported to his Court language on this point as coming from you which I am perfectly sure you never held to him, or indeed to any one else at Paris; but the circumstance is a reason for additional caution respecting a person of whom, I imagine, you do not think more favourably than I do.

"I have written to Lisbon to represent against M. d'Aranjo's being continued at Paris, but the chance of succeeding in any separate negotiation there (except on terms which the Portuguese Government will not consent to) is so small that they will hardly think it worth while to send a new negotiator there, and they will, of course, be unwilling to withdraw him whom they have there, till the last moment.

"I do not say more to you in my public letters about intelligence because I do not like to controvert what I strongly feel, the necessity of great caution in your situation. But, on the other hand, the importance of the object is such that something must be risked for it, and we should both of us blame ourselves if your mission should terminate abruptly, without your having established some means of our being better served in that respect than we have hitherto been. I have also desired Mr. Ellis to mention to you very particularly the necessity of frequent communication (at least once a week) in order to keep us informed of what is passing on the Continent now that the Elbe is frozen, and will probably continue so, with very short intervals, till February or March. Do not forget that Paris may be our only channel of communication, and, therefore, do not omit anything interesting from any quarter on the supposition that we already know it.

"Mr. Ellis will give you the details of our finance operations, which are wonderful even in the eyes of the most sanguine. I trust they will very greatly facilitate your negotiations, for there is no doubt that the Directory believed, *au pied de la lettre*, all they read and heard of the impossibility of our finding resources for another campaign. It remains to be seen whether they will be equally successful in their attempts for the same object. But what we have done certainly enables us to take a tone of more confidence in support of those demands which we think ourselves bound to adhere to.

"The answer from Vienna I think much more negative in form than in substance; and I conclude from it that the Austrians would not be sorry to be saved against their will, or rather against their declarations. We have at least obtained groundwork enough to proceed upon as far as the present state of our business requires, and very probably much further than it will in fact ever proceed.

"Mr. Ellis will be followed, in twenty-four hours after he sets out by a messenger whom you will have the goodness to send on to Vienna without delay, as I have no other certain mode of communicating with Sir M. Eden but through Paris. You will probably be enabled to say something to him of the first reception the proposals will have experienced. I have no idea that anything is to be done with the Directory but by firmness and steadiness; and I trust, therefore, that if you have not already received a favourable answer about Sir Sydney, you will not delay stating it in your dispatches that we may act accordingly. You can judge better upon the spot, but I cannot persuade myself that they could for two days stand the clamour which would be raised against them if they drove us to the necessity of retaliation. In all events I am clear that we owe it to our naval service not to let the business remain any longer in its present state.

"The peace of Naples is involved in so much confusion, and I fear I must add deceit, that I am at a loss what to say about it. In general I should have thought the terms favourable enough, and that we lost very little by the defection of such an ally which was not compensated by our no longer having the duty of protecting him. But when one sees on how nice a turn the business of Italy has been decided (if decided it has been) it is impossible not sometimes to think that 30 or 40,000 men, even Neapolitans, must have turned the scale. Till, therefore, we know the facts and circumstances we can neither approve nor disapprove, we can only regret."

*Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MALMESBURY.

1796, December 10, Cleveland Row.—"Since I wrote my other letter I have received the enclosed. I am afraid that the last paragraph may lead to much embarrassment, because if Aranjó makes any formal declaration of this nature, it will naturally renew the discussion whether the Emperor will do the same, and if not why France should be called upon to explain herself about terms of peace with Austria.

"You must do in this the best you can, and I thought it very material that you should be apprized of it."

*Copy.*

#### CABINET MINUTE.

1796, December 10, Downing Street.

Present.

The Lord Chancellor.  
Lord President.  
Duke of Portland.  
Marquis Cornwallis.  
Earl Spencer.

Earl of Liverpool.  
Mr. Pitt.  
Mr. Dundas.  
Lord Grenville.

"The drafts of two dispatches to Lord Malmesbury, with the memorials inclosed in them, being read by Lord Grenville, it was

agreed that they should be humbly submitted to your Majesty, as containing the instructions which, in the opinion of your Majesty's servants, should be given respecting the further conduct of the negotiation at Paris."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 11, Windsor.—"This morning I have received Lord Grenville's box containing two dispatches for Lord Malmesbury with the draft of the note and *mémoire confidentiel*, as also a second *mémoire confidentiel* with regard to Spain and the Dutch, with an explanatory dispatch on that subject; which papers he has laid before the Cabinet, and obtained the approbation of all those present; I perceive Mr. Wyndham was not there. As the measure is so unanimously recommended, I shall not refuse to permit these being sent to Lord Malmesbury; though I should not do justice to my sincerity, if I did not add that I hope the propositions will be rejected by the Directory, as I cannot think either the terms proposed, or the time for treating, such as I can wish shall end the present struggle."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1796, December 11, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour of submitting for your Majesty's royal signature two messages to the Houses of Parliament, communicating the declaration of war on the part of the King of Spain. He also begs leave to lay before your Majesty a printed declaration in answer to that of the Court of Madrid, which has been prepared by Lord Grenville's direction, and which, if your Majesty should approve of it, is proposed to be published and laid before Parliament to-morrow.

"Lord Grenville has seen Lord Bute, who does not bring anything new, except the most unfavourable accounts of the state of preparation in Portugal."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 12, Windsor.—"I return the messages for the two Houses of Parliament which I have signed in the usual manner, and highly approve of the printed answer to the declaration of the Court of Madrid which Lord Grenville has prepared, and which certainly ought to be published.

"I am sorry the information Lord Grenville has received from the Marquis of Bute is so unfavorable as to the state of preparation in Portugal."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 12, Stowe.—"As to my Exchequer Office I have satisfied my own mind, and I hope Mr. Pitt's, that it is best for me to state the *actual deductions* and the *actual net receipts* as clearly and distinctly as truth can make it. I am satisfied that the general arrangement of what is *supposed to be reserved to my use* is so much known, that it would be silly to attempt to conceal the facts stated in the report from the Commissioners of Accounts in 1780.

And the efficient officers are so well paid, that I shall not appear to have *under done* that part of the question as you will see by the annexed list. The net receipt which stands charged to me (though you know how much I pay yearly from it) will, after all, fall very short of Mr. Tiernay's expectations, as I understand he expects a net balance ever since 1793 of above 20,000*l. per annum*. The best mode of treating the question is by conceiving it a first step to the attack on private property; stating always that this was a private property granted to Mr. Grenville, and the existing arrangements upon it made (as was true) by him."

Total receipt in Lord Buckingham's Office      Total deductions including  
for Teller, for 1st Clerk and 2nd Clerk.      Clerks salaries, taxes, &c.

	£	s.	d.		£	s.	d.
1794	11,396	7	0				
Deduct	1,569	19	4	-	-	1,569	19 4
	9,836	7	8				
1795	17,269	3	3 $\frac{1}{4}$				
Deduct	1,569	19	4	-	-	1,569	19 4
	15,699	3	11 $\frac{1}{4}$				
1796	16,322	11	9				
Deduct	1,629	19	4	-	-	1,629	19 4
	14,692	12	5				

Clerks in Lord Buckingham's Office—

	£
W. H. Fremantle	400
R. Woodward	300
E. Astle	220
I. Sealey	150
T. Bradford	120

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 13, Stowe.—“I know that it will give you pleasure to hear that I have received from Mr. Pitt the most marked attentions in the immediate expedition of my warrant for 7,000*l.*, and in the discussions with Bernard upon the subject of my office. He perfectly approves the return, varying it in some slight degree but not in the essentials. But I have likewise infinite satisfaction in receiving from him a letter to which I am very sensible, in answer to the thanks I thought myself bound to give him for the justice he did to the memory and services of my father. Though I have nothing to add, I write you these few lines because I know they will gratify you.”

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December, Whitehall.—“I find upon inquiry that there is nothing that I can do in the case of Captain Munro; and that one of the plans which he proposes is not practicable at all. The oath is required in conformity to the directions of an Act of Parliament, and cannot therefore be dispensed with by any less authority; and the commissions in the Commissariat that entitle to half-pay, are made out

at the War Office only in consequence of a communication of the King's pleasure from the Treasury."

*Enclosure.*

GEORGE MONRO TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, July 1st, Ledbury.—"In the vast multiplicity of your business, my name has perhaps escaped your Lordship's memory; but, from what I know of your character, I am sure my services have not; and that you perfectly recollect I am the person that was sent to Paris, when it was thought proper, from the state of affairs there, to recall Lord Gower.

"I shall not trouble your Lordship with the services I rendered while there; whether great or small, they were performed to the utmost of my abilities; neither will I take up your time in stating the risks I ran, as I am sure you have forgot neither of them, nor the promises made by your Lordship (through Sir James Burges) to provide handsomely for me; for that was the message delivered by him to me in your name.

"After what I have stated, your Lordship no doubt will be surprised when I tell you that, as yet, I have little or nothing permanent done for me; and the little I may have has not been given me even by your Lordship. This, however, I am far from imputing to you, or anyone in administration. It has arisen from circumstances too tedious to trouble you with, and a course of ill luck, which can still be easily remedied if your Lordship thinks proper to interest yourself about me.

"To make the matter short, I am so situate at present as to hold two appointments in the army, that of Captain, and Assistant-Commissary. They are both commissions entitled to half-pay; the first is five shillings a day, and the other seven shillings and sixpence. Could I hold the half-pay of both these places I should think myself most amply provided for; but that is impossible without your Lordship's interest. Should you be kind enough to give me that, I am given to understand that in particular cases there is such a thing as an order issued from one of the Secretary of State's Office (or from the Treasury) to the Pay Office, directing the Paymaster-General to dispense with the oath half-pay officers are obliged to take. Could I get this dispensation for my half-pay as Assistant Commissary, it is exactly what I would wish. Should your Lordship however not approve of this, I would be obliged to you to get my eldest son, *George Monro*, appointed Assistant Commissary in my place (it is necessary to mention the boy is only twelve years old).

"Should your Lordship be kind enough to procure me either of these favours (I should prefer the first) I shall then (holding my Captain's half-pay) have twelve shillings and sixpence a day, which I shall gratefully think an ample provision for myself and three children. As in all probability I shall soon be obliged to join my regiment in the West Indies, I am anxious to have this done prior to my departure; I therefore look up to your Lordship for protection with that anxiety a father naturally has for his children."

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, December 20, Paris.—"You will, I am sure, forgive my not answering fully your kind private letter by Ellis, and allow me to



postpone the doing till we meet, which, although it is perhaps a little sooner than you expected it would be, is not at all sooner than I wish it. I hope I am not mistaken in thinking we have died well; certain I am that I quit *this* world without regret.

"The death of the Empress of Russia has, I have the best reasons to believe, very much influenced their conduct here.

"We shall be at Calais on Saturday night or Sunday morning."

*Postscript.*—"I have not been unmindful of Sir S. Smyth, and will post in the form of a dispatch an account of the steps I have taken, and give it to you when we meet."

————— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 21, Vienna.—"Before I quit this city, I take the opportunity of throwing together, and probably without method, some ideas which have offered, as well as some information received. I am assured that a principal lure for bringing Spain into the war against you was the promise to put a second son of Spain on the throne of France. This consists well with various indications which have fallen under my notice, so that I cannot withhold my belief; but you have probably a perfect knowledge of the business as far as it has gone. I now believe it was not unknown at Berlin when I was there, for I observed some little incidents then unaccountable, and which stand explained by that idea. I conclude also that, if the Emperor's arms do not prevail in Italy, Naples will throw herself into the scale against you, and drag the Pope along with him; in which case I shall expect that the French will make use of the resources in Italy for carrying the war, aided by the Turks, into Hungary and the Ukraine. On the other hand, if the Emperor be successful, he will have an enormous superiority of force there, and it must be his own fault if he do not find resources. He will come in by the *droit du plus fort* as successor to the French, who now hold by that same right; and may declare that, as this war is evidently carried on by his enemy for the destruction of property, he expects and insists that the proprietors pay for the protection afforded them; and considers the petty Sovereigns of that country as entitled only to an expectancy in their dominions, to be realized when the war shall be at an end. Naples, which has all along played a double game, is too far off for him; but your fleet may show good reasons to the Neapolitan Administration why, in preserving the peace concluded with France, they should pay a monthly sum to aid the Emperor in defraying the expenses of the war. Our holy father the Pope is desirous to connect himself with Austria rather than with France, because this last has brought the question off from political to personal interests; and in so doing has acted unwisely. If you are superior in the Mediterranean, and your ally in Italy, will it not be worth while to transport 30,000 Austrians to Barcelona, and dictate a peace there to Spain? In this case the Pope can be useful, and I have reason to believe that he would come into any measures you would wish. I have mentioned this thing to the Baron de Thugut, who thought it very good for you, but did not see how this country, which has no marine, could derive any benefit from commercial privilege in the ports of Spanish America. I told him that such privileges, opening a trade from Trieste and Fiume to the new world, would invigorate their pecuniary means, and eventually raise for them some marine. That you could not but see with pleasure a new maritime Power in the Mediterranean, which would check there the influence of your natural enemies. That, in like

manner, you could not but favour a commerce whose operation must go to diminish that of France, without affecting your own by any possibility. And as you would be sometimes obliged to call on them for aid at land, you would be the more ready to give them help at sea, and *vice versa*; which mutual state of dependence would strengthen the bands of friendship between you. He did not seem to think there was any cause of apprehension from the indolent Turk; and the rather, as Prussia is equally interested with Austria and Russia in preserving the peace of Poland. But here he is, I believe, mistaken. It would suit Prussia perfectly well to erect again a kingdom of Poland in that part of it which is occupied by the Imperial Courts; and I know it is in the system of Prussian politics to play off, in case of necessity, a Polish insurrection against Russia. The death of the Empress changes, in my opinion, the state of affairs very much. I do not believe you will have any assistance from the new Emperor, because the population and finances of his country really require repose; because it is not his interest to strengthen so powerful a neighbour as Austria; because he is equally interested with France in preserving that anarchy which goes by the name of the German Empire; and, above all, because in his quality of successor to the throne, he is naturally disposed to adopt measures different from those of his predecessor. What reasons he has to stimulate him beyond the usual measure of new Princes, and what evidences he has given of their influence over him, it is needless to mention. You will have seen how he is straining at popularity; a conduct which, in my opinion, savours more of puerile vanity than of sound discretion. It is to act not to be the monarch, and suits better the theatre than the throne. I stated to Monsieur de Thugut my conviction that he would have no aid from Russia, without detailing my reasons; and, on that ground, suggested the engaging Prussia in a manner I have formerly mentioned to your Lordship. He considered it as impossible to bind that court by any engagements. This did not surprise me, but I replied that, admitting their infidelity, it would only follow that the consideration for their services should be eventual, and depend on the success of their exertions. He startled at the idea of giving strength to Prussia; but I observed that if he gained Bavaria, it would be more than a compensation for anything which Prussia could get. That, moreover, the case supposing you in a position to influence the decisions of Holland, it would result that the most abundant resources in men, money, and other means of war would be thus united. That Prussia could not carry on two campaigns, if the war were carried into their country. That geographical reasons, the only ones to be relied on for any considerable period, having placed Russia in direct enmity with Prussia, the aggrandizement of the latter would be the best method of obtaining the cordial assistance of the other. That on a peace, France, if reduced to her antient limits, would be for a long time *hors de combat*; in which case nothing could prevent Austria and Russia from crushing Prussia, which must ever be considered as the naturally ally of France. He asked me whether I thought the English prejudice against standing armies might not make them unwilling to hold the Low Countries. To this I replied that, in my opinion, the present situation of England was such that the danger to liberty did not arise from the too great power of the executive magistrate, but the contrary; and that I did suppose the good sense of the nation would turn with pleasure to the contemplation of a force which might, in case of necessity, be called in to protect property against those who wish to destroy it; and who in that view are endeavouring under plausible pretences to overturn the Government. I think I might have added that this would

be a safer resource than such interior regulations as circumstances may otherwise require ; but I did not choose then, nor do I wish now, to tread further on this tender ground.

"I mentioned to M. de Thugut the situation of Monsieur de la Fayette, and found that they wished never to have taken him, and would now be glad to get rid of him, but see no way in which it can be done conveniently. I proposed his liberation in a moment of rejoicing for any good news, but this did not seem to take. He told me, however, that if England would ask for him, they would readily give him up ; and the King might, if he pleased, let him loose in London. Now I wish you to consider that, when peace takes place, he will of course be liberated, and go to America. He will have more or less influence there. I believe he will have a good deal. You may, if you please, send him thither under such a weight of *notorious* obligation that he shall be incapacitated from dis-serving you. And, if you take him now, there are two supposable cases in which, if he were twenty times a Frenchman, he would be inclined to serve you ; namely a restoration of the titular monarch, or the full establishment of the present rulers of his country. In all cases you would do an act agreeable to America, which would cost you nothing ; and I am sure you are not to learn that such things propitiate more the minds of men than more solid services, which, however they may promote the interests, seldom fail to wound the pride of the obliged party. Should you incline to this measure, the least hint would induce the American Minister to request it on the part of the United States ; unless, which I should deem the better mode, you did it of your own motion. The effect would then be great even in France, for though he is now of no importance there, that nation is highly sensible to every act of nobleness and generosity."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1796, December 21, Berlin.—"I beg leave to advert to a subject which I should not have submitted to your Lordship had not an occasion offered in which its influence on public affairs had become very evident.

"In many parts of the continent of Europe there are sects whose tenets and doctrines supersede every other consideration ; and who hold together in spite of every principle of disunion, whether of country, of national religion, or of political interests. Much has been said of the *Illuminés*, who have been supposed to have great influence at Berlin. I have no reason, however, to suppose that to be the case. But most certainly there are here many of the sect, called *la secte pieuse*, whose fundamental doctrine consists in attributing everything to faith, and supernatural interposition. This sect has many partisans in Russia, and the present Emperor is supposed to be at the head of it. About five years ago a Prince Traboulsky was banished with his family into the Ukraine for having carried on a correspondence on the part of this description of people. He is now recalled to Petersburg ; and a Russian, of the name of ———, who has resided some time here and was equally concerned in the above correspondence, is preparing to return to his country at the recommendation of the King of Prussia. Prince Repnin appears to have been much engaged in the mysteries of this sect, for M. Haugwitz speaking lately confidentially of him said, *je ne le connais pas personnellement, mais nous avons été autrefois dans les liaisons les plus étroites* ; referring to these doctrines. It is chiefly from being initiated into the higher ranks of this sect, that Count

Bruhl has been selected for the purpose of congratulating the Emperor on his accession. That had been formerly a bond of much union between them; and Count Bruhl goes both on this account, and with a view to establish in the Emperor's mind the attachment of the King and his ministers to these doctrines.

"Your Lordship knows that Count Bruhl married a daughter of M. Gomm, one of the most absurd and violent enthusiasts."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 25, Windsor.—"I have received Lord Grenville's note transmitting the one he has had from Baron Rieger. All the answer I can possibly give is that I hope the letter that has been written by the Duke of Gloucester will have been received by the Hereditary Prince in time to prevent his present inconvenient journey; but least that should not be the case, I desire Lord Grenville, after mentioning this in his note to Baron Rieger, will remind him that, should the Prince come, it is hoped it will be as a short visit, for that I abide by my resolution that the marriage of my daughter cannot be at this time, nor till I think her situation in Germany will be free from the perils of war. Since Somerset House has been turned into public offices I have no house for lodging any foreign prince; Lord Grenville must therefore send to the Lord Chamberlain, and the best ready furnished house that can be found must be hired for his reception, and application must be made to the Admiralty for a frigate for the prince's passage from Cuxhaven, an allowance given to the captain for providing him on this occasion, as is now done when they carry any passenger by command.

Since writing, I have found in another box Lord Grenville's note and the decyphered letter from Mr. Arbuthnot on the subject of the Duke of Ostragothia. I lose not an instant in desiring Mr. Arbuthnot may be acquainted that any proposal of the kind would not be accepted by me, that therefore he should clearly explain this, that no further idea of such a negotiation may exist."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, December 28, Windsor.—"As Lord Grenville seems to wish to have my opinion on the paper to be published on the cause of the rupture of the negotiation at Paris for peace, I have rapidly read it, and can assure him that I think it is that cool discussion which must satisfy those who were desirous of the negotiation terminating with a peace; perhaps if, at the end, a summary of the wicked principles of France, and how much they must be shocking to every man of probity, would have been pleasing to those who seriously view the subject; but the omitting this may perhaps, as far as others are wished to be gained, appear to some, though not to me, more prudent."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796-1797].—"I see no tolerable report in any of the newspapers of your Demosthenes sentence, or of any of the most striking parts of your speech. I wish you would employ an hour to put down both that particular sentence, and, as well as you can remember it, all that related to the reasons for staying in office, the sort of peace which Opposition would make and be hanged for, the conciliation with Ireland, and the

connection with the Corresponding Society. As much more as you please, but these topics are really what would be of the most essential use. I called to mention this but found you gone to the woods."

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1796-1797].—"I make haste to prepare you for a visit which you will have from the Duc d'Harcourt, on a subject which he judged very rightly that I might probably be informed of, though I made a pretence of ignorance, leaving it to you to admit to him what degree of knowledge you should think proper. I take it for granted, indeed, that in return for his frankness and confidence, you will think it right to state to him what Ministry know upon the subject. I am rather sorry to find that our Breton friend, whose arrival here you know of, has not observed all the good faith which we had reason to expect from him. If he found it absolutely necessary for him to have a communication directly with the Princes, he should not have told us that he meant to have none. I am not, however, willing to infer from thence that he is a person not to be trusted. It is possible also, though hardly probable, that the whole of this communication supposed to be made from him to the Princes may be a forgery, at least it does not appear that he has communicated to them the secret of his being here; and a communication with them of some sort he has, if I am not mistaken, avowed.

"It might still, therefore, be possible to keep the Duc d'Harcourt ignorant to a certain degree of his being here, supposing it were expedient to do so; but the integrity of the Duke of Harcourt's character, the reliance that may be placed on his prudence and his conduct in this affair, all make it advisable probably that no reserve should be used with him, but that he should fairly be taken into counsel; though certainly, previously to this partial communication to the Princes, one should have wished that the affair had remained entirely in the hands of Government here."

#### CABINET MINUTE.

1797, January 2.—"It is agreed to authorise Lord Grenville to give to M. Duvergne de R. an assurance of receiving—

1. "Twenty thousand per month, for three months certain, to cover the expense of intelligence, and of the allowance to the force which the royal agents are collecting in the central departments of Paris with a view to act after the elections if necessary, or to resist any attempt to supersede the elections.

2. "An engagement that, if the case shall arise, 15,000*l.* shall be paid for clothing men in dépôt at Rouen.

3. "An engagement that, if the scheme should actually take place and should lead to the actual assembling of an army, 30,000*l.* shall be paid in the first month after such event shall happen."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, January 4, Berne.—"I shall do no more to day than inform your Lordship of M. de Précy's safe arrival. I find him to the last degree grateful for the kindness which your Lordship had shown him.

"I have no intelligence respecting the fleet but what will be found in the enclosures of the annexed dispatch. M. de la Harpe is constantly closeted with the Minister La Croix on the business which has

lately occupied the Abbé Girod. The death of the Empress of Russia is, I believe, the principal cause of Lord Malmesbury's having been dismissed in so hasty and indecent a manner.

"The Prince of Carency is the author of the articles that have lately appeared against England in the *Journal Général* and the *Journal des Hommes Libres*. The Abbé B. informs me, in justification of the momentary confidence he had given him, that that young man had been entrusted by his father with the whole secret of the negotiation alluded to in my public dispatch No. 66.

"Montgaillard is here after having had a violent quarrel with M. d'Entraigues.

"We are all going wrong again in this country. The French faction has again taken the lead, and has commenced its operations by a most scandalous and indecent act of partiality. Colonel Grose, the Commandant of the contingent of this canton at Basle, has been recalled because he paid a visit to the Prince of Orange (who came there with Prince Frederick in the month of October last) with his orange cockade in his hat. Your Lordship will observe that M. Grose has passed his life in the Dutch service, and that he was appointed to the command of the contingent subsequent to the fact complained of.

658. 1557. 3978. 1220. 2176. 865. 315.

"As Lord Wycombe is on his way home, I send enclosed a note of one of his conversations."

1551. 1701. 2944. 2948. 1478. 2963. 566. 2817. 410.  
1339. 1701. 1255.

"The measures alluded to in your Lordship's late despatches will oblige me to draw for a large sum immediately, probably ten thousand pounds."

*Enclosed* is a note in French of remarks of a very general character on the war between Great Britain and France.

#### COUNT WOROUZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 9, Richmond.—"Connaissant mes sentiments, vous pouvez concevoir combien je suis douloureusement affecté des dépêches que nous a apporté votre dernier courier de Petersbourg. La seule consolation que j'ai reçue est l'assurance positive que me donnent mes amis qui sont bien informés que l'Empereur n'est pas pour la Cour de Berlin en fait de politique, et qu'admirateur de l'ordre et de la discipline de l'armée Prussienne qu'il veut imiter, il n'est nullement Prussien pour le reste, et qu'il est très décidé à contenir Frédéric Guillaume, s'il s'avise d'inquiéter l'Autriche. Attaché comme je suis à ce pays-ci, je crois de mon devoir de vous faire observer, que si vous voulez avoir une escadre Russe pour le printemps prochain, il faut vous presser sans perdre de tems, et envoyer des ordres au Chevalier Whitworth pour qu'il presse chez nous l'arrangement de cette expédition, pour que les ordres soient donnés avant le départ de la Cour pour Moscow, ce qui aura lieu au mois de Mars. Si la chose n'est pas arrangée avant, il y aura des lenteurs interminables, car Moscow est à 500 miles d'Angleterre de Petersbourg, et de Cronstadt où sont l'administration et le dépôt de notre marine.

"Pour l'amour de Dieu ne perdez pas de tems. Ce n'est pas que je crois qu'une escadre de notre faible marine d'un très grand secours pour vous; mais il faut avoir égard à l'opinion qui dans toutes les affaires, et surtout en politique, gouverne le monde. L'union du pavillon Russe avec celui de la Grande Bretagne aurait une grande

influence sur l'opinion générale en Europe. Et cela servira toujours de maintenir l'union des deux pays. Ceux qui se tiennent par la main sont plus prêt de l'embrasser que ceux qui se tiennent éloignés l'un de l'autre. Notre escadre unies avec les vôtres prouvera par le fait les mensonges que le Prusse ne cesse de débiter à Paris. Je ne doute nullement que vous ne sentiez tout ceci beaucoup mieux que moi, et je me flatte que vous vous presserez d'envoyer un exprès à cet effet au M. Whitworth."

*French.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 10, Windsor.—"As Lord Grenville has no particular business to call him to town this day, I perfectly consent to his remaining at Dropmore; he is so thoroughly worked by business in general, that it is but just he should have some relaxation when it fairly occurs.

"I am happy at finding the letters from Ireland show that, so late as Thursday, great probability subsisted that the French fleet could not yet be far off, consequently that Lord Bridport may give a good account [of] it; he may have been by Friday morning off that coast."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 11, Windsor.—"In the box which contains this, I received letters from Lord Grenville and from Mr. Pitt, but as they both relate to the same business I shall only answer that from Lord Grenville, and desire it may be looked upon as an answer to both.

"I perfectly coincide in the opinion that, in the present state of things, private negotiations are preferable to public ones, and that Lord Grenville shall instruct Monsieur de Luc now at Hanover (by sending the letter under cover to Monsieur de Steinberg my privy counsellor) to return to Brunswick and persuade the dispatching General Stamford instantly to Berlin, and authorising him to offer such sum as Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt may think right to the King of Prussia in case France shall involve him into a fresh war by his defending the north of Germany.

"I approve of the idea of getting Prince Frederick of Orange to return to Vienna; the avowed reason may be the concerns of his family; I wish therefore Lord Grenville would sound him through Baron Nagell as to his willingness if pressed by me to return to Vienna. He certainly should go by Berlin, from whence he may be also employed on the present occasion; and a communication through Sir Charles Whitworth to Russia will certainly do all the good that can be effected there."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 13, Windsor.—"The box I have just received from Lord Grenville contains the private letters from Wurtemberg brought by Count Warkvill for me and the Queen. I authorize Lord Grenville to bring him on Wednesday to St. James's; I shall order the mourning for Sunday the 21st, by which means the Court will be the next week in colours."

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WICKHAM.

1797, January 13, London.—"Although it is not improbable that Mr. Talbot may reach you before this letter, I take the chance of

mentioning to you that the present state of the Foreign Office making Mr. Flint's presence there absolutely necessary, Mr Talbot will immediately be sent to replace him. He will have the character of Secretary of Legation, and I have every reason to hope that you will be satisfied with his talents, discretion, and industry. You will have the goodness to mention this to Mr. Flint, who I trust has continued to deserve the satisfactory manner in which you have spoken of him in your letter."

*Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 19, Stowe.—"You are very good to remember me on a subject and in a moment so interesting to us all. If Lord B[ridport] has good fortune with the unaccounted-for divisions of the French fleet, the consequences are uncalculable; particularly when coupled with all that is known to exist in France, and with the actual state of the politics of Italy, which I hope are now safe; for the capture of Mantua seems wholly out of the question, and the retreat of the French seems *almost* as certain. I wish Kehl was taken; for I fear least the Arch-Duke's illness or possible death may turn the tide once more in that quarter. I never yet have been so sanguine as I am in the present moment; for Talbot's information has confirmed the very interesting intelligence of which I have seen part; and of which the whole has been long since shown to Mr. Pitt or to you; and from which I expect so much."

— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 26, Dresden.—"Just before I left Vienna I was told by a person of good understanding, who has tolerable means of information, that the Emperor is hurt at his brother's high reputation. In short, is struck deep with jealous envy, and that as soon as the fate of Kehl should be decided, Prince Charles, having made the needful arrangements, would come to Vienna, from whence, said my informant, he will never return to the army. I hope this may be a mistake, for he is adored by the soldiery who think themselves invincible under his command; and that idea goes, as your Lordship well knows, a great way towards making them so. Moreover I have learnt from an old and discerning friend whom I met with at Vienna, and who spoke from personal knowledge, that the Prince is really a man of talents, to whom nothing but experience was wanting to make an able commander. I think it a great pity that the courts of Berlin and Vienna cannot be brought together in the present crisis. The feelings of the latter are very poignant, and Sir Morton seems fully to share them; but policy is, we know, a creature void of passions. I have but a moment to acknowledge the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 22nd of August, which should have reached me at Berlin; but I had unfortunately left that city before Mr. Hammond arrived. Mr. Elliot gave it to me two days ago. I have some reason to believe that you may yet bring the Prussian Cabinet to hear reason."

W. WINDHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, January 31, Park Street.—"I enclose a letter, which Hippisley has chose to convey through me. The object is certainly one that I wish well to, as to everything that may contribute to save Italy and



encourage the noble spirit that has shown itself in some of the states of that country. I cannot rejoice for my own part that our troops have not been able to quit Elba, and suspect that they may be of more consequence there, than they will at present in Portugal.

"What is meant to be done respecting the offer made from Malta? The total abandonment of the Mediterranean has always seemed to me the most desperate of all measures.

"With respect to furnishing to the Pope any part of our troops, I am afraid it must be considered as rather an idle fancy. But it will be a great pity if, when the Pope thinks that resistance is practicable, at least for a certain time, he should be incapable of it for want of arms, or that exertions for supplying him should not be made from here. Arms sufficiently good for his purpose may certainly be obtained from the country.

"As I am enclosing suggestions, let me add one which I likewise think not undeserving of consideration, and which may certainly in the end, should we be in a state to adopt it, lead to consequences the most important. One would certainly be disposed to do whatever our finances would admit to help the Swiss into a quarrel."

#### *Enclosure.*

"Quoiqu'il ne puisse plus être question dans ce moment d'un subside tel qu'on aurait été en état de donner aux Suisses en 1792 et 1793, pour les décider à faire cause commune avec les Puissances Alliés, ce à quoi il eut été facile alors de réussir, cependant il ne faut pas se dissimuler que la grande difficulté qui se présentera dans chaque canton où les provocations de la France deviendront même les plus sensibles, sera, comme ci-devant, l'impossibilité de fournir, au-delà d'un temps très limité, aux besoins et aux dépenses d'entretien de l'armée de milices qui serait nécessaire pour couvrir une étendue de frontières aussi considérable que celle de Genève à Basle.

"Et néanmoins la levée de ces milices, et l'attitude guerrière qui prendrait par là la Suisse sont de la plus grande importance au Gouvernement Britannique, soit parceque cela obligerait les Français à tenir sur les mêmes frontières un corps tout au moins d'observation, qui diminuerait d'autant la force de leurs troupes dirigées contre l'Empereur, soit parceque, d'un instant à l'autre, et suivant les circonstances, cela amènerait une rupture ouverte, et forcerait les Suisses à devenir, au fin de compte, les auxiliaires très actifs de l'Empereur. Il est donc à considérer si une offre d'aide et secours pécuniaires, relatifs seulement à l'entretien des milices excédantes qu'il s'agirait de mettre sur pied, et qui ne sont point à comparer avec des levées et équipements de régiments tels que ceux qui passent de Suisse au service étranger, ne serait pas en même temps et une mesure politique sage, et une véritable économie.

"Risquerait-on beaucoup à sonder le terrain à cet égard, surtout s'il s'en présente une occasion favorable par la suite des défiances et de l'irritation que le ton hautain et chicanier de la France peut augmenter rapidement dans les cantons les plus influens; mais afin que la chose fût absolument cachée au Gouvernement Français, et n'excitât pas les clameurs de ses partisans et amis en diverses parties de la Suisse, il conviendrait essentiellement qu'elle ne se traitât qu'avec les chefs du canton de Berne, en sorte que ceux-ci puissent déterminer leurs Conseils à accorder pour un temps illimité aux cantons pauvres le secours dont ils auraient besoin relativement à leurs milices tant qu'ils seraient sur pied, avec la certitude d'être remboursés ici de la majeure

partie de ces secours, jusqu'à un *quantum* qui serait à-peu-près fixé, et de la manière que, vis-à-vis des autres cantons, l'avance à long terme, soit le prêt à très bas intérêt, (et plutôt ainsi stipulé pour la forme) parut émaner uniquement du trésor de leurs Excellences de Berne.

"Cela serait fort aisé à régler si cette affaire, quant à tous ses détails, était traité ici où Leurs Excellences de Berne ont des fonds très considérables, dont les dividendes sont perçus par la maison Vanneck ; et, au moyen d'arrangements secrets et néanmoins solides, on leur bonifierait sans que rien parut au dehors ce qu'elles avanceraient soit autres cantons, soit (en parti) à leurs propres levées, somme dont le total ne serait nullement majeur pour les finances de l'Angleterre, et pourrait cependant par son emploi produire un résultat très majeur dans la tournure des affaires à la campagne prochaine."

*French.*

#### EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, February 3, Bath.—"I had already received from Admiral Barrington a note upon the subject you mention, and had communicated it to my friends at the Board for their consideration. The position he mentions in it (though I have not any maps to refer to here) must, I should suppose, be only tenable when the wind is easterly ; but, as such, may very probably be an advantageous one for watching Dunkirk. It is not however correctly stated, when it is called Dunkirk harbour, where, I assume, no ships could anchor out of reach of their guns ; but the spot meant usually goes under the name of Gravelines pits, and lies between Dunkirk and Calais. In a westerly wind I should think this must be dangerous, and would be ineffectual into the bargain, as they may always go out of Dunkirk eastward when the wind is not east. If the road is sheltered, I should suppose it must answer very well.

"I have a note unanswered of yours about Cadiz. If the present state of the force at Brest would admit of our so much weakening the channel fleet, and if we were more certain than we are of the arrival of our troops from Elba, the idea, though a very dashing one, might perhaps do ; but under impressions which I cannot help feeling of the great probability of some other desperate attempt from Brest, and in the actual state of our channel fleet which has been unavoidably very much battered by their late ineffectual cruise, and which will barely be ready again as soon as it is possible the French may have another fleet at sea, I own I cannot advise the measure.

"I send you to-day by Mr. Taylor the box containing Wickham's letters. It seems very difficult to form any judgment from them, as, no doubt, even if his intelligence was more clear and decided than it is, much alteration must since have taken place in their plans."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, February 4, Downing Street.—"Les nouvelles d'Italie que nous venons de recevoir par Paris sont affreuses. Elles paraissent, malheureusement, de toute vérité, puisqu'elles sont conséquentes au plan de M. d'Alvinzi. Je ne doute pas que le Directoire n'envoie immédiatement des nouvelles propositions de paix à Vienne ; il les fera même d'un avantage apparent pour essayer de nous séparer de vous. Comme j'aime à juger ma Cour d'après mon cœur, et d'après l'exemple du passé, je me flatte qu'on restera toujours inébranlable. Mais, en même temps, je ne puis me défendre d'une sorte de crainte. Songez qu'il n'y a que l'Empereur et M. de Thugut qui soient dans le bon

système. Ils vont être plus assaillis que jamais par les fauteurs d'une paix déshonorante. Je ne doute pas qu'on ne persévère; mais on peut tout appréhender dans ce monde.

"La vertu la plus sévère succombe quelque fois, je frémis à l'idée de la seule possibilité de séparer nos intérêts des vôtres. Vous savez combien je suis Anglais, parceque je suis véritable Autrichien, ou plutôt parceque je suis un homme honnête, attaché au sort de l'Europe et au maintien des monarchies.

"Il serait, je crois, bien important que vous envoyassiez aussi promptement que possible un courier à Vienne pour y rassurer, et encourager, en appuyant cet envoi de motifs déterminans. Si même cette mesure était inutile comme je l'espère, elle ne peut rien gêner, et ne doit que vous ranimer. Pardonnez ces réflexions, qui sont dans notre confiance. Elles doivent vous prouver mon attachement. On craint toujours quand on aime bien. Il est souvent si aisé, en s'y prenant à temps, de prévenir les plus grands malheurs."

*French.*

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, February 6, London.—Quoique le courier que j'attends de Vienne, et qui doit me rapporter les instructions nécessaires à l'égard de la convention qui concerne vos avances mensuelles, ne soit point encore arrivé, je me fais un vrai plaisir d'avoir l'honneur de vous annoncer que j'ai appris, par une voie sûre non-officielle, qu'on a accueilli vos dernières propositions avec l'amitié reconnaissante qu'elles méritaient. Cette information me rassure un peu sur le fâcheux effet que pourra produire la mauvaise nouvelle de la défaite d'Alvinzy. J'ai de nouveau la certitude que les Français veulent faire des offres avantageux à ma Cour pour la détacher de l'Angleterre. J'aime à croire à la bonne foi; et la conduite constante de mon maître me raffermir dans cet heureux sentiment. Mais je plains l'Empereur et son ministre; ils auront des rudes attaques à soutenir. Il s'agira, je crois, de défendre seulement le Tyrol, et de porter des plus grandes forces encore vers le Rhin. N'y aurait-il pas moyen pour nous fournir la possibilité de détacher beaucoup de troupes de l'Italie, de forcer le Roi de Naples à rentrer en jeu? Il a une armée assez considérable prête à marcher. Je ne voudrais pas qu'il vous en coutât beaucoup plus que des menaces; mais l'Amiral Jarvis venant près de Naples, comme fit Truguet au commencement de la guerre, pourrait bien produire le même effet. Ceci est peut-être un songe creux; pardonnez-le à mon zèle.

"Vous pourriez, en outre, nous prouver d'une manière bien digne de vous dans ce moment combien vous vous occupez de nos intérêts. Il était convenu entre nous que vous nous payeriez les 300,000 livres du mois de Janvier immédiatement. Cet argent a été mis à notre disposition; mais vous vous appellerez en même temps, qu'en nous promettant de nous faire encore au mois de Février une avance semblable, vous vouliez attendre notre réponse pour mettre cette somme à notre disposition. Cette réponse ne peut plus tarder, et sera conforme à vos désirs. Ainsi si vous m'autorisiez à mander par votre courier que nous pouvons, dès à présent, tirer ces 300,000 livres, ce procédé, rempli de grace de votre part, serait apprécié comme il doit l'être dans la circonstance, et vous ne courrez aucun risque. Je me flatte que vous m'applaudirez vous-même d'avoir suggéré cette idée à votre désir constant de nous être utile, si votre bon esprit ne m'avait pas déjà prévenu."

*French.*

SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797. February 23, St. Petersburg.—“In about ten or twelve days, we shall, I presume, be on the road to Moscow. It is supposed that His Imperial Majesty will, immediately after the ceremony of the coronation, proceed further into the interior of his dominions, and, in that case, it is possible that he may do me the honour to invite me to accompany him. I therefore request His Majesty’s eventual permission so to do ; but I do not scruple to confess to your Lordship that, although it would be highly flattering, yet I am no wise ambitious of such a distinction ; His Imperial Majesty being of that sort of character with which it is easier to live at a little distance than too near.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1797, March 2, Downing Street.—“You will see by the tenor of my despatches of this night that we are full of distrust as to the sincerity of all the professions made to you. In truth if they were sincere, why were not the proposals and offers made distinctly and plainly from *them* whose intentions we have so much reason to distrust, and why is so much stress laid on instructions and powers to be had from *us*, all whose wishes, views, and means are notorious to them and to all Europe? What more can *we* say than we have said, and said publicly? and what necessity would there be for wrapping up *their* good intentions, if good they are, in mystery, dissimulation, and reserve? Still we do not wish to discourage whatever tendency there may be, however remote, to a system conformable to our interests and to those of Europe. But all possible care must be taken not to lose Austrian realities in pursuing Prussian expectations, and such would, I fear, be the event of any new overtures to be made from hence to Prussia till after the fullest communication with Vienna.

“All these speculations seem to set very much at a distance the object of your application contained in your private letter; nor would it be possible for me to say anything upon the subject of that application without much more consideration, and a nearer view of the circumstances that may exist.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1797, March 3, Cleveland Row.—“I have only time just to add to these despatches that Count Starhemberg has no knowledge of my sending on this messenger to Vienna, because I thought it might be more agreeable to M. Thugut that the subject now in question should not be previously known to him.

“I cannot say I have much hopes in this scheme of Prussian co-operation, and yet, if M. Thugut could be brought to look at it deliberately, I think that even from the opening such a discussion at Berlin much good must arise; although, possibly, the ultimate object, that of co-operation, may not be obtained. It is very material to observe that the basis of this plan is the scheme of peace already offered by the allies; and, therefore, that all the former objections of making confidences to Prussia which might be betrayed from Berlin to Paris, are, in this case, totally inexplicable.

"If this idea does not produce something, we may be under the absolute necessity of having recourse to Russia, and that very soon. I wish, therefore, that you would converse with M. Thugut on that subject that we may know his general notions, and that he may not be wholly unprepared to hear from us upon it. You will at once perceive how urgent this would be if our difficulties of finance should shut our purse to Austria, which, though I still allow myself to hope will not happen, I am sure no man can answer for."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 8, Queen's House.—"In one of the two boxes I received this morning from Lord Grenville's Office there was a letter to him from Baron Rieger desiring to have the Princess Royal's picture, if ready, that he might send it tomorrow by a messenger to the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg at Hamburg. I therefore send the snuff-box I have had prepared on the occasion with my daughter's picture, which I desire Lord Grenville will send to that Prince with a suitable compliment. I have since seen the Duke of Gloucester, who came to communicate to me a conversation he has had with M. de Whymphen, who is the real confidant of the Prince, who again presses for leave to come over; he has also heard from the grand intriguer *Hipsley* [Hippesley] who says the Prince must be at Stutgard in May. I therefore desired the Duke of Gloucester to say any directions I should send would be through the channel of Lord Grenville, as I think, if the Duke of Gloucester had written as strongly as he promised, this fresh application would not be made. I desire therefore that, though Lord Grenville may send the box through the channel of Baron Rieger, that he will separately converse with Monsieur de Whymphen, and show him the impossibility of my agreeing to the Prince's coming here till the treaty of marriage has been drawn up and ratified, and the other arrangements for the wedding settled; that if the Prince is obliged to go to Stutgard in May, he had best do so, as it [is] impossible the whole can be arranged so soon. I think Whymphen had best return to Hamburgh and explain the business to the Prince.

"I have sent to Hanover for some information as to the affairs of the Duke as well as Duchy of Wurtemberg, which I must have before I can give any directions to Lord Grenville with regard to the treaty of marriage; and indeed the perplexed state of Germany requires my not being over expeditious in transacting this business."

"By the *précis* of the treaty of marriage of the present Duchess of Brunswick, it was, by the first article, regulated that the marriage should be solemnized in England; a similar article for that of the Princess Royal with the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg.

2nd Article. "The portion to be eighty thousand pounds.

3rd Article. "As the Hereditary Prince has children by his first marriage, it seems natural that no distinction should be made as to the future children of this marriage, but those of each sex to share equally.

4th. "The children to live and be brought up in the Duchy of Wurtemberg; but not to marry without the consent of the king or his successors, agreeable to the present act for marriages of the royal family.

5th. "In case the Princess should die without children, half her portion to remain with the Court of Wurtemberg, and the other half to be disposable by her; and that, if she leaves no disposition, to return to

the king. But the survivor of her or the Prince to receive the whole interest during their lives.

6th. "One-half at least of the fortune to be placed in the English funds; perhaps it might be better to have the whole placed there till the troubles of Germany are totally quieted; and then, if it be thought that the one moiety be placed on mortgage in lands or other revenues belonging to the House of Wurtemberg, that not to be without the consent of the king.

6th [7th]. "The Princess to have a pension on the Irish establishment of £5,000 *per annum* during her life for her sole use; but with no power to alienate or mortgage it.

"I do not mean to add any pension as Elector; that was peculiar to the case of the Duchess of Brunswick, as it had been intended she should live in my Electorate.

"A German treaty must also be made with me as Elector, wherein the usual German portion will be fixed, and the jointure that is to be settled on my daughter."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 9, London.—"J'ai été bien fâché d'apprendre que vous êtes incommodé; j'espère que cela n'aura aucune espèce de suite. Vous connaissez mon tendre et véritable attachement à votre personne.

"Je serai obligé de vous prier de vouloir bien me dédommager incessamment de la conférence d'aujourd'hui. J'ai une occasion sûre et prompte pour Vienne Lundi prochain, et je ne puis, en vérité, pas me dispenser d'écrire à ma Cour au sujet de nos affaires. Quelques soient les raisons (dont je reconnais l'importance et la validité) qui vous forcent à nous tenir encore en suspens, l'incertitude n'en est pas moins cruelle pour nous; et j'ai toujours peur que nous ne puissions pas avoir de quoi subvenir à une aussi longue attente. Il y a plus de 10 jours que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de me parler, et je n'ai plus eu rien de vous depuis ce moment. Songez donc, de grace, que les instans sont des siècles dans notre position, et que des délais plus prolongés pourraient avoir les suites les plus fâcheuses. Vous les appréciez sûrement aussi bien que moi; mais il est de mon devoir de vous les représenter pour n'avoir pas à me reprocher un jour comme ministre de l'Empereur, et comme la personne la plus attachée au Gouvernement Anglais et à Milord Grenville, de ne vous avoir pas prévenu à temps, et à plusieurs reprises, des malheureuses conséquences que l'embarras dans lequel vous nous laissez pourrait amener. Si donc vous ne pouvez pas encore rien prononcer de décisif, daignez au moins m'entretenir du plus ou du moins d'espérance que vous conservez; nous méritons certainement d'être prévenue à temps. Il me paraît impossible que vous ne préjugiez pas déjà dans votre sagesse du succès ou de la non-réussite de la mesure sérieuse que vous avez adopté, sans doute, dans la vue d'aider vos alliés. Croyez que les informations dont votre dernier courrier était le porteur, n'auront pas manqué d'affecter comme elles le devaient des amis dont la constance inébranlable n'hésite jamais quand il est question de vous prouver leur loyauté et leur fidélité. Tous les préparatifs immenses pour la campagne prochaine sont, sans doute, déjà faits à compte des remises sur lesquelles nous avons le droit de compter d'après vos dernières assurances; mais quelque cruel que serait un refus que nous sommes bien loin d'attendre, et qui étonnerait au delà de toute expression, la prolongation de la situation critique dans laquelle nous sommes,

et qui nous fait subir journellement toutes les anxiétés du doute, est bien plus fâcheuse encore, puisqu'elle paralise tous les projets et toutes les déterminations, tandis que l'ennemi commun redouble d'activité. Mettez-moi donc, je vous prie, dans le cas de pouvoir annoncer confidentiellement à mon chef, ou que vous entrevoyez la possibilité prochaine de contracter les engagements que vous paraissiez vous-même empressé de conclure il y a très peu de temps, ou que vous craignez que les expédiens que votre zèle et bonne volonté en notre faveur vous avaient suggéré, ne soient pas suffisans pour remplir le but proposé.

"Je ne puis m'empêcher encore de vous demander une réponse à la lettre officielle que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire, d'après l'ordre réitéré de ma Cour, au sujet de la flotille à établir dans l'Adriatique. Nous avons trop d'intérêt à cet objet pour n'être pas très pressé de connaître vos intentions."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, March 9, Cleveland Row.—"Je viens de recevoir votre lettre laquelle je ne sais si je dois regarder comme officielle. Si cela est, il faut y répondre ; et ce sera avec les sentimens que vous me connaissez, et que les embarras des affaires n'altéreront jamais, en tout ce qui regarde l'union de nos deux Cours.

"Cependant (soit dit dans notre amitié et confiance) je vous avais cru trop raisonnable pour insister sur une réponse que vous êtes bien à portée de voir que nous ne pouvons encore vous donner. Vous ne croyez pas, sans doute, que cet état d'incertitude soit pour nous un lit de roses. Voilà cependant ce que l'on pourrait inférer de tous vos raisonnemens, que vous employez avec tant d'éloquence pour persuader à un malade de vouloir bien guérir.

"J'espère que tout ira bien, mais je suis bien loin de vous le dire officiellement ; et, si le contraire arrive, vous n'aurez pas à vous reprocher d'avoir compromis votre ami par des instances si peu nécessaires." *Copy.*

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 10, London.—"Il suffit que vous jugiez à propos de communiquer mes réflexions à Monsieur Pitt pour que je n'y trouve aucune difficulté. Je sais trop apprécier son bon esprit, et j'ai trop de confiance dans son caractère, pour avoir la moindre inquiétude en lui communiquant ma façon personnelle de voir les objets dans la circonstance critique où nous nous trouvons. N'oubliez jamais, l'un et l'autre, que ce papier est peut-être entièrement différent du langage officiel que je devrais tenir, et vraisemblablement très éloigné de la manière dont les meneurs envisagent les objets chez nous ; et daignez ne le considérer que comme le résultat des observations de quelqu'un dont vous connaissez depuis longtemps l'amitié et les principes, qui gémît sur le passé, songe au présent, et craint pour l'avenir."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, March 10, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to submit to your Majesty's consideration the draft of a dispatch to

Mr. Walpole at Lisbon, directing that minister to propose to the Portuguese Government to sound the dispositions of Spain respecting a separate peace.

"Lord Grenville does not flatter himself with much hope of the success of this measure; but he thinks it may be so conducted that the attempt can lead to no inconvenience, while it takes the chances, whatever they may be, of materially weakening the means of France for carrying on the war."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 11, Queen's House.--"I do not object to the proposed draft to Mr. Walpole, though I do not expect it will have the effect proposed of detaching Spain from France; yet, if the Court of Lisbon make the proposal with the delicacy that the step requires, should it not succeed my name ought not to be brought forward.

"I have received another box from Lord Grenville. I own I did not expect that with the candour I have acted, that the Prince of Wurtemberg would have so eagerly pressed; I must therefore take a little time to consider of my answer, which I will certainly send to-morrow to Lord Grenville."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 11, Queen's House.--"Lord Grenville knows me too well not to imagine that the strong pressing from M. de Wimffen in the name of the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg for leave to come to England gave me pain; and indeed it is not very encouraging for my daughter that she is going to enter into a family much divided; but as I ever wish that reason rather than temper should direct my conduct, I have delayed till now returning an answer on that subject to you.

"I think it absolutely necessary that the treaty of marriage should be drawn up and mutually agreed to before the Prince comes here. I have therefore drawn up, on the accompanying paper, the alterations I think necessary from the treaty of marriage of my sister the Duchess of Brunswick, which seems to suit the case of my daughter better than that of my aunt the late Princess of Orange; as those papers may not be immediately at hand I send the substance Lord Grenville had sent me, which I hope he will return when no more of use to him.

"I desire he will communicate the whole to Mr. Pitt before any step is taken, who, with the Lord Chancellor, will be the proper persons to be consulted on this occasion.

"When the treaty is ready, M. de Wimffen would return to Hamburg and, when the Prince accedes to it, the consent of the Duke must be obtained; that once done, the Prince may then come over according to his proposal, and, after being seen by my family only in private, and staying a few days, he must make a tour in the country till the time for the ceremony of the marriage, and all the arrangements necessary for it can have been prepared.

"Lord Grenville should intimate to Mr. Pitt that, considering the great arrears in my payments, I have desired the Queen that the jewels, cloths, and other things for my daughter may be done with as much economy as decency will permit. I shall take care that he shall hereafter have the account, that it may be paid."



## LORD GRENVILLE TO GEORGE III.

1797, March 21, Downing Street.—“In humble obedience to your Majesty’s commands, Lord Grenville has the honour to return your Majesty the two *précis* of the marriage articles of their Royal Highnesses the Princess of Orange and the Duchess of Brunswick, together with the *projet* of the treaty with the Duke of Wurtemberg, and the French translation of it, which Lord Grenville has this day communicated to Baron Reiger, and which the latter has promised to send immediately to Stutgard.

¶ “Lord Grenville has also seen M. de Wimffen, and has apprized him of your Majesty’s intentions respecting the arrival of the Hereditary Prince, which M. de Wimffen promised immediately to communicate to his Serene Highness.”

*Copy.*

## M. DUTHEIL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 27, London.—“Dans la note que M. Dutheil a eu l’honneur d’envoyer à Milord Grenville, et qui contient des observations sur l’insuffisance des fonds accordés à l’armée de Normandie, M. Dutheil n’a pas cru devoir se permettre de rappeler à Milord Grenville dans cette note qui peut être communiquée, que c’est à cette armée où Monsieur a la projet de se rendre très incessamment. Cette détermination de Monsieur est un des motifs qui engage M. Dutheil à envoyer en Normandie l’agent du Roi actuellement à Londres, afin de faire concourir les moyens civils avec l’organisation militaire à la plus prompte arrivée de Monsieur en France. M. Dutheil ayant eu ordre de ne communiquer le projet de Monsieur qu’à Milord Grenville seulement, il lui devient impossible de faire connaître à aucun autre membre du Conseil de Sa Majesté Britannique ce projet, et de le présenter comme moyen pour obtenir non seulement les mille livres promises par mois pour cette armée, mais encore ce qui peut être nécessaire au delà de cette somme pour que l’armée de Normandie puisse, vers la fin du mois dernier, recevoir Monsieur. Les agents qui étaient pénétrés de l’importance de l’arrivée de Monsieur en Normandie, avaient promis de donner sur la somme qui leur avait été accordée par le Ministère Britannique, tout ce qu’il aurait pu être possible d’économiser sur cette somme. M. Dutheil a l’honneur de demander la permission à Milord Grenville d’avoir celui de lui observer que, quoique Monsieur n’ait point fait l’honneur d’écrire à M. Dutheil rien qui puisse lui faire présumer que Monsieur ait eu l’intention de diminuer en aucune manière le nombre des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique aux quels Milord Grenville croira devoir confier le projet de Monsieur, cependant M. Dutheil croit pouvoir assurer que Monsieur a pensé que peut-être son Excellence jugerait à propos de borner, quant à présent, cette confiance à M. Pitt seulement. M. Dutheil ajoutera encore à cette observation que Monsieur, croyant que le succès de son projet est attaché au secret profond dont il sera couvert, n’a cru devoir jusqu’à ce moment confier ce projet qu’à M. Dutheil seul.”

*French.*

## THE ROYALIST WAR IN FRANCE.

*Memorandum of M. Dutheil.*

1797, March 29, London.—“Il résulte d’un entretien que M. Dutheil vient d’avoir avec le Comte de Frotté, relativement aux demandes

d'argent faites par le général, et qui se trouvent dans une note jointe au contrôle des officiers de son armée que le Comte de Frotté a expliqué à M. Dutheil, qui effectivement a vérifié avec lui que les demandes que contient cette note ne doivent être considérées que sous le rapport d'une armée à lever, et pour laquelle on aurait à payer, non seulement tout ce qui concerne l'habillement, l'équipement, mais encore des prix d'engagement à chaque individu. Le Comte de Frotté ayant fait cette note à la fin du mois d'Octobre, reconnaît qu'elle ne peut plus s'appliquer à l'ordre de choses qui existe en ce moment, d'après lequel rien n'est plus facile que de recruter parmi tous les gens de la réquisition qui ont quitté les armées pour rentrer dans leurs foyers. Aussi, le Comte de Frotté dans les instructions qu'il a données à ceux de ses officiers qui l'ont précédé, leur a-t-il spécialement recommandé de comprendre dans le contrôle de leurs divisions respectives, tous ces hommes de réquisition qui eux-mêmes ont fait offrir au Comte de Frotté de se réunir aussitôt qu'il jugera à propos de leur en donner l'ordre. Le Comte de Frotté recrutera encore son armée des troupes Républicains qui passeront collectivement sous les drapeaux du Roi ; mais pour celles-ci, il ne doit les solder qu'au moment où, par le mouvement général qui doit avoir lieu, il se trouvera dans le cas de pouvoir les faire agir. Jusqu'à cette époque, il doit se contenter d'entretenir les bonnes dispositions des chefs, et leur fournir quelques moyens qui puissent les mettre à portée de conserver sur les soldats qu'ils commandent, l'influence qu'ils se sont ménagés. Enfin, le Comte de Frotté, en considérant la note dont il s'agit comme étant sans objet, au moyen des changements survenus depuis l'instant où elle a été rédigée, reconnaît qu'il ne devra recevoir de fonds lorsqu'il sera question de mettre son armée en activité, que par les personnes qui doivent être chargées de la distribution générale ; excepté toutefois, les mille livres par mois qui lui ont été promises pour son organisation."

*French.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 29, Windsor.—"I wish Lord Grenville, previous to answering Baron Rieger on the Additional Article proposed by the latter, would see Baron Leathe and, as it is different from the treaty of marriage of my sister the Duchess of Brunswick, [consider] whether it ought not rather to be an article in the German treaty, where the jointure and German portion will be fixed, according to former precedents.

"I suppose it is out of stupidity, for certainly there has as yet not a word passed as to the particular time of the marriage ; the Prince has leave to come over, and, after being seen in private, to travel into the country till the notification has been made to Parliament, and the time fixed for the marriage. I think Lord Grenville, when he shall fix the mode of completing the treaty, must by letter remind the Baron of the mistake in his assertion."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 30, Queen's House.—"I return to Lord Grenville the important despatches received this morning from the Earl of Elgin, and highly approve his not having delayed to the usual hour the communicating them to me. I desire he will direct a copy of the Prussian agreement with France, as accompanying Lord Elgin's private letter, to be made for me."

## THE ROYALIST WAR IN FRANCE.

## MINUTE OF LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 30.—“I saw M. Dutheil and M. F., the latter being on the point of setting out for France. They were very urgent with me to explain to them what they could depend upon in the way of pecuniary assistance for keeping up the R[oyalist] party. They divided this question into two points.

“First, with respect to the payments that had been settled with M. D[uvergne], and secondly, with respect to future aid.

“I told them that, on both these points, we must be further informed before we could speak with certainty. That the engagements taken with M. D[uvergne] were provisional only, and extended no further than to the end of this month. The object stated by M. D[uvergne] had been the being enabled to keep together a party sufficient (particularly in point of military strength) to resist any attempt of the Directory to prevent the elections from taking place. That payments were to be made for that purpose for the three months of January, February and March; but that we had expressly reserved to ourselves the right of judging at the end of that period, according to the turn which affairs might then have taken, what further measures we should adopt. That, on the arrest of the agents at Paris, I had explained to M. Dutheil that we conceived the course of that plan must necessarily be thereby interrupted; and that it seemed doubtful whether the amount of monthly payments settled with M. D[uvergne] could now be beneficially employed for the same objects. That if, as was now stated to me, individuals at Paris had, on the faith of those payments, made advances on their own account to be employed for the same objects, we should certainly be desirous of freeing them from any personal embarrassment; but that I must, for that purpose, know the amount of any sums so advanced, and the general objects for which the money had been employed.

“The second point was one of still greater difficulty. I owed it to them and to myself to say that we had not the means of furnishing the assistance in money which I thought indispensably necessary to support any general rising. That I was therefore extremely reluctant to concur in advancing any sums which could have for their object the bringing on that which, if it depended for success on our support, must fail, and involve in it the ruin of all those engaged in it.

“They both gave me, upon this, the strongest and most explicit assurances that they perfectly understood this explanation; that they had the express orders of the king to discourage any partial insurrection; and that nothing would be done except under the direction of the central agency at Paris, who would act only when they saw a plan which contained in it the means of supporting itself. But that, even with that view, it would be necessary that some funds should be left at the disposal of that agency, in order that they might be enabled to maintain their correspondencies, and keep up the favourable dispositions in the different parts of France.

“It was at last agreed that M. F. should go to Paris in order to judge there of the plan to be adopted in future, which must in great degree depend on the result of the elections. And that he would transmit here a statement of the situation of things such as he might find them, of the measures proposed to be pursued, and of the expense which they might require, in order that the British Government might form its judgment on these grounds.

"The same day I saw M. Frotté with the Duke de Harcourt, and held to them the same language; requiring that M. Frotté should distinctly explain to those with whom he had communication in Normandy the grounds on which they stood in this respect; and this I repeated to M. Frotté when I saw him again two or three days after, previous to his leaving England."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, March 30, Dropmore.—"Je suis bien mortifié d'avoir quitté le bureau hier peu de temps avant que vous y êtes venu. Je retourne Lundi; et Mardi matin à onze heures, je serais bien aise de vous recevoir, si cela vous convient. Lord Elgin m'envoie la copie de la *Convention Secrete*. Je vous la transmet ci-jointe, et quand vous en aurez pris lecture, je vous prie de l'envoyer au Comte Starhemberg pour son information, avec prière de la renvoyer au bureau. Elle est vraiment curieuse, et bien fait pour donner des sujets de penser à tout le monde.

"Lord Elgin ne m'envoie pas la copie des instructions données à M. de Kalitcheff, mais seulement une espèce de sommaire qu'il en a fait d'après la lecture que M. de Kalitcheff l'a permis d'en prendre.

"L'Empereur s'excuse de répondre à la lettre du Roi. Les instructions entrent assez en détail sur tous les points contenus dans cette lettre, et dans un mémoire justificatif qui y était joint. On dévoile d'une manière claire et énergique la mauvaise foi des Prussiens en la qualifiant d'*astuce qui a surpris la religion du Monarque*. On confond les mauvaises prétextes allégués par M. de Haugwitz, et l'on ajoute enfin que les plans proposés par le Roi de Prusse sont en contradiction directe avec toutes les vues de l'Empereur, et tout désir de les seconder. Et l'on exige, comme la première preuve d'un pareil désir, que la Cour de Berlin se désiste de toute mesure attentatoire à l'intégrité de l'Allemagne, en ajoutant que c'est à ce prix seul que la bonne intelligence avec la Russie peut être établie. Enfin M. de Kalitcheff a l'ordre de déclarer formellement *la vive et juste apprehension de l'Empereur de voir tout autre résultat des mesures adoptées par la Prusse que celui d'opérer la rétablissement du calme et de l'équilibre, et la résolution de Sa Majesté Russe de diriger tous ses efforts à ce but salutaire*.

"Je ne sais si vous pourrez lire ce barbouillage, mais voilà le résumé (et même les paroles expresses) de ce que Lord Elgin me mande. Il serait fort à désirer que ces communications fussent encore suivies de déclarations capables à contenir la mauvaise volonté de ceux qui ont ourdi cette trame si perfide et si inique."

*French. Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, March 31, Downing Street.—"Hier sa Majesté le Roi me fit l'honneur de me dire *in extenso* la réponse de mon souverain au Roi de Prusse, mais, comme sa Majesté parle ordinairement fort bas, et que par malheur j'avais à mes côtés Spinola, Elle me parla encore plus doucement que de coutume, de manière que je n'ai presque pu rien retenir.

"J'étais venu ici pour vous supplier de me communiquer la dépêche de my lord Elgin, de qui on a les détails de cette réponse; et comme vous êtes déjà parti, je vous supplie de me faire la faveure de me communiquer les détails de cette réponse intéressante."

*French.*

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1897, March—April, London.]—"Ces dernières nouvelles d'Italie me déplaisent beaucoup. Je ne conçois pas cette terrible reculade sans se battre, et cet oubli des pauvres bataillons. Une autre chose tout aussi inconcevable est que l'ennemi n'ait pas profité de cet avantage avec son activité ordinaire. Je crains, de vous à moi, que ceci ne soit un jeu préparé et convenu par le guerrier pacificateur, pour venir à bout de convaincre son auguste frère, dont le caractère est aussi ferme que le sien l'est peu, de la nécessité de la paix. Je crains, en outre, que les premières nouvelles peu consolantes d'ici, qui seront arrivées presque en même temps, n'achevent de tout gâter. Je serais inconsolable de voir notre conduite héroïque se terminer par une lâcheté. Cela me tourmente au-delà de toute expression. En attendant, j'ai pensé qu'il serait peut-être à propos que vous fissiez aller par Vienne le courrier qui va ce soir à Petersbourg. Il pourrait y porter en passant des paroles de consolation et d'encouragement, et annoncer la signature très prochaine de notre arrangement. Cette attention ferait un merveilleux effet sur les braves gens qu'on veut rendre poltrons, et qui ne seront jamais perfides.

"Ne pourriez-vous pas aussi, pour perdre le moins de temps que possible, commencer dès aujourd'hui le plan politique dont nous parlions dernièrement, et jeter les fondemens de la pacifications que vous feriez agréer par la Russie. Il est bien essentiel de prévenir à temps l'étendue gangreneuse des perfides Prussiennes, et de se presser d'entrer en négociation avant que la faiblesse qui paralise les plus grands talens n'ait procuré des nouveaux avantages à un ennemi insolent, qui saura se prévaloir de tout.

"Vous connaissez l'esprit dans lequel je vous offre ces réflexions. Je les soumets à la supériorité de vos lumières et les répand dans le sein de l'amitié. Je passerai vers une heure au bureau ; si vous voulez me voir un instant vous me rendrez heureux. Je serai bien aussi d'écrire au Count de Cobentzel, d'une manière conforme à vos désirs. Il me semble que, dans la crise actuelle, tous les bien-intentionnés doivent s'entendre, et concourir au même but en tenant le même langage."

*French.*

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, March—April, London.]—"Je reçois votre billet qui est bien aimable pour moi, et je tâcherai en conséquence d'arriver à la conférence un peu avant mes collègues, afin de vous entretenir quelques minutes de plus que les autres. Comme vous expédiez un courrier Mardi, je me dispenserai de l'envoi du mien Vendredi, à moins que vous ne le jugiez nécessaire vous-même. Il me semble qu'il vaut autant ne pas les tenir en suspens à Vienne, et leur prononcer leur arrêt définitif tout d'un coup. J'espère comme vous que l'on tiendra bon chez nous, mais je ne suis pas sans crainte. Je rougis de voir de mes proches, et des gens que je suis obligé de respecter, se conduire d'une manière si lâche et si peu honorable."

*Postscript.*—"Vous savez sans doute que le Prince de Waldeck est arrivé."

*French.*

## COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 3, Harley Street.—“ Je vous rend mille et mille grace pour votre obligant billet, pour la bonté avec laquelle vous avez bien voulu vous donner la peine de m'expliquer les sens de la réponse de mon souverain à la Cour de Berlin, et pour la confiance avec laquelle vous m'avez communiqué les articles secrets entre la Prusse et la France, et qui complètent les infâmes et sinistres projets de la première. J'ai remis d'abord au Comte Starhemberg ces pièces ainsi que vous l'avez permis, et il vous les a déjà renvoyé sans doute.

“ Comme il se pourrait bien que my lord Elgin, qui vous les a envoyé, n'en a pas fait de même avec le Chevalier Whitworth, dans le doute de cela ne trouveriez-vous pas nécessaire d'envoyer la copie de ces pièces à ce chevalier, pour qu'il fasse voir à l'Empereur et à son ministère toute l'étendue de la perfidie de la Cour de Berlin. Il faut battre le fer tandis qu'il est chaud ; et bien loin de laisser refroidir l'indignation qu'on a chez nous, il faut la renouveler et l'entretenir avec soins, quand on a des moyens et des preuves aussi palpables.

“ Je ne manquerai pas de me rendre demain à 11 heures à votre bureau.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1797, April 4, Cleveland Row.—“ I have spoken to you in my dispatch as it was necessary for me to do, in terms of doubt and uncertainty respecting the possible decision of Parliament on the question of affording further pecuniary aid to the Emperor ; because in the present state of things, it would not be proper for me to anticipate that decision, which must be made on a view of the proposal to be laid before Parliament on that subject, with all its attendant circumstances. I have, however, the pleasure to acquaint you that a preliminary question on this subject of the utmost importance, to the fate of the general proposition has, this evening, been decided by the House of Commons ; a very large majority having supported the general policy of aid to Austria.

“ Mr. Sheridan moved that the House should resolve itself into a committee to consider how far it might be proper to grant further advances to the Emperor. The intention of this motion being avowedly to obstruct, and if possible to pledge the House against any such further aid, it was resisted by Government, and negatived on a division by 266 against 87.

“ This decision may justly be considered as one of the most important events of the age in which we live, and I most sincerely congratulate you upon it. There is, I trust, now no doubt of the event of the proposition itself, which will be made by Mr. Pitt in the course of next week at furthest ; and I shall immediately acquaint you with it by a messenger, by whom I shall also write to you on other points.”

*Copy.*

## M. DUTHEIL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 6, London.—“ M. Dutheil a l'honneur d'envoyer à milord Grenville la lettre qu'il vient de recevoir du Comte de Frotté, et d'après laquelle il paraît que les dispositions continuent à être parfaites en Normandie, où il semble qu'on prend le parti de ne porter que des Royalistes au Corps Législatif. Si cette mesure est suivie par toute la

France, c'est alors que véritablement les principes monarchiques se trouvaient en majorité dans les deux Conseils, où ils cesseraient de n'y plus être que l'opposition. La personne qui m'a apporté la lettre du Comte de Frotté l'a vu embarquer hier, et croit qu'il a dû arriver à l'Isle St. Marcouf ce matin, au moyen du vent qui a constamment régné depuis son départ."

*French.*

*Enclosure.*

J. S. DE FROTTÉ TO M. DUTHEIL.

1797, April 5, Portsmouth.—"Nous arrivons, et je trouve à mon débotté un courier qui m'arrive de France avec beaucoup de lettres où dans toutes l'on me demande *de l'argent et tout ira bien*. Les élections sont meilleures qu'on ne pouvait l'espérer. Les Jacobins sont dans la boue, et nous fort tranquilles. Nous organisent fort bien. Nous avons dans le seul département, le moins bon, de La Manche, trois mille nouveaux déserteurs rentrés depuis le mois. Tous les propriétaires sont parfaitement disposés, et l'on fera de ce pays tout ce que l'on voudra. Il est bien douloureux d'être obligé d'abandonner ces bonnes dispositions, et nous y serons forcés, n'ayant plus d'argent pour les soutenir. Le département du Calvados est excellent, et M. le Comte de Turgot est nommé électeur à Falaise; à Caen, M. de Lisle ——— et partout à peu-près le choix est aussi parfait. Mais il faut de l'argent pour endormir la surveillance du Directoire, qui a donné des ordres pour nous faire tous arrêter en Normandie, où l'on me cherche depuis six semaines; heureusement que l'on commence à s'en lasser. Il faut de l'argent pour payer les déserteurs qui reviennent, et les matelots qui ne veulent pas partir, si on veut les faire subsister. Il faut de l'argent pour les officiers Républicains que l'on a travaillé, et aux quels déjà l'on a donné, mais qui se dégouteront si on cesse de tenir les promesses qu'on leur a faites. Il en faut pour tout, et je suis effrayé de ma position dès l'instant où j'en manquerai, ce qui ne sera pas long attendre, que ce que j'emporte est à peu-près à payer en arrivant. Si je pouvais être sûr au moins, en attendant les événements, de continuer à toucher chaque mois ce que j'ai eu jusqu'ici, je prendrais patience, en donnant aux autres les moyens d'en avoir; autrement je ne pourrai rester en Normandie. Sans argent, j'y serais inutile au parti, et serais poursuivi comme un lièvre par le parti contraire. Tachez, je vous prie, de me faire toucher les mois comme par le passé, mais payez chaque mois.

"Je vous envoie une note dont je vous prie de vous occuper, pour que l'on envoie les ordres nécessaires à St. Marcouf afin d'en retirer les prisonniers, et surtout, de ne jamais les échanger. Tout mon monde se trouve fort bien en Normandie; l'on m'y attend avec impatience, et je pars."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, April 6, Cleveland Row.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre un papier de veille date, mais que vous aviez désiré de ravoïr; et que Monsieur Pitt, à qui je l'avais communiqué, ne m'a restitué qu'hier.

"Nos nouvelles de Tyrol ne sont pas bonnes; mais il ne me paraît pas qu'il y ait en aucun événement décisif. On montre encore beaucoup de fermeté à Vienne, et j'espère que nos dernières nouvelles viendront assez à temps pour rassurer les esprits un peu abattus."

*French. Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, April 9, Cleveland Row.—“In submitting to your Majesty the minute of Cabinet with the annexed drafts of despatches which Lord Grenville has the honour to lay before your Majesty in pursuance of the opinion of your Majesty’s servants, he feels it his indispensable duty to assure your Majesty that nothing but the most thorough and deliberate conviction of the necessity of the measures there recommended could have induced him to lay them before your Majesty. As long as the financial resources of the country seemed to be such as to afford the means of making vigorous exertions both for the prosecution of your Majesty’s part in this extensive war, and for the support of your Majesty’s allies, Lord Grenville allowed himself to hope that, by firmness and perseverance, it would be possible to avert the many evils which must result from the conclusion of a peace on inadequate terms, and that under all the circumstances of the present moment. No man can be more deeply sensible than he is of the extent of those evils, but, without resources of finance, it is impossible to resist them by war, and to prolong the attempt would only be to increase the difficulty of those measures that must now be resorted to.

“Lord Grenville is sensible that this view of the subject includes a very small part of it only. The military difficulties of Austria form another very material branch of it; and though it is possible that by energy and skill these may be surmounted now, as at the close of the last campaign, the experiment at the best is doubtful, and the failure would produce effects almost beyond the power of calculation. But he forbears to trouble your Majesty any more on these points which are, in great degree, developped in the drafts themselves; and he entreats your Majesty to believe that nothing but the most thorough persuasion of the utility and even the necessity of these measures could induce him to advise your Majesty to have recourse to them.”

*Copy.*

*Enclosurè.*

## MINUTE OF CABINET.

1797, April 9, Downing Street.

Present :

Lord Chancellor, Lord President, Duke of Portland, Marquis Cornwallis, Earl Spencer, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Secretary Dundas, Lord Grenville.

“It was agreed humbly to submit to your Majesty as the opinion of this meeting, that, under the various circumstances of difficulty and danger in which his Majesty’s dominions and those of his allies are placed by the result of the late unfavourable events, and most particularly by the increasing embarrassments of the public finances of this kingdom, it is become indispensably necessary that steps should be taken for making a joint application on the part of his Majesty and of the Emperor to the Emperor of Russia for his intervention, with the view of opening and conducting negotiations for peace; and also that measures should be adopted for concurring with the court of Vienna in any immediate negotiation which may be rendered necessary by the urgency of increased pressure from any further progress of the French in Carinthia.

“And the instructions which have been prepared with this view to Sir M. Eden having been read and considered, it was agreed that they



should be laid before your Majesty, with the humble opinion of this meeting, that, under the circumstances above mentioned, it is indispensably necessary that these instructions should be sent to Sir M. Eden; and that it would be advisable that Mr. Hammond should be made the bearer of them, and that he should have full powers to enter into negotiations jointly with Sir M. Eden, and on the grounds therein stated."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 10, Queen's House.—"Lord Grenville is too sensible of my opinion on the whole business to doubt of my sorrow at finding myself obliged to acquiesce in a measure that I think big with evils; but he has in his note, which accompanied the Minute of Cabinet, shown he is equally impressed with the same opinion, that it would be a waste of time for me to add more on the present melancholy occasion.

*Postscript.*—"Having cast my eye over the paper for Sir Morton Eden, I should not do right if I did not in the strongest manner, as a member of the German Empire, declare that in that capacity I never can accede to the Emperor's gaining any acquisition at the expense of the Empire, but shall as Elector think myself in duty bound to object to any such unjust measure."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, April 11, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has this instant received the letters which he has now the honour to transmit to your Majesty. He does not presume to say anything upon their contents, but humbly requests to be honoured with your Majesty's commands respecting the answer to be returned to Baron Rieger."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 11, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville will not be surprised that I am rather astonished and displeased at the inconsiderate step the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg has taken of suddenly arriving at Harwich when another line of conduct had been recommended. If Sir John Hippisley can persuade him, when he arrives to-morrow in London, to depart with him into the country a[nd] visit its different parts till the treaty returns from Wurtemberg, that would be the best arrangement; but should he, on the Prince's arrival, find that not practicable, if the Prince privately notifies his arrival to Lord Grenville, I will not object to receiving him in private at the Queen's House, introducing him to my family; after which I hope he will continue his tour into the country, a[nd] view the various objects worthy of his notice."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1797, April 11, Cleveland Row.—"I am very sorry that it is so wholly impossible for me to promote the object of your request contained in your No. 13, the difficulties attending which would, I am quite sure, have been wholly insurmountable. At the same time you may be persuaded that I shall be always happy to bear my testimony to your merit and services.

"We have been a little embarrassed by the signature of the treaty of commerce which did not allow us time to send you the few remarks that occurred to us on the *projet*. I perfectly understand and do full justice to the reasons which made you anxious to hasten the conclusion of it, both as a proof to others and as in itself a pledge of continued friendship and union. But it would be a very unfortunate circumstance if either of the difficulties which I have adverted to in my dispatch should be found insurmountable obstacles to the ratifications being exchanged; and yet I dread the effect and impression of that respecting America, though I really do not see how it is possible for us to relax either on that point or on the other.

"The circumstances and situation of public affairs render the friendship of Russia more and more important. It is only by the intervention of that power that a precipitate peace on the part of Austria can be prevented, if at all. You cannot therefore take too much pains to urge this point. The assistance we had once hoped for from Russia was not more than was wanted to enable Austria to stem the torrent. But even the time for that is now past, and we could no longer furnish the means which were to have put that force in motion, and to have maintained it in action."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

*Private.*

1797, April 11, Cleveland Row.—"This letter, together with my public despatches, will be delivered to you by Mr. Hammond. The sentiments which you expressed respecting him on a former occasion render it, I trust, unnecessary for me to assure you that the sending him to assist you in one of the most difficult situations in which it is possible for any body to be placed, does not arise from any diminution of confidence towards you, but from a sense of the extreme importance of the crisis, and of the aid which you must derive from the co-operation of a man whose situation puts him in possession of all the details of our foreign affairs, and enables him to follow up the points which arise with a local knowledge and observation which can no otherwise be acquired.

"From the tenor of the last despatches, I greatly fear that we are still too late. If it is not so, we prefer sharing with our ally the difficulties of an unfavourable peace, to being entirely abandoned and left to our own resources; though these are still such as would, I trust, in such case suffice to bring us safe out of the contest.

"I am uneasy at one point in your last letters. It would surely be much more worthy of the firmness and uprightness of M. Thugut's character, having stood with energy and resolution against so many adversities, not to yield to them even in the last extremity; and rather to take such measures (whatever they may be) as the interest of his Sovereign and country really requires, than to leave that task to be performed by others, who will add to the mischief of a disadvantageous peace those of a total subversion of that system which will then be, more than ever, the protection of Europe. These are the sentiments on which His Majesty's servants are acting; and I could wish that you would take an opportunity to express them in our name to him, if the thing is not over before this letter reaches you.

"You will easily judge that this is no time for the appointment of ambassadors, and that all questions on that subject must stand over for more favourable circumstances.

"If the Arch-Duke has not succeeded to stop Bonaparte, and even to drive him back, I fear even an armistice would be unattainable. But that is the point to be aimed at, because the advantage of having time to look about us, and, if possible, to establish something like a congress, would be beyond all calculation when compared with treating for a peace precipitately, and in a moment of dismay, such as seems to prevail at Vienna."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 12, Queen's House.—"I lose no time in transmitting to Lord Grenville the letter I have copied for the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg, which I desire may be delivered to M. de Zepelin. I shall be ready to see the Prince of Wurtemberg on Saturday evening; the Duke of York will go and fetch him, which all the family think, as he is to be *incognito*, is certainly more honourable and less formal than my sending the lord in waiting. I desire therefore by three o'clock on Saturday to hear from Lord Grenville whether and where the Prince is arrived in town, when the hour for the Duke of York going for the Prince shall, in return to the notification, be fixed."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 13, Stowe.—"In consequence of a communication which was directed to be made to my private ear, informing me of the object of an interview which has been requested from you, I am tempted to write, for fear you should be detained in the country, to request you to see that person without loss of time; as it is most essential that no time should be lost in discussing (with another person just arrived) a new and most important chapter. Pray be assured that I have no object in all this but what arises from the firm persuasion that every moment is most critical; and that the secret may be detected if the interview is delayed, and the third person detained by that delay.

"I am indeed most impatient to hear from Vienna. If the Emperor must make his peace, God send that Mr. Hammond may arrive too late to include this country in the chapter of concessions, which, to my comprehension will, so far from purchasing security to us, only add to the gloom of a prospect already too alarming. I see daylight in risking another campaign detached from our Imperial alliance, though I well know the risk, but I see *none* in a peace such as Austria and we must make jointly. You will of course keep your secret; but mine is, as you see, very short."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, April, London.]—"Encore un songe creux de ma part qu'il faut que je vous communique immédiatement. En réfléchissant au danger réel que nous courrons en Italie, et à l'extrême activité des Français, je ne vois en vérité pas d'impossibilité à ce que Buonaparte ne tente de nouveau de marcher sur Vienne. Nous savons qu'il a déjà été au-delà de Trente, il y a quelques mois. S'il ne marchait que sur un point, il y aurait des grandes ressources de défense même avec le reste d'une armée entamée; mais il peut se mettre en chemin tout à la fois par la Stirie et par la Tirol. Chacune de ses armées sera plus forte que celle qu'on pourrait lui opposer, et qui serait commandée, Dieu sait par qui. Il y a un moyen néanmoins encore de ranimer

l'enthousiasme et se procurer des renforts par le zèle et l'énergie des sujets auquel leur amour pour leur souverain rendra tout possible; c'est que l'Empereur, accompagné de Mack, Lascey, ou Clerfaye aille lui-même à cette armée. Je vous réponds que l'effet en serait magique, et le succès le couronnerait. Il est militaire, adoré de ses troupes; il a fait plusieurs campagnes, et cette mesure serait bien plus à place que la *postillionade* aux Pais-Bas à laquelle vous vous appellerez que j'ai toujours été contraire, et qui s'est terminée comme vous savez. Ne pourriez-vous pas écrire au Chevalier Eden de laisser tomber cette idée? peut-être y mordrait-on; mais, au nom de notre amitié, ne me compromettez pas. Mon désir du bien me suggère cet expédient, et ma confiance sans bornes la dépose dans votre sein, et la soumet à vos lumières."

*French.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 15, Queen's House.—"On returning from Kew I have found Lord Grenville's note. He may acquaint the Hereditary Prince of Wurtemberg that the Duke of York will call a little before eight this evening to conduct the Prince here. I, at the same time, return the paper Lord Grenville left with me, to which I have put down all the answers necessary for the present; I think they ought to be translated into French and Monsieur de Zepelin seems to be the best person to treat with, and most in the confidence of the Prince; therefore these answers should be communicated through him."

#### EARL CAMDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, April 18, Dublin Castle.—"I am much obliged to you for giving me notice of your correspondence with Lord Mountnorris, and for not having deviated from your rule in his instance. It is certainly very often inconvenient to the King's Government to be assailed by English application; at the same time it is frequently the most satisfactory way to one's own feeling, to dispose of the patronage which belongs to this office. Allow me to say, however, if I may venture thus far, that it must have been a very pressing application of yours that would have made it very satisfactory to one to load that noble earl, your courier, with any very *essential marks* of his Majesty's favour.

"I cannot indeed doubt of the kindness and attention which I have experienced from the English Government, and I should be extremely insensible to your public as well as private friendship, if I did feel with much gratitude the testimony you have been so good as to give of your good opinion of me.

"The situation of this country requires the indulgence of Ministers to whomsoever may be sent to *attempt* to govern it; and it is impossible to disguise that its situation is extremely critical. The system of *United Irishmen* has spread in a manner almost incredible in the north; and by threats and actual assassinations, they have driven all their gentlemen from their residence, whom they have not forced into a sort of compliance with their views. I am endeavouring to find some opportunity of letting them feel the weight of military arguments; but it is so difficult to meet with that opportunity that I begin to think Mr. Grattan's charges of cruelty and violence will be converted into those of want of energy and inactivity. In the mean time this system has been introduced with some success into the south and west of Ireland. The Roman Catholics are again extremely

active, and some of their popular preachers (Doctor Hussey particularly) are endeavouring to inflame their congregations against Government.

"Add to this, the mischievous effects of Fox's speech; the ill-success of our ally's; the difficulty of procuring money; the prospect of invasion; the speculation, *not an idle one*, of a change of Government, and you know enough of the world, and of the Irish world particularly, to be aware of the difficulties we have to encounter.

"You speak with so little confidence of the success of Hammond's mission that I should lament the step had been taken if you did not say it was unavoidable. The situation of Ireland seems to me to press for a peace more than that of any other part of the King's dominions, and whenever that event takes place, no time should be lost in relieving ourselves from the very inconvenient terms upon which the two countries are at this time.

"I have trespassed upon you much longer than I had intended."

#### GEORGE HAMMOND TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, April 20, Cuxhaven.—"I arrived here this morning after a passage of seventy-nine hours. I am very sorry to add that the wind is at present so contrary that I dare not risk making any part of my journey by water; I shall therefore be under the necessity of proceeding by the common route from Cuxhaven to Vienna. I, however, hope that I do not hazard too much in expressing my expectation that I shall be at Vienna in ten days, at *the farthest*, from this date. Your Lordship may be assured that I shall travel with the utmost expedition in my power."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARIEMBERG.

1797, April 26, Cleveland Row.—"Je crois qu'il serait fort à propos qu'vous envoyiez un courier, vendredi. Je reserve le mien jusqu'à mardi, quand je pourrai probablement annoncer la conclusion définitive de notre affaire; à moins que, dans l'intervalle, nous ne nous voyons arrêtés par la plus désastreuse de toutes les nouvelles, celle d'une séparation de mesures entre la Grande Bretagne et l'Autriche. Jusqu'ici, il faut l'avouer, l'Empereur s'est montré bien digne de son rang et de sa position élevée; et son ministre s'est acquis un nom immortel. Mais, vous le savez peut-être mieux que moi, tout le monde n'est pas de même, et il se pourrait qu'à la fin le petit nombre sage et bien pensant cédât à la majorité faible et intimidé.

"Je reçois les ministres demain, et peut-être que j'aurai le plaisir de vous voir. Mais si vous préféreriez une heure fixe, je vous prie de m'en prévenir."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT DE ZEPPELIN.

1797, April 26, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville fait bien ses complimens à Monsieur le Comte de Zeppelin, et le prie d'avoir la bonté d'informer Sa Altesse Sereine Monseigneur le Prince Héréditaire de Wirtemberg que, d'après les arrangemens pour lesquels le Roi lui a donné ses ordres aujourd'hui, le mariage sera déclaré au Conseil Privé mercredi prochain, et sera communiqué le même jour par un message de Sa Majesté aux deux Chambres de Parlement. Les mesures à

prendre en conséquence demandront encore quelque jours, et l'appartement que Sa Majesté destine au Prince au Palais de St. James sera prêt le mardi suivant (c'est-à-dire le 9 de mai). Si Monsieur le Comte de Zeppclin veut bien prévenir Lord Grenville du chemin par lequel Sa Altesse Sereine retournera ce jour-là à Londres, les ordres nécessaires seront donnés pour les carrosses que le Roi envoie, suivant l'usage, à la rencontre du Prince à dix milles de Londres, ou à la première poste au-delà.

"Lord Grenville prend la liberté d'ajouter que le Prince jugera sans doute qu'il serait convenable qu'il fit sa cour au Roi et à la Reine le mercredi et le jeudi suivant son arrivée à Londres."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, April 27, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville begs leave humbly to mention to your Majesty that he finds, on reference to the proceedings previous to the marriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, that the full powers given to Lord Malmesbury were approved in Council, and the treaty signed, previous to your Majesty's declaring in Council your Majesty's royal consent to the marriage. In order therefore to follow this precedent, Lord Grenville has transmitted to the Lord President the draft of the full powers, in order that it may, if your Majesty approves it, be laid before your Majesty in Council to-morrow. And the treaty may, with your Majesty's permission, be signed on any day between that and the Wednesday following, when the declaration in Council, and the communication to the two Houses may be made as your Majesty had intended."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE

1797, April 28, Queen's House.—"Provided Lord Grenville follows in the example established by the treaty of marriage in the case of the Prince of Wales I cannot object to it; though different from the other instances to which, in great measure, the treaty of marriage for the Princess Royal had been proposed as precedents."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, May 1-2, London].—"Après les nouvelles affreuses que nous avons reçu hier par la voie de la France, il est impossible que je n'aie pas l'honneur de vous entretenir dans le courant de la journée. Vous m'avez, d'ailleurs, dit expressément de passer à votre bureau aujourd'hui, mardi. Comme je sais que vous avez conseil, à moins que vous ne me fassiez dire de venir plutôt, j'irai vous attendre au bureau vers une heure. Daignez en croire une honnête homme qui est trop dévoué à la bonne cause pour ne pas vous l'être entièrement, *je connais mieux les individus de mon pays que ceux du vôtre qui s'y trouvent. Rassurez nous bien vite, et assurez-vous de nous plus que jamais. Je* sais de bonne part que les derniers malheurs nous ont extrêmement allarmés, et je crains toujours les premiers effets de la première impression. Je vous en dirai davantage quand nous nous verrons."

*French.*

## LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STAHERMBERG.

1797, May 3, Cleveland Row.—“Je viens de lire dans le *True Briton* la traduction du papier Français dont je n’ai pas encore vu l’original. Il est impossible de ne pas croire à une nouvelle si positivement annoncée, quelque répugnance que j’ai à admettre la probabilité d’un événement auquel, réellement, je ne m’attendais pas.

“Ce ne sera qu’après l’arrivée du courrier que le Chevalier Eden doit m’avoir envoyé que je pourrai juger quelles seront pour l’avenir les relations politiques entre vous et moi; mais je n’ai besoin d’aucune nouvelle information pour vous assurer que je rends toujours justice à l’honnêteté de votre cœur, et à la probité de votre caractère; et que je ne cesserai jamais de vous estimer et aimer en particulier, quoiqu’il en soit du Ministre Autrichien. Je suis désolé de ne pouvoir vous recevoir ce matin, mais je dois me rendre à midi chez le Lord Chancelier pour la signature du traité de mariage, et de là au levée pour faire ma cour au Roi sur un événement si intéressante pour sa famille. Après cela il y a Conseil Privé, et alors message à porter à la Chambre Haute, et ensuite *Cabinet Dinner*. Ainsi voilà la journée assez bien occupée.

“Demain nous mêlerons ensemble nos regrets pour la perte irréparable de la dignité des Souverains et des Gouvernemens de l’Europe.”

*French. Copy.*

## COUNT STAHERMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 3, London.—J’ai de nouvelles raisons de croire à l’infamie de la paix. Je sais qu’un papier Français nommé *Le Republicain* est arrivé hier en ville, et porte que, le 26, on a appris à Paris la nouvelle de notre ignominie. Il y a eu des réjouissances à ce sujet le 27 et le 28. Vous me connaissez trop bien pour ne pas apprécier tout ce que je souffre. La honte, l’indignation, et la douleur la plus profonde se déchirent alternativement mon cœur. Permettez-moi de vous voir un moment dans la matinée; je passerai vers midi chez vous, et ensuite au bureau. Ce sera un instant de consolation pour moi que de parler de mes peines à un homme tel que vous, que j’aime, que je respecte, et qui me rend justice.”

*French.*

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797], May 4, Stowe.—“I am prepared for the news of this day by the full persuasion that we shall more easily obtain such a peace as I shall deem most insecure and most calamitous; but such as will meet the opinions of a very large proportion of those who, in as well as out of Parliament, will discuss it. And if France is to attempt to force us by invasion, it may be more practicable to unite all ranks to that object, than to the undefined object of Austrian frontiers, which the cowardice and ignorance of this country is ready to deem wholly uninteresting to us. But whatever may be the result of it, the die is cast, and we must abide the event with the sure and heartbreaking reflexion that our peace must assuredly be purchased at a price infinitely beyond its real value, if every circumstance is considered of the very many which ought to give us good terms, and will be counted for nothing, from the disaffected poltroonery of the commercial men on whom Mr. Pitt has leant, and who have been the first to betray the public cause. It is however now become a serious matter of great doubt how Ireland is to

be saved from the storm which this peace will thicken tenfold. You have no alternative between the most decided measures, and an absolute capitulation (hands and feet tied) with all that is ill-disposed in that country. I know that those who are most interested in the struggle think the worst of it; and, unless some immediate blow is struck, I fear that the oath of the United Irishman which is spreading will run all over the country. Nugent, whose opinions have weight with you, thinks very gloomily of the whole business.

"Your Prince was here for some hours yesterday complaining, *entre nous*, of his reception at Blenheim, and very much gratified by the attentions I showed him. I gave him a very handsome cold dinner which Sir J. Hippley (who, *par parenthèse*, is not very wise) told me was the only dinner he had got upon his tour. He seems a sensible and observant man, and cautious not to give the least offence. I am much obliged by the recollection of the picture which I was to have of you. I cannot judge whether red or blue becomes you best, or which is most like; pray therefore be so good as to desire Lady Grenville to decide which is most like you."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 5, Queen's House.—"I have just read the despatch from Sir Morton Eden with the account of the signing of preliminary articles of peace between the Emperor and the French. Though the situation of the Emperor was highly critical, yet it by no means excuses his not having avowed the intention of treating, and much less the keeping the stipulations secret when called upon to explain them."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 5, Harley Street.—"Je me flatte que vous me rendez la justice de croire que je suis tout aussi affligé que vous, et notre ami commun Starhemberg, de ce qui s'est fait aux environs de Vienne. Je vous envoie la lettre que m'a apporté votre courier de la part de Razoumowski.

"Je l'ai montré à Starhemberg, et comme il m'a dit que vous désirez que la chose ne soit pas ébruitée, je vous promet de n'en parler à personne, pas même au Prince de Wurtemberg, qui m'a prié de l'informer si j'apprens quelque chose sur la réalité de la paix.

"Je vous supplie de me renvoyer l'incluse."

*French.*

#### *Enclosure.*

#### COUNT RAZOUMOUSKOI to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, April 22, Vienna.—"Vous savez, Monsieur le Comte, que c'est aux deux petites villes de Bruck et Loeben en Styrie que ce sont arrêtés les Français dans leur marche sur Vienne. Là ont commencés les armistices.

"Le I. en conséquence d'une lettre de Buonaparte à l'Archiduc.

"Le II. pour donner le temps d'apporter des pleins pouvoirs.

"Le III. pour celui de les produire et les échanger. Nous en étions là; et je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que la crise qui menaçait cette capitale a fait saisir avec empressement l'occasion de gagner du temps. Tel était le motif des délais et du désir de prolonger les armistices quelques semaines encore si on pouvait y parvenir, et là-dessus étaient basées les instructions très succinctes des plénipotentiaires.



“ L'ambassadeur de Gallo fut associé au Comte de Merfeld pour la soi-disante négociation, mais, quand il fut question d'exhiber les pouvoirs dont ils étaient munis, Buonaparte avoua qu'il n'en avait point. Vous jugerez, sans doute, que cet étrange incident, joint à l'esprit même de la négociation, devait nous présager d'autres délais conformément au plan de Thugut. Figurez-vous donc notre surprise en apprenant hier que ces Messieurs ont signé, le 18, les préliminaires d'une paix. Je me représente le votre cas; chose pareille est peut-être sans exemple. Vous ne vous persuaderez point, sans doute, que ce ne soit un jeu de Thugut. Je peux vous assurer que son étonnement n'a pas été feint, et qu'il ne s'y attendait pas plus que moi. Voici comme la chose s'explique, de vous à moi bien entendu. Gallo (je ne sais si vous le connaissez) est par état et par caractère dans le commérage intérieur de la Cour. L'épouvante pour la ville de Vienne aura porté à lui dire à son départ de chercher à conjurer l'orage. Buonaparte lui a déclaré fermement qu'il ne souscrirait plus à un nouvel armistice, et que le 21, au matin, il marcherait à moins que les préliminaires ne fussent signés. Je ne vous en marquerai point les conditions. Je les sais très imparfaitement pour n'avoir eu qu'une demie-heure de conversation hier avec Thugut, qui m'a demandé d'ailleurs ma parole d'honneur de ne faire aucun usage du peu qu'il m'a dit, jusqu'à ce que, sous peu de jours, il puisse en faire une ample communication aux alliés.

“ J'observerai seulement que l'ensemble en est infiniment meilleur qu'on n'aurait pu s'y attendre; mais l'incohérence des idées y jette une telle confusion, qu'il est persuadé de l'impossibilité d'y donner de la consistance. Dès préliminaires signés, sans pleins pouvoirs d'un côté, ne peuvent présenter qu'une stipulation très précaire. Aussi Clarke, qui arriva au quartier-général peu d'heures après, jeta feu et flamme contre la précipitation de Buonaparte. Une clause porte la ratification dans un mois, mais dès que celle de l'Empereur sera montrée au général Français, il évacuera aussitôt le pays jusque par delà le Tagliamento. Vous sentez qu'on n'aura rien de plus pressé maintenant que d'exécuter cet article, et de voir venir ensuite; je présume donc qu'ils se mettront en marche de retraite au commencement de la semaine prochaine. Vous aurez de la peine à concevoir la conduite du général Français. Il chasse les Autrichiens, délabrés, désorganisés, annulés, depuis la Piave jusqu'à dix postes de Vienne, où la terreur panique qui les prend lui aurait livré sans obstacle une ville sans défense, vuide de troupes, la noblesse en fuite, l'habitant confus, mécontent, et dans les transes. Il entame une ouverture de paix, convient d'armistices, donne le temps aux renforts d'arriver, à l'esprit public de se remettre, et, enfin, précipite des préliminaires, dont le premier fruit et le plus essentiel est l'évacuation des provinces.

“ Ce petit Corse, qui passe pour un grand homme dans l'opinion de bien des gens, ne me paraît pas fort admirable en tout ceci. Il n'avait, à la vérité, que 32,000 hommes avec lui, et point d'artillerie de siège. Son plan sur le Tyrol a manqué, mais il ne l'a su que pendant la première armistice; Moreau n'a point passé le Rhin, mais les renforts Autrichiens n'étaient point encore à portée d'ici, car il a fallu crever hommes et chevaux pour en faire arriver une partie, il y a trois jours, afin de se donner au moins une contenance. Enfin, puisqu'à Loeben des préliminaires ont été signés quand il l'a voulu positivement, combien n'eût-il pas été plus facile de dicter la loi sous les murs de Vienne? La Providence a veillé sur nous; c'est tout ce que j'en peux conclure, et je m'y abandonne encore pour l'avenir. Je crois vous avoir dit qu'on a réclamé d'ici chez nous les secours stipulés par les traités; nous ne pouvons en avoir réponse que dans trois semaines. Thugut a jusqu'ici

attendu impatiemment ceux des Anglais; il désire encore qu'il en arrive, car, je l'ai dite plus haut, il ne regarde point les bases de cette paix comme solides. Il est sûr, Monsieur le Comte, qu'on est bien lent et bien timide chez vous. Si les Ministres n'osent point encore terminer le traité, pourquoi ne fournissent-ils pas les arrérages de trois mois à compte de la future stipulation qu'ils ont promis sur leur parole sacrée? Les finances ici sont abimées; et c'est le grand épouvantail dont on s'est servi à l'égard du Souverain, qu'à trop juste titre malheureusement, car le discrédit du papier menaçait de la banqueroute."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, May 5, Cleveland Row.—"Mille graces, mon cher ami, pour la communication de vos nouvelles. Quelqu'affligeans que soient les détails qu'elles renferment, ils le sont moins que ceux de mes dépêches, parceque la réserve envers notre Ministre relativement aux stipulations de cette paix était faite pour autoriser toute sorte de soupçons; tandis que votre lettre paraît annoncer une communication ample et prochaine.

"C'est cette réserve, ou plutôt ce refus de communication, que j'ai souhaité d'adoucir vis-à-vis du public d'ici, dans l'espérance que dans peu de jours on se sera expliqué avec plus de franchise, comme, en vérité, notre conduite l'exige.

"Il est difficile de concevoir la nécessité d'une paix aussi précipitée, dans une position que tant de circonstances pouvaient, de jour en jour, rendre plus avantageuse. Mais il ne peut y avoir des motifs suffisans pour en cacher les conditions à des alliés, qui, de leur côté, ont toujours agi avec franchise et bonne foi. Quelle que soit la paix qu'on a faite, notre union n'en deviendra que plus nécessaire. Il faudra bien nous attendre pour empêcher que les principes Révolutionnaires ne deviennent le droit public de l'Europe. C'est pourquoi je désire de ménager l'honneur de la Cour de Vienne même au moment où elle paraît avoir le plus oublié ce qu'elle doit à nous et à elle-même.

"Un peu de temps nous mettra à même de débrouiller ce chaos. Dieu veuille qu'il en résulte des moyens pour le maintien de l'ordre public."

*French. Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 6, Harley Street.—"Je suis bien aise de savoir que la lettre que j'ai reçu de Razoumoukoi vous a satisfait sur l'assurance positive qu'il me donne de la prochaine communication qu'il annonce de ces maudits préliminaires qui ont été visiblement signés à l'insu de Thugut. Vous avez dû observer que ce même Ministre a dit à Razoumoukoi que l'incohérence et la confusion de ces préliminaires rendent presque impossible leur exécution; ainsi la chose peut encore tourner autrement qu'on ne le voit. Nous saurons le tout dans quatre à cinq jours.

"J'ai passé ce matin au Bureau, espérant de vous y trouver; mais puisque vous êtes à la campagne, faite-moi la grace de me faire savoir à votre arrivée en ville, quand je pourai vous voir pour le moment. Notre ami Starhemberg est désespéré et indigné de ce que sa Cour vient de faire."

*French.*

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 6, London.—“J’ai écrit hier assez longuement à ma Cour par l’occasion de votre courier, et je ne lui ai point caché mon étonnement et ma douleur personnelle de tout ce qui vient d’arriver. Je sais bien que cela ne remédiera point à un mal déjà fait ; mais il me semble qu’il y a des occasions dans la vie où un honnête homme se doit à lui-même (surtout quand il est en place) de faire connaître que tout ce qui est contre l’honneur le révolte.

“J’ai parlé de l’effet que cette nouvelle a dû produire sur le ministère Anglais, et je n’ai pas manqué de remarquer que j’avais observé qu’on avait été plus affecté de la réticence déplacée qu’on a usé depuis le commencement de cette vilaine négociation vis-à-vis de M. le Chevalier Eden, que de la chose même.

“J’ai eu soin de relever, comme je le devais, la noblesse de votre conduite amicale en ménageant notre réputation intacte et glorieuse pendant six ans, mais qui malheureusement ne donne depuis quinze jours que trop de prises à nos ennemis. J’ai ajouté que je savais qu’on nous estimait trop encore pour n’être pas convaincus que nous ne nous soyons sérieusement occupés de l’intérêt de nos alliés, et que nous ne nous empressions de leur donner incessamment une entière et pleine communication de nos dernières transactions. J’ai profité de la circonstance pour rappeler la fidélité constante que vous nous avez montré pendant toute cette guerre, et je n’ai point balancé à prouver que vous étiez le seul allié véritable et utile que l’Autriche ait eu depuis longtemps ; en conseillant, en même temps, de vous ménager comme nos intérêts l’exigent, et comme nous en avons tous les moyens en redoublant de confiance vis-à-vis de vous ; ce qui serait une manière certaine de faire oublier une démarche précipitée, occasionnée d’une part par la crainte, et de l’autre par des plénipotentiaires trop avides de faire. Mon zèle m’a porté à faire appercevoir à ma Cour tout le parti qu’on pourrait néanmoins tirer encore de cette besogne si mal entamée, si on vous y plaçait convenablement et à propos ; et, d’un autre côté, les malheurs incalculables qui résulteraient d’une séparation d’intérêt avec l’Angleterre (*quod Deus avertat*) dont le moindre serait son rapprochement de la perfide Prusse, et le pire, la subversion des trônes et le triomphe complet de l’Anarchie. Je désire qu’on profite des avis que j’ai pris la liberté de dire hardiment dans ce moment, comme je m’y suis cru obligé. Ils feront sûrement effet si M. Eden m’a secondé à propos, et surtout sans aigreur. Il est bien important d’en éviter jusqu’à la moindre apparence. Cette raison m’a fait lire avec peine dans les papiers d’hier que M. Pitt avait déclaré ne vouloir plus faire d’avances à l’Empereur. Je conçois que, d’ici à une plus ample information, il ne nous avance rien. Mais pourquoi le dire ? Pourquoi s’oter aussi la possibilité de nous être utile un jour s’il le voulait ? Ne peut-il pas arriver que le Directoire refuse ses ratifications ; que le Congrès assemblé se sépare au bout de quelques semaines, et qu’on commence de nouveau à se battre ?

“Quoiqu’il en soit, le désir de conserver cette intimité si nécessaire entre nos deux Cours, si indispensable au bonheur de l’Europe et au maintien de l’ordre contre les attaques de l’Anarchie m’a fourni l’idée de trouver après l’événement désagréable qui vient de se passer un moyen de cimenter de nouveau encore les liens qui nous unissent. Il faudra que, tôt ou tard, nous fassions un emprunt, au moins pour le remboursement de ce que nous vous devons. Cet arrangement exigera une espèce d’acte ou de convention, dans laquelle je voudrais qu’on renouvellât d’une manière solennelle les assurances de la solidité de notre alliance, ainsi que la promesse de se tenir étroitement liés de vœux

et d'intérêts conjointement avec la Cour de Russie. On pourrait y ajouter telle autre stipulation que la circonstance ferait juger convenable ; et cette convention en passant l'éponge sur le passé (sur lequel je suppose que nous vous satisferons tout à fait par nos aveux sincères) ranimerait entre nos deux Cours ces sentimens dont je suis si pénétré, et la durée desquels seuls dépend, en vérité, la sûreté future des trônes.

“Permettez que je profite de cet instant pour vous prémunir contre les embûches et les pièges que je sais que la Cour de Berlin va vous tendre pour vous détacher de nous. Il y a plusieurs mois qu'elle prépare ses filets, et elle croit avoir trouvé le moment de les jeter. Il ne suffit pas de les éviter ; mais il faut encore que nous ne puissions jamais soupçonner que vous soyez disposés à prêter l'oreille un seul instant aux insinuations perfides du Cabinet qu'est la cause de tous les maux de l'Europe. N'oubliez pas, de grace, que notre faiblesse et nos torts mêmes nous rendront plus inquiets à cet égard. Voilà en vérité assez de radotage ; il y a longtemps que vous me permettez mes *nonsense* ; je ne vous en ennuierai plus avant de me retrouver en droit de vous parler à coeur ouvert *officiellement*, comme en mon particulier. Croyez que jusqu'à cette époque, qui ne sera, j'espère, retardée que de peu de jours, je ne serai ni heureux ni tranquille. Le passé me tourmente, le présent me déchire, et l'avenir m'inquiète.”

*French.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, May 9, Vienna.—“In addition to what I have stated in my public letter of this date, with regard to the concealing from the Austrian Minister the instructions which I had received to proceed to Berlin, I beg leave to mention to your Lordship that, having no direction either to communicate those instructions or to conceal them, I was left entirely to my own discretion in this respect. In this situation, as it appeared to me by no means improbable that the knowledge of the hasty manner in which the preliminaries had been concluded might induce His Majesty's Ministers to make some alteration in the system which they had previously formed, or that His Majesty might accede to the invitation of assisting at the congress, I felt it incumbent upon me not to preclude any beneficial use which might be made of these circumstances, by the premature disclosure of a determination that had been taken at a time when they were unknown. I, farther, thought it right not to put the Austrian Government at present in possession of the fact that His Majesty's Ministers had taken any measures founded on the probability of this country's having made a separate peace ; more especially as I knew that the messenger who carried the intelligence to England of that event, had sailed from Cuxhaven on the 29th ultimo with a fair wind, and that, therefore, answers to the dispatches sent by him might be received in the course of a very few days. At the same time, however, I thought it proper not to quit Vienna without taking leave of M. de Thugut. With regard to my intention of remaining for a day or two at Dresden under the hope of learning there your Lordship's sentiments, subsequent to the arrival in England of the intelligence of the preliminaries being signed with France, I trust no ill can result from that measure, as Dresden is in the direct road both to Berlin and Cuxhaven ; and I can, therefore, prosecute my journey to the former place if your Lordship should still think it necessary, or to the latter,

if I should perceive that his Majesty's Ministers have adopted any other system."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, May 10, Cleveland Row.—"Je viens de prendre les ordres du Roi au sujet de votre note. Sa Majesté m'a chargé de vous prévenir que Madame la Princesse vous recevra demain dans les appartemens de la Reine, avant le cercle, si vous voulez bien vous y rendre à *une heure et demie*. Vous aurez la complaisance d'apporter l'ordre que vous présenterez alors à s'Altesse Royale.

"Le Roi m'apprend que j'ai un compliment à vous faire. Vous savez que c'est de bon cœur que je me réjouis de tout ce que vous est agréable.

"J'ai des lettres de Vienne qui vont jusqu'au 29. M. de Thugut persistait encore dans son incroyable mystère sur un secret que les papiers de Paris nous ont dévoilé. Si vous avez encore quelques particularités, vous m'obligerez infiniment en me les communiquant.

"Nos lettres de Portsmouth sont meilleures aujourd'hui, et l'on peut espérer que l'arrivée de Lord Howe apaisera tout. Mais quel malheur d'en douter encore !"

*French. Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 10, Harley Street.—"J'ai reçu votre lettre, et je ne manquerai pas de me rendre demain à une heure et demie à l'appartement de la Reine au Palais de St. James pour avoir audience de Sa Altesse la Princesse Royale, et lui remettre la lettre et l'ordre de Sainte Catherine que l'Impératrice lui envoie.

"Je suis très mortifié de ne pouvoir vous donner des nouvelles de Vienne. C'est le cher Chevalier Eden qui en est la cause, car, toutes les fois qu'il a averti le Comte Razoumousskoi de l'expédition de ses courriers, jamais dans aucun cas, jamais il n'a manqué de m'écrire sur les affaires, et quand ce cher Chevalier ne l'avertissait pas, et qu'il apprenait après qu'il y aurait un courier Anglais départi sans qu'il l'eût su, il me témoignait combien il était fâché de ce peu d'attention de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

"J'ai été au Bureau, et j'ai tourmenté le bon Monsieur Canning pour savoir s'il n'y a pas de lettre pour moi de Vienne, et il m'a protesté qu'il n'y en aurait pas, qu'il l'avait demandé au courier, et que celui-ci l'a assuré qu'il n'avait d'autre paquet que ceux qu'il lui a remis. Je ne doute pas que le courier qui doit venir de Vienne à notre malheureux ami Starhemberg m'apporterait des nouvelles sur les affaires de la part de Razoumousskoi, et je vous donne ma parole que je vous communiquerai tout, et s'il y a quelque chose que je ne pourrai pas faire voir au Secrétaire d'État, je le ferai voir à mon ami Lord Grenville que j'aime, que j'estime, et auquel je serai attaché toute ma vie dans quelque situation que, lui et moi, nous nous trouvions un jour.

"Je vous rend mille et mille grâces pour la bonne nouvelle que vous m'avez donné par réport à l'affaire de Portsmouth ; cette maudite affaire m'a privé de sommeil les deux nuits dernières. Il est affreux que des Anglais cherchent à renverser la constitution Anglaise, la seule où l'homme soit dans toute sa dignité.

"J'ai cru avec un plaisir extrême que vous avez eu le noble courage de dire au Duc de Bedford que c'est lui qui est cause de ce qui est arrivé sur la flotte, et je suis fâché que dans la Chambre de Commune

quand l'opposition parla que l'armée va ou peut se révolter, on ne lui a pas répondu qu'elle parle d'après ses désirs, et d'après les billets qu'on repandait parmis les troupes pour les révolter, et qu'il est clair que ceux qui parlent de la révolte prochaine de l'armée, la désirent et l'excite. En vérité ceux qui veulent bouleverser le pays ne méritent aucun ménagement."

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 11, York Farm.—"Quoiqu'il ne me soit encore rien parvenu d'officiel sur nos dernières transactions avec l'ennemi de l'autel, des trônes, et du repos de l'Europe, je ne puis m'empêcher d'avoir l'honneur de vous entretenir un moment sur un objet aussi important, et dont la douloureuse image me poursuit sans cesse et en tous lieux. Je me suis réfugié à la campagne pour m'en distraire un peu ; mais l'idée insupportable de ces malheureux préliminaires m'y accompagne et ne me laisse point de repos. Comme je cherche néanmoins tous les moyens de me procurer des renseignemens sur ce qui s'est passé, j'ai tâché de lire le plus de lettres que j'ai pu parmi celles qui sont venues dernièrement du Continent ; et, en comparant leur contenu, j'ai crû pouvoir fixer une opinion vraisemblable sur les derniers événemens.

"Il paraît, hors de doute, que l'Archiduc est celui qui a porté le découragement à son comble. Il est bien certain que le 12 encore, on était résolu de tenir ferme ; et la meilleure preuve en est le départ subit des jeunes archiducs, menés à Prague par mon père, et les préparatifs très sérieux faits pour la défense de Vienne. J'ai lieu de supposer, avec un apparence de certitude, que Buonaparte avait fait, avant cette époque et depuis sa première lettre à l'Archiduc en date du 31 de Mars, plusieurs propositions de différens genres que M. de Thugut que j'aime, respecte, et regrette, a néanmoins déjà eu tort de ne pas communiquer dans leur entier à M. le Chevalier Eden ; lequel a, peut-être, en un autre tort de ne pas les deviner, et de les apprendre par tous les moyens dont un ministre étranger un peu adroit doit se servir en pareil cas. Toutes les notions que j'ai, s'accordent à me prouver que la nature de ces propositions portait sur un démembrement de l'Empire, et que mon maître s'y est toujours refusé avec horreur. Je ne pardonne pas encore à M. de Thugut de n'avoir point communiqué à M. Eden les pouvoirs donnés à M. de Meerfeld, car ou ces pouvoirs étaient insuffisans, comme il l'a dit depuis, et, alors, il ne courrait aucun risque de les montrer au ministre allié qu'il rassurait ainsi ; ou ils étaient suffisans, et il avait défense de les montrer, et dans ce cas il devait quitter immédiatement, et dès qu'on manquait à ce qu'on devait à l'Angleterre ; c'est du moins comme j'aurais certainement agi à sa place. On me trouvera peut-être exagéré, mais je m'en fais gloire ; et je suis trop vrai pour ne pas vous avouer que ces assurances du 17, données par M. de Thugut, font une petite tâche dans la belle histoire de sa carrière politique, puisqu'elles ne pouvaient pas être sincères, aucun pouvoir quelconque n'ayant pu être expédié à Meerfeld, sans être contresigné par lui. Je n'en dis pas de même à l'égard de ceux de M. de Gallo, qui peuvent (quoique je ne le crois pas non plus) être émanés directement de l'Empereur par l'influence de l'Impératrice. Je trouve en outre que, puisqu'on était décidé à faire cette paix que j'abhorrer, il y avait un moyen plus honnête, qui eut été que M. de Thugut eut dit tout franchement

à M. Eden, *Nous ne savons plus que faire. Nous sommes à bout de voies, et je ne vous cacherai pas que la nécessité la plus urgente va nous forger à la paix si nous obtenons des conditions supportables.* Cette manière était loyale au moins, parcequ'elle était vraie, et l'Empereur l'eut certainement adoptée, si on la lui avait suggérée.

“Le secret qu'on garde encore, vis-à-vis du Ministre d'Angleterre, est inexcusable selon moi; et je crains aussi, de vous à moi, qu'il ne tienne un peu à l'humeur de notre Ministre qui, décidé à quitter honorablement, n'est point fâché de se faire regretter par vous, et ne parle pas à l'Empereur sur la circonstance. Daignez en croire un ami sans préjugé, et qui connaît bien les personnages dirigeans dans son pays, *Si on représentait à mon souverain ce qu'il serait obligé de faire actuellement, il s'y conformerait, parcequ'il est bon, et qu'il ne veut manquer à rien.* J'en suis certain. M. Eden aurait encore eu entre les mains un moyen de parvenir à obtenir la communication que M. de Thugut quittant ne s'est pas donné la peine de prouver qu'on lui devait, et ce moyen était de demander une audience à l'Empereur. Vous savez que tout le monde et même les Ministres étrangers voit l'Empereur tête-à-tête dès qu'on le veut. Il lui aurait démontré que l'on ne pouvait pas faire un mystère à un allié aussi fidèle et aussi utile d'une transaction essentielle. Votre Ministre, seul à seul avec mon maître, eut pu en dire davantage, et on l'aurait écouté.

“On ne peut nier néanmoins que, si on en avait agi autrement envers nous, car je ne pardonnerai jamais cette conduite, les bases de notre paix, dès qu'on est réduit à en conclure une avec ces infâmes régicides, seraient très honorables; puisque.

I. Ce sont les Français qui, sous les murs de Vienne, ont demandé la paix;

II. Que nous avons eu le bon esprit de décliner jusqu'au bout la médiation perfide de la Prusse, qui voulait pêcher en eau trouble, et piller l'Empire en ayant l'air de nous rendre un service important;

III. Qu'enfin, l'Empereur aura à jamais le mérite incontestable d'avoir sacrifié les plus grands avantages, et des acquisitions considérables, à l'intégrité de l'Empire; et qu'ainsi, quelques soient les pertes qu'il éprouve, il aura la gloire d'avoir sauvé l'Allemagne du plan de destruction combiné contre elle par la France et surtout par la Prusse.

“Je ne veux pas manquer de vous faire observer ici combien il serait déplacé que le Ministre Anglais fût actuellement, dans son premier moment d'humeur, des ouvertures amicales à Berlin. Je sens bien vivement nos torts, mais ils sont loin d'approcher encore de ceux que la Prusse a déjà eu, et aura sans cesse. Chaque démarche de cette Cour est marquée au coin de la trahison, et de la perfidie; et je sais à n'en pas douter que, depuis très peu de temps, les conférences intimes de Caillard et de M. de Haugwitz redoublent encore, et sont plus fréquentes qu'auparavant. Ne croyez pas que la prévention, bien justifiée par l'expérience, que j'ai contre la Prusse m'aveugle dans ce moment; mais la même justice qui me fait rougir de notre dernière conduite, me force à tâcher de vous prémunir contre les embûches qu'on vous prépare. Six années de constance, de fidélité, et d'héroïsme peuvent contrebalancer un instant d'un oubli coupable. Mais je ne vois pas un seul trait de vertu dans la chronique Prussienne qu'on puisse opposer à son Machiavélisme non interrompu. La Cour de Petersbourg nous rend justice dans ce sens; elle est entièrement détachée de Berlin. Ses derniers offices au Roi et chez nous le démontrent évidemment; peut-être même que sa lenteur à se prononcer dans la guerre des souverains a hâté nos

déterminations. Nous les excuserons à ses yeux quoiqu'on ne les excusera jamais aux miens. Dans cet état de choses, l'Angleterre peut-elle balancer et songer un seul instant à préférer la Prusse aux deux Cours Impériales indissolublement unies de coeur et d'intérêt, et à l'abri de toutes les insinuations Berlinaises qui voudraient les diviser.

"C'est parceque je n'ignore pas que ces mêmes Prussiens vont s'efforcer de nous persuader que vous vous rapprochez d'eux, et que je crains que nous n'ajoutions trop aisément foi à leurs discours atroces, que je m'empresse de vous parler aussi vivement sur cet objet. Ne voyez, au reste, dans tout ce que je viens de vous dire, que l'expression de la douleur, des regrets, et des craintes d'un honnête homme, attaché à ce pays-ci comme au sien, et à vous-même plus qu'à personne."

*French.*

GEORGE HAMMOND to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, May 13, Lobositz.—"The messenger Basset having overtaken me here, I avail myself of this circumstance to add to my letters from Vienna, of which he is the bearer, that it is not my intention to wait at Dresden (at which place I shall be to-morrow) for the messenger who, as I understand from your Lordship's dispatch of the 2nd instant to Sir Morton Eden by Scott, would be dispatched last Friday week, longer than Thursday next; on which day, if he be not then arrived, I shall proceed to Berlin. With respect to my immediately communicating to the Prussian Minister the object of my journey thither, I shall be guided by the instructions which I may hope to receive there, or by those which Lord Elgin may have received upon the subject. I am the more inclined to use some discretion in this respect, as I am apprehensive that the delay in receiving the answers from St. Petersburg to the dispatch sent by Shaw, may be longer than that which I stated in my letter from Vienna; since I learn from Sir Morton Eden that, subsequently to my departure, Count Razoumowsky has received information from his court that the Emperor intends to visit some of the distant provinces of his empire previously to his return to St. Petersburg. In which case, if the ratification of the preliminaries be now received at Vienna, it is not absolutely impossible that the invitation to His Imperial Majesty to send a Minister to the congress, may reach him almost as soon as the communication transmitted by Shaw.

"I flatter myself that your Lordship will have the goodness to forgive the anxiety which I have expressed with respect to the receiving farther instructions previously to my arrival at Berlin; for although, in the delay which I have proposed, I conceive myself to be acting in opposition to the *letter* of your Lordship's last instructions, yet I venture to hope that, with my knowledge of what has passed at Vienna, I shall be justified in your Lordship's opinion for exercising some discretion on this point."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, May, York Farm].—"Voici enfin des nouvelles plus consolantes. J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer la dépêche que j'ai reçue; j'en ai une autre chiffrée, dont je vous rendrai compte après le déchiffrement. On veut bien sérieusement rester intime avec l'Angleterre. C'est beaucoup pour mon cœur. Je suis plus tranquille. Mandez-moi, ou faites moi de grace savoir, avec la même franchise, ce que M.



Hammond vous dit sur les conditions de la paix ; s'est-on ouvert à lui ? Je verrai cela dans le chiffre, vraisemblablement."

*French.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, May 30, Queen's House.—"In consequence of Lord Grenville's note, I have persuaded the Prince of Wurtemberg to defer his journey till Friday, but I do not believe it will be possible to get him to put it off longer ; indeed his servants and cloaths are gone to Harwich, and he is obliged to send after the baggage waggon that he may have linen to stay till that day. I hope therefore no time will be lost in sending out cutters to look into the Texel, and that Admiral Duncan will have orders to get his fleet out to secure the passage of the frigates."

LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, May 31, Downing Street.—"Lord Grenville has the honour humbly to submit to your Majesty the draft which was agreed upon this evening at the meeting of your Majesty's servants, for the official note to be sent to Paris. Lord Grenville trusts that your Majesty will find this paper as unexceptionable as the nature of the circumstances, and the occasion to which it is adapted will allow."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, June 1, Queen's House.—"I should not do justice to my feelings if I did not, in confidence, state to Lord Grenville that the many humiliating steps I have been advised to take in the last nine months have taken so deep an impression on my mind that I undoubtedly feel this kingdom lowered in its proper estimation much below what I should have flattered myself could have been the case during the latter part of my reign ; that I certainly look on the additional measure now proposed as a confirmation of that opinion ; at the same time that Lord Grenville has certainly worded it as little exceptionably as its nature would permit. I cannot add more on this occasion but that if both Houses of Parliament are in as tame a state of mind as it is pretended, I do not see the hopes that either war can be continued with effect or peace obtained but of the most disgraceful and unsolid tenure."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, June 2, Cleveland Row.—"Quoiqu'il serait difficile dans ce moment de faire des confidences au Ministre d'Autriche, je ne veux pas laisser ignorer à mon ami le Comte de Starhemberg que j'ai envoyé hier une lettre, par un bâtiment parlementaire, avec la proposition au Gouvernement Français de renouveler nos négociations pacifiques. Un peu de confiance de la part de votre Gouvernement aurait pu nous autoriser d'attendre l'invitation à un congrès. Peut-être qu'on préférerait à Vienne de nous forcer de faire ce que nous avons fait. Peut-être ne s'en soucie-t-on du tout. Peut-être même tout ceci tournera en bien. Dieu le veuille !"

*French. Copy.*

## COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, June 3, York Farm.—“Vous veniez de quitter le bureau quand j’y suis arrivé hier. Immédiatement après la réception de votre premier billet, j’avais pris mon cheval pour me rendre *in full speed* à vos ordres. J’ai trouvé à mon retour ici le billet confidentiel que vous m’avez fait l’honneur de m’écrire. Croyez que votre *bien tendre et véritable ami Starhemberg* à été, on ne peut pas plus, sensible à votre touchante attention pour lui, mais il aime à se flatter que, même en qualité de Ministre Impérial, il a et continuera d’avoir des droits à la confiance du Secrétaire d’État. Je suis convaincu que mon courier, qui n’est pas arrivé puisque le vent ne le lui permet pas, m’apportera de quoi vous satisfaire. Il ne m’appartient aucunement de juger votre dernière détermination, mais je suis trop vrai pour ne pas vous répéter encore que je regrette beaucoup que M. Hammond ait témoigné autant d’humeur à son départ, et ait quitté Vienne si brusquement; je regrette également l’envoi de votre dernier courier. Il est plus essentiel que jamais de s’entendre, et il faut le vouloir des deux côtés. Un premier tort ne doit pas en occasionner un second. J’espère qu’on sentira cette vérité chez nous et ici. Nous ne pouvons nous passer l’un de l’autre. Tout ce qui y supplierait ne serait que des convenances factices. Cette idée me rassure et me console en dernière analyse. La Russie ne remplirait pas plus pour vous le vide de l’Autriche que ne le ferait la Prusse. Elle ne serait point perfide, et voilà tout. Ce n’est pas d’aujourd’hui que vous connaissez celui qui ne voit de bonheur pour lui que dans votre estime et votre amitié, et de prospérité pour son pays que dans l’intimité avec le votre.”

*Postscript.*—“Ne croyez pas que Thugut soit étranger à tout ce qui se passe. Comptez sur la parole de votre ami, *ce ministre trouve la paix honorable*. Gallo n’a été qu’un instrument ignorant et intrigant, et un étranger dont on a sacrifié la réputation déjà peu florissante. Ce vilain Archiduc a fait la paix. Thugut n’en est pas fâché au fond, mais il l’affecte. Ceci est le vrai, mais dans notre intimité. Je connais mieux mon pays que M. Eden, et vous pouvez ne pas douter de mes renseignements, que je ne donne *qu’à vous*.”

*French.*

## EARL SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, June 5, Admiralty.—“It has occurred to me that, as it appears very improbable that the four ships in Yarmouth roads will join Admiral Duncan, it might not be amiss to apply to Woronzow for an order to the Russian Admiral (who is there with three sail of the line, a frigate, and a sloop) to join Duncan on his rendezvous off the Texel for a little time.

“I fear the change of wind to-day will retard the junction of Sir Roger Curtis who sailed only yesterday from Spithead, and facilitate the going out of the Dutch fleet.

“No satisfactory news from Sheerness. The delegates have hanged two men; but were obliged to do it with their own hands, as not a man in the ship would assist them.”

## LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, June 5, Cleveland Row.—“Il paraît qu’il n’y a guères lieu de se flatter que les quatre vaisseaux qui sont à Yarmouth se résoudront à rejoindre l’Amiral Duncan avant que la révolte à Sheerness ne soit entièrement calmée par la soumission des équipages.

“Duncan a avec lui deux vaisseaux, et Sir Roger Curtis est parti de Spithead pour se mettre sous ses ordres.

“Tous nos avis annoncent que la flotte Hollandaise est prête à mettre à la voile avec des troupes pour venir nous attaquer soit ici, soit (comme il est plus probable) en Irlande.

“Si dans ces circonstances vous pourriez persuader à votre Amiral de retarder son départ, et de se joindre à Duncan, la force serait suffisante; et je pense que, bien loin d'être désapprouvé, vous vous feriez un nouveau mérite auprès de l'Empereur en le mettant à même de rendre, au commencement de son règne, le plus grand service à l'Angleterre qu'elle ait jamais reçu de quelque autre nation ou puissance que ce fut.

“Je ne vous écris pas officiellement, parceque j'ai voulu savoir vos sentimens sur cette affaire avant de vous passer une note ministérielle. Si la chose est faisable, je suis bien sûr de vos dispositions personnelles.”

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, June 16, Downing Street.—“Your Majesty will receive from Mr. Pitt the minute of the meeting of your Majesty's servants this morning at which the draft of the answer to be returned to the late communication from Paris was finally settled. Lord Grenville would not discharge his duty to your Majesty as an honest man or as an attached and dutiful servant if, with the opinion which he cannot help entertaining on the subject of that paper, he omitted to declare to your Majesty without reserve how it appears to him to fall both in tone and substance below what the present situation of your Majesty's kingdoms, even under all the pressure of the moment, might have entitled your Majesty's Government to assume when speaking in your Majesty's name; and how much even the object of peace itself is endangered by a line of so much apparent weakness.

“It is the more necessary for Lord Grenville to submit to your Majesty, with all humility, his sentiments on this point from the circumstance of their relating to a matter so immediately connected with that department in which your Majesty has condescended to think his councils and services might be useful, and from the necessity of the measure receiving its execution in that department, and under the signature of the person placed by your Majesty at the head of it. In other times and circumstances he should have thought that with his opinion of this measure there remained for him but one line, that of most humbly requesting your Majesty to dispense with his farther services, and laying at your Majesty's feet, with every expression and sentiment of duty and gratitude, an office in the execution of which his opinions do not coincide with those of the majority of your Majesty's servants. But the crisis of the present hour is such that the withdrawing even of the most insignificant member of the Government might weaken it in the public opinion at a moment when every good man must wish it strengthened. And he feels that no motive short of the most uncontrollable necessity could justify to himself his deserting in a moment of so much danger that post in which your Majesty has been pleased to command his service. If in this respect he is led, from whatever sentiment, to attach too high an importance to any step which he might take, he humbly entreats your Majesty to pardon his presumption, and he submits himself entirely to your Majesty's disposal, anxious only to conduct himself according to the best dictates of his conscience, and thus to merit, what he knows he can no otherwise obtain, the

continuance of your Majesty's gracious and favourable opinion, in whatever station, public or private, he may be placed."

*Note by Lord Grenville.*—"This letter written during the time of the mutiny in the fleet."

*Enclosure.*

MINUTE OF CABINET.

1797, June 16.

Present:

Lord Chancellor, Lord President, Duke of Portland, Earl Spencer, Lord Grenville, Marquis Cornwallis, Earl of Chatham, Mr. Secretary Dundas, Mr. Pitt.

"It is humbly recommended to your Majesty than an official note conformable to the accompanying draft should be transmitted to Paris in answer to the last communication from thence. Lord Grenville desires to express his dissent."

*Copy by Lord Grenville.*

GEORGE III. to [W. PITT].

1797, June 17, Windsor.—"I am sorry to find the *note officielle*, and consequently the Minute of Cabinet could not be drawn up agreeable to the sentiments of all the ministers; for, though Lord Grenville is the only one that has dissented, yet I perceive neither Lord Liverpool nor Mr. Wyndham attend, which I must suppose was to avoid taking the step which, with Lord Grenville's manner of viewing the paper, he could not honourably avoid.

"I do not deny, though I shall not object to its being sent to Paris, that I rather think the tone taken is too low; and that I fear the object will be destroyed, as it will probably raise that of that horrid nation, and must oblige us to come to some explanation which might have been done more advantageously at present.

"I am happy to find, however unpleasant this business may be to Lord Grenville, that he is too sensible what he owes to me at this time to think of wishing to change his situation, and I am certain his talents will be very material in conducting the present negotiation should it really come to be the serious object of both nations."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, June 17, Windsor.—"The explanation which I have received in writing from Lord Grenville for his dissent to the Minute of Cabinet, and the proposed *note officielle* in answer to the last communication from Paris, so much more tallies with my own view of the business than the opinion of those who have drawn it up, that I can fairly approve of the whole of his conduct on this occasion; but however I think the tone adopted is below that which I should think advisable, I fear the having sought from hence a negotiation precludes our instantly breaking it off.

"However it may be irksome to Lord Grenville to hold the pen on this occasion, I must feel at this particular moment his remaining in his situation absolutely essential, for he will be able to stave off many farther humiliations that might be attempted from having shown a mind jealous of what seems in the outset an attempt to draw us into future embarrassments.

"I shall not be surprised if the note now prepared may not open a scene of chicane that may prevent the negotiation, in which case the conduct of Lord Grenville will be as highly thought of by his colleagues as it is now by me."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, June 17, Cleveland Row.--"Je vous restitue, avec bien des grâces, la lettre du Comte de Razoumowski. J'ai enfin reçu ce matin, par un courier du Chevalier Eden, ces fameux préliminaires. Ils sont tels que nous les connaissons déjà. Il n'y a, donc, rien de nouveau, mais on ne peut lire sans éprouver un sentiment d'indignation mêlée de douleur, des stipulations entre l'Empereur et le Directoire Français pour s'indemniser au dépens de la République de Venise. Cet objet était consigné à des articles secrets, dont on ne nous a pas communiqué la copie. Mais comme Eden a eu la permission de les lire, il me rend un compte fidèle de la teneur de ces stipulations indignes. Tout ceci est bien fait pour donner gain de cause aux Jacobins partout."

*French. Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, June 18, York Farm.--"J'aime à croire que vous voulez bien me rendre assez de justice, et que vous me connaissez assez, pour juger de tous les sentimens que j'ai dû éprouver à la lecture de ces maudits préliminaires que j'ai enfin reçu hier, avec ordre de vous les communiquer. Notre ami commun le Comte de Woronzow m'a dit que vous en aviez déjà connaissance, ainsi que de l'infâme stipulation secrète pour la spoliation de Venise, dont on me rend compte également. Je ne puis vous peindre ma peine et mon indignation. C'est la virginité jusqu'à présent intacte de la probité, de la dignité, et de l'honneur Autrichien que nous venons de perdre. Marie Thérèse dans des temps malheureux a prouvé qu'elle savait faire des sacrifices sans se déshonorer. Le système de brigandage et d'avilissement, après six ans de constance, devait donc tomber en partage à son petit fils. La conduite de Thugut n'a point de nom. Il est aussi coupable que Gallo, puisqu'il a tout laissé faire. Il est plus vil puisqu'il reste. Faut-il que mon malheureux païs, où il y a néanmoins tant de grands seigneurs parmi lesquels il se rencontre cependant quelques talens, soit toujours gouverné par des espèces comme *Spielmann* et *Thugut*, ou des pantalons Italiens comme ce poliçon de Gallo. Hélas! hélas!! Quoiqu'il en soit, toutes mes dépêches et mes lettres sont pleines du désir de rester bien avec l'Angleterre. Vos propres principes coïncident à cet égard avec notre volonté. Je vois encore des moyens de remédier à beaucoup de choses, quoiqu'on ne puisse pas tout réparer. Daignez me nommer un jour pour aller vous faire ma cour, vous faire cette pénible communication, et convenir avec vous du langage que nous tiendrons à Vienne. Adieu. Conservez-moi bonté, amitié, et estime; mes sentimens ne méritent pas qu'on me confonde avec mes ——— supérieurs. Je vous assure que je suis bien malheureux. Je ne me consolerais jamais de ce qui vient d'arriver."

*French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, July 2, York Farm.--"J'ai reçu une longue dépêche chiffrée de ma Cour, dont le sens roule sur les difficultés qu'on entrevoit à pouvoir

ratifier notre convention pour l'emprunt. On me promet à ce sujet des détails ultérieurs par ce courier, attendu comme le Messie, et qui n'arrive pas. Ce sera par la même occasion que je recevrai l'instruction (que je n'ai pas encore) de vous entretenir officiellement à cet égard. M. de Meerfeld est allé par ordre de l'Empereur à Milan pour insister positivement auprès des Plénipotentiaires Français sur la fixation positive de l'endroit et du moment de l'ouverture du congrès. Nos troupes ont déjà occupé la plus grande partie de l'Istrie et de la Dalmatie. On craint des troubles dans ce dernier pays où l'anarchie prévaut. Voilà les fruits de la paix, et de toute communication avec ces infâmes Français. Puisse le ciel préserver votre bon pays des maux inévitables de la pacification avec l'anarchie; il ne l'a sûrement pas mérité. Je suis trop accablé, honteux, et désolé pour vous en dire davantage. Plaignez-moi; ceux qui pensent comme votre ami le méritent. Le Lieutenant Raigersfeld vient d'être échangé. C'était la seule chose qui s'opposait à son avancement. J'ose donc de nouveau le recommander à vos bontés, et à votre souvenir."

*French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, July 4, Dropmore.—"J'avais déjà appris par les dernières lettres du Chevalier Eden qu'il était encore question d'ajouter à tous les autres torts celui de manquer à ses engagements pécuniaires, et de rejeter sur nous les pertes qui ne résultent que de ce que nous avons fait, et voulu faire pour nos alliés. Je vous ai dit tout ce que je pense à ce sujet. Il me paraît que la question est bien autrement importante pour l'intérêt de Sa Majesté Impériale que pour celui de l'Angleterre. Nous y perdrons quelque argent pour avoir cru à la bonne foi et à la probité du Gouvernement Autrichien. La Cour de Vienne y perdra pour jamais son crédit, son honneur, et la possibilité de trouver ici en quelque cas que ce fut une assistance quelconque en fait de finances. Tout compté, je crois véritablement qu'il si nous sommes les dupes, ce sera le *Dupeer* qui perdra.

"La fraternisation Istrienne et Dalmatienne n'était pas difficile à prévoir, non plus que tout ce qui se prépare dans l'Empire. Dans la perspective de tant de maux, c'est toujours une grande consolation de pouvoir dire qu'on n'y a pas contribué; et cette consolation le Gouvernement de mon pays partage avec vous, et le très petit nombre d'honnêtes gens qui ont soutenu, jusqu'à la fin, la bonne cause.

*French. Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, July 6, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville will be surprised when he finds that the letter he has forwarded to me is from the uncle of the King of Sweden, and on the business I have already declined his proposing to come to England; I therefore desire an explicit answer may be prepared for me disapproving of any such idea, as I certainly shall not consent to any union of him with either of my daughters. How shameful a deceit in his sister's sending this through the Duchess of York?"

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, July 6, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour most humbly to submit to your Majesty a draft to Mr. Craufurd on the

subject of the Condé army; to which he has taken the liberty to annex a draft of a letter in your Majesty's name to the Prince of Condé, which he trusts your Majesty will not deem improper, and which, if your Majesty were graciously pleased to send it under your Majesty's royal hand, would certainly on that account acquire great additional value in the eyes of these unfortunate and meritorious men."

*Copy.*

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, July 7, Windsor.—"I return to Lord Grenville the drafts, and the letter to the Prince of Condé which I have copied, and send also that it may be forwarded to Mr. Crauford. In the other box is the letter to the Duke of Ostragothia, which I desire may be sent to Mr. Hales, and that he may be instructed to communicate the contents to the King of Sweden, that I may be no further troubled on this subject."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1797, July 13, Cleveland Row.—"I have to acknowledge your two private letters which accompanied the despatches by the two messengers. I was the more anxious to use expedition in sending the present despatches in order that you might have a messenger with you so as to enable you, as fast as possible, to feed our anxious expectation. I do not think much conclusion can be drawn from what has already passed, though the three demands made by France are more unreasonable and unconciliating than was generally expected here.

"The negotiations between France and the Emperor were at a stand, and the latter appears by the last letters from Vienna to have insisted on the concluding his definitive treaty only at a congress. How far the knowledge of your mission, and the avowed object of it may change this determination, I cannot say; but if the court of Vienna suffers from this separation of interest and conduct, it has only to thank itself for it. Some good may perhaps result to our negotiation from any rub which that with Austria experiences, but, in the end, Austria unsupported by England must acquiesce in almost any terms that France will give her.

"Buonaparte seems to be settling Italy (if a total subversion of a country can be called settling it) without any reference either to the Directory or their treaties."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1797, July 20, Cleveland Row.—"The complexion of your last despatch is certainly much more unfavourable to peace than I thought the Directory could have ventured, under the present circumstances of the country in which you are. My only hope is in firmness, without asperity of tone. We have purposely postponed saying anything on the two points, of the King's title and of the Toulon ships, till we see more clearly into the intentions of the French Government respecting terms; for, in truth, neither those points nor any other in such a treaty as this are separate, or can be insulated (as they call it) from the general

consideration of the whole. Good terms as to matters of substantial importance might make us more disposed to overlook points of form, which are however, as you well know, matters of real substance when they relate to the intercourse of two great powers, whose most valuable possession is national dignity, and a due sense of their own importance and weight. I think the first point might be arranged (but this is merely my own private opinion) by using in the treaty the style of Great Britain only, for which you will see there are precedents enough down to the peace of Utrecht, but retaining the present style in the full powers, the ratification, and all other instruments to which this Government alone is a party; perhaps the words *Britannic Majesty* would be better than *King of Great Britain*, and these are now very often used even in our latest treaties and connections. As to the acts of our own Government, the French have no more right to object to any style the King takes than we have to quarrel with the denomination of their councils, or any other branch of the Government. Beyond this we might go so far as to add to the separate article some such words as the concluding part only of those which you mention in your letter to Canning, not admitting it to be *only a genealogical title*, but declaring that it is not meant to prejudice the King's acknowledgment of a Republican form of government in France.

"The Toulon question is more difficult, and has more of substance in it. We do not quite understand how far the demand is meant to go; whether to restore those ships which can be restored, and to compensate those which are burnt; or to restore, and if not to compensate those only which are now in our possession. If the former, it is a question of 18 sail of the line and as many frigates, the value of which is perhaps fully equal to some of the conquests we restore. I confess I hardly see how we can in any case do more than let some words be inserted in the article of our restitutions, in which they shall be said to be made in compensation for the ships. This, however, is also private opinion only, and on a point on which the King's Government think an ultimate decision cannot be taken without some reference to the terms of peace.

"This subject brings me by too natural and easy a connection to one which has given me much uneasiness. I mean the constant publication of almost every circumstance of this negotiation within a few hours after your couriers arrive here. I have been at some pains to trace the channel of this breach of trust, but to no purpose. Such measures have now been taken here as will, I think, make it impossible that any thing should for the future be known through any person admitted to a knowledge or perusal of your dispatches. You will also see in one of my public letters to you some steps taken to prevent the means of intercourse from France. I am far from suspecting carelessness or indiscretion on this subject from any of the persons attached to your mission in whatever situation; but at the time I am imposing the strongest restrictions on the persons belonging to my own Office, it is due to them, as well as to the importance of the subject, that I should request you to converse upon it with every one of the persons now with you, and to beg them to use the utmost caution, not only not to reveal any thing secret, which I am confident none of them would, but not even to suffer the remotest inferences to be drawn from any thing they write. It is not only with a view to political consequences that this is so important, but also from the effects which this public discussion of every point and turn of the negotiation must have in promoting ruinous speculation in the funds."

*Copy.*



## LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WOROUZOW.

1797, July 22, Dropmore.—“Je viens de recevoir une dépêche de notre Ministre à Pétersbourg, par laquelle il m'informe de l'approbation entière que l'Empereur a donné à votre conduite en acquiescant à la demande que je vous fis par ordre du Roi pour retenir les vaisseaux Russes qui avaient reçu l'ordre de partir. Je ne manquerai pas de saisir le premier moment pour charger le Chevalier Whitworth de l'expression des sentimens de reconnaissance du Roi pour cette nouvelle marque d'amitié de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale, dont je vous prie d'être aussi l'interprète auprès de votre Cour, connaissant, comme vous le faites, l'attachement du Roi à la personne de l'Empereur, et aux liens d'alliance et d'intérêt commun qui unissent les deux monarchies.

“Sa Majesté a bien voulu aussi me charger de nouveau de vous témoigner, M. le Comte, combien Elle est sensible aux preuves que vous avez donné dans cette occasion de votre désir constant de contribuer à maintenir cette union si importante au bonheur de toute l'Europe, et de marquer votre attachement aux intérêts de ce pays, si intimement liés avec ceux des états de l'Empereur.

“C'est avec un bien vrai plaisir que je m'acquitte de cette commission, en vous priant d'agréer les assurances de mon attachement inviolable, et de l'amitié sincère que je vous ai vouée.”

*French. Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WOROUZOW.

1797, July 22, Dropmore.—“Permettez-moi de joindre à ma lettre d'aujourd'hui deux mots par rapport à l'entretien que vous avez eu avec Canning.

“Je suis dans le cas de plusieurs grands Ministres, moi indigne; c'est à dire que je garde très scrupuleusement le secret, n'ayant rien à dire.

“Notre négociation n'est pas encore assez avancée pour qu'il soit possible de juger des résultats. Nous sommes encore à tatonner. Peut-être qu'il faudra encore que le Directoire connaisse à quoi se tenir par rapport aux deux Conseils, avant d'entrer sérieusement en matière. On dit que de nouveaux acteurs paraissent sur la scène, et que d'autres reparaissent aux quels, sans doute, on aurait peu songé il y a un an. Mais pour dire quelle influence le ministère de l'ex-evêque d'Autun aura sur la paix, ou la guerre, il faudrait être meilleur devin que je ne me crois.”

*French. Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

*Private.*

1797, July 27, Cleveland Row.—“Brooks arrived here with your despatches of the 25th this morning. The picture which you draw of the state of affairs at Paris is exactly conformable to my other information, and I make no doubt that the question of peace and war depends much more on the issue of that crisis than on any thing we can do or say in the way of negotiation.

“Lord Mornington, who takes his brother with him to India, is anxious to have him over here as soon as possible. I conclude therefore that you will send him instead of Lord Granville Leveson with whatever you may have for us next week. I have not yet exactly determined how to replace him, but I shall probably have settled this

point in a few days, and I will take care to keep you as little a time as possible without a secretary."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, July 29, Lille.—"I have made my dispatches to day exceedingly short as it was my wish that everything material should be reported to you by Mr. Wesley, who, in consequence of the strong desire expressed in Lord Mornington's letter, leaves Lille in a few hours. Mr. Wesley is perfectly master of the subject, and will not only be able to give a very accurate account of what I referred to in my last private letter, but also to answer any questions which may be put to him; and I am sure you will derive more information and more satisfaction from conversing with him than from the longest official account I could send. I am very glad to find that the intelligence you receive relative to the present situation of affairs in this country, corresponds with that I collect here, and that you draw from it the same inference that I do. I think what you hear from Wesley will confirm you in this idea. My strong motive for giving credit to the persons who inform me is, that they are, according to every reasonable conjecture, acting with a view to their own interests, and that they personally are and must be anxious that the negotiation should succeed. It will be nearly a week before I can hope to be able to write to you again. It is *just possible* that I shall be sent back to make my own report; but it is much more probable that the return of the courier from Paris will furnish me with such important matter as to authorise me to send over Lord G. Leveson, which I shall not hesitate doing if it appears to me tantamount.

"In regard to a successor to Mr. Wesley, I really should consider myself as much obliged to you if you would not send over anyone. I have such pleasant and ready assistance from Lord Morpeth, Lord G. Leveson and Mr. Ellis that, with the help of Mr. Ross, I have no employment for a Secretary of Legation; and as we necessarily must from the total want of society and from other very obvious reasons live entirely by ourselves, and, in a manner, always together and in the same house, the addition of any person with whom we are not in as strict habits of intimacy as we were with Wesley previous to his leaving England, would very much break in upon our comforts, and perhaps be not very pleasant to him."

NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE.

[M. MARET TO LORD MALMESBURY.]

1797, July 31, Lille.—"Un courier adressé à une seule personne, et apportant des dépêches pour *elle seule*, arrive à l'instant. Elles font pressentir, que des sentiments d'honneur ne permettront pas de revenir sur la mesure antérieure. Il ne reste donc à cet égard que très peu d'espérance de changement dans l'état présent des choses. Un résultat plus heureux dépendra uniquement des *intérêts moins directes*. La personne qui a reçu le courier est autorisé à faire par écrit les communications nécessaires pour amener à des dispositions plus faciles sur ces intérêts moins directs. Elle se propose d'expédier cette nuit un courier vers les lieux d'où doivent être adressées les intentions des co-intéressés dont les agents doivent bientôt se rendre à Paris, afin

d'influer utilement sur les instructions qui leur seront remises, et auxquelles tient tout espoir d'accommodement.

"Il serait sans doute précieux de connaître les bornes dans lesquelles pourraient être restreintes les prétentions énoncées contre eux. On concevra, qu'en sollicitant des indications d'une nature aussi grave et aussi confidentielle, on ne peut avoir d'autre but que de favoriser le désir réciproque de succès, et d'autres règles de conduite que celles que doit prescrire la plus prudente réserve. Ce qui serait confié servirait uniquement de direction dans les efforts qui vont être faits près des co-intéressés, et aucune personne quelle qu'elle fut ne serait initiée dans ces détails de pure et d'entière confiance. On réclame également dans les rapports à faire à qui que ce soit, l'oubli absolu de la communication présente, offerte comme un témoignage de la plus véritable estime."

*French. Copy.*

#### NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE.

[LORD MALMESBURY to M. MARET.]

1797, July 31, Lille.—"On regarde le billet remis comme une preuve également loyale et obligéante des sentiments de la personne qui l'a écrite, et on se fait un plaisir d'y répondre dans le même sens. On voit avec chagrin dépendre le seul espoir de succès d'un rapprochement d'intérêts aussi difficiles, pour ne pas dire impossibles, à concilier. On assure bien sincèrement que les instructions sont positives. Tout ce qu'on peut faire c'est de promettre d'employer toute son influence personnelle pour se procurer la permission de co-opérer avec l'auteur du billet en obtenant, s'il est possible, quelques modifications pour les intérêts moins directs.

"En attendant, pour répondre à une confiance dont on sent tout le prix (et comptant sur le même secret qu'on promet à son tour) on n'hésite pas de dire qu'on recevra sans difficulté toute proposition de cette nature, et même qu'on l'appuyera autant que cela est compatible avec son devoir."

*French. Copy.*

[GEORGE CANNING] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, July 31, 10 p.m., Spring Gardens.—"Wesley arrived this evening, and would willingly have proceeded at once to Dropmore, but that as he had already been two nights without going to bed on his journey, and as he could not have arrived at Dropmore in such time as to have any chance of much conversation with your Lordship this evening, I confess I rather discouraged his doing so, and recommended his making the sort of *précis*, which is herewith sent, of what he had to communicate to your Lordship, and deferring his going to waiting upon you at Dropmore till tomorrow morning.

"Lord Malmesbury recommends so earnestly the keeping a profound secret the particulars of all that has passed at Lille upon this subject, that Mr. Pitt had thought it right that the enclosed bulletin (written under his direction) should be circulated among the members of the Cabinet, as containing all that was fit to be communicated of what Mr. Wesley brought with him.

"But since seeing Mr. Pitt, a doubt has arisen in my mind (which I should state to him if he were still in town, and which I hope your Lordship will pardon me for suggesting to you) that the members of the Cabinet might feel some degree of displeasure at so professed a

limitation of confidence in them, and that it might be better (if it is thought right not to communicate the whole) to withhold *every thing* from them, until a future opportunity. The ostensible dispatch (No. 15) is as much as Wesley *need* have brought, considering the circumstances which occasioned and will account for his coming over. No. 16, in which *he* is referred to for details of great importance, must of course in this case be entirely suppressed. I have separated the dispatches with this view, and with a view of leaving it open to your Lordship to send as much or as little as you may think right to the King. Your Lordship will determine how far these views are right ones. I have only to request that you will have the goodness to let me know your determination as early as possible tomorrow; as you must be aware in how very awkward a situation I am placed with regard to the rest of the Ministers, until I know how I am to answer any questions that may be put to me.

"*Till* I hear from you I shall confine myself to saying that Wesley is come over in consequence of Lord Mornington's summons; that he brings a dispatch of form; and rather promises of future communications than any thing of immediate importance."

*Enclosure 1.*

HENRY WESLEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, July 31, 9 p.m., Spring Gardens.—"I arrived in London this evening, but not so early as to enable me to reach Dropmore in any reasonable time. I have therefore thought it better to put upon paper as accurately as I could the substance of what Lord Malmesbury entrusted to me to communicate to your Lordship. I cannot but be sensible that, in the haste in which I have written, there may be much upon which your Lordship may require further explanation; and I shall therefore do myself the honour of waiting on your Lordship at Dropmore tomorrow by twelve o'clock."

*Enclosure 2.*

MEMORANDUM OF MR. WESLEY.

1797, July 31.—"On the 14th of July an Englishman, whose name is Cunningham, who has been for some years resident at Lisle, called on Mr. Wesley and said he was come on a business of the utmost importance which he had been desired to communicate to some person in Lord Malmesbury's suite. He then produced a note which he said he had received that morning from a M. Pein, a most intimate friend of his, and a near relation of Maret's. The following were the words of his note. '*Il seroit peut-être nécessaire que, pour presser la négociation, Lord Malmesbury eut des moyens de s'entendre et préparer les matières avec la personne qui est vraiment la seule en état de conduire l'affaire; dans ce cas on pourrait ménager au Lord un intermédiaire qui a la confiance entière de la personne en question, et qui, comme elle, n'a d'autre but que l'intérêt de tous, et un arrangement également convenable.*' As soon as Mr. Wesley had read the note, Mr. Cunningham proceeded to state that his friend was in possession of the entire confidence of Maret, by whom he had been authorised to make the above overture. Mr. Wesley immediately informed Lord Malmesbury of what had passed between Mr. Cunningham and him, and it was agreed that Mr. Ellis and M. Pein should meet in the

evening. At that interview M. Pein repeated nearly what Mr. Cunningham had said in the morning, and added that Maret's opinions on all political subjects were very different from those of the other Plenipotentiaries; that he was the intimate friend of Barthélemy through whose means he had been appointed one of the Ministers to treat for peace with England; that therefore his sentiments could not be doubted, as it was well known Barthélemy was sincerely desirous of the restoration of peace. M. Pein added that Maret had his suspicions with respect to the intentions of the Directory; but that the cry of the whole nation was so decidedly for peace, and the majority of the Representatives in the two Councils so convinced of the impracticability of carrying on the war for a much longer term, that, if the negotiation was prudently conducted, the Directory must in the end give way. M. Pein, in the course of this conversation, frequently insisted on the necessity of gaining time; on which he said the success of the whole business chiefly depended.

"Mr. Ellis saw him again on the 16th, and he then assured him on the part of Maret that the note of the Directory in answer to Lord Malmesbury's project had appeared no less offensive to the French legation than to the English; that even Le Tourneur had expressed the most violent indignation on the subject, and that they had sent to the *Ministre des Relations Extérieures* the most pointed remonstrance that they could venture on the subject. His own opinion was '*que c'était une infamie de Charles De la Croix*.' He added that the Directory had kept Maret five days at Paris after Le Tourneur and Pleville, with a view of giving him the fullest private instructions; during which time they never hinted at the secret articles of the Spanish or Dutch treaties. He begged Mr. Ellis to tell Lord Malmesbury that the French legation adjured him to palliate the measure as well as he could to his Court. Mr. Ellis has seen him several times since, and the following is a general statement of what has passed between them. He said that Maret being personally known to and liked by Barras, was promised by him, as well as by Carnot and Barthélemy, to be promoted to the place of Minister of Foreign Affairs, but that knowing Talleyrand to be his rival for that place, he had waited on him to say that his wish was to begin by some foreign mission; that he should prefer London, for which his appointment to the legation at Lisle was a natural preparation; that he would willingly quit his pretensions to the Ministry if he (Talleyrand) would assist him in his other views. He added that Delacroix could not stay in long, and that his dismissal and the nomination of Talleyrand (both of which have since happened) would tend very much to further the views of the English. He said that Le Tourneur was so dull and obstinate that Maret found it very difficult, with all his address, to guide him right. That he had with some trouble managed Pleville, and through him Le Tourneur; but that Pleville's appointment to the Ministry of the Marine would be very inconvenient to him unless he could procure the appointment of Colchen in his room. He seemed very anxious about the answer to be brought by our courier, and begged to know in time what that answer was, in order that Maret might be prepared to act in concert with Lord Malmesbury, both by preparing Le Tourneur for the conference, and by making the earliest favourable impression in Paris. Mr. Ellis agreed with him about a sign of intelligence by which Lord Malmesbury and Maret might understand each other, without attracting the attention of Le Tourneur and Colchen. Immediately after the conference, in consequence of the arrival of our courier, he sent for Mr. Ellis and told him he had two

requests to make; one was that Lord Malmesbury would delay sending his note to the legation for 24 hours; the other that the note might be communicated to Maret before it was delivered. Mr. Ellis acceded to both, and received the note back from him the next morning. He read to Mr. Ellis a few words from Maret to himself in which he says, after some handsome things about Lord Malmesbury, '*qu'il n'y aura plus entre eux d'autre dispute que celle de franchise et de loyauté.*' He then put into Mr. Ellis's hands a note for Lord Malmesbury, in which Maret says, that in consequence of the temper with which the note is written, it cannot but do good; that far from wishing to weaken any part of it, he thought it might be strengthened still farther by a reference to the *arrêté* of the Directory of 27th November last. He then said that in order to prove to Mr. Ellis that he had not insisted without reason on the necessity of delaying our note, he would read to him a letter which Maret had the night before received from Barthélemy. It was expressed very nearly in these words; '*J'ai parlé hier au nouveau Ministre des Relations Extérieures sur l'affaire de notre ami commun Colchen, et il m'avoit promis de proposer aujourd'hui au Directoire sa nomination à la place vacante dans votre Légation. Il n'en a cependant rien fait, je ne sais pour quoi, peut-être le fera-t-il demain. J'en aurais fait moi-même la proposition si je n'avois craint de vous nuire. Pleville, grâce à vos soins, me parait bien disposé pour la paix, mais j'ai de fortes raisons de croire qu'une CERTAINE PERSONNE revient ou se dispose à revenir à l'avis de ses anciens collègues; (the certaine personne means Le Tourneur); j'ai les plus grandes inquiétudes sur l'absurde obstacle qu'on a mis en avant pour retarder la paix, c'est à dire, nos liaisons envers nos alliés. Comment, avec du sens commun, peut-on insister sur un raisonnement aussi absurde, dans un tems où la paix nous est absolument nécessaire, et où nous sommes sûrs de la faire glorieuse. Cependant cela est. Vous ne sauriez vous figurer la jalousie, les sottises préventions de certaines gens.*' Towards the end of the letter he says, '*Nous sommes dans une crise abominable, mais, avec le tems et la modération, on vient à bout de tout. Patientez, je vous prie, et cherchez s'il est possible à gagner du tems.*'

"A few hours before Mr. Wesley left Lisle Mr. Ellis had another interview with M. Pein. M. Pein said that Maret had written him word that he had that morning received private letters from Paris containing very favourable intelligence. Pein believed these to be answers to the letters written by Maret to prepare his friends at Paris for Lord Malmesbury's note. He said he did not think it likely that the official answer to Lord Malmesbury's note would arrive at Lisle before Monday or Tuesday, but that he had little doubt of its being such as would enable him to go on with the negotiation. It would not be possible for him, he said, to see Maret before the departure of Mr. Wesley, as he was gone out of town and was not to return till the next day. He then told Mr. Ellis that an article had appeared in one of the French newspapers stating that Carnot had had an interview with La Revellière Lepaux for the purpose of endeavouring to bring him round to the moderate party. This he said was not true; that it was Pichégrou who was the real mediator between the *Modérés* and the violent part of the Directory; and that, from the style of Pichégrou's report to the Council upon the conduct of the Executive Power in having violated the constitution, which report is much more moderate than was expected, it is probable he has succeeded in bringing about something like a reconciliation. It seems that the *Modéré* party in the Council, though generally alarmed beyond measure at the Jacobins,

are now perfectly fearless under Pichégrou; and that, though they cannot easily attack the authority of the Directory immediately, they can get the better of them through the medium of the Ministers. They have driven out Delacroix, Truguet, and very lately Lenoir Laroche; should they succeed against Merlin, which seems probable, they will greatly diminish the preponderance of the Jacobinical part of the Executive Power. A committee is at this moment framing a report on the *comptabilité des Ministres*; and they are passing a bill for the purpose of reorganising the National Guard, which, when under the influence or control of such men as Pichégrou, will become a most formidable body, entirely devoted to the moderate party. It should seem from all these circumstances that the Directory, divided as it now is, must grow weaker every day. And this is certainly an argument in favour of Peiu's maxim, that everything depends on gaining time. He told Mr. Ellis that every day that passed over our heads put us upon surer ground; and that it is impossible for the Directory to hold out much longer against the clamour for peace, when the impracticability of furnishing funds for the continuation of the war is notorious to everybody."

*Enclosure 3.*

*Most secret.*

CIRCULAR TO CABINET MINISTERS (not sent).

1797, July 31.—"Mr. Wesley arrived in town this evening with despatches from Lord Malmesbury, and charged with communications, the *details* of which are of such a nature that Lord Malmesbury feels himself bound to require that they should be kept entirely secret for the present. The substance of these communications is:—

"That some of the persons accompanying Lord Malmesbury have found an opportunity of establishing a secret communication with a person confidentially connected with a part of the French mission. From a number of circumstances (which it is stipulated shall not be disclosed) there is little doubt that this person expresses the real sentiments of those for whom he professes to speak; and that *they* are in direct communication with the leading persons of the *moderate* party at Paris. This party, so far as can be judged from these reports, is sincerely inclined to peace. The business has not yet gone so far as to lead to the mention of any particular terms of peace. But the extravagance of the pretension advanced in the last note of the Directory is not only admitted, but seems to be strongly felt; and the equity of the original principle of compensations is acknowledged.

"The persons in question recommend above all things our endeavouring to gain time, which is considered as particularly material during the present state of parties at Paris. And they appear to be persuaded that, by patience and firmness on our part, the difficulty arising out of the present pretensions of the Directory will be overcome; and that the negotiation may be carried on with a considerable prospect of success."

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 1, Downing Street.—"I am infinitely obliged to your Lordship for your early answer to my letter, without which I should have felt myself very much at a loss how to measure my language upon this occasion.

"The memorandum which your Lordship has sent me will be a very safe guide to me. And I have thought indeed that the safest mode of making any communication upon the subject will be to make a transcript of it, to be circulated (*sealed*) among the members of the Cabinet.

"I wrote to Mr. Pitt last night, after having dispatched the messenger to Dropmore, as fully and to the same effect as I had done to your Lordship. He is not to be in town today, but I shall see him in a few hours at Wimbledon, where I am to meet him at dinner, and where I will take care to arrive (with my memorandum) before him.

"This engagement at Wimbledon prevents me from having the pleasure of waiting upon you at Dropmore today, which I would otherwise gladly have done. *Tomorrow* I think it not improbable from what Wesley tells me that a messenger may arrive from Lille, with the answer of the Directory to Lord Malmesbury's last note, which was expected at Lille yesterday, or this morning.

"The new boxes will not be ready till this evening. In the meantime, I send to the King with all the precautions which your Lordship recommends.

"I enclose the copy of your letter.

"I open my packet again to tell your Lordship that I have received an answer from Mr. Pitt to my letter of last night. He says that 'he feels very strongly the force of the objections to the bulletin; that half the secret is enough, if disclosed, to do a great deal of the mischief; and there is perhaps less security for its being faithfully kept, when any part is withheld. On the other hand, he does not see how it can be kept back altogether. He inclines to think that it would be best that the whole narrative should be confidentially circulated in a most secret and sealed packet.' He concludes with saying 'that it is impossible to decide anything until I shall have received your Lordship's answer, which he presumes I shall have done before we meet at Wimbledon; and that he will not arrive at Wimbledon till just before dinner, in order to avoid saying anything till he has seen me.'

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, August 1, Dropmore.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty the dispatches received last night from Lord Malmesbury. He has not yet seen Mr. Wesley, whom he expects here in the course of this day, he having been much fatigued with his journey from Lisle. But he understands that the result of Mr. Wesley's account of the state of things at Paris, as far as it was known to Lord Malmesbury, confirms the opinions before entertained by him that the event of the negotiation depends almost entirely on that of the present struggle at Paris; and that an indirect communication has even been made to Lord Malmesbury to that effect."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 2, Weymouth.—"I should hope from the intimations in Lord Malmesbury's dispatches that Mr. Wesley's will have much curious intelligence to communicate to Lord Grenville, who, I trust, will write to me the material information. Every account from Paris proves that the struggle at Paris must be very great, and on the issue of that, not on the state of any proposition from hence, will the fate of peace or the continuation of war depend."



## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, August 4, Dropmore.—“Lord Grenville has been honoured with your Majesty’s commands, and he thinks that the best manner in which he can execute them to your Majesty’s satisfaction will be by humbly submitting to your Majesty the paper herewith enclosed, which was drawn up by Mr. Wesley immediately after his arrival here as the substance of what he was to report, though it has been docketed by mistake as a communication from Lord Malmesbury.

“Lord Grenville had near two hours’ conversation with Mr. Wesley on the different points to which this paper relates, on every one of which he examined him as particularly as possible, but he did not find that any material circumstance had come to Mr. Wesley’s knowledge which is not there stated; and, indeed, the whole of the information which Lord Malmesbury has been able to obtain of the state of affairs at Paris seems to arise solely from this channel of communication. He particularly questioned Mr. Wesley whether anything had been said about terms of peace, as, without this, all other assurances seem to him to be extremely vague and little to be relied on. It appears however that nothing had passed on that head beyond the general expression of reasonable terms, and an implied concession that your Majesty was entitled to some compensation, but without intimating anything of its nature or amount.

“Lord Grenville does not therefore flatter himself that much more results from this communication than that the moderate party were desirous to prevent the negotiation from being abruptly terminated pending the struggle at Paris; but, if they should succeed, there seems no sufficient ground to rely on their being actuated by any other disposition for peace than what would arise from a motive to the operation of which their adversaries would, under the like circumstances, be equally, or even more exposed, the great difficulty which they would find in continuing the war.

“Lord Grenville has, however, thought that the peculiar nature of this communication, and the danger to which any knowledge or suspicion of it would subject the person there named, justified him (particularly under the unfortunate circumstance of the publicity which the former part of this negotiation has been exposed to, from some cause which he cannot ascertain) in withholding from all his colleagues in office except Mr. Pitt, the name and situation of the person with whom Lord Malmesbury has communicated; and in stating to them only the general result of that communication; and he humbly hopes that in so doing he has not deviated from the usual course of your Majesty’s service on similar occasions, or transgressed the rules which your Majesty would be pleased to prescribe to him for his conduct if the time would have admitted of such a reference.”

*Copy by Lord Grenville.*

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, August 4] York Farm.—“Malgré ma meilleure envie d’être utile à ma Cour dans tous les instans de ma vie, il me paraît que celui-ci est un de ceux pendant lesquels il doit lui être absolument indifférent que je me trouve à Londres ou à Broadstairs. Ce dernier endroit n’est pas d’ailleurs tellement éloigné de la capitale que je ne puisse pas y recevoir régulièrement les informations nécessaires pour remplir ma *gazette politique* called dépêche. Cela posé, pourvu que vous ne le trouviez pas mauvais, je me propose d’aller passer huit autres jours

avec Madame de Starhemberg et mes enfans. Je partirai mardi prochain, et serai de retour le mardi d'après. Si dans l'intervalle vous jugiez ma présence nécessaire, un mot de vous me ferait arriver à Londres 24 heures après l'avis reçu. Je me recommande à vos bontés pendant l'intervalle, dans le cas de l'expédition d'un courier, et j'attendrai votre permission avant de m'absenter.

"J'aurai soin d'informer M. Canuing du moment de mon départ et de celui de mon retour, pour éviter que vos bontés pour moi ne deviennent inutiles, comme dans l'occasion du départ du courier Hunter. Agrérez mes hommages ; le bruit public m'apprend que les négociations de Lord Malmsbury cheminent. Je ne demande point un secret auquel la dernière conduite de ma Cour ne me donne aucun droit, selon moi ; mais je ne puis me refuser à vous parler ici de tous les vœux que je forme dans mon cœur pour la réussite de tout ce qui peut contribuer au bien ou à l'utilité du pays que j'habite, et que je regarde comme ma seconde patrie."

*French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, August 5, Dropmore.—"Je ne prévois rien qui puisse vous retenir en ville, mais, si quelque chose arrivait, nous serions toujours assez à temps de vous en prévenir à Broadstairs, où je vous souhaite très sincèrement toute sorte d'amusemens propres à vous faire oublier les chagrins auxquels notre métier nous expose, et les tristes réflexions qu'on ne peut guères s'empêcher de faire en songeant à l'avenir. Mes lettres de Vienne par cette dernière malle ne m'apportent rien de bien positif sur l'état des choses. La négociation paraît ne s'avancer que très lentement, et il semble qu'on n'est rien moins que content de M. de Gallo. On a même dit au Chevalier Eden que si nous pourrions, l'Angleterre et l'Autriche, résister *de concert* encore pour quelques mois, nous obligerions l'ennemi à se soumettre à des conditions raisonnables. Oh si cette vérité eut été sentie il y a trois mois, quand il était encore temps !"

*French. Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 5, Weymouth.—"I have copied the letter for the Duke of Ostragothia, and desire it may be sent to Mr. Hailes with the same instructions that were sent on board the packet, and sunk when she was taken

"I have read with attention the paper drawn up by Mr. Wesley, and perfectly coincide in opinion with Lord Grenville that it by no means holds out any view that can found an opinion that peace will be effected ; but it certainly shows that the gaining [time?] may be advantageous.

"I thoroughly approve of Lord Grenville's having only communicated this paper to Mr. Pitt, as it can be of no use in forming any opinion, and the less papers not necessary towards effecting that are circulated the better."

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, August 6, Lille.—"Mr. Wesley will have acquainted you with the secret channel of communication that has been opened here, and

with such information as I had derived through it up to the day of his leaving Lille. Since, still more material intelligence has come to my knowledge, and the same motive which induced me to employ Mr. Wesley determines me now to send Lord G. Leveson to England. I have no doubt you found Mr. Wesley exact and accurate. You will, I am sure, find Lord Granville equally so ; and, besides the advantage this mode of communication has over all others in point of secrecy and safety, you derive from it the power of question and inquiry, which, for my own satisfaction and comfort, is one that I am very desirous of affording you, since what is now passing ex-officially is so much more important than what passes officially, that I do not feel at all justified in venturing to act upon it on my own judgement ; and am very anxious to have it stated so correctly, and examined so carefully, that its real value may be ascertained, and Lord Granville bring me back orders in consequence.

“Had I no other grounds at this moment to form an opinion but the conduct of the Directory, I should look upon the negotiation as in a very precarious state, and apprehend its breaking up to be a very near event. But, if what I hear from this secret quarter can be relied on, I must hold a contrary belief ; I must suppose the French will contend only for terms and give way in substance, and that they will affect to perform their engagements (real or supposed) in appearance, but break them in fact.

“It required no great art to see through the object of Maret’s note of the 31st July. I hope my answer will be thought sufficiently guarded and, at the same time, as explicit enough to encourage him to continue his communications ; at all events, it is to be recollected that the originals of both our notes are restored and that they never can be produced.

“It is clear from what M[aret] writes that, if the Directory wish to make peace at all, it is at the expense of their allies ; and from the step they have taken, they probably are in earnest. If this should be the case (which must shortly appear) the negotiation will soon be brought to a discussion of the more or less we are to keep from the Dutch, since, if what is told us could be credited, the interests of Spain and Portugal will not throw any great obstacles in the way of the treaty ; but this is so contrary to the conduct observed by the Directory during their last negotiation with the court of Lisbon, that I fear, on this particular point, our informer is either not trusted or not sincere.

“From every thing you read and hear to-day you will, I am sure, be confirmed in your opinion that on the upshot of the present contest at Paris depends the fate of the treaty ; that it cannot possibly be forced on here by any means in my power ; and that the best and only line of conduct I can adopt is, by temper and patience, to prevent its premature rupture from being imputed to us, and by prudence and caution to let nothing escape me which may betray an over-eagerness for its success, or pledge me directly or indirectly to any unbecoming conditions when we really begin to negotiate.

“If the delay, which from the confidential channel is accounted for as being purposely managed for good ends, should, after all, arise from direct contrary motives, and be concerted on the part of the three hostile Directors for the purpose of gaining time in order that they may the better accomplish their views of power, I do not see, even in that case (except that every additional day of war is to be regretted) any particular evil which will result from it. If the treaty is ultimately to break off, it must be done on the part of the French

Government in a more offensive way after they have allowed it to go on for a length of time than at its beginning. I have no good grounds to suspect this, but it is possible that the three Directors, who are certainly more daring than able, may, either by reckoning on support from Buonaparte, or by means of the armed force with which they are surrounding Paris, or perhaps after the signing of the definitive treaty with Austria, think events may turn up in their favour of which they are desirous to take the chance.

"I shall conclude this letter by saying that, with respect to our secret information, Mr. Ellis has been troubled, at my request, after each interview to write down a detailed and circumstantial account of any conversation which passed, in order that I might, by comparing the whole together, be enabled to judge whether it tallied exactly; and, as I cannot discover that his informant has been betrayed into any contradiction, I really do not think there is any internal evidence against his credibility."

*Postscript.*—"The note just received from Maret, and at the moment I am making up my letters, is very curious and very satisfactory. It need not, however, produce an alteration in, or addition to my official dispatches, as I have anticipated his advice."

*Enclosure.*

[M. MARET to LORD MALMESBURY.]

1797, August 6, Lille.—"Il était difficile d'après la manière dont se sont écoulés les moments très courts que l'on a passés ensemble, qu'ils offrisent des ouvertures plus positives. La personne qu'on avait disposée à s'expliquer, a besoin d'être amené par des circumlocutions un peu plus longues. On a répété, dans l'intention de supplier à tout, que dans l'état des choses, les délais disent précisément ce qu'on ne peut exprimer positivement. Ne peut-on pas s'en autoriser pour écrire avec le ton de la certitude, l'état vrai dont on a été informé particulièrement? Ce rapport, s'il pouvait devenir public, ne saurait être désavoué; et celui qui l'aurait autorisé ne se trouverait nullement compromis, en convenant qu'une sagacité supérieure a su démêler la vérité à travers des expressions qu'il avait désiré rendre, tout à la fois, obligeantes et mystérieuses."

*French. Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1797, August 8, Dropmore.—"Mr. Wesley on his return to Lisle will state to you the extent of the caution which has been observed in order to prevent the possibility of any disclosure of the particulars which he was charged to communicate. In order to adhere to this line, it will be proper that you should carefully put into *separate* dispatches all that has reference to that communication, keeping the ordinary chain of your correspondence complete by the relation of all other facts and reasonings not necessarily connected with that circumstance, or leading to it.

"Wesley has a separate note of names to be used for still greater caution, in order that the personal safety of those who communicate with you may be secured as far as possible against accidents.

"I am impatiently waiting to hear from you, though, from what Wesley said, I am prepared to think that all delay is for the best."

*Copy.*

## NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE.

1797, July—August.—“On Monday, July 31st, Mr. Ellis had a message from M. le Pein desiring to see him immediately; his friend Maret had received letters from Paris; the news contained in them was certainly not altogether satisfactory; at the same time, however, that the Directory refused absolutely to give way, they showed anxiety that the negotiation should not break off; they had recourse to an expedient which, if we thought fit, he said, still left us hopes of peace. They had invited the Batavian Republic to send Plenipotentiaries to Paris, in hopes that the Ministers would advise them to make concessions on the part of the Dutch; that the new Minister of Exterior Relations had written to his friend only, informing him he had delayed the public messenger in order that he might first privately consult with us, and then dispatch . . . to Noel (who was directed to pay the greatest attention to his advice) to urge him to procure such instructions for their Plenipotentiaries as might lead to peace. His friend had written upon this subject a note to Lord Malmesbury, which he would first read, and then put into Mr. Ellis’s hands, desiring him to copy and return it to him. He begged to have a written answer, which he would in the same manner return after communicating it to his friend. When he came to that part of the note which requests a communication (in confidence) of our ultimatum, he said, *‘Je vous prie de croire que mon ami sent comme vous la délicatesse de la demande; mais enfin, on ne croit pas que votre premier projet soit votre dernier mot. S’il vous est permis de vous relâcher un peu, d’accorder quelques facilités, il s’agit de savoir si vous avez assez de confiance dans la probité de mon ami, pour lui confier votre secret, afin qu’il puisse de son côté prendre les mesures les plus propres à faciliter votre marche.’* After he had done speaking, Mr. Ellis answered him that he would willingly take the note to Lord Malmesbury, and would promise him a written answer on the same terms; but that he could tell him beforehand, the answer could not possibly quite meet the wishes of his friend. You must consider, Mr. Ellis said, this is not our first offer of peace. Your Directory affected to believe our first offers insincere; they would willingly persuade the world that we do not now wish for peace; but you know that if we now broke off the negotiation, they would incur in the eyes of Europe the whole responsibility. Will the French Legislature and nation devote their lives and fortunes in the prosecution of a war which has no longer a national object? You admit this is not very certain; you admit that it is certain that France would incur much more than her natural share of misery from the continuation of the war; nay, you urge this as a plea to induce us to make further sacrifices; but surely this argument ought to weigh a little with your Directory. He admitted all this, but convinced that we were sincerely desirous of peace, he wished to know whether we would make any farther sacrifices to obtain it. You know, said M. Pein, that the Legislative Body gains ground every day; that the majority of the Directory grows weaker in the same proportion; consequently every day that the negotiation continues advances your cause. You best know how far you have any confidence in my friend, how far you wish, how far it is in your power, to co-operate with him. The Directory have, in their distress for money, very meanly, very foolishly, very unconstitutionally, pledged themselves to the Dutch to procure the restitution of all your conquests. Perhaps this money transaction cannot be defended under the terms of the Constitution as a *secret article of treaty*. Of this you are certain, that they will not break off immediately, nor force you to break

off immediately. Judge for yourselves and tell me your decision. What passes between us is not binding till it is avowed by your Cabinet, and till Lord Malmesbury receives orders to act in consequence at his conferences with the French Legation. Mr. Ellis told him that Lord Malmesbury's instructions were positive; that our first object had been to evince our sincerity by the reasonableness of our proposals; that as to Ceylon, any definite demand of the island (which we should retain only as means of additional security to our East India possessions) must be dictated by the previous desire of recommencing hostilities in that country as soon as the finances of France should enable her to send a fleet there. That the Cape was ours at present, and that he had not heard a shadow of reason why we should part with it. Lastly, that our demand of Cochin was only in return for Negapatnam, which was, he conceived, of much higher value to the Dutch. Here Le Pein said, '*si vous vouliez rendre le Cap, je suis bien persuadé qu'il ne tiendrait qu'à vous de signer la paix dans quinze jours.*' Mr. Ellis told him that Lord Malmesbury could not consent to any such thing; that his proposal to him was, in three words, only a proposal to gain time, to which he was persuaded that Lord Malmesbury from his confidence in Maret would consent, and that he would go immediately and bring him a written answer to his note. But, said Le Pein, if we put the answer which will come from the Directory tomorrow into civil words, will you answer it civilly, and wait? Mr. Ellis said, certainly. But your Cabinet, Le Pein then added, will think we are doing nothing; will you send over a confidential person (for we entreat you not to write) who will explain verbally, under the seal of the most sacred secrecy, that Lord Malmesbury and my friend are jointly labouring on the same subject, and that, unpromising as the negotiation now appears, we have still great hopes of concluding it by an honourable peace. Mr. Ellis then returned home with Maret's note, and on the same evening returned it with Lord Malmesbury's answer.

"On the following morning, Tuesday 1st August, Mr. Ellis called upon M. Le Pein, who returned to him Lord Malmesbury's note. He said that Maret had written to Noel in conformity to what had been agreed upon; stating that he was desired by Talleyrand to insist on the necessity of some complaisance on the part of Holland; to remark that it was probable no future opportunity of making peace would be so favourable as the present; that the penury of the French finances was notorious; that it was impossible for the Directory to look forward to the formation of such a marine as, with the fullest assistance of Spain, aided by the navy of the Batavian Republic, could face that of England. That the remainder of the Dutch colonies must probably soon fall; that the Directory were ready to go all lengths for the purpose of fulfilling its treaties; but that the Dutch must feel the difficulty of continuing a war, which must henceforward become a naval war, without money, or ships, or effective allies, and contrary to the decided wishes of all Europe and the French nation. Mr. Ellis said this was all very good sense; but observed, at the same time to him, that it was impossible that the Directory, if truly desirous of peace, should be unable to force the Dutch to compliance; that certainly the Directory were not bound to the performance of the secret articles by which they pretended to be confined, since it was absurd to suppose that any such money transaction as he had alluded to could have been kept secret in Holland. Le Pein said, you certainly misunderstood me. The sum of money to which I alluded is mentioned in the public articles, great part of it has not been paid, and the Directory in their distress are very solicitous for its payment. It was stipulated in a secret article

that we should compensate for the large sum demanded by obtaining from you the restitution of all you had taken, or might take from them. How can they now press for payment on one side, and refuse the condition to which they had bound themselves? It is for this reason that address is necessary. I answered, in this case why did the Directory in November last agree to the principle of mutual compensation? And why did they lately propose to treat in the name, and on the part of their allies, since it appears by what you now say, if I understand you right, that you had not, and have not, full powers. His answer, according to Mr. Ellis's recollection, was nearly in these words; '*Je pourrais vous remarquer en général que le Directoire ne sait ce qu'il dit. D'ailleurs pour répondre à votre première question, le Directoire ne voulait pas la paix; il voulait savoir votre dernier mot, décourrir où se bornaient vos prétentions, vous faire une querelle d'Allemand, et vous renvoyer. Quant à la seconde, il a encore agi sottement; il espérait vous faire la loi; il espérait forcer la nation à continuer la guerre; il espérait dominer les circonstances; et il se trouve dominé par elles. Vos objections sont sans réplique; mais que voulez vous? la paix. Je vous avois déjà dit dès notre premier entretien, que le biais qu'on vient d'imaginer pourrait nous y mener; et je le crois encore, pourvu que vous y consentiez. Le moyen que nous employons nous fait peu d'honneur, il est vrai; mais que vous importe, s'il vous mène où vous voulez arriver.*' Mr. Ellis then observed to him that his friend's note of yesterday requested, and indeed stipulated, perfect secrecy on the part of Lord Malmesbury, and that this night, he was afraid, defeat the whole object that his friend had in view; that while the Directory persisted in keeping such untenable ground he could not guess how his friend could frame an ostensible answer that should at all convey the spirit of his private assurances. That Lord Malmesbury, acting under orders which had been submitted to the confidential servants of his Majesty, must satisfy the Cabinet that he was not so far hurried away by his private wishes for peace, as to act in opposition to those orders. He interrupted Mr. Ellis, and said, we will take care that the communication which we shall make to you shall not put you under the necessity of breaking off the negotiation. It shall express that the Directory will consult with their allies; and this will give Lord Malmesbury an opportunity of taking our answer, if he pleases, *ad referendum*. If Noel should succeed in his commission, which we shall know in a few days, it will then be for your Cabinet to determine what instructions they will give on the subject, and to relax or persist in their present demands. You are hitherto bound to nothing. If this cause were pleaded before a jury of Frenchmen, or before the whole French nation, they would certainly think your present demands not exorbitant; because it is just that your gains by the war should be in some measure proportionate to ours. I have already explained to you that the Directory are unlike such a jury, but you can lose nothing by a little delay. The strength of the Directory sinks every hour. Mr. Ellis said this might be true; but that it was possible the Directory might, in some respects, be great gainers by delay; that the signature of the definitive treaty with Austria for instance—Mr. Ellis was here interrupted by Le Pein, who said, the mere approach of peace has given strength to the Councils, and every additional step towards it must add to their strength. The wish for peace is, as you know, universal in France, and has long been so; but the many complicated interests which it would have been necessary to reconcile, had we negotiated when we had Austria and all Germany for our enemies, would have eternally

offered new subterfuges to the Directory. The question is now become so plain, that they will soon have no means of evading it. Mr. Ellis then asked him why the French Plenipotentiaries intended giving in any written declaration at all? And why they would not ask for a conference? You must feel, said he, that your note, word it as you will, cannot meet all the objections stated to you in our last. It is notorious that you did invite us to treat with you as Plenipotentiaries for your allies. You now say you are not so. Why put this proof of your evasion on paper? He answered that he would not fail to convey this proposal to his friend. Mr. Ellis then said, you have hitherto taken no notice either of Spain or Portugal; and yet the last instructions of the Directory relate to the interests of Spain as well as those of Holland. He replied, *'il est vrai, mais ne vous inquiétez pas sur l'Espagne. Nous saurons bien la mener où nous voulons. Ce n'est pas qu'elle ne soit honnêtement déraisonnable; ce n'est pas l'embarras. Cabarrus a bien remis au Directoire des prétentions excessives; et Del Campo s'évertue, depuis quelque tems, pour qu'on y passe un peu d'attention. Mais on trouve tout cela si absurde qu'on ne songe pas seulement à y répondre. Non, vous pouvez être tranquille là-dessus.'* Mr. Ellis then pressed him on the subject of Portugal, observing to him that the integrity of the Portuguese possessions was so much a *sine quâ non*, that if he foresaw any difficulty on that subject, he had better save further trouble by stating it, as that would certainly compel us to put an end to the negotiation. He said *'Non; Le Portugal ne fera jamais un . . .; si les intérêts des Bataves s'arrangent, vous pouvez compter que nous arriverons, sans difficultés considérables, à la paix.'*

"On Wednesday, 2nd August, Mr. Ellis and M. Le Pein again met. The despatches from the Directory, Le Pein said, were not arrived, and that they would not arrive till Friday, because they were to come by the common post, and not by a special courier. He said both Maret and Le Tourneur had received private letters from Carnot and from Guiraudet, but that these letters contained nothing beyond what we knew already, except that the present delay had been owing to the ceremonies and forms at the reception of the Turkish Ambassador, and to Talleyrand not being completely settled in his Office. Mr. Ellis then observed upon the strange conduct of the Directory, and expressed his apprehensions that Lord Malmesbury would be unable to state the matter at home in such a way as to convince the Cabinet that there remained even that slight hope of success which his friend had admitted in his note to be the only hope. Le Pein here said with eagerness, I feel this as strongly as you do, and it is my greatest cause of anxiety. Certainly if the Directory sincerely wished for peace, they would force the Dutch to withdraw all opposition; but the Directory are not sincere. It was proposed to them to compel the Dutch to come into terms; the proposal was rejected. My friend proposed to them to order the Dutch commissaries to this place, where he hoped to bring them to terms; this too was rejected. Talleyrand proposed to appoint a special Minister at the Hague for the same purpose, and we hoped to fix the choice on Sémonville; in this too he failed. All he could obtain, after the Directory had ordered the Dutch Ministers to repair to Paris, was the permission to send some fresh instructions to Noel; alleging as a reason for it, that the Directory would only make themselves ridiculous by affecting to consult their allies if those allies should afterwards appear to pay no regard to their remonstrances. Talleyrand has written to Noel, who is very well disposed. He has referred him to my friend for further instructions, and we too have written. Noel, I am sure, will exert himself to the utmost. Talley-



rand will not be inactive at Paris. We may expect an answer in eight days from the Hague, and shall then be able to judge whether our hopes are well or ill founded. I trust we shall not be disappointed, but, if we should, and here he hesitated, '*il faudra nous remettre à guerroyer.*' Mr. Ellis, wishing to know exactly what his ultimate expectation was, said '*Comment! vous voulez encore continuer la guerre.*' He replied, No, certainly. We have still means of success in our power, means which the Directory seem not aware of. It will be very disagreeable to employ them; but they must be tried, if all others fail. The moment of the return of peace, and dismissal of the armies, must be the moment of confusion and civil discord, if we have not a strong and well regulated government; if we cannot put an end to that unfortunate and disgraceful struggle which the majority in the Directory so foolishly, and wickedly, desire to provoke between the constituted authorities. But even at this risk, we must defend the Constitution. The Directory have a right to conclude secret articles without the immediate participation of the Councils, but the Councils have a subsequent right to demand the communication of such articles; and finally to break them, if they appear incompatible with the happiness of the people. Sooner than submit to the further continuance of the present war, the Council of 500 will certainly try this desperate remedy; but they will not try it till every other attempt has failed. *Souvenez-vous*, he added, *que je vous parle à cœur ouvert, et sous le sceau du plus profond secret. Les longueurs de cette négociation vont vous désespérer; mais tachez de ne pas perdre patience; elles sont accablantes pour nous aussi.* It was then settled that they should meet on Friday, the day on which the dispatches from Paris were expected. On the morning of that day, about eleven o'clock, Mr. Ellis was sent for by M. Le Pein, and informed by him that the dispatches from the Directory were arrived; and that the French Plenipotentiaries had sent to propose a conference with Lord Malmesbury, when they would declare officially what Mr. Ellis had so often heard from him by private communication. Le Pein said, his friend conceived that disagreeable effects might be produced by the total interruption of the public conferences; and that it would be proposed to Lord Malmesbury today to meet every post day, in order that, although neither party should have any thing to communicate, they might not let the public into the secret of their inactivity. He then added, my friend has received today a private letter from Talleyrand, which gives us great hopes of success. He writes word that Lestevenon is arrived at Paris, that he has seen him, and is perfectly satisfied from his conversation that he may easily be brought to hear reason. I have no doubt, he said, that, in consequence of Noel's efforts, the other commissaries from Holland would be equally tractable; and, in the mean time, my friend has been, I hope, usefully employed. Le Pein then talked of Cabarrus, and described him as a vain talkative man without abilities, but possessed of considerable influence through his daughter (Madame Tallien) who is the mistress of Barras. He arrived here in his way to Amsterdam, where he is going to transact some money business. He received a few hours after his arrival here a note from Del Campo by a courier, stating that the French Government had just communicated to him the present state of the negotiation; that, with a view to show their respect for the engagements contracted with their allies, they had for the present suspended all discussion on the articles of the British *projet*; but that they hoped their allies would, on their part, consider the fatal consequences likely to arise to all parties from the continuance of the war; and that they would not render such

a continuance necessary by the exorbitancy of their pretensions. Cabarrus immediately transmitted this note to the French Legation, and Maret, having personally flattered him a good deal, was treated by him with great confidence, and was shown the answer he had written to Del Campo, which was conceived in terms of the most perfect conformity to his wishes. Maret then persuaded him to stop at the Hague in his way to Amsterdam, in order to second Noel's efforts to bring the Dutch Commissaries to a compliant and peaceable disposition. Le Pein then added that Lord Malmesbury would find the French Legation very civil and cordial. Mr. Ellis observed that the important point was to satisfy our Cabinet that the French Government was in earnest; and for this purpose it was necessary that Lord Malmesbury should be assured officially that the allies had been applied to. He again repeated that this would certainly be done; that indeed he had not seen the official dispatches; but that Talleyrand's letters were such as to leave him no apprehensions on that score. On Saturday, August 5th, Mr. Ellis called upon M. Le Pein to inquire into the reason of Lord Malmesbury not having received at the conference of the day before the official communication he expected. Le Pein said that, in fact, the despatches had not been exactly such as he had looked for from Talleyrand's private letter; that indeed they communicated what had been done, but referred them to a future letter for instructions; and that Le Tourneur had not thought himself authorised, under such orders, to communicate the step which the Directory had taken, but had contented himself with assuring Lord Malmesbury that the delay augured well for the final success of the negotiation, and that the other two Commissaries had hinted at the truth as plainly as they could venture to do. Mr. Ellis said, although we may be satisfied with the knowledge afforded us by private communication, you should consider that it is not official, and therefore cannot be satisfactory to the English Cabinet. Le Pein admitted this, but added, if the Directory had made this application to their allies with a mere view to gain time, they would of course have been ready enough to announce the measure as an excuse. The conduct of our Government is certainly unsatisfactory, but if it is not such as to force the British Cabinet to break off the negotiation, and even if Lord Malmesbury were ignorant of all that we have communicated to him, I cannot think they would feel this necessity at present. I trust we shall yet bring matters to a favourable conclusion.

"This was the last interview Mr. Ellis had with M. Le Pein, but, on Sunday about an hour after Lord Malmesbury's conference, Maret sent privately by him the enclosed note."\*

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1797, August 9, Dropmore.—"At Mr. Wesley's request, I send him back to you with the acknowledgment of your public dispatches by Lord G. Leveson, whom I have seen here today. The communications which I have received from him have not tended to remove the anxious suspense in which we before were respecting the final termination of this important discussion. I am inclined to believe that the person with whom you have communicated is so far sincere that he and his friends wish that peace may be concluded; but it is, I am afraid, very doubtful whether even they wish to conclude it on such terms as

\* This is the French note of August 6 referred to in the postscript of Lord Malmesbury's letter of the same date,—see page 346.

we must unavoidably insist on. And the attempt to learn the further modifications to which they supposed you were authorised to agree, before the least ground had been yielded on their part, was one which does not seem to me to promise well as to their further intentions. I am extremely glad that this attempt was defeated in the manner in which it appears to have been, nor do I think it possible that we should advance one step in the very little we have to concede, till they have shown that they have not only the will (as they profess) but also the power to be of some service to us.

"In the meantime I have no doubt that it is on every account proper that the communication should be kept up, as one from which much good may arise, and from which no inconvenience is to be feared. I observe that the conduct of the Directory clearly shows them to be as anxious for delay as those who profess themselves better disposed to us. In these things it is sometimes a rule that what your adversary wishes must be injurious to your interests. But I do not think this rule applies here. The Directory appear unwilling to hazard a rupture at this precise moment, and probably rely on the measures they are pursuing for being enabled to break off with less danger to themselves a little time hence. But if pushed to the wall, I think they would rather hazard the rupture now, than give way and suffer peace to be concluded. By delay therefore we take the chance of events that may be in our favour, and we lose no means of peace at present, because none such exist.

"Such at least is my reasoning on this most complicated and interesting subject. I have never thought that the business could be speedily brought to any favourable end, and I am much confirmed in that opinion by finding that it agrees with yours, formed on the spot, and with much better means of judging.

"The principal ground of apprehension which I feel is from the apparent weakness and hesitation of the Councils who, while the Directory are keeping no measures with them, seem nevertheless to distrust their own strength, and to want that confidence in themselves which is, in truth, in affairs of this nature the first principle of strength. I am, however, not ignorant how difficult it is to judge on such points as these without knowing all the interior circumstances by which they are governed; and, at the end of all my speculations, I feel that we can do no more than wait the event which will decide much more certainly on peace and war than all that we can write or do by volumes of correspondence.

"The argument that was used to Mr. Ellis about money I take to be a mere pretence. If I am rightly informed, all that could be squeezed from the Dutch has already been taken, and more cannot be had at this time whether the French observe their secret article or break it. Does it not therefore look as if this subject of money was introduced with other views, and as preparatory to demands of which you are apprized that we have received some intimation from a quarter from which we have frequently had our best intelligence of what was to happen?

"I was much struck with the intimation that no difficulty would arise as to Spain. Can it be possible that Spain can mean to cede Trinidad to us? Or are they already prepared with an equivalent which they think we shall accept? Or have they said this without reflecting on the nature and consequences of our demand in this respect?

"I feel that I have run into an unconscionable length with these speculations and doubts, and I will therefore conclude with expressing

my impatience to have something on which we may reason with more certainty."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 10, Weymouth.—"I cannot say that I admire the state in which the negotiation is getting, and though by Lord Granville Levison's paper, Mr. Le Peint and his director Maret pretend to much good intention, I strongly recommend that all answers from hence may be of the most cautious kind. At the same time I will confess to Lord Grenville that I see no disadvantage to us in letting the negotiation draw into length, and that events at Paris may effect that which the bad intentions of the three warmest Directors wish to prevent."

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, August 14, Lille.—"I have many thanks to return to you for your two private letters by Wesley. I am much obliged to you for sending him back, and I have a hope (though perhaps not a well founded one) that before he may be called upon to attend his brother to India, our negotiation will be drawing so near its conclusion, as to make it unnecessary to appoint a successor to him here.

"I am very sorry that my official letters of today will tend so little to remove the state of suspense in which we have been kept so long. The French plenipotentiaries themselves appear to think this delay unreasonable, and endeavour in our conferences to make up by personal attentions and civilities the deficiency in their ministerial communications. Whatever may be my private opinion as to the effects of this delay, you will perceive that in my conversation with them I always complain of it, represent it as calculated to create uneasiness, and give rise to the most unpleasant suspicions. Every thing, however, that I hear and observe convinces me no real evil will result from it provided it is not carried too far, and I am glad to find that your opinion coincides with mine on this point.

"The person who is alluded to in my separate dispatch is M. St. Simon, who (though of a very great family) has lived through the whole of the revolutions at Paris, and increased very considerably his family property by the purchase of church lands. He is a shrewd, sensible, strong-headed man, and there can be little doubt but that he spoke his own genuine sentiments and those of the public in general; but you must consider what he says as the consequence more of opinion and observation than of positive information, and make allowances accordingly. It tallies exceedingly well with what we have heard from Henry,\* though certainly no communication subsists between them; and one of the great inducements I had in being so accurate in stating the conversation between Ellis and his friend was that it may serve to convey a great deal of what Henry has told us without being under the necessity of committing either him or William.† I could wish you would be so good (unless it be absolutely necessary) not to mention M. St. Simon's name to any one but Mr. Pitt.

"You will see by the very strong and recriminating answer sent by the Directory to the Councils that I was not mistaken when I said that no real conciliation had taken place, and I wish I may not be equally justified in my apprehensions that the Directorial party will end by maintaining, consequently by strengthening, its power and authority.

\* M. Pein.

† M. Maret.

But whether, even in this case, in the present temper of the country and in the ruined state of its finance they will venture to break off the negotiation I own I have my doubts, but that they will make it as unpleasant and difficult as possible, I have none. If the moderate party had a regular leader, if they prepared their measures before-hand, and above all, if they confined themselves to popular questions, there is little doubt but that in the end the Directory must be beat; but there cannot exist a stronger proof of this not being the case than the weak debate on Thursday, when this answer was read from the Directory. Vaublanc alone spoke to any purpose, and no strong resolution was come to.

"It was perfectly evident to me, and I really thought I had mentioned it in one of my private letters, that the question of money when connected with the Dutch cessions was precisely what you say. The French were to have had about five millions from the Dutch. They have received about two, and would certainly be very glad to get the remainder from us as the price of the Cape.

"In regard to the Portuguese peace, M. d'Aranjo is so very strange a man, so very partial to revolutionary principles and modern philosophy, that I am almost inclined to believe that he acted under their influence, and very much from his own head. His never acquainting me with his having resumed the negotiation, and his now only communicating to me such a very general account of the treaty looks very suspicious. Possibly Almeida may be able to throw some light on this mysterious and reserved conduct. The copy of the treaty I enclose in my official letter I obtained through Henry, with the consent of William; and as I did not get it till a late hour yesterday, I thought it better to detain Brooks till after our conference of today. You will observe that Le Tourneur declared almost officially that no great difficulty would arise in regard to Spain. I cannot solve this problem.

"Since I began this letter I have read a much more detailed account of Vaublanc's speech on Thursday, and I must retract what I said concerning it. I have thought it so good a one and such an able defence of the Councils against the Directory, that I have enclosed the paper in which it is inserted in one of my dispatches."

"The French Legation within these few days seem allowed to associate with us. Maret came into my box at the play on Friday, and yesterday I went into theirs, to the great surprise and, I believe, satisfaction of the audience, who were much more attentive to us than to the play."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

1797, August 18, Cleveland Row.—"This Portuguese business is of bad omen for what is to come from Talleyrand. You may be assured that the whole has been settled entirely by him and d'Aranjo, and the Court of Lisbon is no party to it; as indeed the enclosed dispatch to him, sent here under flying seal, sufficiently demonstrates. If the Directory refuses to listen to any discussion upon the subject, our negotiations must break off. If the business is referred to Lisle, it will much embarrass your proceedings, because it will be of course more difficult to make them recede from any advantage gained, and which they have made matter of triumph at Paris, than it would have been to have stood firm upon this point which they have no pretence to insist upon. The best expedient that I can devise is that (supposing the

two parties agreed on all other points) the Directory should declare, for which the words would afford some grounds, that these stipulations had reference only to the present war, and expire with its termination. This, if coupled with the signature of peace, and made part of it, we might accept, but not otherwise, as in any other case it would afford to the enemy both a motive and a means of continuing the war. But I greatly doubt whether the period of peace is yet arrived. There seems so much insolence, and such an overbearing opinion of their own consequence and power even among those who profess themselves the best disposed, that I fear it will be impossible yet to obtain such terms as we must require. Our best chance is in patience and firmness; but these are no security against such dispositions as we have to contend with.

"I have done as you desire about the name you sent me in your private letter, and will continue to do so as to all names that you may have occasion to mention to me with the same reserve. The conduct of the Councils seems to me even weaker and more childish than Mr. Ellis's friend describes it; and yet such is the force of opinion with them that they may ultimately triumph in spite of themselves.

"We have no other account than through you of the Emperor's resolutions to treat for definitive peace at Udine, but I have no doubt of the fact."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private and Secret.

1797, August 22, Lille.—"On Friday last a Mr. Melvil of Boston in America desired to speak with me, but being informed by my servants that I never received anybody who was not either personally known to me, or brought with him letters of recommendation, he asked whether any of the gentlemen with me would see him, and, in consequence of what he was told, he wrote a note to Mr. Ellis to request an interview. This was complied with. The motive of his journey (for he said he came from Paris on purpose) was precisely the same as that which brought Mr. Potter to London a few days before my departure. Mr. Melvil said he had been employed in making the Portuguese peace and negotiated the pecuniary part of it; that he would undertake we should obtain any peace the Directory had the power of signing if we could employ him in the same way; that it must, however, cost us somewhat more than it had cost Portugal; and on being asked what this meant, he said fifteen million of *livres* would be the sum required. He asserted with the greatest confidence that he had full authority for what he advanced, and that if I would see him, he would give me incontestable proofs of it.

"Mr. Ellis (as we had previously agreed) told Mr. Melvil that my seeing him was neither possible or material, since he might open himself with equal confidence and with equal security to him. Mr. Melvil then intimated (like Potter) that he was trusted by Peter,\* and, like Potter, he was *l'ami intime de Perregeau*, but, on being pressed for further proofs, he had none beyond these to produce, and these rested solely on assertions. Mr. Ellis asked him whether from what he said it was to be inferred that the Directory, or at least some of its members, intended to apply to their own use the sum to be paid by Portugal, and which, from his statement, appeared to be at least ten millions of *livres*. Mr. Melvil said yes, they certainly do

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\* M. Barras.

intend to share it amongst themselves as they did that which was received from Naples. The utter impossibility of this being fact because, on one side, it is universally known, though not officially published, that some pecuniary stipulations made part of these treaties, and on the other, that these sums are paid into the hands of officers accountable to the Councils if called upon, and never can pass through the hands of the Directory, made the whole of Mr. Melvil's story so improbable that Mr. Ellis, after representing the enormity of the sum asked for, which, when given as a bribe, exceeded any one ever yet heard of for such a purpose, declined listening to Mr. Melvil's proposal; and he, after having seen Mr. Ellis again in the evening and repeating nearly what he had said in the morning, left Lille on Saturday about 10 a.m., and as he took the road to Arras he is probably returned to Paris. Mr. Melvil was different from Mr. Potter as being much less talkative, and much more reserved and on his guard when questioned. He appeared to be between twenty and thirty.

"Although I am nearly satisfied in my own mind that both of them acted with a view to their own personal interests, and without any direct authority, yet, as it is material to ascertain whether they really have any grounds whatever for what they say, and whether, if they have, the means they allude to might (when reduced into a reasonable shape) become practicable, after turning the matter over and over again in my mind and conversing with Mr. Ellis on the subject, it appeared to me that there could be no risk whatever in communicating the whole of it to Henry, that it might be done as a proof of the great confidence placed in him, and by making him acquainted with it, we might possibly get at the bottom of this business, and be able to derive advantage if any was to be obtained from it.

"It is necessary to premise that I should not have been so ready to promote a communication of this sort to Henry if what had passed a few days ago between him and Mr. Ellis had not prepared the way. It had been surmised as to that Henry having lost his office (which is true) was reduced to very narrow circumstances, and that, although he expected (could he remain here) to be chosen as a representative of this commune at the next election, yet that he was obliged to quit Lisle shortly and return to Paris in order to try to obtain employment. To obviate this (which it was supposed we much wished to do) it was hinted by this friend of his that, if I would advance *him* 200*l.*, he would lend that sum to Henry. This was communicated to Ellis by a note. To this note, as it came from one who had no right to interfere (although he had been occasionally employed to settle the meetings between Ellis and Henry) no answer whatever was given, but Mr. Ellis, at my request, immediately called on Henry and communicated it to him, reproaching him at the same time in the language of confidence and friendship with his not having stated directly and at once his situation to him. Henry's behaviour was perfectly proper on this occasion, and not at all that of a person who had been laying a little cunning trap to obtain money. He disclaimed the having authorised the person to write the note, but he acknowledged his situation to be such as was described in it; and when Ellis pressed him to accept that sum or even a larger as from himself and simply as a loan, Henry persisted to decline it with apparent confusion and with strong expressions of gratitude; and the next day wrote Mr. Ellis a very well-turned note, which I believe he has sent to Canning. This incident established between Henry and Ellis a different kind of intimacy from that which arose from their political communications, and naturally placed Henry in a situation to be told what had passed between Mr. Ellis and Melvil,

without its appearing to be an artful confidence, or as touching on an indelicate subject. Henry was not surprised at it. He said that Peter was capable of the greatest *étourderie*, although he scarce would send such a man with such an errand; that Peter and Paul\* were both venal, and that it would be well worth while to get one or both of them if possible. Henry did not speak as a person at all apprised that anything of the sort had happened or was likely to happen; and, although he approved the dismissal of Melvil, yet he wished the business could be resumed. Mr. Ellis here stated the difference between money given privately to an individual to promote a measure, or money stipulated in the negotiation as the price of that measure. The first was one that might perhaps be listened to, but, as to the latter, it could not be heard of. We would not consent to give *un écu de six francs* if it was to come under such a description. Henry acquiesced completely to this distinction, and repeated his wish that Melvil's commission might again appear in another and in a more admissible form. I rather think from his manner what Ellis said sunk deep on his mind, and that we shall hear again from him on this subject. Towards the end of the conversation, Ellis pressed again, if he was distressed in order to continue his residence at Lille, to accept the offer he had made, and Henry promised that, when that was really the case, he would not hesitate to apply to him.

"My reason for entering so fully into this subject is that Mr. Melvil, although he took the Paris road, expressed an intention of carrying his proposals immediately to England; and, as he may possibly try to gain access to your Lordship, I thought it my duty to tell you all that has passed. My suspicion is that he is a mere adventurer, and has a view to stock jobbing. Mr. Ellis has written to Perregeau by the person who carries the letter to Aranjó, requesting him to give us whatever information he can on the subject."

#### NEGOTIATIONS at LILLE.

##### "HENRY" to G. E[LLIS].

1797, August 15.—"Je n'ai pu vous témoigner hier toute la reconnaissance que m'inspire votre généreux procédé. Mes expressions étaient embarrassées; et je vous avoue qu'il se trouvait quelq' émotion de peine à ce que j'éprouvais. L'idée qu'un rapport maladroit vous eut fait supposer un projet formé m'avait saisi au même instant que le ressentiment de votre obligeance; et malgré les ménagements délicats dont vous enveloppiez votre démarche, il s'est fait dans mes sentiments une mélange d'attendrissement et de douleur.

"Soyez bien convaincu qu'aucun calcul n'a décidé l'aveu peu réfléchi que j'ai fait à la personne en question. Je lui ai parlé d'abondance dès le premier moment où je vis que mes propres intérêts m'allaient faire la loi d'abandonner une affaire où j'apporte plus de bonne volonté que de véritables moyens, et dont le succès serait ma plus précieuse récompense. Cette circonstance m'afflige réellement; et lorsque j'en parlai à C[unningham] je m'abandonnai trop à ma sensibilité. Je lui avouai que mon plus cher désir serait de suivre la marche de cette importante affaire, et que je déplorais la nécessité où je me trouvais d'aller à la fois solliciter un nouvel emploi, et la rentrée des arrières qui m'étaient dus. Ne m'accusez pas d'ingratitude si je me reproche d'avoir été plus confiant que prudent. Peut-être ma peine vient-elle de ce que votre offre est

\* M. Rewbell.



toute de générosité de votre part, et nullement méritée de la mienne. Cela doit m'excuser. Je suis pénétré de votre procédé, et j'y réponds en vous avouant qu'il n'est aucun sacrifice que je ne fasse pour continuer ce que vous voulez bien nommer des services ; que ce motif me rendra ma gêne supportable ; et que vous ne me feriez pas justice si vous m'en supposiez quelqu'un d'intéressé."

*French. Copy.*

#### NEGOTIATIONS AT LILLE.

G. E. to "HENRY."

1797, August 15, Lisle.—"Je regrette infiniment qu'une démarche très simple de ma part, et qui n'a pu être mieux amenée parce que les circonstances ne m'en laissent pas le temps, vous ait causé de la peine, ou même occasionné un moment d'embarras. Assurément si l'un de nous devait supposer à l'autre des vues intéressées, c'est bien plutôt vous qui auriez le droit de me les imputer, parce que nous avons un intérêt bien puissant à ne pas nous voir privés des services que vous avez bien voulu nous rendre ; et quoique la levée du principal obstacle qui, sans votre secours, eût déjà rendu votre succès impossible, nous donne actuellement des espérances fondées de réussite, nous sommes très éloignés de croire que vos conseils nous soient désormais indifférents."

"Je reviens donc à la charge, et vous supplie de vouloir bien vous ouvrir à moi avec franchise et en détail sur la manière d'éloigner un malheur qui nous serait bien plus sensible qu'à vous. Surtout, que tout ceci se passe de vous à moi, et *sans intermédiaire*. C'est sur quoi il m'est prescrit d'insister par des raisons les plus importantes. Songez que les confidences que vous m'avez déjà faites sont bien autrement essentielles que celle que je vous demande, et croyez en même temps que celle-ci me sera bien plus sensible."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD MALMESBURY TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, August 22, Lille.—"After having written so very long a private letter as I have already done, it is not quite reasonable to trouble you with a second ; but I wish to thank you for yours of the 18th, and to assure you, although I did not think it necessary to expatiate on them, that I felt all the perplexities and dangers into which d'Aranjo's disgraceful conduct has plunged us, to their full extent. They present themselves in every direction, and I confess I see no safe, certainly no easy way out of them. It is possible before you get any answer from Lisbon we may here either have broken off our negotiation, or be so far advanced in it as, in a certain degree, to smooth these Portuguese difficulties ; but this is but a faint hope, and we must be prepared for the worst. I really believe peace is the general wish of this country, but I also believe that they are so elated by success, so drunk with their own importance, that it will be a work of infinite patience, labour and forbearance to arrive at peace on such terms as they shall think they ought to grant, and we think we ought to demand.

"As nothing that has passed lately between Henry and Ellis has been of a nature sufficiently secret to put it *quite apart* from the rest of my correspondence, and as I conceive it as well to avoid as far as is possible this *most secret* mode of conveying intelligence, I have put all that is come to our knowledge into a separate dispatch. William now begins to be less fearful of associating with me ; and all I say about

the answer from Holland, and of Edward's\* sending it back for amendment, comes from him. The rest comes from Henry, with whom I am not yet personally acquainted, but, unless I am much mistaken, the incident which I have related to you in my other private letter will, in the end, not only procure me *his* intimate acquaintance, but also that of William. I hope you do not think I judged improperly in coming to a determination to communicate what Melvil said to Henry. It cannot commit me, and, if there is any substance or reality in what either Melvil or Potter prepared, I think it will now appear. As it is just possible you may not be in town, and that Melvil may arrive and find means of getting at Mr. Pitt, I have desired Wesley to copy my letter on this subject to you, and I have sent this copy to Mr. Pitt."

#### RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 25, Great Cumberland Place.—"Having just received despatches from Philadelphia, I take the liberty to send your Lordship several newspapers containing the proceedings of the Congress relative to Thomas Blunt, who was on the 8th of July expelled from the Senate of the United States by all the voices except one.

"It has given me great satisfaction to perceive (because it corresponds with my wishes, as well as my uniform reports to the American Government) that his Majesty's Government so distinctly disapproved the project of Mr. Blunt and his associates the moment that they were apprized of it; and, with my sentiments concerning the existence of a perfect harmony and good will between the two countries, I shall always lament that Mr. Liston did not, at least confidentially, communicate to the American Government the existence of a scheme so full of mischief, and so hazardous to our peace.

"I pray your Lordship to be so obliging as to return to me the papers when you shall have perused them."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, August 28, Hollwood.—"Mr. Melvill, of whom Lord Malmesbury gives an account in one of his private communications, has come to me here to-day. You know, of course, the subject of his conversation. It does not amount to anything very precise, but it seems worth consideration. I have only heard what he had to say, without giving him any answer on the point in question, but he must either have one, or be told that he is to have none, in two or three days. If his account is a true one (which from his manner I rather incline to believe it) we shall have no *contre-projet* nor any material communication from Lisle, till some answer is returned through him, or some other of the various channels through which a negotiation of the same sort appears to be solicited. If you could conveniently meet me in town or at Wimbledon, at any hour either on Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday morning, I should be very glad to talk it over with you. I should rather wish to be able to come back here to dinner."

#### LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, August 29, Lille.—"Wesley says he has stayed to the last moment and must now return to accompany his brother to India. I am truly sorry to lose him.

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\* M. de Talleyrand.

"My separate despatch contains the substance, or rather the detail, of everything which we have collected from Henry and William since I last wrote. Indeed I now have such frequent opportunities of conversing alone with William, and find him always so ready to converse, that the mysterious meetings with Henry are no longer so essential as they were before this intercourse was practicable.

"I thought it advisable to put this intelligence rather in the shape of a despatch than to convey it in the secret manner hitherto employed. It contains the only plausible account for the delay in the negotiation so essential to be accounted for, and I have so far endeavoured to disguise the motive which induced my informant here to speak, as without materially altering the fact, to prevent his being committed.

"The other two channels of intelligence to which I refer are St. Simon, and a person of the name of René de Lagarde. He is one of the editors of *Perlet's Journal*, and came here to apply for the release of his brother, who was an officer in the late expedition against Ireland, and now a prisoner at Litchfield. He wrote me so very well turned a letter that I easily perceived he was above the common class of spies, and I directed Mr. Ross to meet him at the time and in the manner he appointed. He certainly was well informed, as he stated a great many facts we know to be true, and which are certainly not generally known. He said he derived his intelligence from a confidential and private secretary of M. Taylerand [Talleyrand]. It went in general to confirm everything we had been told by Henry and William, with some few immaterial variations, and some not very important additional information, which Wesley will acquaint you with. He made no scruple of taking money, and I have settled to pay him for the future in proportion to the value of the intelligence he transmits, and also for any articles which I may choose to insert in *Perlet*. All this was managed by Mr. Ross, who has done it with great discretion and economy.

"I think it is very probable that the Dutch will make a point of having their ministers here. I do not see how they can assist at our conferences, as they are not directly a party to the treaty or supposed to sign it. But I see no objection to their coming and to my seeing them separately, or at the same time with the French, provided it be understood that they make no part of the congress if it may be so called. The same reasoning may also apply to Count Cabarrus. I wish however to hear your opinion before I take any step.

"To my great concern Mr. Ellis talks of leaving me in about ten days. As I am now quite sure there would not be the smallest objection made here to Lord Pembroke being with me, I have thoughts of writing to him, if my endeavours to prevail on Ellis to stay should fail."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1797, August 30, Dropmore.—"I am much obliged to you for the communication of the American papers you sent me. I am not sorry for the accident which has afforded the means of proving the principles and rules by which our conduct is guided in every thing that effects the peace and tranquility of the United States; but I hardly think that Mr. Liston would have been at liberty to communicate to the Government of the United States a proposal of this nature, the communication of which might have involved the proposers in much personal risk; while the plan itself could be productive of no inconvenience to your Government, since it could never be acted upon but by the co-operation of the King's ministers, a co-operation which Mr. Liston had every

reason to presume never would be given, and which was accordingly refused in the most distinct and pointed manner on the first intimation we received of the business.

"I own I think that Mr. Liston (though acting for the best unquestionably, and with great means of judging of the line which he was to pursue) has nevertheless gone at least to the utmost extent of what his situation allowed, if not somewhat beyond it, when he answered the letter of Colonel Pickering by an avowal which may prejudice individuals supposed to be implicated in it. I have however no reason to regret, in the present instance, that the subject did not strike him exactly in the light in which it might perhaps have struck me in the same situation; as the consequence has only been to evince still more clearly the correctness of our principles and conduct."

*Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, July-October] 25; Wimbledon.—"I have this moment received your despatches from Mr. Wickham when Lord Spencer was with me. I have no doubt of agreeing to the terms, as the intelligence of the general intention is worth that compensation, but the knowledge I have of the person in question renders it very necessary indeed to watch over the execution, for, as I shall mention to you when we meet, it is not impossible to be a double treachery for the purpose of involving us in a great scrape. I have given the two enclosures to Lord Spencer to lock up in his private repositories, and I have kept the despatch itself, which I shall restore to you. I do not know what fault De Pres has to find either with the East India or the Board of Control. He may be angry at me for having detected him in his former treachery."

#### W. WINDHAM to W. PITT.

1797, September 2.—"You are aware that there are still some matters remaining to be settled with respect to the Royalists, though this is the last statement with which there may be occasion to trouble you. As such, you may be willing to give to it a more ready attention. *Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi,* . . .

"I will lay before you in one view, but in a few words, the whole of what has been done, that you may judge better, and more readily, what further is necessary.

"The first assistance ever allotted to the Royalists, as far as I can find, in the way of pecuniary succours, was the 10,000*l.* sent out with Sir S. Warren at the time of the expedition to Quiberon. But of this only 2,700*l.* was ever sent into the country, the rest having been laid out in the purchase of provisions, the payment of persons making part of the expedition, and other expenses incurred during the time that the troops remained upon that service.

"From that time, till the evacuation of the Isle D'yeu [Dieu] various sums were sent into the country, all of them to the armies of Charette, Stofflet, or Scepeaux, amounting in the whole to about 12,000*l.*, and forming what may be called the first part of the remittances to the Royalists; which I wish to distinguish from the other, inasmuch as the sums remitted afterwards either passed through my hands, or came more immediately within my own knowledge.

"These latter, counting from the evacuation of the Isle D'Yeu down to the present day, and including remittances of all sorts and to all parties, paid or unpaid, amount to 62,680*l.*; so that the whole sum

remitted to Royalists of any denomination in the provinces on this side of France, from the beginning of the war down to the present time, amounts to 78,180*l.* This account, stated somewhat more in detail, and distinguishing the parties as well as the periods, may be otherwise given as in the margin, amounting to the same sum of 78,180*l.*

*Brittany.*

	£	£
To February 13, 1796 - - -	10,758	
Including 2,042 <i>l.</i> <i>bons</i> paid by Hus- kisson.		
To January, 1797 - - -	22,350	
Since - - - - -	5,551	
	<hr/>	38,659

*Charette, Stofflet, Sapinau, Scepeaux.*

To February 13, 1796 - - -	12,800	
Including 800 <i>l.</i> sent from here in June 1795 by Baron de Nantiat, and 1,000 <i>l.</i> received from Wickham.		
To January, 1797 - - -	16,986	
Since - - - - -	469	
	<hr/>	30,255

*Frotté.*

To February 13, 1796 - - -	1,000	
To January, 1797 - - -	4,637	
Since - - - - -	3,629	
Including 1,500 <i>l.</i> given him by Lord Grenville.		
	<hr/>	9,266
		<hr/>
		78,180

*Nota Bene.*—The period of January 1797 has been chosen as that at which I gave you in a statement of these accounts, and obtained an order for the payment of 9,000*l.* to be issued at the same times as the 60,000*l.* that was to have been remitted to Paris.

“What is meant by remittances unpaid is money paid by our authority in the interior, but not repaid here. The amount of the part so unpaid is about 3,737*l.*, a small sum in itself, but affecting cruelly the persons to whom it is due, and not very creditable to our punctuality in money transactions.

“From the time when the troops were withdrawn from the Isle D’Yeu, though it was signified that nothing further was to be expected in the way of active force, yet the fullest assurances were given that there would be no want of pecuniary assistance, whenever it should appear that such assistance was likely to be fairly and advantageously laid out. Such assurances had in fact been given from a period long antecedent to that in which I had anything to do in these affairs. They were given, I conceive, to Puisaye before his coming into this country. They were certainly given to him at his leaving it. They were renewed to De Moustier when the question was of his going. They were contained, I have a notion, in two letters written about

that period by Lord Grenville to the Duke of Harcourt. They were at length repeated in a more formal manner on the 13th February 1796; when, to bring the matter to an issue, and to put an end to the appearance of dealing only in general professions of which nothing was to come, a specific promise was made of remitting 30,000*l.* per month, to be continued for three months, half to the armies of Charette, Stofflet, and Scepeaux, and half to those of Brittany.

"In comparing the terms of this promise with the amount of the sums remitted, it is plain that no account is to be taken of sums sent over before the promise was made, nor of those that had another destination than that to the armies there specified.

"Of this latter sort, were the sums given to Frotté, amounting to 9,266*l.*

"It is true also that, in strictness, a deduction ought to be made for the 22,425*l.* (namely 7,425*l.* in dollars, and 15,000*l.* in notes) landed by Sir Edward Pellew; it having been agreed that this should not be considered as part of the sums engaged for, but stand in the form of an extra allowance. But without insisting upon that circumstance, particularly as I continued to keep it in great measure from the knowledge of the parties, wishing rather to surprise them with something beyond their hopes than to run the risk of furnishing them with a ground of additional complaint, let there be deducted only 9,266*l.* remitted to Frotté, 23,558*l.* not having any part common with the preceding and remitted before the 13th February 1796, making together 32,824*l.*; leaving a balance of 45,356*l.* as money, that may be carried to account in discharge of the 90,000*l.* promised.\* Observing always that much even of this, having been paid at a later period, could by no means answer the same purpose as if it had been remitted within the time stipulated.

"Such is the state of the transaction, as it appears on the face of the account, and is founded merely on a comparison of the sums sent with the extent of what was engaged for.

"Some circumstances, however, must here be stated which may tend to acquit us, in part, of a breach of engagement; even though the sums remitted should fall short, in a considerable degree, of those held out in the letter above referred to.

"Before this letter was finally agreed on and the measures in consequence carried into effect, before, in fact, the first payment had reached its destination, news arrived of the unfortunate death of Stofflet, which was followed soon after by the capture of Charette, and the suppression of the whole of the Royalist force on that side the Loire.

"In consequence of this, and of the distressed state in which they were for want of money, the army of Scepeaux was soon after obliged to make its peace; and, long before the expiration of the three months, all the other parties had submitted, and the whole of the Royalist war was at an end.

"It is certain that, however we might have been accessory to those events by not fulfilling earlier the promises which we had never failed to make for more than two years before (as I have not the least doubt in my own mind that we were) it could not be expected that we were to make good engagements, when the objects for which they were entered into, by whatever means it so happened, no longer subsisted.

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		£
* Total remitted	-	78,180
Deduct	-	32,824
		<hr/> 45,356

"It is clearly by this test that the question of any further assistance to be given to the Royalists is to be tried, so far as the same is matter of good faith; namely, whether there still exist the means of applying the money conformably to the views and in pursuance of the principle on which it was originally granted.

"To facilitate the application of this rule, I must proceed to state that part of the account which relates separately to Puisaye, the only surviving claimant, and who does claim with great earnestness, and with a force of argument on his side which I confess myself wholly unable to withstand.

"Of the 90,000*l.* promised in all, in the letter of the 13th February, Puisaye was to have 45,000*l.*

"He has received since that time (or rather there has been sent to him, including much that has been lost or diverted from its destination in different ways, *exempli gratia*, 5,000*l.* lost with Comte de Serent, 1,000*l.* lost by M. de Cointré, 800*l.* of it afterwards recovered and applied to other purposes) 27,901*l.* leaving a difference between the sums promised and the sums sent of 17,099*l.*

"It seems to me that of this difference he ought to have whatever there is reason to think will be fairly laid out in any of the following ways:—

"1st. In discharging engagements contracted under the faith of our assurances.

"2nd. In making compensation, as far as may be, to those who have suffered more immediately in consequence of these assurances not having been fulfilled.

"3rd. In maintaining that party in such a state of intelligence, connexion, and organization, as to them, and for their future views and interests, shall appear to be desirable.

"The objects comprised under these several heads have been detailed on different occasions, and will of themselves readily occur.

"Several debts have been contracted for goods purchased on the prospect of our remittances; and now remain undischarged. If the persons we are treating with had a mind to act unfairly, it would be easy for them to state the amount of these much greater than they make it.

"Upon the prospect of reimbursement out of the funds expected from hence, many persons advanced money for the use of the army, exclusive of those who took *bons* for the repayment of such advances here.

"And many more lent their services to an extent which they could not afford, or would not have been disposed to go but upon some prospect of remuneration.

"A great many are in a state still more to call for consideration; namely persons who, upon the invitation formally held out by Puisaye in consequence of the assurances and in obedience even to the instructions sent from here, abandoned their houses, or came over from the Republican armies; and are now, in consequence, in a situation in which they have no means of escape or subsistence but what they derive from the good will of the country people, who, in consequence, partake of this grievance, and of the discontent that must be produced by it.

"These are all claims of direct justice. There are others which, though not excluding the consideration of justice, as these do not exclude that of policy, belong more to the head of policy; and of a policy which, I cannot but think, we shall some day feel, in spite of all that may be done by the negotiations at Lille.

"It cannot be supposed that the Royalists can subsist as a party, even in the state of inaction in which they are at present, and from which no one at this time thinks of removing them, without a continued expense, trifling as a national object, but great as the contribution of a people in such circumstances as theirs.

"They must have money for intelligence, money for communication, money to buy off the vigilance of guards and officers, to get their friends out of prison, their names erased from the list of emigrants, to compensate losses sustained in their service, to support those who by engaging with them have thrown themselves out of every other means of subsistence.

"Do we not owe it to them to employ whatever means are in our power to enable them to make head against these expenses, to preserve themselves as a party, to keep in readiness for events which may happen at any instant, and which may reasonably be expected sooner or later; but which are never likely to take place wholly without a struggle wherein the existence of the Royalists in more or less force may be of material consequence?

"If we do not owe this to them in justice I am sure we owe it to ourselves in policy, as well with a view to the influence it may have, in possible cases, on the fate of the Republic, as to the difference to be made by leaving this part of France friendly or hostile to us, full of distrust or full of confidence.

"To both of these considerations something will perhaps be allowed. The question will be of the extent to which they should go, as measured by what we should do in consequence. Without attempting to state the utmost that we ought to do, which must be regulated principally by the consideration of our means, I will state my opinion that we cannot follow up the principle above laid down, nor acquit ourselves of what is strictly due from us, without approaching so near to the sum before stated, namely the 17,099*l.* by which our remittances in this part fall short of our engagements, that we shall act illiberally if we do not give the whole of that sum. The expense will fall more easy as it will not be necessary to pay the whole at once.

"It will be sufficient at first, after paying the 3,737*l.* due long since for *bons* (which I have considered among the remittances and not as part of the balance, and which is really a scandal to us every hour that it remains) to make an advance of two or three thousand more, and then to proceed by instalments of four or five thousand pounds per month, or in any proportions that you may like better, till the whole 17,099*l.* is discharged.

"Such is my idea of what is further due from us to the Royalists if not in point of justice, which however I am not prepared to give up, at least in conformity to those principles which ought to govern a great nation in a transaction of this sort; particularly if we feel conscious, as I am afraid we must, that the whole of our conduct towards these unfortunate people will not bear a very accurate examination.

"There are still two other matters necessary to complete the whole of what is connected with this subject. The one is a sum of 3,287*l.*, the balance of an account which in two years and upwards, and while it was confined to its proper objects, amounted only to less than 9,000*l.* Even of this 9,000*l.* near 1,000*l.* was for expenses attending the expedition to Quiberon. The other, what concerns the situation of Puisaye, personally.

"The account from which the former of these articles arises, and which began in the spring of the year 1795, consists of a multitude of little particulars growing out of our communications with the Royalists,



and not important enough to find a place under any regular department. Of this sort are allowances to persons going backwards and forwards; subsistence to some of them during their stay here; assistance to persons desirous of returning to France finally; occasional charges made by the Prince de Bouillon for the conveyance of persons and letters which he has considered as peculiarly addressed to me, and has not thought right to put down in his general account. The whole of this amounted, in the present year, to no more than 1,077*l.*, till a sum was added of 1,345*l.* for the conveyance of priests, which cannot be charged particularly to the Royalist service, but is part of the general assistance given to the French clergy, and calculated in the end to produce a considerable saving under that head. The balance, including that sum, is only 3,287*l.*, which I shall of course be glad to get paid as soon as convenient, as it has been partly advanced by myself, and partly taken from other heads of service to which it must be replaced.

"The question of Puisaye himself I must leave entirely to your discretion. In a letter to him from Mr. Dundas, written towards the close of last year, when it was wished probably that he should withdraw from the country, an offer was made, as I collect from his answer, of furnishing him with some means of support in case he should choose either to come over hither or to retire into some other part of Europe. He declined the offer, thinking that his presence in France might still be useful; and certainly did himself no discredit by that refusal; since it is difficult to conceive a state more trying to the constancy of anyone, than that in which his life would be passed during every moment of his continuance in that country.

"He has since, perforce, been obliged to quit it, the plots for his destruction having become too numerous and various to leave him either any chance of escape or hope of being useful.

"The King and *Monsieur* have both been fain to render the fullest testimony to his merits and services. Such is also the opinion of some whose judgment cannot fail to have great weight, and whose real sentiments in this respect I have reason to think myself acquainted with; I mean particularly M. de Cazalès. His conduct in his transactions with us you think of, I presume, as I do, and will be ready to declare to have been open, honourable, and upright; never misleading us on any point of information, nor seeking to obtain the assistance of this country on terms inconsistent either with our interests or his own duty.

"It must never be forgotten that his confidence in us, and his secrecy with respect to everything that we entrusted to him, was one of the first sources of the hostility conceived against him, and the chief instrument used by his enemies for his destruction. All that we see and know of him is that his conduct has been highly meritorious; and that he is traduced and calumniated on charges of which we know him to be innocent, and which result from causes that cannot but give him an additional merit in our eyes. The great foundation of the suspicions and clamours raised against him, and on which his enemies have never failed to work, from the publication by Louvet down to the present day, has been that he is a man sold to England, and who is betraying to us the interests of his own country. We know whether that is so or not; and whether the causes that have led to the suspicion are not such as should give him a claim to our support.

"On this statement, of the correctness of which you can perfectly judge, I leave him to your discretion. I know not that his wishes are at all exorbitant, or that he looks for more than to be enabled for the present, and till things shall have taken their final turn, to subsist in decent comfort, suitably to the condition of a man who has acted so

considerable a part, and been employed so confidentially, and in service so important as it might have proved, by the British Government.

"Though the objects mentioned in this letter are all of a sort to make an early decision desirable, yet the most pressing seem to be an advance for the discharge of the 3,737*l.* unpaid *bons*, and something for claims of a similar nature that remain unsatisfied in the interior."

#### PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797], September 2, Hollwood.—"I have seen Melvill, and obtained from him (on conditions) the paper which I enclose. It seems, I think, a sufficient proof that he communicates with those who know what has passed at Lisle. His conversation however was not very distinct or satisfactory, but he said precisely that it would not be difficult, if we insisted on it, to have the Cape ceded to ourselves, instead of its being neutral.

"I was afraid of entering on the question of Portugal, but he said enough on it to show me that he had some suspicion of our disliking the terms, and that the French set a high value on them. I have promised to let him know after I have sufficiently considered the paper, whether I think the thing worth pursuing. I should wish much to see you first, and will be in readiness either to come to you at Dropmore, or meet you in town, or anywhere else (unless it suits you to come over here) any time to-morrow, or next day."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 4 [Stowe].—"I feel very strongly your kindness to my poor *protégé* Mr. Fisher, who had flattered himself with hopes that his claim might have been considered as very distinct from those whom you so properly put aside; but it is so much more gratifying to me to owe to your kindness the protection which you are so good to hold out to him, that I with pleasure drop any idea of urging further his Dutch claims; and will thank you for your offer of endeavouring to settle his allowance for the employment which you gave him last winter. I am going by the 14th to Bristol; meaning that the signature of the two returns of the 14th September and the 1st of October shall satisfy my military duties for this year. After that day I return home, and wish I could tempt Lady Grenville and you to Wotton for a week, or here, whichever you like best. I am mortified with your Teneriffe disappointment, for I fear that it will give the Spaniards confidence. As to peace, *facile credimus quod volumus*; *et volo* that you shall have no peace till you sign it with Louis XVIII., which will be in six months. You see that I am very communicative of my politics; and if you are not as good a believer as I am, the fault is evidently in your want of understanding. In the meantime do not let the Comte D'Artois starve, which is pretty near his actual situation; and the Treasury having referred Monsieur Duteil to Canning, who has again sent him back to the Treasury on this subject. The only sure and clear result of all these references is, that *Monsieur* has not one farthing; and having received only 1,000*l.* for the last three months, is not very likely to get fat."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 4, Weymouth.—"I entirely approve of Lord Grenville's proposal that Admiral Duncan should accept the Order of

St. Alexander which Count Woronzow has received from Petersburg ; and that, in return, the Russian Admiral should be created a Knight of the Bath ; but do not see any reason of conveying any mark of favour to the other officers of the Russian navy who served in this country."

W. PITT to GEORGE III.

1797, September 6, Hollwood.—"Mr. Pitt humbly begs leave to acquaint your Majesty that a Mr. Melville, the person named in one of Lord Malmesbury's separate letters, has come over here to repeat a proposal similar to that which he had made at Lisle, of engaging for the conclusion of peace on terms satisfactory and advantageous to this country, in return for the private payment of a sum of money to be distributed among the different members of the French Government. The sum he names is a very large one, amounting to four hundred and fifty thousand pounds ; but it seems not to be more than would be wisely employed if he can make good what he proposes as the condition previous to its being paid, namely, that the treaty shall be signed and ratified without delay, leaving this country in possession of the Cape, Ceylon, Cochin, and Trinidad, and exacting nothing in return. On consulting with such of your Majesty's servants as were within reach, Mr. Pitt finds them all of opinion that the knowledge which Mr. Melville appears to have of the most secret particulars of what has passed at Lisle are a sufficient proof that he is really trusted by those in the confidence of the French Government, and that it would be wise to encourage the proposal. The safest mode of doing it seems to be to refer Mr. Melville to Lisle, and state the particulars to Lord Malmesbury, authorising him to engage for the payment on the condition of the treaty being concluded within a limited time on terms consistent with his instructions. The sum might without material difficulty, it is conceived, be supplied in part from the territorial revenues of India, and the remainder from secret service, without the necessity of ever disclosing the transaction. Mr. Pitt has thought it his duty to submit this to your Majesty's consideration, and wait your Majesty's commands before he takes any further step in the business."

*Copy by Lord Grenville.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR MORTON EDEN.

Private.

1797, September 8, Dropmore.—"I have to acknowledge your private letter by Mr. Sevrigh, and I am concerned to be obliged to say that, under the present circumstances, it does not appear to me that the request which it contains could with propriety be recommended to His Majesty.

"I hope at the same time that you are persuaded of the pleasure I should feel in forwarding your wishes, and of the justice which I do to your exertions, however ineffectual they have been rendered by the untoward course of events, which produced the negotiations of Austria for a separate peace.

"In the present moment, I see very little prospect of any cordiality on the part of the Austrian Government. It will be very interesting to us to know whether M. Thugut still entertains any idea of quitting his situation, and what are (in that case) the dispositions of his probable successor. I conclude that you understood, from the tenor of my despatch on the subject, that the business of the Austrian loan was not to be lost sight of ; but that we thought it more advantageous to speak

of it as a point that could admit of no doubt, than to urge it as a matter which could require to be pressed. I shall probably have occasion shortly to instruct you to make a formal demand on this subject; and it will, therefore, be necessary that you should prepare the way for a discussion, the result of which, if unfavourable, must lead to a public communication to Parliament of the whole transaction, and to discussions the most injurious to the honour of His Imperial Majesty's Government, and the most destructive of all future connection or harmony between the two countries."

*Copy.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, September 9, Lille.—"I fear the four days which have passed since the arrival of Brooks will have appeared very long ones, and I most sincerely regret that I have been forced, from want of intelligence, to keep you so long in a state of uncertainty. But, till this morning when the post brought the *rédacteurs* and some few letters, the accounts that came here were so vague and so unsatisfactory, that the transmitting them would only have added to your doubts. The French legation got none but through the telegraph, and these were so imperfect and evidently so partial that they could not be depended on. William and Gregory,\* as you will readily believe, feel very differently on this occasion. William is dejected and uneasy. "Gregory," though sorry for Carnot, approves all that has passed. The first has spoken to me with great freedom and apparent sincerity, and declared that, if he should remain charged with the negotiation (which, however, he does not expect) and that his instructions should be altered, he certainly will resign and not become the instrument of the prolongation of war between the two countries. It is principally from his conversation, and from what I have collected from Henry that my separate dispatch is formed; their opinions may be biassed, but they are unquestionably both sensible men.

"Gregory walked with me last night during a part of the play; his manners were the same as they have been since we have begun to associate, easy and civil, and he expressed his wishes *and hopes* for the success of our negotiation as strong as ever. On speaking of the declaration of Duverne (who, by the way, I think deserves most richly to be hanged) he said he recollected full well, and that whatever impression that part which related to Wickham might have made at the time, he was persuaded it would make no difference as to our negotiation, since the two countries then stood in a very different situation with respect to each other from that in which they were placed by the opening of a pacific treaty. He spoke with great acrimony of Pichégu and affected to give entire credit to the conspiracy of which he and the other members stood accused. Gregory's wife, who is with him here, is a most red-hot Jacobin, and his language when he comes from her or after a conversation with William is very different.

2 o'clock.—"I this moment hear of the appointment of M. de la Croix, and I am quite at a loss how to take it. I however can have little doubt of its being a bad omen, but as I shall speak my sentiments fully on it in a separate despatch it is unnecessary to repeat them here.

8 o'clock.—"I was much surprised about half an hour ago by a visit from M. le Tourneur; he has for some time past been very civil, but I

\* M. le Tourneur.

think really more so than usual since the late event at Paris. The nature of his visit was to apologise for not having it in his power to give me, as he promised this morning, a copy of the whole declaration of Duverne, which he said he had lent to an acquaintance who had left Lille and carried it with him. He also acquainted me with the election of Francois Neufchateau, but was quite silent as to appointment of M. de la Croix which I learnt from Henry.

"It sometimes occurs to me that Melvil may have been *really* employed, and that the arrival of M. de la Croix and the civilities of Gregory may have some connection with his commission.

*Postscript.*—"M. le Tourneur, on speaking of that part of Duverne's declaration which relates to Wickham, said that he was sure it was quite forgotten by the Directory; that at the time they considered it as the natural conduct of a country at war with them; that, at present, no recrimination should be heard of, no reference to past animosity. *Passons l'éponge sur tout cela, et occupons nous seulement de finir notre besogne de la bonne manière*; these were his words, and they were almost as extraordinary in his mouth as when he called a few moments afterwards the General Vandamme, *parfois trop républicain, une tête trop exaltée*; expressions at which Colchen who was with him stared as much as I was disposed to do."

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, September 9, Lille, 11.0 p.m.—"I forgot to mention in my private letter that I believe 'Robert' is arrested, but he is not in possession of a single paper or proof of any kind. I fortunately stopped fifty *Louis* I was going to remit him on Tuesday evening, just in time."

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, September 9, Berlin.—"There are particularities attending the communication which Count Panin has made me that merit your Lordship's notice. It is impossible to shew more manliness in his private sentiments, or more candour in his confidence than was evident in his conversations with me. But independent of a degree of awkwardness, which is to be attributed to his having never before been in a foreign mission, he labours under much uneasiness from an apprehension that he differs in opinion with some of the Emperor's principal advisers, and may, in the present instance, ultimately find his impressions not supported at Petersburg. Your Lordship is doubtless no stranger to the intrigue which occasioned Count Panin's coming here; namely, the recall of M. Kotchubey from Constantinople, for whom he was to make place in the college of foreign affairs. Besides, he is equally dissatisfied with the conduct of the Prussian Ministers, and with the system of Prussia in regard to France, and these circumstances cannot fail to give him a great degree of diffidence, especially as he has no instructions from Russia applicable, in his judgment, to the present situation of France and of the negotiations. I am therefore suspicious that Count Panin has, more from embarrassment than from any wish on his part, withheld part of what has passed with M. Caillard and M. Haugwitz; not, probably, in regard to the issue, but to the motives which have hurried him so much in this transaction. They are, indeed, less material in themselves, but they are connected with the plan which M. Haugwitz appears to have formed (on a knowledge of Count Panin's

character and situation) for counteracting his extreme horror and aversion to France. Count Haugwitz not only shews him a very studied attention, but I am assured M. Alopcœus comes to pass the winter at Berlin, which can be in no view but that of checking Count Panin's natural impressions.

"It were presumption in me to touch upon the internal affairs of Russia were I not in the persuasion that your Lordship may wish to know the opinions of one who, like Count Panin, has been a member of administration since the commencement of this reign. It has accidentally come to [my] knowledge that he is sincerely grieved with what is going on there, and dreads the consequences which the whims and inconsiderate changes, so unfortunately persevered in, appear likely to produce on all descriptions of people in Russia.

"I beg further to recommend to your Lordship's consideration whether you have any mode of encouraging the disposition which Count Panin has now shewn of being on a footing of intimate confidence with me."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

Private.

1797, September 9, Cleveland Row.—*In cipher*.—"It is on every account very fortunate that Count Panin has begun his mission with such favourable dispositions for concert and confidence with you, and with so just impressions of the present system of the Court of Berlin. You certainly cannot do better than to cultivate these sentiments by every attention in your power, and by a return of openness and confidence on your part. In the present moment I am not aware of any particular means of shewing attention to Count Panin, but, if any should occur to you, I should be glad to be informed of it."

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD MALMESBURY.

Private.

1797, September 11, Cleveland Row.—"You may easily imagine the anxiety in which your dispatches have left us respecting the final result of this new revolution in France. I fear that it would be reasoning in a very sanguine manner indeed to expect that it can be favourable to the interests of humanity either there or elsewhere, but one is lost in speculations on the course of such events. The imbecility of the Councils, and particularly of those who conducted what was called the moderating system in the *Conseil des Anciens*, is that which strikes one most on first view of this extraordinary transaction; but it is not the first time that a minority, composed of desperate men acting in concert, have, during the course of the French Revolution, overpowered a much larger number of individuals disunited and distracted in all their views and counsels. The only thing which seems certain as to the future is that there is more to come, but what that is to be, I take it, is far beyond the reach of human prescience.

"As to our part in this transaction, it is most likely that a few days will now assign it to us clearly and unequivocally. I have but little hope of good; but I would not on any account suffer that opinion to influence our measures, or to induce us to omit any rational means of obtaining the end of peace which I had begun to think much nearer in prospect than I can now flatter myself it is.

"As soon as your dispatches arrive, I will send Lord G. Leveson back to you."

*Copy.*

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 11, Lille.—“You will forgive me if I make my private letter of to-day very short. I really am very sorry to lose my French colleagues, though in fact the mischief was irreparably done from the moment the last great event took place at Paris.

“It is quite unaccountable what is become of M. de la Croix. Letters came here directed to him, and both MM. le Tournour and Maret were in hourly expectation of him Saturday evening and yesterday; and it was the certainty of his arrival which made them assert so positively that the business would begin in earnest to-day. Le Tournour, who is certainly very ill-used on this occasion, bears his recall with less temper than the others, and his wife is outrageous. The others are deeply affected since it is a complete overthrow of their fortunes, but they carry it off better.

“William, who expects to keep up his intimacy with Edward,\* has promised to keep me confidentially informed of all that passes through Henry; and, if our business last long, which I much doubt, this will be of very great service.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797.—September 11, Downing Street.—“In transmitting to your Majesty the despatches received this morning from Lisbon, Lord Grenville thinks it his duty to add to what Mr. Walpole states, that he has this day seen M. d’Almeida, who read to him a dispatch from M. de Pinto, in which the latter expressly says that, as the article respecting the reception of no more than six British ships in the ports of Portugal was contrary to the treaties existing between Great Britain and Portugal, it had been determined not to ratify that engagement, but to refer it to subsequent negotiation with France.

“Your Majesty will see by Lord Malmesbury’s dispatches the details of what has passed at Paris, and the appointment of M. de la Croix, which seem very unfavourable to the success of the negotiation.

“Lord Grenville has made enquiry respecting the secret box which was brought to your Majesty in so torn a state, and the messenger declares in the most particular manner that it was done by an accident in the coach seat on his journey to Weymouth. He has been ordered to be more careful of the boxes in future.”

*Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, September 12, Cleveland Row.—“Lord Grenville has the honour to inform your Majesty that he has this day seen M. Balan, who communicated to him the wish of the King of Prussia that the Prince of Orange might receive at the general peace, not only a full indemnity for his private property, but also, if the principle of secularization in Germany is admitted, some territorial acquisition, with which view the King of Prussia had entered into the eventual engagement with France contained in the convention of the 5th of August 1796; and that His Prussian Majesty, in directing these particulars to be communicated to your Majesty’s servants, wished to know how far these ideas were conformable to those entertained by your Majesty.

“Lord Grenville answered that the claim of pecuniary compensation for the loss of property belonging to the House of Orange was founded

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\* M. de Talleyrand.

on the most evident principles of justice, and had, as such, been included in the proposals directed to be made by your Majesty's Minister, and that the representations of His Prussian Majesty, if he should judge proper to direct them to be made at Paris, in support of that demand, could not but be advantageous to the interests of the Prince of Orange.

"That with respect to the second point, your Majesty did not think proper to authorise any particular assurances to be given, because it did not yet appear that there would be any question of secularizations in settling the peace of the Empire, and because your Majesty's wishes must be that the constitutional integrity of the Empire should be maintained. But that if the contrary should happen, your Majesty would certainly see with pleasure any favourable effects which might arise for the advantage of the House of Orange from the adoption of that mode of settling the peace of the Empire."

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 12, [Hill Street].—"I don't trouble you with any reflexions upon the late events in France, of which in our present position we must be content, I fear, to remain idle though not unconcerned spectators. It is the effect of bad play to forfeit the benefit of those occasions which chance from time to time may cause to arise. But there is one attempt that may be made at so little expense that it may be worth the trial, however doubtful or inconsiderable the advantage may be resulting from it. The merits and value of Pichégu appear to be such, as well as of some of his companions, as may make it desirable that he should be saved from exile in Guiana; and I should think that, with good management, we might obtain sufficient information of the time of their sailing, to have a chance of rendering to them the same service that the French attempted for their friends Muir and Gerald and the rest of them. Should Pichégu's intentions be as good as they have sometimes appeared, it is to be wished that he should owe such an obligation to this country. But, at all events, the capture of a French vessel will do us no harm, nor the turning loose into Europe such an enemy of the present French Government.

"A mail, I understand, is arrived from Lisbon. I hope, if they take the course that is to be wished, we shall exert better means than have hitherto been employed, for recruiting our foreign force in that quarter, or rather shall remove those obstructions which Stuart had raised, and which prevented its being recruited, at least to its present establishment, long ago. I cannot help again repeating my wishes that, if we are to have an officer in that country, Mulgrave may be the person, who I am persuaded is, in every view, the man most proper for that situation. A man so improper as the present (or late) one is hardly to be found, I conceive, in the whole army list."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 12, Althorp.—"It has been suggested to me that it would be right that, when the compliment of the Order of the Bath is paid to Admiral Harnikoff, a sword or something of that kind should be given to Rear-Admiral Mackaroff, who was his second in command and who remained Commander in-Chief for a little while, and I think another of less value to Rear-Admiral Taitt, who was third in command of the auxiliary squadron. If you approve of this, it might be as well to



enable Woronzow to notify the whole together, which I understand he might do, if he were apprized of it before Friday's mail. Should this strike you in the same light, will you be so good as to direct either Hammond or Canning to communicate with Nepean on the subject; the exact value or pattern of the swords need not perhaps be fixed immediately. I am the rather inclined to propose this, as I understand that Mackaroff is rather more popular, both in Russia and with Woronzow, than the Vice-Admiral was.

"Being on the subject of compliments, I really think that some notice should be taken (but I don't exactly know the proper mode) of the Spanish Governor of Santa Cruz who behaved so well to our people after the treaty they made for retreating to their ships.

"I suppose you will soon be calling me up to town again. I cannot help feeling very reluctant at leaving this place, but, at all events, even if I have not a summons from you before, I shall be in town on Monday next."

*Endorsed by Lord Grenville.*—"This is conformable to the ideas I entertain on the subject and I wish therefore that it should be settled with Mr. Nepean.

"The time of sending over the Bath insignia to the admiral seems the proper moment for also sending the swords.

"I think it will at all events be necessary to send a star or badge for the admiral of about 400*l.* or 500*l.* value; and if the swords are 300*l.* and 200*l.* value, it would be quite enough. But the whole of this ought, I think, to be done by the Admiralty rather than out of the civil list, which can but ill bear extra charge of this nature."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, September 12, Cleveland Row.—"J'ai reçu votre billet au moment de partir. Si je pourrais voir quelque utilité aux discussions dont vous me parlez, je me serais néanmoins arrangé pour avoir le plaisir de vous recevoir ce matin comme vous me le proposez. Malheureusement après le résultat de nos dernières ouvertures à Vienne, tout ce que je pourrais vous dire serait évidemment des paroles jettées en l'air. Je serais de retour d'ici en deux ou trois jours au plus tard, et si, en attendant, vous avez quelque communication à me faire d'une nature *différente* de ce qui a été dit au Chevalier Eden, je serais toujours à vos ordres; si non, ce sera alors *sat cito si sat bene*.

"Croyez toujours, je vous supplie, au très sincère et invariable attachement personnel que je vous ai voué."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 13, Weymouth.—"Lord Grenville has acted very properly in assuring M. Balan of the good inclination here to having the Prince of Orange and his family fully indemnified in money for the loss of their patrimony and situation in the Dutch Republic; but the not having encouraged any idea of support in obtaining the secularization of some bishopricks in Germany in lieu of his losses. I certainly, as Elector, shall do my utmost to prevent any unjust arrangements of that kind. Holland, not Germany, ought to provide for the House of Orange, and, in failure of the latter, England, out of the acquisitions to be obtained in the East Indies from the Dutch."

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797, September 15, York Farm.]—"J'ai reçu le billet amical que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire. Mes sentimens, ma manière de voir et de juger les choses, et mon attachement personnel à ce pays-ci et à vous m'en ont rendu la lecture bien cruelle. Je ne me permets aucune réflexion. Vous devez être trop prévenu vous-même pour les écouter. Je me borne à vous prier (d'ainsi que votre amitié s'y est engagé) de me prévenir de la mesure queiconque que vous prendrez, et au moment où vous vous déciderez. Permettez-moi cependant de vous observer que tout parti violent serait dangereux en ce que, I, il ne vous fera pas obtenir ce que vous désirez; et II, qu'en le prenant vous nous liez avec la France et, encore une fois, bien malgré nous. Je pourrais en dire davantage sur ce point si je connaissais plus à fond nos projets du moment, dont je n'ai qu'un léger *hint*, et dont, par conséquent, je ne puis pas parler avec certitude, mais qui pourraient encore être de nature à étonner le monde, et à arracher l'admiration de ceux qui sont le plus prévenus contre nous. Vous allez bouleverser tout cela si ce grand objet existe. Il ne m'appartient pas de décider de ce que vous avez à dire au Parlement, mais ne pourriez-vous pas y dire les faits sans y annoncer déjà l'exécution d'une sorte de vengeance en vérité peu digne de vous, et, selon moi, bien déplacée dans la circonstance."

*French.*

## LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 19, Dover.—"I am this moment landed, but shall not be able to reach London till to-morrow about the middle of the day. I have barely time to write these very few words as the post is waiting. The dispatch which accompanies this I wrote on the passage. It is not a very material one, but it appeared to me that something of the sort was wanting to complete the history of this last mission."

## LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, September 21, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville begs leave humbly to submit to your Majesty the draft of a note from Lord Malmesbury to the French plenipotentiaries at Lisle, which was this day settled at the meeting of your Majesty's servants, and which Lord Grenville trusts is calculated to place the business in its true light in the public opinion here."

*Copy.*

## GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 22, Windsor.—"The draft of a note from Lord Malmesbury to the French plenipotentiaries at Lisle seems to me so perfectly drawn to place the transaction in its true light, that it certainly meets with my fullest approbation."

## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 25, York Farm.—"J'ai écrit à ma Cour précisément dans le sens dont nous sommes convenus. C'est la septième fois que je parle le même langage, puisse-t-il faire plus d'effet aujourd'hui. Je me rendrai à vos ordres mardi prochain, et je vous apporterai ma dépêche pour vous en faire la lecture. Je désirerais s'il était possible

que vous me vissiez avant midi, pour que j'ai le temps d'ajouter, rétrancher, ou changer ce que vous jugerez à propos."

*French.*

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 29 [London].—"I send you a corrected copy of my last dispatch, No. 37, from Lisle, in which I have inserted a fuller account of what passed in my second interview with MM. Treilhard and Bonnier.

"On reading over what I wrote to you from Calais it strikes me as being much fitter for a private than for an official letter, and I wish you would be so good as to withdraw it from my public correspondence.

"If you do want me, I propose going to Park Place to-morrow at eleven, but I shall return to London for the levée on Wednesday."

LORD MALMESBURY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, September 30, Spring Garden.—"I am happy to find that you think the dispatch in its present state will convey a more satisfactory account to the public of what passed during the last period of my stay at Lisle, than if it had been printed from the copy which I first sent, and which I had drawn up in great haste.

"Your remark on the passage which you doubled down is most perfectly just. I think the words, *in their note*, should be omitted entirely, and that the sentence should run thus; I replied that, having now no doubt left on my mind as to their exact meaning, and being quite sure, notwithstanding the observation they made, *que j'avais saisi la véritable intention de leur note*, — and so on.

"I put these words in French because they are precisely the same as are used by them in their second note, E, of the 30th Fructidor, and evidently with a view to shift from themselves, and fix on me, the refusal to continue the negotiation.

"In regard to the extent of the intended publication, I am well aware that my private feelings may bias my judgment, and I had much rather trust entirely to yours than argue from my own. The only suggestion I will allow myself to make is whether, in some passages at least, the names of Le Tourneur, Maret, and Colchen could not be omitted, and the words *French plenipotentiaries* inserted in their stead; the sense would remain the same, and, I should conceive, none of its force be lost by such an alteration. I am the more anxious for it on account of Maret and Colchen. They have enemies in the Directory who may avail themselves of this circumstance in a way which may be fatal to them."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, October 4, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville will, I imagine, think it right that Lord Malmesbury should write a few lines, in answer to the strange paper received yesterday, to close the negotiation by stating that it is the unheard pretension of the plenipotentiaries, as authorized by the Directory, that had ended his mission, not any irregularity from his Court."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

Secret.

1797, October 7, Sittingbourne.—"I enclose to you four papers which Dundas brought to me at Hollwood this morning. They

contain an answer to the secret overture such as (if it could be depended upon) amounts to yielding all we wish on the great points of Ceylon and the Cape.

"The first letter, however, of the 30th September (written not by the person who was here, but by his friend before he had reached Paris) is the only thing like a fresh voucher of the authenticity of the communication. It is, however, a strong one, as it contains an accurate statement written on last Saturday, of the note which we received from Lisle on the Tuesday following, by a very expeditious conveyance, and after a very short stop at Lisle. I do not, however, consider this proof as conclusive. But the offer (if it is real) seemed both to Dundas and me so tempting, and the time pressed so much to an hour (lest an answer should be given in the interval to our last note which would preclude all chance) that we did not hesitate to desire Boyd to write to his correspondent immediately to the purport of the enclosed memorandum. If there had been time, I should certainly not have taken the step without first communicating with you, and if there were anything left for consultation after having taken it, till the result appears, I should not have adhered to my plan of going to Walmer, to which I am now in my road. I must trouble you to return the papers as I have no copies of them."

"I think the answer will come by the end of next week. If it amounts to anything we shall, of course, immediately come to town."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1797, October 8, Dropmore.—"I have just received your letter with its enclosures which I return you as you desire. I cannot deny to you that the whole of that transaction is so disagreeable to my mind that I am very glad to have been saved the necessity of deciding upon it; though I do not know that I could ultimately have brought myself to say that, under all the circumstances, we should have been justified towards the country in rejecting such an offer, and running all the chances of what is to come, however favourable, in many respects, I think them. Still, when I think of Europe abandoned without defence of any kind to these monsters, of the Netherlands, Holland, and Italy left in their hands, of Germany revolutionized, and of the little hope we can have of any permanent tranquility in the midst of all this wreck and convulsion of everything around us, I shudder at what we are doing, and believe in my conscience that, if this country could but be brought to think so, it would be ten thousand times safer (and cheaper too, which they seem to consider above all other things) to face the storm, than to shrink from it. And above all I dread the loss of consideration which must, I fear, infallibly result from any mode of *purchasing* our safety, and such this is, and will be felt to be, let us say or do what we will.

"With all this, I repeat that, upon the balance of a most doubtful scale, I believe the state of this country as to its interior to be so bad that we cannot, in strict duty, venture to reject this offer, which may, at least, give us some interval of rest for doing what we have to do at home; an interval longer or shorter as events may happen, but very long it cannot be. But, if we are forced to take this humiliating step at the very moment when the enemy seems least able to resist us, I think we are doubly bound to look closely to the conditions we are to obtain. On that head there are three points which have, I am afraid, been a little overlooked in the memorandum. The first is that a sort

of promise is held out that Lord M[almesbury] shall be sent back to Lisle with no other security for his future treatment than results from the private understanding established, and from a general statement to be made by the D[irectory] that they are satisfied with our explanations about his powers, and consent to renew the negotiation without any preliminary condition. How can you fulfil this assurance after what is said in the conclusion of our last note? Will it not be absolutely necessary that there should be some ostensible assurance on this part of the subject? Otherwise in what situation do we stand, suppose the whole thing to fail at last by the caprice, or timidity, or want of power of those with whom we have to deal?

"The next point relates to the terms, in which all mention of Trinidad, or other compensation from Spain, is omitted, though our first memorandum was drawn with the express object of including all the demands of Lord M[almesbury's] *projet*. It is, I think, by no means an indifferent matter, on many accounts, that Spain should be forced to this or some other equivalent sacrifice, and we are sure that it is much easier for the Directory to do this, than to make good the other part of their offer.

"The third point relates to what I conceive to be a quite new demand on their part, that of stipulating for the manner in which other nations, not parties to the treaty, nor invited to accede to it, shall be treated at the Cape and Ceylon; a very inconvenient stipulation in point of effect, if France is to be the guaranty to all the world of our conduct to them in our own territories; but perhaps still worse in point of appearance, because it admits and recognizes that very principle of stipulating for neutral nations which we thought ourselves bound so peremptorily to resist in the very outset. And it has the further inconvenience of taking from our scale and throwing into that of France the greatest favour which we have to give to America in return for commercial advantages.

"The expression of *grand canal*, I should fear, is not rightly decyphered. If it applies to Newfoundland, which is possible, the demand to the extent then made would be wholly inadmissible; nor, when we are treating upon the footing now in question, can there be any pretence for any concession at all on that subject, which, if it was ever so harmless, would not fail to be misrepresented by a very discontented body of men, as we have always found the Newfoundland merchants. But if this article really does relate to India, I fear the effect would be worse, because it would exactly overthrow the whole result of our convention in 1787, which, you will remember, we very studiously covered by the general terms of our *projet*.

"I conclude that it is upon reflection that you have omitted all mention of the Continent and even of Portugal. The latter certainly cannot be ultimately passed over, because of the many assurances we have given to the Court of Lisbon that we will, at least, bear them harmless against any consequences of their late conduct. Upon the former I have hardly a hope of your thinking as I do, and therefore I do not dwell upon it.

"On the whole I cannot consistently with truth say that I wish this thing to succeed; but, if it is to be thrown in our way, I incline to think that we shall not be quite justified in refusing it; though, certainly for one, I shall take my part in it very reluctantly; *multo gemens ignominiam, plagasque superbi victoris, tum quos amisit inultus honores*.

"I heartily hope Walmer will be of essential benefit to you, and that you will be able to make up your mind to all these gloomy reflections and dismal prospects with more cheerfulness than I do. But above all that, if this thing is to be done, it will only be as the means of taking

that tone and establishing that system at home which can alone save us from what I think will then be a very near danger of running the same course as the French Government did. We shall have many opportunities to discuss this matter in detail, but if you reflect upon it in all its parts, and with the attention which its importance deserves, I think our conclusions can hardly be different."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, October 9, Dropmore.—"Je n'ai reçu qu'hier-au-soir votre billet par lequel vous me demandiez une conférence pour la matinée d'hier. J'avais quitté la ville avant-hier, ayant laissé avec M. Canning des ordres pour vous communiquer les notes qui terminent, à ce que je suppose, notre besogne en fait de négociation pacifique.

"Je conclus d'après ce que j'apprens de Vienne, quoique je ne le sais pas positivement, qu'à Udine les choses se sont passées à peu près comme à Lille. Ainsi, voilà l'Europe replongée dans une nouvelle lutte contre le Jacobinisme ressuscité. Au commencement de cette année-ci, on pouvait encore espérer que votre Cour nous aiderait à opposer une digue à ce torrent dévastateur. Cet espoir s'est évanoui comme bien d'autres, et il ne nous reste que notre fermeté qui, j'ose vous assurer, ne nous manquera pas, et la chance, plus ou moins éloignée, de rétablir un concert avec la Cour de Vienne, si cette dernière peut enfin se convaincre que ce n'est pas en trompant et soi-même et ses amis, qu'on parvient à se sauver dans des moments de crise.

"Je ne sais pas si vous aviez peut-être quelque autre objet sur lequel vous auriez voulu me parler; si cela est, vous n'avez qu'à me le mander, et je serai toujours à vos ordres."

*French. Copy.*

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, October 12, Admiralty.—"I should not have troubled you with a letter on the subject of this if you had been in town yesterday, but I now enclose it, because an early determination is pressed for. The enclosed is an extract of a chapter in the proposed work of Captain Vancouver relative to his survey on the north-west coast of America, and he is anxious to know whether there will be any objection on the part of Government to his publishing that part of it which relates to the taking possession of the country (the part is marked with a pencil). As I am entirely unacquainted with the subject to which the answer to this question relates, I know of no better way than to submit it to you for your sentiments upon it, and shall be glad to know them as soon as is convenient, as he is anxious to proceed with the printing of his book.

"We have heard nothing further to-day of any consequence from Duncan; he was close off the Texel on Tuesday night, and of course between the Dutch fleet and that port, but I suppose if they hear of his being at sea, they will get into some of the other Dutch ports.

"Is Tom Grenville with you? I have no idea what can be become of him."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797], October 13, Walmer Castle.—"We have received a communication from our private channel which (*if authentic*) contains a

*contre-projet* which will enable us to bring the business shortly to a decisive issue. But it requires much explanation and discussion, especially after the new arguments Duncan has put into our hands. We mean therefore to be in town on Sunday before dinner, and I trust you will be able to meet us on that day. You will find dinner in Downing Street. We may have a Cabinet, if necessary, on Monday morning, and I hope to be able to get part of the way here again in the course of that day. The Dutch pretensions must, I think, be a little lowered. *Minuet furorem vix una sospes navis.*"

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, October 13, Richmond.—"Je me réjouis bien sincèrement avec vous, avec tous les bons Anglais, et avec tous les honnêtes gens de l'univers, de la belle et si importante victoire que le digne amiral Duncan vient de remporter.

"Rien n'est plus heureux que cette affaire, si glorieuse pour la bonne cause. Cela mettra de l'eau dans le vin de la vanité Française et fera comparaitre très glorieusement l'administration à la prochaine ouverture du Parlement.

"Je vous en fais mes compliments du fond de mon ame."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, October 16, Cleveland Row.—"Je vous suis infiniment obligé pour vos félicitations sur la victoire de l'Admiral Duncan, qui n'a pas tardé à se montrer digne de la marque de distinction que l'Empereur lui a accordé. J'aurais voulu de toute mon ame que les vaisseaux Russes eussent été là pour partager son triomphe, après avoir partagé si longtemps ses fatigues.

"Voilà l'aile droite de l'invasion assez complètement battue. Dieu veuille que les deux autres alliés fussent le même essai."

*French. Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, October 16, Cleveland Row.—"Mille graces pour vos félicitations sur la brillante victoire de Duncan. Son capitaine est arrivé aujourd'hui avec les détails qui sont réellement superbes. Il m'est aussi arrivé une dépêche de Vienne par laquelle je vois que l'on était encore dans l'incertitude sur le résultat de la négociation à Udine, où le Marquis de Gallo restait toujours. Peut-être que nos marins du *North Sea* y contribueront sans le savoir."

*French. Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, October 18, Walmer Castle.—"We received yesterday fresh communications from the same secret channel, with another copy of the *contre-projet* you saw, and an assurance that the negotiation may still be renewed if, any time within twelve days from last Friday, we announce that Lord M[almesbury] will return *with the full powers required* either to Lisle or Bruxelles, and if he sets out as immediately afterwards as possible, without waiting for an answer. It seems implied, but is not quite expressly said, that the French Plenipotentiaries would remain during the interval; and a disposition is held out to

facilities on the subject of the Toulon ships, and assurances of all sorts of *égards* to Lord M[almesbury]. But details seem of little consequence, as the communication neither is accompanied, nor promises to be followed by any fresh mark of *authenticity* (previous to his setting out, such as we had required) nor by any *ostensible act* on the part of the French Government to justify Lord M[almesbury's] return, and it pointedly insists on his being announced to have the unlimited power to treat on the basis proposed by France, though it states that he may, in his first conference, say peremptorily that he is bound to insist on compensations, and that this will be admitted. It is of course impossible to entertain an idea of stirring a step on such grounds. Our present idea is to send a memorandum to that effect, recapitulating what we have throughout required as an inducement to entertain the proposal: namely, clear proof of its authenticity; some conciliatory step on the part of France sufficient to account for Lord M[almesbury's] return; and a *certainly* that any further question about powers would be waived, that they would treat on the ground of compensations, and be ready to conclude immediately (if Lord M[almesbury] returned) on terms previously agreed upon. If they are at all in earnest, their plenipotentiaries will probably have staid beyond to-morrow, and we may still hear from them again; but I own I have no faith left in the transaction. At all events, I think it seems necessary to publish the manifesto as speedily as possible, adding a paragraph respecting the official notes exchanged since Lord M[almesbury's] return, and declaring our readiness, even now (since our victory), to adhere to the terms of our *projet*. And this, I should think, cannot be too soon followed by a separate proposal (on the same principle both to Holland and to Spain, particularly the former). I shall be very glad if you can send the manifesto as soon as you have completed it, which I think will not take you long."

#### FINANCIAL MINUTE by W. PITT.

1797, October 25 [Downing Street].—"Supposing the war to be protracted for another campaign beyond 1798, the amount of the supply for 1799, beyond the ordinary peace expenditure, may be estimated at 19,000,000*l*.\*

"This sum may be provided thus:—

"To be furnished by the bank (besides postponing the payment of any part of the 4,000,000 <i>l</i> . advanced in 1798)	-	-	-	-	-	1,000,000 <i>l</i> .
"The amount of the treble assessed taxes, and the others imposed in 1798 (after defraying the interest of the loan of that year) to be subscribed by the Commissioners of the National Debt towards the loan of 1799	-	-	-	-	-	8,000,000 <i>l</i> .
"To be borrowed by loan	-	-	-	-	-	10,000,000 <i>l</i> .
Total	-	-	-	-	-	19,000,000 <i>l</i> .

"The sum of 8,000,000*l*. arising from the taxes of 1798, is here proposed to be subscribed by the Commissioners for the National Debt towards the loan of 1799, as a simpler mode than applying it to the redemption of an equal quantity of the 3 per cents., and increasing the

\* This is 2,000,000*l*. less than for 1798, because it is presumed there will be little or no excess of navy debt or of army extraordinaries 1798 (beyond the sum allowed for), to be provided for in 1799.—W.P.



loan of 1799 by that amount. The effect as to the whole quantity of stock in the market must be the same.

"According to this plan, at the end of 1799 the whole quantity of stock (supposing the loans raised at the price of 50) occasioned by two years of war, which will have been created subsequent to the last loan for 1797 (which came into the market in March or April 1797), will have been—

"For 1798 - - - - - 16,000,000*l*.

"For 1799 - - - - - 20,000,000*l*.

making together 36,000,000*l*. capital.

"But by the operation of the present sinking fund (at the same price of 50) in the same period, a quantity of 3 per cent. stock [will be cancelled ?] as follows :—

"In the 3 quarters of 1797 - - - - - 6,000,000*l*.

"In 1798 - - - - - about 8,000,000*l*.

"In 1799 - - - - - near 9,000,000*l*.

Making together - - - - - 23,000,000*l*.

"The difference between this sum and 36,000,000*l*. amounting to 13,000,000*l*. will form the whole excess of capital debt existing at the end of 1799, beyond that existing in April 1797.

"Supposing the war to terminate at the end of 1799, the capital of *twenty millions* (supposed to be created for the loan of that year) will be extinguished by prolonging the taxes of 9,000,000*l*. (subject to the payment of interest in the interval) for a period of from one year and a quarter to one and three-quarters (according as the 3 per cents. are supposed to be redeemed at 50 or at 75) after the extinction of the 16,000,000*l*. created by the loan of 1797. And the whole capital of debt will then be as much reduced below its amount in April 1797, as it would have been if no loans had taken place in 1798 or 1799. In like manner, if the war is continued at the same rate of expense for the year 1800, if the taxes are continued and applied in the same manner, and the repayment to the Bank postponed till the peace, the additional sum to be raised by loan will be 11,000,000*l*., creating a capital of 22,000,000*l*. There will have been paid off in the course of 1800, a capital of about 9,000,000*l*. by the former sinking fund. Consequently the increase of funded debt at the end of 1800, beyond that in April 1797, will be 26,000,000*l*. The additional capital of 22,000,000*l*. for the loan of this year will require (on the same suppositions as stated for 1799) the prolongation of the taxes for a further period of from one year and four months to near two years.

"On a similar supposition for 1801, there will be a further additional capital of 22,000,000*l*., while rather more than 9,000,000*l*. will have been paid off, making the excess in the whole about 45,000,000*l*., and the taxes to extinguish the additional capital must be again prolonged for a further period of from one year and four months to nearly two years.

"Thus the continuance of the war for 1798 only, creates an additional capital which would not otherwise have existed of 16,000,000*l*., but an excess beyond that in April 1797 only of about 2,000,000*l*. And it requires the continuing the taxes proposed for about *two years and an half* (or somewhat more according as the stocks rise on the peace) to repay the 4,000,000*l*. to the bank, and redeem a capital equal to that created by the loan. At the end of this period the taxes may cease, and the whole capital debt (from the operation of the former sinking fund) will be near 14,000,000*l*. less than in April in 1797.

"For 1799 the capital created will be 20,000,000*l.*; the whole excess at the end of 1799 beyond 1797, 13,000,000*l.*; the prolongation of the taxes for two years and a quarter, or two years and three-quarters further, making in the whole from 4½ years to 5½ years (dated from January 1798). After which period, the whole capital will be less than in 1797 by 23,000,000*l.*

"In 1800 and 1801, respectively, the new capital created will be 22,000,000*l.* The excess at the end of 1800 will be 26,000,000*l.*; of 1801, it will be 39,000,000*l.* Each year will require the prolongation of the taxes for near two years and a half or 3 years more; making a prolongation (for 1800) in the whole, of from 7 years to 8½ years; and for 1801, from 9½ years to 11½ years, from January 1798. At the end of the first period the whole capital will be *less* than in 1797 by near 32,000,000*l.*, and of the second, by near 41,000,000*l.*"

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, November 1, Vienna.—"I was so much pressed for time on the day that I sent the messenger Wiffin back to England, that I had it not in my power to thank your Lordship for your two private letters by Mr. Sevrigh; and more particularly for the very obliging manner in which your Lordship was pleased to express yourself relative to my application for the Irish peerage. On this subject I will not at present trouble your Lordship further than to express my hopes that, though your Lordship does not think proper at this moment to lay at His Majesty's feet my most humble request, yet that your Lordship will be so good as to do it at a convenient time, and to support it with your powerful protection.

"I have little to add to what I have said in my public despatches of this day. M. de Thugut talked again on Monday of his disgust with his situation, and of his determination to retire from it immediately; but, as the accomplishment of the treaty of Udine depends on the conclusion of the peace of the Empire, and cannot consequently be looked upon as definitive, I presume that he will, conformably to a promise which I have reason to believe that he has given to the Emperor, retain his place till after the congress of Rastadt. He has to different persons, with whom he does not even live in habits of intimacy, expressed his disapprobation of the treaty of Udine, and his apprehensions of its consequences; and, though the news arrived here early on the morning of the 22nd past, he did not see the Emperor, who was only at Lachen, till the evening of the 24th. Count Cobenzl will, I believe, be his successor. If it be fair to judge from M. de Thugut's language relative to the treaty of Udine, it may be doubted whether M. de Cobenzl possesses those talents and energy of character necessary for the situation in which he will be placed, more particularly in the arduous circumstances in which this country must still remain. I shall fear that that influence which brought about the signature of the preliminary articles, and the subsequent measures, will, on M. de Thugut's retiring from office, meet with no opposition.

"M. de Gallo is returned hither. He also censures the treaty of Udine, and M. de Thugut; and says that, if that Minister had not thwarted him, he would, at Montebello, have concluded a treaty on more honourable and permanent conditions."

T. PELHAM to ———.

*Private.*

1797, November 2, Phoenix Park.—“I have received a letter from Elliot informing me that you apprehend an attack from the Opposition in England upon the conduct of the army in this country, and that you wished to be acquainted with any particular instances of misconduct which might be noticed.

“It cannot be denied that some things have been done which are to be regretted. At the same time, I believe that no army ever behaved better under similar circumstances, and I will venture to say that no army was ever placed in exactly the same situation; and, with regard to the British troops, I can assure you that they are not only sought for by those who want protection, but even those who by their conduct expose themselves to any military vigour, acknowledge the humanity of the British soldiers.

“The destruction of the *Northern Star* at Belfast, and the attack upon Mr. Gregg’s house at the same town by the soldiers of the Monaghan militia, are outrages not to be justified, and were punished. At the same time, when it is recollected that the Monaghan was reckoned the most loyal regiment in Ireland before it went to Belfast; that owing to the spirit of the Colonel, Colonel Leslie, the conspiracy was discovered, and that two men of that regiment were the first victims, it is not to be wondered at that the regiment should feel indignation at the printers of that paper which had been industriously circulated amongst them, and had corrupted so many of their comrades as well as the whole province of Ulster. Mr. Gregg is, in himself perhaps, a harmless man; but his sisters were notorious encouragers of the United Irishmen, and had sent liquor and money to the Monaghan militia men who were confined.

“The Ancient Britons, from their activity and loyalty, and particularly from the success of one dragoon who, being attacked by two men with pikes, was enabled by his dexterity in the sword exercise to parry both and kill one, soon became the terror of the disaffected, and might, in some instances, have proceeded too far; but I have written to General Lake to make particular inquiries.

“An affray in Cookstown, in which the Kerry militia were the aggressors by attacking the yeomen who wore orange ribbons in honour of the battle of the Boyne, produced very serious consequences, which became the subject of a court of inquiry. The result was that Lord Blayney, who had been entrusted with a special command, was no longer employed; and it would be difficult to say much upon that subject, for the death of two men would, according to one statement, amount to murder. But I must also confess that, in my opinion, even in the most favourable point of view towards Lord Blayney, the soldiers were suffered to act too much from resentment and feeling.

“Mr. Carter wrote to me about an article in the English papers respecting an officer of the Dumbarton Fencibles, which I answered yesterday; and the trial of Captain Frazier will justify the conduct of that officer whom the English papers have so wantonly represented as a murderer.

“It is not a thing which can be openly declared, but the fact is that, without British troops and British officers, the murders and outrages would be unrestrained. The proneness to murder is sufficiently proved in the trial of the conspirators against Lord Carhampton; the assassination of all informers is part of the system of the United Irishmen, and too many have fallen victims to it. Dunn, who was convicted of

having intended to murder Lord Carhampton, acknowledged that he planned, to use his own expression, the murder of a father and son in one of Lord Carhampton's lodges; and that he actually murdered two other men who were also at Lord Carhampton's for protection.

"Since the outrages have begun in the south, one magistrate has been killed, another wounded, a constable murdered, and his limbs cut to pieces, and afterwards placed on a hill with a label in his hand threatening the same treatment to any one who should bury him. At another house, a farmer, his wife, his maid servant, and all his pigs and dogs and his poultry killed, the bowels of the farmer torn out, and a label on his belly threatening all informers.

"It is shocking either to relate or to think upon these things, nor is the barbarity of the country any justification of the soldier, and still less of the Government, if they tolerated retaliation; but it will sometimes prevail.

"Several houses have certainly been burnt in many parts of the country; but in no instance, I believe, excepting where arms and pikes have been concealed, or where the troops have been attacked.

"If I thought that any serious attack was intended upon the Irish Government, I should be very glad to come over and defend myself in my place, at least; and if I were not afraid of increasing the jealousies of the two countries, I should have no objection to carry the war into the enemies' quarters.

"I will write again when I have received General Lake's report."

*Copy.*

#### EARL CAMDEN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1797, November 3, Dublin Castle.—"I am told it is intended to bring before the English Parliament the state of Ireland, and the supposed atrocities which have been practised by the military, and countenanced by Government.

"So much delicacy exists in treating of Irish affairs in the British Parliament, that I have frequently taken notice that Ministers have answered the observations upon the state of this kingdom with the remark, that those considerations are out of the province of the English Parliament. As long as these observations assume a general form, and no specific charges are made, such perhaps is the wisest mode of meeting them. But if, in support of such assertions, facts are attempted to be brought, those facts, if not contradicted, will be generally believed.

"I have, therefore, thought it necessary to furnish you with such facts and remarks as occur to me on the sudden, apprizing you that I will furnish you with more satisfactory information if you are called upon to enter into this subject. I only wish to premise that the dreadful state of this country, from the intimidation practised by the United Irishmen, made it indispensable to take strong measures, and to employ the military without waiting for the forms attendant on their acting in quiet times. I will, therefore, proceed to mention those circumstances which have come to my knowledge, and which, I suppose, can be the object of animadversion; for the policy of the measures themselves can be defended here and in England upon general grounds.

"The destruction of the printing press and other materials for the publication of the *Northern Star* is one of those outrages which will be most dwelt upon. The following is the account of that transaction.

The Monaghan militia was avowedly the most loyal and the best regiment of militia in Ireland. By the machinations of the United Irishmen at Belfast, many of this regiment were corrupted, in so much that it was thought necessary to execute four men who had been found guilty, by a court martial, the proceedings of which I enclose to you. By the exertions of the Colonel (Leslie) the regiment was restored to its loyalty, and, from strongly feeling the imputation that had been justly thrown upon the regiment, from a sense of the mischiefs originating from the publication of the *Northern Star*, and, more particularly, from the editor's refusing to publish a loyal address they had drawn up upon the occasion, a party of that regiment certainly destroyed all the writing utensils, and part of the house of the person who printed the paper; and they also destroyed the furniture of the house of a Mr. Gregg, who had been found, as well as his sister, supplying the condemned men of the Monaghan militia with food. Colonel Leslie offered to punish those who could be ascertained, but, either from confusion or from the intimidation which the adverse party at Belfast now felt, no individuals were selected. And I will fairly own to you that I was not willing to pursue with too much rigour this outrage. It did much good at the time; and to have severely punished the soldiers, when they were required to act with spirit, would have been very dangerous. There was no military punishment, but the proprietors brought an action for damages at the last assizes for Antrim. They failed however in their action.

"Information having been given to General Lake that several persons were appointed colonels of certain regiments to be raised in the counties of Down and Antrim, he ordered such colonels to be seized. One of them was described to be in the house of his brother at Ballinahinch, Lord Moira's town, and upon the brother's denying that he was there, the officer is said to have ordered the men to fire into the house, and much damage was done, and a woman, though not hurt, very much frightened. No report was made to Government upon it. But upon Lord Moira's coming to Ireland, he represented to me this outrage, and said that he would not enquire into it, if it could be construed into a peevish opposition on his part to measures which he disapproved of, but which, if adopted, were liable to such outrages being committed as he described. I requested him to have no delicacy, and to represent to me the circumstances, that they might be enquired into. I transmitted his representation to General Nugent, who reported at first that the affidavits enclosed by Lord Moira were not true; but, upon further enquiry, it was discovered the officer had probably not conducted himself properly, *though it was not proved*; and as Lord Moira informed me that he would be proceeded against *by law*, I communicated that intelligence to General Nugent, who, thereupon, made no further enquiry. No proceeding has been had against him.

"Informations had been frequently given of concealed arms, and, in many instances, those informations had not appeared to have been truly given. The continued assertions of those who gave the information, induced the commanding officers of detachments to threaten to destroy the houses of those who should be discovered to have arms concealed within them. This threat produced the arms; and the execution of it was found to produce so good an effect that, certainly, many houses have been consumed by fire; but scarcely any in which arms have not been found, and some, perhaps, where acknowledged and discovered meetings of rebels have been held. These facts happened soon after the publication of the Proclamation, and, since

that time, scarcely any outrage of a nature worth detailing has been committed. It is to be observed that a remedy was in the power of the person whose property was destroyed. Actions have been brought in some cases and allowed.

"The conduct of Lord Blayney has been much the subject of conversation here. The county of Monaghan was disturbed in the most dreadful manner. Lord Blayney, who is of an old family and great property in that county, had taken a very decided line of opposition to Government, and encouraged all the ideas of reform which are made the ground of the disaffected. He was, however, convinced by the report of the Secret Committee that it was absolutely necessary to take strong measures to quell this rebellion, and offered his services as a military man. It was thought expedient to employ him. Much advantage arose from it. His neighbourhood, from his exertions, became tranquil. Many persons were taken up, and have since been punished. And although he might, perhaps, conduct himself at first with some warmth, it was thought that it would be detrimental to remove from him the command. On the anniversary of the battle of the Boyne, a detachment of the Kerry militia marched through Stewart's Town in the County of Tyrone, and, as some disputes had arisen between this, which is a Catholic regiment, and the Orange men, the detachment vented their rage against the inhabitants of Stewart's Town, who were on that day ornamented with orange ribands. Several were killed on both sides, and it was not without much bloodshed the disturbance was appeased. On the next day Lord Blayney, having been informed of the disturbance, marched at the head of some dragoons to protect that part of the country through which the Kerry militia were to march, and, upon seeing one sergeant and three men of the Kerry militia drawn up, ordered, as it appears without previous enquiry as to their destination, his dragoons to attack them. The men were frightened, and ran into a barn and a house, and attempted to defend themselves; and, in the scuffle, these three men were killed. A court of enquiry was immediately held, consisting of Major-General Loftus, Lord Glandore Colonel of the Kerry militia, Lord Portarlington, Lord William Bentinck, and another officer. The result of that enquiry was a report that the Kerry militia had been the aggressors on the 12th of July, and that the misfortune which happened on the 13th, in which Lord Blayney was concerned, arose from the alarm which the men of the Kerry militia had conceived, and the subsequent confusion upon it. I desired, however, that the command should be immediately taken from so intemperate a man, which was accordingly done.

"Captain Fraser, of the Fraser Fencibles, had a verdict of murder found against him in the county of Kildare by the coroner's inquest, but this gentleman has been honourably acquitted at the assizes.

"The Duke of Leinster informed me of other atrocities committed in that county, but I enquired and found his information not supported.

"The publication of a Declaration from Lord Ancram's regiment of Light Dragoons was very absurd, but it was impossible to prevent or to punish it. A disapprobation of it has been strongly expressed to the commanding officer.

"The Ancient Britons, commanded by Sir Watkin Williams Wynne, did, on their first landing, act perhaps with too much attachment to the sword exercise which they had recently learnt; but their protection is now anxiously sought by all the gentlemen, and by the various towns and villages in the neighbourhood.

"The case of Colonel Sparrow has also been the subject of conversation. He is High Sheriff of Armagh, and was stated to have been patrolling with dragoons, and stopped Captain Lucas of the Monaghan militia, and, upon his refusing to say where he was going, ordered the dragoons to fire, who refusing, he killed him with his own hand. I heard this account, and was so shocked with it, that I wrote to General Lake to enquire into the fact. He enquired of Colonel Leslie of the Monaghan militia. From neither of them could I, at that time, obtain any accurate information upon the subject; but I since learn that Captain Lucas lived some weeks, that a meeting took place between him and Colonel Sparrow, on which the former released the latter from any suspicion of his towards him, and that no prosecution by the family has taken place.

"I think it proper to mention the case of the Dumbarton officer mentioned in the English papers, for which I beg to refer your lordship to the letter written by Mr. Pelham to Mr. Carter, a copy of which I enclose.

"I think it right also to add the case of Captain Rays of the Armagh militia, to prove that, even where an officer met with and suffered the rigour of the law, Government did not interfere. Captain Rays was by Lord Yelverton condemned to three months' imprisonment, for suffering his soldiers to shave a man supposed to have attempted to corrupt them, and to beat the '*rogues march*' when he was conveyed out of camp.

"I have furnished you with these facts, if the subject is introduced, and you can make use of them if you think proper. I rely on your not suffering an imputation of cruelty and want of attention to the rights of the subject to be fastened upon my government, and I have directed more particular enquiry to be made of the generals and magistrates, in case more stress is laid on this subject than I expect.

"It is not to be denied that Government meant to strike terror. That had been the policy of the rebellious, and they had reduced many parts of the north of Ireland to such a state, that a tenant did not dare to speak to or even acknowledge his landlord. The assassination of informers and evidences have been without number; the threats the most extensive and the most dreadful. I enclose you the account of the trial of the persons convicted of the conspiracy to murder Lord Carhampton. I enclose you, also, one of the papers called the *Union Star*.

"An information was yesterday sent to me, an extract of which I also enclose, to show you the system endeavoured to be introduced; and I anxiously hope, if the subject is to be entertained, the state of this country may be explained; and I will venture to say that, in a kingdom like this, and in the sort of warfare we have carried on, it is wonderful that so few real grievances are to be complained of.

"I have also enclosed you the report of the Secret Committee, and the proclamation which was issued in consequence. I have confined myself merely to the supposed military grievances. Those practised by magistrates are liable to prosecution in the courts of law, and do not so loudly call for the interference of Government.

"I have sent a copy of this letter to Mr. Pitt and to the Duke of Portland.

"For the proceedings on the court martial on the Monaghan Militia men, and for the *Union Star*, I must refer you to the Duke of Portland."

*Enclosure.*

T. PELHAM to THOMAS CARTER.

1797, October 30, Dublin Castle.—“I have received your letter of the 23rd, enclosing two newspapers containing an account of a most shocking outrage committed by an officer at Kilcock. The fact I understand to be this. A lieutenant of the Dumbarton Fencibles had dined at Naas, where he made himself intoxicated. On his return to Kilcock, he set off with some of his men and apprehended with violence a person of suspicious character in the neighbourhood, and at the same time dragged away his daughter, and brought her to the guard-house. He there wanted to lie with her, which the girl refusing, he beat her violently, and called in soldiers to hold her while he attempted to ravish her. The next morning the girl came before a magistrate, and swore examinations against the officer, who was immediately apprehended, and lodged in Naas Gaol. The girl being asked whether she had been ravished, denied it to the magistrate; but, the next day on going to Dublin, an attorney drew for her another examination in which a rape was alleged. The girl went back to the magistrate to swear it, but, having taken her first examination wherein she refused to swear a rape, though particularly interrogated on that point, the magistrate declined from a sense of duty to take it.

“The business, in its best form, is very shocking, and you may be assured that proper measures will be taken to bring the officer to punishment.”

*Copy.*

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 5 [Stowe].—“Ten ewes of my best breed to whom a very fine ram has been very properly attentive, together with ten more of this year's breed, and a young gentleman, who will all be forward for next year's marriage, are ready for you; and will set out as soon as you please. They will be three days on the road, and will be overtaken on the third day by my cart with 7,000 three-year-old beech, and a number of odds and ends of other plants including 1,500 two-year-old oaks, together with some pigeons and poultry for Madam. Now I wish that this cargo should arrive when *you* are ready to receive it; and as that may depend upon accident, I write to know whether you will be at Dropmore on Friday, Saturday, or Sunday next, that I may arrange so that they shall all assemble by the earliest moment of your arrival. But, at all events, as this is much more important than anything that can be discussed in your Cabinet, I will beg a line by return of post, that no time may be lost in arranging the march of the sheep; who at least have this advantage over anything that has marched by order of your Cabinet for the last five years, namely, that they march without a subsidy to put them in motion. I hope that your great jack arrived without accident; and, as I am very much inclined to count my chickens of this description before they are hatched, I think it not impossible that I may find for you another of the same sort (if you will let me know in time) for your dinner on the Thanksgiving Day, which I suppose is fixed for Friday next.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1797, November 8, Wimbledon.—“The subject of St. Domingo is a very difficult one; it clearly exceeds all the bounds of expense we had



resolved upon, and what the country either can or will bear. I had much conversation with Mr. Pitt on the subject when we were together at Walmer. I have put the whole into the shape of despatches which, from the connexion between the different parts of the subject, should with most propriety go in joint despatches from the Duke of Portland and me. That however can be easily arranged, when the whole is agreed upon. The subject does not admit of delay. I have sent copies to the Duke of Portland, the same as those now conveyed to you. If the proposed communication is to go to France, it must go through you; but, without regard to my ideas, I wish you to look at the whole subject without bias, but there must be no delay, for every hour of delay is a source of uncalculable expense; and, after what was stated last year to the House of Commons, nothing but the depending negotiation can afford any apology for the expense which has been going forward for more than twelve months past."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 10, Queen's House.—"M. de Luc is very anxious to quit London this day as early as shall suit the convenience of Lord Grenville, thinking himself too infirm to travel all night. I have therefore undertaken to hint to Lord Grenville that he may if possible appoint M. de Luc by noon; another matter that requires some explanation is that Lord Grenville should direct him in what manner he is to address his letters to him. M. de Luc thought of enclosing them to Mr. Hammond, but I have told him that he will be acquainted of the proper channel by Lord Grenville; he is also desirous of knowing how he is to draw for his expenses. Lord Grenville will find him perfectly moderate, but he certainly is not in a situation to travel without assistance."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, November 10, Cleveland Row.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's commands. He had before appointed M. de Luc at twelve o'clock, and he has since seen him and settled everything with him for his departure. Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty in this box the memorandum for the Duke of Brunswick which M. de Luc takes with him."

*Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 10, Richmond.—"Je ne puis croire que mon souverain soit aussi peu fidèle à ses engagements, et soit si impolitique que de refuser les secours qu'il est obligé de fournir à ce pays. Je suis donc persuadé qu'il fera ce qu'il doit faire, mais ne manquez pas de votre côté à certains arrangements pour hâter l'arrivée de ce secours.

"Il faut ordonner au Chevalier Whitworth qu'aussitôt que le secours sera promis, qu'il insiste qu'il soit rassemblé en Courland, et embarqué à Libau, car la mer est ouverte là au commencement de Mars, tandis qu'à Cronstat elle ne l'est qu'au mois de Mai, à Revel à la fin d'Avril, et à Riga au commencement du même mois.

"Il faut se presser d'obtenir ce point pour que les troupes aient le tems de s'assembler dans le voisinage de Libau, et que vous ayez le tems

d'envoyer vos vaisseaux de transport qui doivent partir d'ici pour la côte de Courland vers la fin de Février.

"Excusez la liberté que je prends; c'est mon attachement pour ce pays qui me la fait prendre."

*French.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 11, Windsor.—"I am much pleased with the paper of instructions Lord Grenville has entrusted M. de Luc, which seems most fully to answer the purpose intended, and of the success of which I have the most sanguine hopes. I have not less commendation to express on the despatches to Russia."

#### W. WINDHAM to W. PITT.

1797, November 15.—"You can forgive me, I dare say, the delay of an account of which the object is to ask money. I should not, however, have delayed it so long but for the difficulty of collecting again my materials, so as to give you both the summary you wished, and to correct a mistake which I suspect to have found its way into the former account. With a view to that I will beg you, if you can readily lay your hand upon the paper, to let me have it again.

"In the meanwhile I will give you such a statement as, I conceive, will best conduce to the purpose you have in view.

"The sums required had better be distinguished into those that are due as absolute debt and on which there can be no question, and those of which part at least is matter of discretion and part even subject to future contingencies. Of the former sort the list is—

	£
"1st. Balance of an account delivered in, ending 31st December 1796 - - - - -	1,593
"2nd. Balance of an account continued to the present time - - - - -	2,127
"3rd. Arrear to persons, to whom subsistence has been granted during their occasional residence in this country - - - - -	350
"4th. <i>Bons</i> , being money actually paid by our authority in the interior, and due on bills accepted here -	4,124
"5th. Due for arms, which it was expected the ordnance would have paid for - - - - -	888
	<hr/> 9,082

"The accounts on which the balances Nos. 1 and 2 are due are both before you. They contain, as you will perceive, several articles of a temporary nature, and others not properly belonging to this head of service.

"The sums of the second description are first, 17,099*l.*, being the difference between the money formerly promised to the army of Brittany and the money remitted in consequence, of which, though part only may be due of strict right, I have given my reasons in the other paper why it appears to me that the whole should be ultimately paid, supposing always that the means exist of applying it fairly according to the true intent and purpose on which it was originally promised. In this view I consider whatever shall be granted in future to this part of the Royalists as going in discharge of that promise; and,

accordingly, shall so set down, as soon as they are paid, the 2,000*l.* of *bons* which you have lately consented that Puisaye should draw from the interior.

"There are, then, a number of small objects continually occurring, too minute and anomalous to find a place or obtain attention in any other Department, yet too important to the credit, justice, and interests of the country to be left unprovided for.

"Of this sort are expenses of persons going backwards and forwards; allowance to the same during their occasional residence here; allowance to so very few, whose names were formerly given to you, and who having been long confidentially employed by us, are now wholly excluded from France, and have no means of subsistence but what this allowance affords.

"The whole of these objects, including even the expenses of Puisaye, I shall consider as very sufficiently provided for by 400*l.* a month, with a prospect even of some saving; which, if it should take place, I will apply fairly, according to the strict and rigid economy which I have always observed in this service, towards the discharge of any *bons* of an old date which may still come in, though certainly not to any amount, in addition to those above mentioned.

"These two sums, namely, the 17,099*l.* and the 400*l.* per month (or 4,800*l.* per year) joined to the 9,082*l.* under the first head, will make, within the course of the year commencing from this time, the sum of 30,981*l.* on which if you will give me a tolerable advance so as to enable me to pay off a good portion of the old debts, some of which, as you will observe, have been three years in contracting, I shall hope not to be obliged to trouble you for a good while.

"Whatever sums you advance shall be regularly set off against the debt as it now stands, specifying the article to which it is applied, agreeably to the form exhibited in the paper No. 1.

"I shall wish to observe this form in order to avoid confusion in the accounts, and because I am far from meaning to state it as my opinion that no succours should be given to the royalists beyond the amount of the 17,099*l.* which I have named as the limit that we ought not to stop short of, supposing the circumstances to admit and require the transmission of a sum to that amount in favour of the royalists in Brittany.

"There are at this moment applications (some of them upon the ground of the specific promise which need not be admitted, and others upon the ground of the general assurances given to the royalists, which I certainly think not undeserving of attention) from the royalists of the Vendée, requesting some continuation of pecuniary assistance from this country.

"There is likewise a most impudent demand from Frotté, made in opposition to the most notorious fact, and in contradiction to a most distinct acknowledgment which I have under his hand; a demand so impudent and so ungrateful that, if he alone were concerned, I should think it a reason for having nothing further to do with him. But the royalists of his division, though far from being of the amount and consequence that he would now give out, may well be deserving of a share of consideration; of so much as may prevent this party from falling into utter despair, and being left with no resource but that of flying the country, or submitting upon whatever terms they can make to the Republic, perfectly contrary to what is their present wishes.

"Whatever is done, however, in that way must be matter of separate consideration. Something, I clearly think, ought to be done, I mean for the other descriptions of royalists besides those of Brittany; and

the amount need not be considerable. But unless I receive special directions upon that head, I shall feel myself bound to apply whatever sums you may advance me to the discharge of the account as I have at present stated it, that is, to a mixed discharge of the old debts and the supply of the pressing demands from the interior of Brittany, within the limits assigned, keeping in hand always enough for the current service, so as not to exceed the rate of 400*l.* per month."

MEMORANDUM of MR. WINDHAM *on the same subject*.—"The claims of M. de Suzanet are for 8,500*l.* for the army of Charette, and the same sum for that of Stofflet, being the difference between the sums promised respectively, and those received or remitted.

"If this claim be admitted it will not be possible to refuse a similar claim and to the same amount, though not hitherto made, to the army of Scepeaux; making altogether the sum of 25,000*l.*, independent of the 17,099*l.* which, I think, ought to be paid to Brittany.

"Though these claims on the part of the armies of Charette and Stofflet, and in like manner that which, in the case of their admission, would be set up upon the part of the army of Scepeaux, need not be admitted to their full extent, yet it cannot be denied that something is due to them, either as matter of strict right and in discharge of an actual promise, or in pursuance of the principle on which that promise was made.

"It cannot well be supposed that, with the expectation which they had long been authorised to entertain of assistance from this country, and the knowledge which they had that such assistance was actually on the road, they may not have incurred debts and contracted engagements beyond what the assistance that actually reached them would be able to discharge.

"Whatever stands upon that footing, though its amount cannot be accurately ascertained, seems to stand upon the footing of strict right. A certain degree of assistance is due to them for the support of those who were either not included in, or cannot trust to the terms of the pacification; and also for the prosecution of the further hopes of the party.

"One difficulty, besides that of ascertaining the amount of what ought to be given to them, is the ensuring a right application of it.

"What I should propose is that MM. de Chatillon and Suzanet should be sent with a sum of ——— to be applied under the joint authority of them and the abbé Bernier, and that, under the same authority, a right should be given of drawing for ——— more; a statement being sent over at the same time, upon honour, of any debts of the party incurred since the period of our first offer of pecuniary assistance, which could not have been earlier than the middle of 95; and of the objects for which future assistance would be wanted; reserving to ourselves the right of deciding the extent to which the demands for either of those purposes could be complied with."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL CAMDEN.

1797, November 17, Cleveland Row.—"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant containing some particulars respecting the conduct of the military in Ireland, and the points on which it is probable that the intended attack to be made on the conduct of the King's Government there is to be grounded. I am persuaded it is unnecessary for me to say that no exertion of mine shall be wanting in support of your Government personally, or in the defence

of those principles and that line of conduct which I so thoroughly approve; and that, as far as can depend on me, no imputation shall be fixed on those who seem to me so little to deserve censure, but on the contrary to be entitled to high praise. It would, however, be much more satisfactory to me if the task could fall to the lot of persons more acquainted with the particulars and details which will probably compose the principal part of the attack.

"It has always been a difficulty with me in what manner to manage these debates without giving up the strong advantage ground of refusing to admit of the agitation of questions in the English Parliament, destructive of the independence of Ireland; and without, on the other hand, appearing to admit the imputations which, for the reason just stated, one declined to discuss. I have generally done this by very strong general assertions of the merit of the conduct of the Government in Ireland, and of the rectitude of the system pursued there, as the only one that could keep Ireland from being made a Jacobin appendage to the French Republic. Perhaps this might be done upon the present occasion with a little more detail (if I was sufficiently master of the subject), but it would be productive of great future inconvenience and mischief if, from an over anxiety to justify ourselves, we were induced to abandon a line which everybody here understands and approves, and to enter into debate on questions which cannot be made intelligible without much more knowledge upon them than is commonly possessed here."

*Copy.*

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 17, Richmond.—"Je vous envoie en toute confiance une lettre que j'ai reçu de notre Ambassadeur à Vienne, que les couriers arrivés à notre désolé ami Comte Starhemberg m'ont apporté. Ce dernier n'a pas reçu le traité de cette maudite paix qu'il déteste, et dont il est tout honteux pour sa Cour.

"Vous verrez dans cette lettre beaucoup de verbiage, mais il y a des choses remarquables à observer. Vous y verrez que cette paix n'est envisagée que comme une trêve que le besoin vrai ou cru du moment a fait conclure; qu'on s'attend à une rupture; qu'on désire de se lier de nouveau avec ses anciens alliés, et qu'on croit que si la Triple Alliance se réunissait de nouveau, et agissait avec unanimité et vigueur, l'Europe pourrait encore sauvée. Je laisse à votre sagesse à peser tous ces aperçus, et à considérer l'importance de profiter des ouvertures qui peuvent remédier à l'état critique où se trouve l'Europe.

Je vous supplie de me renvoyer l'inclose, et de croire à mon attachement sincère pour vous et pour ce pays."

*French.*

#### *Enclosure.*

#### COUNT RAZOUMOUSKOI to COUNT WORONZOW.

1797, November 1, Vienna.—"J'aurais profité avec empressement du courier qu'a expédié le Chevalier Eden le 22 de ce mois, jour où nous avons reçu la nouvelle de la paix, pour vous annoncer ce grand événement, si ce Ministre avait eu l'attention de m'en prévenir. Le Baron de Thugut me prévint le même jour, qu'immédiatement après l'arrivée du Comte de Cobenzl qu'on attendait le sur-lendemain, une double expédition aurait lieu pour Petersbourg et pour Londres; elle a

tardé jusqu'à ce jour, et j'en saisis l'occasion avec la satisfaction que je prouve toujours en me livrant à notre correspondance.

"Depuis l'envoi de Cobenzl à Udine les altercations y ont été extrêmement vives ; plus d'une fois la négociation semblait être rompue et les hostilités prêtes à recommencer.

"Ce jeu a été parfaitement joué de part et d'autre. De celle-ci on était déterminée à conclure, non de gré assurément, mais de nécessité.

"Finances épuisées, armée découragée, lassitude générale en imposaient la loi ; il n'était question que d'épier le meilleur moment. Le dernier triomphe du Directoire en a fait manquer un bien avantageux, et l'Italie alors livrée plus que jamais aux conceptions audacieuses du brigand qui la domine, allait être achevée de révolutionner, et la maison d'Autriche menacée de se voir frustrée de ses dédommagemens. Le négociation de Lille rompue a accéléré l'issue de celle d'Udine. Il n'était plus question d'insister sur les bases des préliminaires ; on a conclu aux termes les moins mauvais qu'on a pu obtenir. Les premiers limites sont resserrées ; elles suivent à peu près le cours de l'Adige. Mantoue reste au Français, de même que les isles Vénitiennes. L'Empereur acquiert en dédommagement la ville de Venise. Tel est en gros la stipulation pour l'Italie ; je n'ai point encore vu le traité, et ce n'est que verbalement que le Baron de Thugut m'en a fait part. On n'a plus soutenu l'intégrité de l'Empire. Cet objet indécis est renvoyé au congrès qui se tiendra à Rastadt ; il y a apparence qu'on y traitera de l'établissement de la maison d'Orange, de celle de Modène, et des intérêts des possesseurs considérables sur la rive gauche du Rhin. Il est essentiel pour la Cour de Vienne d'atteindre au plutôt l'exécution de son traité en Italie ; elle sent combien il souffrira de difficultés sous tous ses autres rapports ; elle en apprécie par conséquent le peu de solidité ; elle ne le considère avec raison que comme une trêve qu'une foule de motifs plausibles concourront à faire rompre avant de restituer en Europe la stabilité qu'on ne peut espérer que par une réunion des Puissances qui en impose à celle des Français.

"Voilà l'objet de ses méditations actuelles, et de ses communications à ses alliés. Nous venons d'apprendre que notre Cour a fait tout récemment une Déclaration très énergique à Berlin qui constate l'intérêt que nous voulons prendre au maintien de l'Empire Germanique, en retenant le Cabinet Prussien dans les bornes qu'il était disposé à franchir, moyennant ses liaisons secrètes avec la France. Cet office ne m'est point encore parvenu de chez nous ; ce que j'en sais m'a été dit ici d'après les relations par courrier de Ditsichstein. Le point important pour bien lier la partie, et se mettre en garde contre les événemens à venir, c'est le rapprochement avec l'Angleterre ; et malheureusement, d'après les termes où je vois le Chevalier Eden et le Baron de Thugut, je ne présage point un succès satisfaisant. On insiste toujours sur la ratification au sujet des avances ; on a eu tort assurément de la différer jusqu'ici ; mais le moment actuel présente bien des inconvéniens à y satisfaire. C'est ce qu'on allégué dans la note en réponse à celle qu'a présenté Eden. L'Empereur promet la ratification, mais il désire un sursis, et qu'il ne soit point question au Parlement d'un nouvel emprunt pour liquider cette somme jusqu'à une époque plus reculée. Le Comte de Starhemberg est chargé d'entrer en explication sur les motifs de cette demande. Elle se fonde sur deux considérations principales ; la crainte de donner aux Français un prétexte d'entraver l'exécution du traité en prenant ombrage de nouveaux engagements avec l'Angleterre ; et de nuire au crédit de cette Cour-ci, occupée à faire des emprunts en

Allemagne à 5 et 6 per cent, tandis que ceux d'Angleterre, dont il serait question en Parlement, ne se feraient qu'à un intérêt infiniment plus onéreux. La question se réduit à ceci, veut-on ou ne veut-on pas de bonne foi renouveler l'union, l'intimité, et les efforts propres à triompher de la France? Dans ce cas il faut mettre de côté toute considération accessoire, surtout les récriminations dans le passé. On a eu des torts réciproquement; il faut les oublier, et renouer avec franchise et énergie, et, ce qui est essentiel, dérober à l'ennemi commun le concert qu'on établira dans les premiers momens. On objectera à Londres la marche du Gouvernement, la difficulté de répondre à l'Opposition. Il me semble qu'ici c'est à l'habileté, à la fermeté de ministres à obvier aux inconvéniens de la constitution. S'ils en manquent, c'en est fait; l'alternative est effrayante; mais eux les premiers et toute l'Europe ensuite subira le joug et la loi de la part des Français. Croyez-moi (vous?) M. le Comte qu'on puisse l'éviter? Voilà l'époque, ou du moins encore une époque où la Triple Alliance devrait peser de tout son poids sur l'équilibre générale, et très certainement ce nœud formidable rendrait à l'Europe sa tranquillité, et à tous les Gouvernemens la sécurité qu'ils sont menacés de perdre si le triomphe de la France se consolide par l'humiliation de tous les Cabinets et de tous les trônes. Jamais une opération plus noble, plus utile, plus digne de la véritable gloire des souverains ne s'est présentée à leur médiation. Je n'ai pas besoin de la présenter ici sous toutes ses considérations; le tableau dépasserait trop les bornes d'une lettre, et vos lumières supérieures m'interdisent de l'entreprendre. Je joins mes vœux aux vôtres pour que nous ayons la douce et consolante satisfaction de voir un heureux dénouement à la situation si compliquée des affaires générales."

*Copy. French.*

#### JAMES TALBOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 18, Berne.—*In cipher*.—"This mode of correspondence, which prudence absolutely demands upon such occasions, would prevent me from expressing my ideas in detail (if I might presume so far to trouble your Lordship) upon the present internal state of France.

"The moment in which I write, it will not be necessary to prove that the question of changing the existing form of Government and putting the nation at large, who (*blank*) of all terror and restraint would decide (*not deciphered*) might, without much impropriety be called the unanimity of this majority, I conceive that the number that would under such circumstances refuse their consent to the restoration of monarchy, or the legitimate heir to the Crown, would be comparatively speaking very inconsiderable. This statement granted, it may be presumed (*not deciphered*) subject to their present rulers by their remarks of the effects of the system of terror, and their actual dread of the soldiery, accede, if once the legislative body were, in order to finish the embarrassment, to depose the Executive power, the odiousness of which is so full, as almost to make the other causes of oppression forgot, it would meet the joyful support of the mass of the people. This ground for my argument is daily gaining strength, and every convulsion in the Government serves to extend its base, impressing on the mind the little prospect of enjoying in the present order of things what has long been the ultimate object of the general wishes and repose.

"The same thing, I think, would happen with regard to the Legislature in the first place, supposing them to be composed so well or

nearly as well as they were before the explosion of the fourth of September last, that is to say, that upon the contingency of the Directory being deposed or put to death, the majority of those bodies would decrease, there was no hesitation to an essential change in the form, which if it were not judged an advisable plan in the first instance, the King upon the throne would adopt measures that would lead to that desirable event.

"From the best information I have been able to procure, I have reason to believe that the majority of the members in the two Councils attached to the existing Government, including the Jacobins, is very small. I have indeed heard it positively asserted by persons well-informed, that it does not exceed four or five. Should this be correct, we may not despair of having a decided majority after the approaching elections in the month of May.

"Now from what we have seen of the capacity, unanimity, and resolution of the well-disposed party in the Assemblies when it amounted to a majority very strongly pronounced, we may conceive that very little hopes are to be entertained of success in future in our object, under their joint direction. In this I am corroborated by what I have seen and heard of the deputy who has taken refuge in this country; and it is painful to reflect that those of the highest repute, groan in German colleges. Their most distinguishing features are vanity and indiscretion, and we may often add, indifference.

"As we have not the choice of materials, I shall take the liberty of proposing to your Lordship Count Reventlau's plan, which recommended itself to me upon considering the causes of the failure of all those which have hitherto been attempted; and which appears to me to obviate many difficulties which present themselves from the improbability of making faithful conspirators of so great a number of people as will constitute a majority of the two councils; even supposing them better composed than we have any reason to expect.

"If the elections be suffered (which is certainly matter of much doubt) we may indulge ourselves in the hope, judging from the temper of their constituents, that the deputies will force the greater part to be chosen from amongst the well-intentioned inhabitants; and if means can be found to encourage the natural leaning of the electors, the foundation of my project will be laid, by giving us a decided majority in the Legislative body.

"I beg your Lordship to admit this hypothesis, at least for the sake of argument. What steps are this majority to take? Certainly not those of their predecessors. I should require nothing from them further than to avoid provoking an attack from the Directory, and in order to throw this latter body totally off their guard, I should recommend them to act in concert in other respects according to their fancy, and should by no means be surprised to see them from time to time vote and speak contrary to their real sentiments.

"My next care should be to provide a sufficient number of resolute men, who, upon signal given, would make themselves masters of the Directory and perhaps some of the Ministers, particularly the Minister of Police. This should be done without previous (*blank*) on our part in their councils. Upon its execution the Government would naturally devolve upon the Councils, that is upon the majority. They would then be able without dread to take such steps as most to conduce to the objects in view; and I think we might rely with some degree of confidence on their firmness—nay, I believe that they would make a great display of their intrepidity and vigour, every cause for personal



apprehension being by this means removed, and being persuaded that they would be supported in their measures by the almost unanimous voice of the nation.

"This plan has to recommend it at least simplicity; it would be attended with no very heavy expense. It might be contrived so as the secret should be imparted to none but those who are to strike the blow, and that, the moment before the execution of it. This might be effectuated like a stroke of lightning, by a small number of people well chosen, as they would be employed in a moment of supposed security; and should it fail in the execution, none would be involved but those who were taken with arms in their hands.

"The effect would be the same whether the violent part of this plan were accomplished by the *Jacobins* or the *Compagnie de Jesus*, either of which description of persons might possibly be interested to undertake it from motives decidedly opposite.

"What would be the most to be dreaded at the crisis would be the troops; but, perhaps, they would consider themselves bound to obey the majority of the councils, particularly as they would be supported by the bulk of their fellow citizens. At all events the struggle would eventually produce more good than evil.

"I communicate these ideas to your Lordship in the form of a private letter, trusting to your Lordship's indulgence. If what I here propose should be thought chimerical, at least, I should not appear by making it the subject of a dispatch, to take too much upon me, which I shall on every occasion avoid; but if your Lordship should be of opinion that what I take the liberty to suggest merits any further consideration, and that it is the intention of Government to act upon the prospect which the present order of things in the interior of France presents, I will endeavour to prepare for entering more fully upon the subject.

"I have communicated the idea to Monsieur Bentinek, who seemed to approve of it, and he has promised to furnish me with a *mémoire* upon the subject."

#### EARL CAMDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 21, Dublin Castle.—"It certainly would be more agreeable to my own individual feelings that the state of Ireland could be canvassed in the British Parliament, and that the grounds for a severity of conduct could be stated as well as the conduct itself detailed; but I am aware it is liable to the observation you so justly make, and that to avoid an imputation upon your friends in one instance, you expose yourself to much difficulty upon the general mode of treating subjects which appertain to this kingdom. But I think Lord Moira might be advised to bring his charges into the Irish House of Lords where they could be met, and canvassed. I cannot, however, leave my character and government in better hands than yours, and I only sent the few particulars I could collect immediately that you might refer to them, if it should be necessary. The cruelties which are exercised are dreadful, and the familiarity with which assassination is treated in the conversations and meetings of the United Irishmen proves the determination with which they are inclined to pursue their system. I wish I saw any probability that a different line of conduct could ensure quiet and give satisfaction; but I am at present clear it cannot advantageously be adopted."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 26, Wimbledon.—"You wished in a recent conversation to know what I had collected respecting the means of offensive

operations on the coast of France. I expect some more from another quarter, but the enclosed is very accurate and very minute, and I believe he is the best authority on the subject. Return them to me with your first convenience, and be particularly cautious, for reasons I shall explain to you, to avoid taking any notice of your having seen them, and, above all, be cautious not to mention from whom I have received them.

"I know not whether I shall succeed, as there are strong military prejudices and objections stated against the plan; but I am excessively anxious to induce the *supplemental militia* to fill up the skeletons of regular regiments, with the condition of serving not only in Great Britain, but in Ireland and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. If I can accomplish this plan I am from that moment on velvet with regard to every service this country can require."

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, November 28, Funchal, Island of Madeira.—"I arrived here on the 21st instant, and am at present in perfectly good health. The voyage fatigued me a good deal, but the weather was such as I have no reason to expect as we advance to the southward. This is a delightful climate, and the country is beautiful; it has all the advantages of the southern countries of Europe and of the tropical climates, without the inconveniences of either.

"An unfavourable wind has compelled all the ships to quit the anchorage in Funchal Road, and until they return we cannot proceed on our voyage; from all appearances we are likely to be detained for some days longer.

"I have been most hospitably received by all the English on this island, and most respectfully by His Excellency Don Dioso Perreira Forjaes da Continho, Governor General of the Madeiras. Pray see Lady Mornington and my children sometimes, and write to me, that I may not repeat Alexander Selkirk's ode too often,

I am monarch of all I survey . . . .

"If you want excellent Madeira, send your orders to Mr. Masterton, at Messrs. Kingston, Crump, and Company, New Broad Street, London, and direct the wine to be forwarded to me in India on your account. I will keep it until the Asiatic sun has ripened it, and then I will send it to you by a safe hand.

"I sincerely wish that you and Bathurst would renew our ancient application to Camden in favour of poor William Bisset. I mean to write upon the subject; my conscience reproaches me for not having been more active in his interest."

GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 1, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville's attention in sending this evening the dispatches brought by Lord Elgin's servant from Berlin is very agreeably felt by me; they incline me to hope the best from the new king, though it is certainly too early to form any solid conclusion. The Court of Russia, if really inclined to stop the mischief which will rapidly advance to the walls of Petersburg if not prevented by joining in active measures, has now a certain means of coming forward, an alliance for that purpose consisting of England, Russia, and Prussia, to which every other regular government may be invited to accede. This, founded on the defence of religion, of society, and of the rights of every independent state, and to prevent the destruction of the smaller ones, may still save Europe."

## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 2, Richmond.—“ Outre la lettre et le *postscriptum* du Comte Panin que j’ai prié M. Hammond de vous remettre, et que vous venez de me renvoyer, j’ai reçu aussi une lettre chiffrée que je n’hésiterai pas de vous communiquer dans la confiance que j’ai en vous; et si vous êtes lundi en ville, je viendrai exprès pour vous la lire. Si non, je vous la communiquerai jeudi à la conférence.

“ Quant à M. Taunzin, je sais que c’est un fourbe, un intrigant indigne, qu’il a beaucoup intrigué dans le Brabant; qu’ami il protège par Hankowitz, celui à lui procura la mission de Russie; qu’à Petersbourg, il n’a cessé d’intriguer, et que, quand le Cour de Berlin chercha chez nous à faire rapeller Kalitchef parcequ’il était trop honnête, l’Empereur désira d’être débarassé de ce Taunzin parcequ’il était trop coquin; ainsi on sacrifia chez nous un honnête homme pour se défaire d’un gueux. Au reste ce gueux est, dit-on, fort mielleux, affecte la douceur de caractère qu’il n’a pas, et ne manque pas d’aimabilité!

“ Je suis bien aise de voir que la Cour de Berlin, qui espérait d’avoir Allopeus pour successeur de Kalitchef, s’est trompée. Car le Comte Panin est dans les mêmes excellents principes que son prédcesseur, avec plus de lumière, et infiniment plus de fermeté.”

*French.*

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 8 [Stowe].—“ I was in hopes that nothing was likely to have disturbed the trifling loan of 1,500*l.* which I lent you last Christmas, and which, in the usual course of things, might have lain in your hands for ever. But six days ago I received a letter from Mr. C. Long, with an order from the Treasury to pay before December 29th 3,900*l.*, which they state to be my father’s final balance, being the sum declared. In the year 1792 when Lord Barrington’s, Lord Howe’s, and my father’s accounts were closed, the usual cravings were made for monies surcharged in consequence of forgeries of seamen’s wills, double payments, as well as for the expence of passing the accounts; and Mr. Pitt (though my account was for ten times the amount of the others) agreed to give me the same sum as the others, namely, 7,000*l.*, which would of course pay 3,900*l.* to Government, and leave the residue to the Navy Pay Office clerks, and to the other Offices who claim fees. Of this sum not one shilling has been paid, and I have been held out in the Report of the Finance Committee as a defaulter. I have writ to Mr. Pitt a *private* letter, before I write a public letter to the Board in answer to Mr. Long; and I have recalled these facts to his recollection, and requested to hear from him before I write to the Treasury; as I take it for granted that he had forgot that communication, and that Mr. Long’s letter was writ in consequence of *general* orders. In all events however I must be prepared, for I feel it most essential and necessary to my credit that on the 29th December my balance must be paid; and I protest that I do not know how I can safely depend upon Mr. Pitt’s payment of the sum promised to me, and which I understand has actually been paid to Lord Howe and to Lord Barrington. And if this should be the case, I must request your immediate answer upon the subject of the 1,500*l.*, without which I fear that I am aground. I have earnestly begged Mr. Pitt to let me have some answer from him, announcing to me his intentions on this subject, that I may be prepared; and you can serve me most essentially in urging him not to leave me

uninformed of them. He will of course clearly understand that I cannot for a moment propose to him to do in this matter what should be deemed a *private favour*, or to depart from the usual and accustomed practice of his Office.

"I have likewise information this morning that Mr. Tiernay has moved an attack on my office in the Exchequer. I have written to Lord Temple and to Sir William Young to *insist* that my *friends* shall not be provoked to say one single word on the subject of me or of my office, as it will be time enough for me to decide upon my line (if any) as soon as I know what the attack is. But as I do not consider this entirely as a naked and abstract question unconnected with others, I wish to know your ideas upon it."

#### The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, December 10, Berlin.—"I must have recourse to this mode of communication in informing your Lordship of some circumstances relative to the conduct of business at this Court.

"The King has hitherto shewn so much reserve to those who fill the several departments of State, that it is impossible to foresee where his confidence may ultimately be placed. He, no doubt, chiefly employs Count Haugwitz in foreign affairs; still, however, he converses more than his predecessor did with Count Finckenstein, and Baron Alvensleben; besides his Majesty examines himself the reports made by his Ministers in different Courts.

"But, in the midst of this uncertainty, I can take upon myself to assure your Lordship that Count Bruhl, who had been his governor, enjoys his Majesty's friendship, and the permission to converse with him at all times, and on all subjects. The communications which lately have passed between Russia and Prussia have been carried on by this gentleman. Your Lordship is already acquainted with his character, and his honourable sentiments.

"There is another source of influence which I could never mention except to your Lordship. It is the Queen of Prussia. Attached by the strongest ties of affection, and persuaded of the purity of her character, and of the sincere interest her Majesty takes in his welfare, the King encourages her candid observations, and acts towards her with unrestrained confidence. Her opinion is known to have weight, and is not withheld from the King when her Majesty feels it may [be] of use. I have every reason to believe that the Queen, as well as the King, entertain very favourable impressions towards the King and Queen of England. Among many trifling instances which I could adduce, there is one immediately before me, in the case of Lord Folkestone, who brought a letter of recommendation from the Queen to the then Princess Royal, and the attentions which have, on that account, been shewn him are beyond example.

"In submitting these matters to your Lordship's consideration, I trust that their possible utility may be an apology for my touching on such very delicate topics."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 10, Windsor.—"I enclose to Lord Grenville, and desire he will communicate to Mr. Pitt, the copies of the letters I wrote to the King of Prussia through Baron Steinberg, and to the Duke of

Brunswick by M. de Luc, as they will shew I have taken every prudential means to get the Duke of Brunswick to stand forth, and to prepare the King of Prussia to expect friendship from this Court. Lord Grenville will find by the two letters I have received through the channel of Field Marshal Freytag from M. de Luc, that it is very difficult to move the Duke of Brunswick, and that a timidity of political character strongly pervades his composition. No plan is yet sent; there is a letter from the Princess of Orange to the Duke of Brunswick which shews she is much fitter than him for the days we live in. I suppose de Luc's reason for writing to me instead of to Lord Grenville is that, as yet, he truly has nothing to say, but to prove that he is pushing for decision, and that General Stamford sees the business in a just manner."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797] December 12, [Stowe].—"I hasten to relieve you from the uneasiness of any difficulty respecting the 1,500*l.*, which I would not on any consideration suffer you to *raise* with a loss; preferring infinitely any sacrifice on my part to the slightest on yours. But by a line which I have received from Bernard, who has seen Long, the warrant for my money will be paid (I trust) before the 29th; and, at all events, I shall know decidedly to-morrow; because Mr. Pitt, to whom I wrote again respecting it and my proposed return to Mr. Tiernay's motion, had appointed Bernard to see him this morning; but I fancy that the payment is so far *settled* that I determined to prevent, as soon as possible, any money negotiation on your part.

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 12, Richmond.—"Je vous envoie la traduction de l'ordre que je viens de recevoir de l'Empereur, ainsi que la copie de l'instruction que la Régence d'Hanovre a donnée à son plénipotentier à Ratisbone, laquelle m'ayant été envoyée en Almand; je l'ai fait traduire, et je joins aussi cette traduction.

"Je sais que le Ministère Britannique ne se melle jamais des affaires de l'Electorat, et que vous avez toujours décliné de recevoir de moi la moindre communication sur ces affaires; aussi je puis vous assurer que, si j'avais eu l'ordre de m'adresser à Monsieur le Baron de Leuthe, je l'aurais fait avec plaisir, sans vous incomoder par la lecture de ces pièces. Mais vous verrez par la lettre de l'Empereur que je dois seulement faire quelques observations amicales au Ministère Britannique sur le contraste de la politique de la Régence d'Hanovre d'avec celle de la Cour de Londres dans une affaire où l'intérêt est absolument le même entre elles; car s'il ne convient pas à la Grande Bretagne que la France augmente encore son territoire, trop étendue déjà, au dépense de l'Empire Germanique, le renversement de l'intégrité de l'Empire convient encore moins aux intérêts de l'Electorat d'Hanovre.

"Ce vif intérêt que prend l'Empereur à la conservation de l'intégrité de l'Allemagne est connue de toute l'Europe. Il s'est si fortement prononcé sur ce sujet que cela devrait, sans doute, engager la France et les amis de cette République, si ambitieuse d'acroître sa puissance et son influence, à décliner, autant qu'ils peuvent, cette médiation et garantie d'un Prince si puissant, et qui veut empêcher l'effet de leurs projets sinistres; mais ce n'est pas certainement à la Régence d'Hanovre à suivre la marche des ennemis de l'Empire Germanique, et de la sûreté de l'Europe en général.

“Ce n'est pas officiellement que je vous écris, c'est un billet d'ami à ami pour vous informer de l'affaire, pour vous demander si vous pouvez metre sous les yeux du Roi les pièces ci-incluses. Et, si vous ne le pouvez pas, je vous prie de me conseiller vous-même ce que j'ai à faire, et si je dois, quoique je n'en ai pas l'ordre, m'adresser à Monsieur le Baron de Leuthe.”

*French.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1797] December 13 [Stowe].—“I know that it will give you pleasure to hear that I have received from Mr. Pitt the most marked attentions in the immediate expedition of my warrant for 7,000*l.*, and in the discussions with Bernard upon the subject of my office. He perfectly approves the return, varying it in some slight degree but not in the essentials. But I have likewise infinite satisfaction in receiving from him a letter to which I am very sensible, in answer to the thanks I thought myself bound to give him for the justice he did to the memory and services of my father. Though I have nothing to add, I write you these few lines because I know they will gratify you.”

GEORGE III. TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 15, Windsor.—“I have received this morning Lord Grenville's box; I highly approve of his letter to Mr. de Luc, which I shall enclose under cover to Field Marshal Freytag. I trust Lord Grenville will urge Mr. Pitt to stand firm on the proposed assessed taxes. I have wrote this morning to the same effect, as I see by the return of Mr. Fox to the House of Commons, Opposition mean to give as much trouble as they can on this subject.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1797, December 16, Cleveland Row.—“Je vous restitue, selon la promesse que je vous en ai fait, vos deux lettres du 16 et 19 Novembre, que j'avais mis à part pour vous les remettre la dernière fois que j'eus le plaisir de vous recevoir ici, mais que j'ai alors oublié de vous donner. La conduite de votre Cour en annonçant à l'Empire l'intégrité pour base des négociations de Rastadt, est bien faite pour étonner ceux qui sont obligés d'admirer dans l'éloignement et l'ignorance, le developpement du nouveau code diplomatique.

“Je sais que vous êtes, comme nous, un peu attaché aux vielleries de la bonne foi, et de la vérité.”

*French. Copy.*

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, December 17, Berlin.—“I avail myself of Mr. Lloyd's passage through Berlin to acquaint your Lordship that Prince Kourakin, being much attached to Count Panin, and considering him as an efficient member of the department of foreign affairs at Petersburg, frequently communicates to him intelligence of a secret nature, that would not necessarily be conveyed to the Minister resident at this Court. Count Panin's habits of intimacy and confidence with me induce him occasionally to permit me to derive some benefit from these communications, always however under the engagement in no ways to commit him. If,

therefore, I have at times to send to your Lordship notions or information which I draw from such private but authentic sources, I trust to your thinking it sufficient if on such occasions I avoid citing names, and content myself with saying that I speak *from authority*, or *with certainty*, or some such marked expression."

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 23, Windsor.—"As the letters arrived from the Earl of Elgin at Berlin give but little insight as to the state of politics there, I think it must be agreeable to Lord Grenville to hear what Monsieur d'Ompteda, a young gentleman of much observation and employed by me at that Court, has stated on the 5th of this month. That, on the 3rd, he waited on the Duke of Brunswick, in whose anti-chamber he found several military persons; the most distinguished had separate audiences of the Duke, the rest he came and received in that room, where he cautiously avoided taking any notice of Monsieur d'Ompteda; but, on retiring from this *levée*, addressed himself with a loud voice, that all might hear him, to Monsieur d'Ompteda; 'Sir, I have one word to say to you, pray follow me.' This gentleman immediately communicated the arrival of Baron de Steinberg who thought it proper to have his audience of the King of Prussia previous to waiting on the Duke, who, with some hesitation, expressed a wish that the Baron would not come to him, as his own situation was so very critical; but d'Ompteda said that the Baron neglecting that attention, which would be known by all, would be more liable to comments, that consequently the Baron would not desist from what every degree of decorum required, and which mark of respect he would equally show to every reigning Prince then at Berlin. The Duke then opened himself by saying that, on his first interview with Prince Henry of Prussia, that Prince had with much eagerness desired to know why the Baron had been sent to Berlin, and what was his personal character. The Duke had replied that he was totally ignorant of the Baron's commission, that he supposed it was similar to that on the death of Frederick the Second, that perhaps he might also have instructions to mention the neutrality of the North of Germany. The Duke then added he had reason to believe that Count Haugwitz was not inclined to any strong objections against the detaching the left of the Rhine from the German empire; indeed that he would rather encourage it as an excuse for aggrandizing Prussia in other parts of Germany; that the Duke feared he could be of little utility in preventing this, for that, though the King of Prussia had received him in the most friendly manner, and perhaps might permit him now and then in conversation to prevent some bad maxims, yet he did not think his weight would be great; that, therefore, he owed it to his own reputation to state that people had more opinion of the good he could do than there was any ground for; that the people at Berlin were bad, and indeed even worse than he had supposed; that his delicate situation did not permit [him] to act with the warmth of his own feelings in favour of England; that Count Haugwitz was his personal enemy, and one whom no honest man could trust; that he respect[ed] the talents of the Count, but knew that he was bound by no ties but those of his own personal interest; that if this had been doubted, his conduct towards Madame de Lichtenau, whom he had pretended to concur with to get possession of her secrets, and had since betrayed to the young monarch, must shock every man of common honesty. He also maintains that no treaty between Courts is binding longer than mutual interest requires; and

ended with saying he had been just assured by Prince Reuss, the Austrian Minister, that he had been directed by Baron Thugut to assure the Prussian Cabinet that no stipulations had been settled between the Emperor and the French at Udino concerning the German Empire; that therefore he hoped Prussia would support Austria in the maintenance at Radstadt of the integrity of the German Empire. Lord Grenville has my permission to communicate this to Mr. Pitt, who, I am certain, will agree with me in lamenting that a Prince with talents to be of real use at this critical moment is so over-cautious, I fear, to render them perfectly null; and I fear we cannot push on Russia to take an hearty part which I am confident would secure the young king; but if that is not effected, I fear we shall get fair words from Berlin, but no one step of vigour."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, December 23, Dropmore.—"Lord Grenville has availed himself of your Majesty's permission to communicate to Mr. Pitt the information which your Majesty has received from Berlin, and which seems to preclude all hope of any effective assistance from the Duke of Brunswick's exertions or influence there. Nothing can be more striking than the comparison between the active and daring measures adopted by the enemy for the purposes of subversion, and the timid, languid, and indecisive conduct of those who have the strongest interest in opposing a system of unexampled danger and mischief to civil society.

"Lord Grenville will not fail to write again to your Majesty's Minister at Petersburg to instruct him to use every means to stimulate that Court, but he is very fearful that the same observation which he has ventured to make respecting the Duke of Brunswick's conduct applies with full as much force to that of the Emperor of Russia."

*Copy.*

#### GEORGE III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 24, Windsor.—"Lord Grenville seems so fully to view the conduct of the Duke of Brunswick in the same manner as it strikes me, that it is unnecessary to dwell on it, but [we] ought still to redouble every means left of bringing the young King of Prussia to take a part suitable to the supposed worth of his private character; as such, I highly approve of the intention of further urging the Russian Emperor to step forward. I shall add the further intelligence I have received by this post from Berlin. While Baron de Steinberg was waiting in the Queen's antichamber for his audience, the King of Prussia came there, and immediately addressed him with expressions of sorrow at thinking the left side of the Rhine would be taken from the German Empire; the Baron expressed that though there might be some risk of such a fatal measure, that, if the king would stand forth, he had the means of preventing it. The king [said] he was certainly most desirous of preventing this evil, but that it seemed to him that it was almost too late to make any effectual resistance. Other persons came into the room, which stopped the conversation. Count Haugwitz avoids having any conversation with the Baron but in mixed company, though an interview has been desired by Steinberg, who has had a very full conversation with Duke of Brunswick, who has held similar language to that with Monsieur de Luc at Brunswick on a triple alliance to which Austria should be invited to accede; that there is no fear for the present of the king's having any close connection with France, and that he will



scrupulously [scrupulously] avoid any concert with that horrid nation; that his last words to Jacobi on his setting off for Radstadt were, preserve the integrity of the German Empire, and you may expect from me the greatest reward. That the Duke has reason to believe, at the same time, there is but little hopes of regaining the left bank of the Rhine; that if Prussia cannot recover the Duchy of Cleves, he will be repaid by some secularization; that France will not allow any change of Principalities, but that the clergy must make good all these losses to Princes, from a view of preventing Austria from obtaining Bavaria. It is not yet known what secret agreements Austria has made with France. The Baron is persuaded the Duke of Brunswick might be of great use if he would step forward, and that the king's confidence in him certainly renders him of some use, but that he meant to return to Brunswick the day after the public interment.

"Rough as this account is drawn up by me, I desire it may be communicated to Mr. Pitt."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 24, Downing Street.—"I return you the King's letter, which indeed gives a deplorable picture of the person from whom we expected the safety of Europe. I hope we shall now have an interval to look into arrangements at home, which certainly, during the last fortnight, as far as I am concerned, have had very little attention. I shall endeavour now to bring up my arrears.

"I should wish to know how particular the intelligence is you mention in the secret letters from Paris, whether enough so to ground ostensible measures upon them here. It will be as well if you can send them to Hammond or Canning, to be shown to me and Dundas."

#### The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

Private.

1797, December 27, Berlin.—"I cannot withhold from your Lordship that it was the Duke of Brunswick who, amidst his timid counsels, recommended to the King of Prussia the taking in sequestration the Electorate of Hanover during the war."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to GEORGE III.

1797, December 29, Dropmore.—"Lord Grenville has the honour to transmit to your Majesty a letter from M. de Luc, with its inclosure, which seem to prove but too clearly that nothing is to be expected in the present moment from the Court of Berlin, except a resistance which might possibly be made to any hostile measures of the French against the north of Germany; and the humiliating step taken respecting the French king presents but a bad presage of vigour or spirit in that quarter.

"Lord Grenville humbly submits to your Majesty that till some information is received of the effect of the insinuations made in your Majesty's name at the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna, any further representations at those Courts, on the ideas stated in the Duke of Brunswick's paper, would be premature and useless.

"Lord Grenville has received a note from Mr. Balan announcing Count Tauenzein's arrival, and he will, with your Majesty's permission, appoint him to deliver his letter to your Majesty on Wednesday next."

*Copy.*

## GEORGE. III. to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 30, Windsor.—“The letter Lord Grenville has received from Monsieur de Luc, and the flimsy enclosure, shew no hopes are to be formed of any active assistance from the Court of Berlin in the present arduous moment. I perfectly agree with Lord Grenville that, till an answer arrives from Petersburg to the proposals that have been made, no step can be further taken from hence to Berlin. I highly approve of the draft I have read this morning to Sir Charles Whitworth, which ought to have much effect. I approve of receiving Count Tauenzien on Wednesday.”

## ADDENDA.

## The MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, July 27, Whitehall.—“Inclosed I transmit to you the principal points on which his Majesty’s confidential servants wish to obtain the earliest as well as most accurate information. It gave me great pleasure to learn that you were willing to go to Holland at this very interesting period.

“I have taken the liberty of troubling you with a letter to the worthy Greffier, who, I am sure, will be glad to show you every attention in his power.”

## W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, July 31, The Hague.—“I arrived here yesterday evening, and have had a great deal of very instructive communication from Sir James Harris on the different points on which the King’s servants appeared to wish that I should inform myself. The intelligence which you will receive from him by this post respecting the proposition made by the King of Prussia for a joint mediation with France to the exclusion of Great Britain, certainly conveys a very unfavourable impression of his disposition on this subject; especially as there is no room to doubt that M. de Thuleymeer has acted in this particular in exact conformity to the orders which he received from his Court. At the same time the terms which the King of Prussia has stated to France as the grounds of a mediation are so conformable to what he must feel to be the wishes of His Majesty on this subject, that I should hope there may still be a possibility that he may close with the offer now made to him, of acting in concert for the attainment of those objects, on which the two Courts are so much agreed. No account has yet been received by Sir James Harris of the effect produced by Lord Carmarthen’s dispatch to Mr. Ewart of the 17th instant, authorising him to make to the King of Prussia an offer of communication on the present state of the Republic. But as we shall probably know here by Friday what answer has been given to this proposal, it appears clearly proper that no steps shall be taken for going to Nimeguen till after that day, as the language to be held there may depend so much on this point.

“I am indeed very apprehensive that the interval will be far from sufficient to enable me to inform myself as amply as I should wish on many material points of enquiry with respect to the detail of the disputes existing between the different Provinces, and those relating to the Stadtholder. Sir James Harris has promised to procure for me the commissions of Stadtholder and Captain General granted in 1747, and in 1766; but I understand that these are different in the several

Provinces, and that there is no commission given to the Prince as Stadtholder and Captain-General of the Union. Besides this, the commissions themselves are far from being precise or definite as to the extent of the power which they convey. The right of appointing magistrates in the different towns of Holland was one of the points in which it was proposed to concede when a union was projected of the aristocracy and the Prince's friends at Amsterdam, and defeated by the obstinacy of the latter. It appears that it will, in any case, be difficult to maintain the right of absolute appointment, as no more is given by the constitution than the right of choosing one person out of three named by the councils of the towns. The *règlemens* were made in the time of King William, for the express purpose of counterbalancing the power of Holland, by giving influence and authority to the Stadtholder. They convey to him in the three provinces of Guelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel large powers, both in the appointment of magistrates, and in the choice of deputies to the Provincial States. M. de Montmorin, in his letter to M. Barthélemy, speaks of four provinces to which the *règlemens* apply. This is done with a view to include Frizeland, in which there is a *règlement*, but of a different nature from those of the other three provinces. There has never been in Frizeland any dispute on the subject of their *règlement*; whereas, in Overijssel, the *règlement* has actually been overthrown; in Utrecht, it is the point on which the province is now in arms; and in Guelderland it is the opinion, even of those who support the Prince, that some concession ought to be made by him on this head.

"From the very statement of the original view with which these *règlemens* were made, and from their general nature and tendency, it seems apparent that the Prince has a strong interest in maintaining them as much as possible in their present form. But if this is inconsistent with the ideas of his own supporters, I apprehend that it would, in the next place, be important that, in any arrangement of the affairs of the Republic, this point should be left to be settled by the Prince with the States of the several Provinces to which the *règlemens* apply, and not with the States of Holland, who have clearly no right to interfere in a matter entirely relating to the interior government of the other provinces. This was the answer made by the Prince and Princess of Orange to M. De Rayneval's proposition on this head. The same object is now made one of the terms contained in the King of Prussia's proposal to France, and it appears entirely consistent with the language held in the last dispatch to the Duke of Dorset, which states the constitution of 1747 and 1766 as the basis of negotiation, and mentions the other points as proper matters for discussion in the Republic, with or without the mediation of the Powers.

"I have thought it right to advert in the above general manner to the chief points in dispute, and I shall endeavour as far as possible to procure such particulars relating to them as may enable me to return to England with that sort of detailed information which it was wished I should acquire. I am apprehensive that the greatest difficulty will arise in endeavouring to ascertain the extent to which concessions may be made on those heads on which some concession appears reasonable, as Sir James Harris is of opinion that there are no persons here of sufficient weight to undertake to answer for the rest. Perhaps the more immediate purpose with which I understood this information to be desired, will, in some degree, be answered by the circumstance of the King of Prussia having come forward with propositions so consonant to the wishes of the Stadtholder and his friends. I shall, however, not

fail to endeavour to acquire as much information on the subject as the circumstances in which we are placed will admit."

"*Postscript.*—I find that there is also a *règlement* in Groningen, by which considerable powers are given to the Stadtholder. Sir James Harris is, however, clearly of opinion that the expression of France was used with a view to Frizeland. The general term of provinces à *règlement* is understood here to apply only to the three provinces of Guelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel. The claim stated in M. de Montmorin's letter of the *bourgeoisies* to interfere in the election of the Regents, is one which has not been brought forward for more than a century, and is in direct contradiction to what is understood to be the constitution of Holland, and of its different towns. It goes, in effect, to change the form of government from an aristocracy to one purely democratical; as is evident by the manner in which this principle has been applied at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, where the magistrates elected in the old form have been dismissed, and others substituted in their room by an armed mob."

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

Private.

1787, July 31, The Hague.—"I have nothing to add to my other letter, little as I am afraid you will find there, except that I much fear I shall have more difficulty than I had foreseen in bringing to distinct points the questions with which I am furnished, on account of the strange unsettled state in which the constitution of this country has always been, and the imperfect manner in which it is understood by the people here. I think, however, that the King of Prussia's paper affords good ground for us to proceed upon, even if he should reject our offers of communication and concert, which can hardly be supposed; although, in that case, I see little for us to do but to withdraw ourselves as handsomely as we can.

"I have been received with great civility by Sir James Harris. I propose certainly staying here till Friday. It is not yet settled whether he goes to Nimeguen, but it seems impossible for me to avoid it on account of the letters to be delivered; although, if the King of Prussia rejects our first offer, it will be to very little purpose. If when I get there the Duke of Brunswick is arrived at Wesel, I think I shall proceed there. Though I have nothing to say to him, he might be flattered by it as an attention; and the report received to-day of the unlimited powers given to him by the King of Prussia (if it is anything like the truth) makes him a card of some consequence. As it is not quite impossible that I may remain here two or three days longer than I proposed, and may by that means be able to have an answer to this letter, I wish you would let me know what you think of this idea; and particularly whether it would probably be agreeable or not to His Majesty. I cannot help thinking that it would be right that some officer of rank should be sent expressly for the purpose of flattering him, and perhaps holding out to him the idea of command; and this would make my journey useless, to my great satisfaction."

*Draft.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, August 1, Downing Street.—"You will have learnt from Sir James Harris the contents of the last letters from Berlin, which came

here on Sunday night, and the circumstance of the Emperor's letter to the Prince of Orange. We have sent further instructions in consequence both to Vienna and Berlin, the copies of which Sir James Harris will of course show you. The question respecting the deputies from Utrecht seems left in an awkward posture, though I observe Sir James Harris doubts whether it can be prudently be pushed to a decision at present. The account he gives of levies in Liege, to replace the defection of the corps in the service of Holland, seems also to require attention. It is very material that our friends should not lose the superiority of force within the Republic, while we are labouring to protect it from interference from without. There is no news from France or elsewhere but what I have already alluded to. I forgot, in speaking to you about the Greflier, to mention that the King particularly wished you to say civilities to him from His Majesty, and to express his reliance upon his good dispositions.

"I hope the remainder of your journey will have been prosperous, and with less delays than you had to encounter in the beginning."

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, August 3, The Hague.—"Sir James Harris writes to-day by an extra packet in order to lose no time in sending over the resolution of the States of Zeland on the subject of the proposed mediation, and in stating the strong wish of our friends here that some memorial should be delivered to the States General on our part, of a nature similar to that of France, in consequence of the resolution of Holland. In conversing with Sir James Harris on this subject it did not occur to me that any considerable objection was felt in England to this step when it was first proposed. I imagine, therefore, that the desire of our friends here will be thought a sufficient reason for adopting a measure in itself so indifferent, and which can probably have no other effect than that of showing that Great Britain interests herself in the present situation of the Republic; a truth which, however evident from a variety of circumstances, is nevertheless contradicted here with great pains, and some success. The resolution of Zeland is, I think, drawn up with force and judgment. It seems right that similar resolutions should now be brought forward in Guelderland and at Amersfort, in order to anticipate any effect which the approach of the King of Prussia's army might produce on the deliberations of those provinces, if he should be still desirous of excluding Great Britain from the mediation, as appears to be the case by the note received from the Princess of Orange.

"I shall certainly remain here till the King of Prussia's answer to the first proposal of communication with Great Britain is known, which will probably be in a day or two. It appears to me at present that my going to Nimeguen or not should depend on the nature of that answer, unless I should previously receive any intimation of your wishes on the subject. The instruction given to the Flemish deputies seems likely to encourage the King of Prussia to proceed, as it proves that, without the greatest concessions on the part of the Emperor, his principal attention must still be directed to that object. If I do not go to Nimeguen I propose returning from hence to England in the beginning of next week; although I fear that I shall not have been able to acquire, by that time, much of the information which was desired when I left England.

"On the important subject, however, of the terms on which a mediation might proceed, Sir James Harris and myself had yesterday a conversation of some length with two of our most intelligent friends

here, the result of which will, I trust, be thought in great measure satisfactory, and will be fully stated to you to-morrow in a dispatch from Sir James Harris."

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

Private.

1787, August 3, The Hague.—"Sir James Harris writes by an extraordinary packet, as it seems to be a point which our friends here have extremely at heart that a memorial should be immediately presented by us, to do away the impressions of our indifference. I feel every moment that I remain here how much I have undertaken a task beyond my abilities (or even those of much abler men) when I formed the expectation of being able to bring to anything like distinct points questions upon which the people of this country are themselves so uninformed. I must trust, therefore, to your friendship to prepare the minds of our investigators for a considerable disappointment, in order that my character may not suffer essentially from it. At the same time I really think that what will be stated to you to-morrow, although it will contain little new, and will be very short of an answer to all our enquiries, will nevertheless, by bringing together a number of scattered objects, afford no unsatisfactory basis for us to proceed upon, till the business is brought to that sort of point when it will be impossible to advance a step without consulting upon the spot with the few persons here who, having made these questions the study of their lives, are masters of them. I have great reason to be satisfied with Sir James Harris's openness and attentions. I am extremely unwilling to go to Nimeguen, unless there is ground to expect co-operation with Prussia. Without that, great expectations would be formed by the Princess from my coming; and I should not have one word to say beyond empty compliments and general assurances, which might be conveyed without a special commission for that purpose."

*Postscript.*—"I have made a great blunder in the paper which I sent on Tuesday, in saying that there is no commission as Captain-General of the union. There is one, and it is printed in *Janison*. Pray, if you have an opportunity, scratch out those words. I was led into the mistake by the information which I received here. This will give you an idea how little the subject is understood."

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

Private.

1787, August 3, The Hague.—"I trust you will be satisfied with the dispatch which goes to-day on the different points in discussion. More precise information can, I fear, not be acquired without a long and particular application to the study of the constitution of this country, which is that of all others whose constitution is least fixed. But, if a negotiation can be commenced on these principles, whoever carries it on here (where I take it for granted on every account you mean it should be carried on) will have the assistance, as the different points come under a detailed discussion, of those persons who have made this the study of their lives. A more particular account could not have been given in a dispatch, without writing a book like *Blackstone's Commentaries*. Some, however, of the persons to whom I allude could not leave the Hague, which circumstance makes it absolutely necessary to negotiate here, rather than at Nimeguen, Aix la Chapelle, or any other town.

“Although the King of Prussia’s answer is not quite what it might be, yet, I think, it makes it proper for me to go to Nimeguen. I cannot well go till after Monday or Tuesday, on account of engagements here which I thought it important not to refuse. The delay will be amply compensated by the advantage of conversing with some of the persons whom I shall see in the interim. From Nimeguen I shall, I believe, return through Flanders, and by Calais, partly from curiosity, and partly to avoid the necessity of passing at least 24 hours in the tortures of the damned. I shall hope, before I leave this place, to receive your answer about the Duke of Brunswick. It is a commission I am far from desirous of undertaking; but I am very anxious that something of the sort should be done by somebody.”

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, August 4, The Hague.—“Sir James Harris writes by this post so fully on the different points to be discussed between the parties here in case of a mediation, that it is impossible to add anything on the subject. I flatter myself that if any part of his letter should be thought to require further explanation, I shall be able on my return in some degree to supply such particulars as may be necessary for that purpose. I take it for granted that in the meantime it will have been thought right to agree entirely in the propositions which were made by Prussia to the French Court, and which are now formally communicated to the king. The only point on which any difference of opinion can probably have arisen seems to be that of the suspension of hostilities, on which head the proposition of Prussia appears to concur with that of France, to which we had objected. I think that some modification may be adopted on this subject, especially as our friends here seem to wish much that the removal of the troops from Utrecht should take place. In anything, however, which is to be done on this subject it will be necessary to act with the utmost caution, particularly as the intelligence to which you allude in your letter (which I received last night) respecting the new levies, is confirmed beyond a possibility of doubt, and the object of France, evidently, is to restore to her friends in the Republic such a superiority of force as may render her open intervention unnecessary, if circumstances should arise to make her think it dangerous to herself. I cannot help suggesting whether it might not be proper, if the language now held by France and the other information from that quarter should not be satisfactory, to enable the States of Guelderland immediately to take measures to counteract this plan by a similar augmentation of their army, either in the way of new levies, or perhaps more advantageously, by the subsidy of foreign troops.

“It is particularly necessary that in any suspension of hostilities the fullest provision should be made both for the security and the support during the truce of the troops which have gone over to the Stadtholder, some of whom would, on the idea proposed by France and Prussia, be drawn back into the province of Holland. Perhaps the thing most to be wished is that France may have adopted the proposition made in the dispatch to the Duke of Dorset, but even in that case a stipulation must certainly be made to prevent new levies. Sir James Harris will write on Tuesday more fully on this whole subject, after consulting again our friends upon it.

“The point of the advantage which might be derived from attentions paid to the Duke of Brunswick is again strongly pressed by the Princess; and from a short letter from Mr. Ewart to Sir James Harris, I conclude

he has also mentioned it in his dispatch, which there has not yet been time to decipher here. It certainly appears to be of the utmost importance."

*Draft.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, August 7, Hollwood.—"This messenger will reach you later than was intended; but after receiving your letter of the 4th, and the accounts from Berlin which came yesterday, I thought it necessary to write again to Windsor. The king approves entirely of your going to the Duke of Brunswick, and *'expressing in His Majesty's name that he is happy the King of Prussia has entrusted the command to him, who he knows would not have accepted it unless he knew that the King of Prussia, when once moving so far, would not only look for a proper satisfaction for the insult committed, but also see the rights of his family preserved.'* I give you the words of the king's letter. I find that His Majesty has just received through the Duke of York strong expressions of thanks from the Duke of Brunswick for what he has done for one of his sons, which I understand to be taking him into his service abroad. You will, I think, be better able from this visit than anything else to learn what really in the end may be expected from Prussia. The Duke of Brunswick, I am told, is usually distant and reserved; but I trust you will be able to make him speak confidentially on this occasion.

"The prospect looks very favourable at present, as the Prussian preliminaries seem to take, in almost all respects, the right ground. We have written to Ewart to express in general our great satisfaction in seeing them; but we have thought it best not to commit ourselves on the particular points till you return. The chief difficulty at first view is that which you mention respecting the cessation of hostilities. If any modification is practicable, we shall learn it from you when you come. You will see Eden's and the Duke of Dorset's dispatches, which came Sunday, and contain all we yet know from thence, Barthélemi not having yet received the dispatch which he is to communicate. In the meantime the assurances respecting naval preparations seem clear and satisfactory. The camp at Givet is not formed, and all our intelligence goes to show that no serious steps have been yet taken for it. But they decline giving assurances not to form it, alleging the new ground that they must watch the motion of the Prussian troops. Eden says M. de Montmorin told him they had represented against the King of Prussia's marching, and that if he persisted they must immediately have a much larger force in the French Netherlands. I mention these points lest you should have left the Hague before the copies of the dispatches get there. If the Prussian troops advance, and France does assemble hers, it will be to be considered whether we must not take steps, notwithstanding the assurances respecting the stopping naval preparations. Perhaps a treaty of subsidy may be sufficient in the first instance, and no further naval armament need take place, unless in the progress of things it becomes necessary. All this must be regulated by events; as if the negotiation fails, and the King of Prussia is ready to act a decided part, we must, I think, go along with him as far as circumstances may require. If, however, there should seem a prospect of effecting a good settlement on the points explained in Sir James Harris's last dispatch, it is to be wished that anything tending to extremities may in the meantime be avoided, if it safely can. I do not know how far the King of Prussia can wait to make the reparation of the



Princess matter of negotiation. But in many respects it may be as well that it should not be decided before other points are settled. And, if this is the case, perhaps it will be enough that the Prussian troops should be in such a position as may enable them clearly to move in time, if France should have recourse to force; and we need not then act till some such a step is taken. Under such circumstances any settlement in the Republic (in the manner pointed at in the resolutions of Zealand) or a mediation, would come forward with advantage, and I think must end well. It seems material, in the meantime, not to let the levies of the Province of Holland bring them back to an equality of strength with the Stadtholder; and I hope you will come prepared to state what steps are best for augmenting the troops of Guelderland and other Provinces supporting the Prince of Orange, if it should be necessary for this purpose.

"Sir James Harris is authorised to present the memorial. There was some doubt here whether we ought to take public notice of a measure taken only by separate Provinces, and not by the States General. But it seems to deserve no weight, if the memorial itself is thought likely to be useful. A change of phrase seemed necessary respecting the two Provinces mentioned, as what was said did not apply accurately to Frizeland. And the last sentence was altered to show that we had no wish to force a mediation in preference to an internal arrangement, if the latter should be practicable; and also to avoid committing us to other measures, which some of the proposed expressions seemed to do in a way not necessary at present. If you find anything objectionable as it now stands, have no scruple to get Sir James Harris to change it in any manner you think safe, preserving the two general ideas I have just mentioned. The king speaks with the warmest approbation of the effects already produced by your enquiries; and even the insatiable craving of the Chancellor is more quieted than I have ever known it."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, August 18, Hague.—"Although on every account I should have had great pleasure in seeing you again here, yet the reasons which induced you to proceed directly to England were of a nature to diminish my regrets.

"Count Bentinck returned on Wednesday early, and Lord Torrington's messenger brought me, about an hour ago, your letters from Brussels. It is too near that when the post goes out for me to attempt to decipher them to-day. I, however, can collect enough from what I have heard from your fellow traveller to perceive that, on the whole, you are not dissatisfied with your expedition; and that you are inclined to think well of the future operations of Berlin.

"I must beg leave to refer you to what I have written to the Office since you left me for my information and ideas on that point, on which I confess freely I dare not be sanguine.

"You will see by my letters of to-day the efforts of our adversaries to increase their strength, and you saw enough during your short residence amongst us of the character of our friends not to conceive the impression of fear and alarm these exertions give them. Without being quite so easily depressed as they, I own I see great difficulties for us, and real danger for them, if the opposite party should be allowed to complete their plan without molestation. The conduct of France is so notorious on this occasion, that I do not see how we can permit it to

pass unnoticed, particularly as it is in direct contradiction to every assurance she gives us.

"The two enclosed letters came at a moment when I expected you back from Nimeguen. I hope they contain nothing what ought to have been said or done here. At all events you never could have got them in time.

"I beg you would believe me perfectly sincere when I assure you I derived the greatest pleasure and satisfaction from your short visit; and that I shall be happy if it should lead to an as intimate acquaintance as that which subsisted between your very respectable father and mine."

LORD TORRINGTON to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, August 20, Brussels.—"It is with great pleasure I acquaint you my messenger returned yesterday without having met with the smallest delay or risk, owing to his own good sense, by which he avoided the two first outposts, and passed the third as a chasseur going to his master with his dog, as I had recommended, and which was credited, as he was a foreigner. He arrived at ——— on Friday at two o'clock p.m. before the English mail set out.

"Although you must already have received advice of the safe arrival of your letters, yet the fear I have been under least any unforeseen accident might have happened, my anxiety about them, and the personal satisfaction I enjoy at having so well executed your orders, have induced me to trouble you with this letter, to relieve your mind as well as my own from a very uneasy sensation."

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1787, August 23, Whitehall.—"I am very sensibly flattered by the obliging expressions of your letter, and I can assure you with the greatest truth that I shall at all times feel a most sincere pleasure in any opportunity of cultivating and improving an acquaintance which, during the short time I have enjoyed it, I have seen so much reason to value. I had intended, and had even begun to write to you fully on all the different points on which you must be anxious to be informed, but I am prevented by the circumstances in which there is too much reason to fear from your last dispatch you may now find yourself. I will only, therefore, say that no endeavours have been wanting on my part to state to the king's servants the real situation of the Republic, and particularly of the Province of Holland, as far as I was able to collect it during my short residence there; and that I trust you will be satisfied with the measures which have been adopted.

"I shall wait with great impatience for the next accounts from the Hague. I beg to be particularly remembered to Count Charles Bentinck."

*Draft.*

W. PITT to SIR ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL.

Private.

1787, August 28, Downing Street.—"I send by this conveyance a duplicate of a letter to Lord Cornwallis, a copy of which I enclosed to you by the *Ranger* packet. Since that time, no decisive turn has been given to the situation of affairs. The idea of a mediation in the United Provinces, though proposed some time ago by Holland, and approved

by the four Provinces in the opposite interest, has not yet been determined upon. It is delayed in Overijssel and Groningen, and perhaps now secretly discouraged by France, who finds the present moment unfavourable to any settlement consistent with her views, and probably wishes to gain time. The most explicit assurances have been given us by France in answer to our inquiries respecting naval preparations, and we have not hitherto found it necessary to go farther than the equipment mentioned in my former letter. The camp at Givet has not yet taken place, but possibly it may in a very short time, in consequence of the assemblage of Prussian troops at Wesel, which France has in vain endeavoured to prevail upon the King of Prussia to countermand, and which will probably have taken effect by the first week in September.

"Holland still persists in not giving the King of Prussia the satisfaction which he requires, and he will most likely employ his army to enforce it. In the meantime the internal violence in the Republic increases, and makes it difficult to judge what will be the issue. Possibly till the personal reparation to the King of Prussia is adjusted, no effectual step can be taken towards the general settlement of the disputes. But as he is now fully disposed to co-operate in effecting such a settlement on principles entirely conformable to our wishes, and as the increasing embarrassments in France (from the state of her finances, and the resistance of the Parliaments to the proposed taxes) render her open interference more and more difficult, there seems reason upon the whole to expect a favourable termination of the business. Every degree of precaution on our part is, however, still necessary. The orders from the Secretary of War for sending a regiment to Bombay, which I alluded to in my former letter, are sent by this conveyance. A duplicate will be sent by the first safe opportunity, as we are extremely anxious for their speedy execution."

COUNT C. F. BENTINCK to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, August 30, Hague.—"I had the pleasure of hearing yesterday from Sir James Harris that you was arrived in London. I need not repeat that I am happy to have made your acquaintance, and hope we shall meet often even if you should not pay another visit to this country. Independent of myself, I have every reason to think the stay you made with us a fortunate circumstance for this country, particularly at that time. It has contributed to remove the ill-grounded insinuations that were so artfully circulated; it has given encouragement to the constitutional party; you are now informed on the spot, and I flatter myself we have now in England one more advocate able and willing to do justice to a good cause. I have not forgot the promise I made; and for provision I transmit to you a copy of a letter of my brother's on the preliminary articles proposed by the Court of Berlin to the Court of Versailles. The illegality and even nullity of the States of Holland is perfectly well made out, so as to warrant resistance if it could be done with success. To the towns where the Regencies have been changed and the vote thus obtained by force, you may now add Delft, where the same game has been played within these few days past, by means of 800 or 1,000 volunteers or *bourgeois armés* with a few pieces of cannon, calling themselves the voice of the people, in direct contradiction to the sense of the greatest part of the citizens who, at Delft, are particularly well affected to the Constitution. We knew of the march of the *volunteers* long before they came; 200 men of the garrison of the Hague would have parried the blow. But the scheme was concerted with the

Cabal. They declared the whole to be a *domestic* affair that concerned Delft only, and that they had too much regard for the voice of the people to oppose it. And thus within this small distance of this place, we have again been witnesses of so open a breach of the privileges of one of the voting towns, and so violent and direct an attack on the freedom of elections. A body of these volunteers is now hovering about the country at their own will and pleasure; they are quartered on the inhabitants, they disarm all such as are averse to their plan, and nobody knows by whose orders they act. The nation bears all this with impatience, but they are not embodied and disciplined. Such as resist are only exposed to greater insults and acts of violence; or, countenanced as the *volunteers* are by the Cabal, should their adversaries oppose force to force, they would only run the risk of being brought to a trial before *packed courts of justice*, where the remedy would be worse than the disease. This is what is meant in my brother's letter by the *Juges Délégués*. In this country almost every town or district has its own judges and courts of justice, chosen annually among the citizens of that place so as to answer very nearly the institution of juries. Under the pretence of extraordinary cases, of the riotous disposition of the people, they have extended the authority of the *Council Committee* (*Gecommitteerde Raaden*) to judicial cases under the denomination of *political offences*. The Council Committee is an assembly chosen out of the majority of the States of Holland, which has always existed as a part of the executive government of the country, and to represent the States when not sitting; but from the very nature of it was never meant by a wise legislator to be a court of justice in any case whatever. The Cabal, however, have extended the authority of this assembly, where they have a packed majority, to criminal cases under the denomination above mentioned, and have named an Attorney General to carry on prosecutions in the name of this new unparalleled tribunal; and as the definition of *political offences* is a wide one, there are few cases but what they thus bring before them. This is the tribunal against which the legal courts of justice have made the most vigorous representations to no purpose, and which the nation does and must hold in utter execration, as well as the authors of it, if they had no other reasons. By these and by similar means the majority of Holland have made themselves masters of our lives and property; by suspending the Prince as Captain General they are masters of the army; they are masters of the purse and of the sword and of the courts of justice. Is there anywhere a power more arbitrary and more despotic? Yet all this they have done under the pretence of checking the rapid strides of the Prince towards despotism, and of giving more liberty to a nation that never asked *them* for it. Ask them if they can charge the Prince with a maladministration of the finances, with encouraging corrupt practices in the courts of justice to serve his own purposes, or with making use of his power and influence in an unjust or an oppressive manner? They are forced to own they cannot.

“But to return to the *volunteers*. They mean at present to take a tour through the different towns of the Province to disarm their adversaries where they are superior in numbers, and to change the Regencies by force, and thus obtain the votes farther to strengthen their majority. They are carrying on all their military preparations with the greatest rapidity; whilst France, who still assists them and sends them soldiers *sans faire semblant de rien*, is holding out conciliatory language; and they themselves talk of giving the satisfaction whilst, as a proof of their sincerity, all the steps they take make it more difficult for the Prince and Princess to accept of the satisfaction they mean to offer; and

all this in hopes of gaining time. They still are in hopes that the powers interested in the event will not act so as to oblige them to give up the point, but I flatter myself they will be disappointed. If we give them the winter to strengthen themselves, it will be more difficult to make them give up the point than we think, though I am convinced, on the long run, they must lose the game. I hope to hear soon of an English fleet on the coast. Remember 1688; there is a sea-port town ready to receive you. This country must not fall into the hands of France to the detriment of old England. I enclose a defence of the good cause which, if it is not yet translated, deserves being inserted in some of the papers. My mother and sisters are gone to Guelderland; my brother and Hoogendorf desire to be remembered. You seemed to take our cause so much at heart that I make no apology for the length of my letter."

*Enclosure.*

Copy of a letter, in French, from Count Rhoon to Sir James Harris.

HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1787, September 2, Athole House.—"Your messenger found me here yesterday morning, and I shall, after answering a letter from Mr. Pitt, dispatch him to-morrow. I have given a serious consideration to the contents of your letter and the paper which accompanies it. I am extremely happy in the opportunity you have had in collecting information from Mr. Boer, and, confiding most implicitly in the accuracy with which you will do it, I feel no regret that I am only to receive it at second hand. With regard to the general object of Mr. Boer's visit to England, I fairly confess to you that I see at present no daylight in it. I do not think our interest can in any such degree be affected by the fate of the Dutch East India Company as to dispose us to embark at all in any measures for its extrication; and I say this as well with regard to the Chamber of Zeland as with regard to the others, unless there are grounds of policy for aiding that particular chamber on account of its attachment to the interests of this country in Holland. Any consideration of that kind I lay out of my view, both because I am not competent to judge of it, and because I understand your wish is to know my sentiments on this subject as an Indian question. In that point of view I confess I feel pretty decisively that, if we attend to our own commercial interests in India, the advantages we possess are of so predominant a nature as to render us independent of the situation of the state of the East India Companies of the other European nations. If the territorial revenues of India were in the hands of the public, and the trade of the British subjects from India (whether individually or in companies) not adequate to the purposes of bringing home those revenues in trade, which is the only means [by which] they can with propriety be brought home, I can well conceive that the interest of Britain would be promoted by the subsistence and stability of the East India Companies of other States, in so far as those companies could be made the channels of remittances to this country, by paying to the Treasury here what they received from the Treasury in India. I am aware I may be told that if other European nations could bring them home advantageously in the shape of commerce, we may do the same ourselves. I readily admit the force of this reasoning to its full extent, but I believe it to be a mistake to suppose that the trade of any country,

be it as prosperous as it may, can so effectually ensure to itself a monopoly as to exclude a considerable share to each country, to the extent at least of its own consumption. What I mean is that, although the great share of the trade of both India and China ought and probably will be in the hands of Great Britain, still France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and other countries will certainly have a share, and to the extent that goes, may be used as useful channels of remittance of our revenues. In this view the existence of East India Companies in other nations may be beneficial for us, because we could not be trusting the individuals of those nations with loans in India, however safely or wisely we might be induced to give credit to established companies. In what I have said I have stated the whole interest I feel we have in the existence or fate of the East India Companies of other European nations. But such an interest is surely not sufficient to induce us to take upon ourselves any load to save the credit of the East India Company of any other nation, and least of all of Holland in its present distracted state. I omit to dwell on the almost impossibility of doing it with any effect on account of the charter of your own East India Company, but I need not in writing to you enlarge on the ignorance and narrow-mindedness of that society. It would be in vain to state to them the happy effects to both nations from a liberal exercise of the trade and industry of both. They would feel every bale of goods that went to Holland, although bought from their own provinces in India, as so many pounds taken out of their pockets, and would of course execrate any idea of interposing, or of the public interposing, to save the India Company of Holland. And it will not escape your observation that if, in such an arrangement, any idea should be adopted of not taking the benefit of the article of the treaty of peace relative to the navigation of the Eastern seas, the East India Company, while their charter subsists, have an absolute negative upon such an idea; for they have by their charter and public treaty a right to that navigation exclusive of other British subjects. And I leave you to judge how far it would be practicable to bring their minds to any concessions which could enable you in the present moment to make any permanent arrangement with the Dutch East India Company. You will, therefore, perceive that the result of what I have wrote is, that, although it may be highly beneficial to derive every information from Mr. Boer, I see no opening upon which you can act to *promote* the object he has immediately in view, namely, the relief of the Dutch East India Company. But after saying this, I have no hesitation in stating it decisively as my opinion that if, either as a means of settling the disturbances of Holland advantageously for us, or of negotiating with the ruling power of the States after they are settled, a strict union between Great Britain and Holland can be restored in India, it is an object of the first magnitude; nor does it occur to me that there can be any difficulty in effectuating it, if the ruling powers of the two countries are so circumstanced in point of disposition to each other as to bring the subject fairly into discussion. I know it is usual to say that the Dutch have no pretension to the almost exclusive possession of the spice trade, and that it is in our power to obtain it to ourselves if we will use the proper means. I may be wrong, but I have always felt differently from others upon that subject, in so much as ought to make me diffident of my own opinion. I cannot feel the importance of the spice trade, nor have I the least disposition to disturb the Dutch in the possession of it. No doubt if Holland and Great Britain are to be on the footing of enemies, or even hostile rivals, in trade to each other, we must aim at the spice trade as a means of annoying them; but laying that idea out of the question, I have no hesitation in thinking

that an amicable footing with Holland in India would be cheaply purchased by a total surrender to them of the spice trade, which is the great object of their jealousy. What I mean by an amicable footing is a complete enjoyment of the advantages of the Cape and Trincomalé and the arsenals of Batavia in time of war. The cession of Trincomalé to us in return for Negapatan would undoubtedly be a most advantageous transaction. In short, any transaction which makes the Dutch and us friends in place of enemies in India is a good one for us; and in saying this, I desire to be understood as meaning to leave them the exclusive possession of the spice trade, which, according to the ideas which they entertain of that trade is all they can possibly desire. As to a mutual guarantee of Indian possessions nothing certainly can be safer for us or wiser for them. There can be no difficulty in accommodating them as to opium and saltpetre, but we cannot with any propriety give any further communication of the right of exporting salt without imposing a material revenue. In every other respect there can be no difficulty in placing them on the same footing as the French. When talking of Trincomalé and the navigation of the Eastern seas you write as if the possession of these was incompatible with the interest of the Dutch on account of the spice trade, but I do not exactly follow what you mean in that observation. I do not see how there is any inconsistency between their having the exclusive spice trade, and yet our having Trincomalé as a safe asylum for our fleets, and our having a free navigation in the Eastern seas for the purposes of our China trade, and likewise for the purpose of opening new markets both for our Indian and European manufactures.

"I trust what I have said may be sufficient to put you in possession of all my ideas on the subject of your letter. I would certainly have come to Loudon in place of writing, but I am sure my doing so can be of no importance. If any of the ideas I have thrown out, or which may occur to yourself or Mr. Pitt, can be acted upon at this moment, it can only be in your negotiations for settling the disturbances; but in the present state of Holland there can be no room for concluding a national treaty, which is the only one I can see wisdom in negotiating between Holland and us relative to our Indian interests. I have already stated that if the particular Chamber of Zealand, as essentially connected with the prosperity of that province, is to be furnished with any relief, it may be expedient to do it; but that can only be on the ground of European policy, independent of the national interest in India, to which view of the subject I have confined what I have troubled you with.

"I am this far on my way to the north of Scotland on a visit to Sir James Grant, General Grant, Duke of Gordon, Lord Findlater, and Lord Fife. They are all very hostile to each other; and yet I am told that a visit from me may probably have the effect of uniting their political interests in such a manner as to co-operate for securing five seats in Parliament at the general election in the interest of Government; whereas, if I do not interpose, there is a danger of their getting into immediate warfare among themselves, and, if that happens, it is a throw of the dice how their competitions may ultimately end. When I tell you that I was living idly and pleasantly with a few chosen friends in my Highland retreat you will not suppose that this is a jaunt of pleasure, but I must undertake it; and I am sorry to perceive that our opponents are beginning even already to take their measures in this part of the world with a view to a general election. So that between this and Christmas I am afraid I must pay more attention to that business in general than is compatible with the ease and comfort I had proposed to myself during

my residence in Scotland. Unless something unforeseen occurred to call me to London, I have no thoughts of it till after Christmas. My idea of returning in October is only in the event of my getting down at the beginning of summer, before the arrival of the summer ships from India; but, as we answered them this year by the *Ranger*, I have no business to carry me to London. Mr. Pitt will have informed you how everything was arranged relative to Meadows, and I trust you would approve of everything. I have thought over everything again since I came down, and I cannot recollect anything that is omitted.

"I am exceedingly comforted by Mr. Pitt's letters relative to Holland. It will be truly splendid if we can be piloted through these rough waters without a war, and at the same time creditably and with permanent utility to this country."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 4, Hague.—"I am greatly obliged to you for your kind letter of the 23rd August, and can only repeat what I have already said, that it will give me the greatest pleasure if the few days we passed together here should lay the foundation of an intimate and lasting acquaintance.

"I have a point or two on which I stand in need of your assistance. I have mentioned in several of my late letters that my fund is exhausted. Our friends are distressed for money; one hundred and forty thousand florins are due on the Gelderland subsidy, and the troops expect to be paid on the 10th, which without a certainty of this sum being forthcoming, it will [be] impossible to effect. Thirty thousand are to [be] expended at the Brielle, and as many will be wanted in Friesland. Allow me, therefore, to entreat you to press Mr. Pitt for the *immediate* payment of 20,000*l.* into my banker's hands, who has directions how to dispose of it; otherwise our friends will be in the greatest perplexity, and I shall not have kept my word with them. This is really a matter of the last consequence.

"You will see from my despatches an indirect proposal for a plan of active co-operations. I have repeated it just as it came to me. As matters now stand there is no pretext for our committing an act which would be one of aggression, and the very *demonstration* desired would in my mind be too much on the slight grounds it is proposed. I have written to the Princess of Orange that it is a matter of too much consequence to be undertaken without a previous arrangement, and that I conceive neither the Duke or myself are invested with full powers to treat to the extent of this proposition. I have at the same time reason to believe the Duke of Brunswick has asked for these full powers; and I submit it to you whether, to avoid loss of time, it would not be expedient to prepare such instructions for me as may enable me to treat with him on this point if I should be call[ed] upon by him, and if it should be thought advisable.

"Notwithstanding the strong assurances and positive assertions in the Princess's letter to me, I am still in doubt as to what will be the final conduct of His Prussian Majesty; and till we see the effect of our last messenger (the 24th August) to Berlin, I would not willingly venture to engage ourselves too far with him.

"I am satisfied France means either to evade a mediation entirely, or, by introducing a new constitution and *an army* in that Province to render its effect fruitless. Our firmness and the not allowing France to procrastinate or prevaricate, can alone defeat her designs. We stand so high at this moment in the esteem of Europe, and France so low, that



I think we may venture the experiment without a risk. You may be assured if we are moderate France will be violent, and that it will be very difficult to effect a *half* cure. If any one is sent to England I will take care it shall be Nagel.

"We are surrounded by free corps, who are hovering round the skirts of the Hague and keep the inhabitants in a constant alarm. This morning they were at the gates of the town, and I expect every day they will commit some outrages on the dwellings of the well-disposed inhabitants, which, if attempted, may lead to scenes of destruction without end."

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1787, September 7, Whitehall.—"The uncertainty of the hands into which any letters addressed to you may fall while the Hague is circumstanced as it now is, prevents my troubling you with such reflections as occur to me on the present state of affairs, which I should otherwise be desirous of doing from an anxiety to avail myself of the wish which you are so good as to express on the subject, rather than for the sake of any information or amusement which I can flatter myself you would derive from my correspondence. Lord Carmarthen's dispatches to yourself and to Mr. Ewart will state to you more fully, and much more securely than I could, what is felt here with regard to every part of the present crisis, which I take to be one of the most important that this country has ever seen. A few weeks must now probably decide on points the most interesting to us. In the interval it is impossible not to feel a very strong and painful anxiety for the result.

"I mentioned to you in my last letter that the business of the *Africa* was in a perfectly good train. Immediately after I came over here I had an opportunity of conversing on the subject with Mr. Beresford, the First Commissioner of the Revenue in Ireland. I learnt from him that it was never in the idea of the Revenue Board to seize the property *belonging to the company*, although legally it might have been done. They are now perfectly ready to restore the ship, exactly on the same terms on which they released a ship belonging to our own East India Company which had been detained under similar circumstances in 1785. The whole business might, as he told me, have been settled long ago if there had not been persons here who advised the people not to make the necessary submission, in order to drive matters to extremities, with what view you will not be at a loss to guess. Mr. Beresford is since returned to Ireland, and I have written to him to beg that he will state to me the present situation of this business and the nature of the conditions required, with more exactness than he could do in conversation here.

"I have also made enquiries with respect to the business which you mentioned to me on the subject of Lord Aghrim. I find that the opinions of all persons here who are conversant with the subject agree that he could not, consistently with the Act of Settlement, be appointed to a commission in the army at large, and that even a bill of naturalization would not make it more possible. But there is one regiment in our service (the 62nd, I think) into which foreigners are permitted to be introduced, by virtue of an express Act of Parliament which was made for that purpose. And when they thus become a part of our army, there is no law which prevents them from being employed in our service out of England. It was in this manner that Prevoot and Haldimand came into the army, the former of whom commanded the expedition against Savannah in the last war, and the latter was for several years Governor of Quebec. It would not be difficult by the

means of removing to make a vacancy in this regiment for the purpose of introducing Lord Aghrim. In case of service he would find opportunities enough of being employed abroad; in time of peace his promotion would, I should think, from his rank and situation not be less rapid in that regiment than in the army at large, especially as a large proportion of the officers in it are now English and might consequently move into other corps; and ultimately his rank of a peer of Ireland (whensoever that takes place) would, I conceive, remove all difficulties. If this idea should be thought satisfactory I have reason to be persuaded that there would be every disposition here to facilitate it; and, if it should be wished, I would undertake that it should be properly mentioned to the king.

"You will have heard that the Archbishop of Toulouse is declared First Minister, and that there is a new Controller General, making the fourth since the month of May. I understand that the opinion which is formed in the public of M. de Brienne's abilities by no means keeps pace with the increase of his honours. It is said that they will be obliged to modify the stamp duties."

*Postscript.*—"I have this day received yours of the 4th. I have particularly pressed the first point which you mention, and you will see by Lord Carmarthen's dispatch that it is done, notwithstanding some difficulty that occurred from the dispersion of the Lords of the Treasury at this season of the year. Pray have the goodness to let me know in your next letter whether you have destroyed the cipher which I left with you, and, if not, whether you was able to make out the few lines I sent you from Brussels."

*Holograph Copy.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to COUNT C. F. BENTINCK.

1787, September 7, Whitehall.—"It will always afford me the greatest pleasure to have an opportunity of expressing to you in person, either here or at the Hague, how happy I am in the circumstances which began our acquaintance; but I should certainly derive much additional satisfaction from them if I could ever flatter myself that they had been in any degree serviceable to a cause in which I saw so much reason to interest myself, independently even of the concern which every Englishman has in it.

"I was much obliged to you for the papers which you was so good as to enclose. The remarks on the Prussian preliminaries had been received here before. They arrived at a moment when such a communication was particularly useful, and they were considered here with all the attention to which they were so justly entitled. If it does not trespass too much on your time I should be particularly glad to receive from you, from time to time, such other papers as you may think interesting. When I was at the Hague Mr. Vancitters gave me the printed account of the detention of the Princess, but by some accident I have mislaid it, and it is not to be had here. If you would allow me I would beg you to send it me."

*Drift.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

Private.

1787, September 21, Whitehall.—"You will learn from the public despatches the nature of the commission which I have undertaken. It is thought here that the language of Monsieur de Montmorin still holds

out a desire on the part of France not to come to extremities; and that if a person was sent with power to agree immediately on all the material points in discussion, they might be inclined to conclude such an agreement on terms favourable to our interests. But in order to afford any hope of doing this it is clearly felt that our preparations must be vigorous and rapid, and our language firm.

"The general idea which has been pointed out to me of such an agreement is this; that instead of an armistice for the purpose of negotiation, with all the difficulties to which it is liable, the three Courts should immediately agree on all the leading points, and declare their opinion upon them, pledging themselves at the same time to each other not to support in any case any persons who should act in opposition to those principles. Such an agreement should contain an article for enforcing the laws (which I understand from Boers are actually existing) against all military arrays without the authority of the magistrate. Another for restoring to the Regencies and Councils the persons who have been dismissed by force or threats in any of the Provinces since the beginning of the troubles. A third for restoring the Prince to his dignities as confirmed to him in 1766. And in order to secure the essential points of the *règlements*, and at the same time to give some appearance to France of not being entirely driven from all her ground, there might be a fourth article in which it should be said that the Stadtholder and the Provincial States should deliberate freely on the subjects of the *règlements*, and of any alterations to be made with respect to the functions of the Captain General. Perhaps it might be proper to go so far in this as to say that the Powers should expressly recommend to the Stadtholder and the States to adopt such alterations in the *règlements*, and such an arrangement on the points of the *jurisdiction militaire*, and of the *patentes*, as shall be found expedient on full consideration.

"You will immediately perceive that, as the above idea includes the three essential points of restoring the Stadtholder, and the Regents, and disbanding the free corps previous to the deliberation, it can never be acceded to by France unless she has determined fairly to renounce her objects; and, on the other hand, that if these points are carried, we can run no danger by stipulating the sort of recommendation which I have stated. I think even that, if it could be done, it might be advisable to make this recommendation still more particular by pointing it to the specific mode of alteration as well as to the objects to be altered. I am by no means sufficiently informed to do this, and I know your difficulties on the subject; but the importance of smoothing the ground for France, if she is desirous of retreating, will, I am sure, induce you to do all you can, and to communicate the result to me at Paris as soon as possible.

"The whole is only an experiment, and one which is most likely not to succeed, but it is surely worth trying; and at the same time it is of the utmost importance that it should not affect either our armaments or the Duke of Brunswick's operations. You will see in the despatches the sort of modification which we think may take place on the satisfaction; but this only in the case that France should acquiesce in our terms of accommodation, and that the King of Prussia should be satisfied both with the one and the other. I hope the Duke of Brunswick will proceed with activity, and I can give you the fullest assurances that there is a determination here to go to all extremities, if it is necessary."

*Draft.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 21, Downing Street.—“Sir James Harris’s despatch is arrived, confirming and adding to the good news. His account of the towns which had surrendered is nearly the same, with the exception of Rotterdam, which his letter (finished on Wednesday morning) mentions only as likely to surrender immediately, but not as having actually done so. But what is more than all the rest, most of the Patriots and some of the Deputies of that side had abandoned the Hague, the free corps there were in a great measure disarmed, the populace tumultuous in their joy, and an extraordinary assembly of the States of Holland on Tuesday night, composed of the Equestrian Order, and the town of Delft, Haarlem, Leyden, Amsterdam, Gouda, Brill, Enkhuyzen, Edam, and Medemblick, voted the restoration of the Stadtholder to all his dignities on the footing of the year 1766, and to the command of the Hague. Amsterdam did not vote. The rest were unanimous. It seems, however, that the Deputies who have withdrawn will, if they keep possession of the town of Amsterdam, set out an assembly of the States there. But by Sir James Harris’s intelligence, Naarden and Muiden were supposed to be already taken by another of the Prussian columns, in which case Amsterdam itself would, I imagine; be less likely to hold out. Of these last facts, however, he was not absolutely certain. He speaks of the whole transaction as being as complete a revolution as that of the year 1747, and only wishes it may be as lasting. It seems on the first view that the chief points we have to state to France are in fact gained already. The Stadtholder restored, and invited back to the Hague; the free corps in a great measure disarmed, or at least dispersed; the Regencies in many of the towns probably re-established; and the Province of Holland in such a state as to be more likely to join the other Provinces against France than to interfere in altering their respective governments. One might almost be tempted to tell Monsieur de Montmorin in his own language *que c’est une affaire terminée*. On the whole, however, it is best still to be moderate, and I do not see why you should not take the credit of having instructions which were prepared before the news of this event, and are not altered in consequence of it. Only it seems probable that the satisfaction may be now put out of the question, as it will have been completely accomplished. I have added a second postscript to Ewart to tell him that we suppose this to be the case; and that, if it proves so, it remains only to procure the assent of Prussia to our terms of negotiation on the other points. *What can I say more?*”

*Postscript*.—“There is a despatch from Berlin, dated the 11th, which looks as if the King of Prussia would be disposed to insist on the other points being settled as well as the satisfaction.”

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 22, 9 p.m., Downing Street.—“Another account arrived from Sir James Harris this evening, which left the Hague only at three yesterday morning. I send you an abstract of the contents. The satisfaction to the King of Prussia seems likely to have been completely settled by this time. The restoration of the Stadtholder to all his rights, *without any modification*, may perhaps make it impossible for us now to stipulate a recommendation, even respecting the *patents* and the *military jurisdiction*. I am not clear from Sir James Harris’s dispatches and the former accounts, whether the Deputies who have now voted by so large a majority of the States the Prince’s restoration,

are the legal Deputies, or have been sent in consequence of the recent change of the Regencies. This may make it advisable to be cautious in the manner of speaking of restoring the lawful Regencies in *Holland* till we hear more distinctly how the matter now stands. The proposal for *disarming the free corps*, and for leaving *the several Provincial States to deliberate on the règlements*, are still clearly right in their principle, though, in fact, they may be nearly superfluous as the end is probably obtained. The best line that occurs to me at present is that your language should be on every point (except *that of the satisfaction* which should be treated as a point now probably decided) the same as it would have been according to your instructions, and by no means less conciliatory; but accompanied at the same time with a doubt as from yourself how far the events which have since happened may vary *the application* of the principles laid down. It is clearly advisable that our terms should not appear to rise from this appearance of success, but it seems really true that some of the points are no longer matter for negotiation. All these, however, are only first thoughts; and what I have most to desire is perhaps somewhat unseasonable, that you will use your own discretion on the spot. I send you this letter, such as it is, in great haste, because it is above all material that you should know the facts as soon as possible. You shall hear again very soon. Whether it ends in peace or war, things now cannot go ill."

Private.

The MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 22, Whitehall.—"The very important accounts from the Hague, received last night and this evening, have, as you may easily conceive, given the utmost satisfaction. I enclose you a *précis* of their contents, as several points which were before considered as matters of negotiation seem already to have been amply provided for in a more expeditious manner; and some others require reconsideration from the nature of the great revolution which has taken place.

"The *conversion* of several of the towns (composing the States of Holland) to the *true faith*, will make it rather unpleasant to suppose their Deputies have been illegally or even irregularly chosen; and yet it will be very difficult to pass over our former complaints upon their forcible intrusion if any part of that subject has been already touched upon by Mr. Eden, and that M. de Montmorin should again choose to make it matter of discussion.

"This part of the subject is, however, as well as the rest, in such good hands *at present*, that though I scarce know how to quiet my apprehensions on its entangling us a little with France, by any resource of my own imagination, I have the fullest confidence in your ability to extricate us from it should the case arise.

"The menace from Amsterdam does not occasion much apprehension at the Hague, and none at all on this side the water.

"Bourgoin and Caillard are perfectly silent. They could not indeed have received any fresh instructions since the news of the Prussian troops having entered the Province of Holland could have reached Versailles; but it seems strange they were not furnished with that most common of French commodities, good words and promises of assistance in case of need."

*Enclosure.*

1787, September 21, Hague.—"The Prince of Orange arrived at the Hague on Thursday at 2 p.m., was met by a deputation from the States

General, another from the States of Holland, the Council of State, the Equestrian Order, the Committee Rada, the Courts of Justice, and all the different colleges; all the foreign ministers except the French, Spanish, and American, went to compliment him. It is impossible to describe the universal joy at the Hague. There is still an appearance of resistance at Amsterdam, and they talk of breaking down the sea dikes rather than submit. (This was not at all believed.) Fifteen towns were present in the States of Holland, who were unceasing in voting addresses to the Stadtholder. No account has been received of the preparations on the side of France, but it was in contemplation for the States of Holland to come to a resolution declaring that the Prince of Orange was reinstated in all his rights; that it was determined to give the King of Prussia the satisfaction required; and therefore the resolution of the 9th instant, applying for assistance to the Court of France, was rescinded."

*Abstract.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 23, Downing Street.—"I do not like sending you a dispatch which contains so little ground to act upon as that you will now receive; but I do not know how we could say anything more precise at present; and it seemed right to take some notice immediately of the language last held by Monsieur de Montmorin, which is referred to in the beginning of the dispatch. From that language I think at present it will be peace. But it looks more like withdrawing altogether from the affairs of Holland than entering heartily into a mediation. Much, however, will depend upon the news of what passes at Amsterdam. If France can be made a party to the settlement on our terms (even though with some slight concessions so as in some degree to save appearances) it will be somewhat more difficult for her to take an opportunity of disturbing a settlement so made hereafter. If she withdraws altogether perhaps the present triumph in Holland will be more complete, and the immediate effects of the revolution more decisive. I am not quite clear which of these two circumstances we ought most to wish; though the prevailing opinion here, particularly of the Chancellor and the Duke of Richmond, is much in favour of the former. At all events, if France shows a readiness to negotiate, and events in Holland admit of it, we must certainly meet them readily on the principles we have professed, as far as they are really applicable to the circumstances. The additional circumstance of personal security for their friends may, in the present moment, be a great object with them, and I trust our friends in the Provinces may be reconciled to it. I do not make out from our accounts from the Hague whether any formal step had been taken for giving completely the satisfaction asked by the King of Prussia, but that point will no doubt have been settled before this time, and you will be freed from any embarrassment on that part of the business. As to our other points of negotiation, if France should agree to them, the form must, I think, be varied from what it would have been. Most of them are carried into effect, and they may now be rather to be recognised than stipulated for. Perhaps guarantying or in some mode acknowledging the restoration of the Stadtholder according to the settlement of 1766, accompanied by the indemnity (if agreed to) and any other modifications, would answer every purpose. I am not sure whether it includes the security we should wish respecting the *règlements*; perhaps the substance of what we proposed is enough gained, if the States of Holland, as will now

be case, desist from the attempt to enforce alterations. As to disbanding the free corps, it will be to a great degree have taken place in the present moment; and you seemed to think the laws already subsisting on this point as strong as they could be made. The point of restoring everywhere the lawful magistrates seems to be capable of producing some embarrassment, as I cannot find whether the Deputies, whose votes restored the Prince of Orange, were appointed under the old Constitution, or in consequence of the late innovations. I have endeavoured, as you will see, to state this question to Harris, and you will know from him the state of it. Let me know what you think of all this. Even in these two days I feel no small difference in not being able to have your opinion on things as they arise. I think, however, all is going well, and our preparations will not be slow. The necessity of waiting to hear from Prussia, and still more the possible effect of events which may happen every hour in Holland, will, I hope, make it less uncomfortable to you than it would otherwise be, not to be able to come more precisely to a point."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 23, Seve [Sevrès].—"I shall be impatient to see you here. I have a tolerably good apartment for you; you will lose much time by coming through Paris. The road is from St. Denys to Seve. My hotel is *presque en face du pont*."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 25, Seve [Sevrès].—"I am this moment arrived from the quarter in which your note is dated. I have waylaid you upon the Calais road in vain to entreat you to come directly here, where I can give you an apartment as comfortable as what you have at Paris at least, and I have sent a note to the same effect to-day to Paris.

"It is material to me, if possible, to have a conversation with you even to-night, and yet I fear that you will feel too much fatigued to come. I send my *valet de chambre* to town with this; if you will come here and sleep here he will get you post horses instantly, and you will be here at half-past eight. I have detained all this day a messenger whom it is material to dispatch to England to-night that he may arrive early on Friday morning. He carries the answers to your communications, and very important accounts of the change of affairs, to a degree in favour of our friends in Holland, which seems to have settled the business in the opinions not only there but here.

"If you cannot come, I shall be tempted either to go to you as soon as I receive a word of answer and have finished my dispatch, or to wait on you in the morning at 11; but you will be better here if you will accept moderate good quarters."

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 25, 2 p.m., Downing Street.—"I wait with much impatience for the account of your first interview. By Eden's dispatch, received to-day, it seems still uncertain whether France wishes to negotiate at all; and by what we heard from Harris to-day (dated Friday evening) it is at least equally doubtful whether our friends in Holland will now admit them to the mediation.

"The chief object of sending this messenger is that you may be certain to receive the Resolution of the States of Holland, which furnishes excellent ground to reason upon with the French Ministers. Some other observations are added, not perhaps of much importance; but they were *thought necessary*, and can at least do no harm."

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, September 25, Seve.—"I came here this evening from Paris and have received much satisfaction from the account of the state of things here. Monsieur de Montmorin's answer seems to preclude all idea of a negotiation with France in the present moment on the Dutch business; but that affair appears to be in a train to execute itself more satisfactorily than could be done by any agreement here. I shall, however, think it right when I see him to-morrow to state the king's readiness to enter into the discussion; but if he declines it there can be no reason for my pressing it, as this would be useless if they are determined to go on, and still more so if they mean to withdraw themselves. The very circumstance of their not making military preparations is a strong argument for the latter supposition, as the delay will enable the Duke of Brunswick and the Stadtholder's friends to do whatever shall remain undone; though by the accounts here I doubt whether there is anything falling under that description.

"Our objects would, I imagine, be unquestionably much better answered by an agreement which should oblige France to renounce her preparations, after the demonstration she has made, than by any stipulations on particular points of arrangement; especially as such an agreement, if made under the present circumstances, would necessarily imply a free liberty to the King of Prussia to continue his operations till his objects are completely attained. It is impossible for me to pretend to say how far such an agreement could be carried here, but it seems so advantageous a way of our settling the business, that I almost doubt whether we ought not to risk it here if circumstances should be favourable; but I am perfectly clear that *you* should give us instructions for that purpose, and explain to Prussia that the proposed article applied to existing circumstances, and that we had always told her we engaged for nothing more than to keep France from obstructing the operations of the Duke of Brunswick.

"If you concur in this opinion, and such an agreement could be concluded, the whole of my mission may be over in six or seven days. Even in the contrary case I see no advantage from my remaining here any longer than that time, nor if France is disposed to admit it as an *affaire décidée* even without expressly saying so. We can desire no more."

*Holograph Copy.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 25, 4 p.m., Downing Street.—"Since writing my other note, a point occurs to me on which I wish for your opinion. The moment seems come to think of renewing in some shape or other our alliance with Holland, and we write to Sir James Harris to-day to sound in general the disposition of our friends concerning it. If it is to be attempted, should it include the former stipulation of free ships, free goods, or not? If it does not, there may be more difficulty in carrying it, and it may furnish ground to France for urging that our



connection, besides the risk of leading them into a war, would, even where the *casus fœderis* might not apply, deprive them of the chief benefit of neutrality. If it is included, it may furnish new ground to Russia, whom circumstances might perhaps otherwise bring to some practicable expedient. As to any real effect, I doubt whether the thing itself signifies much. We can hardly be engaged in any but a defensive war, and if they should not choose in that event to admit the *casus fœderis*, we may, if we are strong enough, consider this stipulation as no longer binding. On the other hand, if we should be weak, they may always insist on the principle as part of the law of nations, even though it is not recognised by treaty."

*Postscript.*—"The intended communications are sent to Spain, Russia, and Denmark."

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1787, September 26, Seve.—"I arrived at Paris on Monday evening, and received this morning from Lord Carmarthen an abstract of your dispatch to him containing the very satisfactory account of what has passed at the Hague. I know the pleasure which you will have felt on this occasion, and congratulate you most sincerely upon it.

"As there is another messenger here I thought it would be useful to you to send Needham to the Hague, in order that you might know the state of things here. It appears in the present moment highly probable that the Government of this country will consider the Dutch business as an affair already decided, and no longer affording any room for the intervention of France. There is every reason to believe that they have not yet given orders for the march of any troops, and the season is advancing so fast that a delay is in point of effect the same with a determination not to act. They are taking measures for arming their fleet, but I apprehend this is rather from the necessity of keeping pace with England in this respect than from any idea of hostile operations, unless anything new should arise. I hope the resistance of Amsterdam is over, so as not to give their friends there a claim to call upon them for protection.

"I have not yet seen Monsieur de Montmorin, and the turn which things have taken will make me think it right to confine what I have to say to him to a general statement of the views of England with respect to the negotiation, supposing that circumstances had been favourable for continuing it. I understand that it is most probable that he will decline any further discussion on the subject, and I shall certainly not think it necessary to press it.

"It would, I think, be of great importance that Ewart should be informed of this, particularly as the sending any instructions to Goltze in the present moment would, I imagine, be more likely to embarrass than assist us."

*Postscript.*—"Pray let no time be lost in taking proper measures for putting the garrisons and forces in the East Indies into proper hands, as so much would depend on this if, after all, we should be obliged to fight for our object; which, though not probable, is still possible."

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, September 27, Paris.—"I have written to Monsieur de Montmorin and expect that he will appoint me either this evening or

to-morrow morning. I do not trouble Lord Carmarthen with a letter till I am able to state the result of the conversation, but, as I may probably be a good deal hurried when I send off the messenger, I sit down in the interval to mention what occurs to me on the present situation of this Dutch business.

“Your letter of the 26th and Lord Carmarthen’s dispatch of the same date mention the two lines which are now thought the most likely for the conduct of France. The first, that of a silent acquiescence in what has been done; the other, that of her consenting to join with us in a guarantee of the constitution of 1766. You state a doubt which of these would be most desirable, but I think the reasoning of both letters seems to point the guaranty as preferable to the other. It is most probable that the option will not be with us, and that the answer which I shall receive from Monsieur de Montmorin when I see him will be conformable to that which he has already made, declining to enter into any further discussion of the business in the present situation of affairs. We may, however, I think, now look with confidence to a complete acquiescence, either implied by their taking no further steps and leaving the Duke of Brunswick to finish what he has begun, or, perhaps, even expressed by an agreement to disarm, notwithstanding that those very circumstances have happened, the fear of which was their professed reason for arming. And either of these would, I take for granted, be thought a turn of the business with which we should have no reason to be dissatisfied, whatever your wishes might be with respect to a guaranty. For my own part, speaking with that freedom with which you desired me to state my opinion on any question which might occur, I confess the acquiescence of France, if sufficiently secured, appears to me more desirable than even her concurrence in the measure of a guaranty, supposing this latter could be obtained. To make it possible for France to accede to such a measure we must hold out some concessions, and we must bind ourselves to abide by the constitution of 1766. The concession which you justly think France would be most anxious to obtain is that of an amnesty for her friends. But the Dutch Ambassador here has expressed himself to Mr. Eden in such a manner on this subject as shows that he understands this to have been already held out by the Prince of Orange. With respect to any other stipulations of this nature they must relate to the *Patentes*, the military jurisdiction, and the *règlements*. You know the difficulties which we have in stating the particulars of these, and I imagine that they will be much augmented by the turn which things have taken. There is also a consideration on the subject of 1766 which seems to me deserving of attention. No one can certainly wish that we should encourage any measures for the gratification of the Prince of Orange’s ambition, and still less of his revenge, supposing him actuated by either of those passions, which I most sincerely believe he is not. But if the acquiescence of France were secured, and men of reason and moderation in the Republic were disposed to extend the privileges of an office which is so essential to be maintained, and so little able to maintain itself, we surely are not prepared to say that we should wish to have bound ourselves to oppose every such alteration.

“With these difficulties on one hand, I own that on the other the advantage of a guaranty does not appear to me so considerable as it is felt by others much better able to judge of it. Under all the circumstances of vexation and disgust which France must feel at the event of her Dutch intrigues, may it not well be doubted whether the French Government will still continue to pursue Monsieur de Vergennes’s system in Holland, especially while foreign affairs remain

under the direction of Monsieur de Montmorin who has expressed himself so decidedly averse to the whole measure. If they should, I cannot think that a guaranty would prevent them from acting by the same underhand measures as before; nor that they would have any difficulty (when things were again brought to their crisis under more favourable circumstances) in finding pretexts for doing once more exactly what they have now done. But, on the other hand, if they should be disposed in great measure to abandon the business, would not a guaranty tend very much to prevent this by entangling them in every discussion, and making them a party in every quarrel that may arise. I do not know whether these considerations are entitled to any weight with respect to the permanent effect of the two modes of settling this business. In addition to these I have a strong impression that the whole transaction would have a much more complete and creditable appearance for us in the present moment if it was terminated not only in exact conformity to our wishes, but without even the intervention of France. I again repeat, however, that, although it may be advantageous to discuss this question thoroughly, the decision of it will in all probability not rest with us.

27th.—“Since I wrote the above I have received Monsieur de Montmorin’s answer appointing me for to-morrow. This delay is, I think, a strong additional ground to believe that he will not agree to any negotiation on these points. If this should be the case, I submit to you whether there would not be a considerable degree of impropriety in my remaining here longer than is necessary for me to receive the answer to my account of that conference. It could be productive of no good effect, and would have the appearance of courting a negotiation in a manner very inconsistent with the high situation in which we stand at present. I trust that you will do me the justice to believe that my own personal convenience is an object which I would most willingly sacrifice to any prospect of being of service at such a crisis as this; but, if there is no appearance of my being useful by remaining here, it would certainly be highly satisfactory to me to be allowed to return.”

*Draft.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to the MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN.

1787, September 27, Paris.—“I am much obliged to you for your letter and for the communication of the very satisfactory news from the Hague. I envy Sir James Harris the pleasure which he must have had in communicating the overthrow of his old friends the Patriots. The intelligence has not been received here with much patience, almost everybody concurring to blame their Ministry and to sing the triumph of England. I hope to God they will not be able to rail the French Government out of their acquiescence; and, for the rest, I confess myself very indifferent about it.

“I shall be curious to hear what Montmorin says upon it, but I am given to understand that he is to say little, and to be exceedingly cold, reserved, and polite. If this is the case I see no necessity for my giving myself much trouble to put him into better humour, and I shall hope for the King’s permission to return to England immediately.”

*Holograph Copy.*

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, September 28, Downing Street.—“Your letter and Eden’s despatches came this morning. I think war seems out of the question,

and we certainly should on every account endeavour to settle the business as soon as possible, when once our object is secure, which I really think is nearly the case at present. It seems, however, impossible to agree to disarm without previous concert with Prussia and Holland. No difficulty, I think, can arise in either quarter, as they are both as much interested as ourselves in a speedy and quiet settlement; and the acting to this extent separately from Prussia would not, in my opinion, be consistent with the engagements we have authorised Ewart to form. This objection, if well founded, is alone sufficient; but besides this, the risk of giving any jealousy at Berlin seems still a serious one. The worst part that I know of the plan we have acted upon is that it necessarily prolongs your stay for a fortnight more, instead of the six or seven days in which you seemed to think all might be ended. The mail came to-day from Holland, with nothing very particular and no decisive news yet of Amsterdam; but its surrender seems immediately expected, and everything was going on well."

*Postscript.*—"I should not omit that by Sir James Harris's accounts, our friends in Holland seemed bent not to admit the interference of France. Monsieur de Montmorin seems equally determined to decline it, and I am more confirmed in thinking that making them acquiesce is better than making them parties."

W. W. GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1787, October 1, Paris.—"I had written you a long letter to go by this messenger, but what I had said is in great measure superseded by the result of Eden's conference with Monsieur de Montmorin, and the rest will be better explained in person. I trust that it is impossible I can do wrong in coming over at this crisis. Nothing could be done here till Ewart's letter is received, which cannot be till the 12th at soonest; and much advantage may, I think, arise from my seeing you in the interval.

"My situation has been sufficiently uneasy especially since the language here has been so warlike. My first conference was particularly difficult, because I was obliged to determine what line to follow without any instructions from home that could at all assist me. I guess from what we have received from England to-day that I shall be thought to have leant too much to the idea of present negotiation. And this is the more unfortunate because what I said on that head was against my own judgment, but in order not to preclude that line if it had been determined in England that it ought to be pressed. At present the appearance certainly is that as soon as Ewart's letter is received we shall all disarm. It is a great question then whether to wish negotiation or not, and this must be in a great degree decided on what Harris says of the situation in which Holland will be left.

"You will, however, I am sure, feel that while the thing is so uncertain, and France expressly tells you *qu'il n'est pas possible de ralentir*, which were Montmorin's words to Eden, it is of the utmost importance that we should proceed with as much vigour as if war were certain.

"Pray turn in your mind the point about Russia and the Porte. It is very probable that Montmorin may say something upon it to-morrow."

*Draft.*

W. W. MILES to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1787, October 1, Liege.—"From the very instant that the Prussians prepared to invade Holland, I arranged my measures so well that I

should have had the earliest intelligence of the motions of the French at Givet, and would certainly have given immediate information of their marching not only to the Marquis of Carmarthen but to Sir James Harris and the Duke of Brunswick. Expresses arriving continually at the Secretary of the French Envoy, and Deputies from Holland passing daily through Liege in their way to Paris to solicit the promised succour, kept me in a perpetual alarm for several days; and especially as Lord Torrington in his different letters always insisted, in opposition to my assurances to the contrary, that there were assembled 25,000 men ready to march on the frontiers of this country, in the neighbourhood of Givet.

"In this dilemma, I prevailed upon a friend, a man of property, who had large contracts in the war before the last, and perfectly acquainted with the country, to go to the very spot, and inform himself fully of particulars. He set off the 25th, and enclosed your Lordship will receive a copy of his letter to me on his return; since which I have seen him, and he informs me that at Ciney, in his way from Givet, he passed the evening on the 28th of September with the Bourgmastres of Utrecht and Gorcum, who were on their road to Paris fully persuaded that France would never leave them in the lurch, and that her troops would certainly march to the relief of Amsterdam, resolved to defend itself to the very last notwithstanding fresh water was already sold at 30 sols the pail. The former of these boasting at Dinant the day after that it was he who stopped the Princess of Orange, a Prussian Baron, sent to watch the motions of the French, had the imprudence in his honest zeal to seize him and attempt to take him, forgetting he was not in Prussia or in Holland.

"Some Dutch recruiting parties being in town, and the populace assembling, he was obliged to decamp. Excepting 1,000 sacks of wheat from Nancy in August, and the detention of a few boats from Liege, there has been no appearance of any hostile preparations. The assurance I have this day received of everything being quiet in the environs of Givet affords me a degree of repose to which, for these last 15 days, I have been an entire stranger; as I was resolved that the King's Minister of the Hague, and the Duke of Brunswick, should have the earliest and most authentic information from me."

*Enclosure.*

————— to W. W. MILES.

1787, September 29, Liège.—"Je suis de retour de Givet où mes affaires m'avaient appelé. Il n'y a aucune apparence, ni préparatifs aucuns, qui indiquent que les troupes Françaises passeront par cette ville pour aller au secours de la Hollande. Hier on a lâché les semestres, preuve certaine que le régiment de Châtre qui forme à peu près 1,000 hommes, celui de Royal Roussillon, cavalerie de deux escadrons qui font 300 hommes, et puis le bataillon de Suisse qui est à Charlemont ne seront pas de l'armée auxiliaire pour la Hollande. Voilà ce que j'en sais."

*French. Copy.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1787, October 2, Paris.—"There is one point to which I have not adverted in my letter, but which seems very material in the present moment. There are strong symptoms here of a communication, even

under the existing circumstances, between the Court of Berlin and this Government. It is difficult to reconcile this with what has so lately passed and is still passing, if the singular system of the Prussian Government did not make such contradictions by no means impossible. I cannot help thinking that you might be able to get material information on this point. You will therefore excuse the liberty I take of suggesting it to you."

*Holograph Copy.*

Private.

W. PITT to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 2, Downing Street.—"Your despatch came yesterday morning, and as we were obliged to be at Windsor early in the day, and the ball was not over till six this morning, there was no possibility of answering you sooner. I am clear that unless Monsieur de Montmorin changes his language, the sooner you come away the better. But I still think all their communications have an air of indecision. If they should still be inclined to revert to the idea of withdrawing from the business of Holland, or to accede to the *guarantee*, it will undoubtedly be of the *utmost importance* that you should wait till the matter is brought to an issue. We have a notion here, and I think a probable one, that if France saw its way in the business of Turkey, she would be glad to give up that of Holland. But there seems no certainty yet whether their intention is to support Turkey or to join Russia and Austria. The language recommended to you in the despatch is meant for either contingency. It is certainly the truth and can do no harm. But if you should find in conversation with Monsieur de Montmorin that they wish to support Turkey, I do not see what we can wish better than to be at peace ourselves, and see them engaged in a system which must separate them from both the Imperial Courts. In that case you might safely tell them (in addition to general profession) *that you have no reason to believe the King would feel himself interested to take any measures to oppose their operations*. If they should join Austria and Russia, it will open so new a scene, that we can say nothing to it immediately, and the language then should be only general. On the whole I think it full as likely that you will have no opening given to induce you to stay; and that the French Government will find itself *hotted* into a war. But let us continue to give the other a fair trial, though without ever abandoning our advantage ground. If you come away, leave directions for Ewart's despatches to you to be forwarded hither, *unopened*."

LE COMTE DE MONTMORIN to the MARQUIS OF CARMARTHEN.

1787, October 3, Versailles.—"Mr. Grenville m'a remis la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire le 21ème de ce mois. La mission dont il est chargé ayant pour l'objet d'écarter tout ce qui pourrait porter atteinte à l'intelligence et à la bonne harmonie qui régnent entre les deux Cours, elle n'a pu qu'être très agréable à sa Majesté; mais vous sentirez qu'il serait impracticable de travailler à pacifier les troubles dans les Provinces Unies tant que leur territoire sera occupé par des troupes étrangères. C'est donc à l'époque de leur retraite qu'il faut remettre à s'occuper de cet objet important. Alors le Roi, dont les vues et les démarches ont toujours été dirigées par l'amour de la paix, embrassera avec plaisir les moyens d'amener les choses à une conciliation solide et durable.

"Quant aux préparatifs dont votre Excellence me fait l'honneur de me parler, il est sans doute à craindre qu'ils ne conduisent nos Cours à un but fort éloigné de leur désir; mais celle de Londres a rendu indispensables ceux que le Roi a ordonnés à son exemple.

"Je prie votre Excellence d'être bien persuadée de tout mon désir de concourir avec elle à prévenir et écarter tout ce qui pourrait altérer ou détruire la bonne intelligence entre nos deux Cours; et que j'approuverai une véritable satisfaction de suivre en cela mes propres sentiments, en me conformant aux intentions bien connues de sa Majesté."

*French. Copy.*

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 5, Hague.—"Flint delivered me your letter of the 2nd of October to-day at two p.m. They find me in such a moment of business and occupation that it is not in my power to answer them otherwise than by referring you to my despatches of to-day's date, the first of which applies almost entirely to every thing which you state on the longest of your two letters.

"If such a guarantee as is there proposed could be obtained, it would be a great point carried; I feel very strongly the tone of the reasoning you bring against the probability of its succeeding, but still I think it might be tried.

"The moment when the Prussian troops withdraw will be a very important one, and I am so far from believing that *we can stand alone*, that I shall press as much as possible the taking German auxiliaries into the pay of the Republic, and to have them enter the towns of this province as the Prussians evacuate them.

"I am far from being at my ease about the event of the Duke of Brunswick's attack on Amsterdam. Every hour's delay brings on the wet season, and if it is attended with a high wind he will find himself in a most perilous situation.

"In regard to what you say in your separate letter on there being something still doubtful in the conduct of Prussia, I confess I have had at times the same misgivings; but I do not suppose that the King himself is playing a double part, but that he is betrayed by his uncle Henry and Count Finckenstein.

"I sent you a messenger to Paris on the 2nd, which I fear did not catch you there."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 6, Sèvres.—"I enclose Mr. Pitt's letter to you unopened. I took the liberty pursuant to your permission to open one from Lord Carmarthen, and retain it, because I have not time to copy it, and Mr. Fraser will give you a duplicate.

"I am in hopes of a letter from you before you leave Boulogne or Calais to tell me a little of the news from the Hague, for which Sir James Harris refers me to what he wrote to you.

"You have had abominable weather for your journey; but the wind is fair this evening.

"I have written a despatch to the Office to-night which you will find sufficiently interesting; I entreat you to see it as soon as you can, as also my letter of this date to Mr. Pitt. I never feel too confident on these great subjects which are liable to be affected by so many side winds; but if the Cabinet, after conversing with you, will only decide as to what ought to be done, and direct it to be done in as conciliating

a manner as circumstances will allow, I have great hopes that the success would not be difficult."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 7, Hague.—"I cannot but think the hearty concurrence of the Court of Berlin to everything we propose will greatly facilitate my idea of making France become a guarantee of the Stadtholderate. We must calculate the concessions she will make, not from inclination but from necessity; and the situation of superior strength in which we stand from the signature of the convention at Berlin, is such as to make us equal to anything. At least we may sound the ground, and attempt a measure which, if it should succeed, will not only put France at an immense political distance from this country, but set her more at variance with her party here than you can imagine. I am sure I need not expatiate on a subject on which I so well know your feelings, or even wish you to go back with a sentiment to Versailles, different from those I am so certain belong to you.

"The conduct of the King of Prussia will do away all *our* doubts as to the sincerity of her intentions. I am satisfied the symptoms which appeared both here and in France were owing to the partial behaviour of Goltz, who, as well as his colleagues here, is connected with the French emissaries at Berlin, and perhaps even with the French Ministry, by the *surest* of all ties. The real object is to exclude France from any share in the negotiation, and that cannot be so effectually done as by a declaration on the part of the other two co-mediating powers to say they considered the disputes on the Republic as settled; which may be followed up or perhaps preceded by a similar one on the side of the States General.

"I presume this will just catch you in England, and if I have occasion to write to you in the course of next week, I will dispatch a messenger to Paris."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 10, Seve.—"I will write to you to-morrow, and will return Harris's letter, which I have only this moment received from you. You will see my letters to Lord Carmarthen and Mr. Pitt. If we wish to establish a great and permanent system, it is probable that in the present moment we may do it; and in a very glorious way. Pray turn it in your mind and expedite matters as much as possible. We shall be sincerely glad if you will make us another visit here and take possession again of your department; but if not, at least do not relax in your attention in this very important moment. If I am fully instructed, and sufficiently informed, I am sure that we may do a great deal in a very little time."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 11, Sève.—"I transmit to you by this conveyance *Peypommel sur le commerce de la Mer Noire*. It shows that the French have a very advantageous traffic in that quarter, but we must not forget that much of it will now be in English goods; and if they will not interfere with our position in the East Indies, we may composedly see their enjoyment of this trade, for which they have some local advantages over us.



"I have received from Abbé Morellet a copy of his *mémoire* on the French East India Company; I am told that it is a curious performance. I will send it next week to England.

"Can you send me one or two copies of Monsieur de Calonné's *mémoire*?"

"Pray read my despatch of this date and expedite matters.

"Whilst I am writing this, I receive your letter and the despatches of the 8th instant. It is understood here that Amsterdam is settled completely, though after some resistance. If that should not be the case, certainly the embarrassment might grow great. I foresee no other difficulty. You surely cannot wish me to attempt to force this Court to sign the words suggested by Sir James Harris. I will write an additional despatch to make the remark which occurs to me upon them."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 13, Seve.—"The enclosed were brought by a courier to Monsieur de Goltz, who sent them to the Duke of Dorset, from whence I received and opened them; and I have taken a copy of them for information if necessary. They were clearly written previous to knowing that the business was likely to settle itself without discussing the Dutch constitutions. If however you feel disposed to give a meeting to Monsieur d'Alvansleben I shall be cordially glad to see you, and we are using all possible means to make this large house a little warmer than when you left it. In the meantime I will take care to see Monsieur d'Alvansleben immediately on his arrival, and will say everything to him that I think you would wish. It is possible that he may enable me to bring this matter to an immediate conclusion.

"I much doubt whether any delay will arise even if the Prussian troops should not absolutely have evacuated. The disposition to peace here is decided and earnest if we do not drive too far; and I have great faith in our making a good use of the moment; for it is no compliment to Mr. Pitt to say that his attention to foreign politics is of the most efficient kind possible, and infinite advantages will result from it."

WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 17, Seve.—"Sir James Harris's messenger brought the enclosed to the Duke of Dorset's hotel on Sunday with a verbal desire that in case of your absence it should be opened; and his Grace communicated it to me immediately. You will observe that it contains nothing but what was passed under a supposition of different circumstances, except the welcome intelligence from Amsterdam.

"M. D'Alvansleben has never appeared, and as it is probable that Stayley arrived previous to his departure, it begins to appear probable that he will not come.

"I had by the same messenger a private letter from Sir James Harris merely referring me to the one addressed to you, with a few general remarks, and therefore I do not trouble you with a copy."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, October 24, Hague.—"I was almost vexed at seeing your letter of the 19th dated from Whitehall, as I am satisfied, without the most distant idea of conveying a compliment to you, that you were by far the properest person for terminating our discussions with France

relative to the affairs of this country. *I cannot write* what I feel on this subject, but the confidence with which you treated me when you was here, would induce me to *speak* freely if the opportunity existed.

"Things here in general go on very well, but there is still a most laborious work to perform, and our instruments are not the best calculated for measures which require decision and expedition. The French are still working under ground, and if the levity of the Prince of Orange induces him to give up the idea of proceeding criminally against some of the chiefs of the faction, they will still maintain a very improper and very dangerous degree of influence on the Republic.

"It is in my mind very much to be lamented that we cannot obtain from France something like the formal guarantee I mentioned. She has yielded on every point we have pressed as yet; and as our management for her proceeds from motives of prudence not from regard, I could wish we were to go to the very last stretch of the cord. Is it impossible to make her add to her declaration, *that she engages not to molest the House of Orange in the quiet possession of the hereditary Stadtholderate, or in future take any measures en haine de la constitution établie en 1747*. This is less than a guarantee, which binds her to stand forth in defence of the Stadtholderate, and only expresses *clearly* an intention which seems implied in the act she is now about to pass, and exchange with us. Its effect however would be very great here, as it would be an official avowal that she deserted her party.

"I do not think it impossible to reinstate the Scotch brigade; but they seem here to insist on the permission to raise and recruit it in Scotland, which, I presume, would meet with insurmountable difficulties at home."

#### WILLIAM EDEN to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, December 6, Seve.—"You will probably see by last night's despatches, and therefore I will not repeat, Monsieur de Montmorin's observations on the papers taken in Holland respecting the French detachment, which (by the bye) whether he knew it or not, was a much less extensive transaction than I had supposed from the general tone with which it has been mentioned. Its insignificance however makes it more disgraceful when stated as a measure of French Government, and we are fairly authorised to treat it in that point of view. I do not believe that Monsieur de Montmorin had been apprised of Monsieur de Ségur's letter; at most he had heard of it inadvertently and confusedly. I am more inclined to suspect that, in the bustle of office, it had been settled between our friend Monsieur de Rayneval and the Maréchal. Monsieur de Montmorin certainly disliked the Dutch pursuit even before its embarrassments grew great, but his *chef de bureau* had a family fondness for them.

"I not only agree with you in doubting the information which you have received of the project of the Triple Alliance, but I go farther; I utterly disbelieve it. At the same time I think that there is a tampering going forwards between this Court and the Imperial Courts. I could fairly ascertain the whole business if I had any materials to work with; but I am utterly without information or instructions. If we had any system or plan to propose, I could either carry it with this Court, or at least I am much mistaken if I could not make it the means of drawing Spain nearer towards us; for I had again a letter from Mr. Liston last night, expressing a solicitude from Monsieur de Florida Blanca to know what we wish, and a disposition to concur in it

Surely with a Court so basely disposed as this is, it is always right to keep communications and discussions amicably afloat as much as possible; particularly when the personal attentions are such as I happen to experience from Monsieur de Montmorin.

"We also delay settling, or declining to settle, a naval system; and the arrangement of the foreign forces for the islands, and the eternal old story of the consulships, which ought to be completed. I wish that you would urge the first quiet moment for attention to these matters.

"The enclosed will amuse you. As it requires proof, I ought to inform you that the memorial really was presented to the Most Christian King by the Duke of Orleans.

"I have doubts as to the utility of paying foreign subsidies in time of peace."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1787, December 27, Hague.—"You will see from my official correspondence the state of the negotiation here.

"The result of my private as well as ministerial conferences is, that if it were possible for us to restore Negapatnam unconditionally and forego our claim to an equivalent, in consideration of the renewal of friendship and alliance between the two countries, it would produce the best of all possible effects here; it would please and satisfy the mercantile part of the nation, and be such a clear and unequivocal proof of our fairness and goodwill, that no pretext could remain with the French party to call in question our sincerity, or to keep alive that spirit of animosity and of suspicion the last war has left behind it. It is needless to inquire whether this spirit (after what has passed) *ought to exist*; it is enough to know it actually *does exist*, and that it is of great importance to destroy it if we cannot refute it. It is on this principle that I have endeavoured to transmit so exactly all that Monsieur Vander Spiegel said on the subject. I have mixed up, in my reports, the opinions and arguments of the other leading people with whom I have conversed. I can have no doubt of their good intentions or good understanding, and they all unanimously concur that the restitution of Negapatnam in the way proposed would be a measure highly requisite to render the re-union between the two countries permanent and sincere and solidly beneficial. I readily conceive that we too have motives of *ménagement* to observe towards our nation, and that these influence our conduct more than the real value of the place itself, or the departing from a right so clearly expressed. But I should think it would go a great way to be able to say, 'Our situation with respect to Holland is now again become *precisely* what it was before the rupture. The former system of friendship and union, although it appeared to be lost beyond the reach of recovery, is restored and consolidated between the two countries; and England has besides acquired a right by the treaty to make such arrangements in India as not only will put an end to the eternal objects of dispute between them in that quarter of the globe, but also may in their consequences lead to put its whole trade and influence into their hands.' For, you will observe, that the renouncing the privileges granted by the 6th article is made subservient to the conclusion of these arrangements, and the one is not to take place if the other fails; and this is certainly so much clear gain to Great Britain since the year 1780.

"The *final* determination of these arrangements will undoubtedly be a difficult and delicate point, on which, at this moment, our ideas here

and in England are very wide. I do not however despair that, on all the essential considerations, they will meet at least as to the effect, though perhaps not as to the form. The subject is so intricate one, and in general so new to me, that I wish it greatly to be discussed and concluded in England, in the way I indicated in my despatch (170), and not sent here for any other purpose than for me to insert it in the treaty under the sanction of the States General.

"Our declining to lend either part or the whole of our Hessian auxiliaries to supply the place of the Prussians has (although I never encouraged them to think we should do otherwise) disappointed a good deal some of the leading members of the Government, and I fear may in the end distress them. His Prussian Majesty declares his peremptory resolution of withdrawing his troops in six weeks. It is morally impossible, before the expiration of that period, for the Republic to have found any others in Germany; and without some better support than its own army (which is in a deplorable state) very serious evils may follow. May I ask whether it is *decidedly impossible* for us to spare 6,000 Hessians for six months? or, if not, 6,000 Hanoverians? and could either of these corps be brought here in six weeks? Unacquainted as I am with the various objections against such a measure, it appears to me that if we were to have in the Republic, for the protection of its constitution and for the maintenance of its police and good order, a body of troops entirely dependent on us, it would be the strongest hold we could have over it; the stronger as it would be a footing of authority acquired by an obligation which would be greatly felt. I wish, if you think there is no objection to it, you would communicate these reflections to Mr. Pitt. They possibly may be easily overthrown, but they strike me as of some weight. They are not of a nature to find a place in a despatch, and I had rather they should reach him through you than by troubling him with a private letter. I shall consider whatever you may say to me in consequence as meant for my private instructions and better guidance on the work in which I am employed.

"My great object is, if possible, to connect this country by indissoluble ties to Great Britain. This is to be effected partly by *affection* (if such a sentiment may be allowed to exist between nations) and partly by specific engagements. Affection will follow complaisance, gentle usage, and not too rough and unqualified an exercise of our influence. The reverse of this lost us the Republic. The guarantee of the Stadtholderate and the other conditions of the treaty constitute very binding engagements; and if to these we were to add the military support they require for the security of their persons and property (which they think in danger) and assist them in raising their loans, they would, I think, be so completely entangled that they never could escape us; and we might direct and employ the influence and strength of this country in any way we pleased, provided we led them gently and adroitly into our views."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1788, January 4, Hague.—"The easterly winds which have continued to blow for near a fortnight, detained the post so long at Harwich that I got both your letter of the 17th and that of the 25th at the same time. It will not be in my power to answer to-day fully, but I will not delay thanking [you] for them and assuring you that I will pay every attention to their contents.

"The African slave trade is an exclusive branch of commerce belonging to the Province of Zeland. I have spoken to M. Vander

Spiegel and written to M. Lynden de Blytterswyk who is now at Middelburg, on the subject, and endeavoured to prevail on them to use their influence with the persons engaged in this trade to co-operate in carrying into execution the humane measure yourself and Mr. Wilberforce intend to bring forward. As soon as I am in possession of any conclusive information relative to their sentiments or intentions I will immediately let you know, although I fear the principles which actuate you and your friend are not likely to make such impression on the Dutch merchant.

"I was happy to find in your letter of the 25th December that my ideas relative to the bringing a corps of Hessian into this Republic coincide with yours. I never had a wish that they should be granted permanently, but only for a stipulated time, during which the Republic was to endeavour to hire some other troops, or put its own army on a more respectable footing. The prospect you hold out of there being a possibility of obtaining Hanoverians, is still better; and, strong as the measure is, I think in the present temper of the States I would be responsible to carry it through.

"I most perfectly agree with you in every thing you say relative to the Indian arrangements with this country. The making the restitution of Negapatnam a preliminary article, however, grateful it would have been to these people, I evidently see must not be thought of; and it is given up by the Pensionary in consequence of what I said in my late conferences with him.

"The other two points, namely the obtaining Rhio and Trincomalé I fear will be nearly impracticable, to the extent proposed in the report of the Commissioners. At all events the discussions on them will necessarily tend to lengthen the negotiation so much, if the treaty is to wait till they are determined, that I am very glad to find it is your opinion that they should be postponed for an after convention, and the alliance signed directly. I have urged this very strongly in one of my despatches to-day, and hope it will meet the approbation of His Majesty's servants. I refer you to this despatch for a provisional article I have drawn up for the purpose of conciliation till such time as East Indian business is finally settled."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1788, February 5, Hague.—"After various attempts as well by letter as by conversation to induce the Zelanders to explain themselves on the idea now in contemplation in England to abolish the African slave trade, I have at last prevailed upon M. Lynden de Blytterswyk, the leading man in that Province, to give me the enclosed answer in writing, which, though far from being so complete as I could have wished, may at least be produced as if there was an inclination on the part of these people to concur in the beneficial work you are going to undertake.

"I shall not fatigue you with a detail of the reasonings of most of them against the project which, as it seems at first sight calculated to affect their interest, cannot be made palatable to them by any application to their feelings; and I confess in the upshot I fear it will be very difficult to make them acquiesce in it. You may [be] assured no pains on my part shall be spared, and I will avail myself to the utmost of any lights you may think proper to furnish me with in order to promote its success.

"Boers returns to England. He is soured and disappointed; his ambition carries him beyond his sphere. I could easily have got him

made Pensionary of Dordt or Haarlem, but nothing short of a Department at which he is to preside will satisfy him. He read me the paper he read to the India Commissioners. I told him it was all *on one side*, and fitter to separate the two Companies and two nations for ever, than to conciliate them. I was displeased with him for some injudicious not to say unfriendly language he had held about England, which, after the reception he had met with, was unpardonable. He has no *commission* whatever from any body here, and, if he affects to be employed, it is an error into which he wishes to lead you.

"The Zelanders are very anxious to know whether the two millions Mr. Pitt (through Boers) gave them some hopes of lending them are to be soon forthcoming. They are in great want. I mean the Chamber of Zeland who solicited the loan. You will greatly oblige me by enabling [me] to answer something to their urgent enquiries on this point.

"I am every day more and more pleased with M. Vander Spiegel; he is everything that can be wished.

"A Colonel Colyear Robertson has produced a plan here to reinstate the Scotch brigade. It seems to me that no idea of this kind should come otherwise than ministerially; and although I see Colonel Robertson often at my house, he concealed from me the letter and plan he sent in last night to the Pensionary. *My* idea is that this country should solicit *us* to let it be restored, and not that we should ask it of them as a favour; and it is from this principle I wish to set aside the numberless proposals Scotch officers are continually coming forward with, without any authority whatever, or without any other view than to get rank and employment."

*Enclosure.*

G. H. C. DE LYNDEN to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1788, February.—"Je ne puis qu'applaudir au dessein louable, dont on s'occupe chez vous, pour régler la traité des nègres sur des principes plus conformes à l'humanité, et aux devoirs du Christianisme, que ne l'est la méthode actuelle; surtout si la chose peut se faire, comme on le croit, sans porter préjudice à la culture Américaine, qui est devenue de première nécessité pour l'Europe. Je vous sollicite bien instamment de vouloir me communiquer le plan sur cet objet, dès que vous l'aurez reçu; et j'ose vous assurer d'avance, que dans ce pays-ci, on concourra volontiers avec les autres nations qui ont des colonies de la même nature que les nôtres, aux changements par rapport aux esclaves, que la culture des terres pourra admettre. Je serai charmé d'entrer plus en détail avec vous sur la matière, lorsque j'aurai vu le projet."

*French.*

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1788, February 27, Whitehall.—"I am very sorry that it has been impossible for me to answer your last letter sooner. I am much obliged to you for the trouble you was so good as to take on the subject of the slave trade. The answer is not very encouraging, but I am still not without hopes that if we should ultimately be able to secure the acquiescence of other countries, something may be done with Holland.

"I have not neglected the point which you mentioned to me about the money for the Chamber of Zeland. But a real difficulty arises from the situation of the whole of the East India business between the two countries. There seems to me much danger in concluding the treaty

with the insertion of the article even as now returned to you, although, on the whole, I think it right on the ground of the reasoning which you have stated. It is certainly impossible for any one to judge with the same accuracy as yourself respecting the effect on the Dutch nation of holding out expectations in present which may probably not be realised hereafter, or, on the other hand, of obstructing the immediate conclusion of a treaty of alliance between us. At all events it seems to me essential on every principle of good faith that the Pensionary should clearly understand all that is meant to be engaged for.

“With respect to pecuniary aid, it seems to be the opinion of those with whom I have conversed that this ought not to be considered in a separate point of view from the rest of this subject. If there was a real disposition in the Government of the Dutch East India Company to unite and blend their interests with ours, much advantage might result to both, and many arrangements might be made for their mutual accommodation. In such a case it would be our interest to prevent the effects of any temporary embarrassment in their affairs. But how could a measure of this sort be justified to our own Company on any different supposition? A circumstance on which much stress is laid with respect to this point occurred in a conversation which I have had with Boers since he has been here. He came to show me a paper which he had received, I think, from Amsterdam. It contained a proposal that our East India Company should send people over to bid at the Dutch sales in March, in order to keep up the prices of teas, and thereby to prevent their being purchased on such terms as might enable the buyers to smuggle them into England so as to defeat the operation of the Commutation Act. Amongst other arguments on this subject the paper states that the Dutch Company were by no means under any necessity of bringing all their teas to market in the present moment, but that they might reserve a certain quantity so as to enable them at all times *to command the price of tea in England*. Now I think on that statement one might almost put it to themselves to decide whether it would be reasonable, or just to our own Company, that we should give the Dutch a loan of money in order to enable them to reserve their teas so as to command the prices of our own sales. It seems quite impossible that we should go on together tolerably on this footing, or without a real good understanding on all these points. Even in the particular instance which I have just mentioned, our interest is in fact the same, and appears sufficiently evident; but it cannot be pursued except by mutual agreement; and without that, by giving pecuniary aid, we should run the risk of doing an essential injury to our own East India Company; and that too with respect to an object which is materially connected with the interest of the public in many different points of view.

“It is on this ground thought absolutely necessary that some explanation should be previously entered into, with respect to the real situation of the Dutch Company, and their intended operations both in present and in future. If there is a confidence between us this explanation can only lead to mutual accommodation and advantage; and without this, it is surely impossible for us to employ the public purse of this country in setting up rivals against our own Company.

“On this subject however I think it right to add that what is felt with respect to rivalry relates to this particular case, and is by no means founded on any idea entertained by us that the trade of the Dutch East India Company should in any respect be sacrificed to ours. We consider it, on the contrary, as our best and true policy with regard to India to encourage the trade of foreign European nations with our provinces

there. And the same principle extends in its operation to their competition with us in European markets, which it is far from our wish to discourage, provided it is carried on upon just and equal principles. It is impossible to allow that a speculation of reserving tea to be smuggled into England falls at all under that description.

"There is some difficulty with respect to giving a public answer on this point, because Boers' communication was not an official one, nor would it perhaps even be fair to him that his name should be mentioned by you in this business. With respect to the proposal itself it was entirely discouraged, both because we felt that under all the circumstances he was not the proper person to treat with about it, and because the idea itself was for many reasons impracticable.

"It is really a thing to be much lamented that there appears so little disposition to establish a confidential communication on these points. We have much in our hands which would be materially beneficial to them, and we have a real desire to feel ourselves justified in giving it. The point of the spice trade, in the extent in which it was proposed in our *projet*, can certainly be given for nothing but Trincomalé. But arrangements might, I think, be made by which the Dutch Company might be to purchase at a given price a certain quantity of opium and manufactures in Bengal, paying the price into our Treasury at Canton; and in this case the article of navigation could be so confined as to relate merely to a commodious and safe passage through the Eastern seas to China, to the exclusion of all trade to or from the islands situated there. I mention this to you only as a loose idea which has been started in conversation, and which we are inclined to think practicable; but it is above all necessary, as I conceive, that they should feel themselves disposed to treat with us as friends, and not as rivals anxious for their destruction.

"I have troubled you with a very long letter on this subject; but I was desirous to convince you of the eagerness which I feel at all times to obey your commands, in any business in which you think I can be of the least service to you in promoting the important objects in which you are engaged."

*Draft.*

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1788, March 4, Hague.—"I have many thanks to return you for yours of the 27th February. If I see any opening to promote your wishes here relative to the African trade, or if you can point out any way in which I can contribute towards the success of the humane undertaking you have in hand, I shall most willingly seize the opportunity.

"As you will probably see my private letter of to-day to Mr. Pitt, as well as my official ones, I shall not waste either your time or mine by useless repetitions. I hope all will end well, yet I shall not sleep sound till the treaty is signed.

"I am sorry there should be any obstacles relative to the loan we were to assist the Zeland branch of the East India Company with; yet the reasons you give are too real ones to admit of argument. Boers in November last wrote word that he had a specific promise from Mr. Pitt, and that one of the two millions required would be *immediately* supplied from the Civil List. This prevented the Company from applying elsewhere, and as the time of payment and settling their accounts now draws near, they are greatly distressed how to go on. I confess, at the same time, that however conclusive the motives you allege for with-



holding this supply from them are, yet that I am rather prevented to employ them, and wish some other plea could be devised for a refusal, as I think that [which] you state to me would breed acrimony and ill will.

"The idea of employing some one on our part to bid for the teas which are to be put to sale at Middelburg on the 10th instant, did not originate with Boers. Mr. Rich wrote a long time ago a letter on the subject to Fraser, and I enclose you a copy of one I received some weeks since from Mr. Hope. As I cannot entertain the remotest doubt of his private or public principles, I am certain he did not mean to lead me into a false measure when he wrote to me; but, as no notice was taken of Mr. Rich's letter, I took it for granted there was reasons for not adopting the plan Mr. Hope proposed. I send his letter to you now, as it is probably the best kind of information you can have on the subject.

"I think it possible, though I will not venture to pledge myself for it, that I could, in return for Negapatman, get Trincomalé on something like the same terms on which the Dutch held the barrier towns; but I fear there is no hope of getting a more positive possession of it."

SIR JAMES HARRIS to W. W. GRENVILLE.

1788, June 2, Whitehall.—"My motive for wishing to see you this morning was this. Mr. Pitt, in consequence of what you had been so good as to say to him, mentioned to me the other day the reasons which had put a stop to my receiving an honour which he confessed it had been in contemplation to bestow upon me. I told him, and with perfect truth, that although nothing could be so grateful to me as such a mark of Royal favour, yet I should be very sorry to embarrass a Government to which I wished so heartily well as his, or, after the favours I had already received, to appear craving for others still. However sincere this declaration is, I will not conceal from you that I shall return to the Hague hurt, mortified, and disheartened, if I am to go back without this distinction. It has been universally understood both here and in Holland that it was intended, and the impression of the public in both countries will naturally be that something has since passed, which has induced his Majesty to withhold from me now an honour of which he did not think [me] undeserving some time back. Besides the very unpleasant feeling such a supposition will give me, it will also materially affect my public situation; and it will lessen considerably that influence so necessary to carry through the points which still remain unsettled between the two countries.

"The new French Ambassador who is just got to the Hague will well know how to avail himself of this circumstance; and I shall not be able to meet him on the same high ground if I return to my post without such a mark of approbation, and under the idea that I may have done something to forfeit it.

"You can, I am sure, readily guess why I could not say this to Mr. Pitt, though I felt it at the time; but he has behaved so kindly and honourably by me that I wish him to know my feelings. It was to request you to convey them to him that I wished to have seen you this morning. You will now perhaps be good enough to communicate to Mr. Pitt this letter, which is a very real and sincere picture of them."

W. W. GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES HARRIS.

1788, June 3, Whitehall.—"I have taken the first opportunity which I had to obey your commands in communicating to Mr. Pitt the contents of your letter of yesterday. I am persuaded that it is unnecessary

for me to repeat to you what he has himself expressed to you; the just sense which he entertains of your services in Holland, and the sincere desire which he feels that you should receive every mark of that distinction to which you are so much entitled. I understand from him, with respect to the particular object in question, that he does not consider the point as finally determined; although there are circumstances which throw considerable embarrassments in the way of it. He has desired me to say that whenever the thing is ultimately decided either way, he will lose no time in acquainting you with the result; and that, in the meantime, you may be assured of the sincere desire which he feels on your account to promote an object so interesting to you."

*Draft.*

#### ACCOUNT OF THE FLIGHT OF LOUIS XVI. FROM PARIS.

1791, June 26, Brussels.—"About eight months ago, it was resolved to attempt to bring away the Royal Family from Paris. The King earnestly desired to leave it, though the risk of his being stopped, either in endeavouring to get out of the town, or in the course of his journey, was represented to him. Monsieur de Bouillé who commanded in Champagne, Lorraine, and the adjacent districts, was perfectly disposed to co-operate in the execution of the project. According to a Decree of the Assembly, and by orders from the Minister of the War Department, he was to take measures for securing the frontiers against attack; under pretence of doing so, he brought regiments he could depend on towards Montmédy, and sent thither camp equipage, ammunition, and a train of field artillery. The place, though small, is strong; behind it are the Austrian territories; nor could anything be apprehended from the inhabitants of the town, as it is entirely commanded by the cannon of the fort.

"Some who had access to the King and Queen recommended that they should endeavour to get to the Low Countries by the shortest road, and from thence proceed to Montmédy. Had they done so, it is beyond a doubt they would have got thither in safety. Though many carriages left Paris before, and on the same day theirs did, they all arrived here without difficulty. But the King was unwilling to quit the French dominions, though but in travelling; and the route given by Monsieur de Bouillé by the way of Chalons was preferred. It was agreed that all the Royal Family at Paris should leave it on the night of Monday the 20th June, and Monsieur de Bouillé was advised thereof, that he might make his dispositions accordingly. The Comte de Fersen was to bring off those that were in the Tuilleries, and Monsieur and Madame were to set out at the same hour from the Luxembourg.

"A Baronne de Korffe, who I understand is a native of Russia, applied to Monsieur de Simolin for a passport to go to Francfort; the number of persons mentioned in it corresponded with the number that were to go in, and attend, the carriage of the King and Queen. Under pretence that the first passport had been accidentally burnt, she obtained another; she went off with one, and gave the other to serve for the Royal Family.

"A strong travelling coach and four excellent carriage horses were provided by Fersen; likewise an ordinary coach and a pair of horses, like those that are hired by strangers, called *des carrosses de remise*. Between five and six on the evening of the 20th June, Fersen went to receive the King's definitive orders. The King observed to him that La Fayette had just given an order to double the usual guards, and that he imagined he entertained some suspicion of their design, as he knew

of no other circumstance that could have occasioned this precaution ; but, before the other could reply, he added, ' Things are now gone too far to recede. Happen what will, I am determined to go on. I can never be more unhappy than I am at present.' He then spoke with cheerfulness, and said that, having taken his final resolution, he now felt himself at ease.

"Three *gardes de corps* had been selected by M. D—— under pretence of being employed on a commission that required secrecy, and were provided with buff coloured coats, such as many servants in France and Germany travel with. About nine in the evening, two of them were sent to the King, when they were informed by him, for the first time, that they were to accompany him; and though he was sure of their fidelity, yet to guard against indiscretion, he locked them up in his closet. The other *garde de corps* was sent to Fersen a little before midnight; he and Fersen's coachman, riding as postillions, drove the travelling coach about a quarter of a mile beyond the barrier St. Martin; they likewise brought with them two riding horses, and they had orders, when they saw any ope, to move gently on and return to their station. About a quarter past eleven Fersen, acting as coachman, went with the other coach to the *Cour des Princes* at the Tuilleries; some other carriages were likewise waiting there. He stopped near the door of M. de Villequier's apartment. Madame de Tourzelle came very soon out of it, with Madame Royale, and the Dauphin dressed as a girl. Fersen having put them into the coach, drove gently out to the *petit Carrousel*, near to the house that was formerly inhabited by the Duchess de la Vallière. Neither this house nor several others in that quarter have any court, therefore carriages are often seen waiting there for company. Madame Elizabeth came next, and Fersen having spoken to her, she immediately went into the coach. About a quarter of an hour after her, the King came, dressed with a brown round wig and a great coat; he was followed by one of the *gardes de corps*, and in a few minutes, the Queen came, followed by the other. She was obliged to pass very near to two sentinels. One near the Dauphin's apartment was sitting down, and probably asleep; and she took the opportunity of getting past the other while he turned his back in walking. Whilst the coach was waiting in the *petit Carrousel* M. de la Fayette passed it twice in his carriage, followed as usual by two troopers; the second time the King, who was sitting in the coach, saw him. As soon as the Queen was in the coach, the two *gardes de corps* got up behind it, and Fersen drove away to the place where the other was waiting. The Royal Family having gone into the travelling coach, Fersen and one of the *gardes de corps* mounted the riding horses; another *garde de corps* got upon the coach box, which was made to carry servants; and the third, as I have already observed, acted as a postillion. The coach that brought them from the Tuilleries was drove to a little distance from the road, and overturned into a ditch. The four horses that brought the coach from the barrier St. Martin were changed for post horses at Bondy; nor could this occasion any suspicion, as it is very common for those who come from Paris to come to the first stage with their own horses, to avoid paying for the *poste royale*. One of the *gardes de corps* continued on the box, one rode by the side of the carriage, and the other went on before to order horses at the next stage. Fersen accompanied the Royal Family about three miles beyond Bondy, and there took leave of them, to go and join his chaise that was waiting for him at Bourget. He came from thence to Mons, where he arrived in the night of Tuesday, and Monsieur likewise came there nearly about the same time. Fersen came to Mons, I believe, in order to deliver a

message to Monsieur, and to give advice of what had been done to M. de Mercy here, and to the King of Sweden at Aix la Chapelle. Having done this he set off for Montmédy, but on the road thither he met M. de Bouillé, who informed him of what had happened at Varenne. You may conceive what their feelings were. Those of Fersen arose purely from gratitude and affection; but besides those sentiments, de Bouillé felt all the pangs of disappointed ambition, which, if I am not extremely mistaken, is his predominant passion; though, by the accounts of all who know him, he is a very honourable and worthy man. While under the first impressions of his grief and indignation, de Bouillé has written a letter to the Assembly, a copy of which I have seen. I think had he deferred it till he was more in possession of himself, he would have wrote in a manner that would have been more generally approved, and that would have been less exceptionable; for, in speaking of the intentions of Foreign Powers, if what he says were true, it is indiscreet to mention; if not, it is ridiculous. He tells the Assembly that it required all that love which he possesses for his country, all that inviolable attachment and respect that he entertains for his Sovereign, to have so long given him force to subdue his feelings, and submit to the humiliation of corresponding with them, and of, apparently, obeying their Decrees.

"The Proclamation, or Manifest, that was left by the King, was written by himself and Monsieur, but is principally *his own* composition."

*Endorsed.*—Account of the attempt of the King of France to quit that kingdom in the month of June 1791, by the Comte de Fersen and others.

#### AN ACCOUNT OF M. DE BOUILLÉ'S ESCAPE.

(From Monsieur de Calonne).

"Monsieur de Bouillé, finding that of all the regiments under his command he could place most confidence in the regiment *Royal Allemagne*, determined to employ it in protecting the King's escape, and advanced with it himself to a place between Stenay and Verdun. From thence he sent out parties, one of which found the King at Varenne, and was witness of his being stopped there. A trooper who escaped from this party, returned with the greatest expedition to the place where M. de Bouillé was waiting with the remainder of the regiment. Monsieur de Bouillé immediately put himself at the head of this corps, and advanced to Varenne. He found that the King had left it two hours before, and having inquired to what place the King was carried, he advanced forwards with a view of overtaking him; but he soon found that a bridge which he was to pass, was broken down. He then ordered part of the regiment to enter the river, and try to swim over; but he soon found that this attempt would not succeed, for, from the length of the march and the expedition he had used, the horses were so fatigued that they could not pass the river, and two or three of the troopers were drowned. He then gave up all hopes of overtaking the King, and returned with the remainder of the regiment to their former quarters in the neighbourhood of Stenay. When the troopers had dismounted, he then acquainted them with his resolution immediately to leave the kingdom. The whole regiment offered to go with him. He would not accept of this offer, saying that it was not proper he should enter the Austrian territories with the appearance of military force, and ordered the troops to go to their quarters. He set out immediately, and all the officers to the number

of thirty-six followed him. About one hundred more officers from the garrison at Metz have since joined him at Luxemburg. The common troopers of the regiment *Royal Allemagne*, who are chiefly Germans that talk French, were so disgusted with M. de Bouillé's refusal to accept of their service that, through anger, they have now joined the rest of the troops that have taken part with the National Assembly.

"Monsieur de Calonne says that the Baron de Breteuil principally promoted the King's escape, and urged it through the Queen, with whom he is in correspondence; being desirous that the King should put himself at the head of the party who are to attempt a counter-revolution, and that it should not be conducted solely by the Count d'Artois, with whom he has little influence or connection. The Count d'Artois knew nothing of the King's intention to escape. The Baron de Breteuil, who was informed of it, left Soleure and came as far as Liege; but hearing that the King was retaken, and being informed of the persons who were then at Brussels, and of all that was passing there, he did not come on to Brussels, but returned immediately back to Soleure.

"Monsieur de Calonne says that the Baron de Breteuil was constantly counteracting the plans which the Count d'Artois, by his advice, was pursuing; objecting particularly to any connection or interference with England, and urging this consideration very strongly to the Emperor and Queen of Naples; which was the reason that the Emperor varied in the language he held in the different conferences with him.

"When Monsieur took leave of the King his brother at Paris, his Majesty gave him a paper signed by himself, appointing him, in case of accident, *Lieutenant Général du Royaume*. Monsieur, being apprehensive of this paper being found in his custody in case he was taken, returned it to the King; but when M. de Fersen took leave of his Majesty at Bondy, he gave M. de Fersen a paper, the purport of which was to devolve his authority on Monsieur, in case of any accident happening to himself. These papers, though signed by his Majesty, and sufficiently expressive of his intention, were not probably drawn in any legal form. When Monsieur joined the Count d'Artois at Brussels, a meeting was held, consisting of all the members of the ancient Parliaments of France then in the neighbourhood of Brussels, and of Monsieur de Calonne, in the presence of the two brothers, in which the question was agitated whether Monsieur should take upon himself the title and authority of Regent, or Lieutenant General of the kingdom of France. All the *Gens de Robe* who were present were of opinion that, as the King was a prisoner and no longer a free agent, and as Monsieur was the first Prince of the Blood then in a state of liberty, he might legally assume either of the titles before mentioned. The two precedents of the Dauphin Charles, afterwards Charles the V., who assumed the quality of Regent and Lieutenant of the King during the imprisonment of King John his father, who was taken at the battle of Poitiers by the English; and of the Dauphin, afterwards Charles the VII., who took upon himself the like title and authority after the treaty of Troyes, by which his father, then in the hands of the English, had in fact disinherited him, were quoted; but it was observed that the assumption of a title of this nature, which could not be acknowledged either by the *Etats Généraux*, nor by any of the Parliaments of France, since none were in existence, and which probably would be denied and rejected by the majority of the people, would, in effect, be of no service; especially as the present National Assembly, who pretend to represent the nation, would certainly disclaim any right which Monsieur might pretend to have to such a title; and would probably oblige the

King his brother, who is now their prisoner, formally to renounce any authority pretended to be derived from him ; so that the idea of assuming such a title was on this account relinquished."

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 5, Berlin.—"I think it proper to give your Lordship the earliest intelligence of a conversation I had yesterday with the Duke of York, and of the consequences which have resulted from it; though I have acted in this affair only in my private capacity.

"His Royal Highness communicated to me, in confidence, his passion for Princess Frederica, the King of Prussia's only child by his first marriage; his desire to marry her, and his wish to have His Prussian Majesty's dispositions sounded, in order that, if they were favourable, he might immediately write to the King to ask his permission to make a formal proposal of marriage. After a good deal of conversation with the Duke, particularly on the reasons which made him believe that this step would be agreeable to His Majesty, I complied with his request, in communicating his wishes to the King of Prussia, whose answer was that nothing could be more agreeable to him, as he loved the Duke, and had observed with pleasure his daughter's partiality for him; but that he could not give his consent until he knew His Majesty's sentiments. His Royal Highness writes to the King by this opportunity, and I have his permission to give your Lordship this information. Though he pays particular attention to the Princess, he has, hitherto, made her no declaration of his wishes; but the passion appears to be perfectly mutual, and has, in fact, existed for the last six years. The Princess is pretty, though not remarkably handsome, but very agreeable and accomplished. She was subject, about a year ago, to some nervous or hysterical complaints, but she is perfectly well at present.

"In conversing on this subject with Count Schulemberg, through whom I made the communication to the King of Prussia, the prospect of the marriage of the Prince Royal was naturally mentioned; when that Minister told me that His Prussian Majesty would certainly prefer an English Princess to any other; but that, having experienced the hardship of marrying a Princess he had never seen, he was determined to make his son travel, especially to England, to choose for himself.

"Your Lordship will be best able to judge what good effects the union in question might have in strengthening the political connection between England and Prussia, the force of which has been certainly considerably diminished here of late.

"I shall be impatient to receive your Lordship's instructions on the subject of this letter, as it places me in an embarrassing situation."

*Copy.*

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, July 7, Berlin.—"The departure of the Duke of York's messenger having been delayed, I think it right to add to my preceding letter that nothing can exceed the satisfaction the King of Prussia receives from the prospect of the marriage of His Royal Highness with Princess Frederica, and his eagerness to see it accomplished. His Prussian Majesty expressed these sentiments to the Duke last night, in the strongest terms; observing that this new tie of connection with His Majesty would make him happy on every account, public and private, and that he would rejoice to see his favourite daughter so happily settled. His Royal Highness having, with the King's

permission, mentioned his wishes to the Prince of Prussia, he likewise expressed the greatest satisfaction."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to JOSEPH EWART.

1791, July 22, Whitehall.—"I have received your three private letters of the 5th, 7th and 9th instant, respecting the communication made to you by His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and what had since passed on that interesting subject. As I understand that His Majesty intends writing to His Royal Highness upon it, there remains nothing for me to mention to you relative to it, except to express His Majesty's gracious approbation of the steps which you have taken, and to congratulate you upon the prospect of an event so interesting in itself, and which I cannot but look forward to with peculiar satisfaction, as tending to strengthen and improve the union between this country and Prussia. I desire that you will omit no opportunity of expressing these sentiments to His Prussian Majesty, and to those of his servants who may be informed of this business."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF YORK.

1791, July 22, Whitehall.—"The King has been graciously pleased to allow me to have the honour of informing your Royal Highness that it is his Majesty's intention, in the course of a few days, to write to your Royal Highness, and to the King of Prussia, on the subject of your Royal Highness's late letter to his Majesty. And I have the very great additional satisfaction of being permitted by His Majesty to add, that His Majesty's sentiments relative to that subject are such as your Royal Highness would wish.

"I hope your Royal Highness will not think it presumptuous in me if I take the liberty of availing myself of this opportunity to be the first to offer to your Royal Highness my sincere and respectful congratulations on an occasion which must be, on every account, so highly interesting to all his Majesty's subjects, and more particularly to those who, like myself, are bound to his Majesty by the ties of personal gratitude and attachment, as well as by those of duty and allegiance."

*Copy.*

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, August 4, Berlin.—"The King of Prussia has expressed to me, in the strongest terms, the satisfaction he received from his Majesty's letter, announcing to him his consent to the marriage of the Duke of York with Princess Frederica. But His Prussian Majesty, at the same time, testified his regret that the ceremony should be delayed till after the meeting of Parliament, and asked if this difficulty could not be obviated by an assurance from his Majesty respecting the Duke's establishment and the Princess's jointure, with which his Majesty said he would be perfectly satisfied. The Hereditary Prince of Orange is to be married here to the Princess Wilhelmine in the beginning of October, and the King is very desirous that the Duke of York's marriage should be celebrated about the same time. His Royal Highness desires me to entreat your Lordship to exert your influence in his behalf, on this occasion, as the greatest mark of friendship you can show him."

*Copy.*

## JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

## Extract.

1791, September 2, Berlin.—“The Duke of York is extremely distressed at not having received any positive accounts relative to the time his marriage may take place. I acquainted your Lordship in a former letter that the King of Prussia is very desirous the ceremony should be performed a few days before that of the Prince of Orange, for different reasons, and, among others, that by this means much trouble and expense would be avoided. I know that His Prussian Majesty is extremely impatient at the delay, which circumstance tends much to increase the Duke's uneasiness; and it is at the desire of His Royal Highness that I state these particulars to your Lordship, though I have repeatedly explained your situation in regard to business of this nature.”

*Copy.*

## W. PITT to JOSEPH EWART.

1791, September 2, Downing Street.—“I have received the King's commands to communicate to you, in this private letter, the outline of what His Majesty has in contemplation, with a view to the establishment to be formed for His Royal Highness the Duke of York, on the happy event of his approaching marriage.

“His Majesty has thought it best to adopt this mode, not choosing himself to state, finally, his intentions on the subject, without some previous knowledge of the ideas of the King of Prussia; and meaning that what is now to be intimated to you should be considered as open to any farther explanation and discussion which may appear to be necessary.

“You will be aware that His Majesty can only at present undertake to recommend to Parliament to concur in making such a settlement as his Majesty may judge proper; but that it cannot actually take place without Parliamentary assistance; and it is probable, that it will be proposed to the Parliament of Ireland, to bear a reasonable share of this additional expense. The sum which His Majesty has thought of fixing is twenty-four or twenty-five thousand pounds per annum, in addition to what His Royal Highness at present receives from the Civil List, and from his regiment of Guards, so as to make His Royal Highness's income, in the whole, about forty thousand pounds per annum, exclusive of the revenues arising from the Bishopric of Osnaburgh. His Majesty will also wish to recommend the settlement of a proper jointure on Her Royal Highness the Princess, the amount of which would naturally be six thousand pounds per annum, being what His Majesty has by Act of Parliament been enabled to settle on the Princesses his daughters. This however would be independent of any settlement which it may be thought right to make of whatever may be the sum intended to be given by the King of Prussia as the Princess's portion, with regard to which I am not aware that any explanation has hitherto taken place.

“You will understand that it is left to you to take the properest mode of communicating to His Prussian Majesty, and to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, the contents of this letter; and you will, of course, acquaint me with what may pass in consequence, in order to its being laid before His Majesty.”

*Copy.*



JOSEPH EWART to W. PITT.

1791, September 10, Berlin.—“I had the honour of receiving yesterday your private letter of the 2nd instant, containing the outline of His Majesty’s intentions respecting the establishment of His Royal Highness the Duke of York on his marriage. His Royal Highness having immediately communicated to the King of Prussia the purport of His Majesty’s letter to him, and of your letter to me, His Prussian Majesty, after expressing entire satisfaction with the amount of the proposed establishment, determined that the marriage should take place on the 29th instant, and gave orders for his Cabinet Ministers discussing with me the different points to be arranged. I have just had a conference with them on the subject; and great difficulties and objections were made to the ceremony being celebrated without a formal contract, or rather treaty, of marriage being signed. After much discussion, the particulars of which were of too little consequence to be mentioned, it was proposed to draw up and sign, *sub spe rati*, a preliminary Act containing the most essential points, and referring to the treaty or contract to be concluded as soon as possible. Finding that unless I complied with this form, the Prussian Ministers would make a representation to the King their master against the marriage taking place till after the meeting of Parliament, I agreed to this proposal, with the reserve that the preliminary Act should be signed *sub spe rati*, and consequently subject to be modified in the formal contract, in whatever manner His Majesty may judge advisable. The *projet* of this Act is to be drawn up and signed as soon as possible, after having been laid before the King of Prussia; but, as the marriage is so soon to take place, I lose no time in despatching this messenger with an account of what has been already settled.

“The Act is to consist of eight articles, of which the enclosed paper contains the substance. The first article is for the sake of form. The sum, specified in the second, is that which has been given to the Princesses of the House of Brandenburg on every similar occasion. The renunciation to be made by the Princess, according to the third article, is conformable to the laws of this country; as the present, specified in the fourth, is to its customs. The Duke of York fixed himself the sum of four thousand pounds per annum for pin money. The counter-portion, mentioned in the sixth article, is likewise established by the laws of this country. The King of Prussia made no objection to the jointure of six thousand pounds, but his Ministers told me that seven thousand five hundred pounds had been settled for the Hereditary Princess of Orange, whose contract of marriage is founded on the same principles with those contained in the enclosed articles.

“It is proposed to sign this preliminary Act in the course of a few days; and the Prussian Ministers require that I should have a full power, though I could not receive it.

“I have made no objections to the marriage ceremony being performed by one of the King of Prussia’s chaplains of the reformed religion; but, as there is an English one at Dresden, he could be sent for, if judged necessary.

“I shall be very anxious to know if my conduct, on this occasion, be honoured with His Majesty’s gracious approbation, and with yours.”

*Enclosure.*

SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSED PRELIMINARY ACT.

“1st Article. To state the nature of this preliminary Act, and the reasons for making it.

"2nd Article. The settlement of the portion, to consist of one hundred thousand thalers, about thirteen thousand pounds, besides a suitable *trousseau*.

"3rd Article. The renunciation of the Princess to this portion, which is to be paid to the Duke soon after the marriage.

"4th Article. Mentions the present to be made by the Duke to the Princess, the day after the marriage, of six thousand pounds sterling; but of which Her Royal Highness is only to receive the interest during the Duke's lifetime.

"5th Article. Four thousand pounds per annum for pin-money.

"6th Article. Counter-portion, or one hundred thousand thalers, which the Duke is to deposit, or give security for, in order to receive the Princess's portion.

"7th Article. The jointure to consist of six thousand pounds per annum, with a residence and suitable establishment.

"8th Article. Signature of the Plenipotentiaries, *sub spe rati*, of their respective Sovereigns; but with a ratification on the part of the Duke and the Princess for what depends on them."

*Copy.*

#### JOSEPH EWART to W. PITT.

1791, September 15, Berlin.--"I have now the honour of transmitting to you the preliminary and provisional Act which the King of Prussia and his Ministers have required to be concluded, previous to the celebration of the marriage of His Royal Highness the Duke of York with Princess Frederica. I need scarcely observe that by my signing *sub spe rati*, and from its being specified that the instrument is only provisional, it may be altered, or even superseded, according to His Majesty's pleasure, by the stipulations of the formal contract of marriage. Upon the same principle, though I have signed *sub spe rati* for the reason already mentioned, the King of Prussia does not require His Majesty's ratification of this preliminary Act, but only that, if approved, it should be acknowledged in the full power for the signature of the contract, which His Prussian Majesty wishes to be concluded as soon as it may suit His Majesty's convenience, in order that the business may be terminated.

"In this country the attachment to old forms is very strong, and, though I prevailed upon the Prussian Ministers to omit several singular ones, they insisted upon retaining that specified in the fourth article; though its origin is very absurd, and that the interest of the six thousand pounds being included in the pin-money reduces the engagement simply to the payment of the capital in the event of the Duke's death.

"After what I stated in my last letter, there seems to be nothing essential to add on the subject of the other articles, and I have only to repeat my hopes that His Majesty will not disapprove the measures which I have been obliged by the circumstances to take upon myself to adopt in regard to this affair."

*Copy.*

#### W. PITT to JOSEPH EWART.

1791, September 23, Downing Street.--"I received on the 19th instant at Weymouth your private letter of the 10th (enclosing the substance of a proposed preliminary Act relative to the marriage of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, and mentioning that the marriage ceremony was to take place on the 29th instant), and I lost no time in

laying it before the King. I have not received His Majesty's commands to make any observations on the paper stating the substance of the preliminary Act, as it seems difficult to form a precise opinion on some parts of it until the articles themselves are received; and also as, according to your letter, the signature must have taken place before a messenger could reach Berlin. I must, however, observe to you that my letter of the 2nd instant was a private letter, written only with a view to procure such explanations as might enable His Majesty to form his ultimate decision; after which His Majesty would have proceeded to signify his formal consent, and have directed the proper official steps to be taken for authorizing a regular proposal of marriage, and for observing the other formalities usual on such occasions.

"It is the more to be regretted that time has not been left for observing this course as, in consequence of the omission, the marriage ceremony will have taken place without due attention to the provisions of the Royal Marriage Act, a copy of which I enclose. The best measure which, on consideration, it has seemed possible to take here under this unforeseen difficulty, has been to endeavour, if possible, that His Majesty's consent should be signified by an instrument which may pass the Great Seal previous to the 29th instant, and should also be declared in Council before that day; but the precise time when the Great Seal can be affixed to such an instrument is rendered uncertain, from the Lord Chancellor's being on a tour at a distance from London. In this situation, His Majesty has been pleased to approve of my apprising you, as expeditiously as possible, of these circumstances, for the information of the King of Prussia and of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, in order that they may be prepared for taking such steps as may, on full consideration, be thought most advisable for preventing any inconvenience or embarrassment in future, in consequence of this informality. If any accident should prevent the due signification of His Majesty's consent before the 29th instant, or if, on consideration, it should be thought that, according to the terms of the Act of Parliament, the Duke of York ought actually to have received such formal consent previous to the marriage, it may become necessary that the ceremony should be repeated after the previous forms have been observed; and it must also be considered whether, for greater security, it would not be advisable that the ceremony should be performed by a minister of the Church of England. If this should be the case, it probably could not be necessary that any greater number of persons should be present than might be sufficient for the purpose of being witnesses, and of attesting a proper certificate to be entered on the books of the Privy Council here. On this point, however, and on any other which upon consideration may appear material, you will receive more particular information, together with such official instructions as may appear necessary, with as much expedition as the circumstances may admit."

*Copy.*

JOSEPH EWART to LORD GRENVILLE.

1791, October 6, Berlin.—"I have communicated to His Royal Highness the Duke of York the contents of your Lordship's private letter of the 23rd ultimo, expressing your concern at the difficulties which have arisen respecting the forms which ought to have been observed previous to the celebration of his marriage, and particularly at the omission of the official steps usual on such occasions. I am desired by His Royal Highness to repeat to your Lordship the assurances I

have already frequently communicated, of the sense he has of the friendly dispositions you have all along shown to facilitate the conclusion of his marriage; and His Royal Highness readily admitted that whatever informality may have happened, had been occasioned by His Prussian Majesty's impatience, and his own, to have the ceremony performed, and to their inattention to all forms.

"I beg leave to add, that nothing but extreme circumspection in what I conceived to be my duty, prevented me from writing to your Lordship officially on the subject of the Duke of York's marriage; for, as both your communications and Mr. Pitt's to me were conveyed in private letters, I thought it would be improper to answer them in a despatch. I need not repeat how much I regret the embarrassment occasioned to your Lordship by this business, and that nothing but the extreme impatience of the King of Prussia, arising in a great measure from his desire to have the two marriages concluded at the same time to save trouble and expense, could have induced me to consent. At the same time, your Lordship will be sensible that, had I refused to concur with His Prussian Majesty's wishes, I should have been placed in a very disagreeable situation with respect both to His Prussian Majesty and the Duke of York; and I believe I may safely venture to say, that the consequences of such a state of things might have been more embarrassing than those produced by any informality.

"I shall be very sorry if, after what I have said, my conduct should appear blameable to your Lordship; but I acted to the best of my judgment, and have been more harrassed and perplexed by this affair than by much more important ones."

*Copy.*

#### LE BARON DE BRETEUIL to W. PITT.

1792, August 8, Brussels.—"Quoique je n'aie jamais eu l'honneur d'avoir aucun rapport avec votre Excellence, je n'en suis pas moins convaincu que je puis parler avec confiance à ses vertus comme à ses grandes qualités d'homme d'état; et je me flatte que les grandes occupations de ma vie m'empêchent de vous être absolument inconnu. C'est dans toutes ces persuasions que je vais m'ouvrir à vous, avec la franchise qui doit toujours entre nos deux nations faire la base de leur langage. Mais afin d'autoriser le mien auprès de vous, je dois commencer par vous faire connaître le plein pouvoir dont il a plu au Roi de m'honorer depuis le commencement de ses malheurs pour traiter de toutes les affaires avec les Puissances de l'Europe. Je vous envoie donc copie de ce plein pouvoir, et j'ose espérer qu'en voulant bien y ajouter foi, vous aurez aussi la bonté de le mettre sous les yeux du Roi d'Angleterre pour légitimer auprès de Sa Majesté les services que je viens réclamer auprès d'Elle au nom du Roi, et pour le Roi.

"Sa Majesté, depuis ses malheurs, a mis au nombre de ses plus sensibles consolations, tout ce qui lui est revenu sans cesse des expressions de l'amitié de Sa Majesté Britannique. Le Roi ne croit pas pouvoir mieux témoigner au Roi d'Angleterre combien il est touché de son intérêt, qu'en voulant être son obligé, et en lui fournissant l'occasion de lier à la fois sa reconnaissance et celle des vrais Français à la personne de Sa Majesté Britannique. Votre Excellence est instruite des nouvelles fureurs des factieux Français depuis qu'ils voyent la marche des armées combinées pour secourir le Roi. Elle sait que le Maire de Paris a présenté à l'Assemblée Nationale la prétendue pétition de la Municipalité pour la déchéance du Roi; tous mes avis secrets me forcent de croire que les factieux veulent décidément le succès de ce

crime sous cette frénétique Assemblée, et attenter aux jours du Roi. Dans cette affreuse position, mon amour et mon devoir pour le Roi m'ont fait penser que je devais m'adresser à votre Excellence pour qu'Elle obtint du Roi d'Angleterre une démarche dont j'attendrais autant que de la force des armées pour contenir les rebelles et leurs forfaits, et je fais M. l'Evêque de Pamiers, associé à mon travail, porteur de cette lettre pour votre Excellence. Je vous prie de lui accorder croyance et confiance entière sur tout ce qu'il pourra vous dire. Je le charge de vous demander ardemment de proposer à Sa Majesté Britannique de vouloir se montrer assez l'ami du Roi et de la famille Royale, pour ordonner à son ambassadeur de déclarer au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, que si on attentait à la vie du Roi, de la Reine, ou de M. le Dauphin, les scélérats seraient poursuivis par sa vengeance. Je suis persuadé que ce prononcé de l'amitié du Roi d'Angleterre arrêterait tous les crimes dont nos factieux se montrent capables. Vous jugez de l'obligation de la France pour un aussi grand service, et je me contente de la présenter à votre ame. Jamais deux nations rivales sans cesse de s'estimer et de s'honorer n'auront été réunies par une action dont la vertu soit aussi égale à l'éclat. Jamais votre Ministère n'aura pu donner un plus bel exemple au monde politique. Toujours je croirai le mien honoré de n'avoir pas hésité à mettre cette confiance sans mesure dans la grande ame du Roi d'Angleterre et dans les principes de son Ministre. Je ne crois pas en conjurant Sa Majesté Britannique de venir au secours du Roi par une démarche de son cœur, que je puisse paraître vouloir atténuer le système de neutralité que Sa Majesté a cru devoir adopter dans les troubles de la France, et je me flatte que votre Excellence en jugera ainsi. Je la prie, si elle est favorable à mes instances auprès du Roi d'Angleterre, de vouloir bien ne pas différer de les faire connaître à Sa Majesté pour que le bien que le Roi peut recevoir de son amitié arrive avant les scélérates actions. Je me sens bien soulagé en faisant mes très humbles prières à Sa Majesté Britannique, et en les remettant, pour qu'elles lui arrivent, entre les mains d'un ministre qui a fixé également l'estime et les regards de l'Europe avant l'âge qui permet ordinairement de les rechercher."

*Copy. French.*

LE BARON DE BRETEUIL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 8, Brussels.—"Votre ministère et la reputation de vos talens ainsi que de vos vertus me suffisent pour me donner la confiance de m'adresser à votre Excellence dans la circonstance la plus majeure et la plus importante pour le Roi comme pour son royaume. M. Pitt à qui j'adresse les documens qui m'autorisent à vous prier, l'un et l'autre, de vouloir bien m'écrire sur les grands intérêts qui me sont confiés, voudra bien sans doute vous faire part de ma position ; et je me flatte, qu'ainsi que M. Pitt, vous m'accorderez assez d'estime pour croire à la vérité du titre avec lequel je me présente, et avec lequel je vous prie de me permettre de vous présenter le porteur de cette lettre, M. l'Evêque de Pamiers, associé à mon travail depuis que le Roi a bien voulu me remettre la conduite de toutes ses affaires, pendant qu'il n'a pas la possibilité de les diriger directement. Je vous prie de vouloir bien accorder audience et croyance à M. l'Evêque de Pamiers sur tout ce qu'il pourra vous dire. Je le charge de vous exposer les dangers du Roi, et de vous engager de concourir à déterminer le Roi d'Angleterre à couvrir Sa Majesté de l'égide de son amitié la plus prononcée, en faisant entendre aux factieux Français tous les ressentiments de Sa Majesté Britannique, si le Roi, la Reine

ou M. le Dauphin se trouvaient victimes des forfaits de ces scélérats, comme tout indique que tels sont leurs horribles projets. L'Evêque de Pamiers dira à votre Excellence combien le temps presse. Si Sa Majesté Britannique croit pouvoir faire tenir à nos factieux le langage imposant que je sollicite de son amitié pour le Roi, je serai ravi que Sa Majesté contracte la plus vive reconnaissance pour Sa Majesté Britannique et pour la personne de son Ministre, qui réunit l'opinion de l'Europe à celle de ses compatriotes. J'éprouve une double en m'adressant à votre Excellence pour la plus grande, pour la plus juste cause que les annales du monde aient jamais présentée, parceque je sais que je la sou mets aux vertus publiques et particulières que la réputation de Votre Excellence m'a appris lui appartenir également."

*Copy. French.*

*Enclosure.*

Copie du Plein Pouvoir donné par le Roi au Baron de Breteuil, le 20 Novembre 1790.

M. CHAUVELIN to HENRY DUNDAS.

1792, August 16, Portman Square.—"M. Chauvelin a l'honneur d'offrir ses complimens à Monsieur Dundas, et conformément à ce que lui a dit Lord Grenville au moment où il a quitté Londres, il a l'honneur de lui faire passer la nôte ci-jointe."

*Copy. French.*

*Enclosure.*

M. CHAUVELIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, ce 16 Août, Portman Square, l'an 4 de la Liberté Française.—"Le soussigné Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français, informé par diverses lettres particulières et par les papiers publics, des événements criminels et désastreux qui ont eu lieu à Paris dès le vendredi 10 du courant, doit à la Nation Française et au Roi qu'il a l'honneur de représenter, de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Britannique ce qui dans les circonstances actuelles lui paraît le plus digne de sa considération.

"La liberté de l'Assemblée Nationale vient d'être violée; des furieux qui ont égaré la multitude, convaincus par des faits récents et notoires que la grande majorité des Représentans de la Nation repoussait leurs coupables desseins, ont attenté à la sûreté de plusieurs d'entre eux. Après avoir déstitué les Magistrats du peuple, nommés par lui dans sa plus entière liberté, ils ont attaqué à main armée l'asile inviolable du Roi, ils l'ont réduit ainsi que Sa famille à chercher un refuge dans le sein de l'Assemblée Nationale; et au milieu des terreurs et du carnage, au bruit du canon, à la lueur de l'incendie du Chateau des Tuilleries, ils ont arraché au petit nombre des Représentans de la Nation à qui ils avaient permis de se rassembler, la suspension du pouvoir royal, l'emprisonnement du Roi et de Sa famille, et autres actes également contraires aux articles fondamentaux de la constitution que l'Assemblée Nationale a jurée avec tous les Français.

"L'Assemblée voyant sa propre liberté violée, a tenté de conserver celle de la Nation par un appel solennel qu'elle lui adresse en décrétant une Convention Nationale; mais les clauses mêmes qu'elle a jointes à cet acte conservatoire prouvent toujours plus à quel point elle était subjuguée par la crainte de provoquer de nouveaux crimes, en irritant les rebelles.

“ Dans ces tristes conjonctures, le Soussigné croirait manquer à ses devoirs les plus sacrés, s'il ne se hâtait de réclamer en faveur de la Nation et du Roi dont les intérêts lui ont été légalement confiés, les effets de cette sensibilité généreuse et de cette amitié dont Sa Majesté Britannique lui a donné en diverses occasions les touchantes assurances.

“ Convaincu que les malheurs actuels de la France et du Roi sont principalement dus à cette ligue qui s'est formée entre divers Princes de l'Europe contre l'indépendance et la liberté de la Nation; allarmé des désordres et des crimes qui peuvent encore désoler la France, si ces puissances persévèrent dans des mesures oppressives; persuadé que la Nation seule, rendue à elle-même et à ses propres forces, peut venger dignement de tel attentats et rétablir l'ordre sans altérer la liberté; le Soussigné, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi des Français, et en vertu des instructions et des pleins pouvoirs qu'il en a précédemment reçus pour tout ce qui peut contribuer à l'union et au bonheur des deux empires, vient conjurer Sa Majesté Britannique de déployer en cette occasion toute son influence et, s'il en est besoin, d'agir de concert avec les autres puissances demeurées neutres à l'effet d'empêcher que des armées ennemies n'envahissent le territoire Français, n'y donnent des prétextes à de nouvelles fureurs, ne compromettent encore d'avantage la liberté, la sûreté, et l'existence du Roi et de Sa famille, et ne consomment ainsi les malheurs qu'ont amenés leurs Déclarations incendiaires, et enfin à l'effet d'inspirer à la Nation, si indignement outragée, le courage nécessaire pour se réunir, pour faire justice des forfaits commis en son nom, et pour ramener incessamment au milieu d'elle, le règne des loix et le respect dû aux autorités constituées.”

*Copy. French.*

#### MINUTE of Mr. DUNDAS.

Mr. Aust will not allow any copies of the paper delivered this day by M. Chauvelin to get out of the office, and will inform (by circulating this note) His Majesty's confidential servants who attended the Cabinet this day, that M. Chauvelin having, in the most earnest manner, requested the paper to be returned to him, Mr. Dundas after consulting with Mr. Pitt, thought the reasons stated impossible to be resisted.

Mr. Aust will send a copy of this note to Lord Grenville, as Mr. Dundas mentioned it this day in a letter to him.

*Endorsed.*

“ Copy of instruction from Mr. Secretary Dundas to Mr. Aust, after his conference with M. Chauvelin at 6 p.m., August 17, 1792.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GOWER.

Private.

1792, August 17, London.—“ Along with this you will receive an official dispatch, in consequence of which you will leave Paris as soon as convenient. Your residence there at present cannot be a pleasant one, and the present state of the Government supercedes all your official powers. You will observe that the official dispatch is prepared in such a way as to relieve you from the difficulties of any very formal communication of his Majesty's feelings as to the present state of the Royal Family; for the best way of performing that duty will be by giving a copy of the dispatch (at the same time you ask your passports) as the most authentic explanation of the grounds of your leaving Paris, and the least formal way of expressing the sensation which any outrage

to the Royal Family would naturally excite. It does not occur that I have anything more to trouble you with."

*Copy.*

J. W. MILES to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 18, Cleveland Row.—"It may be proper perhaps to inform Lord Grenville of the character of the man who is become Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in France. His name is Le Brun. He was originally a private soldier. He deserted from his regiment, and left his country. After an absence of several years he returned, and, in conjunction with another, complimented the late Monsieur de Vergennes for his interposition in favour of the Americans; for which compliment he was, with his associate, conducted to the frontier of the kingdom and forbid to return. He went to Liege, and set up a paper called *Le Journal Général et Politique de l'Europe*. His indirect attacks on the clergy, and abuse of the Empress of Russia, occasioned complaints to be made by the latter; and he was ordered to submit his manuscripts in future to a Licensor, or to quit the territory. He moved to Herf, *pays de Limburgh Autrichien*, and commenced under the auspices of Monsieur de Ste. Croix, the French Envoy at Liege, a regular attack on the English Funds, with a view of obtaining his pardon from the French Court. The favourable part of his history had been told to me in the year 1786, and not being so well acquainted with the *arcana* politics and with mankind as I am at present, I attributed his gross misrepresentation of our Funds, and his libels on the public faith of my country, as the effects of ignorance, and from patriotism undertook to *undeceive* him. My information arriving at the time that he suspected M. de Ste. Croix was playing him foul, and *qu'il fut joué par le Ministre à Paris*, from whom he found he had nothing to expect, he answered my letter, and was afterwards very modest, and finally silent on the subject of our finances. He even came round and approved of them. *Le croyant de bonne foi*, and not being at that time instructed with his relation with M. de Ste. Croix, I considered him as a candid, honest, and oppressed man. In 1787, the States of Brabant issued an order for seizing his person, and he had only half an hour's notice to make his escape. He fled to Vienna, with only a crown in his pocket, to claim the protection of the Emperor. The *Bourquestre* Fabry told me his distress, and thinking I had made him friendly to this country, and knowing the influence of the public prints on the minds of the people abroad, I sent him twenty *louis* by a bill of exchange on Ratisbon, to enable him to pursue his journey, and with the view, I confess, of attaching him by gratitude to defend the interests of my country. The Emperor received him, ordered him to return, and promised his protection, which was all the recompense he had. At this time public report gave out that our Court, by its intrigues at Constantinople, had seduced the Porte to declare war against Russia, and the *Journal Politique* echoed the report. I wrote to Le Brun that he was mistaken, reasoned with him by letter, for I had never seen him, and convinced him of the falsehood of the slander. He contradicted what he had inserted, and rejected for some time all letters on the contrary side. Lord Torrington, I afterwards found, had recommended him to the Duke of Leeds to allow him something; and this by some means was communicated to Le Brun who, counting upon the success of the application, was the more hurt at not finding his hopes realised, and soon revived the Russian business, and never ceased to abuse Mr. Pitt and the English Government. Being ignorant of



the cause I became incensed, and expressed my sentiments in pretty strong terms. He pretended to apologise, declared he had been deceived by the Government of Bruxelles, acknowledged his regret, and begged I would assist him with eighteen *louis* as he was in the utmost distress; which I declined. He then sent the Marquis de Langle from Herf to Bruxelles to trick me out of twenty. His attack on the Emperor in 1789 compelled him to fly to Liege, which the abdication of the late Bishop had left open to him. On the shameful flight of Dalton he returned to Herf, from whence he was again driven by Van Ensen and Vandernoot, and Liege was no longer an asylum to him when the Austrians entered to execute the Imperial decree. He then came to Paris, but, previous to his departure from the Low Countries, made an offer of his pen to the Government of Bruxelles, to whom he was the less obnoxious for having abused Van Ensen.

"A negotiation was opened, but his terms were considered as too extravagant, and being admitted into the Jacobin club at Paris where I saw him, he proposed setting up a paper in France, and actually published a prospectus, when he saw that by cabal and intrigue he might get into office. This is the short history of a man whose life was fully detailed to me in France, and which is marked by all that is atrocious and mean. *Le Garde de Sceau*, Danton, is also a terrible fellow, and such are the men to whom France is confided."

#### EDMUND BURKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, August 18, Beconsfield.—"I do not know whether I can perfectly justify myself in venturing to trouble your Lordship, in my imperfect state of knowledge, with any suggestion of mine; but I trust that, however weak you may find my notions, you will believe that they are formed with general good intentions, and that they are laid before you with all possible respect to yourself and to your colleagues, and with real good wishes for whatever may contribute to your reputation in the conduct of the King's business.

"The late shocking though long expected event at Paris has rendered, in my opinion, every step that shall be taken with regard to France at this conjuncture extremely delicate.

"The part of a neutral Power is in itself delicate, but particularly so in a case in which it is impossible to suppose that, in this neutrality, there should not be some lurking wish in favour of one of the parties in the contest. The conduct of such a Power will be looked up to with hope and fear during the contention. Every thing which such a power says or does will be construed by an application to the circumstances.

"The present circumstances are an attack upon the King of France's palace; the murder of all who were found in it; the imprisonment of the King; his suspension, stated by the faction itself as a deposition; acts of violence which have obliged the majority of the National Assembly to absent themselves from their functions. Add to these the intention, not in the least ambiguous, of bringing the King and Queen to a trial; and by many, of putting them to death, with or without that formality. The effect of these things, from their very nature, and the nature of men, as well as from the principle on which they are done, at a time when theories are rashly formed and rapidly pass from speculation into practice, and when ill examples, at all times apt to infect, are so unusually contagious, it is unnecessary for me to state to one of your Lordship's sagacity and penetration.

"This last revolution, whatever name it may assume, at present bears no one character of a national act. It is the act only of some desperate persons, instigating and hiring at an enormous expense the lowest of the people, inhabitants of one city only, to destroy the monarch and monarchy, with whatever else is respectable in society. Not one officer of the national guards of Paris, which officers are composed of nothing higher than good tradesmen, has appeared in this business. It is not yet adopted throughout France by any one class of people. No regular government of any country has yet an object with which they can decently treat in France, or to which they can rationally make any official declaration whatsoever.

"In such a state of things to address the present heads of the insurrection, put by them[selves] into the nominal administrative departments of state office, is to give a direct sanction to their authority on the part of the Court of Great Britain. To this time the King of France's name has appeared to every public act and instrument; and all office transactions to our Court, and to every other foreign Court, have appeared in their usual form. If we pleased it was in our power to shut our eyes as to everything else, but this is now no longer possible. I should therefore beg leave to submit it to consideration, whether to recognise the leaders in the late murderous insurrection as the actual Government of France is not, at best, a little premature. Perhaps it may be a doubt, as a matter of sound policy, whether more would not be lost by this hasty recognition on the side of the great, settled, and acknowledged Powers, than we can hope to gain by pressing to pay our court to this, at best, unformed and embryo potentate.

"I take it for granted that it will not be easy for Lord Gower to continue in his present situation. If it were even thought for the dignity of this Crown, no man of honour and spirit would submit to it. It is a sacrifice too great to be made of all generous and noble feeling. I should humbly propose it for consideration whether, on his retreat, great reserve ought not to be used with regard to any declaration. If any person standing in the place of a Minister should apply to him for an explanation, he ought, in my poor opinion, to be absolutely silent; but if that should not be the best course, he might say that he had leave to return on his private affairs. The King of Spain has no Minister at Paris, yet his neutrality has hitherto been complete. The neutrality of this Court has already been more than once declared. At *this moment* any over prompt and affected new declaration on that subject, made to the persons who have lately vaulted into the seat of government, after committing so many atrocious acts and threatening more, would have all the force and effect of a declaration in their favour. Although it should be covered with mollifying expressions with regard to the King's personal safety (which will be considered as nothing but a sacrifice to decorum and ceremony, and as mere words of course) it will appear to the Jacobin faction as a direct recommendation to their meditated act of regicide; knowing, as the world does, their dispositions, their menaces, their preparations, and the whole train of the existing circumstances. In that case to say, 'I hope you mean no ill, and I recommend it to you to do no ill, but do what you please, you have nothing to fear from me,' would be plainly to call upon them to proceed to any lengths their wickedness might carry them.

"It is a great doubt with me whether a declaration to this new Power, a creature almost literally of yesterday, and a creature of treasonable and murderous riot of the lowest people in one city, is not a substantial breach of the neutrality promised to the Power to whom originally the neutrality was assured on the interposition of foreign Powers, namely

to the Most Christian King. To take the first opportunity with the most extraordinary haste to remove all fears from the minds of his assassins, is tantamount to taking a part against him. Much I fear that, though if such a declaration were made nothing could be more remote from the intention of this Court, if the act of atrocity apprehended should actually take place, we shall be considered as ready accomplices in it, and a sort of accessories before the fact; particularly when no declaration on the part of our Court has been yet called for by the new Power, and that as yet they have no Minister at this Court. If the step of the recall of our Minister, supposing such a step in contemplation, should produce any fears in them, I see no use in removing those fears. On our part the navy of France is not so formidable that I think we have any just ground of apprehension that she will make war upon us. It is not the enmity but the friendship of France that is truly terrible. Her intercourse, her example, the spread of her doctrines are the most dreadful of her arms.

"I do not see what a nation loses in reputation or in safety by keeping its conduct in its own power. I think such a state of freedom in the use of a moral and politic reserve in such unheard of circumstances, can be well justified to any Sovereign abroad or to any party or person at home. I perceive that much pains are taken by the Jacobins of England to propagate a notion, that States have not a right to interfere, according to their discretion, in the interior affairs of another. This strange notion can be only supported by a confusion of ideas, and not distinguishing the case of promoting rebellion and sedition in a neighbouring country, and taking a part in the divisions of a country when they prevail and are actually formed. In the first case there is undoubtedly more difficulty than in the second, in which there is clearly no difficulty at all. To interfere in such dissensions requires great prudence and circumspection, and a serious attention to justice, and to the policy of one's own country as well as to that of Europe. But an abstract principle of public law forbidding such interference, is not supported by the reason of that law, nor by the authorities on the subject, nor by the practice of this kingdom, or by that of any civilized nation in the world. This nation owes its laws and liberties, his Majesty owes the throne on which he sits, to the contrary principle. The several treaties of guarantee to the Protestant Succession more than once reclaimed, affirm the principle of interference, which in a manner forms the basis of the public law of Europe. A more mischievous idea cannot exist, than that any degree of wickedness, and violence, and oppression may exist in a country; that the most abominable, exterminatory, and murderous rebellions may rage in it; or the most atrocious and bloody tyranny may domineer, and that no neighbouring power can take cognizance of either, or offer succour to the miserable sufferers.

"I trust your Lordship will have the goodness to excuse the freedom taken by an old member of Parliament. The habits of the House of Commons teach a liberty perhaps improper with regard to office. But be assured there is nothing in mine that has the smallest mixture of hostility; and it will, I trust, appear that my motives are candid and friendly, if ever this affair should come into discussion in the House of Commons, and I should feel myself called on to deliver my opinion. If I were, as formerly I have been, in systematic opposition (most assuredly I am not so now) I had much rather, according to my practice in more instances than one, respectfully to state a doubt to Ministers whilst a measure is depending, than to reproach them afterwards with its consequences in my place. What I write will, I hope, at worst be

thought the intrusion of an importunate friend. I am thoroughly convinced that the faction of English Jacobins, though a little under a cloud for the present, is neither destroyed nor disheartened. The fire is still alive under the ashes; every encouragement, direct or indirect, given to their brethren in France, stirs and animates the embers. So sure as we have an existence, if these things should go on in France, as go on they may, so sure it is that, in the ripeness of their time, the same tragedies will be acted in England. Carra and Condorcet, and Santerre, and Pétion, and their brethren, the Priestleys, the Coopers, and the Watts, the deputies of a body of the Dissenters and others at Manchester who embraced Carra in the midst of the Jacobin club, the Revolution Society that received Pétion in London, the whole race of the *affiliated* who are numerous and powerful, whose principles, dispositions, and wishes are the very same, are as closely connected as ever; and they do not fail to mark and use everything that shows a remissness, or any equivocal appearance in Government, to their own advantage. I conceive that the Duke of Brunswick is as much fighting the battle of the Crown of England as the Duke of Cumberland did at Culloden. I conceive that any unnecessary declarations on our part will be, to him, and to those who are disposed to put a bound to this empire of anarchy and assassination, a signal discouragement. The cause of my dread, and perhaps over officious anxiety at this time, has arisen from what (you will have the goodness to pardon me) I thought rather too much readiness to declare on other occasions. Perhaps I talk of a thing not at all in contemplation. I have never heard that it was. If no thoughts of the kind have been entertained, your Lordship will be pleased to consider this as waste paper. It is at any rate but an hint to yourself and requires no answer."

#### EDMUND BURKE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 19, Bath.—"I am to acknowledge with my best thanks the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 6th instant. I ought to be the more sensible of this mark of your polite attention, because in submitting to your Lordship's judgment my weak and crude sentiments upon an important subject, I did not desire or expect an answer. The fact is (and I am afraid it is but too visible) I wrote the letter in some haste, and under some agitation, the effect of the extraordinary events of the 10th of August, which made, though far from unexpected, as they and their consequences do still make, no slight impression upon my mind. But recollecting, that there was little in what I then wrote which I had not suggested before in a discussion of the probable effect of the French Revolution upon the whole of Europe, written at the close of the year 1791; that this paper had been communicated to your Lordship, and that it did not meet your ideas, I resolved not to send my letter. It lay by me, until on some conversation in a meeting merely accidental with our common friend Mr. King, I showed to him what I had hastily thrown down on what, I thought, a most melancholy state of things. He seemed rather to wish it to be communicated to your Lordship, and so I sent it, as I recollect, without even the formality of a direction.

"I knew very well the determination of this Court with regard to the neutrality. But I humbly conceived that, even on that determination, the declaration had been made sufficiently; and that, under the circumstances, a frequent and affected renewal of the same assurance might be considered, by the regicide faction in France, as amounting to an encouragement to proceed to the final execution of its designs

on their unhappy prisoner; as well as to continue to affront His Majesty our Sovereign, by never referring to him, but to the English nation as a body separate and distinct, and, in its intercourse with foreign Powers, not fully represented by the Crown. This, since the removal of Lord Gower, they have done.

“Our object, as your Lordship very truly observes, is the same; namely the prevention of the prevalence of these principles in this country. But it is my misfortune that I have very different ideas on the mode of compassing our common end. I am very ready to allow that I ought to entertain them with the greatest diffidence myself, and that they ought to have the less comparative weight with others, that I am not officially responsible for their effects.

“Whatever weight they may have, most certainly the object of them, the French business, is no light or trivial thing, or such as commonly has occurred in the course of political events. At present the whole political state of Europe hinges upon it. On the *Continent*, there is little doubt, every thing will take its future shape and colour from the good or ill success of the Duke of Brunswick. In my opinion, it is the most important crisis that ever existed in the world. I know it is the opinion of His Majesty’s Ministers that the new principles may be encouraged, and even triumph over every interior and exterior resistance, and may even overturn other States as they have that of France, without any sort of danger of their extending in their consequences to this kingdom. My poor opinion is that these principles, considering their *quality* and the *means* by which they are supported, cannot possibly be realised in practice in France, without an *absolute certainty*, and that at no remote period, of overturning the whole fabric of the British constitution. On that head, however, I do not mean to trouble your Lordship any further. My sense of a very urgent, certainly a most unpleasant duty, may lead me, if I can obtain an hearing, to a full explanation of my sentiments in my place. I do not expect the good fortune of the coincidence of any of the King’s Ministers. But if I may seem (a thing which I assure you gives me an heartfelt concern) to differ with them, they will be amply indemnified by the support of many, and some of those men of the most brilliant abilities in the House, and in the kingdom.”

#### GENERAL MONEY to CAPTAIN GORDON.

##### *Extract.*

1792, September 19, Camp Coté-bien, near St. Ménéhould.—“In my last I informed you of the positions taken by General Dumourier and General Kellerman to prevent the enemy penetrating, and that my position is in the gorge of the mountains at a very important pass, which I apprehend from the manœuvres of King of Prussia must soon be evacuated. I also informed you I had given in my resignation, and which has been refused to be received.

“I think it a duty I owe myself that my friends should know it; I think it a duty I owe the public that through you [they should have] authentic accounts of the most important events that attend this army.

“General Dumourier has been obliged to retire from his position at Grand-pré. He had taken a very advantage post between two woods; he had advanced General Chauzaud to another pass still more on his left; but there was a small gorge in the mountain which was thought of little consequence; the enemy penetrated these the 15th. General Chauzaud returned and attacked the head of the column of the enemy, and they fell back in some disorder. The Prince de Ligne who commanded the enemy was killed, and his two aides-de-camp. In a few

hours after, the enemy returned in great force and obliged the French to retire. The next day the enemy appeared on the left flank of General Dumourier, he immediately ordered his tents to be struck and began his march to join us. Unfortunately the baggage of his army took a route never meant for them, in consequence of which a great deal of baggage was lost; I believe all that belonged to the Generals, but not the military chest. Our hussars, it is said, behaved exceedingly well, twenty-three in one regiment were killed or taken. The 12th regiment of cavalry behaved ill; the National Guards behaved ill also, as they threw themselves into the woods without availing themselves of the advantage they had in being there. Two pieces of cannon only were lost. Had Dumourier been hard pressed he would have lost all his artillery, but it arrived safe near St. Ménéhould on the 17th. He has taken another position, and is joined by General Kellerman and 11,000 men from the frontiers of Flanders. The army now consists of 60,000 men, they say more; on this ground they mean to risk a battle, which I think will be fatal to them, though we have 10,000 cavalry which will certainly contribute to prevent a total defeat. I think this afternoon or to-morrow they will be obliged to fight or quit their position, then of course I must quit mine. I have issued the order of retreat. I expect from my situation to lose not only my baggage but all my artillery. I have, however, taken every precaution in my power to save both. On the 18th the enemy cannonaded my post for near two hours, and threw a number of shells amongst us; the men behaved exceedingly well and stood to their post, though shot and shells were continually dropping amongst them. The enemy, on my sending some men into the woods on the right beyond my *abbatis*, retired; very few men were killed on either side. I expect them again the moment the Prussians attack Dumourier.

"This is our present situation. I shall write to you again after the action, which I hope Dumourier will act with more prudence than to risk, for, if he retires before the enemy, they never dare to penetrate into the country and leave so formidable a force in their rear. We have eat up everything the country affords. The Prussians are obliged to take the cows of the poor peasants for the subsistence of their army, and their light troops live by plunder. The inhabitants are in the most distressed situation it is possible to conceive, particularly those who are between the two armies."

#### GENERAL MONEY to GENERAL RAINSFORD.

1792, September 20, Camp Coté-bien, near St. Ménéhould.—"I still command here. It is now the right flank of General Dumourier's army; the enemy are in considerable force opposite, but I think they will not risk a serious attack *on this post*. I have only 5,000 men, as the pass is so very strong by nature and art that even that number is not necessary to defend it; but our engineers, like all others, have erected so many works that we must occupy in our front, that we cannot *dégarnir* the post more than it has been. I had a warm cannonade the 17th, which lasted near two hours. I hear the cannon on my left whilst I am writing, about five miles off at Vienne de Chateau; the Prussians are advancing to attack our grand army which, I understand, amount to near 70,000 men, most of them troops of the line. We have 15,000 cavalry. Notwithstanding this great army, I think we shall be beat. It rains very fast and that is in our favour, as the ground over the plains and corn fields is soft, and the enemies horses are in bad condition; and

they are in great want of bread, insomuch that their light troops and advanced corps live by plunder. I am in a critical situation. The right of Dumourier's army is about two miles from St. Ménéhould; I must retreat if he is beat, which cannot be done by St. Ménéhould. I am five miles from it, and by the time I arrive there the enemy will be in possession. I have a road through the woods which is in a bad condition."

"September 21.--Whilst I was writing yesterday an attack was made on my post in consequence of the grand armies being engaged. The left of Dumourier's has given way considerable, insomuch that our communication with Chalons is cut. Dumourier is marching by his left to secure our communication. The business of yesterday was only a heavy cannonade on our right; the left was only amused, while the enemy pressed the right. This has had so far the desired effect. We must certainly prevent the enemy from turning our left flank or retire to Vitry; the latter is by far the measure we ought to adopt. The enemy have two objects in view, to fight us on advantageous terms, or oblige us to retire and quit this pass which will open his communication by a short rout to Verdun. The attack on my post did not last above an hour. General Dillon was at dinner with me; we went down and ordered two eight pounders out of the retrenchment, for their howitzers were out of reach of our guns. We advanced under the cover [of] a rising piece of ground, and drove them back in great disorder into Clermont. I expect them every minute to come, as we attacked last night their grand guard. Our men behaved shameful. We had 2,000 men, and as soon as the firing began in the front, those in the rear dispersed, and the greater part have been wandering all night in the wood, and a terrible bad night it has been. Maréchal Luckner is or was at Chalons when the Marseillais arrived. They began their freaks by cutting off the head of a man apprehended as a spy. The line of the Maréchal was menaced; he and Dillon are both announced by one of the party writers of Paris as traitors to the cause. If the Marseillais put the Maréchal to death the army will not leave a man of them alive; if they come here, they are held in the most sovereign contempt by the troops of the line. I have the pleasure to say I am on the best terms possible with the national guards as well as with the troops of the line. I will do my duty while I am with them, which shall be no longer than the campaign lasts, which I apprehend will not be before Christmas. I hope to get my Christmas dinner with you yet. When you come to town, write to my sister for game. I have ordered all my game to be destroyed except my pheasants.

"I shall only add that I expect to lose all my cannon and camp equipage whenever we quit this post. We must retreat by the forest towards Vitry. I have taken every precaution possible; the roads are repaired, and I have 200 workmen with hatchets to cut the trees in our rear. But if we get out of the forest we are not sure we shall meet our friends on the other side. 'To be or not to be' is the question now. Dillon is very brave and understands combination well, but he has wild ideas, and he is indiscreet in the extreme in speaking his mind too freely on public affairs. I should not be surprised to hear he is put in arrest, which is tantamount to a death warrant. I shall conclude till to-morrow.

September 23.--"Yesterday passed without a shot being fired on either side. The King of Prussia has cut our communication by the great road to Chalon. I went last night to St. Ménéhould. I went on purpose to give my opinion to Dumourier. I found General Kellerman with him. I told them from the situation of the two armies

we ought to retire immediately towards Vitry, that I was certain the enemy dare not march towards Paris and leave 70,000 in rear. I have the pleasure to find both of them not to differ in opinion with me, and I expected this morning at daylight orders to strike our tents and be prepared to march in a moment's warning. But an extraordinary event has taken place which may be attended with consequence of the greatest importance to these unhappy and miserable people. The King of Prussia has sent to demand a conference between Dumourier and one of his generals between the two armies. I leave you in England to form your conjectures of what may be result of this conference. The enemy are certainly in great distress for want of bread and forage, and we shall be in the same situation in a few days. I have never varied in my opinion a moment; we have no business to fight the Prussians; we must retire before them, not on the rout to Paris, that would be the greatest folly in the world. They would be masters of all the country in their rear. Now they can only forage on their left flank. If we risk a battle we must be beat, but this I have said before. The generals seem sensible of it themselves. I am inclined to think the enemy have a deep finesse in this conference; it is to gain time to bring all their force from Verdun in rear of our right flank. Monsieur and Le Comte D'Artois is with the King of Prussia; a large body of the emigrants and the Hessians are opposite me; there is little desertion on either side. I shall write to you again soon and let you know the result of this conference."

#### GENERAL MONEY to GENERAL RAINSFORD.

1792, September 24, Camp Coté-bien, near St. Ménéhould.—"The conference which I mentioned in my last, held between the two armies with Monsieur Manstein, a Prussian General, and Dumourier yesterday, was this day renewed. The subject of this conference is a profound secret; some say the Prussians have desired a cessation of arms for six months, and that it has been refused; others say that propositions are made for the return of the emigrants. This, however, is certain that the enemy are in a bad situation. The country in their rear furnishes no forage or provisions of any kind; they must either risk a battle in a day or two or retire. It is said they are near 60,000, but we are augmented to near 100,000 with those arrived at Chalons, most of them troops of the line. The enemy are formed *en potence*; a part of their army face General Kellerman, the other Dumourier; their cavalry on their right flank, ours on our left. They thought by gaining the grand *chaussée* to Chalons we should be obliged to retire, and open their communication by a short route to Verdun. I must confess I thought we could not have remained twenty-four hours here; but I understand our position is strong, that we have now in our camp, pointed on the direction the enemy must take, eighty-three pieces of cannon, eight and twelve pounders, besides near four hundred pieces of four pounders battalion guns. Our communication is not cut to Chalons; we had five hundred waggons loaded with bread yesterday from thence. We have a friendly country behind us, they a pillaged and enraged peasantry.

"This is the present situation of the two armies. I leave you to form your conjectures on the probability of events. It rains very fast, which is much against the enemy whether they advance or retreat, as the ground is soft and slippery.



"The enemy opposite me have been very quiet these two days; we have neither annoyed them or they us. They are fortifying the gorge opposite me, which looks as if they feared our penetrating here, if their grand army retire. If the enemy do not risk a battle, which may be fatal to them, they must quit France, and never think of entering it in this direction, as all the gorges of this forest, as well as those beyond Verdun, will be occupied. Probably these people will be left to themselves to cut *each other's throats*.

September 25.—"General Dillon arrived last night from St. Ménéhould to visit the posts. He informed me that he had seen the Prussian General who told him they had been deceived by the emigrants, who had assured them all our cavalry and the troops of the line would have joined their army. It is very true that they hold in abhorrence those assassins who have committed such outrages at Paris and Versailles; but not a man will quit his post to join the enemy; but if the enemy retire it is probable they will have great desertions. The force of the enemy is greatly increased by a body of emigrants.

September 26.—"Not a shot was fired yesterday. The Prussian General was yesterday at St. Ménéhould and dined with Dumourier. I am inclined to think this is a deep finesse of the enemy, and that they meditate an attack on us, when they [we?] are off our guard, and when all their force is assembled. If they direct their whole strength against Dumourier's left flank and separate the two armies, and they succeed, we at this post are lost; at least all our cannon and baggage must be taken, as the heavy rains have made roads through the forest impossible. Or if Dumourier is obliged to retire, I will never believe that an army of 60,000 Prussian and Austrians will retire without risking a battle. I every moment expect to hear it begin, and, of course, this post attack[ed] not [to] force us, [but] to keep us here, and prevent our sending succours to Dumourier."

#### MEMORANDUM BY LORD GRENVILLE ON THE INSURRECTION OF AUGUST 10, AND THE SEPTEMBER MASSACRES, IN PARIS.

1792, September 24.—"M. Talleyrand told me that the Princess de Lamballe had been acquitted by the tribunal which was established at the prisons by the mob. That all the prisoners, whether condemned or acquitted, were obliged to pass through a wicket where two men stood to give the first blow to those who were to be massacred. That, on going out of this wicket, she stepped into the blood of the victims who had preceded her, and being sickened by this, her head (by a convulsion to which she was subject) fell on one side, which made those near her think that she had been struck by one of the men at the door; and that it was in consequence of this that she was immediately pierced through with a pike, and afterwards despatched.

"A. M.—an aide-de-camp of M. de Narbonne, was acquitted by the same tribunal; but they told him that he must not go out yet, because the man who immediately preceded him had been likewise absolved, and the people expected some one upon whom they might satisfy their fury. He insisted that he would not stay unless they would tell him that it was for their safety and not for his that they made the request. They did, and he stayed.

"On the 10th August there were in the palace 2,000 of the national guard, on whom dependence might have been placed. A battalion of this guard whose sentiments were doubtful had been sent away. The

King had reviewed them in the morning, and the national guards appeared as much determined to stand by him if he was attacked, as the Swiss. On the first appearance of the mob the King took fright, when he announced his intention to go to the Assembly. M. de Ste. Croix spoke to him in strong terms, and told him that if he went there, and abandoned the national guards, the Swiss, and the gentlemen who had been three days in the palace to defend him, *il ferait une lâcheté*. He went, but, as he left the palace, told those who were there to defend it. This appeared from that moment to be impossible.

"Before his flight on the 21st June, he had 1,800 of the national guard of Paris in pay."

#### WILLIAM LINDSAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, September 27, Cavendish Square.—"I have this morning seen Sir Robert Smyth who is just returned from Paris; which place he left the 21st instant, after the arrival of the news of Dumourier's defeat, which, he says, did not make so much impression as might have been expected from what he (though a violent democrat) confesses was a great victory on the side of the Prussians. Sir Robert informs me that the first business the Convention intends to enter upon is fully to debate the great question *whether a monarch is necessary to their form of Government*. It is pretty well known which way this matter will be carried; but the Deputies thinking it more prudent to have their decision on so weighty a point sanctioned by the eighty-three Departments, are to ask their advice on the subject before they come to a final determination. They are next to revise and new model the late constitution, lopping off such parts of it as may not appear to coincide with the present state of men's minds. Some reforms are also to be made in the municipalities whose powers have been found too extensive and dangerous. It is expected that an order of the Convention will authorize M. Pétion to continue in his office of Mayor of Paris, notwithstanding his being a Deputy. It is not intended to *murder* any of the Royal Family, and their personal safety is not likely to be endangered except by the momentary caprice of an ungovernable mob. Her Most Christian Majesty has had a return of an old complaint, a swelling in her legs, but she is not dangerously ill. Should the Duke of Brunswick approach too near to Paris the Convention will remove to Tours, and adjourn from place to place as circumstances may require, in the same manner as was practised by the American Congress in the late rebellion.

"Mr. Thomas Payne on his arrival in France was received with great honours; some cannon were fired to salute him, and the municipality waited upon him to congratulate him on his safe landing in a land of freedom.

"As Sir Robert Smyth is, I know, intimately connected with some of the leading Republicans, much of this intelligence is likely to be true, and I hope your Lordship will not think me impertinent for troubling you with it.

"The above person is extremely violent, and will do all the mischief in his power during his stay here. He proposes to return next week; *he says* he is come on private business."

#### GEORGE MUNRO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792, October 1, London.—"I arrived here this morning after a tedious passage; I have therefore but little to communicate, as the

Thursday's mail only left Paris some hours before me. You, of course, have heard that Monsieur Robespierre was denounced in the National Convention for having an intention of aspiring to be dictator. The whole of the Parisian Deputies considered themselves as in some degree involved in this accusation, and many of them separately made their defence. Monsieur Danton in particular spoke much in vindication of himself, and moved that the punishment of death should be inflicted on any one who dared to propose a dictator, or who should propose any division of the French Republic. In this debate of the greatest confusion and heat, Marat, the friend of Robespierre, was violently attacked for his different *affichées*, in one of which he had openly proposed electing a dictator. This man mounted the tribune to defend himself, and, after an odd sort of defence, took a pistol from his pocket, and declared that, had they decreed to accuse him, he would instantly have shot himself.

"On Wednesday morning the *Ministre de la Guerre* gave in his resignation, on a pretence of bad health, an excuse which no one believed.

"I think I told you in my last General Luckner had arrived in Paris. They recalled him on a pretence of asking his advice respecting the mode of defence they ought to adopt in defending the capital; and a member proposed that this should be done in writing, and in German, as the General had once before retracted a conversation he had with a Deputy respecting La Fayette's marching his army to Paris, on a pretence that he must have explained himself wrong, not understanding the French sufficiently. The old man submitted to this insult, and sent his *mémoire* to the Convention; the nature of its contents were of course not made public.

"General Montesquiou's having entered Savoy and taken Montmelian [Montméliart?] had put all classes of people in the greatest spirits, and the National Convention had suspended that General's dismissal till the Deputies that were sent to his camp should make their report of his conduct.

"These are the chief circumstances that had happened in Paris prior to my departure. The minds of the people were much agitated, and it was easy to discover a want of confidence in the whole National Convention rapidly increasing amongst all classes of people. The massacre of one party or other was already talked of, and I daresay will soon take place. They were making no progress in the works about Paris; last time I was there I saw scarce any one working. All along the road they were complaining much of the want and dearness of provisions. I am sure many of the people will soon rise and pillage the magazines, and they seem now only anxious for some settled government, not caring of what kind it may be."

STEPHEN ROLLESTON to GEORGE AUST.

1792, October 19, Dover.—"I have seen a great many private letters from France and Germany within these few days, and have conversed with very well informed gentlemen recently arrived from the Continent, some zealously attached to the cause of one of the contending parties, and some to that of the other, and have endeavoured, to the best of my judgment amidst a great inundation of exaggerated details on both sides of the question, to separate truth from falsehood, and to penetrate, as far as I was able, into the nature of the *secret* negotiation that took place between his Prussian Majesty and the Executive Council in France during the late suspension of arms, which was immediately

followed by the retreat of the Prussian army, under circumstances that appeared to me to be somewhat mysterious. My attention was principally directed to this point by a Declaration of M. Lebrun (the Minister for Foreign Affairs) to the National Convention on the 25th ultimo, which I alluded to in a former letter to you. After taking a review of the private politics of every Court in Europe, this Minister concluded his *Rapport* by throwing out 'that there were negotiations then on foot ' with Foreign Powers, and one in particular upon which the future ' existence of the Republic depended.' He forbore communicating anything further on that head. I forwarded by my servant to Mr. Pitt at Walmer Castle the *Moniteur* of the 26th September which contained that *Rapport*; and took the liberty at the same time of marking the paragraph in question with my pen, in order to direct Mr. Pitt's attention thereto, as I conceived the result of the negotiation alluded to might possibly materially affect the future interests of this country.

"The intelligence which made the greatest impression on my mind, and appeared to be accompanied by the strongest marks of authenticity, was to the following purport:

"That the Executive Council in France are in possession of the originals of some private letters which passed between their most Christian Majesties and the late and present Emperor, relative to an armed interference in the affairs of France on the part of their Imperial and Prussian Majesties, with a view to bring about a counter-revolution in that country. That copies of these letters were sent by the Executive Council to M. Dumourier during the late truce, with instructions to communicate them to his Prussian Majesty, with an offer to show the originals to any person whom the King of Prussia should confidentially authorize to inspect them in Paris; and in the meantime these letters should be kept secret from the Convention. That in some of these papers (written during the time he manifested a disinclination to co-operate with the Emperor in this business) the character and talents of his Prussian Majesty were commented upon, in a manner that could not fail to excite the indignation of the King of Prussia. That M. Dumourier was empowered to follow up any impression which this communication might make on the mind of his Prussian Majesty, by an offer on the part of the French Republic calculated to gratify the ambition of this sovereign, and to humiliate his natural rival. That *the language* which the King of Prussia made use of upon this occasion was exceedingly guarded, and though he did not commit himself in any manner to the Executive Council, yet that *his manner* has given ground to conclude that he has taken their proposition *ad deliberandum*. That his Prussian Majesty intends to keep well with the Emperor, for the present at least, as thereby he will carry two strings to his bow. Upon the one hand, if the present contending factions in the National Convention should again produce general anarchy and unbridled cruelty throughout the country, and that *their* Imperial Majesties should meet the King of Prussia's wishes with regard to the formation of the new government in France, and in respect to other objects in a more distant quarter from hence, he might come forward at the commencement of the next campaign, at the head [of a] far more extended and formidable combination of Powers, and accomplish with greater facility the re-establishment of the royal authority in that country, in a manner the most favourable to the reciprocal interests of these *three* sovereigns; and, upon the other hand, in case the exertions of the National Convention should produce any degree of order in the country, and appear likely to retain the confidence of the nation at large, his Prussian

Majesty will have it in his power perhaps to secure the gratitude and attachment of the bulk of the people, by withdrawing himself from the Emperor, and thereby giving permanency to the present form of government in France, while he avails himself of the proffered boon. It is supposed that his Prussian Majesty will be the more disposed to steer the latter course, provided the internal affairs of France take a turn favourable to the adoption of such a line of conduct towards the commencement of the next campaign, as, in addition to the impression which is supposed to be made by the letters before alluded to, he is said to have a misunderstanding with the Emperor in consequence of his Imperial Majesty's retaining possession of some post (contrary to the remonstrances of the King of Prussia) in the Turkish territories (which is of considerable consequence in the present subjugated state of Poland), and as he does not consider himself fairly dealt with by either of their Imperial Majesties in respect to Dantzic and Thorn.

"I have felt it my duty to state to you, with as much precision as I was able, but with a considerable degree of diffidence, the above particulars, because I conceived that the peace and happiness of this country might possibly be involved in the game now about to be played upon the Continent; and as I heard from authority, which I look upon to be undoubted, that the King of Prussia declared not long since that 'he considered *this country* as completely unconnected with any other Power as she ever was since she became a nation.'"

————— to SIR MORTON EDEN.

1792, October 19, Treves.—"I was prevented from giving you the news of the operations of the inglorious campaign we have made, by not having the smallest communication with any post town, nor indeed with the main body of the army; being always at the advanced guard with the Prussian and Austrian hussars, with whom our regiment was starving in the barren plains of Champagne *pouilleux*.

"The reason of our unexpected and disorderly retreat probably you diplomatic gentlemen can account for; as no military man of either of the three armies with whom I have conversed can form the most distant conjecture of it. Three superior armies in numbers, almost surrounding the undisciplined rabble of Dumourier, and after waiting ten or twelve days till *half the army* perished by famine and disease, retreating as we did.

"I give you the position as near as I remember, and you may judge. The French, desponding and impatient in adversity as they are insolent in prosperity, but ill recompense the King of Prussia for the loss of half his army, and active part he took for them. They openly accuse him and the Duke of Brunswick of either betraying them or, at best, say that the Duke committed numberless faults, in first cannonading without either bombarding or besieging in form Thionville. Secondly, in advancing precipitately into the plains of lousy Champagne, almost as barren as the deserts of Barca, without provisions or communication behind him; and leaving behind him Metz and Thionville, where, if he could not have advanced to Paris, he might have formed a line of communication for the winter; namely, the left of the armies in Metz or Toul, and the right extending to Sedan and Mezières, by Verdun, Stenay, and Montmédy. And lastly, in the council of war on the 28th or 29th, being the only negative for an attack on Dumourier, which Clerfayt offered singly to do, and which, though it would have cost a number of men, particularly in the attack on the Islets which he

neglected to take possession of, and where Arthur Dillon was posted, but certainly must have dispersed and discouraged that army, and prevented their harassing the armies in the manner they have done.

"Far from forming any impertinent remark on the conduct of a General so universally looked up to as the Duke, I wait with impatience for the reasons which I am certain he had, but with surprise and concern have been an eye-witness to the ruin and disorder of so great a part of the finest army in the world; and the ruin and desolation which marked our entrance into France, and which must have estranged from our cause any unfortunate inhabitant (if *such a one there was*) who might have been inclined to us; as not only the villages were pillaged and burnt, the inhabitants deprived not only of their cattle of every kind, hay, and straw, but mostly of their houses; as for the want of fire we were often obliged to burn their barns and the wood of their houses; and even the country layed waste of the only crop which grows in it, rye; so that it must have had the appearance of the Ukraine layed waste by the double scourges of heaven, the locusts and Tartars.

"The sometimes want of even bread, and that which we had being of sour rotten rye, bad water and even that (as happened at a post I was at, at Croix in Champagne) where we were obliged to send a league and a half for it, no brandy, and the war (unexampled in the memory of man) which the heavens declared against us, brought on the dysentery which almost totally destroyed the half of the Prussian army.

"From the 2nd of August but three days without perpetual rain even *till the moment* I am writing, destroyed the horses, so that the whole country was covered with dead horses; and in the retreat between Longuion and Longwy, in the bad roads through which the convoy of the sick passed, I saw, as I passed with the rear-guard, five Prussian soldiers thrown off the waggons, and lying in the mud, *dead and neglected* at the side of the carriages lying also there, and nineteen thrown into a waste barn. The magazines which followed the Austrian army, and indeed I believe the great coats which the infantry have, in a great measure contributed to the mortality not being so great as it was in the Prussian army; and on every occasion they have shown a steadiness, patience, and discipline superior to any other, which I was *once* far from imagining.

"The Princes with their numberless train of domestics, *maison du Roi, maison de Monsieur, maison du Comte D'artois*, generals, cooks, and aides-de-camp without number, remained in Asiatic magnificence behind the armies, consuming the little forage left for useful soldiers. They had always eight thousand cavalry to protect them, and which otherwise were useless. Berching's, Chamborra's, and Lauzun's hussars, with another corps of light cavalry, composing in all about two thousand, formed the advanced guard, and in the retreat we were the rear guard. At first we had Koeller's (Prussian) hussars, and afterwards Esterhazi's (Austrian) hussars, and lastly Wolfrath's Prussian with us, and some small detachments of light infantry. We had perpetual employment, and always in the nights, during which we were always on horseback from twelve till five in the mornings. And even in the retreat we were once in the same village with the enemy, a bridge separating us which they had barricaded, and our regiment had nothing to support us but a company of Clerfayt's and fifty Austrian Tyrolians. The numberless little skirmishes were uninteresting. The first unsuccessful attack of the Prussians cost them a number of men; and the Austrian affair at La Croix near Besancy also, where eight hundred of Clerfayt's regiment

repulsed six thousand and with the loss of only eighty killed and one hundred wounded by grape shot.

"We were three times attacked in our retreat, at the famous camp at Attila, also near where he was defeated, and in a defile near Stenay where we lost some baggage burnt. The numberless blunders our generals committed could not be believed, but the few officers of that rank they had, who had a distant idea of military business, were unemployed. Marshal Broglie is doating and has lost his memory, at any rate has lost his brother to whom, it is said, he owes the reputation he had acquired; and it is lucky for us we had neither experienced generals nor troops against us.

"On the arrival of the army at Arlon the Princes disbanded their numerous household trains and corps of gentlemen who did nothing but *manger et murmurer*, and nothing now remains but the regular regiments who are gone into quarters in the Pays de Havelo. The Princes themselves go to Liege, or Aix-la-Chapelle.

"The situation of the unfortunate disbanded *émigrés* is to be *pitied, though less than any other people*. They are pillaged and robbed by the Prussians, the Prussian by the Hessians, and *both* and *émigrés* by the Austrian light troops; and I believe, on the whole, such a scene of indiscipline and disorder has never been exhibited."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to M. de TALLEYRAND.

1792, December 22, St. James Square.—"Lord Grenville fait bien ses complimens à Monsieur de Talleyrand, et il a l'honneur de lui accuser la reception de son billet, et de l'assurer que ce n'est nullement par manque de considération personnelle qu'il se croit obligé de se refuser le plaisir de voir M. de Talleyrand dans les circonstances actuelles."

*Copy.*

*French.*

#### M. MALOUET to LORD GRENVILLE.

1792 [1793 ?], January 2, London.—"L'évêque d'Autun avait à faire à my lord une proposition de la plus grande importance. M. de Giliers en est instruit, et peut-être l'intermédiaire de cette négociation qui a trait aux plus grands intérêts de ce moment-ci. Je prie, my Lord, d'accorder un rendez-vous à M. de Giliers aujourd'hui; il se présentera chez lui dans la soirée pour savoir sa réponse.

*Ce mercredi matin.* Je désirerais pouvoir écrire par voie sûre à Paris pour avoir les renseignemens les plus positifs sur ce que my lord m'a demandé. S'il a l'occasion d'un courier, je le prie d'avoir la bonté de m'en faire prévenir."

*French.*

#### M. MALOUET to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January, London.—"J'ai différé de répondre à my lord pour consulter M. de Monciel et M. Bertrand qui pouvaient avoir mieux que moi dans la tête la nomenclature des décrets. Nous ne nous rappellons qu'il y en ait eu d'autres relatifs aux étrangers que celui qui supprime le droit d'aubaine, et celui qui détermine les conditions de la naturalisation.

"L'évêque d'Autun est venu me voir hier. Il m'a demandé si j'avais parlé des confidences qu'il m'avait faites. Je lui ai dit que

d'après la permission qu'il m'en avait donné, je m'étais empressé de faire parvenir aux Ministres des informations qui m'avaient paru importantes, et que je lui en avais fait honneur ; que j'avais même espéré qu'il n'en resterait pas là, l'ayant laissé dans l'intention de voir my lord Grenville ; qu'il devoit avoir d'autres détails et de nouveaux renseignemens ; et que puisqu'il était aujourd'hui décrété d'accusation il n'aurait plus rien à ménager.

"Il m'a paru avoir toujours le désir et le projet de négotier. La presence de M. de Gilliers et ensuite du Prince de Poix, qui sont arrivés au milieu de notre conversation, l'ont interrompu. L'Evêque m'avait déjà annoncé qu'il verrait demain my lord Grenville, qu'il faudrât éviter la guerre, la différer ; que la République ne pouvait pas se soutenir plus d'un an, attendu le discrédit très prochain des assignats ; que Dumourier n'attaquerait pas la Hollande ; qu'il négocierait volontiers avec le Ministère Anglais ; que lui, évêque, se chargerait bien de l'y décider ; qu'on sauverait ainsi le Roi, qu'on arrêterait le torrent dévastateur. Mais il a ajouté à ces réflexions d'autres raisonnemens qui m'ont paru bizarres. Il prétend que le Gouvernement Français croit toujours en audace et en prétention ; que Malet a été chargé de rapporter hier à M. Pitt une réponse insolente du Ministre Le Brun ; qu'ils ne craignent point la guerre, qu'ils veulent bien perdre leurs colonies, sûrs de détruire aussi celles des Anglais, et de ruiner leur commerce en se bornant à armer une multitude de corsaires ; que M. Fox, avec qui il a passé hier une partie de la journée, persiste à dire qu'on se gardera bien ici de déclarer la guerre, que cela serait fou, qu'il faut traiter avec la Convention absolument.

"C'est ici où j'ai vu un point de contact entre les opinions de l'Evêque d'Autun et celles de M. Fox. Qu'est-ce que cela signifie, il mettra peut-être my lord dans le cas de le deviner. Il ne demande pas mieux que de causer, et en lui faisant entrevoir la possibilité d'une correspondance avec Du Mourier, on lui fera dire ce qu'il sait et ce qu'il veut."

*French.*

#### M. MALOUE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 10, London.—"Je m'empresse de prévenir my lord que deux mulâtres Français, auteurs de la révolte et des désastres de St. Dominique, sont arrivés à Londres dans le dessein de passer à la Jamaïque. Leurs noms sont Raimond et François ; ils ont été rencontrés hier par un habitant de St. Dominique qui est venu m'en avertir, en attendant qu'on puisse avoir leur signalement, et connaître leur logement, leur correspondant, et toutes leurs habitudes à Londres. Je crois qu'il importe à la sûreté de toutes les colonies Anglaises d'en interdire l'entrée à tout mulâtre ou négre libre Français soit qu'il arrive d'Europe ou des colonies Françaises. Raimond et François qui m'ont été dénoncés, sont les associés de Brissot et de Grégoire, et ont dirigé la première insurrection des mulâtres à St. Dominique et ensuite la révolte des négres. L'arrestation de ces deux hommes ici ou à la Jamaïque serait d'un grand intérêt pour les colonies Anglaises et Françaises."

*French.*

#### COUNT LALLY-TOLENDAL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 24, Richmond.—"Je dois, quelque pénible que soit un tel effort, m'arracher une minute à l'unique pensée qui m'obsède,



pour donner un avis essentiel au Gouvernement. Il ne peut trop se mettre en garde contre la passion des différents partis qui cherchent à le rendre l'instrument de leurs ressentiments personnels, justes ou injustes, dans l'exécution de l'*Alien Bill*. Entre diverses personnes, dont je regarderai comme un devoir de me porter la caution, je citerai dès aujourd'hui, la fille de M. Necker, l'ambassadrice des Suèdes, que j'ai vu pleurer amèrement le malheur qui nous opprime tous, qui a fui avec horreur la terre coupable d'un si grand forfait, qui vient ici s'ensevelir pendant quelques mois dans une retraite profonde, et qui a été déjà accueilli par la méchanceté de quelques gens beaucoup moins affectés qu'elle de l'horrible catastrophe. Hélas ! j'en sais plus que je n'en dirai de longtemps sur les causes qui ont amené cette catastrophe. Les partis les plus opposés semblent avoir travaillé de concert à immoler le plus innocent des hommes. Il eut été sauvé, si l'on eut connu en France un débat comme celui de Lord Grenville et de Lord Spencer. M. de Bouillé disait dernièrement à Londres : '*Il n'y a qu'une classe d'hommes que je hais autant que les Jacobins de Paris ; ce sont les Jacobins de Coblenz.*' M. de Bouillé avait trop raison."

*French.*

LOUIS DE NOAILLES to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 29, London.—"J'ai eu l'honneur de vous proposer un moyen d'arracher M. le Dauphin aux assassins qui le menaient, et je me suis offert pour le mettre à exécution. J'ai choisi M. de Breteuil pour vous en faire part, comme ayant eu plus qu'aucun autre la confiance du père de ce malheureux enfant. Il m'a communiqué la réponse de l'homme sensible ; il ne m'a point caché celle du ministre ; et je l'avoue, j'attendais plus de succès d'un projet que l'Europe entière devrait avouer.

"Mon parti est pris. Je laisse aux autres leur opinion, je ne consulte que ma conscience.

"Pour exécuter mon projet, je ne puis me conformer aux loix du royaume. Je pars avec un faux passeport, et j'emporte des pistolets à vent. J'espère qu'on mettra quelque différence entre ne pas se seconder et ne punir. La prudence exigerait que vous me permissiez verbalement d'enfreindre la loi ; mais le même motif qui vous porte à ne prendre aucune part à mon projet vous décide à me refuser une entrevue. Il est encore possible que vous ne répondrez pas à ma lettre. J'ai prévu tous ces obstacles, et pour que rien ne m'arrête, je les ai surmontés. J'attendrai encore ici vingt-quatre heures ; après ce délai, je regarderai votre silence non comme un aveu de mon projet, mais comme une permission tacite de violer une loi qui, certes, ne peut pas être appliquée à celui qui va sacrifier sa tété pour tacher de sauver celle de cet enfant, sur lequel reposent aujourd'hui de si grands intérêts, de si hautes espérances, et tous les regards de l'Europe.

"Je partirai donc en déposant la copie de cette lettre entre les mains d'un ami. Si Milord Grenville, simple particulier, ne tenait pas les rênes d'un grand état, il ne me laisserait pas partir sans le voir. Eh, pourquoi faut-il donc qu'une si grande distance sépare l'humanité de la politique ? Comme Ministre il doit penser qu'il aura sa place dans l'histoire, et réfléchir que mon projet en sera une page."

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LOUIS DE NOAILLES.

1793, January 29, St. James Square.—"J'ai reçu ce matin votre lettre, et après m'être déjà expliqué sur le sujet de votre entreprise, je

ne vous répondez que parceque vous paraissez vouloir attribuer à mon silence une interprétation que je ne puis pas autoriser.

"C'est assurément au Ministre que vous avez voulu confier le projet d'une entreprise pour laquelle vous avez demandé l'assistance du Gouvernement. C'est en cette qualité que je vous répète que le Gouvernement ne croit pas devoir s'y compromettre, et cela pour les raisons qui vous sont connues. Je dois maintenant ajouter qu'aucun Ministre n'a ici le pouvoir de donner une permission, ou tacite ou verbale, de violer la loi.

"Mes sentiments comme particulier vous doivent être peu importants. Mais puisque vous m'en parlez, je vous dirai seulement que je rends assurément justice à vos motifs, mais que je ne me dissimule pas combien votre entreprise pourrait compromettre les intérêts et la sûreté de ceux que vous désirez servir."

*French.*

#### LOUIS DE NOAILLES to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, January 30, London.—"J'ai voulu faire une bonne action et non pas une belle chose. J'ai voulu être utile et non pas desservir, et non pas donner aux autres des dangers que je réservais pour moi seul.

"Je me conforme aux ordres du Ministre, et j'obéirais de même aux simples vœux de Lord Grenville. Je ne distingue point les intentions du premier, de la prévoyance du second. Quoi ! je compromettrais les intérêts ! A ce mot je m'arrête, et n'y eut-il que de l'incertitude, je dois également rester. Non, my lord, il n'est pas vrai que vos sentiments personnels puissent m'être peu importants ; et puisque vous voulez bien rendre justice à mes motifs dans le projet que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous proposer. Permettez que je vous renvoie les deux lettres que vous avez écrites. J'aime encore mieux vous les rendre que les brûler. Les miennes n'existent plus. Si le projet pouvait nuire, sa divulgation aurait le même inconvénient. Voyez combien vos craintes m'ont frappé moi-même."

*French.*

#### [THE EARL OF ELGIN] to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Extract.*

1793, February 3.—"M. de Mercy, who is most deeply affected with the late melancholy event, has written to consult a friend of his at this place, whether any and what means could be employed to rescue the Queen from the danger with which she is so eminently threatened. While his anxiety and zeal prompt him to do something, the fear of committing a step (in times when there is no rule to go by, and when nothing is held sacred) that may do harm instead of good, seems to withhold him from acting, and to make him look abroad for advice, rather than trust entirely to his own judgment. He asks whether the Emperor should demand her, and if so, in what manner and to whom he should apply. His friend is of opinion that if she is demanded at all, instead of losing time by applying to Vienna and waiting for an answer, M. de Mercy should do it immediately in the Emperor's name ; merely to claim Marie Antoinette, Archduchess of Austria and widow of Louis XVI., without any reflection or expression that could be applied to any political question whatsoever. From the aversion which the Orléans party have, with so much industry and success, infused into the mob at Paris to the Queen personally, and the House of Austria in

general, I am very doubtful whether a public demand of this nature, instead of having the desired effect, might not be made use of to lead them to commit what it is intended to prevent. And if the demand was even complied with, I am almost convinced that the Queen would never consent to come away and leave her children behind her. Some months ago she might have escaped with the Dauphin, but she positively refused to quit the King, though persuaded that her death was almost certain if she remained. The friend of M. de Mercy that I have alluded to, and who I mention to your Lordship in confidence, that you may judge yourself of the weight that may be given to his opinions, is the Count de la Marck; who, as far as I can presume to say, appears to me to possess a considerable share of ability, has for a long time past shown great zeal for the unfortunate royal family of France, has effected his reconciliation at Vienna, and is sometimes consulted. Both M. de Mercy and he think that the only reasonable hope that can be entertained of being able to save the prisoners at the Temple, is on the efforts that may be made by His Majesty's Ministers to gain the protection of those who have it in their power to destroy them. It must be undoubtedly very painful to apply to men of so horrid a description; but the sentiment that dictates the measure will be probably powerful enough to overcome the just reluctance to the means that it may be necessary to employ. To address the Duke of Orleans himself, I am persuaded, would not only be in vain, but might precipitate the fate of the royal family, by alarming the jealousies of those who direct him. His mind, like his body, is (if I may be allowed the expression) a mass of corruption, void of energy, but susceptible of every vice. He may, and must yield to the advice of those who guide him; but will do nothing of any consequence himself, especially if the thing desired of him be honourable and humane. It is known with certainty that, at different epochs since the beginning of the Revolution, he has wished to recede, but was compelled to go on. Hence I mean to infer that, were it possible to gain some of the principal persons of the Cabal, perhaps De la Clos and Santerre, the royal family might be preserved; but to accomplish this, or to avoid the ill consequences of a miscarriage, your Lordship will be sensible require much address and an extraordinary degree of caution. Perhaps his Majesty's Ministers may have already taken measures on this subject. If they have, or if they propose to do so, there is a person in England who is perhaps capable of giving them many useful intimations. His name is *Pelenc*; he was Mirabeau's friend or secretary, and, it was thought at the time, composed many of his papers and speeches. From the time that Mirabeau was brought over to Government, Pelenc has been very zealous in its services, and has uniformly given the most exact intelligence, as the event always proved. I am not at all acquainted with him, but have read many things of his writing."

#### COUNT LALLY-TOLENDAL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 9, Lisle Street.—"J'ai reçu à dix heures une lettre du Lord Chancelier qui me marque que vous désirez l'explication d'une idée dont je lui ai parlé sans détail, et que vous m'attendez ce matin. La matinée est fort avancée, parceque j'ai voulu fixer cette idée par écrit, et en tracer le développement dans un mémoire que je finis actuellement à trois heures. Je me rends à vos ordres à tout hasard, et dans le cas, trop vraisemblable, où l'heure de vous entretenir serait passée, j'ai l'honneur de vous écrire ce peu de mots pour vous renouveler l'offre de mon dévouement absolu.

“ Si je ne vous trouve point, je remporterai mon mémoire pour en prendre copie, et j'aurai l'honneur de vous l'envoyer le soir.

“ Permettez-vous que j'aie l'honneur de vous offrir complet le douloureux et inutile monument que j'avais consacré à la défense de cet adorable Louis XVI, et dans lequel je n'ai, malheureusement, travaillé que pour l'histoire. Vous n'avez sûrement pas le temps d'en achever aujourd'hui la lecture ; mais je tiens à ce qu'il soit dans la bibliothèque de Lord Grenville.

“ Vous avez essayé une perte douloureuse pour votre cœur, et je l'ai ressentie, je vous assure, quoique je vous l'aie tardivement exprimé par l'organe d'un ami. Je ne crains rien tant que d'importuner ; mais quand vous aurez des instants de liberté, je me réserve le droit d'en réclamer un pour cultiver vos bontés.”

*French.*

#### COUNT LALLY-TOLENDAL TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 12, Lisle Street.—“ Peut-être pourrai-je vous faire hommage ce soir au moins de la première partie de ma défense du Roi ?

“ J'ose, au nom de cet intérêt sacré, vous prier de vouloir bien me faire dire un mot chaque fois que vous aurez un courier traversant Paris.

“ J'ai vu M. l'Aubépy. Il est venu ici comptant qu'il était question du pauvre Roi, et il m'a attendri quand je l'ai vu verser un torrent de larmes sur la destinée de son malheureux maître. J'ai causé ensuite d'affaires avec lui. Il m'a paru avoir le flegme, l'adresse, et surtout la discrétion nécessaire aux services que vous désirez de lui ; beaucoup de probité, et d'exactitude dans les faits, ce qui est encore si nécessaire. Il désirerait, ce me semble, que l'on conservât Longchamps, en le restraignant absolument à ce qu'on lui demanderait, et à un traitement modéré, mais fixe par mois tout le temps qu'il servirait. Vous savez mieux que moi de quelle utilité peut vous être ce dernier. J'ai seulement représenté à M. le Long, il y a quelques jours, que si Longchamps servait utilement, il me paraissait indispensable de lui assigner un traitement fixe par mois (25 livres sterling me paraîtraient magnifiques, en n'entendant parler d'aucune dépense) et que s'il était inutile, il convenait à la dignité du Gouvernement de l'en prévenir, et de lui donner une gratification définitive qui pût le mettre à même de chercher pendant trois mois à se placer, sans être troublé dans les démarches par la crainte de n'avoir pas de quoi manger dans le jour.”

*French.*

#### ————— to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, February 25, Paris.—“ Le pain nous donnera une insurrection. Nous n'avons d'approvisionnements que jusqu'au 20 Mars, et comme il est ici à meilleur marché que dans nos environs, les paysans viennent de deux lieues pour leur provision. Il est vraisemblable que les Départements des frontières ne laisseront pas passer les bleds et farines qui nous sont destinées, parcequ'ils en manquent eux-mêmes, et que nos armées serviront de prétexte. Le midi est entièrement dépourvu, et n'a pas de moyen. La Normandie paye le pain 4s. 6d. la livre. Jugez si elle laissera passer nos farines. Je ne peux pas vous dire ce que ferait une insurrection populaire sur le Temple. La Reine seule en serait l'objet, et elle sera sacrifiée, soit au premier [succès] des troupes étrangères, soit au premier murmure du peuple contre la Convention. Elle n'intéresse aucun parti. Il n'en est pas de même de Louis 17 ; il trouverait des défenseurs, et on fera de grands sacrifices pour le sauver. Mais dans

une insurrection, le peuple se laisse bien commander pour la commencer ; peut-on être certain qu'il s'arrêtera où on lui aura dit ? surtout lorsque la contre-partie est attentive aux mouvements. Un scélérat, pour cent louis, peut tromper la vigilance de plusieurs milliers. Je vous ferai passer incessamment tous les détails que vous me demandez. L'argent est aujourd'hui à 35. Un décret ne tardera pas à en interdire la vente, afin qu'on ne sache pas à quel prix la Convention l'achètera.

“Je vous envoie par M. Martin quatre feuilles sous quatre numéros écrit en blanc. Il faudra faire paraître l'encre seulement pour Milord. M. Martin doit passer demain.”

*French.*

*Written in invisible ink between the lines of an ostensible letter on mercantile affairs. Without address or signature.*

1793, May 30, Paris.—“I arrived safe here yesterday. You cannot form to yourself an idea of all I suffered. Not a word of that. You shall hear from me as often as I can with safety write to you. This city is in the greatest confusion. The cannon of alarm is just fired, and the tocsin rings everywhere. The minority, or *Maratists*, with the sections, want to murder the majority, and dissolve the Convention. The insurgents in Poitou have had great advantages ; all the *gendarmérie à cheval* deserted to them. If you send them some assistance, the business will be soon decided. You have no time to lose, as troops are everywhere in motion to go and attack them. Everything announces to-day the speedy dissolution of the Convention. The most sanguinary motions are making carnage and destruction hang suspended over the head of this guilty city. How I shall escape, heaven only knows. I am afraid to go out this morning to acquire intelligence. The most hellish cries interrupt me every moment. Custine commands the army of Flanders ; his headquarters are at Cambray, and advanced posts in the environs of Bouchain. That army is considerably weakened by the great draft of soldiers sent from it to combat the insurgents. The royal family are all well in the Temple ; not a word is spoken of them here. All the division rests among the people themselves. You shall hear from me as often as I can find an occasion of writing to you. Barrère proposed yesterday a decree for the expulsion of all strangers, especially English.

“The Girondists have to-day all the power of the Convention in their hands, but Paris, with its sections and Jacobins, will in the end triumph. Blood and massacre will be the result of their success. The troubles of the provinces occasion here more fear than all the combined armies. Send them speedily some assistance, if you wish to put a speedy end to an expensive war. If I can find nobody to go to carry you my despatches, I shall endeavour to be bearer myself. Adieu, my dear friend, never doubt of my zeal and fidelity to serve you.”

MONSIEUR MALOUEU to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, August 23, Twickenham.—“Je crois devoir vous faire hommage d'un nouvel écrit de M. Mallet Dupan. Au milieu d'une récapitulation de crimes et de folies que vous connaissez aussi bien que nous, vous trouverez des idées neuves et profondes, dignes certainement d'être méditées par votre sagesse. L'agitation, la mélancolie, le découragement ont nui sans doute à la perfection de l'ouvrage, mais il n'en n'est pas moins fait par un des observateurs les plus pénétrants,

par un des meilleurs écrivains politiques qui existent aujourd'hui en Europe, qui, pendant trois ans, a vécu dans le feu de la Révolution Française et en a écrit l'histoire entière, et qui sera trop compté par la postérité pour ne pas l'être un peu par les contemporains. Son opinion a pour moi d'autant plus de poids que, depuis la guerre déclarée, il a eu des relations directes avec les Ministres de Vienne et de Berlin. Dans son désespoir qui ne paroît hélas ! que trop fondé, il m'a écrit une lettre particulière remplie de détails déchirants. J'ai l'honneur de vous en faire passer quelques extraits. Vous y verrez qu'il regarde le Cabinet de Londres comme le seul que puisse préserver l'Europe d'une longue suite de désastres. S'il était permis de se citer soi-même, j'oserais vous rappeler le mémoire que j'ai pris la liberté de vous présenter aussitôt que la guerre a été déclarée. En rapprochant les annonces que je fis alors, et les résultats que présente aujourd'hui M. Mallet Dupan, on doit sans doute être moins porté à se méfier de ce qu'on appelle les jugemens de notre intérêt particulier, qui, dans cette occasion, est bien véritablement l'intérêt universel. Je n'affligerai pas votre sensibilité par le souvenir douloureux du stérile mémoire que nous avons présenté en commun, M. de Lally, M. de Gilliers et moi, pour le salut de l'infortuné Louis Seize ; je ne répéterai pas tout ce que j'ai dit depuis huit mois sur les colonies. Louis Seize n'est plus, les colonies ne sont plus ; la veuve et le fils de Louis Seize vivent encore ; les Gouvernemens de l'Europe sont encore sur pied ; il est bien sûrement encore des moyens de salut ; mais s'ils sont négligés, si les ennemis intérieurs de la Convention ne sont pas secourus, si la guerre se prolonge, si elle se fait de manière à réunir et à aguerrir tous les partis de cette monstrueuse République, la subversion de l'Europe suivra probablement celle de la France.

“Au sentiment des maux publics se joint pour moi celui d'une inquiétude cruelle sur le sort de ma famille, retirée à quinze lieues de Cambrai, près Compiègne. J'ai le projet de passer dans le Brabant et jusqu'à Valenciennes, pour tenter d'en avoir des nouvelles. Serois-je vous prier de m'accorder des recommandations pour le Ministre Anglais à Bruxelles et pour un des généraux de l'armée de Monseigneur Duc d'York. Je voudrais profiter de la première occasion favorable pour faire sortir de France ma femme et mon fils, et je ne peux en avoir l'espérance que par une protection puissante dans l'armée alliée.”

#### *Enclosure.*

Extract.

MONSIEUR MALLET DU PAN to MONSIEUR MALOUE.

1793, August 16, Brussels.—“Montlosier vous a tracé, il y a deux jours, la véritable situation des affaires . . . ils ont eû encore une fois la révolution entre leurs mains. La Convention épouvantée perdait la tête. Lyon et le Midi relevaient la leur. Les Jacobins de Péronne avaient déménagé jusqu'à Paris, semant l'effroi devant eux. Voilà le moment qu'on a choisi pour revenir sur ses pas, pour abandonner Cambray où se trouvaient les grands magasins, et pour venir stoïquement assiéger Dunkerque et Maubeuge. Je vous laisse à penser la sécurité et l'audace qu'une pareille conduite va inspirer à la Convention. Tremblons de l'influence que cette marche rétrograde peut avoir sur le sort de la malheureuse Reine. Vous savez que les scélérats ne sont jamais plus cruels que lors qu'on leur montre de la crainte.

“Deux ou trois sièges finiront cette campagne. Si les cent trente mille hommes que couvrent cette frontière eussent été dans les mains

de Du Mourier on d'un Capitaine de Hussards, ils seraient déjà aux portes de Paris. Mais on ne peut donner de l'âme, de la hardiesse, de la célérité à des généraux engourdis par une tactique matérielle. C'est bien pire, en ce genre, que l'année dernière.

"Je n'entrevois qu'une ressource. Serait-elle mise en usage? Ce serait que le Cabinet de Londres se ressentit d'une conduite si pernicieuse, qu'il se fit entendre fortement, qu'il menaçât même, et qu'il fit adopter un autre plan. Ce Cabinet est le seul qui connaisse la Révolution, le seul qui apprécie les effets moraux de tel ou tel système d'opérations. Si son influence ne prévaut pas dans le sens que je vous indique, comptez que la Révolution est fixée. Elle survivra à la campagne, et à toutes les campagnes. Elle percera ces fragiles remparts derrière lesquels les alliés entendent se cacher, et nulle puissance humaine ne la renversera l'année prochaine. Représentez fortement cette vérité. Citez moi, si vous le voulez."

"Lyon et le Midi donnaient de puissantes espérances. Elles s'évanouissent par les mêmes causes qui font périliter ailleurs les affaires générales. Au lieu de soutenir ces mouvemens, le Cabinet de Turin, cloué par celui de Vienne, a laissé ses troupes sur la défensive derrière les Alpes. Du Bois de Crancé, rassuré de ce côté là, a témoigné assez de mépris aux alliés pour ne pas craindre de marcher, le 2, sur Lyon, avec la majeure partie de l'armée des Alpes. Il ne reste que trois bataillons dans toute la basse Savoye, et les alliés n'y font pas descendre un seul homme. S'ils eussent paru, la Convention perdait la moitié de son empire, coupé en deux. Elle aura peut-être tout subjugué, lorsqu'on se ravisera. Que voulez-vous faire avec des hommes qui sont toujours en arrière des circonstances, et qui ne connaissent ni la valeur des temps, ni celle des choses et des personnes?"

"La même négligence a annulé la Suisse, dont on pouvait tirer une immense utilité, et que les Français redoutaient plus qu'aucun autre état. On a abandonné ce pays-là à leur influence absolue. On s'en est remis à des intriguans étrangers qui ne connaissent ni les hommes, ni les moyens à mettre en œuvre dans cette contrée. De fausses mesures équivoques ont achevé de tout gâter. L'Angleterre, en particulier, pouvait gouverner la Suisse avec un fil; mais, certes, ce n'est pas avec un Ambassadeur comme celui qu'elle paye à Berne qu'on pouvait manier des gouvernemens si variés, et les ressorts convenables à ce sol."

"Insistez sur l'importance de secourir Lyon, Marseille, et le Midi, par une diversion active des armées alliées au pied des Alpes, qui occupe ou culbute les Français dans cette partie. Je crains beaucoup au surplus qu'il ne soit trop tard. Dites encore que si la Savoye n'est pas recouvrée avant l'hiver, Genève avec 150 pièces de canon, 70 mille mesures de bled en magasin, des munitions considérable, sera aux mains des Français qui s'y retrancheront, et tiendront en échec d'une part les Suisses, et les Piémontais de l'autre."

*French. Copy.*

#### M. MALOUET to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, September 3, London.—"Je reçois au moment de mon départ le mémoire ci-joint de M. Mallet du Pan. Il me prie de vous le présenter; il m'annonce que ses liaisons en Suisse peuvent le mettre en état d'en suivre l'objet sous l'inspection de votre ambassadeur, et c'est ici le moment de vous dire que, depuis un an, M. Mallet du Pan n'est point étranger aux négociations relatives à la Révolution.

"M. de Monciel à qui je laisse ce paquet pour vous le remettre, a eût connaissance de la correspondance secrète de M. Mallet du

Pan que j'avais pris la liberté de proposer au feu roi. M. de Monciel vous instruira de l'occasion et de la forme dans laquelle il a été employé.

"Une autre personne de mes amis peut vous être également utile en Suisse, et arrive incessamment en Angleterre. C'est M. Mounier, mais je dois vous dire que son voyage à Londres n'a aucun rapport aux affaires politiques. La détresse dans laquelle se trouve aujourd'hui cet homme intéressant m'a décidé à le proposer à Mylord Hawke qui désire envoyer son fils en Suisse pour y passer un ou deux ans, et M. Mounier vient chercher ici le jeune homme pour le conduire à Berne.

"Je n'ai garde de me permettre ni conseil ni recommandation. Vous jugerez le mémoire, les personnes; et si vous avez une réponse à me faire parvenir, M. de Monciel s'en chargera."

*French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the GREFFIER FAGEL.

1793, November 21, St. James's Square.—"I cannot let Lord Malmesbury proceed to the Hague without charging him with a few lines to express to you my acknowledgments for your very obliging letter, and to assure you how much I wish to cultivate those sentiments which you are so good as to entertain towards me.

"Lord Malmesbury will explain to you the whole object of his mission, and as both his instructions and his inclination will lead him to speak to you with the fullest confidence on that interesting subject I have little to add upon it. The Ministers of the Republic will, I am sure, see in the same light with the King's servants the tendency and effect of the late conduct of the Court of Berlin, and the necessity which exists of ascertaining precisely the situation in which we stand with respect to our alliance with that Court. Whatever may be the result we have no doubt of the full concurrence and co-operation of the Republic in measures which our common interests so evidently require.

"The long expected answer of the Court of Vienna is not yet arrived, relative to the business with which you were charged, and to the representations which by the King's directions I made on that head to Count Starhemberg. I flatter myself that you have not been dissatisfied with the manner in which this Government has fulfilled the assurances which I was authorised to give you here; and I will confess to you that I am disposed to be sanguine in my expectations of the result. If it is such as I wish, it may, I trust, lay the foundation of arrangements advantageous to this country and to the Republic.

"We are preparing to take such measures as are in our power towards opening a concert with the Royalists, whom our late accounts represent as being in considerable force near the coast of Brittany. But the ultimate success of all that we can do there must depend much on the disposition of that part of the country, and this can never be satisfactorily ascertained but by experience. I trust that the exertions of the Republic will correspond, in proportion to its means, with those which we are making here to terminate the war by a successful campaign next year. In the present state of France and of Europe I see no safety but in success, and that success speedy, and if possible decisive."

*Copy.*



## L'EVÊQUE DE LÉON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, October 18, London.—“Dès que le Lord Chancelier ne vous a pas prévenu du motif qui me rendait nécessaire une audience de votre part, j'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que c'est au sujet d'une commission que le Souverain Pontife me donne par sa lettre du onze septembre dernier, par laquelle il me charge de faire connaître au Roi et à la nation Anglaise sa reconnaissance des bienfaits répandus sur les ecclésiastiques en Angleterre. En même temps que je sens la nécessité de remplir ma commission, j'en sens la délicatesse, et je suis bien résolu de ne rien faire que de la manière que vous jugerez être sans inconvénient. J'ai, en conséquence, différents plans à vous proposer qui me paraissent obvier aux inconvénient qu'on pourrait craindre. Je désire les soumettre le plutôt possible à votre décision.”

*French.*

## LOUIS SLANISLAS XAVIER (Comte de Provence) to GEORGE III.

1793, November 9, Hamm.—“La délivrance de Toulon du joug des rebelles par les escadres combinées de votre Majesté et du Roi d'Espagne, le retour de ses habitans à l'obéissance du Roi mon neveu, les couleurs et les emblèmes de la fidélité substitués à celles de la révolte, m'imposaient de nouveaux devoirs, mais avant de les remplir, je croirais manquer à ce que ma reconnaissance envers votre Majesté m'impose, si je ne lui faisais part de mes desseins. Je vais partir, je vais me rendre dans cette ville que les armes de votre Majesté ont rendue à son légitime souverain, je vais y exercer les fonctions que ma naissance et mon malheur m'imposent. Je connais trop la générosité des sentimens de votre Majesté pour douter qu'elle approuve ce parti nécessaire. J'oserais même compter sur ses secours, s'ils m'étaient indispensables pour me rendre à Toulon. Mais j'ose surtout compter sur son appui dans la nouvelle carrière qui s'ouvre devant moi. Eloigné désormais plus encore que je ne le suis aujourd'hui des provinces qui les premières ont relevé la bannière royale, je les recommande à la protection, aux puissans secours de votre Majesté. Elle connaît les vœux de mon frère, et les miens; je la supplie d'y avoir égard, et d'être surtout bien persuadée que devoir tout à votre Majesté, sera toujours pour nous le plus beau des titres, comme la plus douce des satisfactions.”

*French.*

## M. DE MONCIEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 10, Lisle Street.—“M. de Malouet en partant pour les Pays-Bas m'a chargé de vous remettre un mémoire de M. Malet du Pan concernant la Suisse. J'ose vous prier de m'indiquer l'heure à laquelle je pourrais avoir l'honneur de vous le présenter. Je suis à même de vous donner des renseignements sur M. Malet du Pan, ayant connu la mission dont il a été chargé en 1792 par Louis XVI., et la confiance qu'il lui avait accordé.”

*French.*

## L'EVÊQUE DE LÉON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 25, London.—“Recevez tous mes remerciements de la promptitude avec laquelle vous avez eu la bonté de me faire parvenir la réponse que je désirais.

“ Quoique je susse que sa Majesté trouvait dans la bonté de son cœur le motif de ses bienfaits et leur récompense dans le plaisir de les répandre, je n’ai pas douté qu’elle n’attacha quelque prise aux témoignages de la reconnaissance de Pie VI., et je suis très flatté qu’elle n’ait pas désapprouvé la manière dont j’ai exprimé ses sentimens.

“ Vous rendez justice à mes bonnes intentions, et vous voulez bien me juger avec beaucoup d’indulgence. Je suis très sensible à cette bonté.”

*French.*

#### COUNT LALLY TOLENDAL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1793, November 26, Twickenham.—“ Je voulais vous demander la permission d’envoyer par votre courier, et sous le couvert de Lord Fitz-Gerald, quelques lettres à M. Mounier. Naturellement j’aurais dû attendre votre aveu avant de prendre la liberté de vous adresser un paquet ; mais il s’agit d’arracher ma fille du milieu des tygres qui la menacent. Ces misérables qui n’avaient pas voulu reconnaître ma qualité d’Anglais quand elle me sauvait, se sont hâtés de la déclarer quand elle me perdait. Je suis confisqué par un jugement spécial. Madame de Poix avait retiré mon enfant, et me remplaçait auprès d’elle. Vous savez avec quelle inhumanité Madame de Poix mourante a été transportée à sa section, puis reconduite chez elle avec trois gendarmes qui ne sortent pas de sa chambre. Les malheurs et les crimes s’aggravant de minute en minute, je n’ai pas cru devoir en perdre une seule. Je n’ai pas même hésité à supplier votre Excellence de faire parvenir mes instructions à mon ami, et je me suis dit que si le Ministre me trouvait indiscret, le père me trouverait sûrement excusable.”

*French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT LALLY TOLENDAL.

1793, November 28, St. James’s Square.—“ Je ne manquerai pas d’envoyer votre lettre par un courier qui part demain pour la Suisse et l’Italie, et je vous prie d’être persuadé de tout l’intérêt que je prends à une occasion qui vous regarde de si près. Ce serait avec une vraie satisfaction que j’apprendrais le succès de vos mesures à cet égard.”

*French. Copy.*

#### THOMAS ELDRED to SARAH ELDRED.

1794, January 19, Paris.—“ On my return from Havre de Grace I found yours of the 5th instant. I note the contents. I have been under the necessity to return here, as I could not get horses or any conveyance from Havre de Grace to go to Brest and it [is] very expensive in this country at this time, more so than it is in England ; and I never found the cold so much in England as I do here, and what the people will do for bread I cannot tell ; there is not any to be got without you have a card from the Section, saying how much you are to have. There is ten gentlemen in the house with me, besides the servant, and we are allowed four loaves for twenty-four hours, which I suppose is about twelve pounds. However, we are much better off here than they are in the country. I find that there is many places that there is not any to be got. I shall leave this to-morrow morning, and I am told it will take me sixteen days to go there ; the roads is so very bad, and

no horses to be got, and some part of the road we must have a guard of soldiers, as I understand that there is forty to fifty thousand men in arms in the La Vendée, but not altogether in one body. You will hear from me at all opportunities till the latter part of March, when I shall sail for America."

[MALLET DU PAN] to the EARL OF ELGIN.

1794, February 16. *Extrait*.—"Voici la suite du premier dépouillement,\* dont vous recevrez la dernière partie par l'un des couriers de la semaine. Je voudrais pouvoir rendre ces bases historiques très complètes, pour fixer votre jugement, et prévenir les erreurs de fait, sur lesquelles je persiste à craindre qu'on n'édifie les plans de conduite par cette armée. Ne perdez point de vue que vous avez affaire à ceux qui ont *organisé la désorganisation*, et que vous finirez mal une guerre malheureuse, qu'il faudra recommencer bientôt, si elle n'en trouve pas avant six mois le cœur même de la Révolution.

"J'ai reçu un billet timide et couvert de mon voyageur à Paris. Il me demandait d'explications; aussitôt qu'il les aura reçus, il doit se remettre en route. Il renvoye à ce moment de me rendre compte, n'osant pas, avec raison, le confier à la poste. Il a eu beaucoup de peines à s'accréditer auprès des personnes que je lui ai désignées. On n'ose se fier à son meilleur ami, à plus forte à un visage étranger, avant d'avoir bien authentiqué son caractère et sa mission.

"Par les derniers avis que j'ai reçus en date du 2 et du 6, j'apprends que le Comité va lever la seconde réquisition de 25 à 45; preuve de plus que la première n'a servi qu'au complément des cadres de l'armée. La seconde donnera plus de sujets, ainsi que vous le verrez dans le travail inclus.

"Par un nouvel état plus correct que n'a été fourni, je vois qu'à la date du 24 Janvier, le Comité avait 75 millions monnoyés au trésor public, et pour au-de-là, de 330 millions de matières d'or et d'argent. Cette somme est un peu plus forte que celle que je vous avais indiquée. On en verrait bientôt la fin, si de nouvelles rapines ne remplaçaient les vides. Les assignats sont retombés au dehors à 56 par 100 de perte; dans l'intérieur point de prix fixe. Il varie depuis *le pair* jusqu'à 33. Le papier étant devenu rare surtout dans les campagnes, et personne n'osant payer en espèces pour vivre, les particuliers sont obligés de sortir leur or, et leurs écus, et d'aller les échanger au pair, au bureau de leur district ou de leur municipalité. Le Comité va faire fendre des espèces qu'on réduira en lingots, pour s'en servir au dehors, et marquer la source. Cette manœuvre n'a point suspendue les remises, et les opérations, que l'on fait aux trois chefs lieux, Gènes, Basle et Genève. Là entr'autres elle rachète les assignats, à 55 ou 56 de perte, pour les replacer dans l'intérieur au pair, à 10, 20, 30, suivant les lieux et les circonstances.

"Les plans de corruption extérieure continuent à regarder essentiellement l'Angleterre et l'Italie. Voilà les deux points fortement travaillés. Le Piémont c'est à l'outrance; l'esprit du peuple s'y gate visiblement, et à la manière dont les choses y sont dirigées, on peut croire que l'argent de Paris n'y a pas été semé en vain.

"Quant à l'Angleterre, ils espèrent toujours y exciter quelque éboulement, et y former un embryon révolutionnaire que l'on soutiendrait ensuite à *main armée*. Les troupes ci-devant employées contre la Vendée doivent renforcer celles des côtes de la Manche. Mais

\* Deposited in the Public Record Office.

pour l'instant, le grand effort va se porter sur la Flandre. L'attaque de Valenciennes, et une irruption dans les Pays-Bas, sont à l'ordre du jour. Si l'on pénètre dans la Belgique, le projet est de la chatier en la mettant à feu et à sang.

"On compte employer 100 mille hommes et les garnisons à cette entreprise. Vous ne tarderez pas à être vigoureusement attaqués; et l'on ne vous laissera sûrement pas le temps de finir vos longs préparatifs, ni terminer vos quartiers d'hiver. La seconde réquisition sera encore plusieurs mois hors de service, car on est hors d'état de l'équiper, de l'armer et de la nourrir; mais si l'on fait la même faute que l'année dernière, si l'on se moque de cette levée, et qu'on lui laisse le temps de s'organiser, cette nouvelle pépinière vous tombera sur les bras au milieu de l'été.

"Le nombre des malades dans l'armée est prodigieux; la mortalité y est terrible. Il en est mort 6,000 dans les seuls hôpitaux de Besançon. Une fièvre épidémique les moissonne, et est même passée aux habitants. Elle vient aussi de se déclarer à Lyon, où elle peut devenir pestilentielle par l'infection des cadavres qu'on laisse presque sans sépulture, ou qu'on jette dans le Rhône, d'où ils sont portés sur la côte où ils pourrissent. Toutes les campagnes des environs de Lyon sont infectées de cette puanteur.

"Le système pillard des massacrans ne discontinue point à Paris. Tous les banquiers, négociants, et marchands y passeront. On a formellement exclus de l'admission au Jacobin tous les individus de ces classes. C'est assez vous dire qu'elles sont destinées à la boucherie; il y a des Départements où les  $\frac{7}{8}$  des propriétés sont aux mains de la Convention.

"Roberspierre, toujours meneur en chef, commence à sentir le poids de sa dignité, le danger de son élévation, et des embarras de toute espèce. Il voudrait arrêter l'action du Gouvernement Révolutionnaire, et ne sait comment s'y prendre. Il emploie Camille Desmoulins à lui ramener l'opinion populaire qu'on lui enlève jour par jour; il est observé par ses co-adjuteurs, qui épient le moment de le culbuter, et qui font son tourment. Quoique son crédit actuel soit encore très supérieur au leur; il n'ose les attaquer de front. Il a perdu sa cause dans l'affaire de Ronsin, Vincent, et Maillard, qui sont élargis, et qui vont travailler avec ses ennemis à lui debaucher l'armée révolutionnaire, qui formait son corps de Janissaires. Si les Alliés feraient autrement la guerre, et qu'ils pussent de grands et rapides succès en débutant, le Comité de Salut Public volerait en pièces, Roberspierre et Danton seraient éborgés.

"Il a péri 350,000 âmes dans la guerre de la Vendée, y compris les vieillards, femmes, et enfants. Les cinq départements qui en ont été le théâtre sont en cendres.

"Par les derniers renseignements que j'ai vus, je vois que la disette de plusieurs articles essentiels est au plus haut degré. Les bestiaux manquent généralement; il est défendu au peuple de manger du bœuf, et de la vache; cette viande étant réservée aux troupes. Dans beaucoup de départements, il ne reste pas un mouton. Cela est vrai même du Dauphiné et de la Provence, qui en abondaient. La loi du maximum a achevé cette dépopulation, en mettant la viande à la portée de toutes les classes du peuple. La disette des bestiaux a entraîné celle des cuirs; celle des moutons, la rareté des laines. On ne trouve presque plus de marchandises dans les villes, bourgs, et villages de la Provence. Au pied de la lettre, il est impossible en Franche Comté et en Bourgogne, par exemple, d'acheter une culotte.

“La conversion des rentes viagères en annuités à un prix très onéreux pour les rentiers est arrêtée, et passera au premier jour à la Convention.

“Le blocus du port de Gênes continue toujours à ne rien bloquer ; tout passe à Nice, grains, vivres, marchandises, poudres. Les grains de la Lombardie par l'impardonnable négligence du ministre de l'Empereur, Comte de Wilseck, ont été exportés par les Génois ; ils ont enlevé une bonne partie de ceux de la Toscane et des Etats du Pape ; ensorte que les grains ont renchéri par tout, et sur tout en Piémont, et en Lombardie.

“Les troupes qui étaient survenues en Savoye sont reparties pour les Pyrénées.

“On poursuit les exécutions à Lyon, 40, 50, 80 par semaine ; 140 maisons à démolir par mois. Mêmes scènes à Marseilles et à Bordeaux.”

*French.*

[MALLET DU PAN] to the EARL OF ELGIN.

#### MÉMOIRE SUR LE COMITÉ DE SALUT PUBLIC.

1794, [March].—“Vous avez vu, dans la première partie de ce travail, que le Comité de Salut Public formait la clef de la voûte. Je vous ai tracé sommairement la nature, l'exercice, les effets de ce pouvoir qui est parvenu au phénomène *d'organiser la désorganisation*, et de réunir les forces du despotisme à celles de l'anarchie. Il me reste, maintenant, à vous entretenir de sa composition, du but de ses chefs, des dangers qui les menacent, et des divisions qui le déchirent, ainsi que la Convention et les Jacobins. On ne saurait accorder une trop grande attention à cette analyse qui repose sur des informations précises, immédiates, uniformes ; car, le destin de la guerre et de la révolution peuvent dépendre de celui du Comité de Salut Public. L'explosion chaque jour travaillée qui le fera sauter, ira jusqu'aux entrailles ; où elle déplacera seulement les membres actuels de ce conseil absolu, où elle remettra en vigueur l'anarchie du pouvoir populaire. L'un ou l'autre de ces événemens précédera l'été. Si les alliés ont la sagesse de le prévoir, de diriger leurs premières opérations sur cette prévoyance, et de préméditer les moyens de tirer parti d'une circonstance si décisive, ils pouvaient encore regagner les avantages qu'ils laissèrent échapper l'année dernière après la défection de Dumourier, et pendant les divisions des Brissotins et de Maratistes.

“Le Comité de Salut Public est composé de douze membres ; qui sont : *Hérault de Sechelles, Lindet, Roberspierre l'aîné, Billaud-Varennnes, Couthon, Prieur, Carnot, Fabre d'Eglantine*, (accusé et détenu), *Barrère, Jean-Bon St. André, Collot d'Herbois* (le douzième vacant au 25 Février).

“*Hérault de Sechelles*, retenu dans le Comité par la crainte de se rendre suspect en s'en détachant, sentant qu'il marche sur la lame d'un rasoir, effrayé de son nom, de son ancienne noblesse, de son ancien état, voulant à tout prix se faire pardonner ces tâches, et se montrant, par conséquent, aussi exagéré que ses collègues. Impitoyable de sang-froid, il propose en souriant les mesures les plus atroces ; cherche à se rendre populaire par des décrets de rigueur ; s'en fait ordinairement nommer l'organe pour en avoir le mérite ; inaccessible à aucun repentir tant que la peur le subjuge, instrument flexible sûr et féroce de quiconque le fait trembler. N'ayant ni les talens ni l'activité d'un chef,

aujourd'hui il paraît tenir aux intérêts de Robespierre, qu'il égorgera s'il le faut à l'instant où ce dictateur sera près de succomber.

"La maison de Hérault fort riche, et celle de son parent Pelletier, frère de Pelletier St. Fargeau tué l'année dernière, sont les rendez-vous où les Dieux infernaux se rassemblent, dînent fréquemment, et se livrent à la plus crapuleuse débauche.

"*Lindet*, Député du Département de l'Eure, protégé et placé par Buzot qu'il trahit; il vient à Robespierre, qui l'a fait nommer au Comité, et à qui il ne sera pas plus fidèle au premier orage qu'il ne le fut à Buzot. Chef du second ordre, il ne parviendra jamais au premier rang.

"*Robespierre*, jusqu'au commencement de février a dominé le Comité qui domine tout. L'Etranger, les Français qui le jugent sur ses succès, lui attribuent un grand talent; ils en font un chef consommé, un prodige de profondeur, un second Cromwell. Cette description est une caricature. Robespierre n'a jamais été, et ne sera jamais, capable du rôle qu'il a pris. Peu considéré dans la première Convention, même du côté gauche où il était sans crédit, oublié ensuite pendant la Législature, n'ayant jamais obtenu qu'une demi confiance de la part des Brissotins, il n'est réellement devenu le principal pivot des affaires et le principal objet de l'attention que depuis la mort de Marat. Sombre, soupçonneux, se défiant de ses meilleurs amis, fanatique atroce, vindicatif et implacable, sa vie est l'image de celle de Pygmalion Roi de Tyr, telle que Fénélon nous la décrit.

"Aujourd'hui décharné, les yeux caves, le visage livide, le regard inquiet et farouche, sa physionomie porte l'empreinte du crime et du remords. Tourmenté de terreurs, il est toujours escorté de trois sans-culottes, choisis et armés jusqu'aux dents, qui l'accompagnent dans sa voiture. Revenu à sa chétive demeure, il s'y enferme, s'y barricade, n'ouvre sa porte qu'avec des précautions extrêmes. Dîne-t-il hors chez lui? Ce n'est jamais sans avoir deux pistolets sur la table aux deux côtés de son assiette. Nul domestique ne peut se tenir derrière sa chaise. Il ne mange d'aucun plat sans que l'un des convives en ait mangé avant lui. Il promène un œil troublé et soupçonneux sur tout ce qui l'entoure, craint celui à qui il est obligé de se confier, voit un ennemi dans chacun de ses collègues, et traîne son existence entre la terreur d'un assassinat et celle d'un empoisonnement. La simplicité, ou plutôt la grossièreté de ses goûts, sa saleté, son grenier, son abstinence, sa haine des plaisirs, et l'opinion fondée de son désintéressement ont fait et soutiennent sa fortune populaire. Il n'a pas un écu; son incorruptibilité contraste avec les brigandages de ses associés. Vivant de ses appointemens de Député, il économise sur sa dépense domestique l'entretien d'un chétif carrosse qu'il a crû nécessaire à sa sûreté, et qu'il a fait numéroté comme un fiacre pour éviter jusqu'à l'apparence du luxe.

"Les Brissotins en leur temps, et ses ennemis actuels l'accusent de viser à la Dictature, au Protectorat, même à la Royauté. Ce reproche n'est pas dépourvu de vraisemblance; mais on lui donne communément trop d'extension. Robespierre aspire à rester maître, moins par ambition, que par crainte. La crainte, voilà le fond et le ressort de son caractère. Connaissant les scélérats avec lesquels il partage la faveur publique; témoin par l'expérience de ses prédécesseurs de la difficulté de se maintenir au sommet, et d'échapper à la Roche Tarpéienne, il redoute ceux auxquels il suppose l'effroi dont il est agité, les aspirans aux premiers grades, les agitateurs, les ambitieux, les hypocrites. Environné de rivaux, d'observateurs, d'hommes effrénés, et n'ayant

dans le fait ni un ami dont il soit sûr, ni un partisan sur la fidélité duquel il compte, son projet fut de se défaire successivement des uns et des autres, et de régner seul pour ôter à tous le pouvoir et le droit de régner malgré lui. Nous indiquerons plus bas en quoi consiste sa puissance personnelle.

“ *Billaud Varennes*.—Élève du Club des Cordeliers et de la section de Marseille où il a fait ses premières armes. Insolent et audacieux, cruel par insensibilité, consommé dans les ruses, les complots, les forfaits révolutionnaires, il contraste avec Robespierre par la recherche de son costume, de sa propreté, et de ses goûts ; c'est le petit maître de la Sans-Culotterie. Paris l'ayant formée, il a acquis l'expérience, des liaisons, des fils de conduite dans le Gouvernement, des intrigues, des opinions, des bandits mercenaires ; expérience qui manque aux Députés Provinciaux.

“ *Couthon*.—Avocat d'Auvergne, partage avec Robespierre et Billaud-Varennes la suprématie du Comité. Il a de l'esprit, et quelque talent, sanguinaire comme tant d'autres par défaut de courage. Avide, et ayant fondé sa fortune sur la Révolution, sa capacité relative surpasse celle de la plupart de ses associés. Il ne manque ni d'une certaine étendue dans les idées, ni de ressort dans la conception et l'exécution des plans.

“ *Prieur*.—Ancien Député de la première Convention, instrument, mais instrument expérimenté, du pouvoir révolutionnaire, brigand dans sa conduite ainsi que dans ses principes, restera toujours au second rang.

“ *Carnot*.—Officier du génie, membre de la première Législature, et l'un des plus utiles du Comité. Chargé de la partie militaire, il le fait avec activité, intelligence, et application. Il partage son temps entre les travaux du Comité de Salut-Public, et ceux du Comité de la Guerre adjoint au Département de ce nom. Ce dernier est formé d'officiers du génie et de l'état-major, dont les principaux sont de *Rosières*, *Favart*, *St. Fief*, *D'arçon*, *La Fite*, *Clavé*, et quelques autres. *D'arçon*, a dirigé la levée du siège de Dunkerque et celle du siège de Maubeuge. Personne en Europe ne le surpasse en pénétration, en connaissances pratiques, en promptitude de coup-d'œil, et en imagination. C'est une âme de feu, et une tête patrie de ressources.<sup>(1)</sup> Carnot, son collègue, assiste aux séances du Comité de la Guerre, en transmet, en développe, et appuie les résultats auprès du Comité du Salut-Public, et, une fois délibérés, rédige les ordonnances de leur exécution. Tout entier à ses fonctions spéciales, il se mêle peu des intrigues de parti, et les servira tous successivement par ambition, par intérêt, par impuissance de revenir sur ses pas.

“ *Fabre d'Eglantine*, décrété d'accusations et enfermé, malgré le crédit de Danton son ami, et de Robespierre qui l'avoit poussé en avant contre les Exagérés. Les rapines, la vénalité, le luxe, l'excès fabuleux des prévarications de ce comédien bel esprit, lui firent imprudemment déclarer la guerre à ses jaloux. Ceux-ci l'ayant dénoncé, ses imitateurs, pour arrêter le torrent, ont jugé prudent de le sacrifier, ainsi que Bazire et Chabot, impliqués de même dans des brigandages monstrueux, d'infâmes trafics de leur autorité, de pillage clandestin, des viols de jeunes filles *mises en réquisition*.

“ *Barrère*.—Déclamateur au brevet du Comité, chargé de la partie de rapports, subordonné aux principaux Chefs, variable dans sa conduite, et n'étant, comme tant d'autres, forcené que pour échapper à la guillotine ; il succombera avec Robespierre.

(1) Je parle de D'arçon d'après une liaison intime de dix années avec lui ; il n'est pas plus révolutionnaire que moi.

*Jean-Bon St André.*—Président Calviniste de Montauban, auteur du massacre des Catholiques dans cette ville en 1790, boute-feu infatigable, portant dans le crime le caractère du climat sous lequel il a pris naissance; envoyé l'automne dernière à Brest où il a raffermi la domination des Jacobins; bon suppôt de tyrannie, mais hors d'état de s'élever aux premiers rangs.

*Collot d'Herbois.*—Pour définir ce scélérat, il faut prendre la description d'un de ces tyrans de fantaisie, peint par les poètes, et que lui-même a joué vingt ans sur le théâtre. Tout ce que Tacite nous raconte de Tibère, aux qualités près, lui est applicable. Formé à la plus profonde dissimulation, personne n'a pu se vanter de connaître les replis innombrables de son cœur. Dévoré d'ambition, de cupidité, de jalousie, de vengeance, il réunit toutes les passions tristes. Conspirateur sombre, déclamateur étudié, impopulaire par goût et par habitude, il n'a jamais perdu l'apprêt théâtral. Mauvais demagogue, sa véritable place était celle de chef de bourreaux. Il possède le sang-froid, le raffinement, la perfidie combinée, la barbarie calme d'un tyran oriental. Il ordonne un massacre avec plus d'indifférence qu'on ne prend une glace. Jamais sa conscience n'a ressenti un mouvement, ni sa sensibilité une émotion. D'autres se font remarquer et excuser par leur fanatisme, ou par une cruauté qui tient à la violence du caractère. Collot d'Herbois ne montre aucun emportement; il est maître de lui comme de sa physionomie. Orgueilleux et dominateur, l'égalité Jacobine lui était à charge. Il fut créature mercenaire du Duc d'Orléans, et l'un des artisans des crimes révolutionnaires dès le commencement de 1789. Lorsqu'il a vu le Duc pencher vers son déclin, il a porté ses espérances aux postes les plus lucratifs et les plus élevés de l'anarchie.

“ Parvenu à force d'intrigues à se faire nommer commissaire principal à Lyon, il y a déployé la nature de son génie, et l'impassible férocité de son caractère. Longtemps il avait servi sur le théâtre de cette ville infortunée; ses caprices, ses hauteurs et la médiocrité de ses talens dramatiques lui attirèrent beaucoup de désagrémens. Plus d'une fois le public l'avait sifflé. *Manet altâ mente repostum*; il n'a pas oublié les outrages, il s'en est vengé comme Néron. On ferait un volume aussi épouvantable que curieux de sa gestion à Lyon. Nul pacha n'atteignit le manière, les maximes, les discours, les décisions de ce triumvir. Sa représentation solennelle ressemblait à celle du Grand Seigneur; on ne parvenait à son audience qu'après trois requêtes itératives. Une file d'appartemens précédait son salon de réception. Personne ne l'approchait qu'à quinze pas de distance; deux gardes, le fusil armé, étaient à ses côtés, l'œil tendu sur les solliciteurs. Impénétrable à volonté, il ne sortait de sa maison qu'avec une escorte nombreuse. Toutes ces précautions eussent été nécessaires et même insuffisantes avec un autre peuple. Mais le monstre qui a fait égorgé quatre mille citoyens en cinq semaines, dépouillé dix mille familles, plongé dans les cachots les sept-huits des propriétaires de la seconde ville de France, n'a pas reçu une égratignure.

“ Son sang-froid barbare, ses railleries envers les malheureux qu'il assassinait, l'ambiguïté de ses réponses et de ses ordres, ambiguïté d'après laquelle il restait toujours maître d'absoudre ensuite ou de condamner à discrétion: ce mélange incompréhensible de cruauté intarissable et d'artifices entortillés pour leur imprimer un caractère de justice et de l'égalité, formeront le tableau le plus frappant de la Révolution.

“ Voice deux exemples de la politique de Collot. Un matin il avait ordonné au tribunal révolutionnaire d'arrêter un jeune adolescent



suspect ; de l'interroger, et de le juger avant la fin du jour. Vers les six heures, Collot étant à table et en orgie avec des filles des baladins, des bourreaux, mangeant et buvant au bruit d'une musique choisie, entre un des juges du tribunal. Après les formalités d'usage, on l'introduit à l'oreille du triumvir ; il lui annonce que le jeune homme arrêté, interrogé, et les plus sévères informations prises sur son compte, il se trouve irréprochable, et que le tribunal opine à l'élargir. Collot, sans regarder le juge, élève la voix et lui dit ; *'Je vous ai ordonné de punir cet homme ; je veux qu'il périsse avant la fin du jour ; si l'on épargnait les innocens, trop de coupables échapperaient ; allez.'* La musique et l'allégresse recommencent, et l'heure suivante le jeune homme est fusillé.

"Un, nommé Châlon, présidait la commission provisoire instituée à Lyon avant l'arrivée des commissaires. Plus honnête que ses collègues, épouvanté de l'injustice et de la violence des instructions qui leur étaient confiées, il vint représenter à Collot—d'Herbois l'impossibilité d'exécuter certaines des opérations exigées, et lui demanda des éclaircissemens positifs. *'Les Représentans du Peuple,'* répliqua Collot, du ton grave d'un oracle, *'sont ici pour presser les mouvemens de la commission s'ils les jugent trop lents, et pour les réprimer s'ils ont trop d'énergie ; faites votre devoir, vous répondrez de votre obéissance.'* Châlons comprit le sens de ce logogriphe, et donna sa démission le lendemain.

"Au milieu des ruines sanglantes de Lyon, un orage sourd se préparait contre l'exterminateur. Robespierre, Danton, et leurs amis, aussi peu touchés que d'Herbois de ces scènes de carnage, complotaient de les faire servir à la perte de leur ordinateur. Ils arrangèrent de le rappeler, de l'accuser, et de le faire périr comme ayant excédé ses pouvoirs. On eut ensuite exalté l'humanité de la Convention. Collot eventa ce projet. Son retour subit précéda l'ordre de rappel, il rallia les coupe-jarrets de sa clique, parut aux Jacobins, les harangua, prit le ton de menace envers ses ennemis, les força au silence, et arracha à la Convention un décret approubatif de sa conduite. De ce moment il est devenu l'implacable adversaire de Robespierre, et son tourment dans le comité. Il souffla l'incendie à la Commune, dans les sections, et aux Jacobins ; et s'est fait le chef ostensible de tous les rivaux des dictateurs du Comité.

"Cet homme ne devant pas tarder à devenir important, et à paraître à la tête d'une nouvelle domination, j'ai cru essentiel de vous le faire connaître avec quelque détail. Personne n'est plus dangereux pour diviser, calomnier, brouiller un parti. Voilà son véritable talent. Il n'en a aucun pour l'administration générale.

"En décrivant la composition et les attributs du Comité de Salut-Public, je ne dois pas omettre de vous rappeler le Comité de *Sûreté Générale*, créé le 2 October 1792, alors investi de la surveillance la plus étendue sur les desseins, discours, pensées, actions, correspondances ; autorisé à provoquer, à recevoir les délations, à dénoncer lui-même, et à faire saisir arbitrairement les citoyens ; ses fonctions redoutables lui assurèrent une influence qui ne l'était pas moins. Si cet empire n'a pas été fondée dans celui du Comité de Salut Public, il lui reste, du moins, très subordonné. C'est le satellite de la planète, le bras que la tête fait mouvoir à son gré, l'inquisition d'état que dirige le comité de Salut-Public. Jusqu'ici, elle avait conservé à ce dernier fidélité et obéissance. Robespierre et ses collègues la tenaient en lesse [laisse ?] mais leurs ennemis sont parvenus à jeter entre les deux conseils des semences de discorde et de rivalité. Je suis instruit que *Vadier* et *Vouland*,

membres du conseil de Sûreté Générale, y ont formé un parti actif et nombreux contre le Comité de Salut-Public. Ces deux hommes, privés par eux-mêmes d'une consistance suffisante, sont très probablement les agents d'une faction plus cachée, gouvernée par des chefs plus puissans.

" Cette scission finira par conduire ses auteurs à l'échafaud, ou par soustraire le Comité de Sûreté Générale à celui de Salut-Public. Ce dernier, perdant sa sentinelle, perdra l'une des principales colonnes de sa puissance. Comme ces deux autorités s'amortiraient mutuellement par leur discordance, il faudra nécessairement que le Comité de Salut-Public repeuple le Comité de Surveillance de ses créatures, ou que le Comité de Surveillance forme un nouveau Comité de Salut-Public.

" Ce pouvoir inquisitorial qui s'exerçait sur la Convention même, qui jouissait du droit de faire les enquêtes, de recueillir les soupçons, d'ordonner les arrestations, et aussi du droit de rapporter à l'Assemblée représentative le résultat des recherches, et les fondemens de ses accusations, préparait de fait tous les décrets juridiques de la Convention, et les dicta toutes les fois qu'il marcha d'accord avec le Comité de Salut-Public. Celui-ci, par le ministère de l'autre, tenait donc dans ses mains la liberté et la vie de tous les Représentans du Peuple, et de tous les agens de la République : chaque Député soumis tremblait de voir son nom inscrit sur les tables de proscription. Ainsi, à l'exception d'un petit nombre des Montagnards aguerris, le Comité de Salut-Public disposait de l'Assemblée, en suspendant journallement sur sa tête l'épée de *Damoclès*.

" L'accusation contre *Bazire* et *Chabot*, l'arrestation de *Ronsin*, de *Vincent* et de *Maillard*, furent dictées par le Comité de Salut-Public au Comité de Sûreté-Générale. La même influence a fait rejeter l'accusation contre *Philippeaux* et *Bourdon* de l'Oise, tous deux partisans du Comité dictatorial.

" Les tribunaux révolutionnaires recevaient la même impulsion. Ceux des provinces par les Commissaires Conventionnels à la dévotion du Comité ; celui de Paris par l'action journalière et immédiate de la même autorité. Innocent ou coupable, tout prévenu accusé par l'inquisition comituelle a été sûr d'un arrêt de mort. Une dame de qualité dont le fils, émigré et rentré en France, venait d'être condamné à la guillotine, malgré les circonstances gracieuses de son état, fut exhortée par l'un des juges révolutionnaires d'aller solliciter *Roberspierre*. Elle employa auprès de lui la séduction des larmes, celle de l'intérêt, la justice, la pitié. *Roberspierre*, qui l'avait écoutée avec un visage de fer, la congédia en lui disant, '*Citoyenne, j'ai le pouvoir du faire punir, mais je ne sais pas faire grace.*'

" Vous voyez maintenant que le bras terrible de la puissance judiciaire, la plus tyrannique, la plus dispensée de toutes formes, la plus indépendante de toutes loix, la plus générale dans l'exercice de ses vengeances, repose au milieu du Comité de Salut-Public. Elle glace et effroi tous les citoyens dans les chaumières comme dans les hôtels ; sur les bancs de la Convention comme dans les lits de l'aristocratie ; dans les clubs des Jacobins, comme dans les foyers du bourgeois royaliste.

" Outre la puissance qui donne au Comité cette concentration de l'autorité inquisitoriale, dénonciatrice, accusatrice, et judiciaire, il en tire une non moins formidable de la disposition absolue des deniers publics, et des fortunes particulières. Je vous ai précédemment indiqué la compétence illimitée dont il jouissait à cet égard. Maître de verser à volonté une pluie d'or, seul confident des dépenses qu'il ordonne, fécond en moyens de détourner, d'altérer, de déguiser, de justifier ses emplois d'argent, il peut multiplier suivant ses besoins tous les genres de

corruption, et acheter les hommes vénals, tandis qu'il fait trembler ceux qui sont au dessus de la nécessité de se vendre.

"Indépendamment des fonds publics, il dispose des *compositions*; c'est à dire, de ces traités par lesquels un propriétaire incarcéré, placé entre la guillotine et la confiscation, croit racheter sa vie en sacrifiant la moitié, les trois quarts de sa fortune. Presque toujours c'est un marché de dupes, car les traitants avec qui l'on stipule sont trop avisés pour laisser vivans des témoins de ce trafic. Il n'en fait pas moins journellement passer dans le poche du Comité, et de ses entremetteurs, les portes-feuilles et la bourse des accusés admis à composition, tandis que leurs immeubles sont dévolûs à la nation.

"Avec l'argent, les dénonciations, les cachots, et les échaffauds, Roberspierre et les siens disposent encore de l'*armée révolutionnaire*. Ce sont là leurs janissaires, leurs prétoriens. Paris et l'empire se trouvent soumis à cette force, soumise elle-même au Comité qui en a nommé les chefs, fixé les fonctions, repartí les divisions, et qui en solde chaque individu par une paye triple de celle du soldat ordinaire.

"Cette armée que l'on croit généralement être une institution nouvelle, existe depuis 1789. Les agens du duc d'Orléans en formèrent le premier noyau. Elle se grossit, s'organisa, reçut des commandans, des lieux de rendez-vous, des mots d'ordre, un argot. On en trouve les détails dans une note *Des considérations sur la durée de la Révolution*, page 64, par Mallet du Pan.

"Elle fut successivement à la disposition des divers machinateurs d'insurrection, mais spécialement à celle du duc d'Orléans. Toutes les révolutions se sont exécutées avec son secours. Elle donnait le mouvement aux violences populaires partout où elle ne parvenait pas en masse; elle faisait porter le buste de Necker le 12 Juillet 1789, et fermer les spectacles, massacrer *Foulon* et *Berthier*, brûler les châteaux, courir la populace à Versailles le 5 Octobre, arrêter le Roi dans la cour des Tuilleries le 20 Avril 1791, et ensanglanter Avignon. Conduite par Westerman et Fournier, et grossie des galériens de *Brest* et de *Marseille*, elle fut le bataillon central de l'attaque du 10 Août 1792. Elle exécuta les massacres du mois de Septembre, elle convoit les Maratistes à la journée du 31 Mai 1793, qui écrasa les Brissotins.

"Le Comité n'a fait autre chose que de mettre au grand jour cette force déjà secrettement organisée, et de la constituer légalement *force publique*. Sa composition répond à ses exploits, et à ses fonctions. Elle renferme les scélérats les plus déterminés, des buveurs de sang humain, le rebut des échaffauds de toute l'Europe, les brigands d'Avignon, l'écumé des Marseillais, du Brabant, de Liège, de la Suisse, de la côte de Gênes. Fort augmentée depuis qu'elle a pris rang dans l'état militaire, on l'a recrutée de perquiers désœuvrés, de laquais sans place, de bandits faiseurs de motions en plein air, de misérables hors d'état de gagner leur pain par un travail honnête. Au commencement on apercevait une distinction assez tranchante entre les mœurs des anciennes et des nouvelles bandes; celles-ci se piquaient encore de scrupules; mais, de jour en jour, elles s'élevaient à la hauteur de leurs modèles, et l'on peut statuer qu'avant trois mois la police de la France et celle de la Révolution seront faites par une armée de quarante ou cinquante mille pendants effrénés, dignes de supplices recherchés.

"La capitale est contenue par dix mille de ces Mamloucks. Ils en imposent de reste à une imbécile et pusillanime bourgeoisie. Chaque Département en supporte un détachement. On en a placés dans les grandes villes, à Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux, Nantes, Amiens, où ils exploitent tous les genres de crimes aux ordres de Commissaires.

*Rouen* est, *je crois*, la seule ville qui ait résisté à leur introduction et qui ait maintenu son indépendance municipale.

Le commandement général de cette armée a été confié à *Ronsin* ci-devant Procureur ; tour à tour espion, délateur, massacreur, commissaire-ordonnateur, employé du Bureau de la Guerre, et parfaitement propre à toutes ces fonctions alternatives dans le sens révolutionnaire. *Pache* en avait fait l'un de ces affidés, pendant qu'il gérait le Ministère de la Guerre. Il le chargea d'aller brouiller les cartes, rompre les marchés de subsistances, intriguer, voler et calomnier dans l'armée de *Dumourier*. Ce général l'a peint d'après nature dans sa correspondance imprimée. Devoué aux anti-Brissotins, *Ronsin* les servit de tous ses talens, devint bientôt un personnage, et gagna surtout du crédit dans les Bureaux de la Guerre, composés d'aussi honnêtes gens qui lui.

“ Ces Bureaux, de l'aveu du Comité, l'envoyèrent l'été dernier à la *Vendée*, investi d'un espèce de dictature militaire. Directeur en Chef de la guerre, sous le nom de *Général Ministre*, il s'associa *Vincent*, Secrétaire Général du Département de la Guerre, et *Rossignol* brigand inepte et toujours ivre (ivre), devenu aussi général par les vicissitudes du temps. Ce triumvirat, escorté d'un phalange d'états-majors, d'histrions, et de filles de joye, ne s'occupa que de disloquer l'armée, de casser des généraux, d'accabler les Commissaires Conventionnels de contrariétés et de mortifications. Ceux-ci se plaignirent vainement au Comité qui avait confié à *Ronsin* des sommes considérables et des lettres de cachet en blanc, que ce général remplissait à discrétion. Quand ces trois égreffins, crapuleux, et pillards, auraient été payé par les Royalistes, ils n'eussent pas dirigés autrement le cours de la campagne ; elle fut une suite de désastres tant qu'ils conservèrent la prédominance. Cependant le Comité, *aveuglé clairvoyant*, mais obligé de ménager les triumvirs, leurs cliens du Bureau de la Guerre, et la nombreuse cabale qui les protégeait, resta sourd aux clameurs des Commissaires. Heureusement l'Armée Révolutionnaire fut installée, on la mit sous les ordres de *Ronsin* ; *Vincent* y fut aussi employé. *Ronsin* expédié à Lyon avec trois mille de ses satellites pour y soutenir les vengeances des Commissaires, correspondit à leur attente et s'y montra digne de sa réputation.

“ Mais dans l'intervalle, le Comité avait été mieux instruit de sa conduite à la *Vendée* ; il le sut étroitement lié à Collot d'Herbois, au parti de la Commune, à tous les agitateurs subalternes ; il découvrit des brigandages inouis commis sans ordres, contre les ordres, et à son profit par ce scélérat et son armée. On le voyait affecter un ton d'indépendance et de menace. Aussitôt *Robespierre* le fit dénoncer à la Convention par *Philippeaux*, par *Bourdon de l'Oise* et *Fabre d'Églantine*. Le Comité de Sûreté Générale reçut ordre de rechercher la conduite de *Ronsin* et de *Vincent*. Après des hésitations, on se hasarda à les faire arrêter ; ainsi que *Maillard*, orateur des femmes de Paris dans la journée du 5<sup>e</sup> Octobre 1789, l'un des chefs des Septembriseurs et précepteur d'une société populaire de la capitale, où se forment, depuis cinq mois, les motions massacrant, les pétitions incendiaires, et la matrice des nouvelles secousses à imprimer à la Révolution.

“ Vous avez été instruit du sort de cette tentative du Comité. Les cris des Cordeliers, des sections, des clubs frénétiques, l'ont forcé de faire élargir ses prisonniers. Leur délivrance *obligée*, triomphe pour leur parti, est l'un des symptômes de sa prochaine supériorité. *Robespierre*, dissimulant son ressentiment, a non seulement témoigné une parfaite impartialité touchant le sort de ces trois hommes, mais il n'a pas

hésité, crainte de pis, à laisser sacrifier *Fabre d'Eglantine*, chasser *Philippeaux* des Jacobins, et maltraiter leurs adhérens, nommés *Philippotins* par leurs adversaires.

“Ce détail qui, peut-être, vous paraîtra épisodique, ne l'est nullement, car il vous donnera la clef de l'impulsion, contraire au Comité, qu'on va travailler à communiquer à l'*Armée Révolutionnaire*. A quelles factions qu'elle s'attache, elle décidera de leur sort, comme elle a décidé celui de tout celle qui les ont précédés.

“Après vous avoir montré les trois piliers fondamentaux de l'existence du Comité de Salut-Public, l'*Argent*, l'*Armée Révolutionnaire*, la *Tyrannie judiciaire*, et la *Terreur universelle* qu'elle entretient, il serait surabondant de rechercher les états subsidiaires de cette autorité. Je me contente de vous faire observer que la multitude d'employés publics dont le salaire, les fonctions, la liberté, la vie, sont à la merci du Comité, lui forment une armée de créatures. On compte trente cinq mille de ses employés dans la seule capitale. Il s'en faut immensément que tous soient des serviteurs fidèles, ou des partisans affectionnés. Le nombre de ceux-ci n'est pas comparable à celui des traitres secrets, qui égorgeraient demain leur idole d'aujourd'hui, que le plus vil intérêt ou une basse pusillanimité enchaîne à la fortune mobile des dominateurs du jour; mais qui, par des motifs différens, les servent et leur obéissent avec zèle, dans l'ignorance de la durée d'un pouvoir qui les renverserait d'un souffle.

“Avant de mesurer la force de ces piliers dont les vacillations deviennent sensibles depuis deux mois, je répondrai à une question fort naturelle que les notions précédentes doivent vous inspirer. Vous me demanderez où tend cette puissance extraordinaire du Comité; quel est son but; quelles sont ses vues définitives; quel terme il se promet de ses travaux, de ses angoisses, et de ses crimes.

“Il serait présomptueux de répondre péremptoirement; car l'ambition n'est pas toujours diaphane, et le Comité, secret sur des entreprises moins importantes, pourrait se rendre impénétrable dans les desseins dont le plus petit nombre de ses membres serait d'ailleurs seul confident. Il faut donc s'arrêter aux idées plausibles sans se flatter d'atteindre la certitude. En vous exposant quelques conjectures je les appuie, cependant, sur plusieurs notions positives autant que sur les probabilités.

“On doit distinguer, d'abord, les vues du Comité qui lui sont personnelles, de celles qui embrassent la République même, la conduite des affaires générales, et celle de la guerre.

“L'opinion vulgaire, au dedans comme au dehors, est que *Robespierre*, *Danton*, et leurs complices dans le Comité, aspirent à perpétuer leur Dictature. Une foule de personnes à Paris même vont plus loin, en concentrant dans *Robespierre* seul ce projet d'usurpation, et un plan profond et suivi pour y parvenir. La conduite de ce Chef depuis quelques mois semblerait accréditer cette présomption. Il avait gagné un ascendant en apparence exclusif. Le Comité n'osait résister à ses volontés; il régnait sur la majorité des Jacobins; tous les partis s'accordaient à le flatter; ses paroles étaient des décisions, et la supériorité de son ton décelait celle de son autorité.

“Nonobstant ces divers indices, l'hypothèse de ce projet me paraît inconciliable avec le caractère des acteurs, avec la connaissance qu'ils possèdent des hazards à courir, avec leur expérience de l'instabilité de la faveur populaire, et de la fragilité d'un pouvoir que la première défiance ferait évanouir. Malgré la docilité fanatique qu'ils ont obtenu du peuple jusqu'à ce jour, ils ne s'aveuglent point sur le principe de ce dévouement; ni sur l'avantage qu'auraient leurs rivaux à tourner contre eux la fureur publique du moment où on les verrait tenter de briser le talisman de la *Liberté et de l'Egalité*.

“ Une semblable entreprise est au dessus des forces et des mœurs de *Robespierre*. Il a montré constamment plus de fanatisme que d'ambition. Cependant on ne peut révoquer en doute son intention et celles de ses collègues de prolonger la durée de leur puissance. Par quel motif ? Je les comprends tous dans un seul, par le *motif de la peur*.

“ Que redoutent-ils maintenant ? Ce n'est pas la guerre étrangère, dont les atteintes sont si loin de leur théâtre, dont les effets ont été si infructueux, et contre laquelle ils se regardent tous unanimement comme invulnérables. C'est encore moins les aristocrates foudroyés, les Feuillans, les Fédéralistes, ensévelis ou trainant dans d'obscures retraites leur misérable existence. Ces fripons sanguinaires qui accusent, qui confisquent, qui égorgent sous prétexte de contre-révolution à craindre, n'ont pas une minute la crainte d'une contre-révolution.

“ Les Révolutionnaires même, voilà leurs ennemis, les objets de leur terreur, et le but caché de leur tyrannie. Obsédés de ces terribles compétiteurs qu'ils ont formé au crime, qu'ils savent incapables d'aucun sentiment d'amitié ou de reconnaissance, et capables de les surpasser en scélératesse, ils les voyent impatiens de toute espèce de joug, avides de pouvoir, élancés contre celui qu'ils ont élevé. Les agitateurs du second ordre, joints à ceux que le crédit populaire ou des places importantes semblent approcher des premières rangs, sont des Furies attachées aux pas de quiconque possède l'autorité. Les titulaires actuels, se voyant menacés du châtiment qu'ils infligèrent aux Brissotins, et que les Brissotins avaient infligés aux Constitutionnels, n'ont que deux ressources de salut ; l'une, d'égaliser en barbarie et en affectation de civisme exterminateur les démagogues toujours prêts à les accuser de modérantisme et de trahison ; l'autre, de les réprimer et à travailler de s'en défaire. Pour remplir ce but, il faut maintenir le pouvoir exorbitant qu'on s'est attribué. Sous peine de passer de la dictature à l'échaffaud, il faut rester dictateur. L'abdication même est interdite ; *Hérault* et *Bazire* en ont fait l'épreuve. Mais il ne suffit pas de conserver le poignard ; il faut encore l'arracher à ceux qui l'approchent de votre gorge. Point d'obéissance, point de repos ; point de sûreté à espérer tant qu'on ne règne que par l'assistance d'alliés perfides, et par des décrets qu'un chef d'insurrection mettra en poudre dans une demie journée.

“ C'est donc pour conserver leur vie, et secondairement pour conserver leur empire, que *Robespierre* et son Comité s'arrogent l'omnipotence. Ils travaillent pour le présent plutôt que pour l'avenir ; environnés de massacreurs, leur prévoyance se concentre à s'en garantir. Dans l'alternative d'éteindre ces foyers de révolutions interminables ou d'en être consumés, la route est tracée ; on la suit forcément, et l'on retient en tachant de l'agrandir la puissance qui sert de bouclier.

“ Voilà dans mon opinion à quoi se réduisent ces grands desseins de souveraineté par lesquels le public cherche à expliquer les profondeurs du Comité de Salut-Public. Des rapports multipliés et un concours de faits particuliers donnent à mes conjectures le plus haut degré de vraisemblance. Je crois, par exemple, vous avoir mandé que le mois dernier une femme, liée avec *Danton* et *Robespierre* et les voyant menacés, les consulta l'un et l'autre sur le projet qu'elle formait de quitter la France.

“ “ *Fuyez vite,*” lui répondirent-ils, “ *fuyez, nous voudrions pouvoir vous suivre ? nous ne tarderons pas à nous entregorger et la France sera un champ de carnage.*” Le portrait que je vous ai tracé des habitudes de *Robespierre* atteste que la crainte domine sur tous ses sentimens. *Danton* travaille à s'éclipser, et ne paraît sur la scène que de loin en loin. Leurs collègues chassent l'ivresse de l'effroi par l'ivresse des plaisirs, et se rassurent dans des banquets crapuleux entre

le vin et la débauche la plus immodérée. Lisez les discours de Robespierre depuis le commencement de l'année ; vous y verrez la dénonciation perpétuelle des faux patriotes, des exagérateurs, des agitateurs.

“ Quand aux vues générales du Comité, elles tendent toutes à maintenir et à consolider le Pouvoir Révolutionnaire qui leur assujettit la République et les armées. Aucun plan de constitution fixe, de gouvernement régulier rentre pour le moment dans leurs projets. Ils sont trop embarrassés du poids de l'édifice à soutenir pour songer à façonner cette masse informe. Leur attention est absorbée par la nécessité de faire face aux vicissitudes imminentes, et aux factions qui les provoquent. Les ressorts sont uniquement armés pour tendre de plus en plus le mobile de la terreur ; pour étouffer les semences de rébellion, et donner le change sur les motifs qui font exiger une obéissance devenue servitude.

“ Les frottemens sans nombre, les contrariétés dans l'exécution, la violence des mesures, la difficulté de faire plier l'anarchie et l'esprit d'indépendance, le besoin de surveiller tant d'agens dont la perversité légitime la défiance de leur commettans, les événemens imprévus, la discorde de tant de rouages hétérogènes échappent fréquemment à la vigilance du Comité, ou plutôt à son action directe partagée entre tant de soins diverses.

“ Mais le péril commun à tous les auteurs, facteurs, directeurs et bénéficiers de la République, fait subordonner dans le Comité ainsi qu'à la Convention, à la Commune et aux Jacobins, les conspirations de partis à la nécessité de la défense générale. Toutes les fois que le danger paraît très menaçant, on oublie un instant les haines et les rivalités. Lorsqu'il se fit adjuger la dictature, le Comité consulta l'intérêt public, autant que celui de son ambition. Il vit, et toutes les factions virent avec lui, le salut de la République dans cette institution. Ainsi l'on se tromperait de croire qu'elle tient aux vues personnelles de quelques hommes. Si le Comité actuel succombe les membres changeront ; mais le Comité restera, probablement avec des modifications.

“ Jusqu'à présent il n'a point menti à son titre : il n'en a pas même méconnu les devoirs. Il a porté dans leur exercice une application soutenue, une infatigable activité, des talens couronnés par le succès, un esprit de suite, de combinaison, et d'audace réfléchie. Les expédiens atroces dont il se sert depuis cinq mois pour soutenir le fardeau n'ont révolté que ceux dont il n'a rien à craindre. Les autres lui ont longtemps pardonné une autorité si dangereuse à leur indépendance licentieuse, et à l'impunité.

“ Il est d'autant plus fortement lié au besoin de défendre la cause de la République contre les attaques du dedans et du dehors, que le pouvoir nécessaire à cette fonction renferme en même temps un pouvoir, répressif et absolu dans l'intérieur, qui assure le propre domination de Comité autant que le salut de la Révolution. Si la crise extérieure venait à prendre fin comme celles de la *Provence*, de *Lyon*, et de la *Vendée*, le Comité serait chassé le lendemain.

“ L'identité de ses moyens d'autorité avec les moyens de défense publique lui a fait ajourner la paix à un terme indéfini. Sans la guerre, plus de prétextes d'extortions, de rapines, d'enrolemens forcés, de réquisition sur tous les fruits de la terre, et de saccagement universel ; sans la guerre, plus d'espérance de maintenir dans les armées cette discipline, non pas militaire mais révolutionnaire, qui prévient les réunions, les complots, les secousses intestines, et la désobéissance au Comité ou à ses préposés. Les armées perdraient cette exaltation de vanité qui les anime contre le soldat étranger ; en refluant dans l'intérieur elles participeraient au fanatisme, à la licence, à la discorde. Chaque faction travaillerait à les agiter, elles se diviseraient comme la

Convention et les Jacobins; ses chefs, devenus plus indépendans, disposeraient un jour du destin de l'empire; l'armée révolutionnaire s'anéantirait devant des bataillons fiers de leurs blessures, et indignés de se voir payer leurs services trois fois moins que les crimes de quelques brigands.

"Ainsi la guerre est aussi nécessaire au Comité que la respiration; il n'est pardonnable qu'à des Hottentots de supposer la possibilité d'obtenir la paix de la République. Lorsqu'on disserte en faveur de cette possibilité, sur la foi de quelques avances clandestines, et de quelques offres insidieuses, on confond le but du Comité avec ses démarches, et l'on se méprend sur le premier. Certainement la Convention ne se laisserait pas échapper l'occasion de diminuer le nombre de ses ennemis. Le Comité a fait, il renouvelle tous les jours, des efforts à ce sujet. Pendant le cours de l'année dernière, et même durant cet hiver, il a, par exemple, proposé sous main à la Cour de Turin de se séparer de la coalition, de réunir ses forces à celles de la République, et de prendre la Lombardie. Il n'est pas moins sûr qu'on a fait des ouvertures à la Prusse. Je ne serais pas étonné que votre Cabinet en eut reçu d'analogues; mais c'est une erreur trop grossière de voir dans cette intention de diviser et d'affaiblir la coalition, un désir de paix générale. Le Comité ne traiterait avec l'un de ses ennemis que pour redoubler avec plus de moyens la fureur de ses hostilités contre les autres.

"Le Comité veut donc continuer la guerre pour sa sûreté, par politique, par nécessité, et toujours dans l'espoir qu'elle livrera à sa discrétion les subsistances et les trésors des provinces qui avoisinent la France. Dès qu'il a vu circuler à Paris le désir de la paix, et s'élever des motions expressives de ce vœu-là, il s'est hâté de l'enchaîner par une nouvelle proclamation de guerre éternelle à tous les Gouvernemens.

"Il poursuivra cet objet jusqu'à sa dernière heure d'existence; ses successeurs le poursuivront après lui et par les mêmes motifs. Aucune faction ne tentera de s'y opposer; puisque, purement politiques, toutes ont un intérêt plus ou moins immédiat à écarter l'armée de l'intérieur; et le gros de la nation est hors d'état de résister à cette volonté. Seulement le Comité, les Montagnards, la Convention s'attacheront toujours d'avantage à populariser la guerre; quoique cette tâche paraisse insurmontable à la vue des calamités dont cette frénésie militaire accable le peuple, ils arrêteront les soupirs sur ses lèvres par des jongleries et des déclamations, et sauront bien prévenir que ces gémissemens aillent jusqu'à un désespoir dangereux. Regardez donc comme des points de conduite constants, *continuation de la guerre à outrance, le séjour de l'armée loin du théâtre des factions, et le besoin de dévaster les contrées adjacentes pour supplier à la disette qui menace de dévorer les armées, après la royaume.*

"Le Comité sacrifiera tout à ces trois buts. Décidé à l'emporter ou à périr, il projette de dépenser quatre cents millions par mois, d'engloutir toutes les fortunes particulières et la population valide; de porter ses masses à la suite de ses armées; de ruiner les vôtres par une agression continue; et de faire un désert des provinces où vous menaceriez de pénétrer. Il a calculé ses ressources pour deux ans; s'il atteint la prochaine récolte, il se croira sauvé. La disette actuelle, je vous le répète, ne l'inquiète qu'autant qu'elle peut s'étendre à la capitale et aux armées. Il entre dans son plan d'approvisionnement abondamment celles-ci, médiocrement Paris, et d'abandonner le reste à la famine, bien sûr qu'elle grossira ses légions de tous les males qui ne pourront plus subsister dans l'intérieur.

"Jusqu'ici je n'ai indiqué que passagèrement les causes qui travaillent à contrarier cette politique des *Mille et une Nuits*; à énerver ces efforts



d'audace, et de malveillance ; à miner par la racine ce Comité dont la puissance, plus personnelle à ses principaux membres qu'on ne le croit, ne sera pas renversée sans ébranler dans sa chute la République entière, le système de la guerre, et la Révolution même à laquelle cet événement donnera peut-être une nouvelle face.

« Depuis que j'ai commencé ce *résumé*, la position du Comité a changé de caractère ; les divisions intestines qu'il maîtrisait, et dont il se servait avec habileté, ont pris des forces ; les siennes sont aujourd'hui balancées. A fin d'éviter l'exagération des pronostics, on doit s'en tenir aux faits actuels, reconnaître les combattans, peser leur poids respectifs, et à cet effet discerner exactement la nature des divisions qui les mettent aux prises. L'issue de cette lutte aura dans le cours de la campagne, vers le fin du printemps, une influence si intéressante, qu'aucun examen ne l'emporte en gravité sur celui-ci.

« Ce ne fut qu'à la fin d'Octobre dernier qu'on aperçut les indices d'un schisme naissant dans la faction dominante. Depuis la chute des Brissotins leurs adversaires, restés unis, concouraient tous dans une déférence enthousiaste pour le Comité de Salut-Public, et spécialement pour *Robespierre*. Toutes les voix célébraient ce dernier ; les papiers publics donnaient l'exemple et le ton de la vénération ; on n'osait contredire ce chef, ni à la Convention, ni aux Jacobins. Paraissait-il au spectacle ? Il était applaudi, comme jadis le Roi. Les prôneurs soudoyés, la canaille gagée pour occuper les galleries et les avenues de l'Assemblée, les délateurs, les tuteurs, tout était dans sa dépendance. Ebloui de cette éclat, et entraîné par la violence de son caractère, il négligea les ménagements, il heurta les amours-propres, il fit craindre ses desseins. On le voyait resserrer sa faction, et appesantir le sceptre sur quiconque lui portait ombrage. Il reléguait aux frontières les caballeurs et les motionnaires trop indépendans ; il laissait percer le désir de contenir le mouvement révolutionnaire, et d'imposer un frein à des hommes qui n'en voulaient aucun.

« Les premières étincelles éclatèrent à la Vendée par les divisions dont j'ai parlé entre les Commissaires Conventionnels, et les *Ronsin*, les *Vincent*, les *Rossignols*. Le Comité prudent ne désavoua ni ne soutint la conduite des Députés ; il paraissait craindre leurs antagonistes, et la cabale du Bureau de la Guerre, leur auxiliaire. Que ce parti ait conspiré dès cette époque la ruine du Comité, en lui procurant des revers dans la Vendée, ou que l'ineptie seule et le brigandage des généraux les aient occasionnés, il demeure certain que les dénonciations faites alors par les Commissaires, et auxquelles le Comité de Salut-public ne fut pas étranger, furent le signal d'une discorde ouverte.

« L'arrestation de *Ronsin*, de *Vincent* et de *Maillard* fit sortir des conciliabules populaires une nouvelle faction dont *Robespierre* connaissait déjà l'existence et méprisait les forces. Les têtes s'échauffèrent à la Commune, dans les sections, aux Cordeliers ; on demanda le jugement en forme des accusés, manière indirecte de censurer la durée de leur détention ; la secrétairerie du Bureau de la Guerre, l'état-major de l'armée révolutionnaire, les adjoints au Ministre Bouchotte se remuèrent ; on tint des conseils secrets chez *Pache*, et à l'Hotel de la Guerre. Les hostilités de la presse enflammèrent le différend ; les Jacobins se divisèrent et paraissaient balancés entre deux forces opposées.

« Cependant personne encore n'avait osé offenser *Robespierre* et le Comité qui, affectant de l'indifférence sur ces débats, voyaient avec plaisir ces dangereuses cabales s'entre-déchirer, et s'appropriaient secrètement à leur perdre l'une par l'autre sans avoir l'air d'y participer.

« Leur crédit ne baissa point extérieurement, mais leur politique fut devinée et déjouée. Ils ne tardèrent pas à se convaincre qu'une main

robuste et exercée maniait ces élémens factieux, dont chacun, pris séparément, inspirait au Comité plus de mépris que de haine. Les accusés furent remis en liberté, leurs accusateurs disgraciés, Roberspierre chercha les moyens de réparer ce premier échec.

“ Il fit donner plus de consistance au Gouvernement Révolutionnaire ; il effraya la Commune par l'autorité de la Convention ; il saisissait chaque occasion de décrier et de poursuivre les *faux patriotes*, les *contre-révolutionnaires* en bonnets rouges ; il les fit attaquer nominativement par *Camille des Moulins* dans une feuille intitulée le *Vieux Cordelier*. Dès la fin de Novembre, et pour tenir tête aux *Hébertistes* (le parti de la Commune) il s'unit avec *Danton son ennemi* mortel mais menacé comme lui, ayant à se reprocher sa vénalité, les sommes qu'il reçut de la liste civile, une fortune scandaleuse, des connivences avec le Temple, et son opposition au procès de la Reine.

“ Cette coalition raffermît quelque temps le crédit suprême de Roberspierre. Il fit décréter aux Jacobins l'épure de cette société, pour en faire sortir les traitres, les aristocrates déguisés, les sans-culottes de mauvaise foi ; c'est à dire pour s'assurer d'une influence exclusive dans le club, en chassant les instrumens de ses ennemis et plusieurs de ses ennemis même.

“ Prolongée jusqu'à la fin de Janvier, cette opération a été un nouveau brandon dans l'incendie. Un ricochet de dénonciations respectives a engendré de nouvelles haines, et rendu les premières implacables. Des débats furieux ont annoncé une guerre à mort ; elle l'était en effet, puisque l'exclusion des Jacobins frappait l'exclus de l'anathème d'*homme suspect*, et le plaçait au pied de la guillotine.

“ On a pu juger par l'examen, et par le résultat du scrutin épuratoire, du degré de puissance des deux factions. La victoire a alterné ; mais les *Hébertistes* ont fait plus d'illustres victimes. Ils sont parvenus à expulser *Philippeaux*, *Camille-Desmoulins*, *Fabre d'Eglantine*, à entacher irrémissiblement plusieurs partisans du Comité, et à ne perdre aucun de leur chefs, ni affiliés essentiels.

*Collot d'Herbois*, ainsi que je l'ai dit plus haut, a paru le conducteur ostensible de l'opposition dans ces démêlés. Sans injurier, ni accuser Roberspierre et le Comité-même, en continuant à conserver avec sa cabale des ménagemens extérieures pour cette autorité légale et redoutable, il s'est étudié à en saper la base, et voici de quelle manière.

“ Il était inévitable qu'investi du pouvoir le Comité voulut en jouir ; qu'il exigea l'obéissance après avoir concouru à subvertir le principe de toute obéissance ; que régnant par la terreur, il invoqua le respect de l'ordre ; et que, créateur de la puissance révolutionnaire, il entendait la subordonner à son impulsion, la retirer des mains de la multitude et de ses agitateurs ; et en arrêter le mouvement toutes les fois qu'il lui paraissait trop fort, ou contraire à ses projets.

“ Voilà le défilé mortel qu'il fallait traverser pour dominer sans trouble ; défilé dans lequel périrent les Brissotins. Le Comité se jettait dans le même danger à l'heure où la faux qui moissonne les Royalistes, paraissait menacer les perturbateurs populaires, jaloux de recommencer une révolution. Faire emprisonner ou guillotiner les anarchistes, c'est soulever contre soi ses propres troupes ; les laisser agir librement, c'est exposer à en recevoir la loi.

“ De plus, comment espérer d'enchaîner jamais des scélérats dégoutans, et non rassasiés de carnage, en immolant toutes les victimes dont ils demandent la mort ? Ceder à leur férocité, c'est l'accroître, et accroître l'opinion de leur puissance. D'ailleurs, le Comité, calculant plus froidement les sacrifices de sang humain, a vu des inconvéniens à les perpétuer : il a vu la commisération chasser la fureur dans l'âme de la populace, l'effroi tuer tout attachement à la Révolution, les supplices

perdre leur efficacité, et la guillotine ne plus être accompagnée que d'un poignée de gueux, qu'on envoie avec un assignat de vingt-quatre sols crier *Vive la République* autour du tribunal révolutionnaire et de l'échaffaud. Le Comité avait donc arrêté de diminuer ce fleuve de sang, d'incarcérer au lieu d'égorger, et de prendre les biens de ceux à qui l'on conserverait la vie.

“En conséquence quelques-uns de ses membres tel que *Fabre d'Églantine*, ses créatures à la Convention et aux Jacobins commençaient à parler de clémence. *Camille Desmoulins* la prêchait, *tête levée*, dans ses pamphlets. On avait ralenti les exécutions à *Bordeaux*, à *Nantes*, à *Marseille*. On faisait arriver des *Lyonnais* à la Convention avec des pétitions de miséricorde; les compositions, à prix d'argent, se multipliaient; toutes les motions sanguinaires des clubs subalternes et des sections étaient écartées.

“*Collot d'Herbois* et sa faction ont monté leur artillerie sur ces affûts: ils ont imprimées aux *Clémentins* l'odieuse que les *Rolandistes* jettèrent sur les *Septembriseurs*; ils ont représenté ce relâchement d'inhumanité éffrénée sous les couleurs d'une conspiration d'une coalition aristocratique; ils ont poussé des clameurs à l'arrestation de quelques patriotes combinée avec cette perfide modération envers les rebelles; ils ont dénoncé un projet formel de sacrifier les colonnes de la République.

“Alors, la cohue des *sans-culottes*, des Jacobins, des sections, a commencé à prendre des soupçons et à faire *chorus*. La majorité des Montagnards de la Convention a répété ces imprécations; le Comité et ses *Moderés* ont été forcés de rétrograder, et de cacher leur jeu; on a ouvert les prisons à la plupart des scélérats citoyens que détenait le Comité, et réclamés comme des patriotes immaculés. Cette lie, se melant à la lie des agitateurs de Paris, a grossi le torrent. Le despotisme de *Robespierre* et du Comité a été à l'ordre du jour; on a rompu la glace, on a jetté de la boue sur l'idole. Robespierre au milieu de février ayant, par une boutade subite, fait chasser des Jacobins deux égrégins nommés *Bricket* et *Saintex* qui se récriaient contre la mollesse des mesures actuelles, le lendemain Paris fut tapissée de placards inflammatoires contre Robespierre; où on le dénonçait sous le caractère d'un tyran.

“A aucun période de sa faveur il n'avait encore essayé une bourrasque si publique, indice de son décadence dans l'opinion. De jour en jour, l'ascendant de ses adversaires s'est fortifié; ils ne mettent plus ni bornes, ni retenue dans leurs pétitions. Le chagrin ayant rendu malades *Robespierre* et *Couthon* depuis trois semaines, l'opposition a profité de leur absence, *Collot d'Herbois* triomphe seul, et absorbe les applaudissemens aux Jacobins.

“Je ne peux mieux vous peindre l'audace croissante de cette faction, qu'en vous transcrivant le placard suivant, affiché dans toutes les rues de Paris les 2 et 3 de ce mois, *par arrêté du Club des Cordeliers*. C'est le procès-verbal de la séance du 28 pluviose, tenu à la *Société des Défenseurs des Droits de l'Homme*.”

“Ce parti, humble et timide jusqu'à la fin de l'année dernière, maintenant audacieux et ouvertement hostile, a ses principales phalanges dans les sections, et dans les sociétés populaires de Paris. Quoique le Comité ait entièrement suspendu dans les départemens cette influence anarchique de la démocratie délibérante, il n'a pas osé la frapper à la source dans la capitale. Comprimée quelque temps par la vigueur de la Dictature, et par les accidens de la campagne qui favorisaient l'action despotique de celle-ci, elle n'a pas tardé à se ranimer. Les sections sont devenues le refuge de tous les ambitieux désappointés, des coquins indisciplinables, des perturbateurs subalternes, des

matamores de la sans-culottisme, et encore d'un nombre de contre-révolutionnaires cachés qui, sous la moustache, le bonnet rouge, et le pantalon brun, forcent de poumons dans ces tripots, propagent la discorde, et se font remarquer par la véhémence de leurs motions. Chaque section renferme un comité de surveillance et un comité révolutionnaire, dont la compétence devrait se borner aux objets de police locale, et qui, dans le fait, sont autant de foyers d'intrigues, d'innovations, d'indépendance et de troubles.

"Cette démocratie élémentaire, en collision par sa nature avec le pouvoir représentatif, tend invinciblement à échapper à la Convention, à usuper une partie de ses fonctions, et à la gouverner. Tantôt, elle se permet des actes d'autorité révolutionnaire; tantôt elle enfante des pétitions; un jour elle les fait appuyer par le Conseil Municipal, le lendemain par les clubs.

"*La Commune* extraite de ces sections, *la Commune* dont l'autorité sur Paris est contrôlée, et souvent contrariée par la Convention, *la Commune* qui, depuis l'origine, s'est toujours considérée comme une Convention *au petit pré*, ne reste soumise à celle-ci qu'autant qu'elle manque de moyens de désobéir. Ses chefs étant par leur crédit et par leur places les premiers en rang, pour arriver aux premiers honneurs, sont autant d'ennemis nés et de rivaux ardens de la puissance conventionnelle.

"Les Jacobins renferment dans leur sein les municipaux les plus accrédités, les oracles des sections, les agitateurs secrets qui les travaillent. Ainsi, le parti populaire a plus ou moins d'influence sur ce club central et primitif. Quant à club des Cordeliers qui a toujours entraîné les Jacobins, et aux sociétés subalternes qui en dépendent, il médite révolutions sur révolutions, et par essence, s'élève toujours contre toute autorité qui peut se prolonger six mois.

"Telle est la confédération qui ébranle le Comité de Salut-Public; et devant laquelle viendra échouer tout pouvoir qui n'aura pas eu la force, la volonté, ou le temps de fermer les sections et les clubs, et d'enchaîner *la Commune*, mais ce ne sont là que les instrumens; la faction obéit à des ressorts moins manifestes, qui communiquent et dirigent les mouvemens. *Hébert* et *Chaumette* ont passé longtemps pour les opérateurs principaux; ils n'étaient, cependant, ni assez habiles ni assez généralement accrédités pour un rôle si difficile. Les projets sont conduits par des mains plus exercées et moins connues.

Une partie des Montagnards de la Convention, les Bureaux de la Guerre que leur nombre et l'immensité des fonds qu'ils ont à distribuer rendent très influens, et les chefs des clubs des Cordeliers semblent former le noyau de la faction. Nous avons vu que les chefs de l'armée révolutionnaire courent la même carrière. *Henriot* Commandant des débris de la garde nationale de Paris, ci-devant laquais de Monsieur de Brehan, marche avec la Commune quoiqu'à jeu couvert; sa scélératesse sans bornes le pousse invinciblement à une nouvelle révolution.

Au milieu de ces troupes coalisées dont *Collet d'Herbois* paraît être le commandant ostensible, il existe néanmoins des moteurs couverts, dont l'action a glissé sourdement dans la Convention, au Comité de Salut-Public, à celui de Sécurité-Générale, et qui contrecarre sans paraître les mesures de l'un et de l'autre. Le 19 Février, *Robespierre* disait à *Amar*, son affidé au Comité de Sécurité Générale, que, depuis quelque temps, il s'apercevait clairement qu'une main invisible les emportait toujours au delà de leurs volontés, que tous les jours le Comité de Salut-Public faisait ce qu'il avait décidé la veille de ne pas faire; et qu'il existait une faction conduite pour les désoler et les perdre sans qu'ils eussent pu encore en découvrir les directeurs. Ses soupçons tombaient sur *Pache*, qui affectait de ne se mêler en rien, étranger en

apparence aux divers partis, mais incapable par son naturel d'une semblable indifférence.<sup>1</sup>

"Tous les avis, en effet, emportent à regarder *Pache* comme le principal chef de la faction. Je vous ai dit antérieurement, qu'il gouvernait encore le département de la guerre. Cette foule de commis, d'épaulettes, et d'adjoints, ont été placés par lui, et sont encore ses créatures. Sa place de Maire lui assure une grande influence à la Commune où il se montre sans parler, lâchant à sa place les Hébert et les Chaumette.

"Voilà la récapitulation analytique des élémens de cette faction menaçante qui nous prépare une nouvelle phase révolutionnaire.

"*Robespierre* lui oppose son crédit encore très étendu, la terreur de son nom, la popularité que lui conserve son désintéressement. Il lui oppose *Danton* et les siens, la majorité du Comité de Salut-Public, celle de la Convention épouvanté de l'approche d'une nouvelle catastrophe, la majorité actuelle du Club des Jacobins, le gros de l'armée révolutionnaire où il a nombre de créatures qu'il soudoye chèrement, et qui partageait avec le Comité l'exercice du despotisme intérieur. Il lui oppose la clientèle des applaudisseurs à gages, des sans culottes à pension, des espions, des délateurs que le Comité et celui de Sécurité Générale répandent jusque dans les réduits obscurs. Il lui oppose l'opinion de l'armée qui, sous la direction du Comité, a remporté de glorieux avantages. Enfin, autour de Robespierre se rangent les gens *paisibles*, les hommes à portefeuille ou à propriété, réduits à regarder un conseil d'exécrables ordonnateurs de brigandages et de meurtres comme leur tuteur contre une faction plus exécrable encore, et qui mettra le comble aux énormités.

"Je ne pénètre point qui l'emportera de ces deux partis. Nous avons besoin de quelques semaines de plus pour acquérir à cet égard des lumières moins incertaines. Dans un pareil océan de haines, de fureurs, de complots, de trahisons imprévues, on aperçoit plus clairement les causes que les effets à venir; mais il est sûr que l'étoile du Comité tiendra aux premiers événemens de la campagne. Il est perdu si les Alliés débutent par de grands succès.

"Quel but se propose la faction ascendante? Est-ce un but politique ou seulement personnel? Cassera-t-elle la Convention, en élira-t-elle une nouvelle? Le contentera-t-elle de prendre les places de ses victimes, et de s'emparer du gouvernement sans le détruire? Je ne découvre encore aucune solution satisfaisante de ces questions. Ce qu'on ne peut révoquer en doute c'est le projet certain de massacrer ses antagonistes, d'épurer la Convention et les Jacobins dans un torrent de sang, de faire passer la domination à une ligue encore plus vile et plus cruelle, d'égorger les détenus, d'en augmenter le nombre, et de satisfaire cette soif intarissable de discorde, de révolution, de sang humain, et de rapine.

"Quant à l'opinion de ceux qui supposent aux chefs le dessein d'un bouleversement qui favorisât une contre-révolution, je n'entravois pas une raison tant soit peu plausible qui puisse la justifier.

"L'engagement ne tardera pas à se développer. Le prétexte en est déjà trouvé et en agitation. Il consiste à demander le mort des 61 membres de la Convention, détenus depuis l'été dernier comme coupables d'avoir protesté contre la journée du 31 Mai. Et à poursuivre également les 28,000 signataires de la pétition présentée au Roi *Louis XVI.* au mois de Juin 1792, pétition où l'on sollicitait la répression des Républicains, et la punition des acteurs du 20 Juin.

<sup>1</sup> *Amar* a rendu cette conversation à mon correspondant la veille de son départ.

“ La Club des Cordeliers, les sections, les sociétés populaires ont déjà itérativement exprimé leur volonté à la Convention à cet égard. La Commune recherche les listes des 28,000 signataires.

“ De leur côté, Robespierre et le Comité entendent de retenir en prison leurs 61 collègues au lieu de les assassiner. Ils résistent à une boucherie trop marquante des gens suspects et détenus ; ils redoutent avec raison que, le signal donné, ils ne soient aussi désignés, eux et leurs cliens, comme *gens suspects*, et que le glaive d’une St. Barthélemy n’ébranle les fondemens de la Révolution.

“ Pour amortir cette rage, le Comité jette quelques gouttes dedans le volcan. Il vient déjà d’ordonner la saisie générale des biens de tous les gens reconnus suspects, ou ennemis de la Révolution depuis 1789. Allant plus loin, il a placé la clef de la voûte, le 3 *Mars*, en faisant décréter, sur le rapport de *Saint-Just* au nom des deux Comités réunis, l’arrestation universelle des personnes suspectes dans toutes les communes ; et la répartition des biens des détenus aux indigens de la République, dont chaque commune fera dresser la liste. Sur la motion additionnelle de Danton, on a étendu le partage aux soldats qui auront été blessés ou mutilés.

“ Cette opération que l’on avait prédite, il y a plusieurs mois, fait le complément de la Révolution. Elle doit réclamer au Comité et à la Convention plus de popularité dans les armées et dans la multitude. Quel que soit l’époque, et les suites du combat que s’élève entre les deux factions, ce combat fera nager Paris dans le sang. Les forces étant moins inégales qu’elles ne le furent au 31 *Mai*, la résistance sera proportionnée à l’attaque, et le Comité se vendra cher.

“ Il en résultera certainement une secousse effroyable et générale. Les Municipalités et les Directoires de Départemens n’étant plus composés que de la fange de chaque lieu, ces scélérats abjects et ineptes mettront à feu et à sang leurs arrondissemens. Avant qu’une nouvelle autorité ait pris de l’assiette, nous reverrons deux mois de chaos.

“ Mais n’espérez rien de cette commotion en faveur de quelques soulèvemens intérieurs. 500,000 âmes seront égorgées. On tendra la gorge aux bourreaux, où on fuira par toutes les issues. S’il s’élève quelqu’insurrection, ce ne sera vraisemblablement que loin du voisinage des armées ; par exemple, dans l’intérieur de Languedoc où le désespoir est moins lâche, et où le feu du climat embrase plus facilement les têtes. Quant à la masse générale des mécontents, il est peu vraisemblable qu’elle sorte de son inertie. Son abbattement est à tel point, qu’elle redoute beaucoup plus que les Jacobins les armées étrangères, persuadée qu’à leur premiers succès un peu allarmans, tous les détenus et les citoyens soupçonnés, sans distinction d’âge ni de sexe, seront égorgés. Chacun a dans les fers son parent, son ami, son épouse, son fils ; chacun attend d’y être plongé lui-même ; et ne forme qu’un souhait, *celui de la paix*, à la quelle il attribue la miraculeuse vertu de désarmer la férocité des bourreaux.”

*French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to GENERAL MACK.

1794, March 15, St. James’s Square.—“ Je ne puis pas douter, Monsieur, que vous n’ayez déjà été prévenu de la détermination finale

de votre Cour de ne pas accéder aux conditions auxquelles Sa Majesté Prussienne a attaché la continuance de la co-opération pour la campagne prochaine. Il ne s'agit plus de discuter les raisons de cette résolution ; mais je ne me rappelle que trop combien vous avez toujours insisté sur la nécessité de s'assurer non seulement de la co-opération des Prussiens actuellement sur le Rhin, mais aussi de l'envoi d'un renfort très considérable. Et il n'est, malheureusement, que trop évident combien les suites de ce nouvel ordre de choses pouvaient devenir facheuses, si on n'y remédiait pas en se réglant sur la position dans laquelle on se trouve.

"M. Dundas aura l'honneur d'écrire officiellement à Son Altesse Royale M. le Duc d'York sur ce point intéressant, et je sais d'avance que Son Altesse Royale se fera un vrai plaisir de vous communiquer tout ce qui peut y avoir rapport, et de discuter avec vous quelles sont les mesures à prendre en conséquence. Mais il m'est trop précieuse de cultiver l'avantage que j'ai eu de vous connaître personnellement pour que je ne désire pas de profiter de cette occasion pour me rappeler à votre souvenir.

"Je puis bien vous assurer que, malgré les difficultés qui pourront survenir de ce nouvel incident, on est toujours ici dans la ferme intention de faire tous les efforts possibles pour soutenir, de concert avec l'armée de sa Majesté Impériale, une campagne offensive et vigoureuse du côté des Pays Bas. Mais il nous importe extrêmement de savoir jusqu'à quel point cette circonstance, survenue depuis l'époque de votre voyage à Londres, pourrait changer les mesures dont on est convenu dans ce temps là ; et, surtout, quelle différence elle pourrait opérer dans la distribution et les opérations des troupes Autrichiennes. Il est aussi très important de ne pas vous laisser ignorer que, malgré le peu de succès de négociations qui ont été suivies jusqu'ici en commun pour s'assurer de la co-opération des Prussiens, sa Majesté s'occupe encore (mais séparément) de cet objet pour lequel elle ferait de très grands sacrifices. Il est certain qu'on ne peut compter sur l'effet de ces démarches, mais, de l'autre côté, il paraît important de ne pas précipiter les mesures qui seraient peut-être nécessaires quand on aurait la certitude de la retraite prochaine d'armée Prussienne.

"Vous sentirez bien que cette lettre n'est rien moins qu'officielle. Mais l'impression que vous avez laissée ici de vos talens et de votre caractère nous font (*sic*) désirer de connaître votre façon de penser sur les circonstances actuelles ; et c'est avec une satisfaction infinie que je saisis une occasion qui me procure le moyen de vous assurer de toute l'étendue de la considération et de l'estime personnelle que vous m'avez inspirées."

*Copy. French.*

#### GENERAL MACK to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, March 20, Valenciennes.—"J'ai reçue la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire dans un moment où j'étais encore dans une affliction et désolation bien profondes à cause de la retraite prochaine des Prussiens. Vous m'avez rendu un peu la vie. J'avais bien besoin de cette consolation, et j'espère que vous n'aurez jamais sujet de vous repentir de l'avoir donnée. Permettez que Lord Elgin soit l'organe de mes idées, de mes sentimens, de mes douleurs, et de mes espérances. Je l'ai instruit en tout, et muni même de plusieurs papiers qui n'auraient peut-être jamais dû sortir de mes mains. Mais je sais à qui je les communique, et je sais aussi que vos intérêts ne peuvent être que

ceux de mon Souverain. Vous daignerez lui permettre aussi qu'il soit l'interprète de mes sentiments d'admiration et d'attachement envers vous et vos dignes et respectables collègues, et quel prix inestimable je mets sur l'honneur de votre confiance. Daignez me la conserver, et daignez être persuadé que je tacherai de la mériter."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT MERCY ARGENTEAU.

1794, April 4, London.—"J'espère que votre Excellence aura la bonté de pardonner la liberté que je prends de m'adresser à Elle pour une affaire importante et confidentielle, et à laquelle je suis persuadé qu'Elle attachera tout l'intérêt qu'elle mérite. J'ai reçu par un canal secret l'avis important que deux hommes devaient incessamment partir de Paris, chargés de la commission horrible d'attenter aux jours du Roi et du Ministre qui, sous les ordres de Sa Majesté, a la direction principale des affaires de ce royaume. L'un de ces hommes m'est désigné comme étant Suisse ou Allemand; l'autre Génois. Le premier se nommant Colla, et l'autre Godoni. L'on ajoute que Colla a une traite sur Londres pour 200 livres sterling, tirée par *Pourra* sur Bourdieu et Chollet; et que Godoni a une pareille traite pour 300 livres sterling, tirée par Caccia sur Tossier et Compagnie. Leur signalement est: *Colla*, grand, bien brun, âgé d'environ 40 ans. *Godoni*, petit, bien jaune, âgé d'environ 32 ans, et il louche.

"Comme on me marque que ces scélérats devaient passer par Liège et par Ostende, j'ai cru ne pouvoir mieux faire que de m'adresser à votre Excellence dans l'espérance que des mesures sûres seront prises pour les arrêter, s'il est possible, dans les Pays-Bas, pour lesquels je crois qu'ils seront déjà en voyage. Peut-être que par l'examen de leurs papiers on pourra trouver des indices qui serviront à la punition de leurs complices; mais, en tout cas, il serait très important d'empêcher leur arrivée dans ce pays-ci, où la nature de notre gouvernement leur donnerait tant de facilité pour se dérober aux poursuites de la police.

"Vous n'ignorez pas qu'on a reçu ici, comme dans toutes les autres cours de l'Europe, beaucoup d'avis de cette nature qui n'ont pas paru mériter une grande attention de la part des gouvernements. De la manière dont celui-ci me parvient, je ne puis pas croire qu'il me soit permis de le négliger; et je prie instamment votre Excellence de vouloir bien l'honorer de son attention; mais, en même temps, de faire en sorte que ses démarches soient secrètes, tant pour le succès de l'objet lui-même, que pour éviter la possibilité de compromettre celui dont je tiens cet avis."

*French. Copy.*

COUNT MERCY-ARGENTEAU to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 8, Brussels.—"Au moment où j'ai reçue la lettre du 4, dont votre Excellence m'honora, je me suis rendu chez M. le Comte de Metternich pour concerter avec ce Ministre toutes les mesures qu'exigeait la circonstance.

"Il a été dépêché avant midi des couriers à Ostende, à Liège, et dans les principales villes du pays, que l'on a supposé pouvoir servir de route détournée pour les deux individus suspects. Leur signalement a été donné d'une manière claire et précise, sans cependant rien motiver qui pût compromettre le secret ni les personnes dont viennent les avis.



“ Nous avons à Liège un homme très adroit. Je ne pourrais en dire autant à l'égard d'Ostende, qui cependant est le lieu le plus essentiel comme point de départ.

“ Cette réflexion m'a porté à redoubler mes moyens en réclamant ceux des militaires en même temps que ceux du civil. J'ai écrit à Monsieur le Prince de Coburg, à tous nos généraux ou commandants dans les postes divers, ne leur disant simplement que ce qui sert à exciter une grande surveillance sans qu'ils en connaissent la cause. Enfin, toutes les précautions qu'il est humainement possible de prendre ont été mises en œuvre sans perdre un instant ; et j'ai cru devoir entrer dans ces détails pour que votre Excellence n'ait pas la moindre doute sur le zèle avec lequel ses intentions ont été remplies dans une conjoncture de si haute importance.

“ Je suis occupé à de nouvelles découvertes des manœuvres commerciales et d'approvisionnements que pratiquent les scélérats de la Convention Française, et que favorise la honteuse connivance des puissances soi-disant neutres du Nord, des cantons Suisses, et de quelques villes d'Allemagne. Tout ce que je pourrai recueillir sur cette matière, ou autre semblable, sera mis sous vos yeux. L'Angleterre, les lumières, l'énergie de ses respectables Ministres, sont devenus le centre du salut de l'Europe. Il faut y porter tous les moyens de l'opérer ; nulle part ailleurs ils ne fructifieraient aussi efficacement.

“ J'attacherai toujours le plus grand prix aux occasions qui me mettront à même de marquer à votre Excellence le souvenir, la reconnaissance des bontés que j'ai éprouvé de sa part, et dont je désire de mériter la continuation par les sentiments sincères d'attachement et de respect.”

*French. Copy.*

#### COUNT MERCY-ARGENTEAU to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, April 8, Brussels.—“ Le courier qui va être expédié ne me laisse que le temps d'avoir l'honneur de prévenir votre Excellence que les deux particuliers suspects viennent d'être arrêtés, il y a une heure. Ils arrivaient par la diligence de Liège. Ils ont été précédés à Ostende par cinq ou six marchands Italiens, lesquels pourraient avoir des rapports avec *Colla* et *Godoni* ; par conséquent, il s'agira des les faire observer. Je verrai tout à l'heure le Lieutenant de Police, et l'instruira de ce qu'il aura à faire pour les papiers et autres preuves. Je supplie votre Excellence de vouloir bien faire savoir comment elle voudra disposer des détenus.”

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT MERCY-ARGENTEAU.

1794, April 11, London.—“ J'a eu l'honneur de recevoir ce matin les deux lettres que votre Excellence a eu la bonté de m'écrire, et je m'empresse de lui témoigner toute ma reconnaissance du zèle et de l'activité avec lesquels elle a bien voulu s'occuper de l'affaire importante dont il a été question. L'arrivée des deux personnes dont il s'agit précisément dans le temps et les lieux qui m'avaient été désignés paraît confirmer les soupçons que j'avais relativement à l'objet de leur voyage. J'ose donc supplier votre Excellence de faire en sorte qu'elles soient détenues jusqu'à ce qu'on pourra savoir si l'examen de leurs papiers ou quelques autres circonstances nous donneront des indices assez fortes pour qu'il soit possible de les poursuivre en justice, elles ou leurs

complices. Si cela se trouve impossible, peut-être que par des promesses ou des menaces on pourra tirer des prisonniers eux-mêmes des informations importantes sur la matière dont il s'agit; et, en tout cas, je crois qu'il est absolument nécessaire de les tenir en captivité jusqu'à la fin de la guerre et la termination du pouvoir des scélérats qui les font agir; à moins que leur innocence ne se manifeste d'une manière à ne laisser aucune doute sur leur compte.

"A ce que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de marquer à votre Excellence, je dois encore ajouter mes remerciements très sincères pour les importantes communications qu'elle a eu la bonté de me faire parvenir. Je m'occupe d'en tirer tous les éclaircissements possibles, et de les rendre utiles à la grande cause dans laquelle nous sommes tous embarqués. Je prie votre Excellence d'être persuadée que je n'abuserai pas de la confiance qu'elle me témoigne, et que je conserverai pendant toute ma vie un souvenir précieux des circonstances qui m'ont donné l'occasion d'avoir ces relations directes avec un Ministre dont le caractère et le mérite distingué m'ont inspiré les sentiments de l'estime et de l'attachement les plus sincères et respectueuse."

*French. Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the DUC D'HARCOURT.

1794, May 28, St. James's Square.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer la liste des officiers Français qui ont demandé de lever ou de commander des corps Français sous les ordres et à la solde du Roi. Je vous prie de m'indiquer les noms de cinq ou six d'entre eux que vous jugerez les plus propres pour cet emploi, tant par leurs services antérieurs, que par la facilité qu'ils pourraient avoir de compléter leurs corps respectifs au plutôt. On serait dans l'intention d'accorder aux commandants des corps la faculté de proposer au Gouvernement les personnes les plus propres pour remplir les autres emplois dans ces corps."

*French. Copy.*

#### COUNT LALLY-TOLENDAL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, July 14, London.—"Je reçois dans l'instant une lettre de M. Mounier du 26 Juin dernier. Il me donne une commission pour vous. Plutôt que de vous interrompre par la demande d'un rendez-vous sur un objet très particulier, qui n'est susceptible d'aucune discussion, je trouve beaucoup plus simple de mettre sous vos yeux l'extrait de sa lettre que vous trouverez au revers de cette feuille. Vous y verrez une nouvelle preuve du scrupule consciencieux de mon ami. J'y ai vu, moi, un nouveau gage de la noblesse et de la sensibilité de votre cœur. J'ose, au nom de tous les serviteurs de Louis XVI., vous remercier de votre tendre vénération pour la mémoire de ce vertueux et infortuné Prince."

July 15.—"Je devais finir cette lettre ce matin, mais je ne sais plus ce que j'avais à vous dire; et si je n'avais pas écrit hier l'extrait de la lettre de mon ami, je ne pourrai le faire aujourd'hui. Je reçois dans l'instant l'horrible nouvelle que cette angélique Duchesse de Biron, dont la vertu méritait des autels, vient d'être immolée sur l'échafaud par ces monstres; que la malheureuse Princesse de Poix, le jour même où son amie périssait du dernier supplice, a vu arracher de chez elle son beau-père, le Maréchal de Mouchy, âgé de 79 ans, et la Maréchale. Tout ce que je chéris, tout ce que je respecte en France et hors de France est atteint par là du coup de la mort. J'ose invoquer votre humanité. Vous avez des papiers que

nous n'avons pas. La nouvelle ne paraît que trop certaine, puisqu'elle vient du Maréchal de Castries; cependant nous avons eu des nouvelles directes de nos amis du 20 Juin, qui ne nous menaçaient d'aucun de ces malheurs, et la lettre qui nous les apprend est datée de Cologne, 4 Juillet. Si vos informations sont les mêmes, ne prenez pas la peine de m'écrire; j'entendrai votre silence; mais si vous avez lieu de croire ou que ces malheurs, ou qu'au moins une partie ne sont pas réels, daignez par un mot consolateur, adressé à *Twickenham Middlesex*, suspendre le désespoir d'une tribu entière de parens et d'amis qui ne sont que douleur et terreur. Je dis *suspendre* car il n'y aura pas une victime d'épargnée; et pendant ce temps trois puissances ne s'occupent que d'aller plonger un autre peuple dans l'abîme où est la France! Il n'y a que vous dans l'Europe entière. Mais serez vous aussi forts que vous êtes grands?

*French.*

*Enclosure.*

M. MOUNIER to COUNT LALLY-TOLENDAL.

*Extrait.*

1794, June 26, Morillon.—“Vous savez qu'un des trois gardes qui avaient accompagné le Roi à Varennes se nommait Du Moutier; et qu'il avait donné dans cette circonstance des preuves sans nombre de fidélité et de courage. Si cet homme se fut adressé à vous, en vous confiant son extrême pauvreté, et le mauvais état de sa poitrine, votre attachement pour la mémoire de Louis XVI. vous eut fait considérer comme un devoir de le servir. J'ai fait connaître sa situation au Lord G[renville], et je lui ai dit que ce brave homme était prêt à porter les armes au poste qu'on voudrait lui indiquer. Le Lord a écrit à son correspondant ordinaire à Berne, pour lui ordonner de compter à M. du Moutier la somme qu'il demanderait pour se rendre à Bruxelles, où il trouverait des instructions pour lui chez le Lord Elgin. M. du Moutier a commencé par demander 100 louis. J'étais absent, et le Lord F[itzgerald] les a payés. Ensuite, au lieu de partir, mon homme s'est marié avec une Bernoise sans fortune. Il s'est mis en route après cette précaution, et un de ses amis vient de m'assurer qu'au lieu d'aller à Bruxelles, il avait dessein de se rendre à Londres. Vous jugez que cet homme qui a le mérite de s'être dévoué à Louis XVI. peut être fort indiscret, et que je ne veux pas répondre de ses prétentions. Je ne voudrais pas lui nuire, après l'avoir obligé; mais je désirerais que vous fissiez vos efforts pour reconstruire le Lord G[renville] et pour lui dire sous le secret que mon unique intention a été de procurer du pain à ce garde fidèle; mais qu'il ne m'avait consulté ni pour taxer ses frais de voyage, ni pour ses démarches ultérieures; et que je n'avais point prétendu l'indiquer comme capable d'un poste militaire supérieur, car il n'a jamais été qu'un simple garde, n'est propre à aucun commandement d'un peu d'importance, et a très peu de lumières.”

*French.*

BARON THUGUT to COUNT MERCY-ARGENTEAU.

1794, July 30, Vienna.—“Votre Excellence a du avoir été, avant son départ pour Londres, témoin d'autres événemens qui n'ont pas amélioré l'état de nos affaires; la seconde évacuation de Namur, l'abandon successif de nos positions de Tirlemont et de Landen, notre séparation

respective d'avec ses alliés par leur retraite vers la Hollande et par la nôtre vers Maestricht, sont autant de nouveaux malheurs. A en juger par l'étrange progression de contrainctés de la fortune, on pourrait craindre que nos revers ne soient pas à leur dernier terme. Il n'est par conséquent *plus permis de perdre un seul instant pour prendre un parti décisif, avant que le délai apporté dans la recherche des remèdes ne rende le mal incurable.*

“Les déterminations de L'Empereur dépendront des mesures que les Puissances Maritimes vont adopter. Sa Majesté veut bien se résoudre à continuer ses efforts pour la conservation ou la reprise des Pays-Bas, efforts si onéreux pour le reste de la monarchie. Mais Elle ne saurait imposer à ses états héréditaires de courir le danger évident de nouvelles pertes que sans la condition bien exprimée, et la promesse solennelle, que les Puissances Maritimes emploieront franchement et loyalement toutes leurs forces à seconder les entreprises de Sa Majesté en lui fournissant les secours les plus abondants et les plus efficaces. L'Empereur pense que ce système de marches sans cesse rétrogrades, l'abandon successif de tous les postes qu'on a suivi dans ces derniers moments, ne saurait aboutir qu'à la ruine totale des affaires; et qu'il est instant de s'occuper de nouveau d'opérations offensives le plutôt que possible. Sans parler de la nécessité absolue d'aviser aux tentatives qu'en tout cas il serait possible de faire pour prévenir, s'il en est temps encore, la perte à jamais irréparable des forteresses conquises, avec les nombreuses garnisons et le dépôt d'une grande partie de notre artillerie de siège qu'elles renferment, il est de l'intérêt le plus évident de disputer au moins à l'ennemi cette étendue considérable des riches contrées de la Belgique qu'il vient d'envahir, et dont la tranquille possession ne peut qu'ajouter tous les jours de nouvelles ressources à ces moyens déjà d'ailleurs si formidables.

*“Nous ne saurions donc trop insister sur ce que les Puissances Maritimes fassent passer à leurs généraux l'ordre de combiner sans délai avec le Prince de Saxe Coburg les projets les plus adaptés aux circonstances pour revenir à agir offensivement en rassemblant et remettant en campagne les troupes alliées, et en renonçant au plan de les disperser dans les garnisons, de les morceler défensivement sur les frontières Hollandaises, plan qui présente aux Français, de tous les genres de guerre, celui qui leur est le plus favorable, avec la certitude de la prise successive de toutes les forteresses, et l'envahissement du territoire des Provinces Unies.*

*“En se réunissant, en concentrant ses forces, en cherchant à occuper l'ennemi loin des limites de possessions de la République, au moins pendant la saison la plus propre aux grandes entreprises, on pourvoira sans doute au salut de la Hollande beaucoup plus sûrement qu'en abandonnant la campagne, et mettant l'ennemi à même de commencer ses sièges et de travailler à l'exécution de ses projets d'invasion avec l'énergie et la rapidité ordinaire de ses succès.*

“Il est infiniment à désirer que la tâche des nouveaux concertis avec le Général Commandant en Chef l'armée de Sa Majesté soit confiée de préférence par les Puissances Maritimes à des personnes bien intentionnées, animées de cet esprit d'équité, de modération, de conciliation, que Sa Majesté recommandera à ses propres généraux; et qui des deux côtés est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'on ne peut pas se dissimuler *que des intrigues tendantes à affaiblir l'ancienne union franche et loyale entre les alliés, ont eu quelque part aux derniers malheurs.* Mais si à Londres on est déterminé d'accéder aux offres du zèle généreux de Sa Majesté, il est indispensable que l'armée du Duc d'York soit, sans aucune perte de temps, renforcée par tout ce qu'on

pourra en Angleterre réunir de troupes, ainsi que par tout ce qu'on pourra s'en procurer ailleurs. Il est également nécessaire d'obtenir des Etats Généraux par l'entremise du Cabinet de St. James, que tout ce qui pourrait se trouver encore de troupes Hollandaises dans l'intérieur des Provinces, soit destiné à augmenter le corps du Prince Héritaire d'Orange, où elles seront employées au salut de la République avec plus de fruit qu'elles ne pourraient l'être nulle autre part.

“Un autre objet de nos justes demandes, et dont sa Majesté ne saurait se départir, c'est que la Grande Bretagne s'applique à nous assister dans nos embarras pécuniaires, embarras dont votre Excellence connaît mieux que personne l'étendue et l'urgence. Sa Majesté désire donc que le Ministère de St. James non seulement emploie tous les moyens qui sont en son pouvoir, et que la conjoncture peut suggérer, pour accélérer la marche et hâter la consommation de l'affaire de notre emprunt à Londres, mais, qu'en même temps, il soit dès à présent pris des arrangements pour subvenir désormais à l'épuisement de nos finances par des avances que Sa Majesté se flatte que les Puissances Maritimes n'hésiteront pas d'accorder à l'énergie de son zèle, à l'efficacité bien constatée de ces efforts, et à la réalité de ces besoins, après en avoir prodigué avec tant de libéralité gratuitement à la Cour de Berlin.

“Sa Majesté serait, sans contredit, autorisée à prétendre à des subsides et à des secours gratuits, et les arguments à l'appui de cette vérité se présenteront en foule aux lumières de votre Excellence ; mais comme les arrangements dont il faudrait convenir à ce sujet exigeraient probablement plus d'intervalle que la pressante pénurie de nos finances n'en saurait admettre, nous serons obligés d'insister provisoirement sur des avances pour lesquelles le crédit du Gouvernement Britannique auprès des principales maisons de banque de Londres, et l'usage de l'émission d'un certain nombre de billets dans les différents départements de son administration lui fournirait de grandes facilités, dont, il est à croire, qu'il ne balancera guères de faire usage, en considérant que son refus, nous laissant sans ressource, pourrait entraîner la dissolution générale de notre armée. En tout cas, Sa Majesté désire que votre Excellence examine l'avantage que, pour obtenir des prêts abondants, l'on pourrait tirer soit auprès des particuliers, soit auprès du Gouvernement même, d'une hypothèque spéciale sur les domaines de Sa Majesté dans les Pays-Bas, sur une partie des revenus ou du territoire même de la Belgique ; hypothèque que non obstant l'état actuel des choses, le Ministère Britannique ne peut regarder comme illusoire, ou qu'il n'ignore pas que, sans souscrire à sa perte certaine, l'Angleterre ne saurait permettre qu'en définitif les Pays-Bas restent jamais à la France.

“L'intention de l'Empereur est que votre Excellence, aidée de Monsieur le Comte de Starhemberg, en vienne sur ces différents objets, avec le Cabinet de St. James à des explications précises, et telles que leur résultat puisse fixer l'opinion de Sa Majesté sur le plus ou le moins d'assistance effective et de co-opération efficace que les dispositions des Puissances Maritimes lui assurent désormais.

“En attendant, l'Empereur a enjoint au Général Commandant en Chef de donner tous ses soins à arrêter les progrès ultérieurs de l'ennemi, et à se tenir toujours à même de se réporter à des opérations offensives, aussitôt que les circonstances le permettront. L'Empereur a également ordonné au Prince de Saxe-Coburg de s'occuper de la sûreté de Maestricht, et malgré le peu de reconnaissance que la République a montré lors de la première délivrance de cette forteresse, Sa Majesté a bien voulu tout oublier pour ne songer en ce moment qu'aux intérêts du salut commun. Sa Majesté a prescrit au Prince de

Saxe-Coburg de suivre ces directions avec exactitude jusqu'à ce que votre Excellence l'ait informé du succès de ses conférences à Londres."

*French. Copy.*

MINUTE OF LORD GRENVILLE ON COUNT MERCY'S  
MISSION TO LONDON.

[1794, August.] "It appears that Comte Mercy's instructions are :

1. "To state the principle of opposing a barrier to the views of aggression on the part of France.

2. "To agree to the principle of not mixing in the internal government of France, provided only that a *limited* monarchy is re-established.

3. "To carry on the war till all decrees injurious to other countries are repealed, and not to make peace but by common consent.

4. "The barrier in question, as above mentioned, is to consist in the conquests to be made on France, and in the political arrangements which may tend to the safety of the Empire and the Low Countries.

5. "In this latter view the exchange of Bavaria is to be proposed, and the Court of Vienna imagine that we have given ground to hope for facilities on that head.

6. "Comte Mercy is to throw out that, in default of this, the Court of Vienna must take its indemnity also in Poland.

7. "He is to ask a written acknowledgment of the principle of indemnities. And a formal promise of our concurrence in the proposed exchange ; and, in failure of this, *the same* acquiescence which we have shown to the plans of Berlin and Petersburg.

8. "The military operations are to be to drive the French from Germany and the Low Countries. Then to attack the Flanders barrier, and the frontier towns towards Germany to secure a barrier to the proposed territories of the Elector Palatine ; and, if the war is successful, to acquire something in Alsace as a compensation for the loss Austria will suffer by the exchange.

9. "In these operations the full concurrence of the English and Dutch force is to be asked for.

"Baron Jacobi is instructed :—

1. "To decline positively and definitively any engagement respecting the continuation of the war, or the terms of peace ; the King of Prussia being determined not to conclude any such engagement either with England or any other power.

2. "To discover our views about the proposed exchange, and if we appear favourable to it to support Comte Mercy's overtures, but

3. "In the contrary case, he is to express that, if difficulties arise on that head, the King of Prussia will not oppose his ally's obtaining, by acquisitions on the side of France, that indemnity to which he has a just title.

4. "He is to refuse to say anything on the subject either of the eventual acquisition in Poland which Austria has in view, if the other project fails ; or of the compensation for the pretended loss she will suffer by the exchange of the Low Countries.

"It is to be observed that the above statement of Comte Mercy's instructions contains only what the Court of Vienna has communicated to the King of Prussia."

JOHN JAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, September 30, Royal Hotel, Pall Mall.—"I have endeavoured to incorporate the two treaties in the enclosed project ; and added some

articles, chiefly borrowed from the treaty between Great Britain and France.

"An article to comprehend the provisions contemplated by the Lord Chancellor is still wanting; while the others are under examination it may be prepared.

"When your Lordship shall be ready to converse with me on the subject, do me the honour to name a time most convenient to your Lordship.

"So mutable are human affairs, especially in these mutable times, that the sooner the peace and friendship of our two countries are put out of hazard the better."

LORD GRENVILLE to JOHN JAY.

1794, October 7, St. James's Square.---"It shall certainly be my object to hasten as much as possible the examination and consideration of the *contre projet* which I have received from you; but, on such attention as I have hitherto been able to give to it, I find so much new matter, and so much variation in the form and substance of the articles proposed in the *projet*, that I am very apprehensive the discussion of these points will of necessity consume more time than I had flattered myself might have been sufficient to bring our negotiation to a satisfactory issue. If you can conveniently call in St. James's Square to-morrow morning at eleven, I will mention to you a few of the leading points which must, if insisted upon on your part, create, as I fear, insurmountable obstacles to the conclusion of the treaty proposed; but the extent and delicacy of these subjects will require more detailed and particular examination in every part where a departure is proposed from the terms of the *projet* delivered to you.

"I flatter myself that it is unnecessary for me to repeat the assurances of my sincere desire to bring the business to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion."

*Copy.*

GENERAL DE CLERFAIT to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1794, October 7, Mederzier, près de Juliers.---"Je me ferais un grand plaisir de vous donner des nouvelles de ce qui arrivera ici d'intéressant. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire, passé peu de jours, et vous ai dit les motifs qui m'empêchaient de faire le procès aux Commandants de Valenciennes et de Condé puisque je ne le pouvais sans ordre du Conseil de Guerre, auquel j'avais envoyé toutes les pièces relatives à cette affaire. J'ai eu la réponse du Conseil de Guerre; mais aucun ordre encore de faire arrêter ces deux généraux. Je souhaite qu'on sente à Vienne la nécessité de le faire. J'ai dit tout ce que je pensais à cet égard, quoiqu'ils aient des espèces de raison de se légitimer *en partie*.

"Quant à notre retraite de la Meuse, elle ne peut assurément être soupçonnée de mauvaise volonté. Nous y avons été attaqués par des forces considérables et forcés, après qu'on s'y est bien défendu. Tout le monde sait que l'aile gauche, obligée de se retirer, il s'ensuivrait la retraite de la droite, et l'abandon de Maestricht. Les Anglais avaient repassés la Meuse avant que nous l'avions quitté, puisqu'ils l'ont passé à Graves le 15 et le 16, et notre affaire était le 18. Ils se sont retirés sans se battre, et je ne suis pas convaincu qu'il y avait des forces suffisantes pour les y contraindre. Ils se sont retirés à portée de soutenir la Hollande, à ce qu'ils disent. Son Altesse Royale le Duc

d'York m'écrivant tous les jours qu'il était prêt de contribuer à la délivrance de Maestricht, je l'ai prié dans ce cas de vouloir se rapprocher jusqu'à Venloo qu'il empêcherait la prise de cette forteresse; le passage de la Meuse couvrirait mon aile droite, et l'empêcherait d'être tournée, et que notre communication serait appuyée, et qu'on pourrait alors agir conjointement. Qu'il pourrait passer la Meuse, renforcé de ce que je pourrais lui donner de troupes de ma droite; et que si, par ce mouvement, l'ennemi, qui était avec toutes ses forces vis-à-vis de moi, faisait des détachements, que je l'attaquerais. Après beaucoup de sollicitation, il a envoyé quelques mille Hanovriens, non pas à Venloo mais à Wiel, me disant qu'il ne pouvait s'éloigner de la Hollande ce qu'il devait protéger, et jamais passer la Meuse, parcequ'il n'avait pas de pont. Sa dernière lettre du 27, dont je vous joins l'extrait, promettait un corps de 16,000 hommes. J'ai envoyé un officier pour en avoir des nouvelles, et ce matin il n'y avait encore que quelques Hanovriens.

“Les Hollandais n'ont que quelques centaines d'hommes dans Venloo. Cette place, si les Anglais ne s'en approchent pas, sera prise aussitôt qu'attaquée, et le passage de la Meuse libre.

“Les Hollandais qui avaient promis d'approvisionner Maestricht de tout ce qui lui manquait, qui ont eu plus de deux mois pour le faire pendant que nous y étions avec l'armée, ne l'ont pas fait. Il n'a qu'une partie du besoin des choses le plus essentielles, entr'autres de la poudre et des boulets. On leur a cédé 23 pièces de canon de ceux que nous avions à Rotterdam; ils se sont chargé de les faire transporter; 12 sont entrés le lendemain que nous en étions partis, je n'ai pu faire entrer les autres, et ai été au moment de les perdre. Enfin j'ai la plus grande partie des forces de l'ennemi vis-à-vis de moi. Je dois occuper un espace fort étendu de pays, depuis Ruremonde jusqu'à la Moselle. Ainsi ce que j'ai à opposer à l'ennemi de ce côté n'est pas proportionné aux forces qu'il a, et qu'il peut rassembler. Cependant j'ai assuré le Duc d'York que, s'il couvrait ma droite et l'empêche d'être tournée, que j'attendrais d'être attaqué quelque soit la force de l'ennemi; mais que s'il passait la Meuse ou tournait mon aile; que je devrais me retirer; et les officiers qu'il m'a envoyé sont convenus que je ne pouvais faire plus. C'est à quoi j'en suis. Les forces de l'ennemi sont considérables, puisque, voyant que j'étais déterminé à tenir ferme, il a rassemblé vers Duren toutes ses forces, et ne commencera la siege de Maestricht qu'après nous avoir forcé à nous retirer. Je crois être attaqué dans peu de jours. Ma droite n'est pas protégée par les Anglais. Si je n'avais qu'un point à défendre je serais content. Si je ne suis pas secondé ou appuyé d'un côté, j'ignore le parti que je devrai prendre. Ce serait à tort qu'on m'accuserait de ne pas donner toutes les marques de fermeté et de bonne volonté. Son Altesse Royale le Duc d'York m'a souvent fait des offres de contribuer à secourir Maestricht; mais, dans le fait, il n'y sera pour rien, puisqu'il ne veut pas s'éloigner de la Hollande, et qu'il veut que seul je fasse une entreprise qui exige beaucoup plus de force que je n'en ai. Je ne suis pas mieux secondé par les Prussiens, et n'ai rien à en espérer. Il est très avantageux de pousser les autres en avant, et de rester en panne.

“D'après cet abrégé des choses, vous verrez combien il est injuste d'être soupçonné de mauvaise volonté, et l'intérêt actuel des alliés étant de faire tous leurs efforts, ils ne doivent, ni ne peuvent, exiger que l'armée Impériale fasse ce qui n'est pas possible. Rien ne pourrait payer des malheurs auxquels on se serait exposé, sans espoir de succès. Je suis dans ce moment dans une position assez critique, et personne ne m'aidera à m'en tirer. J'ai du regret aux huit bataillons que j'ai



laissé à Maestricht, parceque la forteresse n'était pas approvisionnée comme on l'avait promis. Je n'étais pas obligé de tenir l'autre ; j'en ai fait le sacrifice pour n'être pas soupçonné de négliger aucun moyen de contribuer au bien de la cause commune, un reproche que peut-être on aura à me faire dans la suite. Je vous enverrai à l'avenir la copie des lettres que j'écrivai au Duc d'York. J'ai voulu répondre d'abord à la votre du 26, et c'est à la hâte que je vous ai tracé cet abrégé de notre situation.

“ Dans le moment on me dit que des troupes Anglaises sont arrivées à Well.”

*French. Copy.*

GENERAL DE CLAIRFAIT to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1794. October 10, Mulheim.—“ Je n'ai pû que vous écrire un mot après avoir quitté la Roer, et prit le parti de passer le Rhin. J'ai senti combien cette nécessité était cruelle, mais je suis assuré qu'elle était indispensable pour ne pas exposer l'armée à une perte trop considérable pour pouvoir être facilement réparée. Toutes les forces ennemies que tout le monde a pû évaluer au-delà de 90 mil hommes, étaient réunis sur Duren, Juliers, Vladerff. Nos postes au-delà de la Roer, étaient repoussées ; il avait attaqué le lieutenant-général Verneck à Vladerff, le général Krai à Juliers, avait pris possession des passages de la petite rivière ; et c'est dans cet état qu'étaient les choses le 2 au soir, et nous étions très près, et l'événement d'une bataille sanglante certaine pour le lendemain, fort désavantageux pour nous, puisque nous n'étions pas proportionnés pour le nombre, et que l'étendue de l'ennemi débordait nos ailes. Le succès était fort incertain, et la perte n'aurait pû être médiocre. Quelque grande qu'était l'envie que j'avais de combattre, j'ai cédé aux justes représentations de tous ceux qui étaient à même de me donner leur avis, et je ne peux qu'être persuadé encore qu'il n'y avait d'autre parti à prendre que celui de la retraite. Quoique très près de l'ennemi, elle s'est faite en ordre et sans perte. Le 3, nous primes postes derrière la Erff, le 4 près de Cologne, et ce fut la nuit du 5 au 6, lorsque l'ennemi s'apprêtait à nous attaquer, que nous fîmes le passage du Rhin sans aucune perte ; et après avoir sauvé tous les effets que nous avions à Cologne, j'ai fait occuper Dusseldorf. J'ai un corps à Dusseldorf pour la communication avec le duc d'York, à gauche je m'étends jusqu'au-delà de Bonna vers Andermack. Le Général Nauendorft est encore dans les montagnes de la Ahr, et ne retirera à Coblenz que lorsqu'il y sera forcé ; et lors il passera le Rhin pour se joindre à notre gauche. Voilà en abrégé notre position. La nuit du 7, l'ennemi a tiré à boulets rouges sur le Palais-Electoral à Dusseldorf, et n'a cessé que lorsqu'il fut brulé presque en totalité, ainsi que quelques maisons qui en étaient peu éloignées. Toute la Régence, le Gouvernement, le Commandant, toute la garnison Palatine s'est enfui, en abandonnant canons, arséniaux, magasins ; on ne peut décrire la confusion, et la déroute indécente que cet événement a occasionné. Personne n'est encore revenu depuis l'ennemi n'a plus tiré ; il n'en voulait qu'au palais de l'Electeur.

“ Je ne sais où sont les Anglais. Le Duc d'York ne m'a écrit autre chose sinon que je devais sentir ce qu'il devait faire : c'est sans doute de passer le Rhin. Il avait fait commencer un pont à Duyebourg il y a quelque temps, mais il l'a abandonné ; et je sais que celui de Nimègue est achevé, et je crois qu'ils ont passé, il y a trois jours. Je crois même que les Hanovriens nous ont prévenus ; ils étaient du côté de Wesel, et n'y sont plus. J'ai envoyé d'abord un officier au Duc d'York pour

lui dire que je portais des troupes vers Duyebourg, à porté de Wesel, et arrangé notre communication. C'est ce qu'il m'avait demandé, et que j'ai fait d'abord. Depuis ce corps a été augmenté. Je le renforcerai encore lorsque j'aurai de ses nouvelles, et que je me serai assuré que ce corps peut avoir des vivres. J'attends le retour de cet officier encore au Duc d'York. Je ferai tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir pour lui complaire et le seconder. Ce que je peux de mieux est d'envoyer un corps qui appuie son aile gauche. C'est ce qu'il a demandé. J'en ai déjà six bataillons; j'en aurai davantage s'il le faut, et à sa réquisition; mais toute son armée étant, je crois, à Nimègue, et au-delà du Rhin, ils sont bien éloignés, et je ne peux m'étendre jusque là. Si j'en crois des rapports non-officiels, il ne se propose pas même de rester à ce point.

“Le Maréchal Möllendorf fait espérer qu'il restera entre la Moselle et le Rhin. Peut-on compter là-dessus. J'en doute, et je suis persuadé au moins qu'il n'attendra pas d'être pressé par des forces considérables. J'ai eu toutes les forces de l'ennemi sur les bras; et l'éloignement et le peu de mouvement qu'on s'est donné pour me seconder, ont été cause que je n'ai pu résister aux forces que l'ennemi a porté de notre côté. Sachant que ce n'était que l'armée Impériale qui pouvait arrêter les succès que cela fait, le reste lui coûterait peu de peine. C'est un malheur dont je ne suis, et ne peut être, responsable. Il est d'ailleurs la suite inévitable des arrangements faits avant que je n'ai été forcé de prendre le commandement, et c'est ce qui me l'a fait refuser, puisque les suites étaient faciles à prévoir. Je ne suis pas moins accablé de tant de malheurs. Les personnes raisonnables et justes savent que j'ai fait ce que j'ai pu, que j'ai tenu jusqu'au dernier moment, que l'ennemi n'a pu nous entamer dans cette retraite difficile, ni pendant le passage d'une fleuve. Mais combien y-a-t-il de gens justes? On juge l'événement, on ne calcule pas les impossibilités d'avoir pu mieux faire.

“Le Duc d'York n'ayant pas écrit que le seconde paiement était suspendu, j'ai envoyé un officier pour le recevoir, mais je crains qu'il ne le fera pas dans ces circonstances. Parmi tous les autres malheurs, celui de manquer d'argent où me laisse la Cour est affreux, et peut avoir les plus mauvaises conséquences. Redoublez d'efforts pour en avoir. De mon côté, je ferai ce que je pourrai pour complaire au Duc d'York. Donnez-moi de vos nouvelles; dites-moi sans détour l'effet que le passage du Rhin a fait. Je sais qu'il doit avoir été bien funeste, mais peut-être aura-t-on l'indulgence de croire que s'il avait été possible de soutenir, je l'aurai fait.

“J'apprends que le Maréchal de Möllendorf, qui voulait rester dans le Nundernik, et couvrir Coblenz, soutenir le poste de Kaisers, et de qui me l'a fait assurer hier encore, a changé d'avis, veut se retirer et abandonner Coblenz; et que le corps que j'ai encore au-delà du Rhin par là devra abandonner sa position et passer aussi de ce côté; car le Duc Albert ne le soutiendra pas davantage. Il n'y a pas de concert ni d'accord; et tant que ce sera, ainsi on ne fera que des sottises.”

*French. Copy.*

#### AMERICAN AFFAIRS.

1794 [September—October]. Précis of Correspondence relating to alleged breaches of the treaty of peace concluded between Great Britain and the United States of America in 1784.—“When Mr. Hammond arrived in America towards the latter end of the year 1791, disputes subsisted between that country and Great Britain respecting the due

observation of the treaty of peace, each accusing the other of having in various respects infringed it.

"In compliance with his instructions Mr. Hammond presented to the Secretary of State a representation of the several infractions of which we complained.

"He began by stating the measures pursued by Congress for giving effect to the engagements of the treaty of peace. These consisted in a Proclamation which immediately followed the ratification of the definitive treaty, and which announced that event; and in a resolve dated 14th January 1784, both of them requiring and enjoining all bodies of magistracy to carry into effect the definitive articles, and earnestly recommending to the Legislatures of the respective States to provide for the restitution of all confiscated estates belonging to real British subjects, and of those belonging to persons resident in districts possessed by the King's arms, between 30th November 1782 and 14th January 1784, who had not borne arms against the United States.

"From the little attention paid to this proclamation and recommendation, and in consequence of the answer given by the Marquis of Carmarthen to the requisition of Mr. Adams respecting the posts, on the 26th February 1786, the Congress, by a circular letter in April 1787 transmitted to the Governors of the respective States, recommended the repeal of such Acts as were repugnant to the treaty of peace; and the deciding in all causes in the Courts of Law or Equity relative to the said treaty, according to the true intent thereof, notwithstanding any such acts to the contrary. And in this circular, the Congress express their regret that, in some of the States, too little attention appears to have been paid to the public faith pledged by treaty.

"These recommendations however appear to have had very little effect. A municipal adoption of the treaty, either by the repeal of existing laws which were repugnant to the treaty, or by a declaratory law establishing the treaty as the supreme law of the land, was confined to a very few of the states.

"Mr. Hammond then proceeded to specify the particular acts which are considered as infractions of the treaty on the part of the United States.

"First, in not repealing laws enacted previous to the peace.

"Secondly, in enacting laws subsequent to the peace, in contravention of the treaty.

"Thirdly, in the decisions of the state courts on questions affecting the rights of British subjects.

"First, in not repealing laws enacted previous to the peace. Several acts (the heads of which are contained in the appendix from Nos. 1 to 34, marked A.) were passed by the respective Legislatures during the war. A general repeal of these, under the stipulated exceptions, would have been a compliance with the treaty; but the restitution of the estates of real British subjects, or persons resident in districts in possession of His Majesty's arms, and who had not borne arms against the States, was not provided for by any local or general regulation; nor was the restitution of the estates of other persons from whom they had been taken by confiscation, facilitated by any provision of the Legislature.

"Secondly, in enacting laws subsequent to the peace in contravention of the treaty. These Mr. Hammond considered under three heads; as they relate to the estates of the royalists; to their persons; and such as obstruct the recovery of debts due to the subjects of the Crown.

"The titles of the Acts to which Mr. Hammond referred as relating to the estates of the loyalists are contained in the Appendix B., from No. 1 to 10 inclusive. These Acts, by which former confiscations are confirmed; and by which persons who had purchased forfeited lands are secured in their possessions were, as Mr. Hammond observed, enacted in contradiction to the spirit of the treaty, to justice, and to that conciliatory line of conduct so strongly recommended by Congress, and on which that Assembly was engaged to proceed.

"The Acts (the heads of which are contained in Appendix C., from No. 1 to 19 inclusive) relative to the persons of loyalists, which had been left unrepealed as to numbers of persons, though repealed with regard to certain individuals; and those Acts which passed on the same subject subsequent to the peace, contain sentences of proscription, attainder, and banishment against persons who, under the express terms of the treaty, were at liberty to go to any part of the States, to make personal application in order to obtain restitution of their estates; and against others who, though restrained within narrower limits, were still to be allowed privileges and indulgences of which these Acts deprive them.

"With regard to the recovery of debts due to the subjects of the Crown, Acts (mentioned in Appendix D. to No 22 inclusive) prohibiting suits, suspending the recovery of the debts, directing courts to admit the reduction of interest, and providing for the absolute reduction of interest for a number of years, have been passed since the peace; and others of the same purport made during the war have remained unrepealed, and been protracted to periods subsequent to the peace; both of them in direct contradiction to the stipulation of the treaty, 'that creditors on either side should meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all *bonâ fide* debts heretofore contracted.'

"With respect to the third point, the decisions of State Courts on questions affecting the rights of British subjects, Mr. Hammond considered those decisions as they regard the *claims*, and the *persons* of British subjects. In the prosecution of claims for debts contracted previous to the war, many juries have invariably abated interest on the debts for seven years and a half, though proof has been uniformly established of the usage of the trade to allow interest after the expiration of a year on the amount of the goods shipped, or, of the specific contract between the debtor and creditor.

"Mr. Hammond mentioned several instances of the claim of interest being denied in different States for the term of the duration of the war, and, after being suspended for that term, allowed to recommence only from the date of the definitive treaty. In other States the delay of justice has operated equally with a denial of it. All these cases are in direct opposition to the recommendatory resolves of Congress, and infractions of the 4th article of the treaty of peace.

"The few attempts to recover British debts in the county courts of Virginia have failed, and many debts, from the smallness of the sums, can be recovered in such Courts only. The decisions of the state courts on points affecting the *persons* of British subjects have been equally repugnant to the terms of the treaty; and, in cases specified under this head by Mr. Hammond, are direct and positive violations of the 6th article.

"Mr. Hammond concluded with stating the conduct of the States as a sufficient ground for the delay on the part of His Majesty in fulfilling entirely the terms of the treaty, but with expressions of the King's

readiness to enter into a negotiation respecting those articles of it which have not yet been executed.

"In the answer given to Mr. Hammond's representation it was contended by the American Ministers that, as the infractions on the part of Great Britain had preceded, so they had produced the Acts of which we complain. That, contrary to an express stipulation of the treaty, we had carried away the negroes from New York. That, instead of evacuating the upper posts *with all convenient speed*, no order has yet been given for their evacuation; from whence they think it natural to conclude that none had ever been intended. That when one party refuses to fulfil a treaty, the other is free to break it also, either in the whole or in equivalent parts, at its pleasure. That, consequently, the modifying the recovery of debts; firstly, by indulging the American citizens with longer and more practicable times of payment; secondly, by liberating their bodies from execution, on their delivering property to the creditor to the full amount of his demand; and thirdly, by admitting, during the first moments of the non-existence of coin among them, a discharge of executions by paper money, were fair and moderate acts of retaliation. That Congress, however, in consequence of assurances from the British Court that they would concur in a fulfilment of the treaty, had, in 1787, declared to the States its will that even the appearance of obstacle raised by their acts should no longer continue; and that every act of that nature should be formally repealed; which was complied with so fully that no such laws remained in any State of the Union except one; and *that one* could not have resisted, if any symptom of compliance on the part of Great Britain had rendered it expedient for Congress to repeat it's requisition.

"It was also argued that exile and confiscations were lawful acts of war, and that the 5th Article was *recommendatory* only. That this word, having but one meaning, establishes the intent of the parties; and, moreover, that it was particularly explained by the American negotiators that the Legislatures would be free to comply with the recommendation or not, and that probably they would not comply.

"With respect to the *article of interest* it was observed, that the decision whether it shall or shall not be allowed during the war rests, by the American Constitution, with the courts altogether. That if these have generally decided against the allowance, the reasons of their decision appear sufficiently weighty to clear them from the charge of that palpable degree of wrong which may authorise national complaint; or give a right of refusing execution of the treaty, by way of reprisal.

"This answer of the American Ministers appeared so unsatisfactory to Mr. Hammond that he felt it his duty to inform them that he was not authorised to conclude the negotiation, and that all he could do was to submit the paper he had received to the consideration of Her Majesty's Ministers.

"As the restorations of the negroes carried away at the time of evacuating New York has been insisted upon by the American Government, it seems necessary to remark that part of them may be presumed to have been captured during the war, and were therefore acquired by the rights of war; but that the principal part of them had fled to the British lines in consequence of proclamations issued by the British Commanders-in-Chief, which promised them freedom on their joining the British army; and of which freedom the British Government could not now deprive them.

"The breaking out of the war between Great Britain and France gave rise to fresh causes of dispute between the former Power and the Government of the United States.

"The Americans having resolved to observe a strict neutrality, a proclamation was issued by the President in which the citizens of the United States were warned and exhorted carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever that could in any manner tend to contravene the friendly and impartial conduct which was to be adopted and pursued towards the belligerent Powers.

"From this it might naturally have been expected that a just sense of their own rights and duties would have inclined the United States to resent any violation of the established principles of neutrality. The event, however, has proved the contrary, for, in various and repeated instances, the most unjustifiable partiality has been shown towards the French. They have been permitted to equip and arm vessels in the American ports, to molest the British trade within the jurisdiction of the United States, and finally to condemn by tribunals of their own the prizes they have thus taken.

"Immediately after the President's proclamation had been issued, a French frigate, called the *Ambuscade*, captured a small English brig off the Capes of Delaware; and, some days afterwards, the British ship *Grange*, lying at anchor within the Bay of Delaware, was also taken by her as a prize.

"From Charlestown Mr. Hammond received intelligence that two privateers had been fitted out from that port under French commissions.

"From the same quarter he also heard that two English brigantines, captured by the *Ambuscade*, had been condemned by the French Consul at Charlestown, and exposed to sale with their cargoes, under his authority. About the same period Mr. Hammond learnt from various respectable authorities that a considerable quantity of arms collected in America, and purchased by the French Government, were preparing to be shipped for France.

"Off the Capes of Delaware, and not more than two miles from the coast, the *Ambuscade* frigate captured the brig *Catherine*, and sent her into New York.

"At Charlestown, in South Carolina, the Americans permitted and were parties in a flagrant breach of the neutral rights.

"An English ship from Jamaica arrived there to take in provisions. The commander of a French privateer, then in the harbour, declared his intention of capturing her, and actually sold her to a merchant of Charlestown, under an engagement to deliver her in a certain number of weeks. The master of the English vessel, being apprized of this, applied, but without success, for protection to the Lieutenant Governor. He then took on board two six pounders and some ammunition; but a Republican Society of that place, gaining intelligence of this circumstance, forcibly entered the English vessel with a party of the militia artillery, carried off the arms, and deposited them in the public stores.

"The French fleet stationed at New York established a regular succession of cruisers for the purpose of annoying or intercepting any vessels which they might happen to encounter; and, in the above mentioned city, a species of jurisdiction was established by the person representing the actual rulers of France, which avowedly arrogated to itself all the authority and functions exercised by the Directors of the Marine, and by the Admiralty tribunals of France.

"By one of these cruisers the *William Tell*, a British brigantine, was captured at the distance of about a half a mile from the shore of the American coasts.

"The *Pilgrim*, a British brigantine from Nanticoke in Maryland, bound to Barbadoes, was captured by the French privateer *Le Sans-Culotte* of Marseilles, at a distance of two miles and a half, or three miles at the farthest, from the American shore, and consequently within the jurisdiction of the United States. The brigantine was publicly sold under the authority of the pretended tribunal of the French Consul at Baltimore.

"A French privateer, named the *Industry*, was illegally fitted out in the port of Baltimore, and, within a few days after her departure from that port, she captured the British ship *Roehampton*.

"The British ship *Charles*, and British schooner *Delight*, were captured as they were lying at anchor (the former at the distance of one mile, and the latter at the distance of half a mile, from the shore) off the Capes of Virginia, by a French armed ship, which had been for some weeks previously at Baltimore.

"It is true indeed that, in consequence of Mr. Hammond's remonstrations, the American Government has from time to time given some redress to the British sufferers. In some cases restitution has been ordered. In others compensation for the losses sustained has been granted by the Americans themselves.

"Regulations were made which, if they had been carried into execution, would have fully answered the intended purpose of enforcing respect to the American neutrality, and of manifesting an unremitted impartiality towards all the belligerent Powers; but even these have been so repeatedly eluded, and so explained away by subsequent declarations of their meaning, that they have been, in fact, of no material advantage to the British trade against the insults and depredations of French cruisers.

"Promises were given to Mr. Hammond by the American Ministers that effectual measures should be taken to prevent the practice of commissioning, equipping, and manning vessels in their ports, to cruise on any of the belligerent Powers.

"Mr. Hammond was also assured that measures were taken for excluding from all further asylum in the American ports vessels armed in them to cruise on nations with which they were at peace; and for the restoration of prizes taken by such vessels; and that, should the measures for restitution fail in their effect, the President considered it as incumbent on the United States to make compensation to the sufferers.

"After having received such assurances, Mr. Hammond was much astonished to hear from the American Ministers that the warlike equipment of the privateers in the ports of the United States, *provided they elude the vigilance of the officers of the Executive Government*, does not invalidate the legality of any prizes they may happen to make, and bring into those ports.

"Such a principle, if once established, would be productive of the most dangerous consequences; since it presents a scope for collusion, of which the present agent of the ruling party in France would not fail to take advantage.

"But the Americans suppose that they have more than equal causes of complaint against Great Britain.

"They accuse her of having given assistance to the hostile Indians.

"They complain that her privateers plunder their vessels, throw them out of their course by forcing them, upon groundless suspicion, into ports different from those to which they are destined; and detain them even after the hope of a regular confiscation is abandoned. That British ships of war have forcibly seized mariners belonging to American

vessels. That by British regulations, their corn and provisions are driven from the ports of France. And that, without the imputation of a contraband trade, their vessels are captured for carrying on a commercial intercourse with the French West Indies.

"In addition to these grievances, the Instructions dated 6th November 1793, given to the commanders of British ships of war and privateers, by which they are directed to take all vessels that may be either bound to the French West Indies, or that may be laden with the produce of those Islands, are regarded as peculiarly hostile to the United States.

"The truce also with the Algerines is asserted to have been procured through the intervention of England, for Portugal and Holland; and, being considered as another insidious attempt to check the growing prosperity of America, it afforded an additional topic of abuse against the former power.

"The popular resentment being thus previously excited against Great Britain, Mr. Jefferson, the American Secretary of State, made a report on the privileges and restrictions on the commerce of the United States in foreign countries, the fallacies and falsehoods of which are sufficient proofs that the avowed tendency of the whole report is to recommend a closer connexion with France, and to inculcate the expediency of a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain.

"In the course of a fortnight after Mr. Jefferson's report had been presented, Mr. Madison (the ostensible leader of the party to which the former gentleman is attached) offered to the consideration of the House of Representatives certain specific propositions, analogous to the principles laid down in that paper.

"These propositions were fortunately rejected; but, if they had been carried into execution, not only all commercial intercourse with America must in fact have ended, but the hope also of obtaining payment of the debts due from that country to Great Britain would in all probability have been lost; as it is expressly stated, that 'provision ought to be made for liquidating the losses sustained by citizens of the United States, from the operation of particular regulations of any country contravening the law of nations.'

"Another measure however of commercial hostility against Great Britain soon afterwards took place.

"It has been already mentioned that the instructions of the 6th November were loudly complained of in America; but, on accounts being received from St. Christopher's of several American vessels that had been carried into that island, and condemned there in pursuance of them, the national resentment was carried to the highest pitch, and it was immediately resolved that all trade should be prohibited from the United States for thirty days; from the operation of which Act it was expected that the English West India Islands would suffer most essentially.

"This measure was immediately followed by others of a more hostile tendency. On the 27th of March several resolutions were proposed in the House of Representatives, of which the amount is to sequester all debts due to British subjects, and to hold them as a security for the purpose of providing an indemnification for any American property captured by British cruisers.

"The discussion of these resolutions was suspended, and revived according to circumstances; and the final determination is indefinitely postponed to some future day.

"Another resolution, of a nature equally inimical to Great Britain, was proposed in the House of Representatives on 2nd of April, of which



the purport is to prohibit all intercourse with Great Britain, until a compensation shall be granted for all losses arising from captures made by British armed vessels, and until the ports on the confines of Canada shall be surrendered. This resolution was subsequently amended by adding to the specification of the other grievances imputed to Great Britain, a compensation for the negroes carried off at the conclusion of the war. In this form this motion was carried in a Committee of the whole House, by a majority of 53 to 44.

"The main question was not however taken, and consequently the decision on this point also is indefinitely deferred.

"Mr. Hammond could not easily conjecture the motives which induced the promoter of these resolutions to carry them through all the preliminary stages of deliberation, and to proceed no farther for the present, unless indeed they are intended to be held out as a mode of intimidating Great Britain; or, at least, as affording to the citizens of America the expectation of their being capable of producing such an effect.

"The popular ferment was raised to such a height that the American Government, for the purpose of in some measure allaying it, despatched a gentleman of Philadelphia to the British West Indies, in order to institute in those islands appeals in the cases of such American prizes as might appear to him to have been illegally condemned; and to secure an indemnification on the part of the United States to any individuals who may become securities for the prosecution of such appeals.

"In addition to the other marks of ill will manifested towards Great Britain, a member of the House of Representatives gave notice that he intended to move 'that over and above all duties imposed on the importation of foreign commodities into America, ten per cent. of extra duty should be laid on all articles the growth or manufacture of Great Britain.'

"This, if carried into a law, must tend inevitably farther to reduce the number of British vessels, which has been annually and gradually diminishing ever since the importation of the first discriminating duty.

"It must be owned that this motion was afterwards withdrawn by the mover of it; on an express assurance, however, from him that, previously to the close of the session, it should be revived in some other form.

"The spirit of hostility to Great Britain was much increased by Lord Dorchester's speech to the Indians, and by Governor Simcoe's expedition to the foot of the Miami rapids. The American Ministers complained in the strongest terms that Lord Dorchester was fostering and encouraging in the Indians hostile dispositions towards the United States; and that an unjustifiable aggression had been committed by Governor Simcoe, who was preparing to build a fort on their territory, notwithstanding orders had been given, in compliance with Mr. Hammond's demands, that the encroachment should be suppressed which the State and individuals of Vermont were accused of having committed on the territory occupied by His Majesty's garrison.

"Mr. Hammond contended that those encroachments had never been in any manner suppressed; but that recent infringements in that quarter and on the territory in its vicinity, had been since committed. To this he attributed the sentence in Lord Dorchester's speech which had given so much offence. In regard to Governor Simcoe's expedition, he owned he had no intelligence that such an event had occurred. But, in his opinion, much depended on the *place* on which the fort was intended

to be erected. And whether it was for the purpose of protecting subjects of his Majesty residing in districts dependent on the fort of Detroit, or of preventing that fortress from being straightened by the approach of the American army. To either of which cases, he imagined, that the principle of the *status quo*, until the final arrangement of the points in discussion between the two countries shall be concluded, will strictly apply.

"Mr. Hammond thought this a fit opportunity for recapitulating the various breaches of neutrality that have been committed, as well by the State officers and individuals, as by the Federal Government itself. He adverted particularly to the insult which had been recently offered at Newport, Rhode Island, by the Governor and Council of that State to the British flag; in the violent measures pursued towards His Majesty's sloop of war *Nautilus*; and in the forcible detention of the officers by whom she was commanded.

"It is however to be hoped that the French cruisers, fitted out from American ports, will not in future be permitted to molest the British trade; for an Act has been passed authorising the President so employ the naval and military force of the United States to effect the prevention and suppression of so flagrant a violation of neutrality."

#### JOHN JAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 13, Royal Hotel, Pall Mall.—"I received last evening, by a vessel in twenty-one days from New York, despatches from the Secretary of State. They contain much information respecting the then present state of affairs in the United States.

"Among other interesting circumstances, the transaction of Governor Simcoe relative to an American settlement at the Great Soders, is stated, and accompanied with copies of the papers respecting it.

"Extracts from these papers, and from Mr. Randolph's letter to me of the 30 August, I have now the honour of laying before your Lordship. A subsequent letter from Mr. Randolph of the 5 September enclosed a copy of one he had written to Mr. Hammond on the subject, and also a copy of Mr. Hammond's answer expressing his intention of transmitting them to Governor Simcoe, and to His Majesty's Ministers.

"These papers were sent to me, not merely for my information, but to enable me to make proper representations on the subject.

"Considering the present promising state of the negotiation I cannot think it necessary to make any formal applications to your Lordship respecting these painful occurrences.

"It is to be regretted that the same disposition to conciliation which animates your Lordship, does not appear to be entertained and seconded by His Majesty's officers and agents in America and the West Indies. I flatter myself, however, that instructions tending to produce a conduct conformable to that disposition have been sent, and that it will not be long before their effects will become visible, and relieve the President's mind from apprehensions which, I find, have taken strong hold of it.

"These considerations restrain me from troubling your Lordship with details and remarks concerning an opinion, which has become general and fixed, of unfriendly measures with the Indians.

"The treaty now preparing will, I hope, be such as to remove every cause of complaint, and produce sentiments and sensations of a different kind.

"I saw the captain of the Philadelphia ship last night; he told me he expects to sail next Sunday. In case a few days more should happen

to be necessary to complete the treaty, I will endeavour to detain him at the expense of the United States."

Enclosure 1.

MR. SECRETARY RANDOLPH to JOHN JAY.

1794, August 30.—"Last night we received from Captain Williamson, living at Soders in Ontario county, in the State of New York, the enclosed letter containing the most unwarrantable demand from Governor Simcoe, through Lieutenant Sheaff, that he should desist from the prosecution of his settlement there.

"Soders is probably well known to you; if it be not, I add the only information which I can obtain of its position; that it lies between Oswego on lake Ontario, and Niagara, about twenty-five miles from the former, and nearly three times that distance from the latter.

"What might we not be justified in saying or doing on this new aggression? Mr. Hammond has promised to procure the truth of the report as to Governor Simcoe's seizure of the rapids of Miami, but, with a full scope of time, he remains silent; while it is firmly *believed*, that British troops were associated with the Indians in the late attack on Fort Recovery; and it is *certain* that the Governor of Upper Canada threatens us if we clear our own lands, and build houses to shelter our labourers.

"The admonition which your letter of June 23rd gives to prevent the arrival of any irritating intelligence in London, is but a comment upon the unvaried policy of the President, and of every member of the administration. This is evidenced by the step on which the President has now resolved; which is, to transmit copies of the papers to Mr. Hammond, now at New York (where he has been for a considerable time, and whither he went, after an intermission of visits to the President for more than two months) to afford him an occasion to explain this procedure away; or, if he should perchance have power, to check it; to inform Captain Williamson that he is right in his determination to push on his settlement, and that the owner of lands may repel force brought by an invader; and to offer to the Governor of New York, on loan, arms for the purposes of defence.

"My letter to Mr. Hammond cannot be prepared early enough for the express, but it will not be requisite or immediately useful to you; since the outrage of the principle asserted in Governor Simcoe's challenge will instantaneously occur to you; and, compared with similar acts on the part of the British Government, will establish our love of peace, in triumph over the calumnies which British agents, indisposed to us from interest or other motives, may propagate on the other side of the Atlantic."

*Extract.*

Enclosure 2.

CAPTAIN WILLIAMSON to MR. SECRETARY RANDOLPH.

1794, August 19, Bath.—I have the honour to transmit to you, by express, a protest in writing delivered by a British officer to a young man that manages my business at the settlement of Great Soders. You will find the protest is against that settlement, and all the settlements in that country.

"The officer who delivered the protest was attended by a subaltern, and a guard of eight or ten men.

"I shall, on meeting Mr. Sheaf, endeavour to draw from him the intended consequences of inattention to these orders of His Britannic Majesty.

"As it is believed that large supplies of military stores have been lately forwarded to Oswego, I think it not improbable but the intention may be taking possession of this place.

"As to my own part, I feel too sensibly to pay any attention whatever to orders from any foreign Power ; and will, of course, proceed with my improvements (which are merely clearing land and building houses) until I am driven off by a superior force."

*Extract.*

### Enclosure 3.

LIEUTENANT R. H. SHEAFFE to CAPTAIN WILLIAMSON.

1795, August 16, Soders.—"Having a special commission and instructions for that purpose from the Lieutenant-Governor of His Britannic Majesty's Province of Upper Canada, I have come here to demand by what authority an establishment has been ordered at this place, and to *require* that such a design be immediately relinquished, for the reasons stated in the written Declaration accompanying this letter ; for the receipt of which protest, I have taken the acknowledgment of your agent Mr. Little. I regret exceedingly, in my private as well as public character, that I have not the satisfaction of seeing you here, but I hope on my return, which will be in about a week hence, to be more fortunate."

*Copy.*

### Declaration.

"I am commanded to declare that during the inexecution of the treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States, and until the existing differences respecting it shall be mutually and finally adjusted, the taking possession of any part of the Indian territory, either for the purposes of war or sovereignty, is held to be a direct violation of His Majesty's rights, as they unquestionably existed before the treaty, and has an immediate tendency to interrupt, and in its progress to destroy, that good understanding which has hitherto subsisted between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America.

"I therefore require you to desist from any such aggression."

*Copy.*

JOHN NUTT and WILLIAM MOLLESON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, October 24, 33, Broad Street.—"We are sorry to be under the necessity of giving your Lordship this trouble, but we are instructed and urged by the general committee to request some communication of the situation of our claim for debts due to the British merchants trading to North America previous to the year 1776, so far as your Lordship may deem proper and consistent with the existing state of the negotiation with Mr. Jay.

"We trust with confidence in your Lordship's assurances of protection and relief, and that our just expectations which involve the welfare of thousands will be realized."

## M. MALOUEY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, December 14, Welbeck Street.—“Je ne doute pas que vous n'ayez des avis plus détaillées et plus sûrs que ceux qui me parviennent, mais lorsque je vois les événements suivre à peu près les prédictions de M. Mallet du Pan dans lettres qu'il m'écrit, je me reproche de ne pas vous les avoir communiqué au moment où je les reçois. Je prends donc la liberté de vous envoyer les deux dernières. Il est très possible qu'elles vous soient inutiles, qu'elles ne vous apprennent rien que de fausses conjectures; mais j'ai remarqué que sa manière de voir était toujours juste sur quelques points.”

*French.*

## M. MALLET DU PAN to M. MALOUEY.

1794, November 5, Berne.—“Deux heures après le départ de ma dernière lettre du 2, Mr. W[ickham] m'apporta la vôtre du 15 Octobre, et la poste celle du 10 précédent. L'une et l'autre me prouvent que vous êtes loin du point de la question, qu'on n'est informé que très superficiellement à Londres de l'état intérieur actuel de la France; et que les distances vous laissent fort en arrière des variations extraordinaires du moment. Je ne puis vous mettre au fait par de simples lettres; ma dernière aura déjà rectifié quelques unes de vos opinions.

“L'erreur fondamentale de tous ceux qui raisonnent au loin sur la France est de porter leurs raisonnements sur la fausse base de l'analogie. Ils se persuadent que les Jacobins, triomphants cinq ans consécutifs, doivent triompher éternellement. Cette férocité, cette audace, ces prétendus talents dont vous me parlez, n'ont pas empêché que Robespierre leur chef succombât, que la terreur, les guillotines, les mesures révolutionnaires ne fussent emportées d'emblée, et qu'ils ne se regardent comme tellement écrasés qu'ils sont venus en Suisse tenter des négociations avec les Aristocrates, au moyen d'un billet du jeune Roi, qu'ils avaient dicté à ce malheureux *enfant*. J'ai lu ce billet en original; j'ai reçu la confiance de ce qui s'est passé; et j'ai dissuadé les intermédiaires aux quels on s'adressait de répondre à une si dangereuse ouverture. Il ne faut pas s'allier à un parti qui s'en va; il ne faut pas souiller la cause royale par une connexion avec des scélérats qui ont exécuté les noyades, les foudroyades, les mariages républicains, et qui sont l'objet de l'exécration universelle. Une union si monstrueuse serait un crime en morale, et une faute irrémissible en politique; car il suffirait que le *peuple*, que les royalistes même de l'intérieur soupçonnassent cette liaison, pour faire rétrograder toutes les dispositions au retour d'une royauté rendue par les Jacobins. S'ils en avaient la puissance, ils n'en auraient pas la volonté. Ce sont les tentatives d'agonisants. Billand Varennes, d'Herbois, et Barrère leurs chefs sont perdus sans ressource. Le premier est à-peu-près fou; le second va expier les meurtres de Lyon; le troisième sa servilité à Robespierre. Les sociétés populaires, déjà affaiblies, sont presque partout attaquées ou dissoutes. La majorité de la Convention voyant ce parti écrasé par la haine publique, s'est dispensée de recourir à l'insurrection pour l'achever. Elle a tout laissé faire aux formes légales. Voilà Carrier en jugement, sans que les Jacobins aient osé rien entreprendre.

“S'il n'y a point de talents parmi eux; il n'y en a pas d'avantage chez leurs adversaires. Mais ceux-ci ont pour eux l'opinion publique; et observez bien qu'ils ne l'ont pas formée, et que si elle les protège, c'est qu'ils lui obéissent. Ce mouvement des esprits les entraîne, bon

gré, mal gré. Plusieurs de principaux ont témoigné des dispositions conciliatrices ; le système auquel ils sont forcés les rapproche invinciblement des Fédéralistes et des Constitutionnels. Nul autre parti n'offre les mêmes rapports, la même position, les mêmes espérances.

“En vertu des conseils que nous leur avons transmis, ils se sont rendus maîtres des deux grands Comités de Salut-Public et de Sûreté Général ; ils ont relevé les 164 Deputés or restants qui avaient voté l'appel au peuple dans le jugement du Roi ; ils ont mis en train le largissement et la re-intégration des 74 membres du même parti qui se trouvaient détenus depuis 15 mois ; ils ont replacé dans les autorités constituées une infinité de Constitutionnels ; ils ont fait rentrer les bourgeois de Paris dans leurs sections.

“Tout ce qu'on vous débite du prétendu ascendant des Jacobins dans les emplois, les tribunaux, est une reminiscence et non un fait ; ils sont dépossédés en très grande partie, et le seront partout avant le fin du mois.

“Malgré ce que je vous annonce du rapprochement des chefs *Modérés*, gardez-vous de croire qu'ils aient aucun plan ferme de royauté. Ils hésitent, ils tâtonnent, ils craignent pour leurs têtes ; ils se défient de tout ce qui les entoure. D'ailleurs, ils espèrent obtenir la paix, ou la donner aux Puissances ; et s'ils l'ont, ils se regardent comme affermis. Alors la vanité législative, et l'amour de la domination leur feront tenter un nouveau code républicain. Le tiers de la Convention tient à ce régime par nécessité, ou par goût ; un quart est Jacobin ; le reste est composé de politiques qui attendent les événements ; mais la pensée individuelle, dominante, est de se tirer à tout prix des tempêtes de factions sanguinaires, et de sauver vies et propriétés.

“Voilà les éléments sur lesquels on travaille. Le besoin irresistible et la soif effrénée de la paix leur donnent une grande activité ; mais pour qu'ils composent autre chose que le cahos, il faut que la crainte de la guerre accompagne l'espoir de la paix. Plus de ressources si les Puissances, au lieu de marchander celle-ci au prix du rétablissement de la monarchie constitutionnelle, la jettent à la tête de la Convention. Celle-ci ayant rempli le principal vœu public, sera alors maîtresse se donner le gouvernement qui lui plaira, et très probablement elle ne reviendra pas à la monarchie. La nation lassée, voyant tomber une partie de ses chaînes, acceptera tout ce que présenteront ses délégués, et chacun verra trop d'incertitudes et de dangers à reparler d'un Roi. Si, au contraire, les Puissances en renonçant à toute idée de guerre contre la France et pour lui donner des loix, étaient d'accord à déclarer qu'elles ne poseront les armes qu'après le rétabli de la monarchie constitutionnelle, vous verriez les *Modérés*, unis aux 200 membres non régicides, se servir, en faveur des vues royalistes, de ce cri de paix nécessaire ; ils remettraient les Constitutionnels en attitude ; ils opposeraient le vœu national pour la paix aux efforts des Républicains ; ils auraient pour eux majorité dans le peuple, et majorité dans la Convention.

“En ce moment, les modérés jouent serré. Ne vous méprenez pas aux discours des autres ; souvenez-vous que Monck ne parlait que de République la vieille du jour où il proclamait le Roi.

“Cette crise offre certainement une infinité d'obstacles et de chances défavorables ; mais la pire de toutes est la conduite de l'Empire. On ne doute plus que le Roi de Prusse n'ait fait sa paix ; ses troupes se retirent entièrement ; quatre autres Electeurs ont proposé à la Diète de traiter ; la [défection du] Roi de Prusse, l'horrible affaire de Pologne, la crainte de ses usurpations [porte] la Cour de Vienne, d'ailleurs très mécontente des Anglais et des Hollandais, de négotier aussi.

L'Espagne, battue tout les huit jours, traite aussi de son côté. Vous verrez éclore des paix séparées, comme à la paix de Nimègue, et alors notre principal ressort est démonté ; car l'Angleterre seule influe plutôt en sens contraire sur un ennemi qui la déteste, et qui n'aura plus qu'elle à craindre. Toute marche ultérieure est donc suspendue par cette incertitude sur la paix et la guerre. Cependant on ne néglige rien. En ce moment la Convention est un cahos, et la fermentation excessive. Il surviendra dans peu des explosions, dans un sens ou dans un autre.

“ Quoiqu'il arrive, à moins que les Jacobins ne triomphent, la France sera rouverte aux émigrés qui n'ont pas porté les armes. Il serait à désirer que vous vous entretinssiez des circonstances avec deux ou trois des principales Constitutionnels. Montlosier devrait voir Duport qui le caressa à Paris. Quant aux colonies, votre idée est très heureuse, mais l'orgueil résistera à rien céder aux Anglais. On rendra plutôt tout aux autres Puissances, qu'on ne leur abandonnerait un village. Ecrivez moi plus régulièrement.”

*French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1794, November 9, Dover Street.—“ In the course of the discussions with Mr. Jay, which are, I hope, now brought to a satisfactory issue, a great deal has passed respecting the Prize Courts in the West Indies, and the facts mentioned by him, together with those which have in other ways come to my knowledge, have satisfied me of the necessity of our providing some effectual remedy for the evils arising from the present frame and constitution of those Courts. Unless this can be done, there is, I fear, no hope of establishing any permanent good understanding with America; for let us make what regulations we please by treaty, the West India and Bermuda privateers will continue their depredations upon the American trade as long as they find the West Indies Courts disposed to countenance their proceedings.

“ I have attentively considered the report which was made to your Grace by the Advocate, Attorney, and Solicitor General on this subject, under date of the 9th of August; and, though it is impossible not to acknowledge that some of the difficulties stated by them, respecting the execution of the plan which had been referred to them, are of weight, I own I am not satisfied that they are sufficiently important to prevent the adoption even of that plan if done by authority of Parliament. But I am sure that, if that plan should really be impracticable, we should not be justified in leaving matters as they are, without trying whether some other remedy might not be effectual.”

“ Supposing a controlling power in Parliament respecting both the Prize Courts and the Courts of Vice-Admiralty in the Colonies, which I apprehend clearly exists, those being strictly matters of an Imperial nature, I should suppose there could be no difficulty in uniting all the Vice-Admiralty Courts into one, as well as all the Prize Courts. If it were necessary, the several judges of the present Courts in the different islands might all be members of the new Court, and might continue to reside in the separate islands to do such acts relative to causes brought into the General Court, either of Vice-Admiralty or Prize, as might properly be done by single judges out of court. And the General Court might and ought to be an Itinerant Court, holding its sessions in all the islands. And the appointment of one civilian of character and abilities to preside as Chief Justice would operate as a great check on

the proceedings of the Court in each island. There would also be derived from this arrangement the advantage of uniformity of practice and decision; a point in which the present system is greatly defective.

Such an arrangement would much diminish the inconvenience suggested in the report respecting causes now depending. I should think these might be transferred to a Court differing so little in any part of its constitution from that in which they now are. But if not, the present Court might be continued, as with respect to those causes only, but being restrained from entertaining any new cause."

"I throw these suggestions out to your Grace on a point with the detail of which I am not conversant, with a desire that they may be considered both by the King's servants and by those whose local and professional knowledge make them more competent judges of such a business, but in the earnest hope that some new arrangement will be made to obviate a mischief the continuance of which cannot fail to produce the most serious evils."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1794 ], Downing Street.—"I have just read Eliot's account from the Hague of the opening made by Monsieur Martanges, which strikes me as deserving every encouragement; and I should imagine you will think it right to authorize Eliot to make a favourable answer, referring at the same time to the previous conditions, which we mean to require from the Princes. The number of *émigrés* who can be collected within the time named is probably overrated; but, if our conditions are accepted, the larger the force is of this description, the better."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794? [September-October], Wimbledon.—"I return you the papers you sent me; the principles of your *projet* I much approve of; but, before communicating it, I should wish it to be reconsidered whether it is right to admit any other nations whatever to interfere in our differences with them. In truth, I know not who these nations could be, but, if any of such a description as you give could be found, I would not relish the idea of any nation being referees between you and your former subjects.

"On the subject of the ports and the future boundary, I would wish, for our mutual satisfaction, before it goes out of your hands, that Mr. Pitt, you, and I could, with a map before us, and General Clarke in company, run over the report made up by Simcoe on the defence of the two Canadas. The day will be so broke tomorrow it would not answer, but as early on Saturday as is convenient.

"I am rather against King's suggestion as to duties, as mentioned, respecting the first article. This however may be talked of in our conversation with Clarke."

#### JOHN JAY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1794, November 22, Royal Hotel, Pall Mall.—"I have had the pleasure of receiving the letter which your Lordship did me the honour to write yesterday, enclosing a copy of one that you had written to Mr. Hammond. Marks of confidence from those who merit it are grateful



to the human mind; they give occasion to inferences, which, by soothing self-love, produce agreeable emotions.

"Being aware that our mutual efforts to restore good humour and goodwill between our two countries, should be continued beyond the date of the treaty, I am happy that our sentiments in this respect coincide.

"The letters I have written to America with the two copies of the treaty, which are already despatched, leave me little to add on the subject of your Lordship's letter. They are indeed concise, for I had not time to amplify. They will be followed by others less general, and more pointed. There are men among us to whom those ideas will be familiar, and who will not omit to disseminate them. Their opinions and example will have influence, but it will be progressive, not sudden and general. The storm I hope and believe will soon cease, but the agitation of the waters will naturally take some time to subside. No man can with effect say to them, peace, be still. By casting *oil* upon them, they will doubtless be the sooner calmed. Let us do so.

"I have a good opinion of Mr. Hammond, nay more, I really wish him well. The asperities however which have taken place lead me to apprehend that official darts have frequently pierced through official characters, and wounded the men. Hence I cannot forbear wishing that Mr. Hammond had a better place; and that a person well adapted to the existing state of things was sent to succeed him. I make this remark on the most mature reflection, and found it on those active principles in human nature which, however they may be repressed, cannot easily be rendered dormant, except in cases of greater magnanimity than prudence will usually allow us to calculate upon. It is not without reluctance that I give this remark a place in this letter. I class Mr. Hammond among those who, I think, are friendly to me. I have experienced his attentions and hospitality. Not an unkind idea passes in my mind respecting him. Public and common good is my object and my motive. That official letters and documents have been prematurely and improperly published in America is evident. I have not been sparing of animadversions on this head, and flatter myself that more circumspection in future will be used.

"The consuls and other public officers and agents in the two countries will have it much in their power (especially in America, from the nature of the government and state of society) to promote or to check the progress of conciliation and cordiality. I have but imperfect knowledge of those now in the United States, except Sir John Temple, whose conduct and conversation appeared to me to be conciliatory. I have been informed very explicitly that Mr. Hamilton, the consul in Virginia, is not esteemed, and that his private character is far from being estimable. I mention this only as meriting inquiry.

"There being no French *merchant* ships in the American seas, the privateers must either prey on neutral vessels, or return without spoil. Hence they become exposed to temptations not easy for them to resist. The privateers of two hostile nations have no desire to seek and to fight each other. Between mere birds of prey there are few conflicts. If they were recalled, their crews might be usefully employed in ships of war or of commerce. Pardon the liberty of these hints; they occur to me, and I let my pen run on, perhaps too far.

"Permit me to assure you that my endeavours to cultivate amity and goodwill between our countries and people shall continue unremitted, and that they will not cease to be animated by your Lordship's co-operation.

"To use an Indian figure, may the hatchet be henceforth buried for ever, and with it all the animosities which sharpened, and which threatened to redden it."

# MILITARY CONVENTION FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AND GERMANY.

[1794, December.]—NOTE by LORD GRENVILLE of the Prussian case, in regard to the violation of this Convention, as presented by BARON JACOBI.

"On the 26th or 27th July, M. Moellendorff made a Convention for the military operations, with Duke Albert and the Duke of York.

"In August the English Ministers were well contented with the Prussians.

"The middle of September, official assurances were given that the subsidy would be paid

"On the 20th September, M. M. Hohenloe and Frensen gained a victory at Kaiserlautern.

"On the 30th September, notice was given that the subsidy would not be paid for the month of October, because engagements were not fulfilled.

"On the 8th or 10th October this news arrived at Berlin, at the moment they expected payment.

"On the 20th or 24th October, a Declaration was delivered at Berlin that, if a new concert was made with the Duke of York and the commanders of the Austrian and Prussian armies, the subsidy past and future would be paid. Prussia consented to this, provided the arrears were first paid, and that the Prussian army should not act under the Commissary Briel and Haafs, but according to a convention of the tenor of the Convention of the Hague.

"This answer arrived in London the 9th November. On the 28th November the payment refused; but it was declared that if Prussia had any propositions to make for next campaign, they would be considered."

ABSTRACT by LORD GRENVILLE of letters received from Brittany, from November 1794 to January 1795.

3 Messidor.—Republican signals, between the coast and their vessels.

N. B.—These are regulated by the days of the month, which must of course be understood of the Republican month.

Qy.—Whether these signals will not have been changed on the discovery of Prigeant and his associates.

15 November.—This paper is certified by the Baron de Cormantin.

16 November.—Resolutions of the *conseil militaire* of the army of Brittany.

Art. 2.—Danger of delay; requisitions of men and grains in force all through the province.

Art. 3.—Resolution not to act in a body till the English come. If only 12,000 men come, they shall be joined. Will protect their debarkation, but without the certainty of their coming at a given time will not rise.

Art. 4.—Three points of attack proposed. Vannes, St. Brien, St. Malo.

The first a false attack with a debarkation of 2,000 men. May be joined by 12,000 or 15,000 men, but say here only 7,000.

Royalists in Morbihan 8,000.

Real attack near St. Brien with a debarkation of 8,000 men. May be joined in twenty-four hours by 6,000 men, and the whole country would be with them.

No troops *dans cette province*.

Third attack at St. Malo with 2,000 *émigrés*. May be joined in twenty-four hours by 2,000 or 3,000 Royalists; and the latter would probably at that time be in possession of Chateauneuf.

Art. 5. During these attacks the Royalists in the interior will rise in ten or twelve different places, to occupy the attention of the few troops who are in the province.

### *Chiefs in Brittany to Puisaye.*

7 December 1794.—They send Bourdonnaye and Allégre who will explain their plan. The spirit of the country improves, but the danger grows pressing.

### *Cormartin to Puisaye.*

20 December.—Account of what has passed since his departure; successful endeavours to excite a general disposition in the province. He would not know the country again, the whole is with them.

Danger from moderantism, &c. the *armistice*\* has produced *des traitres*.

They sent six weeks ago to press his return as above all things necessary. The cantons are pressed by Republican troops, and remain in a state of inactivity which it is at once difficult and dangerous to prolong. They sent dispatches by his aide-de-camp to press—1. his return. 2. the suspension of all partial debarkations. 3. not to send *émigrés* except in a body.

The Republicans are in great want of troops.

Seeing the urgency of the moment Cormartin meant to have come to England, with the determination of returning at the end of January; but the other chiefs would not agree to it. Urges his return.

### *Council of the Army of Brittany to Puisaye.*

22 December.—Insist on his return and prompt succours. Send articles on which they press,

1 and 2. Puisaye's return, &c.

3. Immediate succours from England.

4. Cessation of partial debarkations.

5. Dufour's return.

6. Till the end of January the committee desire only one boat with our answer, and some pecuniary assistance. Puisaye should come in it.

7. Ditto.

8. Detail of succours asked.

1. A Prince of the blood of France.

2. The return of Puisaye.

3. The *émigrés* in mass.

4. All those in England to be obliged to come.

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\* Qy. amnesty, or does it mean the *truce*.—G.

5. The *émigré* corps raised by England.
6. The British army.
7. Arms, &c., and money.
8. Cannot wait longer. The first British corps to be of 12,000 men, who are *to force a landing*; but the Royalists could assist any such undertaking.
9. The signals, &c.

*The remaining articles not material.*

*The Chiefs to Puisaye.*

22 December 1794.—Danger of delay; no troops in the province; the people with them; absolute necessity of his return; must act immediately.

*Cormartin to Puisaye.*

25 December.—Difficulties of his personal situation. Refers to Dufour.

*Pierrot to Puisaye.*

28 December.—Uncertain state of things in the Republic. Inconvenience of his absence.

Invitations from the Representatives of the Convention, and the Republican general to Boishardy.

Solhilac and *Pierrot* go to Moncontour; are received by the aide-de-camp of General *Humbert*, and the commandant of the town with civility. Return in safety having delivered a letter from Boishardy for *Humbert*.

Boishardy and Cormartin are now with *Humbert*; wait to know the issue.

All this makes it necessary to lose no time in *Puisaye's* return and the British succours

Everything is still well disposed to them, but may change in a month.

They continue to *chouaner* in order to keep up the spirit. They have daily successes.

Refers to Dufour.

Report that Boisguy has surrendered to the Republicans with all his forces. Disbelieves this, but it has some foundation.

His defection would carry with it all that canton.

In the canton of M. ——— above twenty *Chouans* have surrendered.

Names of others who have made their peace; danger that this will spread.

Reports of armistice, and approaching peace in the Vendée.

Want of money very great.

*Guerre des assignats* alone would ruin the Republic.

Exorbitant price of everything.

In all the country from Vannes to Dinant money passes currently.

Cider sells from thirty to forty sols in *assignats*, and from three to four in money.

Their friends begin to murmur at *Puisaye's* absence.

This whole country is good, 15,000 fighting men might be drawn from it.\*

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\* This is meant of the part where the writer is.—G.

[Cormartin] to *Puisaye*.

31 December.—Account of interview with Humbert.

Offers made by him; will see him again before they decide; a similar interview at Nantes between Charette and Canclaux. He is going there with a pass to learn the particulars, as they will regulate his conduct.

He adds in cipher, that he is determined never to surrender; and that he goes only to amuse the enemy, to deliver the letter from Puisaye to Canclaux, and to establish a correspondence with Charette.

December . . . . . to . . . . .

Successful endeavours to gain over that Canton.

Cannot reckon on more than fifty or sixty men; if he could stay a month there, could greatly increase this number.

Further details.

The spirit of the country excellent. There are troops in all the parishes, but little to fear, the number *des coquins*\* being very small.

Suspicious from Puisaye's absence; danger of more delay.

† *Theobalde* to *Puisaye*.

2 January, 1795.—Perschaze has perished.

Prigeant is taken. Despatches which they had sent by Perschaze were very detailed. Presses Puisaye's return; some of their officers are taken; others have surrendered. The Rector of Maizière has betrayed them.

The country is well disposed, but no time is to be lost.

*Chouannerie* has succeeded very well, particularly in Boishardy's canton.

They have seen Humbert again who has renewed his solicitations to them to surrender.

Refers on this point to his cipher.

He and Solhilac are going to Nantes with a passport to know what Charette is doing, and mean to do the same. They supped with Humbert at Boishardy's house.

The Convention is alarmed at their force, and the Republican soldiers tired of the war.

During his journey there is to be a suspension of hostilities. Boishardy is gone to Moncontour with Humbert—danger of this. Urgency of immediate succours, loss of time, &c.

Details of officers, names, &c.

*Assignats* are at eighteen and twenty per cent., when compared with money.

They are in great want of money, for they can now do nothing with *assignats*.

*Cormartin* to *Prince de Bouillon*.

2 January 1795.—This letter contains the same points as the preceding letters, with no material variation.

*N.B.* 3 January 1795.—Agreement for an armistice between the army of Brittany and the Republicans.

The terms are very remarkable.

\* Are these the troops? or the patriots in the parishes?

† This is plainly *Cormartin*. (*Lord Grenville's Notes*.)

It is to last till contrary orders are given, and eight days notice are to be given of its being broken off on either side.

*Chantreau and Boishardy to Puisaye.*

5 January 1795.—Press in the most urgent terms his immediate arrival.

*Chantreau and Boishardy to Puisaye.*

11 January 1795.—Necessity of his return. Very fortunate that the Republicans cannot hurt them in this moment, or they would be dissolved.

But from what the enemy has learnt from Prigeant, he will be enabled to take means for seizing them all.

Cormartin and Humbert are gone to Canclaux. The negotiation does not include the Morbihan, who are too scrupulous for it. Bourdonaye is good for nothing but to be a priest.

They learn from the Republicans that the whole department of Mayenne is in insurrection.

Advantage of seizing this opportunity.

Immense offers of the Republicans.

With money they could answer for the force *armée des parages*,\* which he says is surprising, but proves the influence of their party.

They have all passports from the Republican generals, and eat with them when they choose.

Presses Puisaye's return, with arms and money.

*Chantreau to Puisaye.*

14 January 1795.—Bourdonnaye and his companions had despatches, but they have been obliged to tear them. Refers to their verbal accounts.

Charette has entered into conference with Canclaux; he demands that all his country should be *restored to its former state*. Stofflet refuses to listen to any terms; he fights like a devil.

These facts are certain, for they are in the despatches from Cormartin and Humbert.

He has received to-day a letter from Bollet the *Représentative du Peuple*, who is a *bon et brave homme*.

Boishardi and another are still in conference at Lamballe.

*De Sorville to Puisaye.*

19 January 1795.—Refers to Dufour.

Solhilac and he tried to get to the Vendée, but could not.

He and another have each taken the direction of a canton. His, though new, is much advanced.

He wants arms and ammunition; sends a list of articles.

Presses Puisaye's return; means of it. Never was the country better disposed. General discontent even among the troops.

*L'énergie commence à devenir le caractère du peuple Breton. La chouannerie est devenue à la mode. Tout le monde s'en mêle. Les*

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\* Qy., what is that ?—G.

Municipaux les plus enragés nous recherchent en demandant leur grace, et promettant de la mériter *par leur conduite*.

*Assignats* fall daily. They are at 10 per cent. With money they could have on their side almost all the troops; presses for money, arms, and ammunition.

Urgency of present succour rather than delaying it. Refers to the persons from Morbihan on the subject of the suspension of arms.

Great want of good officers to be sent, particularly those who speak Breton.

One letter from Boishardy, Solhilac and Torville, to Cormartin and Chantreau proposing an immediate explosion without waiting for England.

One from Boishardy, Chantreau, Solihac, and the other chiefs, to Puisaye, urging in the strongest terms the necessity of immediate assistance, and stating that without this is done immediately the Republicans will send troops, who will render a descent impossible.

They state the favourable disposition of the country, and the certainty of corrupting the Republican troops with money; and, on the other hand, the danger that, unless supplies are sent, the want of provisions will oblige 40,000 deserters who are in Brittany to return to the Republican army.

#### A STATE PAPER ON IRELAND.

[Without date, address, or signature, probably written in 1792.]—"I find it necessary not only in order to explain myself more clearly, but to collect and methodise my own thoughts on the subject of Ireland, to take up the consideration of the affairs of that kingdom from a very early period. I feel, at the same time, that I shall be inaccurate as well as prolix, for, excepting about six weeks in Lord Buckingham's Government, when a good deal of information on a few points was put into my hands, I have not for many years given any attention to the detail of Irish business, and I have not even the Statutes, and Journals of Parliament, the notes I have myself taken at different times, nor any other document by which I might correct what I write. The references, however, which I am obliged to make to former transactions are, for the most part, only used as illustrations of my opinions, and provided what I say makes my meaning clear, I shall think I have been sufficiently exact; especially as there is no danger of my misleading you, as to any particular fact, who are so much more fully acquainted than I can ever have been, not only with all the late transactions in Ireland, but with the real causes, and springs from whence they have been produced.

"Though the injustice and mischievous effects of the restraints which had been imposed by the British Parliament should be admitted; though the judicature arrogated by the English House of Lords should be considered as a manifest violence, and usurpation; both the one and the other had been suffered so long, the habits of the people were so moulded to them, and the security of so much property apparently depended upon an adherence to the same system, that it is more than probable the situation of affairs would have undergone no material change, if it had not been for what I have always considered to be an abuse of power, as wanton and corrupt, as it was mischievous and oppressive; and a long continuance of most improvident management; so that I have often thought the English interest in Ireland must have been preserved by a particular Providence, as it was scarcely possible to concert measures better calculated for its destruction.

"Ireland, it is well known, was governed not with an immediate view to the prosperity of its inhabitants, nor even to the augmentation of the general strength and greatness of the British empire, to which it was only remotely and indirectly contributory, by the monopoly which our merchants enjoyed of its trade. Under such a system, it became necessary to depress the political importance of the people. The national interest and that of Government were plainly in opposition to each other; and without examining the general policy of such a system, it must be allowed that the mode of administration was well calculated to maintain it. The operation of Poyning's Law had reduced the House of Lords to absolute insignificance. The business of Government was committed, in the House of Commons, to the Attorney General, a professional man; and the only person who appeared with any leading or consequence when the House of Lords were allowed to take a part, was the Chancellor, who was, upon a fixed principle, to be always an Englishman. No other situation to which either power or dignity was attached remained, so that the great men of the land were excluded from all share of executive as well as legislative authority. The House of Commons was constituted in such a manner as to have the least possible dependance upon the people. The right of election was confined to very few by the original constitution of the greater number of the boroughs, and, by the exclusion of Papists, reduced within still narrower bounds. The choice was for a long and indefinite time, the life of the member, or the King. The members of the Privy Council were nominated by the Crown, and removable at pleasure. The final judicature resided in England; the whole power of the Church was in the disposal of the Crown, and committed to the hands of Englishmen. There was revenue sufficient for all the necessary purposes of Government; the Civil Establishment was, in its nature, as little expensive as possible, and the system of policy such as to lead to its reduction rather than increase; the military was limited by a British Act of Parliament. There was even a great surplus of revenue, and a large sum of money in the Treasury at the disposal of the Crown. The commercial restraints must, when they were first imposed, have been felt as a cruel grievance, and occasioned the distress, and ruin of numbers. But, after they had been submitted to for such a course of years, and all the remaining industry of the kingdom had been confined to particular channels, there was no considerable body of men whose interest was immediately affected by them, and it was become in some degree the private interest of the bulk of the nation to concur with the views of Government. The North depended upon the linen manufacture, the South upon the provision trade; Great Britain was the principal market for both. A free trade, by increasing the general wealth and population of the country, might, in the end, be beneficial to the linen manufacturer and increase the demand for that article, but the markets already opened to him furnished a vent for more than he could supply, and the prospect of a contingent and very remote advantage could never have reconciled him to the immediate danger of Great Britain's shutting her ports against him, or even withdrawing the bounty. It was, besides, notorious that, notwithstanding the restraint, the country prospered exceedingly, and was improving rapidly. The taxes were moderate in themselves, and the limited expenses of Government called for no extraordinary supplies, so that there was as little to apprehend from the temper, as from the power of the people, which we have already seen was circumscribed in the strictest manner.

"When every national principle is excluded, and Government acts for a partial end, it will be the more exposed to the danger of its



servants setting up for themselves, and perverting the powers delegated to them to establish their own independence, and make it necessary for Government to employ them exclusively. Against this danger, as an influence in Parliament was the only engine that could be set to work, there was a resource in the power of dissolution, and if the superior Government had been unremittingly vigilant in guarding against the first encroachments of its servants, this might have been sufficient. The very reverse was the case. They were remiss in the extreme, and their servants were vigilant to improve every opportunity of augmenting their influence and strengthening their connections. The redundancy of the public revenue furnished them with the first important advantage. They bribed a majority of Parliament to confederate with them by means of that treasure which should have been husbanded as the best security of the authority of Government. But, by this profusion, the Exchequer was exhausted, and the Government reduced to a dependence, for the moment, upon the grants of Parliament. And in order to perpetuate that dependence, a popular expedient was devised, which the Government were seduced by their treacherous advisers to consent to, namely, the charging the hereditary revenue with bounties upon different articles to a very great amount. The consequences of these manœuvres were soon apparent, and every successive Lord Lieutenant was obliged to make a new contract with the Junta in Ireland, to carry through the ordinary business of the State. Government was, at length, obliged to make a vigorous effort in order to throw off this disgraceful subjection. For this purpose it became necessary to raise the importance of the people, and the Octennial Law was passed. This measure was attended with all the success that could be expected or desired; and it became manifest from experiment that the natural influence of Government was more powerful than any factious combination that could be formed against it. From this period a revolution took place which called for some modification of the ancient principles and forms. The Government had prevailed by the assistance of the country gentlemen in Parliament. The court which had been paid to this description of men during the struggle had awakened their ambition, and the shortening the duration of Parliaments, as well as the breaking the Ministerial confederacy, had really increased their consequence. It was easy to foresee that they would not soon relapse into the torpid inaction into which they had so long been plunged. They had gained one step which, in the nature of things, must lead to more, and provision was to be made for securing their affection, and uniting their interest with Government, lest they should become the instruments of faction and ambition.

“The general persuasion, which I mentioned before, that the two great articles of trade, namely, linen and provisions, upon which the bulk of the nation depended for subsistence and wealth, were absolutely in the power of Great Britain, and the flourishing state of the linen manufacture in particular, furnished a great advantage to Government; and another circumstance, not less in their favour, was the division between Protestant and Papist, each of which naturally looked to Government for protection. The victory which Administration had recently gained enabled them to augment the revenue, so far as to answer fully the necessary expenses of Government, which might, also, be honourably reduced within narrower limits by an economy, which it was no longer to be apprehended would be construed into a timid compliance with factious clamour, instead of being considered as a deliberate and politic system. But the greatest of all possible advantages for settling upon the firmest basis whatever arrangements the

crisis might require, and which seems to have been peculiar to the Government of Ireland, was the certainty that no demand for extraordinary supplies could disconcert their plans, nor any event deprive them of leisure for that gradual and silent reformation which is at once the safest and most effectual. A war could add nothing to the public expense but the trifling difference of 4,000 men serving abroad or at home. And as Great Britain, even in time of peace, might be expected to avail herself as far as possible of the Irish army, that difference was reduced to nothing. The obvious intention, and indeed the immediate occasion of Poyning's Law was to guard against the possible treachery of an Irish administration, by making it impossible that any law, prejudicial to the English interest, should pass by their connivance. A remedy calculated for extraordinary occasions was not to be lightly resorted to, more especially at a time when it was not only material to conciliate the affections of the people to English Government, but to repress the attempts of the servants of the Crown in Ireland to obtain an influence there, independent of their employers. The idea of a resident Lord Lieutenant perhaps was wise, and calculated to remove the abuses which had been complained of, if it had been connected with a subordinate administration, who might stand between the Government and the people, and be responsible to both for public measures. But, as things are at present, there is no degree of firmness and sagacity which can save the Lord Lieutenant from being the tool or dupe of men whose interest it is to deceive or betray him. During the whole course of Lord Harcourt's and Lord Buckinghamshire's Governments, they might, at the opening of every Session, have informed their employers, without any violation of truth, that they had a large majority in both Houses, who had engaged to vote whatever should be recommended to them. These men, in the country, were heads of popular associations, and colonels of volunteers, exciting discontent, and toasting confusion to measures which, in the closet of the Lord Lieutenant, they had advised or approved. And when the crisis arrived in Parliament, they supported the Castle as far as was sufficient to fix the odium of every unpopular measure upon English Government, and then deserted their standard, or refused to advance. Their object was to embroil the Government and the people. It made them in some degree necessary to both parties, and secured them, during the struggle, the exclusive emoluments of office and all the patronage of the State. Upon this basis they were erecting the fabric of their future power, and, if circumstances had permitted the popular ferment to subside, and the frequent elections had not brought forward a greater number of adventurers than could be readily provided for, the confederacy of the servants of Government would already have acquired a form and consistence much more formidable and powerful than that which, with so much risk and expense, was broken in Lord Townshend's administration. If any apparent and public responsibility had been thrown upon the servants of the Crown; if their share in advising the general measures of Government which was real had been ostensible; and men of figure and consideration in the country had been selected to take the lead in both Houses in official situations, instead of mere adventurers, it is probable that English Government might never have been committed with the people of Ireland. Its influence need not have been openly and visibly exerted but for their protection. But nothing operated more to disincline the people to England than the practice, which so long prevailed, of suppressing and altering Bills in the Privy Council. It always bore the appearance of a violent act of power, and made the Irish feel the dependence of their situation. Yet nothing was

more easy than to have avoided it, as the House of Lords, an assembly devoted to the Crown, might have been employed for the same ends as the Privy Council, without risk or objection. The popular indignation would have spent itself upon Parliamentary leaders, who would have found consolation in the emoluments and patronage of office for all the obloquy to which they might be exposed.

"During the prevalence of the faction which was broken in Lord Townshend's administration, it was obviously necessary to the continuance of their power to garble the sheriffs, upon whom depended the returns of members of Parliament. The same practice was continued afterwards. I do not mention this as a source of the unpopularity of English Government. There was scarcely any description of men who did not find or expect their private advantage in the continuance of this abuse. But, to Government, nothing could be of so much importance as the regular administration of justice, and the due execution of the law, with which it is utterly incompatible.

"I have already taken notice of the two great advantages which England possessed at the period above-mentioned; namely, that the bulk of the people felt no possible grievance, but, on the contrary, considered their interest as materially connected with the favour of Great Britain; and, secondly, that the expenses of Government could be reduced within certain limits, and, under such circumstances, that no augmentation could become necessary. Let us see how the administration availed themselves of these advantages. In the first place, they lavished the public money without any view to the public service, run themselves deeply in debt, and, in every Session, had to apply for new supplies, and new taxes. This was certainly not the best way of making themselves popular, and being considered as the protectors of the people. This occasioned some murmurings, but was of less consequence, as the public indignation was not immediately directed against Great Britain, and the resource of a new Lord Lieutenant was always at hand. The war was now begun, and the fleets of Great Britain were to be victualled. An embargo is evidently a measure which necessity only can justify. It is an expedient for preventing mischief which might happen before a more regular proceeding could take effect. Lord North laid an embargo upon the provision trade of Ireland, and continued it for three years, regardless of the distress and clamour it occasioned. Nor was it thought sufficient to give the pre-emption to the contractors in England. A commissary of provisions was established at Cork, and a letter written by the Treasury to the Commissioners of Revenue in Ireland, desiring them to give orders that such vessels as should be certified by the commissary, from time to time, should be suffered to sail from the ports of Ireland without entry or clearance. That this was contrary to law it is superfluous to remark; and the obvious effect was to enable an individual to buy up all the provisions remaining after the contractors were supplied, at his own price, and to supply the enemy, without fear or punishment, because without the possibility of detection. The man had not discretion to conceal the great fortune which he made with unparalleled rapidity. I never could discover any pretence of public utility upon which this abuse was grounded. It is not easy to conceive the ruin, and misery, which was brought upon Ireland by an act of power which suspended at once, and for so long a period as three years, one great branch of their trade, which was almost the sole dependence of the southern and western provinces. But the evil was felt, more or less, in every part of the island, and by every description of men. I sincerely believe that no people ever experienced a more cruel and general

distress. It was this, and this only, which made the whole nation, who had submitted so tamely for a century to every restriction which the monopolising spirit of British commerce could impose, determine at once to throw off the yoke, under which they were actually perishing. The distinctions of Protestant and Papists, and their senseless dissensions, were obliterated at once in the pursuit of their common safety. Their very existence depended upon a vigorous and united effort to save the vessel in which they were all embarked.

“It is superfluous to examine whether any part of the concessions afterwards made to Ireland might have been avoided. Whatever was worth contending for was finally relinquished, and in my opinion very wisely, by the Act of Renunciation which you procured. The ferment which had been raised so high could not be expected to subside at once. The parade of volunteering, and the nonsense of Parliamentary reform, might engage the people for a time, but the first was too expensive to continue long, and the latter too abstract a speculation to create any general interest, at a time when so many new pursuits were opened, of great and immediate profit. The volunteering spirit was continued something beyond its natural period, by ill-judged attempts to suppress it. The Parliamentary reform was treated with contempt, and, after one convulsive struggle, perished, and was forgot. There remained nothing but the protecting duties, a measure founded upon the narrow principles which are universally exploded in theory, and will be soon in practice, but of so hostile a complexion towards Great Britain, and clamoured for so loudly by the mob of Dublin, that I am not surprised the Duke of Rutland, who came over in the middle of a Session without any previous knowledge of the country, should have been alarmed. He had not time to concert any plan for defeating it, even if he had had courage to attempt it ; but, when it came into Parliament, the Northern members to a man, actuated by the motives I have detailed above, exerted themselves against it, and threw it out by a large majority, without any apparent interference of Government. The conclusion of this Session laid the foundation for the famous commercial propositions, by which, in my humble apprehension, the continuance of the British administration, and, what was of still greater consequence, the peace of the two kingdoms was wantonly hazarded, in order, by purchasing a little popularity for Messires Foster and Company, to put it in their power to embarrass all the future measures of Government, as they had the past. I never had but one opinion on this subject, and declared it from the first. That the sentiments of the Duke of Rutland and Mr. Orde underwent a revolution, I can bear witness. As far as I have considered the propositions, they would have been attended with material advantages to both countries. But it was easy to foresee that they would lead to questions which it was much better should continue dormant, and give a handle for disturbing again the public peace. Some points, upon which Ireland at that moment appeared very careless, might have been silently settled to prevent future discussion, and, as opportunities presented themselves, more material objects might have been provided against, and the whole system gradually brought to perfection. The complete pacification of the country at that moment promised leisure for this, and was, alone, a reason sufficient to have prevented men of common prudence from agitating anything new. Every day, every hour, was giving real strength to Government; the people throughout the kingdom were sedulously employed in commercial enterprises, and, beyond the walls of Dublin, all the arts of faction were unable to excite a murmur of discontent. I will venture to say that, if the British Government had been truly informed of the state of

Ireland, and consulted whether, in that situation of affairs, a scheme of such extent and difficulty should be proposed, they would not have hesitated to determine in the negative. And for the truth of my representation I may appeal to the event. The Opposition in Parliament declared that the people had asked for nothing; that they acquiesced in the situation they remained in after the renunciation of the supremacy of the British Parliament; that Government called upon them to say whether anything could yet be done for them; that they were grateful for this mark of attention and benevolence, and sent in such propositions as appeared calculated for the benefit of Ireland. Instead of which, another set of propositions was tendered to them prejudicial to their commercial interests, and subversive of their constitutional rights. Thus handle was given to represent the conduct of Government as insidious, and spread universal alarm through the nation, who were justly jealous of their recent acquisitions, the advantages of which began to be sensibly felt. No artifice was omitted to improve this opportunity, and inflame the public resentment; but Ireland was quiet then, and has remained so ever since.

“The address which was voted by surprise in the House of Commons, in a thin House, the last day of the Session, when not one member of any note was present, and which, even after Government had acquiesced, the threat of a protest by one unsupported individual was sufficient to defeat in the Lords, was laughed at in Ireland; and no expectation was entertained that it could be made the ground of any future proceeding; and though I can readily comprehend the motives which might induce certain Irishmen in the service of the Crown to stir in the business, I have never yet been able to understand how Mr. Orde and the Duke of Rutland could be induced to represent as discontented, and clamorous for new grants, the nation which they must have known to be in a state of the most profound tranquillity; and, by that means, to lead their friends in England into a transaction of such difficulty and danger, from which if the event had been complete success, no advantages could be hoped but what they were already in full possession of, domestic peace, and an obsequious Parliament.

“One great point was gained for Government in the Duke of Rutland’s administration, a very considerable augmentation of revenue; and what use has been made of it? Between two and three hundred thousand pounds has been squandered in buildings, and other expenses, in which Government has not the remotest concern. With the help of a lottery, and some little manœuvring in stating the accounts to Parliament, they have managed to keep up a tolerable appearance without any new loan; but the Treasury is exhausted, and money must be raised and new taxes imposed. Thus have the strength and security of Government been wasted, and, what is of the greatest importance, time which might have been employed in such a manner as to enable that country to contribute an ample share of the expenses of war, which must now be borne, as formerly, by Great Britain alone. For it would be childish to expect, and ruinous to exact, any considerable supply from Ireland in her present state. The other points which were effected by the Rutland administration were, the City Police Bill, and the General Police. The objects of both, I mean the avowed objects, must be universally approved; and it was of some consequence to Government that the peace and government of the city should be better provided for than it had been; and of infinite importance that the law should be carried into execution in the whole extent of the kingdom, with vigilance, firmness, and impartiality. The means employed to obtain these ends I cannot consider as dictated by political wisdom.

It was beneath the dignity, and repugnant to the interest of Government, to pervert institutions intended for the furtherance of public justice, and order, to purposes of private corruption. It was still more reprehensible, in my humble opinion, to hold out the magistracy as a punishment, and an object of terror; to threaten the counties with what ought to be considered as a common benefit: and when the subject has, by the constitution, and the general principles of every Government under heaven, a right to a due, and effectual execution of the law, to leave it in the discretion of the Lord Lieutenant whether he shall enjoy it, or not. Before a measure proceeding on principles unknown in the law of these islands was adopted, and an opening given for imputing to Government an intention to make the public disorders a pretence for obtaining new and dangerous powers, it might have been prudent to try the effect of a less corrupt appointment of sheriffs, and new commissions of the peace. At any rate it must have been wiser to make the old law the groundwork of the new. There would have been less room for complaint, and, if ancient maxims may be relied on, the effect would have been more certain, as well as more complete.

"In the whole series of measures which I have been considering, I am not able to find one which was calculated to give any substantial advantage to the Government of this country, either by conciliating the affections of the people of Ireland, or rendering their resentment impotent. I am unable to say what is the system which it was intended to establish, or whether the views of those in power extended farther than by temporary expedients to get through the term of their administration, regardless of any consequences to the fundamental interests of Great Britain. I observe, however, that every measure which Government has thought proper to make their object, has, if persisted in, been carried by large majorities; and I also observe some obscure indications of a consciousness that a new system of administration was necessary, to meet the new relative situation of the two kingdoms. On the part of Great Britain nothing appears to have been wanting to facilitate the government of successive Lords Lieutenant. Whatever measures they recommended have been adopted; whatever persons they pointed out have been distinguished by the Royal favour; and offices, and emoluments of great value, making once a part of the patronage of this country, have been relinquished, and restored to Ireland. Nothing, in short, can be imputed to the British Ministers but their rash confidence in the persons they employed, and their want of leisure or inclination to judge with their own eyes.

"I mentioned some indications of an intention to introduce a new system of administration. Such an intention has been repeatedly announced, both in public and private; and, in consequence, great sums of money have been voted by Parliament, to re-purchase the offices of state which had been granted for life, as sinecures, to persons resident in England. They have been continued as sinecures in Ireland. The establishment has been loaded with increased expense, and the success of one set of adventurers has only excited the rapacity and expectations of another. But what points have been gained for England, and what advantages is she likely to reap from all her concessions? A right, most certainly, to call upon Ireland for larger contributions towards the expense of future wars, a right which Ireland herself has readily acknowledged. But has there been any provision made to render that right effectual? Not the least. Has there been any considerable augmentation of the army? No. Any creation of naval force? No. Any augmentation of revenue so as to leave a fund for the supply of

Great Britain? Quite the contrary; the revenue does not equal the expense. In short, the state of things is no other ways altered than as the public debts and expenses have been increased, and, consequently, the difficulty of government. And a national interest having been brought forward, but not a national administration, there is nothing systematic in the public measures of the servants of the Crown in Ireland, nor any public principle pretended to by them, but that the subsisting administration is to be supported. How little such support can contribute to the strength of any party here, the late proceedings have demonstrated, and the principle evidently tends to establish the most mischievous of all distinctions, that of an English and Irish interest. But, surely, if there is anything more peculiarly to be avoided, it is the committing, upon every trivial occasion, the name and authority of Great Britain. This, then, is the conclusion upon which we must rest. After the lapse of so many years, this country has derived no advantage, but some loss, from the concessions made to Ireland. There has been a loss in patronage, and in power, to compensate which neither influence nor security have been gained, so that the policy of yielding in the first instance, though defensible upon every liberal principle, may be called in doubt from the event. Nor is there, at present, any very flattering prospect for the future. The actual state of the revenue is not such as to admit of any further contribution to the common service; and the clamours of discontent are as loud as ever. It remains, therefore, to be enquired whether the people of Ireland still labour under any real grievances, with the continuance of which the interest of this country is in any degree complicated.

“That grievances exist, I think, cannot be denied, and it is equally evident that they are entirely of a domestic nature, and have no relation to British influence and superiority, nor are they of such magnitude as to require immediate redress. They should, however be kept in view, not only as every wise and just Government must make the general happiness of the people its principal object, but they will supply the means of gratifying the people, when the occasion may demand it.

“It is a maxim of good legislation that the poor, from whose labour the public wealth is derived, shall be favoured and protected as much as possible. That the situation of the poor of Ireland is deplorably wretched it would be superfluous to prove; but I do not believe that any person who has not been conversant in the interior of the country can conceive under what a variety of oppression they are crushed. I believe the hearth-money to be a greater source of distress to them than is generally thought. Indeed I am confident that no revenue which has been drawn from houses with single hearths can be considered as compensating in any degree for the misery and discouragement of the poor. The State is a loser by it, in point of immediate profit. I had occasion to talk on this subject with Sir John Parnell, who admitted the distress occasioned by the tax, and that nothing would contribute more effectually to the relief of the people than its repeal, or modification; but justified it by this extraordinary position, that it was necessary to make them *feel* that there was a Government over them. No other object can be answered by its continuance, for Sir John Parnell, and every other person acquainted with the revenue of Ireland, is fully sensible that houses with single hearths might be exempted, and a larger revenue than the present obtained by increasing the tax upon houses of an higher class. A great part of the revenue now drawn from single hearths is merely nominal. A large arrear is incurred every year, and that arrear is never recovered, nor indeed is it possible to recover it; so that the public Treasury must be a gainer by new

modelling this tax. It is sometimes said that no man above the class of beggars can be so poor as to be distressed by the payment of two shillings a year. Labourers in England are never at a loss for an house to shelter them. Many of them have dwellings of their own, and if a landlord was to exact a higher rent for a cottage than they could afford to pay, they have a resource by applying to the parish. In Ireland the great renter of land, whose farm comprehends the extent of one, and often of two or three English parishes, admits just as many families of cottagers to reside upon his land as may supply the labour he has occasion for, and no more. However they may be oppressed, there they must remain. Other farms are already supplied, and they can find neither employment nor room. The poor in the South and West of Ireland have little or no employment but in husbandry. The seat of the linen manufacture is in the North, and no other has yet much extended itself. The nominal wages of a labourer are 6*d.* a day, about 7*l.* 16*s.* 6*d.* a year. Out of this he must pay a high rent for his cottage and potato garden, and all the articles of necessary consumption which he cannot be supplied with from thence, he must take from his master. So that, though it is possible in some cases that the peasant may be tolerably subsisted, yet it may well be doubted whether two shillings in ready money is not a greater sum than he can at any time spare. The poor in England pay no direct tax. They contribute, however, to the State by their consumption of taxed commodities. It must be the policy of Government to bring the poor of Ireland gradually into as good a situation, and I should conceive the relieving them from a direct impost would be one of the first means for accomplishing that end. The grievance of hearth-money is certainly not likely to create any disturbance, and may be continued without danger to Government in its present form, but the modification of it has always been among the popular topics. It must be very ill-managed if it is not made to appear as a favour. No revenue can be lost by it. Perhaps there may be some gained, and it will undoubtedly contribute to the general prosperity of the people.

"Tythe is a subject of much greater weight, and demands, in my opinion, more immediate attention from Government. Whether it may be practicable, in any circumstance, to abolish it may be a matter of doubt; but it is the occasion of such extensive mischief, and the examples of other countries afford such strong presumption that it is possible to substitute some less exceptionable provision for the clergy, that it must, undoubtedly, deserve most serious consideration. Tythe is considered as a tax very burthensome in its nature, and which is, in a peculiar manner, grating to the feelings of those upon whom it is levied. It operates as a discouragement to industry and improvement in that particular line which it is the best policy for this country to promote, both as the improvement of the lands of Ireland is that most immediately within reach, and as multiplying the commercial pursuits of the people, and turning any considerable part of their capital into those channels at present, would be only multiplying the difficulties of Government, by throwing new impediments in the way of that final assimilation and consolidation of the trade and revenues of both kingdoms, which should be the ultimate objects of Government.

"In the provision counties of Ireland, an arbitrary vote of the House of Commons having forced the clergy to desist from the claim of agistment tythes, that is the tythes of pasture land, the revenues of the clergy, far below what they are legally entitled to, are paid by the most miserable wretches in the creation. The rich are exempt. Whether the length of time which has elapsed since the resolution of the House



of Commons above mentioned would be considered as a legal bar to the claim of the Church, I know not. I presume the negative; but I am sure the private interest, the habits, and the prejudices, of a great part of the nation, run with such force against it, that it would be madness to assert it.

"This exemption from tythe is the reason why great tracts of land, which would otherwise be tilled, are continued in pasture. The landlord finds his interest in reducing his estate to a desert, but the revenue and strength of the State depends upon population; tillage supplies the poor with employment, gives them fixed dwellings, and regular habits of life, attaches them to the soil, and makes them amenable to law. The people of Ireland have, of late years, gradually increased. The quantity of land which is engrossed by the provision trade is one source of their distress, and, of course, one cause of the disturbances which have prevailed. Throwing a larger proportion into tillage is the readiest method of providing for them. The increase of the agriculture of Ireland can be no injury to any description of men in England; the increase of population would open a new market for the manufactures of both countries.

"I am not an advocate for any great or violent changes. I think the danger which always attends them is never compensated by the advantages. My objection to the commercial propositions was their attempting too much at once. But I see in England that much has been done, insensibly as it were, towards the abolition of tythe. Moduses are in many places established. In all the inclosures which have taken place, there has been a commutation for land. I think the policy of assimilation to England would alone be an argument for making timely provision for a gradual change of the same kind in Ireland. But I think there are reasons arising from the peculiar situation of that country, and this among others has great weight with me. The Roman Catholic religion is losing ground there daily. The influence of the priests declines. Every means, therefore, should be taken to make it over to the clergy of the Established Church. Some expense would be well bestowed in providing them proper habitations in every parish, and in opening a retreat for the priests who are fewer in number and more inclinable to conform. But, even in England we know what bickerings and heartburnings prevail between the pastor and his flock, on the subject of tythe; and it must be an object of some consequence to remove every obstacle to affection and goodwill when Popery is dying away, and a trifle may determine whether its ancient professors shall unite themselves to the Established Church, or be formed into a new sect of Dissenters.

"Before I quit this subject I must observe that the Pastors, both of the Papists and Protestant Dissenters of Ireland, depending for support entirely upon the goodwill and zealous attachment of their flocks, are stimulated to keep up, by perpetual exertions, that influence which is of such consequence to them. The emoluments belonging to the clergy of the Establishment are secured to them by law, and it is very rarely that their private interest can be affected by the careless and languid performance of their duty. Whether it might be practicable to lessen this dependence of Dissenting teachers upon their respective congregations, by securing to them some provision under the authority of the State, I am not prepared to give a decided opinion; but I am certain that it would have the effect of relaxing their zeal, and gradually disposing the laity to reconcile themselves to the Established Church. The Protestant Dissenters branch out into such a variety of sects, that it would perhaps answer no purpose of public importance to

provide for any particular description among their teachers. The Roman Catholics are much less adverse to the Church of England than most of the Protestant Dissenters. The Papal authority is no longer what it was, and there are Roman Catholic countries in which the King's supremacy is established, and with as little limitation, or nearly so, as in England. If it were possible to conciliate and assimilate the body of Roman Catholics in Ireland with the Established Church, the Dissenters would be of no consequence.

"I must consider as another real grievance to the people of Ireland the accumulated severity of the Revenue Laws. I daresay that the Board of Revenue performs its part of the public service with great integrity, diligence, and capacity. But the subordinate jurisdictions, and officers in remote parts, are the source of infinite oppressions and injustice, and, I am persuaded, not more vexatious to the people than detrimental to the revenue itself. Whoever has remarked that scarce a Session has passed without some reinforcement of the former system of violence, and penalties, or without some new tax; and, at the same time, that the revenue has always fallen far below the expectations of Government, will be satisfied either that the system of taxation is, in its principles, grossly defective, or that the regulations are ill-contrived, or that the revenue is greater than the population and circumstances of the country will bear. The latter of these suppositions is contradicted by its rapid improvement. The deficiency of the revenue must, therefore, be attributed to one, or both, the other causes. In my opinion to both. The general system of the taxes requires revision, and the severity of the laws by which it is enforced is injudiciously applied, and produces no effects but the oppression of the people, and the corruption of the officer. I shall always suspect the wisdom of that Government which appears to have no resource but force, and, when any of its regulations is eluded, has no contrivance for maintaining it but a multiplication of penalties.

"The Pension List is, in my opinion, another just ground of complaint to the people of Ireland, together with all the profusion under the heads of King's Letters, concordatum, and military contingencies. The less the influence of the people of Ireland in the House of Commons, the greater will their jealousy become of any corrupt influence prevailing there. All unnecessary expense, therefore, ought to be avoided. The multiplication of offices, though it may be justified by particular conjunctures, will always excite alarm and clamour. It seems to be, at best, but an expedient to gain a temporary advantage, and by no means calculated to increase the radical and permanent strength of Government.

"The want of apparent responsibility in administration will also naturally occasion discontent. The responsibility of the servants of the State is the acknowledged principle of the British Government, nor can it be expected that the Irish, who are repeatedly told that, in point of constitutional liberty and security, they are now upon the same footing as the people of England, will be deprived of so important a right as that of calling Ministers to account, when they have betrayed their public duties. To convince them that every member of the domestic administration of their country is as truly, and legally responsible, as persons in similar situations in England, is an object of such material consequence, that it should always be kept in sight. The personal responsibility of Ministers is one of the great securities of the monarchy in England; and the personal responsibility of Ministers in Ireland is the only ground upon which British supremacy can be firmly built. The idea that the responsibility of the Government is in the Lord

Lieutenant is false and unconstitutional. He represents the executive magistracy of England, the sovereign of Ireland, between whom and the people no difference can be properly supposed to arise. He is not sheltered by the accidental circumstance of his having no property in the kingdom he governs, nor a residence but merely temporary; but by the principles of the British Constitution, which, for the wisest ends, has made responsible not the sovereign who commands, but the minister who executes. The King's pleasure cannot be pleaded in justification by his servants. They are bound, at their peril, to examine before they act in consequence whether that pleasure is in conformity with the law, and the essential interest of the nation. The Lord Lieutenant, who represents the King, is equally freed from responsibility. Those in official departments under him are properly answerable for the measures which, without them, cannot be carried into execution. But directly in contradiction to these principles has been the system pursued. Everything has been done to take away all appearance of responsibility in the Irish Administration, and to throw every thing upon the Lord Lieutenant and his secretary. To such an absurd extreme has the jealousy of a revival of the old oligarchical tyranny been carried by Government, that all patronage has been taken from every Department, and the Lord Lieutenant is to name, and be personally solicited for, the appointment to the very lowest official situations, as if it could be expected that tide-waiters, searchers and coast officers should conceive that they had contracted an obligation to British Government, and not to those through whose mediation they had obtained its favours. As if every nomination did not make many refusals necessary; as if such patronage was not merely nominal, Government promoting not its own dependents and adherents, but those of other men, and thus incurring all the odium of denials, without any share of the praise of bestowing. In pursuance of the same system, no man in Ireland is called into Cabinet consultations in virtue of his office. The Lord Lieutenant applies, at his discretion, to any person he thinks fit; sometimes it has been the Chancellor, sometimes the Speaker of the House of Commons, sometimes the Prime Sergeant, or Attorney General, at others men in no official situations, with whom the general plan of Government has been concerted, and every measure of importance previously determined, and arranged. Then follows a separate communication, consultation there is none, to each of the leading members of both Houses, whether in or out of office, upon whose support the Government principally rely; and, afterwards, a more general meeting at which the address or the motion, intended to be proposed, is read. This also is mere matter of ceremony, and I have known such meetings attended by men of name and figure, who have gone from the Castle to the House to lead the opposition. Men cannot be properly responsible for measures which they have no share in advising; and, as there is no mark by which the people can distinguish the real advisers of Government, the odium of every measure falls upon the Lord Lieutenant and his Secretary; and with the greater violence as the people are conscious that, whatever may be the demerits of those officers, and though they should in fact intend and attempt all that ruin to the liberty and trade of Ireland which is constantly imputed to them, they are out of the reach of punishment. Yet nothing is more certainly true than that the Irish part of the administration is the spring of all the measures pursued by Government. The suggestions they make, and the information they give, are the grounds of every resolution adopted by the Lord Lieutenant, and the British Cabinet; so that the sum of what has been obtained by breaking the faction in Lord Townshend's time has been no more than this. That

formerly men in place in Ireland had power with the risk and responsibility which ought always to be annexed to it; the power still remains with them, and the Lord Lieutenant and his Secretary, that is, the British Government whom they represent, have all the risk and responsibility.

"It remains to say a few words more concerning the nature and extent of the change which has taken place in the relative situation of the two countries. My ideas concerning it have been already explained in some degree, as far at least as relates to the mode of administration. The boundaries of the political powers of both may be thus expressed. The whole domestic administration, legislation, and regulation of commerce, has been restored by Great Britain to the Parliament and people of Ireland. An absolute negative upon all Acts, legislative and administrative, together with the succession to the Crown, and the unlimited power of peace, war and negotiation, has been reserved. As the Crown of Ireland follows no rule of hereditary succession, but is annexed to, and appendant on the Crown of Great Britain, the limitation of which belongs to the British Parliament, the control of this country over the executive of Ireland is complete; and, though the Privy Council of the former has no longer any power to reject or to alter Bills, yet, as the Royal assent must be signified under the Great Seal of England, the control, in this respect, is also complete; and no law can be passed, affecting the interest of Great Britain, for which the Ministers of this country will not be answerable to Parliament.

"Whatever the public force of Ireland may consist of, it is completely at the disposal of Great Britain, and that without expense. The army is supplied from the revenue of Ireland, whose ports, shipping, and seamen are as much in the disposal of this country, as its own. To augment, therefore, the public force of Ireland, either by augmenting the army, or creating a navy, or building docks, or increasing the quantity of shipping by extending trade, wherever it may be done without prejudice to Great Britain, must be the objects of the policy of this country. The whole of their domestic administration we have surrendered to Ireland, with reserve only of that negative power which may prevent any innovations tending to shake the supremacy of this country. The patronage of English Government in Ireland is reduced to two Vice-Treasurers' places, and a few inconsiderable pensions. The remainder is engrossed by the Irish Administration. What concern, therefore, have we with it? If one party there cannot defend their posts without farther assistance, and fresh means of corruption, let them resign to those who can. It can be of no consequence to this country what Irish names adorn the pages of Watson's Almanack, and of very little to any party here. For, at this moment, when clunours are so loud, and the Whig Club holds out an apparent distinction of parties beyond what has yet been known in Ireland, what changes would take place there, if there was to be any revolution in the administration here? The office of Vice-Treasurer remains in abeyance for Lord Shannon. Mr. Ponsonby's object is the chair. A pension provides for Forster's retreat. Lord Downshire will be as zealous a supporter of the next Administration, as of the present, and for the same reasons. So will Lord Waterford, and Lord Loftus, and so will the Chancellor. Half a dozen unconnected men may be turned out from inferior offices, though even that is not very probable. There is precedent for creating new offices, if vacancies do not happen in time.

"According to my ideas, therefore, the grievances of the people of Ireland are to be referred entirely to their domestic administration, and to be corrected by their own Parliament. Great Britain has no political

interest but in preserving the command of the forces of Ireland. Whatever number of troops Ireland can be brought to maintain is, in fact, an augmentation of the British army, though attended with no expense to Britain; and all the revenue which Ireland can supply, after deducting the expense of her civil establishments, may be made in effect the revenue of Great Britain.

“But as much as I censure that improvident management, which, by useless augmentations of the establishments, and an idle profusion of public money upon objects of no importance to Government, so much or more must I condemn any kind of sinking fund. I disapprove of taxes when they are imposed for no substantial public end; but I must observe that the low taxes in Ireland have formed a principal obstacle to every commercial arrangement between the two countries, and that to draw a great revenue from Ireland must be a main object of British policy. Every fair opportunity, therefore, of laying on new taxes should be improved, keeping always in view the principle of assimilation with Great Britain, so that the trade of both countries may gradually coalesce, and be melted into one. If the debt is paid off, no pretence remains for continuing the taxes. What is wanted for the advantage of this country is a great surplus of revenue over and above the interest of the debt, and the expense of the Establishment. It will never do to go increasing the expenses of the Government of Ireland, for that is to defeat the very end for which the revenue is augmented. But means must be contrived for disposing of the surplus till it becomes considerable enough to be applied to the service of Great Britain. It must not be applied in any constant course, like the corn premiums for example, which may grow into an establishment. I am for giving it in jobs, and my reason is that this expedient has been tried, and with great success. That it was abused is no argument against it. We are not to suppose the superior Government destitute of all vigilance, capacity, and vigour. Prudently managed, occasional grants to private persons on pretence of some work of public utility, such as canals, roads, bridges, piers, may be the means of extensive influence, and can scarcely fail, in some degree, to contribute to the improvement of the country. Influence may thus be made to go hand in hand with popularity, and what creates an interest in the House of Commons creates an interest also among the people. Here it may be asked in what consisted the abuse which I have admitted, and what is the proper use of this expedient. My answer is that the abuse consisted in suffering what ought to have conciliated a general goodwill to and dependence on the superior Government, to be used as an instrument of power to a faction in the Irish administration. The use, under the present circumstances of the country, consists in providing a temporary application of the surplus revenue, without inducing a necessity or pretence for reducing the taxes; and, at the same time, extending the influence and popularity of British Government by means which cannot fail in some degree to increase the prosperity of the country. But as this expedient would furnish a very limited employment for the revenue which might be raised in Ireland, something farther must be thought of. Many are the public works which might be carried on immediately under the orders of Government, or by the different corporations and public bodies, such, for example, as harbours, fortifications, docks, which would have a popular appearance, and would afford the means of extensive gratification to the people. All these should be undertaken in their turns, and particular funds assigned for each particular purpose. Thus, in process of time, a large revenue might be obtained, which, after the ends for which it was first specifically raised had been

answered, would remain for the disposition of Government; that is, might, by an easy transition, be applied to the general service of the empire. If public works are undertaken by Government, or assistance in money given to private adventurers, the charge being thrown upon the same funds by which the ordinary service of Government is supplied, it is, in fact, a deduction of so much from the revenue of the State. If for the support of these grants, separate funds were created, independent of the establishment, the revenue of the State would be unimpaired, and a beneficial and constitutional influence created for Government. The lowering the interest upon the debt is also, according to my principles, a foolish scheme. The object which should be followed in Ireland is not to lower, but gradually raise the taxes, that they may be finally applied to the service of the Empire. The higher, therefore, you can keep the interest of the debt the better, because when the period comes for applying with safety, and without exciting discontent, the surplus revenue of Ireland to the assistance of Great Britain, a larger annual income may be freed by payment of a less sum of money. To illustrate what I have been saying. If a specific fund had been assigned for building the new Custom House, the Inns of Court, *et cetera*, Government would have had no need of a lottery, no want of money, and a considerable annual revenue, would have been near falling in to the public. If the money laid out to build and furnish magnificent houses for Mr. Beresford, and the other Commissioners, who were already sufficiently bound to Government, had been applied in little jobs, that would have been a real improvement to various parts of the country, the votes of 50 members of Parliament might have been secured, as well as the affection of as many towns. As it is, the expense has been a drain and an embarrassment to Government; and the indignation and envy of the public is excited by the profusion with which palaces have been built for men, to whose offices no dignity and representation belongs, and who were certainly amply paid before, since their situation were the objects of general ambition. A surplus of revenue might also be beneficially employed, and contribute to give Government a more diffused influence, by the encouragement of such branches of trade as might least clash with the particular commercial views of England; and the trade of Ireland be led by bounties into such channels as to give it a necessary connexion with and dependence upon the trade of England, and thus bind numbers in a common interest with Great Britain. I have already taken notice of a great advantage of this nature, which in my opinion Government had, and threw away; namely, the persuasion the Irish were under of the importance of the English market, and the advantage of the bounty paid by England upon the importation of their linens. Since that period a very great and essential revolution must have taken place in the manufactures and trade of Ireland. To what extent, and in what particular branches, I cannot pretend to say. I laugh at all those political adepts who profess to estimate the value of every separate trade, and the proportion each bears to the other, by vain theories and conjectures. Government is perhaps informed upon this point from an actual survey. If they are not, they may be, and it is important that they should; for a tolerably accurate knowledge of the numbers and property engaged in different branches of trade will point out to them what bodies of men it is really worth the while of Government to attach to itself; and at the same time, the best means of getting an hold upon them. I believe there are very few manufactures which flourish, as yet, to any considerable degree. A little encouragement to those few, would, if it were thought worth while, confine the people to them, and diminish

the points of competition with England. The division of the people into great bodies of trade, would not only make it more easy to unite their interests, and engage their prejudices in support of British Government, but also to collect and manifest in critical times their sentiments upon public measures, and thus virtually remedy, in some degree, the imperfection of the system of representation. A reform of Parliament I must admit to be measure of great delicacy and danger. I think, however, that it might have very beneficial consequences in Ireland. The more elections are made to depend upon that influence which flows from landed property, the greater will be the steadiness and security of Government. Whatever jealousy subsists between the two countries, springs from persons in trade and the factions of Ireland; either from their clamours and unreasonable monopolising spirit, or from adventurers who purchase seats with no view but, by perplexing and teasing Government, to force themselves into office. Both these descriptions of men would be diminished, as to consequence and numbers in Parliament, by calling in a greater proportion of landed influence. But the preponderance of that influence might be carried to excess, and the nature of our Government requires that all the estates of the people of the realm should be represented. If the close boroughs were to be abolished, or the freeholders in the neighbouring districts be associated to the ancient voters, and, at the same time, the number of county representatives be increased, (a scheme which has been proposed,) in a short space of time, the representation and the right of election would be engrossed by 100, or 150, families. The equipoise might be restored by taking one member from each depopulated or close borough, and making an equal addition to the representation of the counties or large towns; or, leaving all the old corporations untouched, an addition might be made to the county members, and new rights of electing be created in favour of new bodies of men. Belfast, for example, is one of the largest towns in Ireland. The election is in a Sovereign and twelve burgesses. Their franchise might continue, and the inhabitants be empowered to elect two other members for themselves. Clonmel is another great and increasing town, in the same circumstances. Waterford, one of the chief ports of trade, has no proper representatives. The election is in freemen, of whom a vast majority are non-resident, created by a garbled corporation to support a particular interest. A distinct election might here also be given to the inhabitants. But as the contagion of Parliamentary Reform might be dreaded for England, it remains to be considered whether, even in the present state of the Irish Parliament, means may not be found to collect, and to influence the public opinion. I have already touched upon some. I think the House of Lords might be made use of to advantage. Though some improper creations have been made, it consists of the principal landed men in Ireland. The weight of property in it very far exceeds that in the House of Commons. I went over the list of those who are constantly resident, or who reside occasionally and constantly take part in the politics of the country, and I computed the annual landed incomes of 103 of them as amounting to upwards of 700,000*l*. When, in addition to this, is considered the property of the inferior branches of their families, their connexions, and dependents, it is clear their weight in the country must be very great. And, if they were brought a little more forward to public notice, they might be made a most powerful engine of Government; and, if from the vicious system of representation, a faction should prevail for a time in the House of Commons, might be interposed, with safety and effect, as a barrier against their attempts. This is a weapon certainly not to be trusted in rash and common hands,

but there will always be a fund of prudence in the House of Lords itself to temper the use of it. I think it one of the best resources which Government has in critical conjunctures, because the exertion of English influence is there least visible, and will, consequently, be attended with the least odium. It is worth remarking that the Opposition which is now considered as so formidable in the House of Commons, cannot muster ten votes in the Lords. Nothing, therefore, can more contribute to lower the tone of the old leaders of parties than raising the importance of the Lords, where they are insignificant. Exclusive of the preponderance which the attachment of the Bishops must give to Government, many causes will constantly operate in their favour with that Assembly. It is to be hoped that honours, I mean, particularly higher ranks in the peerage, will be distributed with a more sparing hand in future; though I rely much more upon the general leaning of the body of the peerage, and the strong interest by which the proprietors of land are bound to the support of Government, than upon any means of gratifying individuals. Though the House of Commons does not contain nearly the same proportion of real weight and influence as the Lords, yet it has some considerable share of both; and it is to be presumed that, as its lustre and reputation has been increased, more gentlemen of fortune will be solicitous to obtain seats. This will gradually operate to the exclusion of those noisy adventurers who have been the source of so much trouble and mischief, and will give a firmer foundation to Government. With a majority in both Houses, but a very great preponderance in the Lords, and with those holds upon the great bodies of trade which I think may be obtained, and which I believe, indeed, actually exist to a considerable extent, there could be no room for doubt or apprehension as to the inclinations of the people.

"I come now to explain, more particularly, the mode of administration which appears to me best calculated to prevent any mischief from growing in Ireland, for, as to immediate danger, I am persuaded there is none. For this purpose some seven or eight offices should be fixed upon to be filled by persons of high rank and natural consequence, and by those upon whose abilities and experience Government must rely to transact the public business both in Parliament and in office. And these men should, in virtue of their offices, be called into council, so that the share they have in those measures which always depend, and must depend, upon their suggestion and advice, may appear more publicly. An effectual barrier between the people and the superior Government cannot be formed, unless a degree of lustre and power be annexed to these offices. They must be such as to appear considerable in the estimation of the multitude, and to be capable of satisfying the ambition of men who have a lead in Opposition. Ireland is already possessed of several offices of high rank and considerable emolument. All that is wanting is to give some business to them, and an ostensible share in the government. There is the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, the Vice-Treasurership, the Secretary of State. These are all sinecures, and the latter is granted for life. It ought to be redeemed, and I would add to these a Privy Seal, through whose office the grants of pensions might pass. The Treasury should be put in commission to the Vice-Treasurer, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Deputy Vice-Treasurer. The only additional expense would be the salary of the Privy Seal. The wine warrants of Privy Counsellors amount to considerably more than a thousand pounds. It has been proposed to take them in aid. In my opinion, if the measure is thought advisable the additional expense of 2,000*l.* or 2,500*l.* ought to be no objection. If the danger is objected of reviving the system which prevailed before



Lord Townshend's time, I answer that the utmost abuse of that system is infinitely preferable to the present; that it is better calculated for the security of the British interest, and for the internal prosperity of Ireland; that, since the Octennial Bill, and that for regulating the trial of controverted elections, it cannot be abused to the same extent that it formerly was; that all the abuses to which it is exposed are incident to the present state of administration; and that it cannot be abused at all, but by the negligence or connivance of the British Government. The Lord Lieutenant and Secretary ought not, in my opinion, to form the efficient administration in Ireland, but to superintend, and control it, and be the medium of communication, not between a party in office exclusively, but between the people of Ireland, and the Ministry of Great Britain. A competent share of the inferior patronage should be distributed to each of the principal Offices. The rest would continue with the Lord Lieutenant. The grant of honours, in particular, should, I think, be entirely reserved. Too many Bishops have been made of late upon Irish patronage; too many Peers merely to gain a temporary support in the House of Commons. If my estimate is not erroneous, the House of Lords should be a principal bulwark of English authority. The Bishops, therefore, ought, if not Englishmen, to belong to no Irish party. Far from recommending the absolute exclusion of Irishmen, there is, I think, an obvious policy in selecting, from time to time, men of that nation, eminent for learning and piety. But it should be a rule, not to be dispensed with, never to give a seat upon the Bench to Irish political interest; and, upon the same grounds, I think Government ought to be very careful neither to increase too much the numbers of the Peerage, nor to create men who, from their properties, birth and connexions, have not a considerable influence in the country, independent of any borough. But, though I would have the Lord Lieutenant the constant Inspector of the Administration of Ireland, and the immediate channel of communication between the people of that country, and the Government of this, Ireland is of too much consequence, as a member of the Empire, to be trusted to the real and effectual control of any man, or body of men, but the Cabinet of England; which, taking into its view all the interests and relations of every part of the King's dominions, may direct and confine the force and resources of the whole to one common end. The Lord Lieutenant appears to me to be too far removed, and for too long a time, to admit of his being sufficiently associated in the counsels of this country, and too much pressed and perplexed by being engaged in the domestic cabals of Ireland, not to lay aside sometimes the consideration of the general interest, in order to be relieved from a present embarrassment. I am one of those who doubt of the good policy of confining the Lord Lieutenant to residence so strictly as it has been done of late. I am unable to discover what end is answered by it, unless to increase the difficulty of finding proper persons to accept the office, and connect, whoever may accept it, in habits of confidence and familiarity with those whose ambitions and selfish views it is one of his principal duties to watch, and to restrain. No danger can arise from Lords Justices, if they are well chosen, and properly limited. I cannot approve the naming, of course, to that situation men in certain offices. It might give them something of a permanent authority; and it might be difficult to deviate from an established practice, where particular reasons might make it expedient or necessary to pass by a particular person. By taking a wider scope, an opportunity would be gained of gratifying, as occasion offered, men of rank and consequence by an

honourable distinction, without any new expense to the public and without giving them any lasting or real power. The Secretary of State for the Home Department is, I know, properly the Minister for Ireland. But there are few either there or in Great Britain who are aware of it. I cannot pretend to say how far such an extensive and active application to Irish affairs as I have been recommending would be compatible with the other duties of the office; but I am convinced it is necessary, and also that great advantages would follow from Irishmen of rank finding ready access to a Minister when they come to this country. Certain civilities of routine, such, for example, as an invitation to dinner, without any distinction of parties, just as the Lord Lieutenant invites every man in his turn, would, I am persuaded from what I have seen and heard, have great effect. All this might be done without in the least derogating from the confidence and preference justly due to men in office; at the same time that it would be, in some degree, a check upon them, and countenance the idea that the Government here takes no concern in the mere domestic affairs of that country, but, guarding only against any encroachment on the constitutional powers of the State, and the connexion of the kingdoms, observes as to the rest a strict impartiality. Upon the same principle, the surplus of revenue which I propose to distribute in Parliamentary jobs, should be given indifferently to men in the support of Government, and in Opposition; not scrambled for, as it often has been, for it would then cease to be a source of influence to Government, but distributed upon a regular plan. The appearance of impartiality would give some popularity, and the expectations of members of Parliament soften the spirit of opposition. Grants of this kind, as well as of peerages, being instruments of general influence, ought to be reserved to the English part of the Government. They ought not, in my opinion, to be trusted absolutely even to the Lord Lieutenant. It is now high time to conclude, which I think, will best be done by a short recapitulation.

“Upon a review of the transactions of former years, it is evident to me that the spirit of discontent and resistance which occasioned the emancipation of the trade and Legislature of Ireland did not arise from the pressure of any commercial restraints, but merely from the distress resulting from continued embargo upon the provision trade. I am farther of opinion that the bulk of the nation are satisfied with what they have obtained; that the people labour under few actual grievances; that these are entirely of a domestic nature, such as have been long submitted to, and may continue without danger to Government, as they have no relation to the connexion between the two countries, or the supremacy of the British crown. That, if there is patience, to let the remains of popular ferment subside, and the trade of the country is left to find its own level, many of the obstacles which have stood in the way of any commercial arrangements between the two kingdoms will moulder away of themselves; others may be gradually, and silently, removed; that, however desirable a reform of Parliament may be upon general principles, it is probable that such means remain of collecting the sense of the nation that, if that measure is thought to be dangerous, no necessity exists for recurring to it; that the unpopularity of English Government is to be attributed solely to their having taken upon themselves the whole responsibility of the domestic administration of Ireland, in which this country has no immediate concern, and of which they have resigned in effect the whole direction to others; that the best way of preventing any mischief that may grow from this state of things is to establish an apparent responsibility in Irish Administration, so that their continuance in office may depend,

in a great degree, as is the case in this country, upon the success of the measures they recommend, the most effectual pledge that can be taken for their sincerity. And, lastly, that a constant and unremitting attention should be given in this country to the inspection and control of Irish Government, so far as the rights of this country and the general service of the empire may be concerned in it; and care taken not to countenance any exclusive system in the management of parties, so that the private interest of no set of men may lead them to make the distinction of an English and Irish party; but that future Parliamentary contests may not be upon questions, involving the rights of both kingdoms, between English Government and Irish Opposition; but merely between Irish men, for the possession of Irish Offices, under the favour and protection of Great Britain. And that the operations of the superior Government may, notwithstanding any change in the particular administration of Ireland, be steadily and uniformly directed to one end, namely, the gradual augmentation of the forces and revenue of Ireland, to be finally disposed of by the supreme executive authority of both countries, which is one and the same, and the effectual control of which resides in the Parliament of Great Britain."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1795], February , London].—" I write to you three lines to inform you that the Bishop of St. Pol called upon me last night accompanied with the Comte de Serrant, who is overjoyed at the communication made to him by the Duc d'Harcourt, that it was intended to send one or perhaps two commissaries with him to attend to the distribution of the money intended to be employed, and to the other objects of his mission. He seems extremely anxious to assemble (in consequence of this arrangement) a meeting of Charrette, Sapineau, Scepeau, Stoffet, George, and Trettau, to concert with Puisaye their operations; and is sanguine in thinking that this assembly might be very useful, if the commissaries had their instructions as to the repartition of the sum now sent according to some rule to be laid down by you, but with powers to them to vary it in concert with him. And he earnestly wishes Government to be persuaded of his wish not only to obey literally their orders, but likewise to facilitate the duties of the commissaries by the most perfect understanding with them. But, as so much depends upon this, he wishes for their personal acquaintance as soon as possible, as the moon necessarily fixes his journey and his debarkation between the 1st and 5th of March. The latter part and the instructions respecting the repartition, are the only important parts of this note; but, I will add, that I am most extremely pleased with the manners, discretions, and good will of this young man, particularly on the subject of Puisaye, which seems a point on which his countrymen are very absurd."

LORD HENRY SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, March 30, Berlin.—"From the present appearance of things on the Continent, I take it for granted that it is not the intention of his Majesty's ministers to prevent, by any new overtures or proposals, the final conclusion of the treaty which this Court is now negotiating with the French Convention. That treaty will, I should suppose, be immediately followed by an alliance between the two countries, in opposition to the triple league about to be formed between the two

Imperial Courts and Great Britain. The claims of the Emperor to the Palatinates of Cracow and Sandomir are judged by the King of Prussia to be utterly incompatible with the safety of his dominions, and this persuasion, whether well-founded or not, will certainly operate to induce his Majesty rather to go to war immediately for the possession of those provinces, than to leave himself at the mercy of the Emperor by a cession of them. The Austrian Cabinet on the other hand, supported by Russia, and countenanced by England, does not seem inclined to give way, so that upon the whole it appears that the interests of France and Prussia in the present contest are likely to become in part the same.

Under these circumstances, I apprehend that the presence of an English minister at this Court would be as little advantageous to the public service, as agreeable or creditable to himself, and that I may therefore look forward with a great degree of confidence to the leave of absence which I have so long solicited for my private affairs."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to LORD HENRY SPENCER.

1795, April 14, Downing Street.—"I am to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 30th of last month containing a request that you may have leave to visit England on account of your private affairs. As your Lordship appears to have made this application only under the idea that your presence at Berlin might be dispensed with under the present circumstances without inconvenience to the King's affairs, it will, I am persuaded, be sufficient for me to mention to you the importance of an English minister with your Lordship's rank being resident at Berlin in the present moment, in order to induce your Lordship to abandon a request which I should not think myself justified in recommending to his Majesty at so critical a period."

#### NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE.—NOTE OF LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, September 17.—"The person who has made the communication should be acquainted that, in entering into any discussion of this nature, it must be expected that some proof should be given that the proposal is really authorised by those in whose name it is made.

"That on receiving such proof (whether it can now be furnished or after recurring to Paris for it) there would be a disposition to enter into the business on the footing proposed; and that, with that view, it would be essentially necessary that the person who is to conduct the business here should be enabled to enter into particulars as to the terms of the proposed arrangement, and the nature and extent of the inducements expected."


*Endorsed.*—"Copy of note given to Mr. Fordyce, September 17, 1796, to be by him communicated to Mr. Boyd, and with permission to the latter to suffer it to be copied by the person in question."

1796, September 20.—"The person who has made the communication in question not being enabled to produce any authority for the proposal, no more can now be said except that, on his return to Paris, he may express to those to whom it relates, that there is a disposition here to enter into the discussion on the footing proposed; and Mr. F[ordyce] may add that, should the passport which has been applied for from hence be given, he will accompany Mr. L., and might then continue the discussion with the person who is now here."

[G. MORRIS] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1796, August 10, Berlin.—“Lord Elgin tells me that he shall send a messenger this evening; I will therefore trouble your Lordship with some loose thoughts respecting this Court. You know that ever since the accession of his present Majesty there have been endless intrigues to possess him, and, through him, the power of the State. These still exist, and are pursued with unceasing attention, so that no great plan of conduct can be adopted from the fear that some untoward incident should disgust the monarch before things could be brought to issue, in which case the adviser and supporters of the plan would be overturned. It is from this very circumstance that I think it possible to obtain by the aid of Russia the complete direction of this Cabinet. To that effect it would be proper to understand perfectly with Bischopswerder and his right hand man Haugwitz; so that their greatness should be intimately combined with your interests. Furnish them money when the success of their intrigues may require it, and let them feel that it is *better* as well as *safer* to put themselves into the hands of a monarchy than of a republic. The Cabinet of Petersburg combined with you in such plan, the King will be made to understand that both his interest and his quiet require a full confidence in those Ministers. Then an efficient Cabinet will at once exist, and, after it begins to act, will feel (to its astonishment perhaps) that every great movement must be guided by your will. Observe that it is at present understood between Bischopswerder and Haugwitz that proposals not primarily addressed to the latter shall be unsuccessful. If I have a just view of the ground, it will be in vain to try (by showing only public advantage) to lead this Court into the measures you might wish, and that for the reasons already mentioned. I do not conceive it possible to do anything, if you wait for the assent of Austria, unless you have a complete direction and, indeed, dictation there. But, if I am rightly informed, this is not so much the case as it ought to be, all circumstances considered. I will not say anything on that subject, for evident reasons. Propositions from England supported by Russia will meet with a readier attention than if the voice of the Emperor should be heard. This fact your Lordship is well apprized of. I think the contents of this packet will try, if not tire, your patience, so I will proceed no farther.”

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# ERRATA.

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## VOLUME I.

Page 55, line 13, *for* "Mills" *read* "Wills."

- ,, 105. The Countess of Suffolk's letter should probably be dated 1735.
  - ,, 139, line 9 from bottom, *for* "Earl of" *read* "Lord."
  - ,, 161. George Nugent Grenville's letter. The date should probably be 1777.
  - ,, 162. *For* "The Same to the Same," *read* "Thomas, Lord Lyttelton, to R. Berenger."
  - ,, 287, line 41, *for* "except" *read* "accept."
  - ,, 529, line 1, *for* "1780" *read* "1789."
- 

## VOLUME II.

Page 34, line 31, *for* "Napean" *read* "Nepean."

- ,, 61, line 23, *for* "Granville" *read* "Grenville."
  - ,, 88. W. Pitt to Lord Grenville [1791, May-July]; printed also on p. 148, with more probable date.
  - ,, 130. W. Pitt to Lord Grenville [1791, July]; printed also on p. 146.
  - ,, 203. W. Pitt to Lord Grenville [1791, October]; printed also on p. 249, with proper date.
  - ,, 208, line 21, *for* "Thomas Elliot" *read* "Hugh Elliot."
  - ,, 248, line 44, *for* "1792" *read* "1793."
  - ,, 290, line 35, *for* "Lord H. R. Spencer" *read* "Lord H. J. Spencer."
  - ,, 331, line 3, *for* "1782" *read* "1792."
  - ,, 335, line 18, *for* "1791" *read* "1792."
  - ,, 402, line 21, *dele* July.
  - ,, 414, line 5, *for* "Warre" *read* "Warne."
  - ,, 421, line 36, *for* "1793" *read* "1794."
  - ,, 508, line 33, *for* "February" *read* "August 6."
  - ,, 574, line 17, *for* "17" *read* "1794."
  - ,, 604, line 16, *for* "[1794]" *read* "[1795]."
  - ,, 654, line 13 from the bottom, *for* "[1794]" *read* "[1793]."
- 

## VOLUME III.

Page 17, line 23, *for* "1795" *read* "1794."

- ,, 21, last line, *for* "Seerdam" *read* "Leerdam"; *for* "Kuitenburg" *read* "Kuilenburg."
- ,, 26, line 11, *before* "tiendra" *insert* "ne."
- ,, 34, line 29, *for* "Lord" *read* "Lower."
- ,, 51, line 15, from bottom, *for* "Lieg" *read* "Sieg."
- ,, 57, line 36, *for* "1735" *read* "1795."
- ,, 122, lines 2, 3, *for* "Bruc" *read* "Brue."
- ,, 143, 144, transfer the letters of Lords Buckingham and Portland to p. 265.
- ,, 195, last line but one, *for* "2796" *read* "1796."

Page 199, line 13 from the bottom, *for* "we" *read* "he."

„ 290, line 6 from the bottom, *for* "[1796-1797]" *read* "[1797, December]."

„ 307, line 2, *for* "1897" *read* "1797."

„ 403, line 15, *for* "[1797]" *read* "[1796]."

„ 404. The Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville; already printed on p. 295 under its proper date.

„ 434, 435, 462, *for* "W. W." or "J. W. Miles" *read* "A. W. Miles."

„ 478, line 19, *for* "Malet" *read* "Maret."

„ 487, line 15, *for* "Stanislas" *read* "Stanislas."

„ 509. Mack's letter already printed in Vol. II., p. 534, but without the preceding letter from Lord Grenville, which had not come to light when Vol. II. was published.

„ 530, line 14, *for* "1795" *read* "1794."



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## INTRODUCTION.

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THE confidential letters and documents composing Volume IV. of the Dropmore Correspondence relate chiefly to two subjects, one foreign and one domestic, of great historical interest. Those belonging to the series which comes first in point of date are concerned with the political and military projects and the secret negotiations that led up to the third coalition against France in 1799. The second series deals with the outbreak of civil war in Ireland in 1798, and the abortive attempt of Pitt's Government to pass an Act of Legislative Union through the Irish Parliament in January, 1799. The correspondence on both subjects is so voluminous that the volume embraces a period of little more than sixteen months; extending from the middle of November, 1797, to the renewal of hostilities between Austria and France towards the end of March, 1799.

The close of Volume III. left the British monarchy in a situation as dangerous as it was humiliating. Strenuous national efforts continued without intermission for five years, to maintain European settlements of vital importance to Great Britain, had resulted in military defeat, an enormous burden of debt, financial embarrassment, impaired credit, political isolation, and popular discontent. The coalition of all the great monarchical powers, formed at the beginning of 1793 to dismember France, had been itself dismembered. Catherine II. of Russia gave little help from the beginning, and her successor Paul I. had hitherto, in this respect, followed in her footsteps. Frederick William II., King of Prussia, made peace with the French Republic in April, 1795, on terms which saved Northern Germany from the ravages of war, but surrendered the Netherlands and the left bank of the Rhine to the common enemy. His defection set the seal of failure on the coalition. A Prussian alliance was that in which Pitt put his chief trust for the accomplishing of British

objects on the Continent ; that which he had made the greatest pecuniary sacrifices to retain, and showed himself most solicitous to recover. But repeated appeals to his fears and his cupidity had failed to draw the Prussian monarch from the attitude of neutrality to which he bound himself by the treaty of Basle.

Austria struggled on for two years more with the help of British loans, supplied by Pitt in the confident belief that financial ruin would compel the French Government to sue for peace. Unfortunately British credit collapsed at the end of 1796. And Austria, beaten in the field and unable to pay her armies, accepted terms dictated by Bonaparte at Leoben in April, 1797. This preliminary treaty provided for the meeting of two congresses within three months ; one at Berne, to which England and Russia were invited, to settle the conditions of a general pacification ; the other at Rastadt for the conclusion of peace between France and the German Confederation. But the British Government, dissatisfied with the conduct of Austria, sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille to treat on its own account with the French Directory. If France was everywhere victorious on land, Great Britain was mistress of the seas, and had enlarged her colonial empire, and her commerce. It seemed, therefore, that agreement, ardently desired by both nations, might easily be obtained by mutual concessions. But while negotiation still proceeded, a successful *coup d'état* at Paris lodged dictatorial powers in the hands of three Directors representing a small but ruling Jacobin faction, that owed its supremacy to war, and the support of armies living on the plunder of conquered countries. These Directors broke up the Conference at Lille in September, 1797, by putting forward extravagant demands. Bonaparte dissociating himself from Jacobin policy, in disregard of instructions from Paris signed the definite treaty of Campo Formio with Count Cobentzl on behalf of the Emperor, in the following October. The Directory did not venture to repudiate an act which nearly all France applauded. But they announced for the coming year the assembling of a great armament for the invasion of England, under the command of the conqueror of Austria. During the course of 1797, British Consols had fallen to 48 ; and public confidence had sunk to a point unknown in England since the end of the War of American Independence. Pitt's Budget at the

opening of the Session of Parliament in November showed a deficit of 22,000,000*l.* He trebled the assessed taxes ; an unproductive measure which deepened the ill-humour of the people. But national spirit rose to repel invasion. Voluntary subscriptions, initiated by the King and his ministers, flowed in freely from all ranks and parties to supply the wants of the Exchequer, and arm the country for defence.

The political situation wore its gloomiest aspect when news reached George III. in October, 1797 of the approaching death of Frederick William II., King of Prussia. The Prince Royal, heir to the Prussian throne, had been carefully educated in orthodox principles. His wife, a beautiful and talented princess of Mecklinburg Strelitz, who exercised great influence over him, was a niece of Queen Charlotte. He had always listened with great deference to the political counsels of George's brother-in-law, the Duke of Brunswick, who saw with unconcealed dismay the progress of French arms and opinions in Germany. On these circumstances the English monarch founded a belief, which Pitt and Grenville seem to have shared, that if Brunswick could be persuaded to exert his influence at Berlin at the opening of a new reign for the overthrow of Count de Haugwitz, to whose ascendancy the treaty of Basle and the subsequent inaction of Prussia were ascribed, the young sovereign might be made the chief instrument in forming a Quadruple Alliance of Russia, Austria, Great Britain and Prussia, to accomplish aims for the salvation of Europe, which the defection of his father in 1795 had, in their opinion, done so much to wreck. In the beginning of November they sent M. de Luc, a trusted member of Queen Charlotte's household, on a secret mission to Brunswick, to lay the scheme before the Duke, and enlist his aid.<sup>1</sup>

De Luc was the son of a leading citizen of Geneva, a member of the governing Council of that city. He had, himself, in early life, been engaged in public affairs. But, following the natural bent of his genius, he abandoned diplomacy in order to devote his whole time to scientific research. His labours and discoveries in various branches of natural philosophy won for him high rank in the world of science. And he distinguished himself also in the arena of letters, by the zeal and ability with which he defended Christian revelation and monarchy

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<sup>1</sup> Page 8.

against the assaults of the Encyclopædists and the Jacobin propagandism. His controversial essays commended him, during a sojourn in London, to the favour of George III., who conferred on him the post of reader to Queen Charlotte. In the opportunities of familiar intercourse thus opened to him he seems to have acquired the regard and entire confidence of the whole royal family. The King, in order more effectually to cloak his political mission to Germany, appointed him Professor of Natural History in the University of Gottingen. Travelling in this capacity, but accredited by a letter from his royal master, and instructions from Lord Grenville, he reached Brunswick late in November, a few days after the arrival of news of the King of Prussia's death; and took counsel with General de Stamford, a soldier and politician of merit, closely bound to him by private friendship and unity of political purpose, who played a still more prominent part than his own in the negotiations now set on foot.<sup>1</sup>

De Stamford, although of uncertain parentage, seems to have been a Frenchman by birth. In early youth he served through the 'Seven Years' War as Lieutenant in the army of Brunswick; and during the years of peace that followed he rose to some degree of celebrity in Germany as a poet, a writer of military treatises, and a teacher of science. Frederick the Great called him to Potsdam and made him Major in a Prussian Corps of Engineers. After that monarch's death the Prince of Orange invited him to the Hague to take charge of the military education of his sons. He served with the Dutch army in the campaigns of 1793 and 1794 and rose to the rank of Lieutenant-General. When the French conquered Holland, he followed Orange to England, but, after a little, took up his abode at Brunswick as confidential adviser of the Duke. The anxiety shown by statesmen of all nations to avail themselves of his services in the conflict of interests and opinions recorded in this correspondence, testify to a general sense of his uncommon merit.

The friends joined in urging the Duke of Brunswick to go at once to Berlin and rescue from the malign guidance of Count Haugwitz a young prince of good principles indeed, but utterly without experience in the business of government. The Duke



appears to have been a man of unusual ability both for war and politics, but in temper cautious even to timidity. In any important crisis he saw the difficulties besetting every line of action so clearly as often to lose the power of deciding how to act. He desired strongly to stand well with George III.; but he knew that there were well-nigh insuperable difficulties in the rôle proposed to him, of which the English Government seemed to have no conception. While still debating the subject with Stamford, an invitation came to him to attend the funeral obsequies of the deceased King; and he deferred an answer to his brother-in-law until he should have conversed with the leading personages of the Prussian Court, and thus obtained a more exact knowledge of the political situation at Berlin.<sup>1</sup>

In this interval of silence reports received by George III. from his Hanoverian envoys at Berlin of the Duke's timid bearing there, and careful avoidance of political discussion, completely dispelled the hopes entertained in England of good effects to be produced by his personal influence over Frederick William III. He told D'Ompsteda, one of those envoys, that he regarded Haugwitz as his personal enemy, and a man unworthy of trust, with whom he held no communication; but he made no effort to drive the minister from power.<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards, however, Haugwitz in an interview he asked of the Duke succeeded in altering this unfavourable opinion; and the latter having conferred again with the young King, despatched a messenger to De Luc with a *mémoire* for George III. The circumstances and motives, it declared, which had led the late King of Prussia to conclude the treaty of Basle, still operated at Berlin with undiminished force. The Treasury was empty. Mutual hatred and distrust, generated by past injuries and conflicting interests, forbade all hope of voluntary co-operation on the part of Austria and Prussia. Discontent smouldering in Poland might at any moment burst forth in insurrection. An English alliance against France would be very unpopular in Prussia; and the British Government, having failed in endeavours to come to terms with France, lay open to the imputation of selfish motives in attempting to draw other powers into war. Above all, the French were

<sup>1</sup> M. de Luc to George III., November 28, 1797. Page 21.

<sup>2</sup> George III. to Lord Grenville, December 23 and 24, 1797. Pages 405-6, Vol. 3.

now masters of both banks of the Rhine and of the fortresses guarding the passages of that river. Having no enemy in the field, it was in their power, if Prussia showed any signs of hostility, to fall on her with all their forces and crush her, while isolated and unprepared. The peace party represented at Court by Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of Frederick the Great, and famous for his exploits during the Seven Years' War, and by the military members of the King's household, was now all-powerful at Berlin. And although the principles and views of Frederick William III. were all that could be wished, he could not at once emancipate himself from the influences and conditions that environed him. The urgent need of the present moment was to deliver the Empire from the French armies now living on it and propagating anarchical opinions, by concluding peace with France on the best terms that could be obtained at Rastadt. When this settlement had been effected, a Quadruple Alliance as proposed by Lord Grenville might be formed to defend it. But for the formation of such a league it was necessary that the Czar should take the initiative, and guarantee Austria and Prussia against the hostility of each other. By his intervention only could the two great German powers be brought to act in concert, and British diplomacy should begin its efforts at the Court of St. Petersburg. There would be no change of ministers for the present at Berlin, but the King was deeply impressed by the danger to Germany and all Europe from the growing predominance of France. He would enter into no alliance with a government professing Jacobin principles, and his ministers would act in conformity to his wishes.<sup>1</sup>

On returning to Brunswick the Duke spoke freely to De Luc and de Stamford about the incidents of his visit to Berlin. He accounted for the cautious attitude criticized by D'Ompsteda by stating that he had been closely watched and cross-questioned by Prince Henry, who was in league with the resident minister of France. Count Haugwitz, he said, had during their interview expressed disapproval of the policy of the late reign, and shifted responsibility for it to the male and female favourites by whom Frederick William II. had been governed. It was impossible, the minister declared, to break the

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<sup>1</sup> Pages 25 and 27.

agreement with France entered into at Basle ; but he wished to put an end to the isolation of Prussia, by coming to an understanding with other powers for common defence. He sent the Duke a written statement of his political views, of which the latter gave a copy to De Luc for transmission to Lord Grenville. This paper<sup>1</sup> reaffirmed the position that the King of Prussia would not for any consideration violate existing engagements between Prussia and France so long as the French Government observed them faithfully. But, it continued, there were rumours in the air of an intention on the part of the Directory to occupy Hanover and Hamburg. Should they prove founded, Prussia would resist the aggression with all her might. The neutrality of North Germany had been of great advantage to Great Britain in the protection it afforded Hanover, and British trade to the Elbe and the Weser ; and it thus formed common ground of interest, for the defence of which the Prussian Government was willing to enter into concert with that of Great Britain.

The Duke also suggested to De Stamford and De Luc that they should go to Berlin ; the former in the capacity of agent for the Prince of Orange, with the purpose of using the opportunities the appointment would give him of easy access to the King, whose military tutor he had been, to confirm Frederick William in his good dispositions ; the latter in the character of a scientific explorer to confer secretly with Count Haugwitz.

Lord Grenville's answer<sup>2</sup> dealt with the various suggestions contained in the Duke's *mémoire* for George III., or thrown out in his conversation with De Luc. The British Government, it said, had made repeated attempts to rouse the Czar from his apathy, and would renew those exertions whenever a favourable opportunity presented itself. But they placed their chief hopes of success in the good effect on Paul's mind which a friendly overture from the young King of Prussia could not fail to produce. It cordially adopted the idea of sending General de Stamford to the Prussian Court, for the purpose of persuading his old pupil to enter into closer relations with the sovereigns of Austria and Russia ; gave a colder approval to the mission assigned to De Luc, and earnestly besought the Duke not to relax his own efforts at Berlin for the salvation of Europe. A political memorandum<sup>3</sup> in answer to that of Count Haugwitz

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<sup>1</sup> Page 41.

<sup>2</sup> Page 56.

<sup>3</sup> Page 58.

accompanied this letter. In that paper Lord Grenville for the British Government disclaimed any intention of drawing Prussia into war. They desired only to form a Quadruple Alliance, which should settle the conditions of a general peace, and maintain them. They were willing also to enter into a concert with the King of Prussia for the defence of Northern Germany from French aggression; and, if necessary, to grant a subsidy for the purpose. After receiving these communications at the beginning of February, 1798, De Luc, carrying with him a letter of introduction from the Duke of Brunswick, set out for Berlin, ostensibly to collect materials for a scientific treatise, and secretly to present the English memorandum to Count Haugwitz. De Stamford awaited at Brunswick his credentials from the Prince of Orange.

The Duke of Brunswick had prepared the way for De Luc's reception at Berlin by informing the King and Count Haugwitz of his position at the English Court and his informal mission.<sup>1</sup> The Count gave him a warm welcome, expressed great satisfaction on reading Lord Grenville's memorandum; and discussed the situation of Prussia and of Europe with a frankness and unreserve which had all the appearance of sincerity. An attack of measles disabled Frederick William from transacting business, and Haugwitz requested De Luc to conceal his arrival even from the British Minister, Lord Elgin, till the King's approval could be obtained to a confidential reply to Lord Grenville. During the following ten days, De Luc lived in complete seclusion, only stealing out at dusk to hold long conferences with the Prussian Minister. The mystery in which he shrouded himself excited the suspicions of the Berlin police; and Haugwitz, in answer to an appeal for protection, paid him a secret visit to instruct him how to rid himself of their importunity. Of the conversations that passed at these and many subsequent interviews between himself and the Prussian statesman, De Luc sent detailed statements either to George III. or to Lord Grenville. His long letters, diffuse in style, and written with pale ink, in a very small but clear hand, appear to have severely tried Lord Grenville's patience, and his eye-sight; and the more so, as the views expressed in them were often

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<sup>1</sup> M. de Luc to Lord Grenville, February 6, 1798. Page 71.

unwelcome.<sup>1</sup> De Luc's conscientious efforts to do justice to an adversary, to weigh contrary opinions in an even balance, and penetrate to the truth, could hardly be appreciated by a Minister hurried along by the stress of a conflict on which such tremendous issues depended. But they enhance the value of his reports as historical material. In fact, his letters are the only confidential communications from Berlin in Lord Grenville's correspondence which clearly reveal forces and motives underlying Prussian policy, apart from private influences and personal rivalries. They have particular interest on account of the light they throw on the character and conduct of a statesman who acted a leading part on the political stage of Europe from the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars in 1792 to the battle of Jena in 1806. De Luc can hardly have met Count Haugwitz for the first time with favourable dispositions. He must have seen in a Minister who had been notoriously a member of one or more of the secret societies which laboured so effectually to destroy established beliefs, if not an enemy, at best an untrustworthy guardian of the conservative principles of which he had proved himself a zealous champion. In England, where the Swiss philosopher had lived of late years, Haugwitz's political conduct immediately before, and since, the treaty of Basle, of which he was the reputed author, had made the worst impression. Lord Grenville, Lord Malmesbury, Lord Cornwallis, every Englishman who had had public dealings with him, and George III. himself seem to have regarded him as a profligate intriguer, a politician without faith or moral principle. But De Luc's accounts, written with a candour that never failed amid much wavering of personal opinion, warrant a less unfavourable judgment. We gather from them that neither the original bent of his mind, nor early training, designed Haugwitz for an official career. Inheriting large estates he passed his youth in the management of his property, in travel, and philosophical speculation; making powerful friends, among whom he was able to count the Prince Royal of Prussia, afterwards King Frederick William II., and Leopold Archduke of Tuscany. When Leopold succeeded his brother Joseph II. as Emperor, and found it expedient to bring Austria and Prussia to a good understanding, he requested Frederick William to send Count

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, April 3, 1799. Page 514.

Haugwitz as his resident minister to Vienna. In this situation Haugwitz became a chief instrument in forming the alliance between the German sovereigns concluded at Vienna early in 1792, and cemented by their conference at Pilnitz in the following August. When Leopold died, Frederick William recalled Haugwitz to Berlin; and, after a little, made him Minister for Foreign Affairs instead of Count Schulemburg. Once placed in high office, a love of power and political management seems to have developed rapidly in Haugwitz till it became an over-mastering passion. It was not a sordid passion; he served the state without accepting the emoluments of office, and his personal integrity was above suspicion. But having few strong convictions, and being gifted with an intellect astute and versatile rather than commanding, he shaped his conduct more readily by the capricious moods of a despotic Sovereign than might have been possible for a statesman of firmer principles and less ambition. In the strife of politics he used duplicity and finesse without scruple as legitimate weapons; and defeated antagonists or rivals, often not more nice than himself in the choice of means, naturally blackened his reputation. Although unwilling to sacrifice place to consistency, he seems always to have given his sovereign honest advice, according to his lights. These led him to regard the safety and the material advantage of Prussia as the proper objects of Prussian statesmanship, which he seems to have pursued steadily, if timidly, to the exclusion of higher and wider aims.

When Frederick William had recovered sufficiently to attend again to business, Haugwitz sent De Luc his reply to Lord Grenville.<sup>1</sup> Besides expressing the King's satisfaction at the English promise to aid him in defending the neutrality of North Germany, it merely enlarged on the review of the situation of Prussia contained in the Duke of Brunswick's *mémoire* for George III. De Luc being now released from restraint was writing a report for the information of Lord Elgin, then confined to his house by illness, when he was interrupted by a visit from Mr. Garlike, British Secretary of Legation. Elgin had just seen an announcement in the official *Gazette* of the arrival at Berlin, some days before, of the Professor of Natural History at

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<sup>1</sup> Page 89.

Gottingen. At once suspecting some secret practice on the part of Haugwitz, whom he thoroughly distrusted, he sent to ask De Luc to call on him on the following day. The interview seems to have been stormy. Elgin wrote to Lord Grenville complaining of De Luc's secret negotiation as an insult to himself as British Minister. And De Luc having despatched Haugwitz's letter to Grenville, returned to Brunswick to report his proceedings to the Duke, who gave them unqualified approval. Haugwitz had been right, Brunswick said, to enjoin complete secrecy, as he was closely watched by Prince Henry and by the Minister of the French Republic. He had gone as far to meet the proposals of the British Government as the circumstances of the Prussian monarchy permitted; and his language seemed to be straightforward and sincere. The Duke repeated the same views in a letter to George III. But Lord Grenville supported Elgin, and refused to countenance anything that bore the semblance of double negotiation. He returned Count Haugwitz's letter in order that it might be sent to him through the regular official channel. At the same time he asked De Luc to go back to Berlin to co-operate with General de Stamford in an effort to win the adhesion of the King of Prussia to a Quadruple Alliance.

While De Luc was still at Brunswick, dissension had broken out between Austria and Prussia at the Congress of Rastadt. By a convention signed in August, 1796, France and Prussia had agreed to support a proposal emanating from the Director Rewbel, that sovereign Princes on the left bank of the Rhine, and the Prince of Orange, dispossessed by French conquest, should be compensated for their losses by the secularization of ecclesiastical property in Germany. In March, 1798, the German delegates at Rastadt formally ceded the left bank of the Rhine to France, and accepted the arrangement brought forward by France and Prussia in favour of the expelled princes. But Austria protested against a confiscation of church lands; and insisted that if the Prince of Orange were indemnified in Germany for the loss of Holland, the Duke of Modena, an Austrian Archduke, should also receive compensation in Germany for having been stripped of his Italian dominion.

De Luc, on returning to Berlin in the character of a vagrant philosopher, found De Stamford about to relinquish his mission in despair. His political sentiments and objects had naturally

thrown him into association with Lord Elgin, Prince de Reuss, and Count Panin, representing Great Britain, Austria, and Russia at the Prussian Court, who all, though on the best terms with each other, held aloof from Count Haugwitz so far as official duty allowed. De Stamford, relying probably on his old relations with the King, followed their example. Lord Elgin, in accordance with instructions from Lord Grenville, presented his credentials and asked audience for him of the King; but Frederick William allowed weeks to pass without granting the request. Disheartened by this unlooked for neglect, De Stamford had decided to return to Brunswick. The favour of the Queen of England and the introductions she gave him to members of the House of Mecklinburg Strelitz, placed De Luc on an intimate footing at the Prussian Court.<sup>1</sup> At his solicitation Queen Louise induced her husband to receive De Stamford; Colonel de Kökeritz, the King's favourite aide-de-camp and confidential adviser, and a determined foe of an English alliance, being present at the interview, and occasionally joining in the conversation. Frederick William welcomed his old tutor with affection and listened with approval to an eloquent exposition of the dangers impending over continental Europe from the growing preponderance of France. But when the General went on to advocate a Quadruple Alliance as the only safeguard against those dangers, the King said that he found it impossible to come to an agreement with the Austrian Government. It refused to disclose the secret articles of its treaties with France. He was willing to renounce compensation for his own lost territory beyond the Rhine; but felt bound to maintain the claim of the Prince of Orange, which Austria opposed. He had asked the Emperor to send a confidential Minister to Berlin to discuss in a friendly spirit the questions that divided them, but nothing had come of the proposal. De Stamford in reply denounced secularization as a French snare, and suggested other means of compensating the Prince of Orange. But the interview from which so much had been expected, produced no perceptible result. De Stamford, looking at the matter through the glasses of Prince de Reuss, saw in the policy of Count Haugwitz, compounded of fear of France and distrust of Austria, the evil influence that counteracted his efforts. He impressed this view on the mind of De Luc; who

<sup>1</sup> Pages 133-139.



in a special audience, at which Queen Louise was also present, implored the King, as he valued the safety of his kingdom and of Europe, not to be guided by the counsels of any single minister, but to form a Council of Ministers to advise him on questions of foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> Frederick William listened patiently to his long harangue, praised his honesty and good intentions, and dismissed him with gracious words. Then seeing that the question of an indemnity for the Prince of Orange, and the estrangement of their envoys from Count Haugwitz, prevented any approach to an agreement of the other conservative powers with Prussia, as desired by the British Government, De Luc returned to London at the end of March, 1798, to explain to George III. the causes of the political deadlock at Berlin.

De Luc's zeal for religion and established order had been stimulated of late by the aggressions of the French Directory, which excited alarm throughout Europe and brought his native land under Jacobin rule. One French army invaded Switzerland and, after a prolonged struggle, abolished its ancient constitution, and substituted another of the latest Parisian pattern. With the support of a second French army a democratic system of the same character was established in Holland. A third army entered Rome, dragged the Pope from the Vatican to a French prison, and converted the Ecclesiastical States into the Roman Republic. By these acts of violence Austria saw the balance of interests lately established by the treaty of Campo Formio overthrown to her great disadvantage. The King of Naples and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, near relatives of the Emperor, fearing to be overwhelmed in the revolutionary torrent, appealed to him for protection. Baron Thugut, Imperial Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs, was an implacable foe of the French Revolution. He had disapproved of the treaty of Campo Formio concluded by Count Cobentzl, and had only remained in office at the urgent entreaty of the Emperor, and with the purpose of renewing the war in circumstances more favourable to Austria. Unfortunately provocation came from France before the condition of Austria had much improved. The resources of the Austrian monarchy had long been exhausted, and its relations

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<sup>1</sup> M. de Luc to George III. April 4, 1799. Page 160.

with the only power able to supply its needs had become strained to the point of breaking. At the very time when Lord Grenville urged the King of Prussia to enter into an alliance with the Emperor, it appears from a letter written to him by Count Starhemberg on February 18, 1798,<sup>1</sup> that he meditated withdrawing the British Minister from Vienna. The cause of complaint was twofold: concealment by the Austrian Government of certain articles in her late treaties with France, thought to be prejudicial to British interests; and refusal to fulfil a financial engagement. In the course of the year 1796 Pitt advanced £1,600,000 to the Imperial Government, on the understanding that the money should be repaid from an Austrian loan to be raised in London on the guarantee of the British Government. Public credit fell so low in the winter of 1796-7, and his own exigencies were so pressing, that Pitt could not float an Austrian loan. The preliminary treaty of Leoben was signed in April, 1797. In May, the condition of the British money market having somewhat improved, Lord Grenville embodied the agreement between the British and Imperial Governments in a financial convention, which Count Starhemberg signed on behalf of the latter. Baron Thugut, however, refused to ratify this instrument, alleging the danger of giving umbrage to France, and a prospect of raising the money required to repay British advances on less onerous terms in Germany. Moreover, the Imperial Government had allowed payment of interest on a loan of £4,600,000, raised in London on British credit in 1795, to fall into arrear. And, as we gather from Count Starhemberg's private correspondence with Lord Grenville, the imperious tone of British despatches, and scornful comments on the bad faith of a defaulting ally, had deeply wounded Austrian pride and exasperated the quarrel. It was under these unpromising circumstances that in the beginning of April, Count Starhemberg communicated to Grenville the substance of a despatch he had just received from the Imperial Chancellor. The overtures of the King of Prussia to the Emperor, Thugut wrote, were a perfidious manœuvre of Count Haugwitz. The Austrian Government had declined discussion with that of Prussia, and had referred all matters in dispute between them to the arbitration of the Czar. It was still doubtful whether peace

would be made between Germany and France at Rastadt. Even if it were made, the treaty would be worthless, as the aggressions of the Directory could only be restrained by superior force. Such being the case, Thugut suggested that the British and Imperial Governments, having first come to an understanding with each other on certain essential points, should fix the basis of a Quadruple Alliance against France, and propose it for acceptance to the Czar and the King of Prussia. The points to be first settled were : (1) financial aid to Austria, which must be subsidy not loan, and liberal, particularly in money for preparation ; (2) Great Britain's ability to continue this aid during the year 1799 ; (3) the despatch of a British fleet to the Mediterranean for the protection of the King of Naples. Pitt eagerly welcomed the prospect of a new coalition, but he and Grenville doubted if Parliament could be brought to grant a subsidy to Austria. Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, on being consulted, could not see his way to the providing of a naval squadron for the Mediterranean. After the proposal had been considered in all its bearings for a fortnight, Grenville replied that the British Government concurred as to the importance of forming a Quadruple Alliance ; was in a condition to sustain a prolonged conflict ; and would send a fleet to the Mediterranean if the King of Naples would open his ports to it, and the Emperor would undertake to defend him against France. But it declined to discuss the question of a subsidy until the Emperor had ratified the convention of May, 1797 ; and it declared that confidence could only be restored between the two Governments by a frank disclosure of the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio. While this reply was still on its way the situation of Austria had become exceedingly critical. A Viennese mob assailed the French Embassy and hauled down the tricolor flag ; and the satisfaction he demanded being refused, General Bernadotte, the French resident Minister, quitted Vienna. War being now imminent, Thugut again pressed Grenville for a subsidy ; but the British Government would not move from the ground it had taken up. And although the Austrian Chancellor sent an agent named Ransonet to London to try and arrange for the paying of arrears of interest on the Austrian loan of 1795, he flatly refused to ratify the convention of May, 1797. A confidential letter of Starhemberg to Grenville dated July 8,

1798, throws light on this attitude of Baron Thugut.<sup>1</sup> It was due, Starhemberg explained, to irritation caused by the peremptory tone of the British Government ; to doubt as to the sufficiency of the supplies England would agree to furnish ; to fear of provoking France without adequate means of resistance ; to a still greater fear that the British Government might insist on a right to control the movements of Austrian armies. If the British Government would only state the amount of subsidy it was prepared to grant, and would pledge itself not to meddle with Austrian military plans, his sovereign, Starhemberg said, would ratify the convention. Grenville in reply merely availed himself of the freedom of a private letter to point another denial by contrasting British honour with Austrian bad faith.<sup>2</sup>

In the meantime George III. had induced the Prince of Orange to renounce all claim to compensation for his losses in Holland, out of secularized domains in Germany. De Luc returned to Brunswick at the end of April, bringing a commission from the Prince to General de Stamford to announce this renunciation to the King of Prussia and to the Emperor. He also gave Stamford a letter of instructions from Lord Grenville to endeavour, in discharging his new mission, to bring the great German sovereigns into direct communication with each other, so as to get rid of the rivalry of Haugwitz and Thugut, who represented national animosities and distrust. When De Luc, after a short stay at Brunswick, found himself again at Berlin, everything promised well for the success of English policy. The Czar at the request of the Emperor had intervened with great effect. In deference to a direct proposal from St Petersburg the King of Prussia had consented to a conference at Berlin of ministers of the four great monarchical powers, to discuss the question of a defensive alliance ; and Prince de Repnin had come to represent Russia. Frederick William had given De Stamford a very cordial reception ; and the General had found useful allies against Count Haugwitz in the Barons de Reske, two brothers, one Royal Chamberlain and the other Minister of Justice, who stood high in the King's favour and confidence. Prince de Reuss also opened a mode of compensation for the Prince of Orange by promising the Emperor's aid in obtaining the restitution of territory severed at some

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<sup>1</sup> Page 250.

<sup>2</sup> Page 252.

former period from the Principality of Nassau. But a change for which the British Government was in some degree responsible suddenly clouded the prospect. The Austrian Government, on failing to obtain a subsidy from England, had found it necessary, in order to avert war which it could not support, to concede most of the demands made by Bernadotte at Vienna; and to undertake besides to send Count Cobentzl to Rastadt for the purpose of settling with a special envoy of the Directory the more complicated questions at issue between the two powers. Events soon indicated clearly the existence of this secret arrangement. The Directory ordered Bernadotte to halt at Rastadt; and having already alarmed Prussia by requesting a large loan from the city of Hamburg, instructed its ministers at the Congress of Rastadt to claim all the islands of the Rhine, the control of the commerce of that river, the possession of Cassel and Kehl in its right bank, and the demolition of Ehrenbreitstein. And as Count Haugwitz complained loudly, the Austrian Ministers at the Congress refused to join with those of Prussia in repelling those demands. Next came an announcement from Vienna of Baron Thugut's retirement from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in favour of Count Cobentzl, and of the dismissal of the Minister of Police; acts of reparation which had been refused to Bernadotte. Prince de Reuss on being anxiously questioned by De Stamford in regard to the latest developments of Imperial policy, merely answered that he had received no instructions on the subject. The Duke of Brunswick who had come to Potsdam for the army manœuvres, the Barons de Reske, and everyone in Berlin most in favour of a Quadruple Alliance, declared that these circumstances fully justified Count Haugwitz's distrust of Austria. And neither De Stamford nor De Luc had anything to say in reply. The Conference of the Four Powers opened on May 28, with unfavourable auspices. At the first sitting the question of compensating the Prince of Orange by enlarging his Principality of Nassau came up for discussion. Prince de Reuss unexpectedly opposed the suggestion, and debate on it was adjourned. De Stamford started at once for Vienna to ask an audience of the Emperor. Lord Elgin went in search of health to the baths of Töplitz; and soon after returned to England. The King of Prussia, accompanied by Count Haugwitz, set out on

a tour through his provinces. The Duke of Brunswick returned to his capital; and De Luc made an excursion into Saxony for geological investigation, and in the hope of persuading the Elector to invite the Emperor and the King of Prussia to another conference at Pilnitz. Before leaving Berlin Haugwitz drew up and despatched a protest against the recent demands of France at Rastadt, which, as he declared, endangered the safety of Northern Germany, and must, if persisted in, impair the friendly relations of the Republic and Prussia.<sup>1</sup>

During the winter and spring Dundas, as Minister for War, had been strenuously engaged in organizing the national forces to repel invasion. The only enemies, however, he had had to encounter were those of his own political household. He wrote to Grenville on February 12 that if relieved by Pitt from the meddling obstruction of the Duke of Portland's office, "I will in three months hold an invasion in derision; or rather, I shall devoutly pray for the attempt being made."<sup>2</sup> Pitt, who sometimes interfered to restrain the Duke's querulous ineptitude, seems to have found a remedy for this clashing of authority in a better arrangement of public business. Later on, a plan for making the militia more serviceable brought the whole Government into conflict with the Marquis of Buckingham. The Duke of York, Lord Cornwallis, and Sir William Howe, *ex-officio* military advisers of the Crown, agreed as to the necessity of detaching the grenadier or light companies of militia from their respective regiments, and forming them into separate battalions, commanded by officers of the Line. The great majority of the militia colonels cheerfully assented to this arrangement, to which the Law Officers saw no legal objection. But Lord Buckingham, supported by Lords Berkeley and Caernarvon, vehemently opposed it, as insulting to commanding officers of militia, and a breach of the Militia Act.<sup>3</sup> It was proposed to pass a short Bill through Parliament to remove all doubt as to the legality of the measure. Thereupon Lord Buckingham<sup>4</sup> sent Lord Grenville a letter for Pitt, announcing

<sup>1</sup> M. de Luc to Lord Grenville, May 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 19, 22, 28, 1798. Pages 185-221.

<sup>2</sup> Page 79.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Dundas to Lord Grenville, April 17, 1798.

<sup>4</sup> Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, April 25, 1798.

his intention to oppose this "silly German project" in the House of Lords, and to resign his command if it were carried. Pitt and he, Dundas wrote, were at their wits' end what to do. Some way seems to have been discovered of pacifying Lord Buckingham, as the crisis passed without further recrimination.

All Dundas's colleagues in the Cabinet did not share his own sanguine views as to the efficiency of his defensive measures. Windham wrote to Grenville on May 17,<sup>1</sup> "Less than 500,000*l.*, which the charge of maintaining that valuable corps the Provisional Cavalry amounts to, would have sustained the war in Brittany and La Vendée in a manner, at least, to have saved us the necessity of standing on the defensive here." Lord Cornwallis also, in a letter to General Ross, expressed little confidence in plans of defence adopted solely on the advice of the War Minister's kinsman, General David Dundas. Long before these letters were penned, however, all danger of invasion had passed away. Bonaparte had reported to the Directory before the close of February that the miserable condition of the French navy made any attempt of the kind impracticable; and had turned his whole attention to preparations for a magnificent scheme of conquest in the East. Two interesting letters from M. Dolomieu, one of the most distinguished *savans* of the age, sent to De Luc from Switzerland, and forwarded by him to Lord Grenville, give us some idea of the vast range of scientific research comprehended in the aims of the expedition. Dundas alone of the leading members of the British Cabinet seems to have divined its destination; and he did not feel at liberty to act on what was only sagacious surmise. Pitt wrote to Grenville early in June, announcing its departure from Toulon on May 19, in the evident belief that it had sailed for Ireland. Later on, we have a long narrative, dated October 10, by Chevalier de Thuisy, one of the expelled knights, of the capture of Malta by Bonaparte. De Thuisy deals leniently with the Grand Master, Ferdinand de Hompesch, accusing him only of weakness; but French accounts leave no doubt that he betrayed his Order for a large bribe. The fortress of Valetta was so strong that General Caffarelli, commanding the French artillery, exclaimed on entering it, "How lucky for us we had a friend inside to open the gates." That the British Admiralty

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<sup>1</sup> Page 207.

had to overcome immense difficulties in manning additional ships, before they could so re-inforce Lord St. Vincent's fleet as to enable him to detach Nelson with a naval squadron to scour the Mediterranean, is abundantly evident from letters of Pitt and Lord Spencer. A still greater impediment in the way of maintaining a British fleet in the Mediterranean was the want of access to a friendly port for needful supplies and repairs. But a letter from the Queen of Naples to Lady Hamilton, dated June 11, forwarded to Grenville by Sir William Hamilton,<sup>1</sup> gave assurance of covert help. And soon afterwards a defensive treaty concluded with Austria encouraged the King of Naples to open his harbour to the British navy in defiance of France.

A letter, dated July 31, to Grenville from Rufus King, Minister of the American Republic in London, gives some particulars of a rupture of friendly relations between France and the United States.<sup>2</sup> The quarrel was not made up until Bonaparte became First Consul.

The conference of the four Great Powers at Berlin dragged on through the whole summer. General de Stamford, having been well received at Vienna by the Emperor and Baron Thugut, returned to the Prussian capital in July with a renewed conviction that Count Haugwitz was the main obstacle to a Quadruple Alliance. But secret negotiations carried on at Seltze, near Rastadt, by Count Cobentzl with Francois de Neufchateau on behalf of the Directory, at the very time when Prince de Reuss pressed Count Haugwitz at the Berlin Conference to guarantee South Germany against a French invasion, gave an air of insincerity to Austrian policy which strongly impressed even Prince de Repnin, the Russian representative, and intensified the general repugnance felt in Prussia to union with a detested rival.

The meeting at Seltze, however, ended without result. France would make no concession to Austria in Italy; the Emperor would go no further in the way of reparation for the outrage at Vienna. Yet the negotiators parted with mutual civilities. Neither of the parties represented was ready to begin war. Austrian preparations halted for want of money. The French Government was bankrupt, and what crippled it more, its aggressions in Switzerland and Italy had disorganized and almost ruined its victorious armies. All the great generals



who led them in the late war had already vanished from the scene. Bonaparte was in Egypt; Hoche was dead; Pichégru was in exile; Moreau had been deprived of his command for concealing Pichégru's treason. The vacancies were filled by Jacobin officers of an inferior stamp, who, in corrupt league with army contractors and with the Director Barras, plundered the occupied countries without mercy, embezzled military funds, and left their troops without pay or necessary supplies, to find subsistence as best they could. The soldiers became demoralized by license, and deserted in crowds. To fill the gaps in the military ranks the French Directory, after the failure of negotiations at Seltze, passed the law of conscription, making every Frenchman between the ages of twenty and twenty-five years liable for active service in the army or navy. But the levy of 200,000 men decreed by this enactment could not, in the penury of the French exchequer, be trained, armed, and equipped as effectives for several months. The Directory also sent orders to its Ministers at Rastadt to withdraw the exorbitant demands on Germany which gave umbrage to the King of Prussia. Count Cobentzl went from Seltze to Berlin, and thence, after a few days of fruitless discussion with Count Haugwitz, set out for St. Petersburg, accompanied by Prince de Repnin.

The expulsion from Malta of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, of which he was Protector, had inflamed the anger of the Czar, already kindled against France by earlier aggressions. Towards the end of July he instructed Count Woronzow to make an overture to the British Government for an offensive treaty on the lines of that almost concluded by his mother when she died in October, 1796. Pitt, in a letter to Grenville, dated August 16, eagerly welcomed this proposal.<sup>1</sup> He undertook to provide £300,000 as preparation money, £100,000 a month for pay and subsistence, and, at the end of the war, an additional allowance of £50,000 or even £70,000 for each month of the period during which the agreement should have been in operation, on the condition of Russia furnishing 60,000 troops, to be employed as the contracting powers might determine. It appears, however, from a letter of Dundas to Grenville, dated August 19, that doubts, probably suggested by Dundas himself, subsequently arose in Pitt's mind as to whether a return to the system of

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<sup>1</sup> Page 283.

subsidizing foreign powers would be tolerated by the country.<sup>1</sup> The undated letter addressed to Pitt which Dundas sent Grenville, with Pitt's concurrence, as expressing his own sentiments on the subject, has been postponed by an oversight to December 1798.<sup>2</sup> It gives us a striking picture of a rapid recovery of national prosperity and public spirit in the course of a single year. But however Pitt may have wavered for a moment, Lord Grenville's policy prevailed in the British Cabinet, only to meet with an unexpected obstacle at St. Petersburg. Within a few days after his arrival at the Russian Court, Count Cobentzl had so worked on the mind of the Czar as to win his support for the two main objects of Austrian diplomacy, in anticipation of war with France ; (1) to prevail on the King of Prussia to guarantee the neutrality of all Germany, so as to leave the Emperor free to employ his own forces in Italy and Switzerland ; (2) to obtain a promise of an adequate subsidy from England, before ratifying the financial convention of May, 1797. In a letter dated August 30, Paul instructed Count Woronzow to offer his mediation on the points at issue between Austria and Great Britain, in order that the two powers might act in concert against the common foe.<sup>3</sup> Lord Grenville stated the case of the British Government in a conference with the Russian Minister, on whose friendship he could rely to place it in the most favourable light before his Sovereign. A letter from Woronzow, dated July 6,<sup>4</sup> besides giving us an interesting sketch of the character of the Czar, traces the origin and growth of this friendship, now firmly established on common ground of patriotic motive and personal esteem. Pitt, Grenville explained,<sup>5</sup> could only spare £2,000,000 for foreign subsidies in the ensuing year. £200,000 would go to Portugal ; £500,000 to Switzerland ; and £100,000 a month to Russia. These grants exhausted the supply. By maintaining a fleet in the Mediterranean at a cost of £1,500,000, the British Government materially aided Austria and Naples ; but Parliament would not sanction any concert with the former power, while it refused to discharge its pecuniary obligations. If the Czar could induce the Emperor to ratify the convention of May, 1797, the British Government would enter into agreement with that of Austria as to military operations in Switzerland, naval operations in the Mediterranean, and the mode

<sup>1</sup> Page 284.<sup>2</sup> Page 433.<sup>3</sup> Page 293.<sup>4</sup> Page 246.<sup>5</sup> Page 297.

of employing a subsidized Russian army. The line taken by Pitt and Grenville in this business had not the unanimous approval of their colleagues. Lord Loughborough, then in attendance on the King at Weymouth, wrote to the former on October 4, urging him to waive the point of ratification in deference to the Czar. George III. also seems to have written to the Prime Minister in much the same sense. But Pitt, when forwarding the Lord Chancellor's letter to Grenville on October 6, showed no disposition to give way.<sup>1</sup>

Count Cobentzl's influence being still in the ascendent at the Court of St. Petersburg, the British answer to his offer of mediation did not please the Czar. Sir Charles Whitworth, the English resident Minister, reported that Paul postponed co-operation with the British Government until it was prepared to enter into concert with that of Austria.<sup>2</sup> And Whitworth took on himself the responsibility of signing a new convention, drawn up by Cobentzl, which deferred discussion as to the mode of repaying old debts, until the question of a subsidy had been settled. This turn of affairs at St. Petersburg, as appears clearly from their letters of October 28 and 29, placed Pitt and Grenville in a most embarrassing situation. Want of money made only a small part of the trouble; as the national revenue had recovered its elasticity. "Our revenue," Pitt had written on the 16th, "for the year to the 10th of October, surpasses all expectation," and shortly afterwards he found himself able to add £500,000 to the £2,000,000 originally destined for foreign subsidies. But neither of them would give way to Austrian demands. On the other hand the Czar did not easily suffer a check; and without his support the whole project of a new coalition must fall to the ground. From this strait they were rescued by the good offices of Count Woronzow who, in despatches revised by Grenville, assured his master that the British Parliament, which made and unmade Ministries at its pleasure, would not permit any new dealings with Austria until old engagements had been fulfilled. Woronzow also saved Whitworth from being recalled, in addition to being disavowed, by warning Grenville that his own recall from London would inevitably follow.<sup>3</sup> And the storm blew over without leaving any worse effect than a little soreness of feeling at St. Petersburg.

<sup>1</sup> Pages 335, 337.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Grenville to W. Pitt, October 28. Page 354.

<sup>3</sup> Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville, January 22, 1799. Page 447.

In the meantime news had arrived of the landing of Bonaparte in Egypt. The Porte declared war against France in the beginning of September; the Czar sent a fleet and army to the Sultan's aid; and Lord Grenville took measures for despatching Sir Sidney Smith and Colonel Koehler, an artillery officer of repute who had served in the East, to help the Turks on sea and land. Intelligence of Nelson's great victory at Aboukir encouraged a spirit of resistance in countries over-run or threatened by French armies; and desponding letters, intercepted at sea, from officers of Bonaparte's army, seemed to presage the entire destruction of his expedition. Lord Grenville wrote to Rufus King on October 4, "I really think that, without being sanguine, we may consider that business as over." The Maltese rose against their French garrison, and shut it up in the fortress of Valetta, which a British fleet blockaded by sea. The Czar, having entered into an agreement with the British Government that the island when recovered should be defended by a mixed body of Russian, English and Neapolitan troops, assumed the office of Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Naples began to arm openly; General Mack having come from Vienna to organize and lead the levies. A party of Dutch Republicans attached to the old Federal Constitution, which had been lately abolished, applied to the British Government through Rufus King for aid in freeing Holland from a French occupation. But as they insisted on excluding the Prince of Orange from the country, a condition which Lord Grenville would not accept, the negotiation fell through.<sup>1</sup> About the same time hopes inspired by disaffection to the French Government in Belgium were also doomed to disappointment; an appeal from Count Starhemberg to his brother-in-law, the Duke d'Ursel, to organize an insurrection with the support of Great Britain, meeting with no response.<sup>2</sup>

In September, 1798, however, a change that seemed big with the most important consequences came over the policy of Prussia. We have numerous indications of it in letters from M. de Luc and Mr. Garlike to Lord Grenville,<sup>3</sup> from Count Panin to Count Woronzow<sup>4</sup> and in reports from Brunswick to the Count d'Artois at Holyrood House, communicated to Lord Grenville through the agency of Lord Minto.<sup>5</sup> The aggressions of the French Directory

<sup>1</sup>Pages 365-367. <sup>2</sup>Pages 370, 376. <sup>3</sup>Pages 321, 332, 349. <sup>4</sup>Page 346. <sup>5</sup>Pages 352, 368.

had thrown the King of Prussia, the Duke of Brunswick and Count Haugwitz into a state of profound alarm for the safety of North Germany. When the conference at Seltze terminated without result, war between Austria and France seemed to be inevitable. And during the Duke of Brunswick's visit to Potsdam in September for the military reviews, he and Haugwitz succeeded in persuading Frederick William that the course of events might soon enable him, without much risk, to take a bolder line for the assertion of Prussian interests. In order to pave the way for the movement contemplated, they had recourse to the resident minister of Russia, Count Panin. The Duke cautiously inquired of Panin whether in the negotiations for a coalition, the question of new territorial arrangements at the conclusion of peace had been considered. Haugwitz opened his mind more freely in several unofficial conversations. The only object, he said, that could induce Prussia, in the absence of direct provocation from France, to depart from an attitude of neutrality, was the expulsion of French troops from Holland. But even for this object, Prussia would not move until hostilities had actually begun between Austria and France. "It remains to know," he invariably concluded, "what price England attaches to this work; what help she would give to facilitate it." Panin enclosed a note of these remarks in a letter to Count Woronzow, dated October 18, for the consideration of Lord Grenville. Following close on Panin's letter we have a scheme of operations in Holland for the restoration of the Prince of Orange by the combined action of Great Britain and Prussia, drawn up by the Duke of Brunswick. This plan, dated October 22, is prefaced by a declaration that Prussia would not abandon its system of neutrality until Austria and her allies had declared war against France; and then only as intervening for the restoration of general peace, on terms previously agreed on by England, Prussia, Russia and Austria.<sup>1</sup> It did not, however, suit British purposes in the existing posture of affairs to enter into any separate engagement with Prussia. Lord Grenville wrote to Count Woronzow on November 2 that it was only by joining to form a Quadruple Alliance that Prussia could derive benefit from the £2,000,000, which was all Great Britain had to give to foreign powers.<sup>2</sup> But he used the information

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<sup>1</sup> Page 350.

<sup>2</sup> Page 358.

supplied by Panin in drafting new proposals which Sir Charles Whitworth was instructed in a *most secret* letter, dated November 16, to submit to the Czar.<sup>1</sup>

A continental war being now imminent, these instructions ran, the King of Prussia showed an inclination to intervene, but not till after hostilities had begun, for the purpose of expelling the French from Holland. England would aid him in this work to the utmost of her power. He wished, however, to have the general aims of the coalition, and the particular aims of each member of it, ascertained and agreed on beforehand. The British Government therefore requested the Czar to formulate the articles of a Quadruple Alliance, and present them in a complete shape for acceptance at Vienna and Berlin. Grenville suggested as leading provisions of this treaty, the reduction of France to her limits before the Revolution; the independence of Switzerland; union of Holland and Belgium under the Prince of Orange; the restoration of the kingdom of Sardinia and of Germanic integrity. Austria should, he thought, be content with the recovery of Lombardy, and the King of Prussia should be asked to state what acquisitions he had in view. The co-operation of Austria and Prussia could only be secured by the Czar guaranteeing to each the observance by the other of the conditions agreed upon; and the British Government would send a special envoy to Germany to support his proposals. Before, however, this communication reached the Czar, news received at Berlin that Austria had opened fresh negotiations with France, through the mediation of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and had stopped the Russian army advancing to aid her, checked a growing inclination in the King of Prussia to quit the safe ground of neutrality.

British interests at Constantinople had been hitherto so insignificant as only to require a diplomatic mission of the lowest rank. But Turkey's quarrel with France and alliance with England opened such a prospect of political influence, and expanded trade to the Levant, that in November Lord Grenville sent Lord Elgin, at his own request, as British Minister to the Sublime Porte, with the rank and appointments he had held at Berlin. Some weeks later Sir Sidney Smith, after many objections had been overcome, started for the Turkish capital in

order to concert operations with the Porte and M. Tomara, the Russian resident minister, before proceeding to take command of a naval squadron then blockading the Nile. His letters to Grenville in January-March, 1799, contain interesting accounts of his reception by the Sultan and other incidents arising out of his mission to the East.<sup>1</sup> Colonel Kœhler's departure was delayed still longer, partly by obstruction at the Horse Guards,<sup>2</sup> and partly by sanguine anticipations, nourished by rumours of Bonaparte's death, of the ruin of the French expedition. Dundas wrote to Grenville on December 13 to remonstrate against the folly of accepting mere conjecture for ascertained fact.<sup>3</sup> His letter announced an intention of sending Colonel Maitland to Suez to report on the feasibility of despatching British troops from India to Egypt by the Red Sea; a project afterwards accomplished with splendid results.

At Naples the presence of Nelson's fleet had thrown the direction of affairs into the hands of the war party, led by the Queen. General Mack taking advantage of the enfeebled and dispersed state of the French army in the ecclesiastical States, crossed the border in November, at the head 40,000 men, and occupied Rome. The enemy, hastily concentrating under Generals Championnet and Macdonald, drove back the Neapolitans to the line of the Volturno. Though this position was very strong, Mack, losing heart, gave it up on ignominious conditions, and had to fly to the French camp from the fury of his troops. The King and Queen of the Two Sicilies embarked by night on Nelson's flagship, and were carried over to Sicily. The Neapolitan army disbanded. The lazzaroni defended Naples with splendid valour; but though they saved the city from being plundered, they could not save the monarchy; and Naples became the capital of the Parthenopian Republic. Austria, in spite of the Czar's remonstrances, looked on while the Kings of Sardinia and the Two Sicilies were stripped of all their Italian dominions. Baron Thugut, not being as yet ready for war, would not allow his hand to be forced.

On December 30 the Czar replied to Lord Grenville's last proposals.<sup>4</sup> He had spared no effort, he said, to form a strong

<sup>1</sup> Pages 437, 443, 476, 480, 491.

<sup>2</sup> George Canning to Lord Grenville, November, 1798. Page 356.

<sup>3</sup> Page 413.

<sup>4</sup> Page 427.

coalition against France. (1) By offering to mediate between Great Britain and Austria. He still hoped the British Government would not reject his friendly suggestions for an accommodation of its differences with the Emperor, whose aid could not be dispensed with. (2) By sending an army to support the King of Naples. (3) By asking the King of Prussia to join in forming a Quadruple Alliance, on the following conditions. That, in consideration of his acting against the French in Holland, he should have the aid of 45,000 Russian infantry, besides cavalry and artillery, for the support of which force Great Britain would advance £900,000, namely £225,000 for preparation and the remainder at the rate of £37,000 a month; that Holland and Belgium should be united under the rule of the Prince of Orange; that the King should be at liberty to enlarge his dominions by acquisitions from France. Austria had consented to these last articles. For the rest, the Czar approved generally of the territorial settlement recommended by Lord Grenville, but would not limit the Emperor to the recovery of Lombardy lest he should find it more for his interest to come to terms with France. The Pope also, he said, must be restored. He had pressed Austria to defer hostilities no longer; and he declared himself ready to take any further step for the advancement of their common aims the British Government might suggest.

Lord Grenville had already despatched his brother, Mr. Thomas Grenville, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Berlin to support the Russian proposals. But this mission was much impeded by contrary winds, and weather of extraordinary severity. At a first attempt in December to reach Cuxhaven, Mr. Grenville found the German coast completely ice-bound, and the ship, after beating about for nine days on a stormy sea, returned to Yarmouth.<sup>1</sup> A second voyage in the beginning of February proved still more perilous. Floating blocks of ice, swept down the current of the Elbe, caught the vessel and wrecked it on a sand-bank. The passengers and crew made their way over a frozen sea to the little island of Nework; and thence, by walking for six hours, in intense frost, through water which gradually rose above their waists, reached Cuxhaven with little loss of life. Mr. Grenville managed to save most of his official papers, but

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, December 29. Page 426.



recovered none of his personal effects for some weeks afterwards.<sup>1</sup> When he arrived at Berlin on February 17, the Czar's proposals were still under the consideration of the Prussian Government ; Count Panin having orders to quit that capital if they were not accepted. Count Haugwitz and Count Finchenstein, feebly sustained by the Duke of Brunswick, supported them against the opposition of the King's family and the majority of his advisers, of his personal scruples, and of national sentiment.<sup>2</sup> It will be remembered that they carried Prussia much farther and faster on the road to hostilities with France, than Frederick William had consented to go in the overtures made to the British Government through Count Panin. They meant a repudiation by Prussia of the treaty of Basle, without any preliminary explanation with the French Directory ; and concert with Austria for the indefinite aggrandizement of that power, Prussia's rival and natural enemy in Germany. During the struggle of parties Haugwitz's supremacy in the department of foreign affairs had been severely shaken. When it became known that he inclined towards a breach with France, the peace party, headed by Prince Henry, which had hitherto given him his staunchest adherents, conspired to overthrow him. A charge of encouraging the patriotic aspirations of Poland brought against Prince Radzivil, who had married into the Royal family of Prussia, afforded a pretext to the Prince's relatives for accusing Haugwitz of misconduct in office. Count Schulemberg also, an old and able antagonist, whom Haugwitz had supplanted in the post of Foreign Secretary by advocating peace when Schulemberg advocated war, now turned his successful tactics against himself. Haugwitz, however, found no difficulty in exculpating himself to the King ; but though still able to rely on his sovereign's favour, the unsteady sympathy of the Duke of Brunswick, and the fear inspired by the Czar, as sustaining forces, he had forfeited the confidence of powerful classes.<sup>3</sup> And the equivocal conduct of the Austrian Government, which had abandoned the Kings of Sardinia and Naples to their fate, and had renewed secret negotiations with the French Directory through the Minister of the Cisalpine Republic at Vienna, while openly urging the King of Prussia to

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, December 29, 1798 ; January 27. February 3, 7, 19, 23, 1799.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, February 28, 1799.

<sup>3</sup> Prince of Orange to Lord Grenville, December 7 and 10, 1798.

join with it in breaking up the Congress of Rastadt, strengthened the arguments of the peace party, incessantly poured into Frederick William's ear by Colonel Kökeritz, its mouthpiece in the Royal household. Panin, Grenville, Stamford and De Luc earnestly besought the Duke of Brunswick to cast the weight of his influence into the scale of a Quadruple Alliance. But the Duke after several interviews with the King relapsed into a state of doubt; and then Haugwitz, being of pliant disposition and tenacious of office, gave way to please his sovereign. In reply to the Czar's proposal of an offensive concert against France, he brought forward the counter-project of a defensive concert for the protection of North Germany, Sweden, and Denmark. By this scheme the King of Prussia undertook, in consideration of a subsidy from England, and of a pledge of armed aid from Russia in the event of his becoming involved in war with France, to raise the Prussian troops guarding the line of demarcation to such a degree of strength as would enable him *agir au besoin*. And Haugwitz assured Panin verbally that the slightest change of circumstances, such as Austrian victory or Austrian defeat, must inevitably bring Prussia into the field, either to free Holland or to defend Germany. The discussions that followed turned chiefly on the significance of the phrase *agir au besoin*. In the Prussian proposal the *casus fœderis* was a violation by France of the line of neutrality. Count Panin and Mr. Grenville contended that as the dangers arising from French aggression, and the necessity of delivering Holland from a French occupation were fully admitted by all parties, these should also be expressed in the compact as governing motives of Prussian action. After conferring with Frederick William, Haugwitz declared that he could go no farther. And as Mr. Grenville rejected the idea of paying for such limited co-operation, the negotiation came to an end.<sup>1</sup> In a subsequent conversation with De Luc, Haugwitz explained more fully his view of the political situation.<sup>2</sup> The common interests of the monarchical powers, and a mobilization of Prussian troops, would, he declared, have been in themselves a sufficient pledge of Prussian intervention when the fitting time arrived. He had, himself, been in favour of accepting the Russian proposals, but

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, March 4, 10, 18, and April 3, 1799. General de Stamford to the Duke of Brunswick, p. 520.

<sup>2</sup> Confidential notes, by M. de Luc, p. 524.

the King absolutely refused. And he considered an English alliance on the terms he had formulated, but failed to carry, essential to the safety of the Prussian Monarchy.

Mr. Grenville seems at first to have found consolation for the failure of his negotiation in a belief that the loss of Prussian aid would make Austria more tractable to British demands. But the political attitude of Count Dietrechstein, who came from Vienna as successor of Prince de Reuss, quickly dispelled this illusion. Baron Thugut seized the occasion of a new diplomatic appointment to write to Mr. Grenville in the style of old friendship.<sup>1</sup> The letter stated that Dietrechstein was charged to give and ask for such explanations as might clear away the doubts of each other's good faith which now separated Austria and Prussia, and asked Grenville to aid him with advice. But Grenville intimated to Dietrechstein, through Count Panin, that his instructions forbade co-operation with an Austrian envoy until the financial convention of May, 1795, had been ratified.<sup>2</sup> And as no answer was returned to this communication, the official relations of the two ministers assumed a merely formal character. It would appear, however, that the real purpose of Dietrechstein's mission had been to patch up a working agreement between Great Britain and Prussia. His tone and manner in intercourse with Count Haugwitz showed no disposition to conciliate. General de Stamford inferred from this unfriendly bearing of the Austrian envoy that Baron Thugut thought it good policy to exclude Prussia from the coalition. The King of Prussia, so Stamford argued, taking part in a war with France as leader of North Germany, would be in a position to hold Austria in check; isolated, under the jealous supervision of the Czar, he would be a nullity.<sup>3</sup> If this was the aim of the Imperial Chancellor, Mr. Grenville and Count Panin laboured together to defeat it, by forcing Prussia, in spite of herself, into war.

Napper Tandy had arrived at Hamburg in November, 1798; and although a French general, and on neutral ground, had been arrested by order of the Senate and handed over to the British Government. As the Directory threatened vengeance for this insult, the Czar, apparently at Panin's instigation, sent a

<sup>1</sup> Baron de Thugut to Thomas Grenville. p. 516.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, March 23, p. 504.

<sup>3</sup> General de Stamford to the Duke of Brunswick, p. 520.

proposal to Berlin that an army composed of Russian, Prussian, British, and Danish troops should assemble in the vicinity of the menaced city for its defence. And Mr. Grenville instructed Sir James Craufurd, the resident British Minister, secretly to persuade the principal inhabitants to receive a part of this composite force within their walls.<sup>1</sup> Hamburg being within the line of territory allowed to remain neutral by France on the guarantee of Prussia, the success of this intrigue would have served the double purpose of embroiling these two powers, and providing an advantageous starting point for an expedition to Holland. But while Haugwitz gained time by an evasive answer to the Czar's proposal, the citizens of Hamburg spoiled the project by refusing to admit a garrison.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Grenville could no longer hope to accomplish the principal objects of his mission to Germany. In announcing it to the Marquis of Buckingham, Lord Grenville had written: "He (Thomas Grenville) will have, if I mistake not, very much the glory of signing the overthrow of Jacobin France."<sup>3</sup> He had signed nothing at Berlin; and he saw no prospect of advantage from a journey to Vienna. Instead of a Quadruple Alliance of powers acting in concert to achieve objects determined beforehand, there was only a disjointed sort of Triple Alliance, of which two of the partners were mutually estranged, and shaped their plans in entire independence of each other. Under these circumstances Mr. Grenville decided to remain at Berlin to watch and, as far as possible, influence the course of events. He vented his chagrin freely, if not altogether justly, in bitter reproaches against Sir Morton Eden, his colleague at Vienna. Sir Morton, he complained to his brother, sent only very short answers, and these merely echoes of Baron Thugut's opinions, to his own voluminous epistles; and, by servility to the Imperial Chancellor, had spoiled Grenville's game of playing off Austria and Prussia against each other, and thus making both or either pliant instruments of British policy.<sup>4</sup> The correspondence hardly supports this severe impeachment. Thugut during the whole course of negotiations at Berlin appears to have been well informed from Russian sources of King Frederick William's

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Grenville to Sir James Craufurd, p. 516.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Grenville to Sir Charles Whitworth, p. 522.

<sup>3</sup> Lord Grenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, *Court and Cabinets of George III*

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Grenville to Lord Grenville, April 3, 1799.

indisposition to accept the Czar's proposals. And he had no longer the same pressing need as formerly of a British subsidy. He had gained time for Austrian preparation. And it appears from a letter of Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville, dated March 24, 1799, that the British Cabinet had now arranged to pay 90,000 Russian and 20,000 Swiss troops, at the rate of £181,000 a month, to act against the French; of which expenditure, as Mr. Grenville sorrowfully confessed, Austria necessarily would reap the benefit, without making the slightest concession to Great Britain. Sir Morton Eden's letters, no doubt, show that he shared Thugut's distrust of Prussia; but this was the view expressed also by Lord Elgin, and by Lord Grenville himself.

In the meantime hostilities had begun between France and Austria. Baron Thugut's dilatory tactics at length wore out the patience of the Czar, who threatened to withhold his aid if they were persisted in further.<sup>1</sup> And the march of Russian troops into Germany drew a declaration of war from the Directory. Throughout the country which bore the first brunt of the conflict, it seems to have been unpopular. The delegates of the German Confederation at Rastadt had come to an agreement with those of France on every disputed point of much importance. The minor States of Southern Germany appealed in vain to the King of Prussia to include them in the neutral zone protected by his guarantee. A French army commanded by General Jourdan over-ran them early in March, while another under General Massena invaded the Grisons. But though the French pursued the same system of incessant attack which had carried them everywhere to victory in the last war, it was no longer with the same superiority of numbers and of military skill. The defeat of Jourdan by the Archduke Charles at Stockach on March 25, followed by the retreat of the beaten army in confusion across the Rhine, was only the first of a series of Republican reverses which signalized the opening of the campaign, and promised a rapid accomplishment of the aims of the coalition.

The Editor has thought it right to give a rather full account of the secret negotiations for the formation of a third coalition against Revolutionary government in France, because the papers relating to them, now printed for the first time, illustrate

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<sup>1</sup> Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville, March 24, 1799, p. 504.

a somewhat obscure chapter of modern history. The second long series of letters contained in this volume, concerning the state of Ireland at the close of the 18th century, and the Act of Union, add little of importance to what has been told already in the Cornwallis, Castlereagh, Auckland, Pelham, Wolfe Tone, and other contemporary records, and call for comparatively brief notice. The great majority of them were written by the Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville. Grenville's letters to the Marquis during the same period are sparingly given in the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos's work, *Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George III.*

When Bonaparte turned his mind, at the end of February, 1798, from an invasion of England to conquest in the East, the French Directory pledged itself to Wolfe Tone and Lewins, agents at Paris of the Society of United Irishmen, to equip and despatch simultaneously to convenient points of the Irish coast, several small expeditions in aid of a national insurrection. In France, however, performance lagged a long way behind promise. And the arrest of Lord Edward FitzGerald and Messrs. Sheares at Dublin in May disconcerted the plans of the Governing Council of United Irishmen. A few partial outbreaks of civil war within the confines of the old English Pale, and in one or two counties of Ulster, gave little cause of apprehension. But the burnings and other outrages of bodies of yeomanry, living at free quarters among a Catholic population, provoked a semi-religious conflict in Wexford, which proved truly formidable, and threw the Irish Government into a state of panic. Lord Camden, the Viceroy, sent pressing demands to London for English troops<sup>1</sup>; and followed them up by a personal request to Pitt that Lord Cornwallis should be despatched to Ireland to replace or assist him, as Governor-General or Commander-in-Chief.<sup>2</sup> The British Government had but few troops to send. As appears from a memorandum of Lord Grenville, dated June 18, besides the Guards, 4,500 strong, the number of regular infantry in Great Britain fell short of 4,000, many of these being raw recruits.<sup>3</sup> In this dilemma the Cabinet, acting on a suggestion of Lord Buckingham, passed a Bill enabling English militia regiments to serve in Ireland for a limited time at their

<sup>1</sup> Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, May 29, 1798.

<sup>2</sup> W. Pitt to Lord Grenville, June 11 and 12, 1798.

<sup>3</sup> Page 237.

own request.<sup>1</sup> And Lord Cornwallis, yielding to the solicitations of his colleagues, assumed the offices of Lord Lieutenant and Commander-in-Chief in succession to Lord Camden. Before either he or the English reinforcements could reach the scene of conflict, rebellion had been crushed in Wexford, and resistance elsewhere had sunk down to guerilla warfare. But on June 8, while the issue still hung in doubt, Pitt had written in confidence to Lord Auckland that he and Grenville had for some time past been discussing a plan of Legislative Union with Ireland, to be introduced after the suppression of the rebellion; that they saw their way on all points except those of trade and revenue, regarding which they wished to consult him. A statistical statement, prepared by Grenville, accompanied this letter.<sup>2</sup> At the end of the same month Lord Buckingham went to Dublin in command of the Bucks militia, mainly for the purpose of co-operating with Pitt and his brother to frame and pass a political measure which he advocated with all the authority of a Lord Lieutenant who had borne the brunt of the struggle on the Regency question in 1789. On August 6, in answer to Grenville's inquiries, Pitt wrote that he had urged Cornwallis "to bring forward the great work of Union, which can never be so well accomplished as now."<sup>3</sup> From the letters quoted, and from those of Lord Buckingham to his brother of later date, it may be inferred that the plan of the Ministry was to carry an Act of Union through the Irish Parliament while national opposition was paralyzed by terror; dominant Protestantism, a small minority armed to the teeth, being scared almost out of its wits by rebellion, invasion, and tales of "Popish massacre"; Catholics and Presbyterians, a large but disarmed majority, being thoroughly cowed by military outrage, "vigour beyond the law," and savage threats of extermination.

Lord Cornwallis on arriving at Dublin on June 20, 1798, found the minds of men, and particularly of men in power, so swayed by the fiercest religious and political passion that he took the resolution of studying the situation for himself, and acting on his own informed judgment.<sup>4</sup> This independent attitude, his putting a stop to military license and the abuse of martial law, and his proclaiming an amnesty, drew on him the

<sup>1</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, May 29, June 3, 10, 12, 1798.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary and Correspondence of Lord Auckland.*

<sup>3</sup> Page 275.

<sup>4</sup> *Cornwallis Correspondence.*

bitter censure of the Protestant Ascendency party, with the exception of Lord Clare, which filled the high offices of State, and had governed the country under Lord Camden. Lord Buckingham at first gave the Lord Lieutenant zealous support. In a letter to Lord Grenville, dated July 23, he depicted the effects of Lord Camden's system in the darkest colours; the "atrocious rapine and cruelties" of the yeomanry and militia; the state of utter disorganization and lawlessness into which these bodies had fallen under the inefficient command of forty-three generals, "I believe the worst in Europe"; the anarchical influence of the Orange societies, "a loyal association on Jacobin principles," which provoked civil war wherever it found a footing, and had become a danger to the State. He associated himself with the "very meritorious conduct" of Cornwallis; and declared that the question of Union must be postponed until the Irish army had been thoroughly reformed.<sup>1</sup> Lord Carysfort also, Grenville's brother-in-law, in a letter dated August 15, expressed approval of the Viceroy's merciful policy. The clamour against him, Carysfort thought, "proceeded in a great measure from certain political intriguers, who are apprehensive that he means to rely upon his own judgment more than theirs."<sup>2</sup> On August 22 General Humbert landed in Mayo with a small French force, and a few days afterwards defeated General Lake in an action known as the "race of Castlebar." Lord Cornwallis moved westward to meet the enemy, taking with him a detachment of the Bucks militia, but leaving the Colonel with the rest of the regiment in Dublin. By this arrangement, and perhaps still more by his explanation that it had been made for the benefit of the public service, he grievously wounded Lord Buckingham's self-esteem, and converted a useful adherent into a furious and unrelenting assailant.<sup>3</sup> Humbert surrendered at Ballinamuck on September 8. A few days afterwards Napper Tandy, in command of another small French armament, touched at Port Rutland in Donegal, and hearing of Humbert's fate fled to Norway. Then the question of union came to the front again. On September 26 Lord Buckingham sent his brother a report of a conference he had held on that subject with Lord Chancellor Clare. Clare was the Irish statesman in whom Pitt and Grenville placed their chief trust.

<sup>1</sup> Page 264.

<sup>2</sup> Page 280.

<sup>3</sup> Marquis of Buckingham to Lord Grenville, August 26, 30, 31, September 1-30,



They regarded him as the back-bone of what was termed the English interest in Ireland. He and Buckingham found themselves in general agreement except as to the expediency of granting equality of civil rights to Irish Catholics, a concession to which he declared himself absolutely opposed. The Marquis on the contrary insisted that without it and a juster system of levying tithes, a Bill of Union would not be worth the trouble of passing. But no Act of Union, he informed his brother, would or could be carried by the present Viceroy. Cornwallis, he asserted, showed no zeal in the cause, and had sunk too low in public opinion. The forty-three Generals, or some of them, no longer seemingly the "worst in Europe," made a jest of his military capacity since General Humbert had out-manceuvred him in the field; the official class, incensed by his not consulting them, betrayed him at the Castle.<sup>1</sup> About a fortnight later Lord Clare went over to London at Pitt's request. On October 16 Pitt wrote to Grenville "I have had two very full conversations with Lord Clare. What he says is very encouraging with a view to the great question of the Union. . . . I endeavoured to learn what he really thought about the general state of things in Ireland. He seems to believe that the want of that communication which had formerly been made even too much a matter of course, had produced some dissatisfaction, but that the ill-humour does not go far; and that everything may be set right if a Secretary who can speak with the authority belonging to his station is sent over immediately." This letter, for some reason or other, is silent in regard to the change of ministerial policy which gave real significance to the conversations to which it referred. Up to this time the leading members of the Cabinet had professed the opinion that Legislative Union would afford a safe and suitable occasion for emancipating the Irish Catholics. But Lord Clare, as we know from his own letters and from other sources, persuaded Pitt that the Irish Parliament could only be brought to accept an Act of Union which afforded an additional guarantee for the maintenance of Protestant ascendancy.<sup>2</sup> The Prime Minister was too anxious to secure his object to reject the means offered. Lord Grenville acquiesced in the exclusion of the Catholics, in order to teach them, as he explained to his

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<sup>1</sup> Page 322.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary and Correspondence of Lord Auckland—Castlereagh Correspondence.*

brother, that they could gain nothing by rebellion.<sup>1</sup> And Dundas, their staunchest friend in the Cabinet, was absent in Scotland. Grenville seems to have thought Clare's statement to Pitt in regard to Irish clamour against the Viceroy wanting in candour, it tallied so little with the invective of Lord Buckingham, who appealed to the Chancellor's testimony as being in "exact agreement" with his own.<sup>2</sup> He invited Clare to meet Pitt at Dropmore for further discussion, but Clare, at the last moment, sent the excuse of urgent business in Ireland.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Pelham, Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, who had been for some months in England, being now pressed to return to his post, sent in his resignation; and Cornwallis chose Lord Castlereagh to fill the vacancy.

In the meantime two other expeditions from France had reached the Irish coast. One carrying nearly 3,000 troops, with Wolfe Tone as Adjutant General, was defeated, and for the greater part captured, by Admiral Warren at Lough Swilly on October 10. A few days later Admiral Savary, who had conveyed Humbert to Killala, returned with a re-inforcement of 2,000 men, but on hearing of the disaster at Lough Swilly he carried them back to France. This was the last attempt of the French Directory to revolutionize Ireland. Interesting particulars of the trial and death of Wolfe Tone are given in Lord Buckingham's letters dated November 10, 12, and 13.

Early in November Lord Grenville sent to his brother, for criticism and emendation, a draft of the ministerial Bill of Union, which seems to have been mainly his own work.<sup>4</sup> It excluded everything savouring of reform, as leading to revolution in England. The 300 members of the Irish House of Commons were reduced to 100, the number allowed to Ireland in the United Parliament, by taking away one from each county, and grouping the boroughs as in Scotland. The Bill departed from Scottish precedent by providing that Irish representative peers should be elected for life; and making the electing peers eligible to sit for British constituencies in the United House of Commons. Lord Buckingham had also framed a Bill partly on the same

<sup>1</sup> *Court and Cabinets of George III.* Lord Grenville to Marquis of Buckingham, November 5, 1795.

<sup>2</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, October 18 and 23.

<sup>3</sup> Grenville to Buckingham, November 5, 1798, *Court and Cabinets of*

<sup>4</sup> *George III.*

lines. By depriving every county and borough of one representative this scheme reduced the 300 Irish members to 150. 100 of these, chosen by ballot at the beginning of every session, were to sit in Parliament; the 50 others remaining in Dublin to form committees for taking and reporting evidence in cases of contested elections and private Acts. The Bill also proposed to establish a Board of Lords Triers in the Irish capital, to hear appeals from Irish Courts of Justice to the House of Lords.<sup>1</sup> Buckingham insisted much and often that his suggestion of Irish Parliamentary Committees should be adopted, as otherwise the cost of sending witnesses from Ireland to London would, in many cases, operate as a denial of justice. But Grenville answered that no political body could be suffered to sit in Dublin which might keep alive the memory of the Irish Legislature, or be a germ from which a national Parliament might some day spring into existence.

Lord Buckingham's letters throw a good deal of light on the difficulties and discomfort of Lord Cornwallis's position, to which the writer materially contributed. No member of the British Cabinet appears to have been more firmly convinced than the Lord Lieutenant that an independent Irish Parliament was a perpetual danger to the British Monarchy. But he felt that an Act of Union forced through a Legislature that did not really represent them, against the wishes of the people, or as a compact with a small ruling minority, would be calamitous for Ireland, and of very doubtful advantage to Great Britain.<sup>2</sup> The Irish Catholics regarded him as a friend; and, so far as their opinion on the subject could be ascertained, seemed disposed to welcome, or at least acquiesce in, closer connexion with England, if accompanied by a removal of their civil disabilities, freedom of trade, and a more equitable system of levying tithes. Considering their claims equitable, and their assent essential to the success of the policy of Government, he sent an Under-Secretary in whom he confided, William Elliott, to England to remonstrate with Pitt against his sudden change of attitude towards them. The Prime Minister replied that in his opinion an establishment for their clergy and a better tithing system would satisfy the requirements of the case. Cornwallis's sense of duty forbade him either to

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<sup>1</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, November 5, 10, 26, and December 25, 1798.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Cornwallis to Mr. Pelham—*Pelham Papers*.

desert from a post of danger, or to resort to what he thought an abuse of his powers in order to accomplish, and at the same time vitiate, a political object. He therefore continued to govern, so far as might be possible, according to ordinary law, and to temper justice with mercy. But this line of conduct which Lord Buckingham had at first extolled as "highly meritorious," he now denounced almost daily to his brother as criminal "imbecility." The Lord-Lieutenant, the letters complained,<sup>1</sup> allowed Civil Courts to over-ride Military Courts; tolerated free expression of opinion on the question of Union at public meetings, and in pamphlets and ballads; transported rebels instead of putting them to the sword or hanging them. By this fatal leniency he defeated the main purpose he had been sent to Ireland to serve, and displayed absolute inefficiency in the office of Lord Lieutenant. The opportunity of carrying an Act of Union which he neglected to seize was fast passing away; and unless he were at once recalled, and a more capable successor appointed, it might never be recovered. These complaints, to which Lord Clare now lent countenance, were addressed to ears only too open to receive them. Lord Grenville had, more emphatically perhaps than any of his colleagues, identified himself officially with the system of repression that had been pursued by Lord Camden; and had wished to maintain it under Lord Cornwallis, even when his brother had so forcibly condemned it, as well to punish rebellion, as to accomplish the prime object of English policy in Ireland.<sup>2</sup> This view also appears to have been that of Pitt, and to have prevailed in the Cabinet. The Ministry did not venture to recall Lord Cornwallis because, as Grenville wrote to his brother, they had no other general, capable of coping with a French invasion, to send to Ireland.<sup>3</sup> But, with the exception of Dundas, they gave him no support.<sup>4</sup> To add to the Viceroy's embarrassments, no sooner was the question of a Union publicly mooted, than it became apparent that Pitt had been misled in his conferences with Lord Clare with regard to the political sentiments of the party of Protestant Ascendancy. Mr. Foster, the Irish Speaker, its most influential leader, notwithstanding

<sup>1</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, October 23, 1798, and afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> Grenville to Buckingham, July and September, 1798, *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

<sup>3</sup> Grenville to Buckingham, January 28, 1799, *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

<sup>4</sup> *Cornwallis Correspondence; Castlereagh Correspondence.*

“the very desperate state of his private affairs,”<sup>1</sup> could not be brought to support an Act of Union by Pitt’s personal solicitations and splendid offers of recompense. Sir John Parnell and other leading officials, the Archbishop of Cashel, the Orange Society, the Bar, the bankers and merchants of Dublin, followed Foster. The country gentlemen generally, as represented in the House of Commons, took the same side. And the forces of Protestant Ascendency openly coalesced with the Whig Opposition to maintain an Irish Parliament. Being thus reduced to dependence on the good will of borough mongers and political jobbers, who returned a large majority of the Irish House of Commons, for the means of passing a measure framed in England without his concurrence, Cornwallis found it absolutely necessary to retain the English regiments, which had volunteered in June for six months’ service in Ireland, until the close of the session of Parliament opening in January, 1799. Here again Lord Buckingham was a sharp thorn in his side. Several of those regiments, on being sounded, declined to remain beyond the term originally fixed; and further inquiry convinced the Lord Lieutenant that their discontent had originated with the Colonel of the Royal Bucks.<sup>2</sup> Lord Buckingham also, on being officially interrogated by Lord Castlereagh as to the disposition of his men, replied that the question should be addressed to him by the British not the Irish Government; and he wrote in similar terms to Mr. Dundas. Cornwallis reported the circumstance to the Duke of Portland, declining further communication with a commanding officer who disowned his authority; and Dundas wrote on the subject to Grenville, “I can see nothing likely to arise but infinite mischief.”<sup>3</sup> When at length Lord Buckingham, probably under instructions from Dundas, reported to the Lord Lieutenant that his regiment wished to return to England, he, as he wrote to Lord Grenville on December 11, “received an official copy of a letter written by the Adjutant General . . . charging me in most distinct terms with disobedience of orders, and with having ‘occasioned this disease’ among my men. . . . I have, as you will believe, written to Lord Cornwallis in the style that becomes me.” It may safely be inferred from the rest of this

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<sup>1</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, January 19, 1799.

<sup>2</sup> *Cornwallis Correspondence*.

<sup>3</sup> Grenville to Dundas, December 4, 1798. Dundas to Grenville, December 5, 1798.

letter to his brother that the Marquis's epistle to the Lord Lieutenant was characteristic rather than edifying. On the following day he informed Grenville that he had closed his correspondence with the Viceroy "with the insolent submissiveness in language of the very strongest sort that I could put together." Lord Grenville who, earlier in the year, had remonstrated strongly with Lord Buckingham for opposing, as a Colonel of Militia, military arrangements made by the Duke of York,<sup>1</sup> does not appear to have expressed disapproval of insubordination, so much more flagrant and dangerous, to the authority of Lord Cornwallis.

At the end of December Lord Castlereagh, who had been summoned to London to confer with Lord Grenville, returned to Dublin with the Bill of Union which he was to lay before the Irish Parliament at its meeting in January. He announced that the removal of Catholic disabilities was not to be considered in connexion with the measure. Lord Buckingham warned his brother that if Government persisted in this resolution, in the vain hope of conciliating the Orange Societies, the Bill would not pass.<sup>2</sup> Castlereagh spoke confidently of carrying it through the House of Commons by 140 votes to 80. But his Under Secretary Cooke, whose long experience made him a much safer guide in the crooked ways of Irish politics, in a *most secret* letter to Grenville, dated January 15, made success depend on their securing the doubtful support of three great borough proprietors. "My particular reason for writing to your Lordship," he continued, "is that I conceive the question will be decided by the Catholics." Lord Shannon and many others, he said, who had been hostile to their claims hitherto, would concede them under the altered conditions of Legislative Union. "If it were possible," the letter concluded, "that the Catholics should be admitted to equality on a peace, provided they acted heartily in this question, and through the war, it might be of great use." To this appeal Lord Grenville seems to have made no reply. There were difficulties in England of which the Irish Government knew nothing. As January 22, the day fixed for the meeting of Parliament drew near, the tide of national opposition

<sup>1</sup> Grenville to Buckingham, April, and May 1, 1798, *Court and Cabinets of George III.*

<sup>2</sup> Buckingham to Grenville, January 2 and 14, 1799.

rose stronger and higher against the Bill. The dismissal of Sir John Parnell and other high officials quelled a revolt of placemen in the House of Commons. But Lord Castlereagh's "cold shoulder" effectually repelled Catholic support; and certain borough-mongers seized the opportunity of extorting by a display of power better terms for themselves than Pitt was disposed to grant. On January 23, after one of the longest and most passionate debates on record, Castlereagh, to his great mortification, carried an almost colourless address in favour of Union by a single vote. At the next stage of proceedings, he suffered a defeat which decided the fate of the Bill for that session. Two imperfect reports of the debate, written for Grenville by Lords Carysfort and Buckingham on January 23, are published in this volume; the former a sober review of the political situation, the latter an indictment of the Lord Lieutenant. Cornwallis's own explanation of the failure was that the Bill had been opposed by private interests, and not supported by the public. And this view is in some measure confirmed by Lord Carysfort's statement, in a letter dated February 5, that several borough-owners had combined for the protection of their interests, which accounted for the defection of some of the members on whose votes Lord Castlereagh had confidently reckoned. Pitt's great speech at the end of January in the British House of Commons, on the subject of Legislative Union, announced the resolution of the Ministry to persevere with their measure in Ireland. There are, however, indications in Lord Grenville's correspondence that although the check Ministers had met with did not divert them from a cherished purpose, it taught them the necessity of enlarging their methods. On February 7, Pitt wrote to Grenville, "I will write to him (the King) to remonstrate a little against the notion which he seems forming every day, more and more, of excluding the Catholics in case of an Union." Already on January 28, Lord Carysfort had intimated to Grenville that the only sure way of passing an Act of Union through the Irish Parliament was to compensate owners of the boroughs which the measure would disfranchise. In March, Lord Castlereagh found occasion in an outbreak of lawlessness, originating chiefly as would appear in social causes, to pass most drastic Coercion Acts, indemnifying magistrates and others for recent abuses of authority which the Civil Courts

condemned; and enabling the Lord Lieutenant, by his mere proclamation, to place the kingdom, or any part of it, under martial law. These three circumstances suggest the lines which Government now intended to adopt for the accomplishing of its great object.

The defeat of the Irish Government, which he attributed solely to official mismanagement, furnished Lord Buckingham with new arguments for the recall of Lord Cornwallis. As they did not prevail, he turned his attention to the arrangements involved in the removal of his own and other militia regiments to England at the beginning of April. By these he found himself exposed to a fresh "outrage," which filled the cup of his sorrows to overflowing. The offender was the Duke of York. And the offence is set forth with all its aggravating circumstances, in three letters to Lord Grenville dated March 11, 13, and 23. Having, for some reasons not stated, laid his plans to pass the summer months of 1799 at Gosfield in Essex, a country house inherited by his wife from Lord Nugent, he "entreated" the Commander-in-Chief to send the Bucks militia to Chelmsford barracks, "stating expressly the personal convenience which I propose to myself from this arrangement." Lord Euston, commanding the Essex militia, and crossing over from Ireland at the same time, also applied to the Duke to allow his regiment to return to its native county. This request finding more favour at the Horse Guards, Ashford barracks were assigned to the Royal Bucks. Lord Buckingham protested to his brother against a decision breaking in "so essentially and so unhandsomely on my individual and private comfort" as "very wanton oppression;" and Dundas, apparently the most good-natured of Ministers, at Grenville's request, used his influence at the Horse Guards to have it revoked. He seems to have found it a matter not easy to accomplish. On March 23, Lord Buckingham wrote "I shall wait most impatiently for the return of the post that shall untie my tongue, and enable me to explain to my officers how my wishes and theirs have been received by H.R.H., in return for my having led the way on this *most thankless* duty, which every hour makes me regret the having undertaken." This was the last letter of the Marquis from Ireland to Lord Grenville.



The other papers comprised in this Volume which claim particular attention are :—

- (1) Reports, dated March, 1798, by M. Bornes, a member of the Council of Five Hundred, of conversations in Switzerland with General Carnot, after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor in France.
  - (2) A letter from Mr. Dundas to Lord Grenville, dated July 21, 1798, relating to the establishment of a military college for the education of British officers under the superintendence of General de Jarry, a distinguished French strategist, of whose services mention is made in the Introduction to Volume III.
  - (3) Letters from Lord Mornington, dated November 18, 1798, and February 21, 1799, discoursing familiarly to Grenville of his conduct and policy during the first year of his term of office as Viceroy of India.
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This Report has been prepared by Mr. Walter Fitzpatrick, who has also written the introduction and compiled the index.

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THE MANUSCRIPTS OF  
J. B. FORTESCUE, ESQUIRE,  
PRESERVED AT DROPMORE.

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VOL. IV.

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CAPTAIN SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1792, June 21. Walmer House, Deal.—“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, together with my instructions transmitted to me by Mr. Burges, which I shall return as directed before I leave England.

“I beg leave also to make my acknowledgments for the liberal manner in which your Lordship has considered my request for a change in the mode of my receiving the further supply of money, and to express myself satisfied with the propriety of your Lordship’s decision, and, in short, with the arrangement as it now stands. I have no doubt but that the addition your Lordship has been so good as to make to the sum will be adequate to the attainment of the objects at present before me; it shall be my constant care and study to make it hold out, and I hope I need not add my assurances that it shall be faithfully applied to the purposes for which it is destined. I wish clearly to be understood not to look to any surplus or balance left in my hands as repayment to me for my personal services in this business. Nothing of that kind can bear any proportion to the certain labour and probable risk before me, which cannot be estimated arithmetically, or compared with any sum whatever. Your Lordship’s approbation, which I hope to obtain as it shall be my study to deserve it, will go farther towards balancing that account than any sum that could be named; and I cannot but feel the more secure of it, as my communications are allowed to be direct with yourself, and as I am rendered less dependent on the assistance, and less subject to the interference, of any other person. I should be sorry my tenacity on that subject should bear the imputation of caprice or an ungenerous want of confidence. I must therefore say plainly that the cause of it was not only my general experience in parallel cases, but my absolute knowledge of a jealousy existing, and of its operation and effect, by cramping the means of obtaining information, and suppressing or misrepresenting communications in a case exactly similar

to mine. Your Lordship will easily perceive what I allude to, even if you do not already know it in the full extent which I mean it. Common prudence dictated that I should go over the whole of my ground in idea before I stirred a step, and that I should examine the characters of those with whom I am to have dealings; this is the result of my enquiries, and I am induced to give it your Lordship thus early in order to secure myself against the effects of this same jealousy by awakening your attention to its existence. I have only further to assure your Lordship that I shall pay strict attention to the purport of your letter, and my general instructions, governing myself in all cases not specified by what I shall judge to be conformable to your Lordship's wishes and intentions, and by the dictates of that gratitude I cannot but feel for the confidence that is placed in me."

CAPTAIN SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and Secret.*

1795, January 13. *Diamond*, off Brest.—"The subject of Turkey will of course plead my excuse for troubling you, it being my duty to communicate any information I obtain from that quarter. My late letters from Constantinople contain some which I think your Lordship ought to be acquainted with. I have thought it indelicate to anticipate the correspondence of my friend Mr. Liston on the current events of that country, but in this case what I have to tell you cannot come through a regular channel, and it is of such moment that I think you ought not to be ignorant of it, nor would it be right for me to act in it without your knowledge, considering some collateral circumstances which raise a question on the propriety and policy of it, which you alone can decide for me. Sultan Selim, whose characteristic is timidity, and whose most energetic measures are dictated by his apprehensions, being convinced that nothing can secure his throne on the European side of the Bosphorous but the adoption of the same military system which has been so successfully employed against him by his dreaded rival Russia, has turned his thoughts seriously to the new modelling his army and navy; their arms, discipline, are to be European, but every step he takes in this reform shows him he cannot proceed without European instructors in the several branches.

"Having been consulted on these points during my stay at Constantinople, I, of course, did all in my power to influence principals rather to look to the English for these sort of improvements than any other nation, conceiving that we might be benefited thereby in a commercial point of view by our exports, and politically by not allowing any other nation to acquire that sort of influence in their councils which must follow from its subjects being placed at the heads of the several military departments.

"The French aimed at this influence, and as we did not step forward in competition, they obtained some advantages. I

endeavoured to undermine them as long as I stayed there, for which I became so obnoxious to the Jacobins as to be put on their proscribed list and was very near having my throat cut at Smyrna accordingly. It seems, however, that the Sultan's eyes begin to be opened as to the impolicy of nourishing such a nest of vipers as the Jacobins in the bosom of his capital, and has rather taken the alarm at the progress of their system so near his palace gates ; he is afraid to look to Russia for protection, but I am sure he does to England in his own individual sentiments. He is, however, surrounded by those whom the crown jewels and Versailles furniture sent by the Convention have bribed to their service if not to their system.

"The Sultan is chiefly occupied by his fears of Russia, and feels most sensibly his inability to answer the threats which occasionally come from that quarter, impeding him in his projects of finance, and the internal regulations of the bordering provinces. He feels himself unarmed till his forces are organised and equipped in the European mode. Beginning himself to despise those unwieldy cannon which have hitherto encumbered his armies, he secretly writes, through an agent whom he has supplied with the necessary sum, for me to send him a bombardier, a cannon-founder, and a tactician. The question is, then, is it politic to send him these three people (who, by the bye, cannot do much to reorganise that empire in their lifetime). The reasoning on it is, simply, if he does not get them from England (being determined to have them) he will obtain them elsewhere ; and it might be as well to have three persons in those situations, on whom we have a hold, as three from the enemy, who are now labouring with astonishing indefatigability to obtain an exclusive influence in that quarter ; and which may become sufficient to produce an inundation of barbarians from the south, while those of France do their part to destroy civilized Europe in the north.

"I ground my alarm on this subject as well on what I was witness to on the spot as on the uniform tenor of the information I have received from thence since. I will transcribe a paragraph in the last letter I received from my brother Spencer, who is secretary to the ambassador. He begins thus : 'I feel that the increased malignity and activity of our enemies demand that one should not neglect the slightest chance of contributing to their discomfiture, by exertion and efforts however humble and obscure. The reverberative shock, or counterstroke from Bedlam broke loose, is more sensibly and seriously felt here every day (dated Constantinople, 10th November,) without any rational prospect of our present discouraging position being mended. The most urgent necessity exists for taking measures to support the national interests and dignity in this part of the world ; if something is not done, I am firmly persuaded that, independent of immediate loss and humiliation, you will feel the reaction of this same shock that you all seem to suppose is exhausting itself, and it will be felt where least expected, and of most importance. All that human prudence could devise, in the stage and condition in

which our interests were transferred to Mr. Liston, has been done, but every day offers fresh instances of the impossibility of effecting anything here without support, to oppose the want of earnestness in the chiefs, and the marked disinclination among the subalterns of this government. Prevention may still be efficacious, when I fear that remedies cannot be found hereafter.'

"Now you will naturally ask me what harm can they do us. I answer, that if the French, by influence on the rabble, or by alliance with Turkey, usurp the empire of the Levant, the first inconvenience will be that a diversion will be made to draw off the attention and forces of our ally the Emperor. Secondly, our Turkey trade, already at its last effort, will be totally transferred to the hands of the French. A consequence of which will be, that they will be enabled to realize the project of diverting the India trade (so far as regards the south of Europe) into the old channel of the desert and the Red Sea, reducing ours to our own immediate consumption; for it must be recollected that many of those articles which are now imported by us from Bombay will not find their way thither to our hands when the straight way from the gulf of Persia to the Marseilles market is again opened. It was not the *greatest facility* of the conveyance by the Cape of Good Hope which turned the commerce originally to that circuitous route, for it required the *force* of the Portuguese, successfully employed by Albuquerque, to destroy the coasting trade then carried on by the Arabian Moors; nothing but the want of policy in the Turks, and the unsettled state of the government in Egypt has prevented this trade from naturally reverting into the old channel, the practicability of which is proved by the very considerable imports of Turkey for its own consumption.

"The French have long had their eye on Egypt; its military force consisting entirely of cavalry without artillery, and this divided into two distinct and opposite bodies, leaves the country an easy prey to any European invasion. Indeed such is the nature of the contest between the rival Beys, that a European nation siding with the fugitive party (whichever it may happen to be at the time) can replace them in the seat of government at Cairo, and maintain them there in its interest, so long as it finds it convenient, to the exclusion of all others. The French know the state of Egypt well, having the most flourishing factory there, and are likely to profit by this knowledge if we allow them to realize their projects in Turkey.

"Having now, as I hope, awakened your attention to the possibility of such an evil happening to us, it may be as well to see if we cannot avert it.

"The Turkish government, ignorant, indolent, interested and apprehensive as they are, must be under the influence of some European nation; neighbours being rivals are out of the question; they therefore naturally fall under that of France unless we think it worth while to exert ours, which is far from inconsiderable, though much impaired by our not having kept the command of the Archipelago. A French squadron has

ridden, and now rides, master of that sea, to the great prejudice of our trade and our political consequence in the eyes of the Turks. The first step of the new vizier is to talk very high language about the violation of the Turkish neutrality in the capture of the *Sibylle* at Miconi; the best way of silencing him (in my opinion) would be to send a proper squadron to take all the rest of the French frigates in the Archipelago, *wherever they might be*; and if after this the French intrigues should produce any more manifestoes from the Porte in a style our ambassador ought to resent, the presence of that same English squadron under the mouldering walls of the Seraglio would ensure the dismissal of the vizier, prevent an actual *treaty of alliance* with France, and obtain the thanks of Sultan Selim for having relieved him from the impulse of a faction which he well knows will otherwise depose him.

"If things should take a turn to make an appearance of hostility necessary, I am sufficiently well acquainted with all the vulnerable parts of the empire (having been consulted as to their defence) to know how to place a force in such a situation as to ensure that supplications should come without the necessity of burning a grain of powder; a menacing position being quite sufficient to convince the fears of the multitude, if reasoning should fail of reaching their understandings.

"Whenever your Lordship may call on me for this service I am ready; the only obstacles are the famed castles of the Dardanelles, whose fire I consider so little formidable that I assure you it would not even be necessary to return it. It is to be remembered, however, that, if a measure of this kind is intended, it must be done in the spring, when the wind is south-west, or else the summer north-east wind will come on and render the forcing the passage impracticable. The question of the force necessary for such an expedition can be examined at a proper time. I consider it as premature to open the subject to my friend Lord Spencer, with whom I am in correspondence, conceiving it should more properly come from your Lordship. Suffice it to say, I despise eight sail of nominal line-of-battle ships, two of which only are at all arranged; and I have no reason in my intercourse with that false creature the Capitan Pasha to respect his nautic abilities. A very small force would convince him and the Turkish government that France was not mistress of the Mediterranean; and that *they* were supreme in *their* part only so long as we chose they should be so. Our strength in the Mediterranean has hitherto been otherwise employed, but a detachment would be sufficient, if applied in the way which the local pilotage of those seas admits."

H. A. DE ZINCKEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1795, December 24. Manheim.—"Je ne me suis pas cru justifié en dernier lieu d'importuner votre Excellence avec les rapports de ce qui s'est passé aux armées, convaincu comme je l'étais qu'elle en recevait tous les détails par d'autres mains, et

je me suis borné à réunir à la même source tous les objets qui ont pu venir à ma connaissance particulière. N'ayant pas reçu vos commandements à cet égard, j'ai dû espérer que cette conduite, ainsi que les raisons qui m'y ont déterminé, avoient obtenu l'approbation de votre Excellence. Cependant à mesure que l'époque qui doit par un développement d'opérations vigoureuses amener la crise par laquelle la tranquillité sera rendue à l'Europe, et son sort assuré contre les maux d'un bouleversement général dont elle était menacée, je sens qu'il est de mon devoir indispensable de présenter à votre Excellence, dans une lettre toute particulière, quelques observations sur les moyens de rendre l'ouverture de la campagne aussi propice que décisive : elles portent sur le commandement et l'approvisionnement des armées Impériales et Royales. L'on n'a pas cessé depuis le commencement de la guerre de se récrier sur la nécessité d'établir une parfaite unité dans les plans des campagnes, et l'accord entre les généraux qui devoient concourir à leur exécution, et ce fut avec raison que tous les malheurs arrivés ont été attribués au défaut d'harmonie dans l'une et l'autre partie. Le remède à cet inconvénient était, ou le choix d'un chef éminent et expérimenté auquel la conduite de toute la guerre dans cette partie seroit soumise, ou l'établissement d'un comité suprême dont dépendroient tous les généraux. La rivalité des puissances du continent, la différence de leurs vues, et un nombre d'autres obstacles n'ont pas permis d'atteindre ce but salulaire, mais il paroît qu'actuellement tous ces obstacles sont levés depuis que les armées sont uniquement subordonnées à sa Majesté Impériale, soit comme chef de l'Empire, soit comme souverain héréditaire ; cependant le même mal existe et acquiert chaque jour un degré plus allarmant. Votre excellence a été informée en son tems combien M. le Maréchal de Clerfayt fut blessé de la nomination du Général Wurmser ; et de la préférence qui lui a été accordée en le destinant à la guerre offensive. Les circonstances qui offrirent depuis au Maréchal l'occasion de tous les succès qu'il a obtenu avec autant de bonheur que de gloire, ont à leur tour excité les passions du Comte de Wurmser. L'animosité est arrivée à son comble, et la jalousie s'est communiquée aux officiers et même aux troupes des deux armées. Il en résulte déjà, et il résultera avec bien plus danger, que les chefs, au lieu de se soutenir et de se secourir, se traverseront et s'empêcheront par inimitié personnelle, autant que les généraux Prussiens l'ont fait, naguères, par inimitié politique.

“ Dès la prise de Manheim le Maréchal a insisté sur les opérations vers la Moselle ; M. de Wurmser sur celles vers l'Alsace ; il en arrive que ni l'un ni l'autre n'ont pu obtenir de grands succès ; les armées seront harrassées et fatiguées à pure perte, et l'on sera peut-être contraint de consentir à un armistice pour leur procurer quelque relâche. A l'ouverture de la campagne cette divergence sera plus sensible. Le général Wurmser ne détourne pas les regards de l'Alsace, et ne fera rien en faveur des opérations vers le bas-Rhin. Il est probable que chacun agira de son côté, et qu'un grand intervalle de terrain offrira à l'ennemi



le moyen de faire une de ces diversions dont la fatale experience a déjà été éprouvée. Après avoir été assez osé pour présenter à votre Excellence ces vérités, je n'hésiterai pas de lui communiquer avec la même liberté mes notions sur les généraux eux-mêmes. M. le Maréchal est certainement irrésolu, indécis, effrayé de la responsabilité à un point qui ne sauroit se concilier avec un grand commandement. Les plus belles occasions lui échappent des mains, et s'il y a beaucoup fait, il n'en sera pas moins aisé à un spectateur de prouver qu'il auroit pu faire infiniment davantage, et peut-être décider le sort de la guerre. Le général Wurmser possède toujours l'entreprise et la hardiesse, mais ses facultés intellectuelles sont tellement affaiblies par la vieillesse que son état approche d'une incapacité totale. L'on a sans doute cru obvier à cet inconvénient en lui donnant le Comte de Bellegarde muni de la confiance de la cour, mais ce remède est devenu pire que le mal, puisque la jalousie des autres officiers donne toute espèce de jeu à l'intrigue. Feu le roi de Prusse, convaincu qu'il était d'un bon gouvernement de s'astreindre dans le choix des généraux à l'ancienneté et quelques fois à la haute naissance, se servoit souvent du moyen de supplier à leurs talents par ceux d'un officier inférieur, mais il savoit si sévèrement leur imposer la plus parfaite docilité, que ses armées ont souvent obtenu les plus brillants succès de cette manière. Je ne me dissimule pas l'impossibilité de devancer par ces observations la pénétration de votre Excellence. Mon unique but est de prouver l'urgence et la nécessité d'un prompt remède avant la fin de l'hiver. Il n'est pas moins essentiel que le vice qui régné dans le payement et l'approvisionnement de l'armée soit promptement corrigé. Votre Excellence se rappelle que l'incompréhensible inactivité pendant l'été passé qui a perdu Luxembourg, qui auroit presque perdu Mayence, qui enleva à la cour de Vienne toute son influence dans l'Empire, en abandonnant les états aux intrigues de la Prusse et de l'ennemi, fut attribuée par les généraux au défaut d'argent, de vivres, et même de vêtements. Le désordre régné encore de la manière la plus alarmante, et au moment où j'ai l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence, l'armée subsiste au jour la journée, et, pour ainsi dire, de réquisitions, ce qui aliène extrêmement les gens du pays. L'on pourroit même dire que sans le prétexte sur lequel le Palatinat est traité en pays conquis, elle ne subsisterait pas du tout. Les généraux ont été souvent obligés de commettre leur crédit personnel pour payer la solde des troupes. Le Commissariat fait les payements au moyen d'une usure qui coute 20 ou 25 pour cent. à la Cour. Les généraux affectent de dire que le désordre est causé par le retard des remises sur l'emprunt, et comme il est aisé de leur prouver la fausseté de cette assertion, ils déclarent qu'ils ignorent dans quel gouffre ces moyens sont engloutis. Le commissaire dirigeant est depuis deux mois à Vienne pour discuter les remèdes. Aucun magasin considérable n'est encore formé, et cet état de choses pénètre les personnes instruites des plus justes frayeurs à l'approche de la campagne. Je n'ai pas négligé de faire passer à Vienne par le moyen du Comte de

Lehrbach ces informations, et j'ai recueilli les espérances les plus fondées que l'on s'y occupe à remédier; cependant je juge que votre Excellence pourra efficacement contribuer à presser l'application des remèdes. La question si le chef de l'Empire a le droit de faire arrêter et juger les ministres coupables de la reddition de Manheim occupe toutes les plumes. Il est à croire que la déférence que la Cour de Munic continue d'avoir pour celle de Vienne, offrira des moyens de conciliation. Si ce fut la peur de l'ennemi qui opéra la défection des états de l'Empire dans les cercles antérieurs, c'est encore la même affection relativement aux armées victorieuses de l'Empereur qui les a fait revenir; mais il seroit à souhaiter que des ministres habiles profitassent sur les lieux de la circonstance, pour ajouter à ce motif chancelant, le motif plus solide de la conviction et de l'inclination. Le Duc de Deux Ponts est le seul Prince dont l'animosité contre la Cour de Vienne ne peut être pliée. L'on continue de le travailler depuis Berlin, et il est convaincu que la Bavière est toujours, en dernière analyse, l'objet qui fait agir la Cour de Vienne. Il se méfie de son oncle, en lui attribuant des négociations secrètes, et je ne crois pas qu'une entrevue qu'il vient d'avoir à Stouccard avec le ministre Hardenberg, ait diminué ces impressions. Il est très contraire à un traité de subside, dont il m'a dit que le projet existoit; et ce serait un incident fâcheux si l'Electeur, qui a toujours des habitudes apoplectiques, venait à manquer dans la circonstance actuelle."

LORD GRENVILLE to M. DE LUC.

1797, November 10. London.

*Mémoire for the Duke of Brunswick.*

"La personne qui aura l'honneur de remettre ce mémoire à s'altresse sérénissime Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick, est chargé de lui communiquer, dans la confiance la plus illimitée, les idées du gouvernement Britannique sur les mesures à adopter dans le moment actuel, pour parer à tous les dangers dont l'Europe est plus que jamais menacée par les progrès de la Révolution Française. La manière dont s'a[ltresse] s[érénissime] s'est expliquée envers cette personne ne laisse aucun lieu de douter qu'elle ne soit pénétrée de toute l'étendue de ce danger; et on se persuade qu'elle ne refusera pas de coopérer aux seuls moyens qui donnent quelque espérance de pouvoir encore l'arrêter.

"Ces moyens ne peuvent se trouver que dans l'union des grandes puissances. La probabilité d'un nouveau règne en Prusse présente à cet égard un espoir que l'expérience du passé ne permettroit point d'entretenir, tant que le Cabinet de Berlin seroit composé comme il l'est actuellement.

"Les lumières, les talens, le caractère et les relations en tout genre de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick lui donneroient des moyens que nulle autre personne ne pourroit avoir pour faire

sentir au nouveau roi de Prusse toute l'étendue du danger qui le menace, et pour lui indiquer la seule marche convenable, celle dont seule il pourroit espérer sa sûreté même présente.

“Ce ne peut être qu'en fondant son gouvernement sur les principes de moralité et de justice, si longtems méconnus à Berlin, et en renonçant absolument et pour toujours aux idées de chercher à s'aggrandir, en contribuant aux progrès d'un danger qui le menace déjà de si près, et de tous les cotés. En prenant pour base de son système politique l'intégrité constitutionnelle et territoriale de l'Empire, et la conservation de l'état actuel des possessions respectives, on ne doute nullement qu'il ne lui seroit facile d'y faire entrer, pleinement et sans reserve, l'Empereur de Russie, qui déjà, depuis quelques semaines, s'est prononcé fortement, par son ministre à Berlin, en faveur de ces principes, et qui a conçu des vives alarmes sur le progrès d'un mal qui, gagnant de près en près, ne seroit pas longtems à l'atteindre dans ses nouvelles possessions Polonoises, et delà dans les anciennes provinces de son empire. Présenté à la cour de Vienne par l'Angleterre, la Russie, et la Prusse, ce système y sera très probablement adopté avec reconnaissance et empressement, comme offrant la meilleure garantie de ses possessions actuelles. Et il est même évident que l'Autriche n'auroit aucun moyen de s'y opposer, à moins de se jeter dans les bras du gouvernement Jacobin en France; résolution bien difficile à exécuter tant qu'il restera tant de sujets de jalousie et de haine en Italie, en Allemagne, sur les confins du Tyrol, et partout où les possessions Autrichiennes se trouvent en point de contact avec la République Française, et ses alliés. Pour la sûreté permanente de l'empire, et surtout des provinces Prussiennes, il est sans doute absolument nécessaire de mettre les provinces Hollandoises hors de leur dépendance et asservissement actuel aux volontés de la France. Mais ce point, tout important qu'il est, et digne de toute l'attention d'un roi de Prusse, pourroit ne pas également intéresser les autres puissances Continentales; et l'on devroit peut-être l'écarter pour le moment d'un concert général, dont l'établissement et le succès amèneraient nécessairement et en tout cas des mesures tendantes à ce but particulier. Mais il seroit de la dernière conséquence de ne pas perdre un instant pour donner au nouveau roi de Prusse des sentimens justes à cet égard; et pour lui montrer par combien de liens cette affaire tient à ses intérêts les plus immédiats, et à la sûreté permanente de ses états. C'est des premières impressions que ce prince recevra en montant au trône que tout dépendra. On l'a déjà dit, personne ne peut lui donner ces impressions si ce n'est le Duc de Brunswick. Il ne refusera donc sûrement pas d'y mettre un zèle et un intérêt proportionnés à l'importance de l'objet. Les momens seront précieux. En se trouvant sur les lieux, il seroit en mesure d'écarter bien de faux conseils, de rompre bien d'intrigues. Là il jugeroit lui-même mieux des démarches qu'il pourroit et devoit faire à cet effet; mais le point principal seroit de saisir les premiers momens et d'en profiter, pour écarter les fauteurs du système jacobin qui domine aujourd'hui à Berlin.

“S’il y avoit quelque apparence de succès, il seroit facile que le nouveau Roi de Prusse envoyât ici, pour le compliment de notification, une personne de confiance auquel on pourroit s’ouvrir ; celui qui est ici n’étant nullement propre à suivre une pareille discussion. Mais il seroit extrêmement intéressant de recevoir de la part du Duc de Brunswick toutes les informations qui seroient nécessaires, avant que l’on puisse juger à quel point on pourroit s’ouvrir avec la personne chargée d’une pareille commission.”

#### M. DE LUC to GEORGE III.

1797, November 21. Brunswick.—“Votre Majesté ayant eu pour moi la grande bonté de me permettre de lui adresser directement mes premières observations ici, je ne dois pas tarder à le faire.

“Malgré la précaution que j’avois prise d’annoncer ici ma venue, j’y suis arrivé inattendu ; parceque la malle qui portoit ma lettre n’a passé la mer qu’en même temps que moi, et que m’étant déterminé à profiter du vent favorable pour remonter l’Elbe jusqu’ à Hambourg, pendant la nuit du jour de mon arrivée à Cuxhaven, je suis arrivé ici le 19, avant les lettres, qui avoient passé la mer avec moi. Mais la mort du Roi de Prusse avoit déjà précédé de trois jours, et le Duc n’avoit rien fait encore, persistant, malgré les instances de M. de Stamford, à ne se plus mêler des affaires ; parce, disoit-il, que rien ne l’y autorisoit. Malheureusement M. de Stamford étoit, et est encore malade ; ce qui seul l’auroit retenu ici ; mais il en auroit eu une autre raison que votre Majesté verra dans le cours du récit que je vais avoir l’honneur de lui faire.

“Je ne tardai pas un moment à me faire annoncer à Monseigneur le Duc, qui, témoignant sa surprise de mon arrivée, ne laissa pas de me faire dire qu’il m’attendroit avec impatience le lendemain matin. J’avois déjà instruit M. de Stamford du titre que je prendrois en public, et de son but, par l’honneur que m’avoit fait votre Majesté de me conférer dans cette vue, et j’avois prié M. de Stamford de le communiquer au Duc, pour prévenir sa crainte. Ce fut là aussi le premier objet de notre entretien, et quand je lui eus expliqué tout mon plan, je vis que cela le mettoit fort à l’aise.

“La conversation ayant alors commencé sur l’objet de la mission dont votre Majesté a daigné m’honorer, je tâchai, en entrant tout de suite en matière, et ne laissant aucun intervalle entre la lecture qu’il fit de la lettre de votre Majesté et la continuation de mon exposition, de prévenir une première réponse, dans les dispositions que je lui connoissois ; afin d’avoir le temps d’accumuler un nombre de choses qui prévinsent une décision trop prompte. Par là, en effet, j’eus au moins cette première lueur d’espérance, qu’il témoigna la plus grande satisfaction de tout ce que j’avois eu l’honneur de lui dire de la part de votre Majesté et de ses ministres, et qu’il m’assura de son concours dans toute l’étendue de son pouvoir. Mais ce pouvoir que

sera-t-il ? C'est ce dont votre Majesté jugera elle-même, par la suite des choses que je vais avoir l'honneur de lui exposer.

“En général, je vis s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] vraiment touchée de la confiance de votre Majesté, et il est impossible de douter de sa sincérité dans le désir de voir réussir le plan qu'elle et ses ministres proposent. Mais sa timidité va au-delà de tout ce qu'on pourroit imaginer dans un personnage de son rang, de ses talens, et de son courage personnel à la tête d'une armée. Il a la modestie de dire qu'il n'est propre, en aucune manière, aux démarches politiques. Il craint d'y trouver des oppositions dont il n'ait pas l'habilité de se tirer ; parceque tout entier à l'étude des affaires militaires, il ne connoit point la tactique de celle des cabinets ; il auroit voulu que M. de Stamford allât à Berlin, mais il redoutoit de l'autoriser à parler en son nom, et Monsieur de Stamford insistoit toujours sur ce que, sans son concours, personne ne pourroit prévenir ce qui, en effet, est arrivé, que les ministres du Roi mourant cherchoient à se rendre nécessaire à son successeur.

“Le Duc prévoyoit déjà que ce mal étoit très avancé, et pour le porter à en prévenir les suites, il falloit opposer crainte à crainte ; de sorte que je tâchai d'abord de lui faire entrevoir qu'être accusé de foiblesse étoit pire que de l'être d'avoir fait une entreprise sans succès ; ce qui je crois fit d'abord quelque impression sur lui, parceque, dès à présent, votre Majesté sera toujours présente à sa pensée ; et qu'elle lui a fourni tout ce qui pouvoit venir de sa part pour l'engager à agir.

“C'est à ce sentiment, sans doute, qu'est due la communication que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me fit l'honneur de me faire de quelques notes qu'il avoit prises de ce que le présent Roi lui avoit dit dans leurs entretiens, à son retour de Pymont ; où se trouvoit surtout cette circonstance bien remarquable. ‘Ne croyez-vous pas (dit-il au Duc) qu'il faudroit se porter en force du côté du Weser, pour se garantir de quelque mauvais dessein de ce Directoire ?’ Le Duc marquant son approbation de cette idée, le Prince-royal ajouta : ‘mais l'Angleterre ne se laisse point pénétrer ; on ne sait sur quoi compter de ce côté-la.’ Le Duc se tut à cet égard, ne sachant, me dit-il, que répondre ; mais ce fut le principal motif des entretiens qu'il désira d'avoir avec moi, dans lesquels, pourtant, il ne parla point de cette circonstance. Il me semble donc que voilà un changement qui marque celui de ses idées, et je le crois très sincère dans ce qu'il dit qu'il fera tout ce qu'il pourra ; mais il falloit lui montrer la nécessité d'agir avec force.

“Dans ce but il falloit porter ses craintes plus loin qu'il ne me paroissoit les avoir, quoique, dans la lettre qu'il m'avoit fait l'honneur de m'écrire à Londres, il se montrât en général instruit des dangers qui menaçoient toute l'Europe ; mais il lui échappoit des circonstances caractéristiques d'un danger prochain et toujours croissant, qu'il ne lioit point assez les unes aux autres et à un tout, malgré les représentations de M. de Stamford qu'il étoit disposé à croire exagérées, à cause de bien des gens qui, soit manque d'attention soit à dessein, prétendent toujours qu'on se fait des

craintes chimériques, que les peuples de ces contrées sont encore étrangers à toute idée de révolution. Mais je lui ai cité tant de faits, et des liaisons si claires entre ces faits et un plan général, que je l'ai persuadé enfin du danger éminent de l'inaction dans tous ceux qui devroient agir.

“Entre les faits nombreux qui m'étoient déjà connus, et que j'ai encore appris depuis que je suis de retour en Allemagne, je n'en citerai qu'un à votre Majesté, qui en sentira mieux toute la grandeur que le Duc ne l'avoit sentie, quoiqu'il lui fût connu ; ce fait regarde la décadence de la religion, dont s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'avoit déjà parlé avec beaucoup de peine dans mon autre voyage, mais sans y entrevoir de remède, ni sentir aussi profondément qu'il auroit été nécessaire la liaison des conjurations contre le Christianisme et contre les gouvernemens. Dans son Académie même où s'élève une nombreuse jeunesse, le professeur en histoire, ouvrant son cours pour cette année par l'histoire générale, dit à ses élèves ; ‘Il est d'usage de commencer ce cours par la *fable* de Moÿse ; mais comme aujourd'hui *personne n'y croit plus*, je me bornerai à vous en donner une idée en abrégé.’ Rappellant entr'autres cette circonstance au Duc, et lui faisant voir comment elle se lioit avec le plan d'une entière subversion de l'ordre civil, qui n'a d'autre base dans les coeurs que la Révélation, il me demanda comment donc on pourroit remédier à cette source de mal public. Ce sera, Monseigneur, lui répondis-je, quand les souverains imiteront le Roi d'Angleterre, vrai *Defenseur de la Foi*, en encourageant, soutenant, aidant ceux qui ont le dessein et les talens nécessaires pour résister au torrent, en montrant l'ignorance de ceux qui prétendent éclairer les hommes. Ce qui me conduisit à lui expliquer mon but, et en particulier contre les hommes audacieux semblables au professeur d'histoire dans son Académie. Alors il attachait plus de prix à mon but ostensible dans ces contrées, et me témoigna l'obligation qu'il m'auroit en particulier de le montrer bien ouvertement à Brunswick ; ce que j'ai déjà fait.

“Il s'agissoit enfin de conclure quelque chose dans ce premier entretien, et la première idée qui vint au Duc, fondée sur la persuasion que je pouvois me présenter partout comme acteur dans une cause qui ne pourroit qu'intéresser les honnêtes gens, et les savans restés fidèles à la révélation, fut que j'allasse à ce titre à Berlin ; persuadé qu'ayant l'honneur d'appartenir à l'auguste tante de la présente reine, qui possède toute la tendresse et la confiance du roi, je pourrais avoir avec sa Majesté des entretiens privés, dans lesquels il ne doutoit pas que je ne produisisse plus d'effet que dans toute démarche ouvertement politique. Mais je lui représentai très fortement que c'étoit-là un moyen incertain et beaucoup trop foible ; et que nul homme ne pouvoit espérer une pareille influence que lui-même, attaché depuis si longtemps à la maison de Brandebourg sous des relations d'intérêt commun.

“Alors il ajouta à son premier plan, qu'il m'autoriseroit à parler en son nom. Je resistai encore, mais d'une manière

moins décidée, parceque M. de Stamford m'avoit recommandé de lui laisser former tout plan où il interviendrait en quelque chose ; dans l'espérance de l'amener par là à agir plus directement.

“ Laissant donc entrevoir à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] que, votre Majesté ayant en lui la plus grande confiance, je croyais pouvoir me conformer finalement à ce qu'il jugerait absolument nécessaire que je fisse, je le priai néanmoins de considérer que dans une telle crise à Berlin c'étoit encore un moyen trop foible, et que j'espérais qu'il en emploierât de plus efficaces. Alors il m'assura que, dès ce moment, il n'auroit rien de caché pour votre Majesté ; qu'il me communiqueroit pour elle tous les avis qu'il recevrait de Berlin, et toutes les idées qu'ils pourroient lui faire naître sur la manière d'y opérer dans les vues de votre Majesté.

“ Dès le soir même s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] accomplit sa promesse, en m'envoyant, dans une lettre à Monsieur de Stamford, les informations et remarques dont j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici copie ; et il annonça même temps à Monsieur de Stamford, chez qui je suis logé, qu'il viendrait le voir ce matin. Il est venu en effet, et il a d'abord eu un entretien particulier avec M. de S[tamford] sur un objet dont il l'a laissé le maître de m'instruire, et qui je crois intéressera votre Majesté.

“ J'ai été porteur d'un paquet de Madame la Princesse d'Orange pour Madame la Princesse Héréditaire de Brunswick, dans lequel étoit une lettre pour Monseigneur le Duc, qu'il a communiquée à Monsieur de Stamford, avec le projet de sa réponse, pour lui en demander son avis. J'ai lu cette lettre ; elle étoit toute entière destinée à solliciter le Duc de se rapprocher du futur roi pour lui donner des conseils. Mais c'est peu que ce but en comparaison de l'exécution, qui m'a donné une haute idée de Madame la Princesse d'Orange, bien supérieure à l'impression que j'avois déjà reçue à cet égard dans les conversations que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec elle. Si je voyois dans la conversation que M. de S[tamford] n'auroit pas de repugnance à me donner copie de cette lettre, qui est encore dans ses mains, je croirois faire plaisir à votre Majesté en la lui envoyant, pour qu'elle connoisse d'autant mieux cette personne distinguée. A l'égard de la réponse du Duc, M. de Stamford m'a dit qu'elle étoit très bien, mais qu'elle ne laissoit rien entrevoir de ce qui nous occupe.

“ Après cette conversation je fus appelé ; et Monseigneur le Duc m'ayant dit en peu de mots quel en avoit été le sujet, il me fit l'honneur de m'apprendre que le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, arrivé ici pour accompagner le Prince Frédéric (qui dans une huitaine de jours partira pour l'Angleterre) lui avoit dit de la part du nouveau roi que, dans peu de jours, il le prieroit de venir à Berlin. Votre Majesté peut se représenter tout ce que Monsieur de Stamford et moi avons dit à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à cette occasion ; surtout M. de Stamford, qui est un des hommes les plus essentiels en tout ceci ; et il en est résulté que le Duc s'est déterminé à écrire un mémoire

renfermant toutes ses idées, dont il me fera l'honneur de me charger pour votre Majesté; mais qu'il souhaite auparavant de nous communiquer à Monsieur de Stamford et à moi, avec toute liberté de lui faire part de nos remarques avant qu'il le mette au net.

“Tel est, Sire, l'état actuel des choses. Votre Majesté peut bien être assurée qu'aussi loin que mes lumières et mes forces pourront me conduire, elles seront entièrement dévouées à ce grand but; heureux si mes efforts pouvoient répondre à la confiance dont votre Majesté a daigné m'honorer.”

*Enclosure.*

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO M. DE LUC.

“Voici le précis de mes lettres de Berlin. M. de Bischoffwerder a reçu le cordon de l'ordre de l'aigle noir. M. de Zaunzein est nommé pour se rendre à Londres, porter au roi la nouvelle du décès de Frédéric Guillaume second; c'est le beau-frère de M. de Haugwitz, et nullement l'homme avec lequel il seroit prudent de s'ouvrir confidentiellement; c'est une tête au vent, panier percé, et sans caractère. M. le Comte de Schulenburg Rehmer doit avoir été rappelé; on lui destine les finances, mais c'est un bruit vague. Une lettre officielle, signée par le roi, me répond à d'anciennes lettres que j'avois adressées au feu roi, dans le courant des dernières semaines. L'on me marque que le feu roi a marqué beaucoup de fermeté dans ses derniers momens. Je ne vous parle pas de l'arrestation de la Liechtenaw. M. d'Haugwitz et le Maréchal de Mollendorff sont nommés, dit-on, pour examiner les papiers de cette femme. Vous voudrez bien informer M. De Luc de ces détails, qui ne sont pas bien satisfaisans, mais qui ne doivent pas être ignorés.”

*Copy.*

M. DE LUC TO GEORGE III.

1797, November 24. Brunswick.—“Si dans les circonstances présentes où le changement de règne en Prusse bande les ressorts opposés pour influencer sur le nouveau roi, la confiance dont votre Majesté et ses ministres m'ont honoré peut faire quelque bien, je crois qu'il aura principalement sa source dans des informations que je prendrai tout le soin possible de rendre sûres. C'est pourquoi je vais continuer de rendre compte à votre Majesté de mes observations.

“Plus je suis instruit des détails de la conduite de M. le Général de Stamford, avant et depuis le commencement de cette guerre; plus j'étudie les moyens que ses dispositions naturelles, ses talens, et son expérience ont accumulés chez lui, l'usage qu'il en a toujours fait, et la nature des obstacles qu'il a rencontrés auprès du Duc, malgré la confiance entière et la vraie estime



qu'il lui accorde dès longtemps ; plus que je sens d'un côté, que sans lui je serois dans un vraie labyrinthe ; et en général, que son coup d'oeil est le plus sûr qu'on pût obtenir sur les points essentiels de l'état des choses ; ayant toujours eu quelque part aux affaires par cette confiance du Duc, mais sans cesse traversé par ceux qui les ont menées au point où elles sont, et dont les manoeuvres lui sont parfaitement connues. C'est donc d'après ses avis que je tâche de me conduire auprès du Duc, et que je cherche à bien connoître ce qu'on peut sûrement attendre de sa part.

“ Par là il ne me reste aucun doute que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ne voye la nécessité indispensable du plan proposé par votre Majesté ; qu'il ne soit convaincu que sans son succès tout l'édifice de la société s'écroulera ; qu'ainsi, il ne souhaite ardemment ce succès, et qu'il ne soit déterminé à agir de tout son pouvoir. Mais c'est ce pouvoir qu'il importe de bien connoître, non en le jugeant d'après ce qu'il pourroit réellement, mais en connoissant bien sa propre opinion de ce qu'il peut, afin de prendre des tournures qui s'y conforment. Car, sans cela, on perdrait peut-être un temps précieux, en travaillant à le déterminer à ce qu'enfin on ne pourroit obtenir.

“ On connoît à Berlin le caractère du Duc, et on commence à se servir de cette connoissance pour tâcher de l'écarter. On sait, en particulier, qu'il suffit de dire de lui qu'il cherche à influencer pour le décourager de l'entreprendre, et l'on employe déjà ce moyen. C'est le Prince Henri qui le met en oeuvre ; il a fait insinuer, puis écrit au Roi, qu'il prit garde au Duc ; qu'on savoit qu'il vouloit entreprendre de lui faire abandonner le plan du Roi défunt, dont on fait à Berlin de pompeux éloges. Cela n'auroit en soi aucune conséquence, car on sait que le Roi n'a tenu aucun compte de cet avis ; mais le Duc en est très affecté, et voilà une nouvelle difficulté en notre chemin, quoique cette même information semble renfermer un présage favorable sur les dispositions du Roi lui-même.

“ Nous n'avons pas encore le mémoire que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se propose de nous remettre, mais nous croyons prévoir la tournure qu'il y donnera. Dans le plan de votre Majesté, et d'après les développemens et instructions de my Lord Grenville, l'empereur de Russie est présenté comme disposé à l'appuyer ; disposition que le Cabinet de votre Majesté se chargeoit d'entretenir. Mais le Duc proposera probablement de rendre la Russie premier mobile, en l'engageant à proposer le plan elle-même. Ce changement seroit fâcheux ; car ce seroit allonger la marche et la rendre moins sûre ; aussi nous proposons nous bien de faire tout ce qui dépendra de nous pour le prévenir ; mais nous craignons de n'en pas venir à bout.

“ Loin d'avoir l'ambition d'être premier agent en politique, le Duc redoute ce rôle plus qu'une batterie de canons ; au lieu que si le plan étoit proposé par la Russie, n'ayant alors qu'à l'appuyer de ses conseils, il entreprendroit avec zèle de le faire, et, en attendant, il travailleroit à s'en assurer les moyens. C'est

là une perspective que je ne devois pas tarder de présenter à votre Majesté, afin qu'elle soit préparée à la tournure que le Duc pourroit donner finalement à son mémoire, et qu'elle voie à l'avance dans sa sagesse quel parti on peut tirer d'une influence qui, d'après tout ce que j'aperçois, seroit très essentielle pour inspirer de la confiance au Roi de Prusse ; mais qui ne peut être mise en action qu'en se prêtant le plus qu'il est possible au caractère foncier du Duc. Peut-être pourroit-on prendre une route moyenne, en travaillant d'abord à faire sentir par la Russie la nécessité du plan qu'elle proposeroit elle-même, sans perdre de vue ce qui pourroit engager plus tôt le Duc à agir directement.

“Le Duc vient de me donner une nouvelle preuve du désir qu'il a de co-opérer avec votre Majesté et sur un objet qui pourroit l'acheminer plus tôt à agir ; c'est en m'envoyant par M. de Stamford pour votre Majesté l'information que j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici, avec le billet du Duc qui l'accompagnait. Je suis bien sûr que cette information n'apprendra rien à votre Majesté ; ce qui importe donc c'est que le Duc regarde la chose comme très sérieuse, comme étant déjà depuis quelque temps sa plus grande crainte de la part des François, quant aux révolutions.

“M. de Stamford, qui y a beaucoup réfléchi, a conçu une idée qu'il me semble essentiel de considérer le plus tôt possible, vu la rapidité avec laquelle ces *Directoires* exécutent ce qu'ils ont une fois résolu. C'est que Londres, Berlin, et Petersbourg se concertent le plus tôt possible, pour négocier avec les magistrats de Hambourg la remise de la défense de leur ville à une garnison Prussienne et Hanovrienne ; sous la garantie de votre Majesté, du Roi de Prusse, et si l'on a le temps, de l'Empereur de Russie, de n'interrompre à aucun égard ni leur gouvernement, ni leurs affaires intérieures, et de retirer ces troupes dès que le danger cesseroit.

“Hambourg, laissé à lui-même, ne pourroit se défendre ; et quand on rassembleroit des troupes de ce côté-là, il ne faudroit qu'un échec pour que cette ville, si remplie de révolutionnaires, tombât entre les mains des François ; or on connoît leur habileté à conserver tout ce qu'ils possèdent une fois. Ce porte-là est depuis longtemps leur grand but ; ne fût-ce que pour rendre inutile la marine Anglaise. Le Duc est très inquiet de cette circonstance ; et c'est un objet sur lequel sa position le mettriot en état d'agir directement pour presser la réunion des grandes Puissances. M. de Stamford n'a pas eu encore le moment de lui faire part de son idée relativement à Hambourg ; il le fera incessamment, et j'aurai l'honneur de faire part à votre Majesté de ce qu'il en pensera ; mais j'ai cru devoir prendre la liberté de lui en faire mention dès à présent ; parce qu'il me semble que des mesures éventuelles peuvent être préparées ; et que si votre Majesté le trouvoit convenable, elle pourroit déjà les faire concerter avec la Russie. Je prends la liberté de dire ceci, parce que le malheureux sort de la ville de Dantzic pourroit ôter aux Hambourgeois la confiance en la cour de Berlin ; et qu'en ce cas,

malgré celle qu'ils auroient en votre Majesté, ils pourroient ne pas considérer son appui comme suffisant sur le Continent. Or, comme il ne faudroit pas qu'ils balançassent au moment du danger, ni laisser même des tentations aux intrigans de Berlin, le concours immédiat de la Russie me paroîtroit être nécessaire.

"Il est bien important aux Puissances du Nord de considérer sérieusement que les François, songeant moins aujourd'hui à étendre leurs conquêtes que les révolutions, Hambourg ne peut être par là pour eux qu'un objet d'ardent désir. Ils ont déjà semé l'esprit révolutionnaire dans le Holstein, le Danemarc, et sur les autres bords de la Baltique; et postés à Hambourg, puis à Lubeck, ils y joueroient le même rôle qu'en Hollande, en Italie, et sur la rive gauche du Rhin, pour y pousser la formation de républiques, esclaves de la leur. C'est la sécurité qu'ils ont eu l'adresse d'inspirer aux souverains du continent avec qui ils ont traité de neutralité ou de paix qui prépare leur ruine; et il est bien à souhaiter qu'on réussisse enfin à parvenir aux souverains eux-mêmes, pour faire tomber le bandeau qui a couvert leurs yeux.

"Il seroit bien nécessaire, aussi, d'agir de la même manière sur l'empereur d'Allemagne; et c'est parceque votre Majesté le pense elle-même, ainsi que ses ministres, que je prends la liberté de lui ouvrir une idée, mais qui demande quelques détails.

"En faissant mention à votre Majesté, le courrier passé, d'une lettre de Madame la Princesse d'Orange au Duc de Brunswick, je n'avois encore en vue que de lui faire connoître la manière de penser et d'agir de cette princesse; qu'elle verra par la copie de cette lettre que j'ai l'honneur de lui envoyer. Mais depuis l'arrivée des Princes d'Orange, qui m'a fait naître quelques idées, je dois ajouter maintenant que M. de Stamford, qui a vu agir depuis longtemps s'a[ltesse] r[oyale], en a la plus haute opinion; et il m'a assuré avec bien des détails qu'un des plus pernecieux artifices employés par ceux qui vouloient mener le feu roi, avoit été de détruire auprès de lui son influence, en le persuadant, qu'attachée à son rang en Hollande, elle s'étoit liée avec le cabinet d'Angleterre, et n'avoit plus que des idées angloises.

"Les princes, ses fils, ont beaucoup de bonté pour moi, parceque je les ai vu jeunes, et qu'ils savent que Madame la Princesse me conserve celle dont elle m'honnoit dès ce temps-là; ainsi ils ont conversé très librement avec M. de Stamford en ma présence, et m'ont permis de prendre part à la conversation. J'ai remarqué entr'eux beaucoup d'amitié et beaucoup de confiance, de l'un et de l'autre, en M. de Stamford; ils sont tous deux également pénétrés des dangers de l'Europe, et ils ont le même désir qu'on puisse y apporter du remède; mais il y a quelques différences dans leurs idées des moyens, et aussi dans leurs caractères. Le Prince Frédéric est plus ouvert, plus prononcé dans ses opinions; et la différence de leur position, l'un attaché à Berlin et l'autre à Vienne, détermine, peut-être sans qu'ils s'en apperçoivent, leurs idées générales sur la position des

choses, et sur les remèdes. Il seroit inutile que j'occupasse le temps précieux de votre Majesté de détails à cet égard, parceque je n'ai en vue qu'un objet particulier.

“ J'ai été frappé du degré d'attention que le Prince Frédéric a portée aux détails, non seulement de tactique, mais de politique des campagnes aux quelles il a assisté ; et j'ai jugé de la justesse de ses remarques par l'approbation de M. de Stamford. Quant à la politique générale, je l'ai vu fortement pénétré de l'idée que l'empire d'Allemagne est perdu, si les vues de Berlin pour le diviser, et former une puissance à part, étoient suivies par le nouveau Roi. Enfin, il connoit les hommes qui, à Vienne, ont favorisé l'idée de la désorganisation de l'empire, sous prétexte de la conduite de la Prusse, et ceux qui jusqu'ici ont lutté inutilement contre ce système Jacobin.

“ Ces remarques sur le Prince Frédéric m'avoient fait naître une idée que j'avois communiquée à M. de Stamford. Je pensois que lorsque la réunion des cours de Londres, Berlin et Petersbourg commenceroit à paroître probable, on pourroit inspirer au Prince Frédéric de témoigner à M. de Stamford, comme à son premier maître dans l'art militaire, de l'accompagner pour quelque temps à son retour à Vienne ; afin que là, recevant du Prince de premiers fils sur les personnes d'importance à qui l'on pourroit s'ouvrir, il tachât de pénétrer jusqu'à l'Empereur. M. de Stamford ne m'avoit opposé que sa santé qui, Dieu merci, se remet pourtant à son état précédent, toujours très foible ; cependant, comme il sentoit l'utilité du plan, il m'avoit assuré que, s'il étoit trouvé convenable, il s'y prêteroit de tout son pouvoir. Mais une circonstance vint bientôt écarter cette idée ; car Madame le Duchesse m'ayant fait l'honneur de m'inviter à dîner, dans la conversation de la table j'entendis le Duc dire au Prince Frédéric, qui se plaignoit de l'état de son bras blessé, que puisqu'il se proposoit de faire quelque séjour en Angleterre, il conviendrait peut-être qu'il allât à Bath.

“ Tel est, Sire, l'ensemble de cet objet ; j'ai cru qu'il ne seroit pas sans intérêt pour votre Majesté, ne fût-ce que par les informations sur les personnes qui s'y trouvent liées. Mais il pourroit aussi arriver que, dans le cours que prendront les affaires, il devint utile d'avoir à Vienne quelqu'un de sûr, sans caractère public, mais ayant un caractère personnel et le pouvoir d'agir ; et, en ce cas, il pourroit n'être pas inutile que j'eusse pris la liberté d'ouvrir cette idée à votre Majesté. Alors, si votre Majesté tournoit les yeux sur M. de Stamford, j'ai lieu de croire que Madame la Princess d'Orange deviendrait une personne essentielle, et c'est pour cela que je devois à votre Majesté les traits qui pouvoient la caractériser.

“ Je dis Madame la Princesse, car c'est aussi une confidence de M. de Stamford que celui qui doit le plus à cette princesse, et qui devoit avoir le plus d'intérêt personnel à suivre de vrais principes, est malheureusement celui qui en a le moins. Je ne mériterois pas la confiance dont votre Majesté m'honore si, dans un temps aussi critique, je lui dissimulois rien de ce que j'apprends ici, qui est pour ainsi dire un point central.

“ Enfin, je dois encore informer votre Majesté que, dans les instances de M. de Stamford auprès du Duc pour qu’il se présentât à temps au futur roi, la personne qu’il souhaitoit lui voir conseiller au Prince royal, comme méritant le plus sa confiance, étoit M. le Baron de Reck, actuellement Ministre de Justice. Le Duc acquiesca entièrement à cette idée, connoissant M. de Reck pour un homme éclairé, droit, et qui s’étoit fortement prononcé contre la paix de Bâle.

“ M. de Stamford parla aussi de Comte de Brühl comme d’une personne de toute confiance pour les principes, familier avec le Prince, et qui a une raison particulière de ressentiment honnête contre les gens qui veulent conserver leur influence; en ce que ces gens-là, profitant de sa mission auprès de l’Empereur de Russie à son avènement au trône, l’avoient fait porteur d’un mensonge à ce monarque au sujet des articles secrets du traité de Bâle; ce que l’Empereur lui reprocha d’abord, mais qu’il fit retomber avec indignation sur les auteurs, en assurant l’Empereur qu’on ne l’avoit instruit de rien.

“ M. de Stamford avoit fait aussi connoître au Duc des personnes de vrai mérite d’un ordre inférieur, pour remplir les places de confiance sous le ministère, auxquelles encore le Duc avoit acquiescé ; mais il avoit toujours résisté à des démarches formelles, aussi longtemps qu’il ne verroit pas d’avis précis à donner au Prince sur les affaires mêmes. Aujourd’hui cet obstacle est levé ; mais le Prince est Roi, et il reste environné des personnes mêmes dont le Duc redoutoit les insinuations. M. de Stamford ne se laisse point décourager, et sûrement j’aiderai de l’influence que pourra me donner l’accès que m’accorde son altesse sérénissime, et la confiance dont votre Majesté m’a honoré auprès d’elle.”

*Postscript.* “ Pendant que j’écrivois cette lettre, M. de Stamford a communiqué son idée pour Hambourg au Duc, qui non seulement l’approuve, mais la regarderoit comme indispensable, quoique difficile.”

3 *enclosures.*

#### *Enclosure 1.*

The PRINCESS OF ORANGE to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

1797, November 2. Hampton Court.—“ Les marques du souvenir de votre altesse et de la continuation de son amitié que je viens de recevoir tant par M. Tollins, que par M. de Luc (qui est revenu très reconnoissant de la manière distinguée et gracieuse dont votre altesse a daigné l’accueillir) m’engagent en ce moment de profiter d’une occasion favorable pour lui adresser ces lignes, avec l’hommage de tous les sentimens que je lui ai voué, et que ni le tems ni l’éloignement ne sauroient altérer.

“ Votre altesse est plus à portée que moi d’être parfaitement instruit de la triste situation où se trouve le roi mon frère. Elle comprendra aisément combien ce que j’en apprends me navre ;

toutes les nouvelles se réunissent à me faire envisager sa mort comme prochaine, et d'après les dernières, on ôse même à peine souhaiter que ses jours soient prolongés, puisqu'on paroît craindre que la diminution de ses facultés intellectuelles, que l'on apperçoit sensiblement, ne lui laisseroit qu'une existence pire que la mort. De ce déchirant tableau il n'y a qu'un côté qui offre quelque espèce de consolation, c'est la manière dont se montre le Pr[ince] Royal dans ces tristes circonstances. Il paroît le modèle des fils par ses sentimens pour le roi son père, et, en même tems, profondément pénétré de l'importance et des difficultés des grands devoirs qui reposeront sur lui. Plus ce jeune prince se montre digne du sang dont il est issu, plus il seroit douloureux que ses bonnes intentions restassent sans effet, ou qu'elles fussent altérées par de pernicieux conseils ; et vû son peu d'expérience, et le grand nombre d'intrigants dont il sera entouré dans les premiers moments, cela me paroîtroit fort à craindre, si je ne conservois l'espoir que v[otre] a[ltesse] voudra lui tendre une main bienfaisante, l'éclairer de ses lumières, et lui indiquer le fil capable de le guider au travers de ce labyrinthe, en lui faisant éviter les différens écueils qui l'environneront. Au moment du décès du roi, toutes les espérances non seulement de la monarchie Prussienne, mais celles de l'Europe entière (c'est à dire, de la saine partie de ses habitants) se fixeront sur son successeur ; du système qu'il adoptera, de la conduite qu'il tiendra tout peut dépendre. Votre a[ltesse] voudroit-elle dans un moment si critique lui refuser son assistance et ses conseils ? Ne les lui accorderoit-elle pas également dans le cas plus embarrassant, et peut-être plus critique encore, où le roi resteroit en vie, mais ne pouvant s'occuper des affaires, le prince royal seroit forcé par les circonstances, et peut-être par la volonté du roi lui-même, d'accepter la régence ? Non, sans doute que v[otre] a[ltesse] ne les lui refuseroit pas si ce prince les lui demandoit directement, et j'ai trop bonne opinion du prince royal pour douter qu'il ne les apprécie comme il le doit ; mais j'avoue franchement que je crains d'un côté l'*excès* de modestie (qu'elle me pardonne cette expression) de v[otre] a[ltesse] ; et chez mon neveu, la timidité, le manque d'usage du monde, une certaine fausse délicatesse qui proviendrait de là, et lui feroit hésiter de s'ouvrir à elle avec cette plénitude de cœur que sa position exigerait si indispensablement pour retirer tout le fruit nécessaire des sages avis que votre altesse, et *elle seule*, est en état de lui donner. Il seroit bien malheureux que des raisons pareilles devroient l'en priver, et favoriser des odieux projets des désorganisateur, tandis qu'il faudroit si peu de chose de la part de v[otre] a[ltesse] pour amener les choses où je les désirerois, et lui assurer pour toujours cette juste confiance que le Prince royal lui doit à tant de titres, et que son cœur est certainement très porté à lui accorder de lui-même. Que v[otre] a[ltesse] me pardonne ces reflexions, et le trop d'étendue que j'y ai donnée peut-être ; du moins ne méconnoitra-t-elle pas, j'espère, les sentimens qui me les dictent, et la pureté de mes motifs en les lui adressant.

“ Je ne puis ajouter aucune nouvelle du pays que j’habite dont v[otre] a[ltesse] ne soit informée d’ailleurs. Ce qui fixe dans ce moment le plus l’attention du public c’est l’ouverture du Parlement, qui a eû lieu aujourd’hui, et la nouvelle entrée hiér par la France que la paix de l’Empereur auroit été signée à Udine le 17 d’octobre ; pour autant que j’en sais, deux postes d’Allemagne qui viennent d’arriver ne confirment pas encore cette nouvelle. V[otre] A[ltesse] saura mieux que moi ce qu’il faut en croire, et les suites que cet événement nous pronostique, s’il est véritable, et si l’Empereur ratifie le traité.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 2.*

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO GENERAL DE STAMFORD.

[No date.]—“ Voici l’extrait d’une lettre de Paris du 13, *pour M. de Luc*. J’en donne incessamment part à Hannovre, ainsi qu’ à Berlin, pour où j’avois déjà mandé, lundi, les avis qui m’étoient parvenus sur des projets pour une invasion dans le pays d’Hannovre.

“ J’attens aujourd’hui la poste de Berlin, qui nous éclairera peut-être un peu d’avantage sur ses objets essentiels.”

*Enclosure 3.*

1797, November 13. Paris.—*Extrait.*—“ Le Gouvernement François declare maintenant à haute voix qu’il gardera la rive gauche du Rhin. On s’occupe déjà d’organiser les provinces situées à cette rive, et un commissaire du Directoire est parti pour mettre cette organisation en œuvre. En même tems le bruit se répand de plus en plus qu’une colonne de troupes Françaises doit se mettre en marche pour entrer dans le pays d’Hannovre. Quoique ce dernier bruit n’ait, selon moi, point de probabilité, il est pourtant très sûr qu’un projet de cette nature occupe plusieurs personnes du Gouvernement depuis la rupture des négociations avec l’Angleterre ; parcequ’on croit qu’une invasion dans la Basse Saxe pourroit seule faire fléchir le Gouvernement Anglois, et que l’époque actuelle leur paroît la plus propre pour renouveler des projets qu’on avoit abandonnés dans un tems où l’on *croioit* avoir besoin de la bonne volonté du roi de Prusse.”

M. DE LUC to GEORGE III.

1797, November 28. Brunswick.—“ La seconde lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur d’adresser à votre Majesté l’informoit de ce que nous pouvions prévoir, M. de Stamford et moi, sur la tournure que Monseigneur le Duc donneroit au mémoire qu’il se proposoit de faire parvenir à votre Majesté. Ce mémoire étoit esquissé, et s’a[ltesse] s[’]érénissime en avoit déjà communiqué le plan

à M. de Stamford, lorsqu'elle recut une estafette du roi de Prusse pour l'inviter à venir à Berlin ; et son départ fut fixé à demain 28. Alors s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se détermina à suspendre l'envoy de son mémoire, jusqu' à ce qu'elle eût vu ce qui se passeroit à Berlin ; en écrivant néanmoins d'abord à votre Majesté pour lui témoigner la satisfaction qu'elle éprouvoit de son intervention dans des circonstances si urgentes, et l'assurer de son zèle à seconder ses vues. Je ne sais point encore en ce moment si l'intention de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] est de me remettre sa lettre, ni si j'aurai l'honneur de le voir avant son départ ; mais pour n'être pas pressé demain par le départ du courrier, au cas que je ne fusse instruit que tard de son intention, je prends la liberté d'exposer d'avance à votre Majesté tant ce que je sais par M. de Stamford de la substance du mémoire de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], que tout l'ensemble des choses qui, d'après les entretiens que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec elle, me sembleroient pouvoir faire considérer la seule connoissance de ce mémoire comme suffisante pour conduire à une prompte détermination.

“ L'idée fondamentale du mémoire est, en effet, la même dont je crus devoir informer votre Majesté dès le courrier dernier ; celle de rendre la Russie promotrice de l'union à renouveler entre les grandes cours ; mais cette idée y est accompagnée de motifs qui me paroissent avoir beaucoup de force, et c'est aussi l'opinion de M. de Stamford, d'après tout ce qu'il connoit de Berlin. Dans l'exposition que je vais avoir l'honneur d'en faire à votre Majesté, je ne pourrai suivre le mémoire, parceque je n'en connois pas les expressions ; mais j'en connois les fondemens, ce qui me paroît plus essentiel ; et c'est sous ce point de vue que je les envisagerai.

“ Il faut imprimer chez le roi de Prusse une crainte bien forte, produite par un grand nombre de faits, et de réflexions sur l'état tout nouveau de l'Europe, pour le tirer de la sécurité sur sa paix, et lui faire connoître l'illusion de son agrandissement ; et il seroit bien difficile de rendre immédiatement cette crainte supérieure à d'autres plus immédiatement évidentes dans le plan d'une nouvelle coalition ; et dont ceux qui, ou par ignorance, ou par mauvais dessein, entreprendroient de tenir ce jeune monarque dans l'inaction, pourroient aisément se prévaloir.

“ Il seroit fâcheux d'échouer dans une première tentative, parceque l'accès deviendrait plus difficile. Or, la Russie pourroit empêcher ce mal ; d'abord, parceque sans son intervention spontanée, on pourroit la représenter elle-même comme un objet de crainte, qui par là n'existeroit pas ; mais surtout, parcequ'il n'y auroit que la certitude de son intervention auprès de l'Autriche qui pût rassurer le roi de Prusse contre la crainte que, vu les liaisons actuelles de l'Empereur avec la France, sur la connoissance d'une nouvelle liaison tentée entre l'Angleterre et la Prusse sans sa participation il ne songeât à se lier plus intimement avec les François. Cela seroit bien mal vu ; mais on doit craindre le succès de toutes les insinuations des malveillans, vu l'aveuglement qui a déjà conduit cette cour.



“La Russie, au contraire, en proposant elle-même le projet de réunion, pourroit dès l'entrée faire cesser les craintes mutuelles; en offrant sa garantie, tant à Vienne qu' à Berlin, que rien ne seroit changé dans leurs situations respectives; en déclarant positivement, qu'en cas de besoin, elle concourroit de tout son pouvoir au but de l'union qui seroit uniquement, ou du moins fondamentalement, de maintenir l'intégrité de l'Empire, tant contre l'esprit d'agrandissement, que contre les projets dés-organisateurs du Directoire de France.

“Elle seule aussi pourroit faire sentir, tant à Berlin qu' à Vienne, de quelle importance est le concours de l'Angleterre dans cette union, pour empêcher l'agrandissement des forces maritimes dans une nation si active, déjà énormément fort sur le continent, et qui porteroit alors les révolutions par mer comme par terre. Elle seule enfin, en offrant son concours, pourroit faire voir l'indispensable nécessité que toutes puissances se réunissent indissolublement pour faire échouer le projet inoui des paix particulières, inventé par le Directoire pour faire tomber successivement tous les états; ce qui feroit comprendre à ces fourbes que les yeux sont ouverts sur le but de cette nouveauté en diplomatique, et qu'on est bien résolu d'en prévenir l'effet.

“Quand j'ai eu pesé les motifs du mémoire du Duc, en les commentants par les entretiens que j' ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec s[on] a[ltesse] s[érénissime], je n'ai pu m'empêcher d'éprouver beaucoup de satisfaction en voyant ainsi ses incertitudes expliquées par une application précise. Je craignois d'abord que l'éloignement naturel à prendre une part active dans les affaires ne fût ce qu'il y auroit à vaincre chez elle; mais les discussions particulières ont fait ressortir une crainte plus déterminée, c'est celle d'agir sans succès; et que le moyen efficace de réaliser l'intention bien prononcée de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] d'agir de tout son pouvoir est qu'elle voye une route qui promette de mener au but. C'est ainsi que s'est acheminée l'idée de rendre d'abord la Russie active pour le plan comme le proposant elle-même; et ce fut parceque je prévoyois que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se fixeroit à cette idée, que je pris la liberté de mentionner à votre majesté dès le courrier dernier qu'il me sembloit que rien ne périliteroit quant à l'intervention d'ici, si l'objet étoit présenté sous ce point de vue à l'Empereur de Russie.

“Aujourd'hui, d'après la détermination du Duc, et les réflexions depuis longtemps entretenues par M. de Stamford lui-même sur ce qui pourroit entraîner le Prusse, en la supposant déjà déterminée à concourir au bien général, il paroît plus fortement encore que l'intervention immédiate de la Russie est l'objet le plus pressant. Les motifs de songer enfin à la sûreté commune sont sans doute si évident qu'ils devroient convaincre de quelque part qu'ils fussent présentés; mais on a à craindre les insinuations qui, jusqu' ici, ont fait tant de mal; et il y a longtemps qu'on travaille à Berlin à affaiblir l'influence de l'Angleterre, sous le prétexte spécieux

qu'étant encore en guerre avec les François, il lui conviendrait beaucoup de prévenir ou de rompre les paix sur le Continent.

“Voilà ce qui me paroît au fond faire craindre au Duc d'agir dans ce moment pour le plan général, tandis qu'il ne paroît venir que de Angleterre ; et comment, avec la détermination de saisir toutes les occasions de faire connoître au Roi de Prusse que sa sûreté est liée à celle de l'Europe entière, à laquelle, par conséquent, il doit contribuer ; avec l'idée qu'il entretenoit depuis longtemps, et qu'il m'avoit si fortement exprimée, qu'il falloit que l'Angleterre s'unit de nouveau avec la Prusse pour donner de la consistance à un nouvel arrangement ; voyant avec joie que le concours de l'Angleterre est assuré, il désire pour le succès que la Russie propose le plan, avec des déterminations positives sur la manière de son concours.

“Telle étant ici la position précise des choses par des raisons qui ne paroissent pas devoir changer, à moins de nouveaux événemens, votre Majesté y verrait peut-être des raisons de ne pas attendre de nouvelles informations avant que d'agir en Russie pour que la proposition vienne de là au Roi de Prusse. C'est tout cet ensemble que j'ai cru devoir mettre au pied de votre Majesté, sans attendre ce qui se passera avant le départ du Duc ne prévoyant pas qu'il y ait de changement dans ses idées, et craignant de manquer ensuite de temps.

“Ayant appris que M. de Steinberg devoit partir aujourd'hui pour Berlin sans passer par ici, j'ai cru devoir l'informer de tout ce qui s'est passé, et des dispositions du Duc ; et que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] est informée de la confiance dont votre Majesté l'honore ; afin que, si l'occasion s'en présente à Berlin, il puisse parler ouvertement à s'altesse sérénissime, juger lui-même de ses dispositions, et les entretenir d'après qu'ils observeront en commun.

Le 28.—“Tout est maintenant terminé ici pour le présent. Le Duc m'envoya hier, par M. de Stamford, la lettre incluse pour votre Majesté, en l'informant qu'il partiroit ce matin à 4 heures, et ajoutant seulement que s'il lui étoit possible, il passeroit un moment sur le tard ; mais il ne vint pas. Il finissoit en assurant qu'il profiteroit de son séjour à Berlin pour avancer autant qu'il lui seroit possible le bien des choses dont nous nous étions tant entretenus. C'est ce dont je ne saurois douter ; et comme des circonstances accidentelles prouvent souvent mieux les dispositions et les idées que les choses formelles, je prends la liberté d'envoyer à votre Majesté un billet que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] écrivit vers les 10 heures à M. de Stamford en réponse à la communication qu'il lui avoit faite d'un avis que je venois de recevoir, que les François insistent sur le passage de leurs troupes en Suisse, et demandent de l'argent, et que les Bernois arment déjà. Ce billet peint tout-à-fait l'ensemble des dispositions du Duc : une pleine connoissance du danger, et du vrai mal des puissances qui ont à s'en défendre ; il est outré de leur insouciance, il voudrait la surmonter, mais il a besoin de quelque espérance de succès pour se livrer à l'action, et c'est la vraie raison de son désir que la Russie s'avance le plus tôt possible.

“M. de Stamford désire que nous ne nous séparions pas encore, afin de voir ensemble les avis qu'il pourra recevoir ; je me conformerai à son intention, mais je sens qu'étant maintenant arrivé jusqu'au bout de ce que pouvoient me permettre les instructions que j'avois eu l'honneur de recevoir de votre Majesté et de my Lord Grenville, si votre Majesté pensoit que je pusse être encore utile à quelque chose, il me semble que ce ne pourroit être que par de nouvelles instructions relatives tant aux idées du Duc, qu'à tout ce que j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer successivement à votre Majesté. C'est ce dont je prends encore la liberté de faire mention, afin qu'elle décide suivant sa sagesse.”

*Two Enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1.*

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO GEORGE III.

1797, November 27. Brunswick.—“Je m'estime heureux de ce que, par un concours de circonstances favorables, j'ai pu ouvrir mon cœur et prononcer mes sentimens à Monsieur de Luc, et de ce qu'il a bien voulu me nommer à votre Majesté, en lui faisant un tableau de la situation où se trouve l'Allemagne. Cette dernière est plus critique et plus allarmante qu'on ne le pense généralement, et la France va s'élever à un degré de puissance dont les conséquences, plus encore par l'esprit qui la conduit que par les acquisitions territoriales, sont incalculables pour le reste de l'Europe, qui, pour comble de malheur, se trouve divisée par des raisons secondaires, au moment où tout devoit conseiller l'union la plus parfaite. La lettre dont votre Majesté m'a honoré m'est parvenue après la signature de la paix d'Udine, et peu de jours après le décès du Roi de Prusse. Le congrès de Rastadt n'est point assemblé encore, mais tout annonce que nous touchons à des changemens, ou à des tentatives de changemens très essentiels dans la constitution Germanique. C'est sous ces rapports, et en conséquence de ce que votre Majesté m'a fait la grace de m'écrire, que j'avois commencé à rédiger un mémoire relatif à la position de la monarchie Prussienne, lorsque j'ai reçu hier une invitation du Roi de Prusse de me rendre auprès de sa personne à Berlin. J'ai donc cru devoir suspendre pour quelques jours l'envoi de ce mémoire, afin de juger par moi-même, et sur les lieux, l'état des choses, ainsi que la disposition des esprits ; ce qui me mettra en état de donner plus de précision aux idées que j'aurai l'honneur, Sire, de vous présenter très humblement. Votre Majesté daignera cependant recevoir d'avance l'assurance de ma bonne volonté, et de mon zèle dans la recherche des moyens capables de produire un rapprochement entre les quatre grandes puissances, qui peuvent sauver l'Europe ; mais que votre Majesté daigne, en même tems, se persuader que ce n'est pas moi qui pourrai rendre sur ce point à la cour de Berlin les services les plus essentiels. Comme je vois les choses dans le moment présent, ce n'est que par la cour de St. Petersbourg qu'il paroît possible

que l'Angleterre ramène et l'Autriche, et la Prusse, à ce degré d'union qui puisse prévenir encore à tems les effets destructeurs de cette malheureuse division qui a fait triompher le crime, et que le gouvernement François, implacable dans sa haine, et couvert de sang et de dépouilles, sait entretenir. Il faudroit pour cet effet que la Russie peut être persuadée de ce que les gens à portée voient évidemment, que ce n'est pas à l'extension du territoire de France vers elle qu'elle doit juger de son propre danger, mais à la nécessité où le Directoire s'est mis d'étendre sans cesse l'exécution de son système de désorganisation, par l'appui des armes ; et que partout ils sont précédés par les dispositions qu'ils font semer de plus en plus parmi les sujets des autres souverains ; qu'il suffit qu'ils puissent s'approcher pour que leurs mineurs jouent, et que si, par exemple, on ne les empêchait pas, par une union parfaite dans le nord d'approcher de Hambourg, les conséquences en seroient incalculables."

*Enclosure 2.*

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO M. DE STAMFORD.

1797, November 27. Brunswick.—“Je vous suis très obligé de l'extrait que vous venez de me communiquer. Je le prendrai avec moi à Berlin. Peut-être que ces projets sur la Suisse tiennent ensemble avec la lenteur que Buonaparte met à son arrivée à Rastad. Il vient de faire dire aux négociateurs de l'Empereur et de l'Empire, qu'il est retenu par des affaires à Milan. Je n'ai aucun doute que nous verrons la Suisse révolutionnée. Le mal se voit, mais le remède est bien difficile ; nous n'agissons, et nous ne pouvons plus agir qu'après coup, de sorte que nous sommes toujours aux ordres du Directoire. De Berlin il n'y a rien d'intéressant ; le public paroît content du jeune monarque. Je vous prie de lire le passage que je viens de marquer dans la *gazette de Hambourg* ; cela peint bien combien l'on s'attache à cacher la mollesse la plus lâche sous le titre d'amour de la paix. Mes hommages à M. de Luc ; je partis dans quelques heures d'ici.”

M. DE LUC TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 12. Brunswick.—“Je ne doute point que votre Excellence n'ait été informée par le roi du résultat des entretiens que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick, avant son départ pour Berlin, en conséquence de la lettre dont sa Majesté avoit daigné me faire porteur, et du mémoire que votre Excellence m'avoit fait l'honneur de me remettre.

“Pour obvier aux craintes de s'altresse sérénissime qu'on ne soupçonnât ma mission, peu après son départ, et n'attendant pas bientôt des nouvelles essentielles de Berlin, je partis d'ici pour une tournée de *Professeur en Géologie* ; à mon retour aujourd'hui, M. le Général de Stamford m'a remis de la part de s'altresse sérénissime le mémoire que j'ai l'honneur de joindre ici, en me communiquant la lettre qui le renfermoit.

“Cette lettre porte principalement sur ce que M. de Haugwitz conservant son ascendant, et M. le Général Ruchel (dont s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime] n’a pas lieu d’être contente) ayant la plus grande part aux affaires militaires, on ne sauroit compter sur aucun changement immédiat de système, et qu’il faut tourner toutes ses vues sur l’avenir.

“C’est-là le motif du mémoire qui demeure ainsi dans le plan que nous avons prévu, Monsieur de Stamford et moi, et à l’égard duquel j’avois eu l’honneur de présenter à sa Majesté les raisons qui semblent indiquer qu’il ne faudroit pas perdre de temps pour tâcher d’engager l’Empereur de Russie à intervenir lui-même, pour sa propre sûreté, pour produire une nouvelle union; sur quoi s’altesse sérénissime insiste de plus fort, après ses observations à Berlin.

“Quant aux demarches que s’altesse sérénissime indique comme nécessaires de la part de l’Angleterre auprès de Berlin et de Vienne, il ne paroît pas bien clairement si elles devroient être immédiates, ou subordonnées au consentement de la Russie; ce qui s’expliquera, j’espère, au retour de s’altesse sérénissime, qui est annoncé pour le 16. Dès que je serai plus instruit à cet égard, j’aurai l’honneur d’écrire de nouveau à votre Excellence.”

*Enclosure.*

#### MÉMOIRE OF THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

1797, December 5. Berlin.—“Si la cour de Berlin ne déploie pas dans ce moment-ci par une position imposante son influence à la pacification de l’empire Germanique c’est parceque les mêmes raisons qui l’ont forcé à adopter sous le règne précédent le système de neutralité existent encore, et que de nouveaux motifs s’y joignent. Les raisons qui lui dictoient la nécessité de se circonscrire dans les bornes étroites de la neutralité sont le dérangment des finances, les dispositions inquiétantes dans les esprits des provinces nouvellement acquises, l’incertitude des vues de la cour de Vienne, et la différence totale entre les assertions de Catherine II, et le peu d’effet qui en est résulté.

“A cela se joint le secret impénétrable que la cour de Vienne observe sur les articles de la paix signée à Campo Formio, et les insinuations que la France répand que la cession de Mayence, et d’une grande partie de la rive gauche du Rhin sera le prix de la cession faite à l’Empereur de la ville de Venise, et de la majeure partie du territoire Venitien. Buonaparte a dit au négociateurs de la paix de la part de l’Empereur que c’étoit la cour de Berlin qui insistoit sur ce que la France conservât la majeure partie de la rive gauche du Rhin, tandis que le Directoire François a fait insinuer au Cabinet de Berlin qu’il espéroit que l’on ne s’opposeroit pas de la part de la Prusse aux arrangemens que la France alloit prendre avec l’Empereur touchant la rive gauche du Rhin. C’est dans cet état d’incertitude et de fluctuation que le députés de la cour de Berlin sont partis le 4 Decembre pour Rastadt.

“ Il est impossible de prévoir les résultats de cet état de choses ; mais il est fort à craindre, et même à présumer que l'intégrité ainsi que la constitution de l'empire Germanique ne soient ébranlés dans leurs fondemens, quoiqu'il soit positif que les députés de la Prusse sont chargés d'insister sur l'intégrité constitutionnelle de l'Empire. Il est à prévoir que la cour de Vienne s'est engagée par des articles secrets à favoriser les démembrements projetés par la France, et dès lors il reste à voir jusqu'où l'on pourra parvenir à les modifier. Toutes les mesures à prendre dans ce moment seroient trop tardives pour remédier aux maux présents. Il paroît par conséquent qu'il devient urgent de chercher à dévancer les événemens, et de former un plan d'union adoptable après la paix, entre l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Russie, et la Prusse, dont la base seroit la conservation et le maintien des gouvernemens existans, et leur garantie réciproque, ainsi qu'un accord commun pour la défense contre quiconque attaqueroit ce principe. Les païs qui formeront à l'avenir l'Empire Germanique seroient compris dans cette union, et l'on s'accorderoit sur un plan général de défense contre cette puissance monstrueuse qui les ébranlera toutes, si elles ne s'entendent enfin entre eux. Cette mesure est à considérer comme une dernière ressource qui reste dans le moment actuel ; si on ne la prend pas, si on tarde encore à s'unir, les maux à craindre sont incalculables. Il n'y a que l'Angleterre qui peut faire accepter cette mesure, et prévenir par là que la France, à force de manœuvres obliques qu'elle emploie tantôt vis-à-vis de la cour de Vienne, et tantôt vis-à-vis de celle de Berlin, ne fasse tomber enfin l'une ou l'autre dans les embûches qu'elle leur tend. Il ne faudroit point, s'il est possible, tarder à faire aux cours respectives les ouvertures nécessaires, cependant avec le plus de secret que possible. Le moindre soupçon que le Directoire prendroit sur l'objet d'une pareille négociation la porteroit à des extrémités très dangereuses ; aucune puissance n'étant préparée à une défense vigoureuse, et les armées Françaises se trouvant les maîtres des deux rives du Rhin.

“ En omettant les intérêts de la Hollande dans ce mémoire, ce n'est certainement point manque de sentir l'importance de la délivrance de ce païs infortuné, mais il est fort à craindre qu'une telle proposition donneroit facilement ombrage par la nécessité où l'on est d'éviter la guerre aussi longtems que possible.

“ L'union établie sur des bases solides, la tranquillité de l'Europe une fois assurée, il se présenteront par la suite des circonstances favorables, qui pourront être saisies ; mais il seroit dangereux, peut-être, de les établir dès les commencement pour condition expresse.

“ Il y a toute raison de croire que dans les premiers tems du nouveau règne il n'y aura aucun changement dans le ministère ; mais il n'y a aucun doute que les anciens ministres ne s'empressent à suivre les indications du jeune monarque qui voit les choses très bien, qui sent les dangers de l'Europe, et qui emploiera vraisemblablement tous les moyens pour développer aux yeux de l'Europe ses principes de justice et d'équité.

“ L’auteur de ce mémoire ne peut indiquer que des aperçus. Comme il n’est aucunement dans les affaires, comme il n’y a aucune part, il ne parle que d’après ses sentimens, et d’après ce qu’il voit. Il doit le répéter qu’il ne peut point agir ; et avec le plus grand zèle pour le bien général, son intervention pourroit devenir plus nuisible qu’utile. Mais il a tout lieu de croire qu’avec les bonnes dispositions qu’il remarque, il pourra s’opérer un bien infini si l’Angleterre trouve de son intérêt de former sous ses auspices une union de puissances capables de résister à la France, même après les acquisitions immenses qu’elle a faites, et qu’elle va probablement faire encore au moment de la paix.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to M. DE LUC.

1797, December 14. Cleveland Row.—“ Sa Majesté ayant daigné me communiquer les lettres que vous lui avez adressées depuis votre arrivée en Allemagne, m’a aussi chargé de vous écrire le peu de choses qu’il y a dans les circonstances actuelles à répondre sur leur contenu.

“ Le roi n’a pû manquer d’être extrêmement sensible à la confiance avec laquelle s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Duc de Brunswick s’est ouvert vis-à-vis de vous, et sa Majesté a vu avec le plus grand plaisir les nouvelles preuves que cette occasion lui a fourni de la manière de penser de ce prince éclairé. Dès le moment que la perspective de l’événement qui a eu lieu à Berlin a offert celle de la possibilité de s’entendre avec cette cour pour amener une union générale des grandes puissances, dont l’union peut seule sauver l’Europe, sa Majesté a bien pensé que la concurrence de l’Empereur de Russie seroit du plus grand poids pour la réussite d’une pareille proposition à Berlin. Elle n’a rien négligé de ce qui lui a paru le plus propre pour préparer et obtenir cette concurrence, et nous avons même quelque lieu de croire que ces efforts ne seront pas absolument sans succès.

“ Mais, il faut le dire, si pour agir à Berlin, et même pour les premiers pas, il faudra attendre que la proposition en soit faite par la cour de Petersbourg, il paroîtroit que nous sommes encore bien éloignés du but que nous nous proposons ; et cela non seulement à cause des distances, mais aussi parcequ’il seroit peut-être bien plus difficile de déterminer l’Empereur de Russie à devenir lui-même le premier moteur d’un pareil projet, que d’y entrer lorsqu’il paroîtroit que les voies eussent été, du moins en partie, préparées par une intelligence entre sa Majesté et le Roi de Prusse.

“ Voilà tout ce qu’il est possible de vous dire dans le moment. Beaucoup doit résulter du voyage de Monseigneur le Duc à Berlin. Il y jugera sur les lieux de ce qu’il y a à faire, et si, par hasard, il y trouvoit des dispositions favorables, tout doit faire présumer que son zèle pour la bonne cause ne lui permettroit de rien omettre pour les mettre à profit. J’attends avec impatience les nouvelles que vous pourrez me transmettre à cet égard.”

*Postscript.*—“ Vous recevrez, ci-jointe, la copie d'une information qui m'est parvenu relativement aux desseins des François sur Hambourg. Je ne puis pas en garantir l'authenticité, quoique bien des circonstances paroissent la confirmer. Vous en ferez l'usage convenable auprès du Duc de Brunswick, même qu'il puisse la communiquer à Berlin, s'il le juge utile.”

*Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 21. Brunswick.—“ J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence le 12 de ce mois, pour lui envoyer un mémoire que Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick m'avoit fait parvenir de Berlin par M. le Général de Stamford, destiné pour votre Excellence, et exprimant ses idées pour arriver au but de celui dont j'avois eu l'honneur d'être le porteur. Je pris la liberté de faire remarquer en même temps à votre Excellence, que l'idée du Duc dans ce mémoire étoit toujours au fond celle que nous avions prévue, M. de Stamford et moi, et dont pour gagner du temps, j'avois eu l'honneur de faire déjà mention à sa Majesté ; savoir, qu'il falloit se hâter de faire exprimer par la Russie sa persuasion de la nécessité d'une réunion sincère et étroite entre les grandes puissances, et l'assurance de son concours ; mais que je trouvois dans ce mémoire l'idée ultérieure d'une intervention de l'Angleterre auprès des cours de Berlin et de Vienne, présentée comme devant avoir lieu dès à présent ; ce qui me sembloit contraster avec la première idée. Sur quoi j'avois l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence que, comme s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] étoit attendue le 16, dès que je serois éclairée sur ce point j'aurois l'honneur de l'en instruire. Je le suis maintenant ; c'est parceque de nouvelles circonstances ont été amenées par le séjour de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à Berlin. Mais, pour n'avoir pas à interrompre le fil de cet important rapport, où chacune des circonstances qui le composeront est essentielle à l'ensemble, je crois devoir le faire précéder de ce qui regarde l'un des papiers que votre Excellence trouvera ci-joint, que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a remis, pensant qu'il convenoit de le lui faire passer.

“Ce papier est la copie d'un mémoire reçu par Louis XVIII, communiqué au Duc. M. de Stamford en avoit déjà eu connoissance avant l'arrivée de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], et on lui avoit appris qu'il étoit venu en Angleterre au Duc d'Harcourt, ce qui me fait presumer qu'il n'a pas passé en Angleterre sans que les ministres de sa Majesté en aient eu connoissance. Toutefois je ne dois pas manquer de l'envoyer à votre Excellence, qui jugera de l'importance de son contenu ; non quant aux intentions du Directoire, qui ne paroissent pas douteuses, mais quant à ce qui est dit du manque de moyens ; sur quoi le passé doit montrer que la plupart des informations de ce genre ont été trompeuses ; parceque, très souvent, lorsque ces gens-là se plaignoient eux-mêmes ouvertement de pénurie, c'étoit pour



le faire répéter par les donneurs de avis, afin d'endormir ceux contre qui ils se prepaioient.

“ Le second mémoire que j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence va faire maintenant l'objet de mon rapport ; il sera long, mais je dois tâcher de placer votre Excellence au point où je me trouve ; afin qu'elle puisse bien connoître tout ce qui a acheminé ce mémoire, qui est de M. de Haugwitz.

“ Une connoissance précise du Duc, personnage que nous avons toujours plus lieu de considérer comme étant de très grande importance, me paraît d'abord ici très essentielle. Il pourroit sans doute beaucoup plus s'il ajoutoit à ses moyens un caractère ferme et décidé ; mais on s'exposeroit à perdre ce qu'il peut si l'on exigeoit au-delà de ce que comporte son excessive timidité en politique. Depuis l'arrivée de s'a[ltesse] s[éréniissime] nous avons resté, M. de Stamford et moi, trois jours sans qu'il eût cherché à nous voir ; ce qui se joignant à des informations particulières que M. de Stamford avoit recues de Berlin, et au laconisme décourageant de s'a[ltesse] s[éréniissime] dans deux lettres qu'il lui avoit écrites, nous ôtoit presque toute espérance. Nous savions, dis-je, que le Roi de Prusse avoit pressé le Duc de s'ouvrir entièrement à lui, et que même le comte de Pannin (qui devoit lui paroître un homme essentiel dans ses vues sur la Russie) avoit taché de l'engager à agir ; et l'on ajoutoit qu'il avoit décliné ces ouvertures, et qu'il étoit fort bien avec M. de Haugwitz ; ce qui, dans les idées précédentes, paroissoit de mauvaise augure. Mais enfin, le 19 de ce mois, s'a[ltesse] s[éréniissime] désira de nous voir, et vint pour cet effet chez M. de Stamford. Nous avons bien eu lieu de comprendre dans cet entretien que le Duc n'a pas tiré parti des circonstances comme l'aura fait un homme qui, avec les mêmes intentions, auroit eu un caractère plus décidé ; mais il a fait tout ce qui étoit en son pouvoir ; et votre Excellence jugera mieux que nous de l'importance de ce qu'il a opéré au-travers de ses craintes, que je dois toutes expliquer, ainsi que ce qui paroît de leur influence.

“ Une première chose que nous avons remarquée d'après son récit, quoiqu'il n'y ait pas lié lui-même des choses qui, rapprochées, nous paroissent importantes, c'est qu'à la date où il écrivit le mémoire que j'ai eu l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence, il avoit déjà eu des entretiens avec le Roi ; ce qu'il n'avoit pas même laissé entrevoir à M. de Stamford en le lui envoyant. Or, il est trop circonspect pour l'avoir écrit sans savoir, ou prévoir du moins, qu'il étoit d'accord avec les idées de sa Majesté. C'est probablement de là qu'est venu le changement à sa première idée, en conseillant d'agir à Berlin et à Vienne en même temp qu'en Russie ; ce que la suite fortifiera.

“ Sa timidité se montre bien dans une autre circonstance, qui expliquera les avis venus de Berlin à M. de Stamford. Le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, qui pense très sainement, ayant fait ici un petit séjour avec le Prince Frédéric, M. de Stamford en prit occasion de la mettre en état de profiter autant

qu'il le pourroit de l'amitié que le roi (alors encore Prince royal) lui témoignoit, pour lui inspirer des idées salutaires. Dans ce séjour, j'eus aussi l'honneur de voir souvent ce prince. Il ne fut pas instruit de ma mission ; mais il put bien appercevoir qu'il y avoit quelque raison de rapprochement entre le Duc et moi ; et M. de Stamford lui a fait comprendre depuis que, si le roi parloit de l'Angleterre, il pouvoit lui insinuer que, très probablement, le Duc avoit quelque connoissance des intentions de ce cabinet.

“ Il faut bien que le Roi ait témoigné ce désir au Prince, et il paroît même qu'il l'a exprimé à M. de Haugwitz ; car ce ministre, parlant à M. Tollius, venu depuis peu d'Angleterre, et envoyé par le Prince d'Orange à l'occasion du congrès de Rastadt, lui demanda s'il ne savoit rien des idées du cabinet Anglois. Sur quoi M. Tollius, instruit par le Prince Héréditaire et par M. de Stamford, en répondant au ministre qu'il n'en étoit pas instruit, ajouta qu'il pensoit que si quelqu'un en étoit informé, ce seroit peut-être le Duc de Brunswick.

“ Il paroît que c'est ainsi que le Duc a été acheminé par le Roi même et son ministre à agir comme il desiroit lui-même le pouvoir ; et si votre Excellence y voit combien il est difficile à engager s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à l'action, j'espère qu'elle trouvera cette facheuse circonstance compensée en voyant, par là, qu'il y a été acheminé par le désir même du Roi de se lier avec l'Angleterre, et en général de suivre les conseils du Duc. Or, comme M. de Stamford avoit pris soin d'informer le Prince héréditaire d'Orange de tout ce que pensoit s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] sur les dangers actuels, et le seul moyen de s'en garantir, il est probable que sa M[ajesté] l'a engagé à expliquer tout son plan ; et que c'est de là qu'est résultée enfin une longue et très intéressante conférence du Duc avec M. de Haugwitz ; conférence dont s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], en nous faisant l'honneur de nous réciter quelques circonstances, nous a dit qu'elle étoit demeurée absolument secrète entr'eux et le Roi. De sorte que le Prince héréditaire d'Orange, et à plus forte raison M. Tollius, n'en ayant rien appris, ils ont cru que le voyage du Duc à Berlin n'avoit eu aucun effet.

“ Dans cette conférence, M. de Haugwitz se prononça très fortement contre les actes du précédent règne, qu'il rejetta sur ceux qui s'étoient saisis de l'esprit du Roi. Il posa, néanmoins, pour principe actuel qu'on ne pouvoit revenir de la paix de Bâle, quoiqu'il la déplorât, ni rien faire de la part de la Prusse qui l'enfreignît, aujourd'hui qu'elle étoit isolée. Mais il exprima lui-même ses craintes de cet isolement, non seulement pour la Prusse, mais pour tous les états de l'Europe ; et son désir de voir renaître une union sur le plan de sûreté ; et ce fut après cela que l'entretien tourna sur l'Angleterre.

“ Continuant son récit, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ajouta ; que voyant M. de Haugwitz disposé à ce que la Prusse rentrât dans les liaisons avec l'Angleterre, et voulant l'engager à se prononcer de quelque manière à cet égard, il lui avoit proposé de mettre par écrit quelques idées sur ce sujet, pour voir ce qu'on

pourroit faire à cet égard, et de les lui envoyer à Brunswick ; ce qu'il avoit promis. 'Or voici,' a-t-il ajouté, 'ce que j'ai reçu cette nuit par un exprès, écrit de la main même de M. de Haugwitz.' C'est-là le mémoire dont j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer copie à votre Excellence. L'original est resté entre les mains du Duc, mais il a voulu que je pusse dire en l'envoyant que je l'avois copié moi-même sur cet original. Or il est très naturel de conclure d'un tel envoy ici, que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] s'est expliquée, au moins jusqu'à un certain point, sur ma mission. Nous n'avons pas, cependant, jugé qu'il convînt de le faire expliquer là-dessus, puisqu'il n'en disoit rien lui-même ; mais une autre circonstance fortifiera bientôt cette idée.

"Le Duc lut lui-même ce mémoire, et comme c'étoit la fin d'un récit, très circonstancié, qui avoit duré assez longtemps sans interruption de notre part, il le termina par ce mot, *Diri*.

"Je pris alors la liberté de lui dire, 'Monseigneur, le récit que v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a daigné nous faire, avec de si intéressans détails, est sans doute beaucoup, et peut-être en est-elle fatiguée ; cependant j'ose lui représenter qu'elle n'a pas tout dit ; et j'espère qu'elle voudra bien y ajouter ce qu'elle pense elle-même de cette première ouverture. Il y a sans doute là un commencement ; et s'il ne s'agissoit que d'intérêts particuliers, communs sur un point à l'Angleterre et à la Prusse, vis-à-vis d'une puissance telle qu'elles étoient autrefois, avec des moyens bornés, et certaines règles du droit-des-gens, il y auroit de quoi entamer une négociation. Mais comment la Prusse et l'Angleterre se garantiroient-elles seules contre une puissance qui embrasse aujourd'hui toutes les autres ; qui a travaillé et travaille à les désunir pour les détruire en détail, ou renverser au moins leurs constitutions ; qui, au sud, dans sa République Cisalpine, fait jurer ouvertement *haine aux Rois*, et qui déclare, quant au nord, que la constitution d'Angleterre ne doit pas co-exister avec celle de la France ? L'ouverture de M. de Haugwitz, répond-elle à l'étendue d'un tel mal ?' 'Non (m'a répondu s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]) je pense à cet égard comme vous ; le Roi et M. de Haugwitz le voyent de même ; mais c'est un acheminement, et mon idée seroit que vous allassiez à Berlin ; parceque vous pourriez juger mieux que moi de ce qu'on pourroit proposer de part et d'autre.'

"Votre Excellence comprend bien que je ne m'arrêtai pas à cette idée, le roi ayant là un ministre ; et c'étoit à tous égards une ressource trop faible, surtout à cause du temps qui s'est écoulé depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de premières instructions ; et quant à celles-là, que pourrais-je presser auprès du roi de Prusse et M. d'Haugwitz que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] n'eût déjà dans la lettre du Roi, et le mémoire de votre Excellence ? Il s'agissoit donc de tâcher de pénétrer pourquoi il ne paroissoit pas être allé aussi loin lui-même, et voici ce que nous avons pu conjecturer.

"J'ai déjà fait mention dans le premier rapport que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire à sa Majesté, d'une des modifications du

caractère timide du Duc dont le Prince Henri s'étoit déjà prévalu; c'est qu'il suffit de répandre qu'il cherche à influencer, pour lui faire craindre de le tenter. Or le Prince Henri s'étoit établi son surveillant à Berlin, et le lui a fait comprendre par des questions indiscrètes. Heureusement pourtant ce Prince n'a que de la hardiesse, mais point de crédit auprès du Roi; ce qui probablement l'empêche d'en avoir sur M. d'Haugwitz. C'est le Duc lui-même qui nous a rapporté ces circonstances, ajoutant que cela l'avoit obligé à de grands ménagemens.

"Cependant il paroît, comme j'ai eu l'honneur de le faire remarquer plus haut à Votre Excellence, que M. d'Haugwitz sait plus de ce qui est connu au Duc par rapport à l'Angleterre qu'il ne nous a dit lui-même; et M. de Stamford, qui connoît ce Ministre, avoit fort à coeur de savoir surquoi le Duc fondeoit la confiance qu'il paroîssoit lui accorder dans cette négociation; et voici ce que nous avons pu en juger.

"Ce Ministre rejetant tout le mal passé, qu'il ne dissimule point, sur des personnes aujourd'hui écartées des affaires, c'est du moins une preuve qu'il ne s'associeroit pas à ce parti; et l'on peut en trouver la raison dans les dispositions du Roi car, quoique jeune et sans expérience dans les affaires, on peut prévoir qu'il ne se laissera pas circonvenir comme le Roi défunt. Soit par ses propres observations, soit par les soins assidus de M. de Stamford auprès du Prince héréditaire d'Orange, et l'intimité de celui-ci avec le futur roi dans la vie ordinaire, ce prince est arrivé au trône avec l'intime persuasion du danger de toute l'Europe par la faction Française et ses associés secrets; et sa conduite morale ayant toujours été telle qu'on ne peut espérer de le séduire par les plaisirs, on doit s'attendre qu'il restera toujours attentif aux principes d'après lesquelles on dirigera les affaires dans ces dangereuses circonstances. On n'oseroit entreprendre d'effacer de son esprit l'idée trop claire de ce danger, de peur de devenir suspect; et il a déjà exprimé en plusieurs occasions particulières une telle aversion pour les voies obliques, qu'on n'a pas à craindre, tant qu'il sera instruit, qu'on puisse le conduire à rien qui puisse blesser la probité ni l'honneur. Voilà donc une boussole pour M. d'Haugwitz, puisqu'il veut conserver sa place; et l'on voit au moins ces derniers sentimens fortement exprimés dans son mémoire, qui ne peut qu'être connu du Roi. Ainsi, pourvu qu'on puisse tenir ce monarque constamment attentif à toutes les faces des grandes affaires actuelles, M. d'Haugwitz devra continuer en particulier de suivre la route qu'il vient d'entamer vis-à-vis de l'Angleterre; trop liée déjà dans son mémoire même, et très probablement par les entretiens du Duc avec lui en présence du Roi, avec l'ensemble de l'état de l'Europe pour qu'il pût, aujourd'hui, les séparer.

"C'est donc essentiellement vers le Roi qu'il faut tourner ses vues pour être sûr de la conduite de M. d'Haugwitz; il faudroit tâcher, dans des conversations particulières, de partir avec lui du mémoire dont l'intérêt de la Prusse doit être la base pour sa M[ajesté], afin d'examiner s'il y pourvoit suffisamment. Les objets de ce mémoire semblent d'abord très simples; il s'agit de

garantir le nord de l'Allemagne, et ce but importe à l'Angleterre pour sauver son commerce, et ainsi la source de sa richesse. 'Voilà (dit le mémoire) l'objet qui pour la Prusse et l'Angleterre est également sacré, le point où leurs politiques se touchent.'— Mais est-ce là le seul point, même le point le plus essentiel?— S'il n'y avoit rien à craindre en ce moment pour le nord de l'Allemagne, la Prusse n'auroit-elle aucun intérêt au sort de l'Angleterre?

"Voilà sur quoi il faudroit porter fortement l'attention du Roi lui-même, car M. d'Haugwitz ne semble pas pouvoir s'y méprendre comme un jeune monarque qui n'est pas encore accoutumé à embrasser beaucoup d'objets à la fois. Laisser sur l'Angleterre seule le poids énorme de la puissance Française au risque du renversement de sa constitution, c'est perdre de vue, comme toutes les autres puissances du continent semblent le faire, que la Grande Bretagne ne se trouve une grande puissance maritime qu'à cause de sa position; et que si, en l'abandonnant aujourd'hui à ses seules ressources, elle venoit à succomber à ses ennemis extérieurs et intérieurs, et se trouvoit révolutionnée comme la Hollande, tout ce que cette puissance seule a fait jusqu'ici de contrepoids à la puissance croissante de la nation la plus ambitieuse, seroit jetté tout-à-coup et pour toujours de son côté; et ce monstrueux pouvoir, dirigé par des maximes plus monstrueuses encore, commanderoit alors à son gré tous les états de l'Europe, comme il a l'audace de le faire chez tous ceux qu'il a déjà réussi à soumettre ou à intimider, les uns par les autres.

"Il faudroit, dans de telles conversations, et d'après un principe si évident, faire en sorte que le Roi de Prusse lui-même se pénétrât profondément de cette vérité, qu'aucune des puissances encore existantes ne peut se sauver seule de cette hydre; et qu'ainsi, pour rendre efficace un traité entre la Prusse et l'Angleterre dans le but particulier, sans doute indispensable, de défendre les embouchures des deux rivières qui ouvrent l'entrée de l'Allemagne, il faut d'abord examiner sincèrement à quel point chacune des deux puissances peut y concourir dans sa situation actuelle. Mais que de plus il faut essentiellement s'employer à faire sentir à la Russie et à l'Autriche, de manière à attirer leur confiance, que le danger s'étend jusqu'à elles, afin que la dernière concoure elle-même à réveiller l'empire d'Allemagne sur son danger, et à le réunir pour sa défense, avec l'appui et la garantie de la Russie et de l'Angleterre.

"Telles étant aussi les vues de Monseigneur le Duc, et la raison de son désir que j'allasse à Berlin, mes raisons de le décliner, du moins quant à présent, dirigèrent ses idées sur un plan plus lié. Vienne est maintenant un point de plus grande importance que Berlin; parceque l'Empereur, à qui il faudroit aussi parvenir directement pour lui faire comprendre ses vrais intérêts, est bien plus environné d'illusions, en même temps que de craintes. Mais s'il étoit quelque moyen de parvenir jusqu'à lui, en feroit-on un objet préliminaire, tandis qu'il est si pressant

d'acheminer des négociations formelles ? Il seroit donc à souhaiter qu'on pût faire marcher de concert ces négociations et les moyens indirects d'empêcher que les souverains eux-mêmes ne perdent de vue la seule base de leur sûreté, en étant entraînés par des craintes, les uns des autres, qu'on ne peut que trop aisément exciter ; et voici l'idée à laquelle s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se fixa, pour que j'eusse l'honneur de la proposer à votre Excellence, et par elle à sa Majesté.

" Dans la supposition que la négociation pour le concours de la Russie est assez avancée pour y compter dans les démarches de l'Angleterre auprès de Berlin et Vienne, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pense qu'elles devroient commencer à la fois. Et quant aux bases de la négociation, instruite sans doute des intentions de Berlin, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] suppose qu'on y partirait du *statu-quo* avec les engagements précis et ouvertement déclarés ; 1° que les puissances contractantes ne permettraient pas que leur indépendance, ni celle d'aucun des états leurs voisins, fût violée, ni même insultée en aucune manière ; et que ce qui pourroit être tenté à cet égard contr'elles, ou aucun de ces états encore indépendans, deviendrait la cause de toutes, pour s'employer de tout leur pouvoir à l'empêcher. 2° Que comme tout dicte qu'il est de l'intérêt des souverains, et de l'humanité entière, de donner enfin la paix à l'Europe sur une base solide, elles concourront toutes pour cet effet à une paix générale et concertée entre toutes les puissances, dont elles se deviendront mutuellement garantes ; spécifiant notamment la paix à faire de la France avec l'Angleterre sur des bases justes ; objets sur lesquels l'Angleterre donneroit dès à présent des instructions déterminées à ses ministres aux trois cours.

" Mais que pour séconder les démarches officielles, et établir un concert prompt avec le Duc, et rendre ainsi son influence plus efficace à Berlin, M. le Général Stamford seroit envoyé à Vienne, parcequ'il possède au plus haut degré tout l'ensemble du passé, et la perspective de l'avenir ; et qu'ayant la confiance personnelle du Roi de Prusse, il ne pourroit que contribuer beaucoup au rapprochement de ce monarque avec l'Empereur. Quant à lui fournir le moyen plausible de se présenter à Vienne, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Prince d'Orange, qui a déjà envoyé M. Tollius à Rastadt, pourroit aussi envoyer M. de Stamford à Vienne dans le même but. Un homme comme lui, placé seulement à ce poste, se frayeroit sûrement une route ; pourvu seulement que sa santé ne vienne y mettre aucun obstacle.

" Quant à Berlin s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a toujours des vues sur moi ; elle le croit nécessaire pour la correspondance avec M. de Haugwitz, et là aussi je serois à portée de son appui et de ses directions. Dans ce plan, nous serions introduits, M. de Stamford et moi, par votre Excellence auprès des ministres respectifs de sa Majesté, comme des personnes en qui ils pourroient prendre confiance ; pour servir, par nos relations privées, à leur faire parvenir des informations plus immédiates, et les remarques qu'elles occasionneroient.

" Il est une circonstance, liée à l'ensemble des affaires, qui fait

ici autant de peine que de bruit ; c'est le renvoy par le Duc, sur l'avis du Roi de Prusse, de l'infortuné Louis XVIII. et des autres émigrés ; ce qu'on interprète assez naturellement comme un symptôme de faiblesse du Roi et du Duc lui-même ; mais voici ce que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a bien voulu nous en dire.

“Le Directoire a fait déclarer à Berlin qu'entretenir dans ces contrées le plus grand ennemi de la république Française, et le foyer de toutes les conspirations qu'il dit exister dans l'intérieur, ne pouvoit être considéré que comme une conduite contraire à la *neutralité* ; et qu'ainsi il attendoit qu'ils seroient renvoyés. Or on a cru que dans les circonstances actuelles, où rien encore n'est prêt pour une résistance efficace, il falloit ôter prétexte ; en attendant qu'on se soit mis en position de n'en plus souffrir.

S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] nous a fait part ensuite des dispositions dont elle s'occupe, de concert avec Berlin, pour les points avancés de la ligne de démarcation ; en préparant d'autres forces sur les derrières, s'il en étoit besoin ; auquel cas on croit pouvoir compter sur la Saxe. Mais sur ce point, je ne doute pas que votre Excellence n'ait des informations précises par d'autres canaux.

“Je crois que voilà où se termine pour le présent ce qui pouvoit rendre mon séjour de quelque utilité à Brunswick, où j'ai dû employer toutes sortes de moyens durant le temps où je ne pouvois m'absenter, pour soutenir le caractère de ma vocation ostensible ; maintenant il faut que j'aille en faire autant à Hanovre, où l'on s'étonne de ne me pas voir encore, et je songe à y aller dans quelques jours. Je ne perdrai point cependant le fil d'ici, ni M. de Stamford celui de Berlin ; et s'il se passoit quelque chose d'importance, j'aurois l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence. Peut-être que sur les premières informations que j'ai eu l'honneur de faire parvenir à sa Majesté, votre Excellence m'aura envoyé de nouveaux ordres ; qu'en ce cas je suivrai de tout mon pouvoir. Mais voilà une nouvelle scène qui s'ouvre, sur laquelle je ne puis avoir aucune lumière jusqu'à ce que votre Excellence l'ait considérée elle-même, et m'ait fait l'honneur de m'informer du jugement qu'elle en porte ; de même que de la conduite que je dois tenir à cet égard ; et ce sera probablement à Hanovre (sans aller encore à Gottingue) que j'attendrai ses ordres ; prêt à les exécuter autant qu'il me sera possible.” *Two Enclosures.*

#### *Enclosure 1.*

*Secret report from France to Louis XVIII. (Count de Provence).*

*Extract.* “On a des données certaines sur la vie politique et la vie privée des Directeurs.

“En politique, ils continuent d'annoncer ostensiblement le projet de faire des descentes en Angleterre, d'y transporter le théâtre de la guerre.

“ Ils tiennent des Comités secrets, où les idées de chacun sur cet objet sont présentées et discutées, ainsi que les plans que chacun dit avoir reçus, soit des particuliers qui paroissent s’y intéresser, soit des officiers qui s’y destinent.

“ Le résultat des ces dispositions étoit, il y a quelques jours, de réunir 200,000 hommes sur les côtes de Brest et de Bretagne, de faire construire dans chaque port, ou réparer, le plus grand nombre de batteaux plats possible . . . . . de tenter une première descente en Irlande où on se dit sûr du succès . . . . . puis une descente générale, en partant de tous les points de la France, lorsque la guerre seroit établie en Irlande.

“ Forcer l’Espagne et la Hollande à seconder de tous leurs moyens. Ce vaste projet est loin de l’exécution ; nullité presque absolue en finances ; et en marine vains efforts pour les réparer.

“ Provisoirement on voudroit paralyser le commerce Anglois, exciter le mécontentement de ceux qui s’y livrent en les privant des ports qui recoivent leurs navires, notamment de celui de Hambourg ou Cuxhaven ; de là le projet d’y envoyer des troupes. On se flatte de faire taire le roi de Prusse par des actes de satisfaction, et de compensation ou indemnité.

“ Par l’un des articles secrets du traité de paix, l’Electorât de Hannovre a été réservé pour les indemnités des différents intéressés qui réclameraient au congrès de Rastadt.

“ Ce sera toujours par les préparatifs, par les mouvemens des troupes, par les dispositions qui pourront se faire dans les ports qu’on jugera de la réalité des projets, ainsi que par les ordres relatifs à ces divers objets que donnera chaque ministère.

“ Dans leur intérieur, les moeurs, les passions, les habitudes des Directeurs offrent beaucoup de variétés.

“ Merlin travaille quatorze heures par jour ; il s’occupe de tout ce qui est de détail d’exécution des loix, de gouvernement effectif. Les quatre autres, très satisfaits de son assiduité, signent avec complaisance toutes les productions de ce labeur, et se livrent à des exercices différents.

“ Rewbel agiote, boit, s’enivre souvent ; il prend intérêt dans tous les marchés des nouveaux entrepreneurs, parmi lesquels on remarque Tallien, Bentabolle.

“ François fait des vers.

“ La Reveillère herborise au jardin du roi, dit des plantes. La fille du jardinier s’est emparée de son cœur, et a au moins autant de pouvoir sur lui que la Théophilantropie.

“ Barras consacre peu de momens au Cabinet ; s’il y passe quelques heures, ses jambes s’inflent, il se croit mort. Le lendemain une partie de chasse et un dinée nombreux dissipent sa mélancolie.

“ Aucun d’eux ne pense à la constitution actuelle ; s’il y a entre eux un point d’accord à ce sujet c’est celui de la destruction, mais grande divergence sur celle qui devra succéder.

“ Merlin ne s’est chargé de tout le travail que pour disposer au retour de la terreur. Plan du Directoire ; plus de corps législatif en deux conseils ; une seule convention réunissant tous les



pouvoirs, les distribuant par émanation de son centre. Des clubs partout, qui seront autant d'auxiliaires et d'instrumens.

"Tel est le plan de Merlin. Il fut d'abord combattu par Rewbel, qui craignoit que la journée de Grenelle ne lui fut jamais pardonnée ; mais Merlin a dissipé cette frayeur.

"Laclos est le principal collaborateur de Merlin ; depuis huit jours il ne le quitte pas.

"Antonelle et Felix le Pelletier vont tous les soirs chez eux entre onze heures et minuit, et y passent plusieurs heures. Ils dirigent les clubs. Antoine et Marceau rendent compte de leurs opérations, y portent les vœux de Merlin et compagnie.

"Reverchon est le second de Rewbel ; il s'est chargé des Lyonnais ; quatre des siens sont partis hier pour ce travail.

"Barras est l'ennemi déclaré de ce projet et de ses auteurs. Il a montré de l'inquiétude pendant quelques jours. Il paroît actuellement très rassuré ; il dit dans ses confidences intimes qu'il jouera avec les têtes de Merlin et de Rewbel, qu'il les laisse aller, certain de les arrêter quand il en sera tems ; et comme ces deux têtes ne suffiroient pas, il y joindra celles de leurs agens actuels, et de quarante députés des deux conseils. Les troupes sont sa force. L'armée d'Angleterre et son chef seront à sa disposition ; mais s'ils triomphent quel sera leur gouvernement ? On l'ignore. Barras est étroitement lié avec D'iesre, secrétaire d'ambassade d'Espagne.

"Talleyrand est du parti de Merlin et Rewbel ; un ami de Barras lui en a marqué de l'inquiétude, et Barras a répondu *qu'il attendoit incessamment un homme qui mettroit tous ces yeux-là à la raison.*

"Berthier est parti dimanche 12, à onze heures et demi du soir, non pour Rastadt, comme le disent plusieurs journaux, mais pour l'Italie.

"Le Directoire, informé des intelligences qui existent avec les isles de St. Marcou, va tenter de s'en emparer, ou de couvrir cette mer de frégates et de corsaires pour intercepter cette communication.

"Même projet sur les isles de Jersey et Guernsey, au moyen, dit-on, de quelques bateaux plats qui partiroient des côtes de Cherbourg et Coutance.

"Toujours, et plus activement que jamais, système de propagande, et porter la révolution chez nos voisins. Les agens et les instructions parlent des secrets du Directoire et des affaires étrangères. L'un des notres a reçu les propositions qui lui ont été faites à ce sujet pour la Suisse, et les instructions y relatives, et a donné ensuite un prétexte pour refuser."

"Là paix générale n'est pas faite, dit le ministre, même dans le Continent. Il craint de prouver beaucoup de résistance même au congrès. Les Cours de Berlin, Stockholm, Petersbourg et Constantinople l'inquiètent également.

"Sa correspondance avec les ministres de la République en Espagne et Hollande ne tend qu'à les engager à redoubler d'efforts pour exciter la haine des nations où ils résident, contre le gouvernement Anglois ; et employer tous les moyens pour le

contraindre à signer la paix aux conditions qui lui seront imposées.

“Charretier a mission expresse de tout tenter pour soulever le peuple Anglois contre le roi et les ministres, de distribuer de l'argent à propos ; il correspond à Paris avec Vandenyver, rue Varenne.

“Quelques conférences entre le ministre et Beaumarchais, aussi secrètes que possibles, font présumer qu'il ira bientôt à Londres pour y négocier dans le parti de l'opposition les moyens de contraindre les ministres à demander la paix.

“Le Canu, m[archand] de mousselines, de bazins, et autres objets pareils, court l'Angleterre, et surtout les ports. Sa mission est de faire le relevé du nombre des matelots ; étudier leurs dispositions ; leur suggérer le désir de venger leurs camarades, victimes de leur zèle pour la liberté ; sa dernière lettre, venue par Calais, porte que l'abattement causé aux matelots par le supplice des leurs est extrême ; qu'ils tremblent à l'idée d'une cour—martiala ; qu'il croit cependant qu'avec des sommes considérables, et la médiation de quelques patriotes d'Angleterre, on parviendrait encore à les soulever.

“Canivet est un autre acteur de la propagande, et vient de partir pour l'Angleterre avec l'instruction d'usage. Il est employé depuis longtems ; il le fût par Roberspierre, comme ami de Tachereau son beau-frère.

“Il est connu sous des couleurs toutes différentes. On lui croit des principes honnêtes, il est reçu dans les meilleures maisons, voit les émigrés, leur rend des services, leur procure de l'argent. Il n'est pas méchant ; on croit qu'il n'est espion que par intérêt.

“Voici son signalement ; 32 ou 33 ans, 5 pieds 4 pouces, cheveux et sourcils châtains clair, visage plein et coloré, bel homme, toujours bien mis ; a un passeport sous son nom, fait quelques affaires de commerce.

“Houe Anglois s'occupe ici de tout ce qui peut nuire à son pays. Il réunit dans ce moment les matériaux nécessaires pour prouver que les ministres ont acquis des fortunes considérables au préjudice de la nation ; repandre avec profusion le manifeste qui contiendrait ces détails ; annoncer que le gouvernement François fera la paix avec le gouvernement Anglois dèsqu'il y aura d'autres ministres ; il correspond à Calais avec Parry de la même nation.

“Nouvelles inquiétudes des provinces méridionales. Le camp de Jallé est renouvelé ; de toutes parts des rassemblemens nombreux, des républicains mal-traités. Tout le midi va devenir Vendéens, si ces mouvemens ne sont pas réprimés dans leur naissance.

“De même en Brétagne et Normandie. On marque que deux commissaires Anglois ont débarqué à Granville pour y apporter des nouveaux fonds, et exciter les insurrections.

“On a donné au commissaire du gouvernement les pouvoirs les plus étendus pour arrêter tous les royalistes qu'il découvrirait, sans aucune formalité.

“ Le ministre prétend être assuré qu’il existe à Paris des agens de Louis XVIII., et promet au Directoire leurs prompte arrestation.

“ Depuis quelques jours on a cessé les perquisitions de Messieurs de la Trimouille et Frotté ; mais elles se continuent avec activité contre Rohecotte dit Rozette, l’abbé Desgrigny dit Prévost, Bayard, Despomelles, Beaumont, Retel Crecy dit Mallet, Dupuy.

“ Tous sont désignés et signalés par Duverne. Un Irlandais dit *Sommers* est en liberté, et a répondu aux divers interrogatoires, qu’il a subis avec beaucoup d’esprit et de sang-froid.

“ Dupuis et François, en ont été les principaux sujets. Le ministre croit que c’est le même individu. Il recommande à ses agens la plus grande surveillance sur lui, le désigne comme le chef des conspirateurs ; mais il résulte de tous les rapports qui lui ont été faits jusqu’à ce jour, que cet être si dangereux n’est connu de qui que ce soit, non plus que les autres qui lui ont été désignés.

“ Le ministre croit actuellement que tous sont dans l’étranger, ou dans quelques provinces éloignées de Paris.

“ Les Coryphées des Jacobins se disent certains que Barras et Buonaparte sont royalistes, et ne pensent qu’à rétablir la monarchie en France. Ils remarquent que *Serrurier*, aristocrate prononcé, est le confident intime et unique de Buonaparte.”  
*Extrait.*

## Enclosure 2.

### MÉMOIRE by COUNT DE HAUGWITZ.

“ Il ne seroit pas impossible que l’Angleterre isolée, mais tenant dans sa lutte contre son formidable ennemi, ne désirât de se rapprocher de la Prusse. Dans la supposition qu’elle exprimât ce voeu, quel seroit l’intérêt et la marche de cette dernière puissance ?

“ Pour résoudre la question, il est nécessaire d’en poser une autre, et d’examiner dans quelle intention le cabinet de St. James rechercherait, avec celui de Prusse, des relations nouvelles.

“ L’Angleterre, en les amenant, se transporterait-elle encore à cette époque où des discussions, inutiles à rappeler, séparèrent les intérêts des deux cours ?

“ Ou bien, ayant pris son parti sur des revers irrémédiables, et occupée seulement de ses nouveaux dangers, ne désirerait-elle que d’être rassurée sur ceux-ci ?

“ C’est-à-dire, l’Angleterre, en se rapprochant de la Prusse, en exigerait-elle l’offensive contre la France ? Ou seulement la sûreté de l’électorat d’Hanovre, et de ses importans débouchés en Allemagne ?

“ Dans le premier cas, tout examen deviendrait superflu. Le système adopté par la Prusse depuis la paix de Bâle est le seul qui convienne à ses véritables intérêts. Rien au monde ne

sauroit la porter à s'en écarter. Elle s'en tiendra strictement aux engagements qu'elle a contracté avec la France par la convention conclue le 5 Aoust, 1796, sur la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne ; tant que, de son côté, celle-ci demeurera fidèle aux siens ; et dans l'hypothèse des ouvertures que lui adresseroit l'Angleterre, le Cabinet de Berlin, décidé à ne connoître jamais d'autre politique que la franchise et la loyauté, ne mettroit pas de borne à la sienne, et croiroit par là avoir plus fait pour l'amitié qu'en abusant l'Angleterre, en lui laissant le moindre doute sur le degré de coopération qu'elle devoit attendre de sa part.

“ Mais pour le second cas, ce seroit celui où un point de réunion existeroit en effet, et où l'une et l'autre puissance auroient les mêmes dangers à courir, et les mêmes mesures à prendre ; et c'est-là la seconde intention, supposée plus haut, du rapprochement de l'Angleterre.

“ La Prusse a fait la paix ; elle veut la maintenir ; mais sûre, mais conforme à sa dignité, et à ses véritables intérêts. Elle a vu de loin la France combattre les ennemis qui lui restoient après elle ; et en gémissant de voir les maux de la guerre peser encore sur d'autres peuples, elle a veillé tranquille à la sûreté des siens. C'est pour la mettre à l'abri des mêmes malheurs qu'elle a stipulée la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne. En prenant des mesures pour elle, elle n'a pas fait moins pour l'Angleterre. Elle a sauvé l'électorat d'Hanovre ; elle a sauvé le commerce de la Grande Bretagne, et lui a rendu par là un service des plus essentiels.

“ Car si les François s'étoient emparés (et qui, hors la Prusse, leur en eût fermé le chemin) des embouchûres du Weser et de l'Elbe, quels débouchés restoit-il aux Anglois avec les nations qui surtout les enrichissent ? Quelle ressource restoit-il à leur ministère pour poursuivre la terrible lutte ?

“ Voilà l'objet qui, pour la Prusse et l'Angleterre, est également sacré ; c'est là le point où leurs politiques se touchent, et l'intérêt prépondérant pour lequel elles ne sauroient craindre sans que la nature des choses ne les rapproche incessamment.

“ Les engagements les plus formels garantissent cette neutralité importante ; et il seroit trop douloureux de supposer au Gouvernement François la volonté de les rompre, pour en croire aisément les bruits qui l'assurent. Une perfidie pareille, si jamais le Directoire pouvoit s'en rendre coupable, ne seroit guère propre à lui mériter l'assentiment de la nation ; aussi la Prusse est-elle loin d'y croire. Si, cependant, elle étoit possible ; si le Directoire se déterminoit à faire marcher ses armées sur Hanovre et sur Hambourg, la Prusse, inébranlable jusques-là dans son système de loyauté et de paix, déploieroit la même énergie dans la carrière sanglant où on la forceroit d'entrer, et ne craindroit pas de mesurer l'ancienne réputation de ses armes et l'équité de sa cause, contre la bravoure des François et les injustes prétentions de ses Directeurs.

“ Alors naitroit le moment où une politique bien vue réuniroit sans peine les cours de Londres et de Berlin. Alors l'Angleterre,

considérant les dangers de la Prusse même, qui resteroit seule et exposée sur le Continent au choc réuni des armées Françaises ; l'Angleterre, instruite que la bravoure ne peut pas tout, que l'argent est le nerf de la guerre, ne voudroit pas, peut-être, par une économie mal calculée, risquer le succès de la campagne. Elle offriroit aux compagnons d'armes que la perfidie lui auroit rendus, les seuls moyens qui leur manquent ; elle s'épargneroit, en s'empressant à le faire, les regrets tardifs d'avoir exposé à succomber le seul état de la part duquel elle peut s'attendre de le voir combattre pour ses intérêts. Enfin, par le moyen des subsides, elle auroit conservé son commerce, et le superflu de ses richesses en auroit sauvé la source ; et l'empire des choses auroit rapproché deux puissances sans le concours desquels ce résultat resteroit peut-être bien précaire encore." *Copy.*

#### M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1797, December 25. Brunswick.—“ Le 21 de ce mois j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence pour lui communiquer ce qu'avoit produit le voyage de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick à Berlin, quant au plan que certainement il désire lui-même ; et ayant reçu le 23 la lettre dont votre Excellence m'a honoré le 14, elle nous procura hier, à M. de Stamford et à moi, un entretien fort détaillé avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Rien n'y fut épargné de notre part pour peindre des plus vives couleurs les circonstances présentes, et leurs suites indubitables si on ne les fait changer. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] acquiesça entièrement tant à la vérité du tableau, qu'à ce qu'il exigeroit à Berlin ; mais les mêmes obstacles se présentent toujours. C'est-là un ensemble de choses que votre Excellence peut maintenant se représenter assez elle-même pour que je doivre lui en épargner les détails ; ainsi je me bornerai à ce qui peut conduire à l'action. Rien de plus vrai que ce que votre Excellence me fait l'honneur de me dire dans sa lettre, qu'attendre la résolution de Petersbourg, avant que d'agir à Berlin et à Vienne, est une route beaucoup trop longue dans les circonstances urgentes des affaires. Votre Excellence peut bien croire que c'est aussi ce que j'avois représenté avec toute la force dont je suis capable, dans le temps même où cela n'étoit pas aussi évident qu'il l'est devenu ; mais je m'étois cru obligé d'informer sa Majesté que cependant il étoit à craindre que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se fixât à cette idée ; puisqu'à tout événement, des instances plus pressantes à Petersbourg ne pourroient qu'être utiles.

“ Avant le départ de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pour Berlin, nous revinmes à la charge, M. de Stamford et moi, avec toute la force possible. Aussi votre Excellence a-t-elle pu remarquer que, dès le mémoire venu de Berlin, et que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui envoyer le 12 de ce mois, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] modifioit déjà, quoique obscurément, sa première idée ; parlant alors d'agir à Berlin et à Vienne ; et enfin,

dans ma lettre du 21 de ce mois, j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence à quoi avoit été acheminé ce plan d'accélération, en y joignant de premières idées de réunion proposées par M. d'Haugwitz. Mais les pas de l'ennemi s'accélérent, et avec eux les craintes de ce côté-ci augmentent au lieu de redoublement de vigueur ; de sorte que je dois rassembler ici tout ce qui me fait croire qu'il faut se hâter d'entamer les négociations formelles avec ce qui peut, de toute manière, aider à leur succès ; sans quoi il est à craindre qu'on ne soit plus à temps.

“Le point essentiel de cet entretien avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] fut la communication qu'elle nous fit de ce qu'on regardoit comme certain ; que les François exigeroient à Rastadt que le pays d'Hanovre fût remis entre leurs mains en nantissement, jusqu'à la paix avec l'Angleterre ; sur quoi s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ajouta ; ‘la Prusse s'y opposera certainement de tout son pouvoir ; mais pourra-t-elle résister seule ?’ Votre Excellence peut comprendre avec quelle chaleur je m'élevai contre ce mais : combien je le fis contraster avec les sentimens d'honneur et de probité exprimés dans le mémoire même de M. d'Haugwitz ; à quelle peinture je me livrai du sort qui attendroit certainement d'abord le pays de Brunswick, puis la Saxe, et la Prusse elle-même, quand, sous prétexte d'un simple nantissement, on révolutionneroit le pays d'Hanovre ; sur quoi je connois trop bien les faits pour qu'on puisse me les nier. ‘C'est-là,’ dis-je, ‘le piège le plus audacieux qu'aient encore tendu ces gens-là ; non seulement dans son but, qui est très évident, mais comme ne pouvant naître que d'un sentiment de mépris pour l'entendement et le caractère des souverains à qui on oseroit le proposer.’

“Tout cela fut admis par s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] comme très vrai et extrêmement allarmant. Mais que peut faire la Prusse isolée ? La Prusse ! qui voit combien l'Autriche est trompée, et qu'elle s'est mise tellement au pouvoir des François qu'au lieu d'en attendre du secours, on auroit lieu de la craindre elle-même ? Il étoit bien inutile de représenter, comme je ne manquai pas de la faire en peu de mots, que l'Autriche ne s'étoit jettée entre les bras des François que pour les arracher à la Prusse, qui s'y étoit jettée la première. Rien n'est nié, mais cela ne change pas le fait actuel ; c'est que les François ont réussi à ce que ces puissances se craignent l'une l'autre ; et qu'ils y ont réussi par la route qui les tient le plus entre leurs mains ; par cette lutte entr'elles, consolidée avant l'accession du présent roi, mais sous le même ministre, à qui les auroit plus sûrement pour amis, ou comme moins ennemis.

“Il paroît bien que le Roi de Prusse commence à voir, comme le ministre professe de voir, que le Directoire entretient celle lutte pour détruire les deux puissances par cette crainte réciproque ; mais ces craintes jusqu'ici ne sont pas moins réelles ; et comme la Prusse est arrivée à redouter qu'en se prononçant seule, elle ne fût d'abord écrasée, au lieu que les

dangers futurs semblent plus susceptibles de remèdes, c'est-là une illusion entretenue par tant de gens autour du jeune Roi (dont il est inutile d'espérer que le Duc ose s'approcher d'avantage par lui-même), que je ne puis m'empêcher d'en redouter les suites, pour eux-mêmes premièrement, puis pour toute l'Europe.

"Comme nous avons tâché, M. Stamford et moi, de bien voir, de tout sonder et scruter finalement dans cet entretien, je suis conduit à penser (sauf les informations que votre Excellence peut avoir d'autre part) qu'il est dangereux de perdre du temps à combattre par des représentations des idées qui, n'ayant pas le sens commun pour des hommes fermes, n'ont leur fondement que dans la *crainte*; sentiment qui aveugle les plus clair-voyans d'ailleurs. En effet tout est fini lorsqu'après ces représentations, même jusqu'à celles de l'honneur et de la probité, la réponse est toujours, 'Vous avez raison, *mais* . . . ' et que ce *mais* procède toujours d'un sentiment de *crainte* prochaine qui cache ou affoiblit les *crain*tes plus éloignées ou contingentes. Il n'y a, dis-je, alors d'autre ressource qu'à travailler à dissiper cette crainte prochaine. Elle est toute ici dans la défiance de Vienne, et l'incertitude quant à Petersbourg; elle est réelle chez le Roi et le Duc; elle paroît l'être aussi chez le ministre; mais, quoiqu'il en soit, il n'y a pas à compter sur un changement de ministère. Cette crainte est très probablement à Vienne comme à Berlin, réciproquement; elle est plus prochaine que celle des suites, quoique très visibles et avouées, des prétendues paix individuelles; on ne dissiperoit pas ces défiances sans l'intervention bien prononcée de la Russie; et l'on ne pourroit se réunir qu'en se garantissant mutuellement, et avec elle, non le *statu quo* actuel qui changera irremédiablement à Rastadt, mais celui qu'on sera forcé de subir dans ce congrès, où l'on forcera, dis-je, les puissances, les unes par les autres, à recevoir les dépouilles des faibles, pour détruire toute morale politique, et rendre les souverains odieux à leurs peuples. Cela fait frémir; mais est-on en mesure pour l'empêcher?

"C'est-là un torrent qui jusqu'ici me paroît irrésistible; je veux dire qu'il me semble que ce n'est qu'en partant du *statu quo*, tel qu'il sera décidé alors, et montrant qu'il peut être soutenu par la réunion, qu'on peut espérer de donner du poids aux dangers d'une telle paix; et, provisionnellement, de déterminer la Prusse à refuser, quelles que pussent en être les suites, son consentement à l'objet d'Hanovre. Car autrement, quelque contraire que fût un tel consentement au traité de neutralité, et quelque menaçant que fût pour la Prusse elle-même ce *nantissement* insidieux, surtout vu l'information d'Hambourg (dont je n'ai pas manqué de faire usage) j'aurois peur que la crainte du *présent* ne l'emportât sur ces considérations.

"Si cet exposé, qui n'est que trop vrai par ce côté-ci, n'est pas contraire à d'autres informations qui peuvent être parvenues à votre Excellence, il me paroît que les négociations ne pourroient sans danger différer un moment d'être entamées à Vienne comme à Berlin; en informant aussi la Russie qu'il n'y a pas un moment

à perdre pour elle à se prononcer vigoureusement, et avec résolution d'agir de tout son pouvoir ; car par Hambourg, tous les bords de la Baltique seroient menacés d'insurrection ; et tandis qu'elle ne songeroit qu'à rétablir ses finances, la Révolution s'avanceroit pour lui en enlever les sources.

“ Mais pour que ces négociations soient efficaces, il faut tâcher de parvenir aux souverains eux-mêmes. Car là où les ministres sont ou foibles, ou peu éclairés, ou suspects (et malheureusement on ne peut que ranger dans une de ces trois classes celui de Berlin) le danger est le même quant à l'effet. Le plan que j'ai eu l'honneur de communiquer, le courrier passé, à votre Excellence a été encore passé en revue dans cet entretien ; et son exécution, sous la forme indiquée, pressée avec force par s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ; car sur ce point elle en a beaucoup ; ce qui prouve bien, quant à Berlin, que malgré ce qu'elle dit du ministre, elle ne s'y fie qu'autant que quelqu'un (qu'elle ne veut pas être) aura l'oreille du Roi. Cette négociation, dit encore s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] est d'un genre si important, elle doit être si rapide, qu'il n'y faut pas des moyens communs. Un ministre qui se borneroit à delivrer des mémoires, et à recevoir des réponses pour les transmettre ne seroit rien dans ce moment. Des hydres de difficultés s'élèveront, et s'il n'avoit pas la tête assez forte pour les combattre lui-même, ni assez le zèle de la chose pour en être inspiré en toute circonstance, à chaque moment, toutes les batteries braquées contre lui dans le lieu même le mettroient bientôt hors de combat. Ainsi, indépendamment des routes subsidiaires pour s'approcher des souverains, des appuis officiels d'une grande force seroient, dit s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], très essentiels pour un tel ministre.

“ Je vais plus loin par mes propres réflexions. Dans le projet que j'eus l'honneur d'envoyer, le courrier dernier, à votre Excellence, M. de Stamford étoit proposé pour Vienne, pour le but de se rapprocher de l'Empereur ; et certainement nul homme, à ma connoissance, n'est en état de rendre à la cause générale de plus grands services de ce genre. Mais ceci étoit dans la supposition qu'il en seroit besoin à Vienne ; or, dans l'ignorance où nous sommes de ce qui se passe de ce côté-là, nous ne savons point si cela seroit nécessaire.

“ Je veux donc supposer, pour tâcher de tout prévoir, que le succès à Vienne ne dépendit que d'y faire connoître les dispositions de Berlin et de Petersbourg pour une réunion, afin de négocier sous ce point de vue, et non d'en montrer la nécessité ; alors M. de Stamford n'y seroit pas si nécessaire, et en ce cas, peut-être, si s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] n'en craignoit pas les conséquences à cause de ses relations avec lui, il conviendrait qu'il allât à Berlin, où il seroit bien plus important que moi, qui n'ai cédé à cette idée que pour ne me refuser à rien de ce qu'on croiroit utile. Mais c'est-là une chose dont s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] devant être juge, je ne fais mention que pour être considérée éventuellement ; et qui ne pourroit être déterminée ici que d'après les instructions de votre Excellence,



indépendantes du mouvement à donner au grand plan. Pour montrer à votre Excellence ce qu'est M. de Stamford, il est résolu, à moins d'empêchement formel de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], au premier mot officiel qui viendrait relativement à cette indignité sur Hanovre, de partir pour Potzdam. Enfin comme les finances de Prusse sont mises aussi en avant avec beaucoup de force, quelque injuste et mal-vue que soit la base du mémoire de M. d'Haugwitz, comme il n'y a point de temps à perdre pour contester ou marchander, peut-être ne faudroit-il pas s'aheurter à la clause relative aux finances; et que d'après l'idée que M. Pitt me fit l'honneur de me confier, qu'on pourroit payer des services *rendus* et non à *rendre*; s'il étoit possible il faudroit s'expliquer d'abord sur ce point. M. d'Haugwitz s'appuie sur ce que *l'argent est le nerf de la guerre*; mais ce n'est pas sous ce point de vue qu'il faut considérer ici l'objet de *l'argent*; c'est une pierre d'achoppement; ce pourroit être un prétexte; et si l'on peut se tenir près du Roi, il ne faudroit pas laisser cette raison au ministre qui me paroît bien décidé de s'y tenir.

“Je n'attendois pour me rendre à Hanovre que les ordres qui pourroient me venir d'après les premières informations que j'avois eu l'honneur de donner à sa majesté, car je voyois la convenance de ce changement de lieu. Je crois avoir tout fait ici pour le présent, pouvant d'ailleurs en recevoir des nouvelles; ainsi je compte d'être à Hanovre le 30<sup>e</sup>. de ce mois.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 5. Wimbledon.—“I shall attend to what you state respecting the French calumnies, as to the treatment of prisoners, and in some shape it shall be put in a proper state for explanation. I had it under view at the same time that I directed Huskisson to make up the statement for the *Antejacobin*, but Huskisson then mentioned to me that you had it in contemplation to form an official paper on the subject.

“The reason why the French employ such a large proportion of officers is for the double purpose of preventing desertion naturally resulting from a plan of requisition, and in order that there might not be a deficiency of officers to command and discipline the succession of the force *en masse* which they poured into their ranks as fast as the previous mass was destroyed or much thinned by the desperate service they employed them upon. The same reasons don't apply to our regular force acting in the defence of their own country. You are perfectly right in the observation you make with regard to other corps upon which we must in a great measure rely, not excepting the militia. I believe the Duke of York has had reason given to him to believe that some of the most respectable militia officers would be glad to have experienced regular officers in some shape connected with them. I have encouraged the Duke to favour the idea, and I think it is possible to do it without creating any jealousy or umbrage. This would clearly be the best way of employing

them. Most of the other kinds of irregular corps have old officers connected with them, as there was no limitation by law against it, and of course when they agreed to associate, they were naturally induced to entrust their discipline to such old officers as they were, from near neighbourhood or otherwise, acquainted with. At the same time the number of half-pay *serviceable* officers is much fewer than you would imagine. Most of what is worth taking have been brought into service since the Duke of York came into his present situation.

“Nothing is more certain than that the provisional cavalry must undergo a new arrangement, and such as it is proper to preserve may be most beneficially employed. I have had various suggestions laid before me on the subject; none of them exactly correspond with what has occurred to myself. Yours is nearer than [any] of them, only I think you suggest too few when you talk of a tenth part, because in those districts where there are not a sufficiency of yeomanry cavalry, a body of them must be substituted for driving the country and other operations of that kind. A sufficiency of cavalry against an invading enemy in [is?] incalculable in point of advantage. The regular cavalry should be reserved for regular attack upon the enemy. The yeomanry cavalry should have their chief attention directed to preserve the internal quiet of the country. The provisional cavalry should be employed in driving the cattle, and such other business of a Hussar nature as may occur in each district. That I conceive to be outlines of the respective services, subject of course to such modifications and deviations as circumstances and the discretion of the commanding officers of districts may suggest. Sir Charles Grey has sent me a most admirable statement of what has been settled in his district, in concert with the Lord Lieutenant and his Deputies.

“I don’t like to gasconade on the subject, but I am confident, if the different departments of Government do their duty, and we don’t sleep over the business of the country, an attempt to invade us two months hence is an event devoutly to be wished. Without such an attempt the relative strength of the two countries, and the independence and invulnerability of Britain never will be sufficiently ascertained either to our own satisfaction, or to that of the enemy, and the rest of the world.”

#### M. DE LUC to GEORGE III.

1798, January 6. Hanover.—“La poste dernière j’eus l’honneur d’écrire deux lettres à votre Majesté; une, partie par le courrier ordinaire sous couvert de M. de Steinberg, fût finie ici le 30 Decembre, et se terminoit par le compte que j’avois l’honneur de rendre à votre Majesté du projet de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick pour commencer, le plutôt possible, les négociations à Berlin et à Vienne; et l’autre, partie par estaffette pour Cuxhaven sous couvert de M. le Comte de Wallmoden, renfermoit des informations de s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime]

d'après lesquelles, malgré les assurances flatteuses du Directoire à Berlin, loin d'y être tranquille, on songe à la frontière ; ce qui devoit amener ici hier s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], qui arriva en effet, et me fit l'honneur de m'envoyer chercher sur le soir. Je dois y aller ce soir encore, si rien ne s'y oppose par les occupations de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Mais comme c'est jour de courrier, et que je pourrais manquer de temps au retour, je crois devoir rendre compte à l'avance à votre Majesté de ce qui fit les objets de ce nouvel entretien.

“ S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me demanda d'abord si j'étois arrivé ici à temps pour avoir l'honneur d'informer votre Majesté par le dernier courrier de ses idées pour accélérer la négociation à Berlin, et la séconder à Vienne ; et de faire encore parvenir à Cuxhaven par estafette les informations de Berlin ; et lorsque j'eus informé s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] que tout avoit été exécuté, elle en témoigna beaucoup de satisfaction.

“ S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me demanda encore si je m'étois entretenu avec M. de Steinberg, et s'il avoit été content à Berlin. J'eus l'honneur de lui répondre que le Roi lui-même avoit donné à M. de Steinberg les assurances les plus fortes qu'il ne permettroit rien contre la pays d'Hanovre ; et qu'il lui avoit témoigné la plus grande considération personnelle pour votre Majesté ; ce dont s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] témoigna encore beaucoup de satisfaction.

“ Ces dernières questions m'auroient paru étranges, vu que Monseigneur le Duc avoit été à Berlin avec M. de Steinberg, si je n'avois sçu par ce dernier que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] y avoit semblé éviter tout entretien particulier avec lui ; ce que je pus aisément lui expliquer d'après *ses craintes* ; mais comme ce ne peut être le cas ici, je crus devoir répéter à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ce que j'avois déjà eu l'honneur de lui dire à Brunswick, que votre Majesté a une confiance personnelle en M. de Steinberg, en conséquence de laquelle il est informé de ma mission et de ses suites.

“ Je venois de recevoir, par Londres, une lettre de mon frère, contenant le récit de quelques circonstances frappantes du passage de Buonaparte à Genève, dont j'ai lieu de croire que votre Majesté a été informée. J'eus l'honneur de lire cette lettre à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], et quand je vins à cette expression de B[uonapar]te au Syndic, *la Ré[publique] Française voudroit être environnée de cinquante républiques comme la vôtre*, je pris la liberté de rappeler à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] que c'étoit-là ce que j'avois toujours dit du plan, toujours existant, des François dans ces contrées pour pousser au loin les révolutions ; plan contre lequel tous les souverains doivent se réunir s'ils veulent empêcher leur perte ; de quoi s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] convint entièrement. Quand ensuite je vins à ces mots d'un des officiers : ‘ Toutes nos vues tendent maintenant à démocratiser l'Angleterre ; car si nous ne la démocratisons pas, elle nous donnera un roi, ’ s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] en fut frappée par le rapport de ce propos avec tout ce

qu'on apprend du projet des François sur l'Angleterre, et de ses motifs ; mais sa première remarque ayant été qu'il faudroit informer les membres de l'Opposition de cette anecdote, pour qu'ils vissent ce qu'ils ont à craindre, je pris la liberté de répondre que je ne doutois pas qu'on ne vit cela en Angleterre ; mais que ce qu'il importoit étoit qu'on sentit bien dans ce pays-ci que la Prusse et tout le continent avoient un aussi grand intérêt que l'Angleterre à faire échouer ce projet. Je crois que s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] en est maintenant aussi convaincue que moi, et j'espère que cela contribuera à le persuader à Berlin.

"Je viens de recevoir une invitation de s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] de la rencontrer ce soir à 7 heures chez M. le Comte de Wallmoden ; et ce sera après cette conversation que j'aurai l'honneur de finir, ma lettre.

9 heures et quart.—"Je sors de chez M. le Comte de Wallmoden, et je n'ai que quelques momens pour que ma lettre parte, mais à moins que de n'entrer dans les détails de ce long entretien, l'essentiel peut se réduire à peu de mots ; d'autant plus que votre Majesté verra dans le rapport de M. le Comte de Wallmoden, qui ne pourra partir que par les ordonnances pour atteindre le courrier à Brême, que les intentions de la cour de Berlin, aidée par Monseigneur le Duc, sont très sérieuses pour la conservation de ligne de démarcation, ce qui à présent renferme tout.

"S'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] s'est prononcée sans aucune réserve pour le plan d'une résistance absolue. A cet égard, tout va bien à Berlin par les sentimens décidés du Roi que, jusqu'ici, les ministres n'entreprennent pas de traverser. Mais s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] désire ardemment la prompte action directe, explicite, et de manière à persuader de la part de l'Angleterre, avec la perspective d'une possibilité de la grande union ; car les menées pour empêcher ce retour d'harmonie avec l'Angleterre sont de la plus grande activité, ce que s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] sait bien, puisqu'on tâche de l'attirer ou de l'intimider elle-même. S'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] nous a récité nombre de traits très récents qui l'ont poursuivie jusqu'ici, et qui lui viennent de Berlin ; et elle craint que, si les négociations ne donnent bientôt un point d'appui, les efforts du parti à qui jusqu'ici ne résiste que la probité du Roi, et ce que s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] peut faire pour le soutenir, ne produisent de grands maux. Aussi s'a[Itesse] s[érénissime] compte-t-elle les jours jusqu'au temps où je pourrai avoir quelque réponse qui la rassure, et elle m'a fait promettre de ne pas tarder à lui communiquer ce que je pourrai recevoir.

"Voilà tout ce que le temps me permet d'avoir l'honneur de dire à votre Majesté de cet entretien, mais c'est tout l'essentiel. Si j'apprends dans la suite des choses qui me paroisse devoir lui être communiquées, j'aurai l'honneur de le faire."

M. DE LUC to GEORGE III.

1798, January 10. Hanover.—"Dans le compte que j'eus l'honneur de rendre à votre Majesté, le courrier précédent, de la

dernière conversation que Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick avoit désiré d'avoir avec moi chez M. le Comte de Wallmoden, je fus obligé, faute de temps, de supprimer les détails, pour que l'essentiel au moins parvint à votre Majesté le plutôt possible. Cependant comme ce sont les détails qui assurent le jugement, et que dans des choses de cette importance je dois m'abstenir le plus qu'il est possible de juger moi-même, je crois devoir revenir aujourd'hui à cet entretien, pour avoir l'honneur d'exposer à votre Majesté les circonstances qui me firent conclure que les dispositions sont favorables à Berlin, mais qu'il est essentiel qu'on y agisse bientôt positivement.

“ C'est en général d'après un changement de timidité en confiance chez s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], changement que je commençai d'apercevoir dans le dernier entretien que j'eus l'honneur d'avoir avec elle à Brunswick, et par moins de réserve sur les détails, que j'augure ce progrès qu'elle a fait à Berlin. J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de faire remarquer à votre Majesté (ou à my Lord Grenville) d'après quelque traits que, probablement, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] s'étoit plus ouverte avec le Roi à Berlin sur ma mission auprès d'elle qu'elle ne vouloit l'exprimer ; maintenant il est sûr qu'elle est en correspondance avec le roi ; et même M. d'Haugwitz n'a pas été nommé dans les deux entretiens ici. M. le Comte de Wallmoden avoit envoyé à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] l'avis qu'un courrier François avoit passé à Brème, qu'il avoit vu là des gens d'un club, et étoit parti pour Hambourg. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dit dans la conversation qu'elle avoit envoyé cet avis au roi lui-même.

“ Tout l'objet de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] en désirant ce dernier entretien avec moi, avoit été de me faire sentir le besoin pressant qu'il y eût bientôt de la part de l'Angleterre à Berlin, non seulement des propositions officielles précises, mais quelqu'un qui pût à tout moment garantir le Roi des pièges qu'on lui tendoit, en se conciliant sa confiance, et s'entretenant avec lui dans le particulier. Aujourd'hui (nous dit-il) tous les efforts se tournent à empêcher la réunion de la Prusse avec l'Angleterre, et à entretenir la jalousie et le mécontentement contre l'Autriche. On tient ouvertement dans la chambre du Roi, de manière à en être entendu, mille propos dirigés vers ces vues, et, en général, vers le plan de se tenir tranquille, sans se mêler des affaires d'autrui. ‘Qu'importeroit (dit l'un) que les François eussent Hambourg ? Ne seroit-ci pas même le bien de la Prusse ? Puisque les vaisseaux Anglois iroient alors dans les ports de la Baltique, et que leurs marchandises traverseroient notre pays ! Voila, dit s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] comment quelques uns travaillent à produire l'indifférence pour le plus grand objet présent, ce qui est fortifié par ceux qui cherchent à la produire pour l'Angleterre même, ou à montrer du danger à se lier avec elle !

“ “ Que nous importent (disent les uns) la cause de Pitt ? C'est lui qui expose l'Angleterre ; car les François ne feront jamais la paix avec lui ni son parti. ’ D'autres, plus dangereux, insinuent ‘que l'Angleterre ne pourra jamais soutenir cette guerre ;

qu'elle est dans un état forcé pour les finances; que les révoltes des matelots, que l'accroissement de dépense occasionné par ces insurrections, et les craintes de celles de l'armée, sont un fardeau qu'elle ne pourra soutenir; qu'ainsi non seulement on ne pourroit en attendre des subsides, mais qu'elle pourroit bien, en succombant, entraîner ceux qui s'y lieroient.'—'Au fond (ajoutent d'autres) c'est une querelle à qui nous vendra le sucre, le café, le thé, les mousselines; et Frédéric le grand disoit fort bien, qu'importe à la Prusse que ce soit la France ou l'Angleterre? Quant à leurs manufactures, il y aura toujours bien quelque port ouvert pour elles, quand ce ne seroit pas Hambourg.'

“A l'égard de la situation générale des affaires, dit s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], beaucoup de ceux qui accusent l'ancien règne ne sont pas les moins à craindre; parcequ'ils tendent à disculper le présent règne de ce qui peut en résulter. Ils ne feignent dont point de dire; qu'il est honteux d'avoir abandonné la Hollande, et d'avoir fait la paix de Bâle qui a entraîné celle d'Udine; mais c'est pour ajouter: Il est bien malheureux sans doute qu'on ait laissé prendre un tel empire aux François, mais il n'y a point de remède; ce seront eux qui disposeront de tout; et dans le partage, la prépondérance de l'Autriche s'augmentera au double de tout ce que la Prusse ne voudra pas recevoir. C'est donc sur cela qu'il faut avoir l'oeil, et ne pas s'exposer, pour empêcher ce partage, à une guerre ruineuse qui n'aboutiroit à rien.

“C'est ainsi, continua s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], que bien des entours du roi cherchent à le décourager, à l'intimider, à lui donner des doutes sur l'Angleterre, des craintes de l'Autriche, de fausses idées de l'état présent de la société, qui pourtant aujourd'hui devroit être le guide des souverains; et l'on n'apperçoit pas que rien contrebalance ces menées. Le roi, certainement, est bien disposé, mais il est jeune, et sans préservatifs contre ces discours insidieux, et les conseils d'une prétendue prudence, appuyée de l'apparence du bien de ses peuples; il faudroit quelqu'un dans son intimité, qui pût lui faire bien connoître l'état de l'Europe et ses causes; lui montrer les grandes bases de la conduite qu'il doit tenir pour sa conservation et cela de ses états; et être prêt à lui faire appercevoir les pièges qu'on lui tend par ces raisonnemens spécieux. Alors je crois, continua s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], qu'il ne laisseroit rien à désirer de sa part. Je ne puis influer que de loin, ajouta-t-elle; on a bien apperçu que j'y travaillois; et le Prince Henry me dit avant mon départ; 'Vous n'avez pas besoin de vous donner du mouvement pour que le roi n'accepte pas les partages; il croit que cela seroit contraire à l'honnêteté, mais vous devriez penser plus solidement, et céder aux circonstances. Quel tort vous feroit-on quand on vous agrandiroit? Mais prenez garde surtout de devenir un objet d'ombrage aux François!'

“S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] s'expliqua encore sur un point qui avoit paru, au moins, une grande foiblesse. Celui qui le représente à Rastadt, un Professeur de Droit à Helmstedt nommé Habermine, est un jacobin déclaré, dont, par conséquent, la nomination

a surpris tout le monde, et M. de Stamford en particulier. Il y a eu probablement dans ce choix un sentiment de crainte ; cependant il arrive que par là le Duc apperçoit les vues des députés François, et leurs menées, par celles qu'on cherche à faire auprès de lui. Le jour même s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] avoit reçu ici une dépêche de cet envoyé, portant en substance ; 'qu'elle se roidissoit peut-être trop contre les avantages qu'on pourroit lui offrir ; qu'on ne pouvoit plus empêcher que l'Empire ne fût démembré ; et qu'il valloit mieux avoir pour amis que pour ennemis ceux qui avoient le pouvoir de faire les partages ; puis-que la Prusse, quand elle le voudroit, ne pourroit l'empêcher.'

“ Je répondrai (dit s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] avec un vif sentiment d'indignation) comme une telle insinuation le mérite ; mais je dois (me dit-elle) vous instruire de tout, afin que le Roi d'Angleterre et ses ministres soient bien informés de ce qui se trame. Les embûches sont tendues partout ; le Roi de Prusse veut s'en garantir, mais il a besoin d'avis continuels ; il veut être juste, mais il faut qu'il croie le pouvoir. Il y a longtemps qu'on travaille à Berlin contre l'Angleterre ; les préjugés de disconvenance et de défiance sont profondément enracinés. Le Roi, heureusement, a une très grande estime personnelle pour sa Majesté Britannique ; et ainsi une personne qui auroit mérité la confiance de ce monarque ; qui pourroit lui en parler comme ayant eu le bonheur de l'approcher depuis longtemps ; qui connoitroit bien les effets nécessaires de la constitution de l'Angleterre, quelle doit être sa politique, de quelle influence elle peut être pour la sûreté des états du Continent contre ce qui les menace tous, auroit une grande influence sur lui. C'est par là, aussi, qu'on donneroit le plus de confiance dans les vues relatives à la Russie ; parceque le Roi comprendroit alors que, par l'entremise sincère de l'Angleterre, elle peut devenir une puissance conservatrice en faisant au besoin contrepoids à l'Autriche ; tandis que par son concours et celui de l'Angleterre, l'Autriche elle-même pourroit acquérir assez d'assurance pour songer à se garantir contre ceux dont elle cherchoit à se faire un appui.

“ Ce fut après une conversation de près de deux heures, roulant sur les mêmes objets, et toujours mêlée de quelques traits où l'on pénétoit que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] prend soin d'entretenir le jeune monarque dans ses dispositions, qu'elle témoigna une grande impatience d'apprendre ce que votre Majesté auroit jugé de sa proposition, soit pour ce qui me regarde, soit en général pour la prompte ouverture des négociations à Berlin et à Vienne ; et qu'elle me fit même promettre de lui communiquer ce qui, dans les premières lettres que je recevrois, pourroit faire augurer le succès de celle que j'eus l'honneur d'adresser à votre Majesté le 30<sup>me</sup> Decembre ; et c'est d'après tout cela que je présume que le Roi de Prusse a connoissance de ces démarches du Duc, et y prend intérêt.

“ Une circonstance que je ne dois pas omettre, quoique votre Majesté puisse en être informée, c'est que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] nous dit qu'on préparoit le rassemblement de trois

corps, chacun de 20,000 hommes, près de Magdebourg, et de Berlin, et en Silésie.

“Après avoir été si long sur les affaires provisionnelles, je ne dois dire que peu de mots sur ce qui me regarde personnellement, et ce sera pour témoigner à votre Majesté ma profonde reconnaissance de ce que, par la nature de ses ordres, dès que sous les auspices de M. de Steinberg j’ai eu l’honneur de voir M. d’Harnswald, l’objet de mon professorat a été arrangé à mon entière satisfaction, tel qu’il sera mis sous les yeux de votre Majesté.”

#### COUNT STARHENBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 11. York Farm.—“Jamais rien ne m’a autant conté à écrire que la lettre officielle que j’ai l’honneur de vous joindre ici ; j’ai néanmoins préféré ce mode de communication à tout autre, car, en vérité, je n’aurois pas pû prendre sur moi de m’acquitter de ce message désagréable en personne. Vous connoissez trop bien mon cœur et mes sentimens pour ne pas juger de tout ce que je souffre.

“Les nouvelles que j’ai reçu d’un homme à Rastatt qui m’est dévoué sont fâcheuses. Il paroît que tout en prononçant encore avec une emphase bien déplacée le mot d’intégrité de l’Empire Germanique, on va travailler à le morceler. Les François insistent sur la barrière du Rhin, et par conséquent, Mayence et Ehrenbreitstein, les deux clefs de l’Allemagne, leur seront cédées.

“On s’occupera ensuite des moyens de dédommager les perdans par des sécularisations qui ne sont pas décidées, mais sur lesquelles l’accord de Vienne, Berlin, et Paris doit prononcer. A quel excès d’humiliation le ciel nous a-t-il réduit pour nous voir associer aux Prussiens et aux Jacobins. Je sais à n’en pas douter que la Cour de Berlin joue son rôle ordinaire, et se prépare de nouveau à nous duper tous, à commencer par nous-mêmes qui sommes, je crois, tombés encore une fois dans ces filets. Elle nous exhorte sous main pour avoir sa part du gâteau, au pillage qu’on prépare, et joue en attendant le rôle de protectrice de l’empire, vis-a-vis de ceux qui se contentent de belles paroles.

“Vous savez sans doute que les François ont fait nouvellement à Hambourg et à Lubeck les protestations les plus solennelles qu’ils respecteraient la ligne de neutralité, et qu’ils n’avoient aucun projet sur le païs d’Hannovre. Puissent ces promesses ne pas ressembler à toutes les conventions que nous avons vû signer et violer presque dans le même tems. Adieu ; conservez-moi amitié et bonté. Plaignez-moi aussi. Je mérite ce sentiment dans la circonstance, et quoique je ne sais pas un Annibal, ni les François des Romains, recevez le serment que je fais solennellement dans vos mains, de leur faire toute ma vie le plus de mal qui dépendra de moi. Le serment de haine à la république est aussi méritoire que celui de haine à la royauté est atroce.” *French.*



LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

*Private.*

1798, January 12. Cleveland Row.—“ Il m'est facile à croire combien il a dû coûter à un honnête homme de se voir chargé d'une commission comme celle dont vous venez de vous acquitter. Encore si c'était là la fin des disgrâces et des perfidies. Mais il s'en faut bien, et si je ne me trompe fort, vous vous verrez encore dans quelques jours d'ici chargé de faire valoir toutes les belles raisons qu'un *swindler* peut imaginer pour ne pas payer l'argent qu'il a friponné. Dans quel siècle nous vivons ! On se le répète tous les jours, et chaque fois on a de nouvelles raisons pour le dire. Après tout, je trouve que, dans la distribution des rôles, celui qui nous tombe en partage est le moins pénible à remplir ; et si ce sont des Romains que nous avons à combattre, je rends grâces aux Dieux de n'être pas Romain.

“ Comptez, je vous prie, sur mon attachement personnel, qui ne dépend pas des liaisons politiques, mais de l'estime que j'ai vouée au comte de Starhemberg.” *Copy. French.*

CHARLES M. WARBURTON to [the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM].

1798, January 12. Loughgilly.—“ During my whole residence in this country, I have not known the *North* so perfectly tranquil as at this moment. The motive (I fear) is not conviction of error. The failure of their premature efforts last year has taught them more caution. The cunning northern is now silently enjoying the flame that has broken out in the south, and fondly hopes the grand object will be effected in that quarter. But, be the motive what it may, tranquillity is a happy circumstance for the rector of Loughgilly, as I am the only resident (and have been so for the last 18 troublesome months) between Newry and Armagh, a district of 15 miles by 10. The few gentlemen of this neighbourhood unfortunately withdrew upon the first gathering of the storm. The moment was certainly alarming ; but I did not think myself justifiable in deserting the part in which Providence had placed me, whilst there remained any chance of stemming the torrent, or of saving my parishioners from delusion and ruin. And I had the heartfelt satisfaction of seeing that my labour was not in vain ; for, whilst the neighbouring districts exhibited a scene of turbulence and insurrection, and afterwards (perhaps unavoidably) that of desolation, not a cabin was burnt, nor a life lost in the parish of Loughgilly.

“ The enclosed Proclamation is a flattering proof of our peaceable conduct, but I am sorry to observe that it is the only instance of the kind that has yet taken place in the whole kingdom ; and which, I have no scruple in telling your Lordship, is highly attributable to the shameful (and at this time) criminal neglect and non-residence of the clergy and gentry. Only look about and observe the number of Irish bishops now in England ! What can be expected from the inferior clergy when thus deserted by their guides. The consequence is, what might be expected,

that the generality of the beneficed clergy have betaken themselves to Dublin, to Bath, to London, leaving their flocks to the certain seduction of revolutionary agents, who sleep not. And if a miserable curate be upon the spot, as the representative of an absent rector, the very station of this man is craftily turned by the Republican into a proof (convincing enough to the multitude) that our whole Establishment is burthensome and unnecessary, and therefore ought to be overset! These, I do assure you, are not the fancies of a frightened imagination, they are arguments now to be met with in every corner of the country, and in the mouth of every peasant; to counteract the evil effects of which (I do humbly think) that Government should (without delay) compel the residence of every description of our clergy. There may naturally be some delicacy felt in ordering the heads of our Church to do their duty, but surely this is not a time for ceremony. My constant residence, my anxious observation, and my knowledge of the people, fully convince my mind that the absence of our clergy from their respective charges creates disaffection, and is, at this moment, the strongest engine in the hands of our revolutionists to pull down the whole fabric of Church and State.

“Upon the whole, I am honestly and humbly of opinion that every minister of our Church is bound, not only by conscience but by other solemn obligations, to use his best endeavours for its defence. These endeavours are nothing more than residence, example, moderation and benevolence; and, with these universally practised, I am convinced by the best argument, *experience*, that the tide of prejudice against the episcopal establishment might not only be turned, but the preservation and connexion of Church and State highly strengthened and secured.

“From long and perfect knowledge of your Lordship’s earnest wish for the welfare of our ecclesiastical establishment, the foregoing circumstances are humbly and respectfully submitted to your consideration, with the hope of their being communicated to that quarter from which an adequate remedy for the evils hinted at can be expected; or by which any remedy (at this moment) can effectually be applied; and in such application, not an hour is to be lost.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to M. DE LUC.

1798, January 14. London.—“J’ai bien reçu vos différentes lettres du 12 et 21 du mois passé, et j’ai lu avec le plus grand intérêt les détails importants qu’elles renferment. L’espèce d’ouverture de la part du gouvernement Prussien que Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick a eu l’obligeante bonté de me faire parvenir par votre canal a dû surtout engager mon attention particulière. Cette pièce ne répond que très imparfaitement aux espérances que les circonstances du moment auroient pu autoriser, et il est surtout à remarquer combien les vues qu’on y trouve sont partielles et bornées, pendant que la crise actuelle exigeroit un plan général de la plus grande étendue, et capable

d'embrasser tous les intérêts de l'Europe. Dans la réponse ci-jointe, que je vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer à Monseigneur le Duc, j'ai tâché de tirer parti de tout ce que le mémoire de M. de Haugwitz offre d'avantageux pour la cause commune, tout en laissant entrevoir la nécessité de songer d'abord, et sans délai, aux seules mesures qui pourroient encore sauver l'Europe. Si l'on ne parvient qu'à écarter pour le moment le danger d'une attaque contre le nord de l'Allemagne on aura toujours gagné du tems ; mais à moins de mettre ce tems à profit pour s'entendre, et se réunir, le mal ne sera que suspendu, et les mêmes effets seront toujours à craindre.

“ Je me persuade que les mesures générales que je propose au Cabinet de Berlin ne pourront manquer de rencontrer l'approbation éclairée du Duc de Brunswick ; et j'ose me flatter, qu'en faisant parvenir cette piece à M. de Haugwitz, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] voudra bien l'appuyer du témoignage de son opinion, dont le poids doit être si grand auprès de sa m[ajesté] Prussienne.

“ Le roi auroit, sans doute, souhaité que les circonstances eussent permis à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] de seconder ces plans par sa présence à Potsdam. Mais si cela ne se peut pas, sa m[ajesté] voit tout l'avantage que cette cause importante retireroit du voyage de M. de Stamford, dont vous me parlez dans votre dernière lettre, et elle vous charge en conséquence d'insister fortement auprès de M. de St[amfort] pour qu'il se rende à Berlin dans le moindre délai possible, pour y travailler sur le plan tracé dans les différens mémoires de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], et dans celui que je vous envoie aujourd'hui.

“ Il s'agiroit, 1<sup>mo</sup>, de maintenir la cour de Berlin dans la résolution qu'elle annonce de défendre à tout risque le nord de l'Allemagne, et les embouchures des fleuves, contre toute entreprise hostile des François.

2<sup>de</sup>. “ De rassurer le Roi de Prusse contre les dangers qu'on n'aura pas manqué de lui faire voir dans cette résolution ; et d'appuyer sur l'assurance provisionnelle que j'ai été autorisé de donner, d'un secours pécuniaire, au cas que ces mesures ameneroient la guerre avec les François.

3. “ De tacher par tous les moyens possibles de faire sentir la nécessité d'un rapprochement sincère et solide avec la cour de Vienne ; entreprise qui ne laisse pas d'être d'une exécution extrêmement difficile, surtout au moment où les bases de la pacification de l'Empire, arrêtées entre l'Autriche et la France, vont occasioner mille sujets nouveaux de jalousie et de contestation entre la première de ces puissances et la Prusse.

4<sup>o</sup>. “ Un point non moins important c'est de s'assurer de la co-opération de le Russie. Les tentatives du roi pour exciter la cour de Petersbourg à des mesures plus actives ont été toujours infructueuses. On ne peut plus espérer d'induire cette cour à se mettre en avant comme premier moteur d'un plan de résistance au progrès des François et de réunion entre les Grandes Puissances. Mais, une fois assurée de la bonne volonté de la Prusse, il y a lieu de croire qu'elle s'y prêteroit sans hésiter ; soit par

des engagemens formels et ostensibles, ou, au moins, en influant sur le Cabinet de Vienne, et en garantissant la Prusse contre toute attaque de la part des Autrichiens—crainte que les mouvemens actuels des troupes de l'Empereur François paroissent autorizer.

“ Pour poursuivre tous ces objets à Berlin rien ne seroit plus important que de se prévaloir du zèle, et des moyens que M. de Stamford auroit pour se faire écouter. Il seroit aussi à désirer que vous puissiez le suivre ou l'accompagner dans ce voyage, afin de maintenir les communications. Peut-être que dans la suite, si ce plan réussissoit à Berlin, M. de St[amfort] pourroit être engagé à entreprendre le voyage de Vienne.

“ Je crois avoir épuisé l'objet de cette lettre. J'en écris en détail au Ministre du Roi à Berlin, Lord Elgin, pour qu'il puisse aider de ses lumières et de ses talents à l'exécution de ces mesures, mais sans paroître instruit du contenu du mémoire que vous m'avez envoyé. J'attendrai avec impatience vos lettres ultérieures.” *Holograph copy.*

*Enclosure.*

*Reply by LORD GRENVILLE to the Mémoire of COUNT HAUGWITZ.*

“ Désirant de rénouer ses liaisons avec la Prusse, l'Angleterre ne cherche nullement d'entraîner cette puissance dans des mesures offensives contre la France. Elle a encore moins l'intention de revenir sur les événemens passés, ou de retarder par des discussions, aujourd'hui très inutiles, le rapprochement qu'elle désire. L'Europe dans sa crise actuelle ne peut être sauvée que par une réunion des Grandes Puissances, qui auroit pour objet le rétablissement de la paix générale, et ensuite le maintien de la tranquillité commune, et la garantie des possessions et des gouvernemens respectifs. Tant que la guerre existera partiellement, les intérêts seront divisés ; tant qu'un concert général ne sera pas établi pour le maintien de la paix, rien ne pourra arrêter les desseins d'un gouvernement qui domine par la désunion.

“ C'est à la Prusse de juger combien il seroit de son intérêt de contribuer, dans cette vue, à poser les bases d'une paix qui conserveroit à l'Angleterre sa puissance maritime, seul contrepoids à celle des François, et la source principale des moyens qu'elle auroit dans la suite pour soutenir ses alliés. Cet objet ne peut être indifférent à toute puissance intéressée à s'opposer aux progrès des principes et des armes Françaises. Sans vouloir cependant appuyer plus particulièrement sur ces points, il suffit de dire que les moyens qu'on proposeroit pour y parvenir ne seroient pas, par préférence, celles de reprendre l'offensif contre les François, à moins d'une nouvelle attaque de leur part.

“ Ce ne seroit pas là non plus le meilleur moyen de pourvoir à l'objet bien plus limité (mais cependant très nécessaire aux intérêts de la Prusse aussi bien que de l'Angleterre) celui de défendre pour le moment le nord de l'Allemagne, et de protéger

les débouchés des fleuves qui transportent, réciproquement, les articles du produit et de la consommation de ces pays. Une politique saine et vigoureuse, un langage ferme et décidé, des préparatifs bien suivis, et des explications franches et confidentielles avec les autres puissances du Continent y contribueroient, sans doute, mieux que des mesures offensives, adoptées à la hâte, et sans les préliminaires que la sagesse indiquerait.

“ L'Angleterre et la Prusse se concertant ensemble, et établissant (si la chose est encore possible) une intelligence réelle et sincère avec les deux autres Grandes Cours, on se mettroit tous les quatre en état de présenter à la France d'une manière imposante les bases de la tranquillité future de l'Europe, fondée sur les arrangemens quelconques qui termineront les discussions actuelles. Au contraire, en se tenant en réserve et en méfiance, les uns avec les autres, on s'expose à être toujours séparément attaqué, l'Angleterre dans sa puissance maritime, et les monarchies continentales dans toutes les occasions de dispute que les entreprises sans cesse rénaissantes d'un Gouvernement qui vise à tout bouleverser, amèneront à chaque instant. Il paroît donc que ce doit être là l'objet principal de l'attention de tous les Cabinets.

“ Si dans l'intervalle le Gouvernement hardi et remuant qui domine aujourd'hui en France, pour prévenir ces mesures, et pour empêcher la réunion projetée, porte ses armes contre le nord de l'Allemagne, il faut sans doute que la Prusse combatte alors pour son existence; il importe à sa sûreté aussi bien qu'à son honneur que, sans s'arrêter aux assurances perfides de l'ennemi, elle protège les états qui l'avoisinent, comme seul moyen de sa propre défense. Dans ce cas-là elle se trouveroit encore de toute nécessité en guerre avec la France; et l'Angleterre, qui seroit bien loin de vouloir lui offrir des subsides pour amener les choses à ce point, seroit cependant très disposée, dès quelles y seroient arrivées, à s'entendre sur les moyens d'agir de concert, et de s'entr'aider réciproquement. Le gouvernement Anglois trouveroit dans ces circonstances et le motif et les moyens de fournir des secours pécuniaires, proportionnés à l'étendue des efforts que la Prusse déploieroit dans cette nouvelle lutte, et aux sûretés que l'on pourroit se donner, de part et d'autre, pour ne pas se voir abandonné dans les suites, et pour ne conclure aucun accommodement avec l'ennemi que de l'accord commun de toutes les Puissances qui seroient entrées dans ces engagements.

“ Sur tous ces points l'intérêt commun et pressant amèneroit facilement les arrangemens de convenance mutuelle. Mais pour pouvoir profiter d'une pareille union, rien n'est plus important que de se mettre dès à présent dans un état de défense la plus respectable. C'est là le vrai moyen d'écarter le danger de loin, le seul d'y parer s'il arrive. Il n'y a pas non plus un instant à perdre pour s'assurer provisoirement du secours de la Russie, qui n'est guères moins intéressée que l'Angleterre et la Prusse à protéger le nord de l'Allemagne; et le danger seroit déjà surmonté si on pouvoit également en faire sentir l'étendue et les conséquences à la cour de Vienne, en l'invitant à se joindre à

l'alliance projetée, et à concourir aux mesures à prendre pour la sûreté commune de toute l'Europe.

"C'est dans ce sens qui sont déjà rédigées toutes les instructions des ministres Anglois aux différentes cours, dont il est question dans ce mémoire." *Holograph copy.*

#### COUNT STARHENBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 20. York Farm.—" Quoiqu'il soit un peu long de détailler par écrit l'objet dont j'ai eu l'honneur de vous parler l'autre jour, j'y entrevois assez d'importance, et la possibilité d'une utilité future assez majeure, pour me résoudre à vous en ennuyer pendant quelque pages. Armez-vous de votre patience ordinaire et daignez me lire avec attention. Il me paroît que dans la circonstance présent ce qui doit être le plus intéressant est d'être parfaitement au fait de tout ce qui se passe en France, du caractère des différens gouvernans, des événemens qui se préparent pour pouvoir en profiter, et d'être prévenu de mesures hostiles avant qu'elles soient mises à exécution, afin de les déjouer à tems. Il est également important de se trouver en relation avec une personne qui veut le bien, et qui a les moyens, par des espèces de liaison de société, de rencontrer habituellement les principaux personnages du gouvernement Français, qui les connaît à fond, qui peut les sonder sans leur être suspecte, et qui a la tête assez froide et l'esprit assez juste pour ne point s'aventurer, mais porter des jugemens sains et non exagérés.

" Pour rencontrer tous ces avantages, il falloit les chercher dans la bonne compagnie ; tout être subalterne ou sorti de la nouvelle caste Française m'eût été suspect, aussi que tout mercenaire, toujours du plus au moins vendu au plus offrant. Il eût été également impossible de se servir d'un homme, puisque sa qualité même de noble auroit fixé sur lui les regards et les recherches vigilantes du gouvernement Français, qui auroit bientôt paralysé ses services, s'il ne les avait pas puni d'un châtimement exemplaire. Le meilleur agent m'a toujours semblé devoir être une femme sensée et honnête, plus assez jeune pour être emportée par les passions, et assez agée pour être inactive. Il falloit qu'elle fut noble et royaliste pour que notre cause fut la sienne ; il était nécessaire qu'elle n'eût pas quitté la France pendant la révolution, pour être au fait de toute son histoire, en avoir suivi toutes les périodes, et en posséder tous les ressorts. Il était, en outre, à désirer qu'elle ne fut pas dans le besoin pour qu'elle ne servit pas pour exister, ce qui est toujours dangereux. Quelque désir que j'eusse de procurer au gouvernement que j'aime et révere un instrument aussi utile, je n'osois pas y songer, ni même m'en occuper, quoique j'eusse à cet égard plus de données qu'un autre par le long séjour que j'ai fait en France, où je suis né et élevé, et par toutes les relations que j'y ai eu, mais le hasard m'ayant fait tomber sur ce que je ne cherchais pas, je croirais manquer à ce que je dois à la bonne cause, si je ne vous prévenois pas du parti que vous pouvez tirer de Madame de Rochechouart.

“ Agée d’au-delà de 40 ans, elle est restée en France et même à Paris pendant toute la révolution. Elle a été emprisonnée du tems de Robespierre, et n’a échappé à la guillotine que par une méprise qui a fait périr une autre personne à sa place. Elle s’est sauvé en Suisse pendant quelques semaines, et y a vécu momentanément du travail de ses mains. Revenu ensuite en France, elle a fait vivre des débris de sa fortune ses enfans, ses parens, et son mari. Elle n’est venu ici que pour y placer quelques fonds. Vivant au milieu de Paris, elle rencontre tous les jours dans le monde et dans les sociétés, des hommes de tout état, de tout principe, et de toute religion. Elle y professe hautement le royalisme, et n’est suspecte à aucun parti, parcequ’elle est femme, laide, agée, et qu’elle n’a besoin de rien.

“ Je connaissais depuis longtems l’esprit, et la bonne tête de la Comtesse Rochechouart. Elle a donné à l’infortunée reine des preuves du plus grand attachement, et sans un incident aussi malheureux qu’impossible à prévoir, elle serait parvenue à la sauver du Temple.

“ *Hébert* était déjà gagné. M. de Mercy était, je crois, au fait de ce projet.

“ Madame de Rochechouart, après avoir passé quelques semaines à Londrès sans que je susse qu’elle y fut, est venu voir Madame de Starhemberg à la campagne, et prête à retourner en France dans quelques jours, s’est adressé à moi pour avoir un passeport. C’est après quelques conversations assez longues avec elle, sur les événements du jour, sur la manière dont elle les connaît et les juge, et sur le parti que je vois qu’elle saurait en tirer, que l’idée m’est venue de tenter de lui demander si elle ne voudrait pas employer ses talents à rendre service aux ennemis de ceux qui sont nécessairement les siens. J’ai eu beaucoup de peine à la déterminer ; mais j’ai enfin obtenu sa parole de s’y prêter, au cas que le gouvernement Anglais le voulut. Elle m’a fait promettre de n’en parler qu’à vous, et à M. Windham ; et au cas qu’on se serve d’elle, elle ne veut avoir à faire qu’à nous trois, et craint surtout les subalternes de toute espèce. Elle m’a prié en outre de ne vous la nommer, que si vous vous sentiez disposé à agréer ses services. J’ai commencé par lui établir quelques points de question sur lesquelles j’ai demandé qu’elle me donnât ses réponses *ad marginem*, et que je vous soumettrai dès qu’elle me les renverra. Ce sera alors à vous à décider dans votre sagesse ce que vous jugerez à propos, et à vous servir de mon intervention si vous la jugez convenable, ou à traiter directement avec elle. Dans le premier cas, la probité m’engagerait à vous servir sur ce point avec zèle et fidélité ; et votre secret n’étant pas le mien, ne serait, comme de raison, connu de ma Cour qu’autant que vous l’ordonneriez expressément. J’ose dire, de vous à moi, qu’il serait essentiel que tout le monde l’ignorât, et principalement notre Cabinet.

“ Il me semble qu’indépendamment des notions certaines de pure information qu’on pourrait obtenir par ce canal, il serait d’une grande importance pour le Cabinet Anglais de parvenir à

se procurer promptement une paix honorable et profitable, ou à faire rompre par les François mêmes la paix avec l'Empereur, pour obtenir par ce moyen une diversion puissante.

“Madame de Rochechouart a l'air de ne pas douter que l'on pourrait parvenir à la réalisation de l'un ou l'autre de ces objets, mais surtout à la paix. Bonaparte et Barras sont actuellement les plus forts, et le premier désire particulièrement la paix avec l'Angleterre; mais si l'on perd du tems, leur influence dominante pourrait diminuer, surtout à l'approche de la retraite de Barras de la Présidence, et peut-être bientôt après du Directoriat.

“Elle soutient, en outre, que les idées et les plans de Bonaparte ne sont pas encore arrêtés. Il s'agirait peut-être seulement de les fixer, pour en obtenir ce qu'on désirerait. Plus il viserait haut et plus nous y gagnerions; la suprême autorité même en France ne serait que hâter sa chute, et rammener le successeur légitime.

“Pardonnez tout ce radotage à un homme dévoré du désir du bien, indigné des bassesses et infamies qui se commettent partout, et attaché de cœur, d'ame, et d'affection à un pays qu'il a choisi pour sa seconde patrie. Mon dévouement à l'Angleterre diffère un peu de celui du Napolitain *Gallo* à l'Autriche, quoique, pour la première fois de ma vie, j'ai prononcé le mot de paix avec la France. Permettez après tout cela que je vous fasse hommage d'une estampe que je viens de faire graver ici, et qui est bien intéressante sous tous les rapports pour un Anglo-Autrichien tel que moi. Elle représente la vue de la tour où Richard Cœur de Lion a été enfermé par l'Archiduc d'Autriche Leopold, à son retour de la croisade. Le bourg et la terre de Diernstein le long du Danube, à environ 14 lieues de Vienne, où se trouve ce monument historique encore très bien conservé, appartient à mon père. J'en ai fait prendre les dimensions et la vue pour faire exécuter l'estampe qu'on vient d'achever, et dont j'aurai l'honneur de vous envoyer demain une des premières épreuves. J'en joindrai une seconde pour le cas que vous ne jugiez pas hors de propos de la présenter de ma part au Roi, n'osant pas prendre moi-même cette liberté.” *French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret intelligence from France.*

1798, January 26.—“Madame la Comtesse de Rochechouart immédiatement après son arrivée en France, où ses affaires et ses intérêts personnels la rappellent, s'occupera du sens des questions ci-jointes qu'elle a signé, et dès qu'elle pourra donner quelque information essentielle sur la plus grande partie de son contenu, ou sur un autre objet important de la même nature, elle expédiera un exprès à M. de Starhemberg, qui saura son arrivée à Douvres dès qu'il lui fera demander un passeport. La nature des notions qu'il recevra par cet exprès, des moyens, des manières, et des prix, déterminera alors les résolutions des ministres. Il n'y a dans le secret que Lord Grenville, Monsieur Pitt, M. Windham, et M. de Starhemberg.” Duvey de Rochechouart.



## QUESTIONS.

1<sup>o</sup>. “Quels sont les projets futurs de Bonaparte et à quoi pourrait-on les porter ?

2<sup>o</sup>. “Est-il l'homme puissant qui déterminera définitivement les résolutions du gouvernement François ?

3<sup>o</sup>. “Quelles sont ces idées sur la paix avec l'Angleterre ; et quelles seroient les personnes et les moyens à employer pour amener aussi promptement que secrètement une paix honorable et profitable à la Grande Bretagne ?

4<sup>o</sup>. “Comment et à quel prix pourroit-on gagner le commandant des François en Hollande, au point de pouvoir le déterminer à livrer les places fortes ?

5<sup>o</sup>. “Pourroit-on avoir des renseignements certains sur le caractère et les dispositions individuelles des gouvernans de toute classe en France, et sur les moyens de les gagner ; ainsi que sur l'aperçu approchant de ce qu'il en coûterait pour y parvenir ?

6<sup>o</sup>. “Quelles seroient les mesures à prendre pour être continuellement au fait des projets du Directoire, et pour pouvoir être prévenu assez à tems quand ils sont hostiles, pour pouvoir les déjouer ?

7<sup>o</sup>. “Pourroit-on, au moyen de cette nouvelle correspondance qu'on auroit en France, parvenir à connaître quelles sont les personnes et les instruments, sans doute très multipliés, que l'ennemi sait employer en Angleterre-même ?

8<sup>o</sup>. “Quelle seroit la marche à suivre dans notre correspondance ?  
“Duvey de Rochechouart.”

## M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 27. Hanover.—“La lettre de votre Excellence [du 14 de ce mois] a ramené tout ma sérénité, car, quoiqu'elle réponde seulement aux lettres que j'avois eu l'honneur de lui écrire de Brunswick les 12<sup>o</sup> et 21<sup>o</sup> decembre, elle est aussi précise, et le mémoire qu'elle accompagne aussi riche en idées conformes aux intentions de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], que si votre Excellence avoit déjà eu connoissance des nouveaux détails que j'avois eu l'honneur d'adresser d'ici au Roi le 30<sup>o</sup> decembre, et le 1 janvier, et qui devoient être alors à Windsor, rien, dis-je, ne pouvoit être plus directement dans les vues de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Aussi, quoique au premier moment j'eusse l'idée d'attendre à Hanovre si sa Majesté ou votre Excellence ajouteroient, en conséquence de mes dernières lettres, de nouveaux détails à ces premières instructions, les relisant attentivement, m'arrêtant à l'idée que probablement my Lord Elgin seroit déjà iustruit par le même courrier qui me les a fait parvenir dans sa route, et considérant l'incertitude du sort de la malle du 15, je me déterminai à commencer des démarches.

“Afin donc de ne perdre aucun temps, j'envoyai dès hier par estaffette à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] un extrait de cette dépêche, et à M. de Stamford les instances de votre Excellence

pour que, malgré ce que je ne sais que trop de sa mauvaise santé, il ne se refuse pas à l'importante fonction qu'elle lui destine. Je connois son zèle, et ce n'est pas de là que naît chez moi quelque doute de succès, vu la saison. J'annonçai en même temps à l'un et à l'autre, que je comptois être à Brunswick le 29<sup>e</sup>, prêt à suivre les directions de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pour me rendre à Berlin avec M. de Stamford (comme je l'espère encore) ou seul, s'il le falloit.

“ J'ai maintenant la plus grande sécurité à l'égard de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qui a sûrement fait plus qu'elle ne promettoit d'abord ; sans doute pour ne pas donner des espérances qu'elle n'étoit pas sûre de réaliser. Elle sondeit cependant le terrain auprès du jeune monarque, et il s'est trouvé si solide, que je n'ai aucun doute qu'il n'y ait aujourd'hui entr'eux une correspondance directe qui redresseroit M. de H[augwitz] s'il chancelloit. Aussi voit-on la plus grande vigilance de la part de ce Cabinet ; nulle confiance aux belles paroles, et une ferme résolution de déjouer tous les projets sinistres, de bien des sortes, de ce côté-ci ; ce que j'ai lieu de croire lié à l'assurance que j'ai osé donner d'une prompte négociation de la part de l'Angleterre ; mais qui, en même temps, rendoit s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] si impatiente de la voir réaliser.

“ Il faut que je prenne la liberté d'entretenir un moment votre Excellence du petit objet de la finance relativement à ma marche (dont le grand objet est exprimé dans son mémoire, d'une manière si propre à son but, et qui m'a donné à moi-même une grande consolation). Il n'en vaudroit pas la peine pour moi, car, avec la santé que Dieu m'accorde à mon âge, et mon habitude de simplicité, je n'aurois pas eu besoin de quelque temps d'en parler à votre Excellence, n'ayant eu besoin jusqu'ici que de 50*l*. Il est vrai que dans mes séjours j'ai vécu chez des amis, et qu'à la cour où j'ai été, on a eu pour moi beaucoup de bonté et d'indulgence ; ce qui n'aura pas lieu à Berlin ; mais j'aurois attendu d'avoir besoin d'un nouveau secours.

“ L'essentiel est donc M. de Stamford, s'il se détermine à partir avec moi. Il est accoutumé à plus d'aisance que moi, parceque depuis longtemps il a une mauvaise santé ; son état actuel demanderoit de grandes précautions, et par la chute de la Hollande, sa fortune est très réduite. Je dis cela de moi-même, par délicatesse pour lui ; car il n'en a jamais dit un mot, quand il s'est prêté aux idées que j'ai suggérées à son égard. J'espère que votre Excellence ne désapprouvera pas que, si nous nous mettons en route et séjournons ensemble, je sois le caissier ; que je fisse ensorte que ce digne homme fût *confortablement*, et que je tirasse sur Messrs. Drummond ce qui seroit nécessaire pour cela.

“ J'aurai le temps d'informer votre Excellence de ce qui seroit nécessaire à cet égard, parceque sur les 200*l* qu'elle a eu la bonté de faire mettre chez Messrs. Drummond, j'aurois de quoi commencer. J'aurai aussi l'honneur de l'informer régulièrement de tout ce qui pourra mériter son attention ; et quant aux nouveaux ordres qu'elle pourroit avoir à me donner, je crois que

jusqu' à ce qu'elle apprenne mon départ pour Berlin, la voie la plus sûre sera sous le même couvert à Hanovre, parcequ'on y saura toujours ma marche."

*Private.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

1798, January 27. London.—"The return of Lord Berwick's servant did not allow of my answering your letter immediately on its receipt, and the circumstances of Italy oblige me now to send this letter round to Vienna, to wait the chance of an opportunity of forwarding it to Naples. I should be very glad to promote your wishes on the subject of your retreat if it were in my power to do so; but the state of the Civil List, and the necessary expences of the present circumstances are such that I could not venture to propose to His Majesty to grant you a pension so much beyond the usual proportion of the retreat of foreign ministers to their salary. In this state of things, which it does not depend on me to alter, I perfectly understand that it may, on many accounts, be more desirable for you to remain in your present situation than to accept of a much more reduced income at home; and I certainly can have no wish to make any change in the mission at Naples other than such as would be perfectly agreeable to you. I earnestly hope that the course of events may not in this, as in so many other instances, supersede all other arrangements which I considered as most fixed. But I own I see no safety to Naples in the present moment but submission, and no man can calculate the extent or the effects of that submission."

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 30. Brunswick.—"Arrivé ici depuis quelques heures (le 29) je commence une lettre pour votre Excellence parceque le courrier pour Hanovre, et ainsi pour Londres, part demain matin à midi; et qu'étant trop tard pour voir ce soir Monseigneur le Duc, ce sera sans doute demain matin, et peut-être trop tard, pour que j'aie ensuite le temps d'entrer dans des détails.

"Malgré la santé, toujours très foible, de M. le Général de Stamford, je l'ai trouvé déterminé, et il a déjà écrit à s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange pour le prier de l'inviter à venir le voir dans le dessein de le consulter sur un instituteur pour son fils, et d'en prévenir le Roi. C'est-là une des ressources qu'il faut employer parfois pour que les bonnes intentions de Monseigneur le Duc ne soient pas rendues inutiles par sa circonspection. S' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] étoit retombée dans ses incertitudes, et n'auroit osé avouer M. de Stamford à cause d'un nuage qui s'étoit formé à Berlin, produit par le parti qui veut renouer la Prusse

avec la France, même jusqu' à un traité d'alliance; et le Roi, malgré les bonnes dispositions de son cœur, ne participe que trop aux irrésolutions de celui qui devroit être son mentor. Mais heureusement ce parti vient d'être déjoué lui-même par les François; et dans ce moment, tandis que nous déplorions, M. de Stamford et moi, ce nouvel incident, il a reçu de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] la note suivante. ' Mes lettres de Berlin, du 27, disent que le Roi a la rougeole, mais que les médecins ont les meilleures espérances. Elles ajoutent que la prise de possession des provinces Prussiennes sur la rive gauche du Rhin a beaucoup surpris; qu'elle est diamétralement contraire aux assurances du Directoire en date du 6 de ce mois, et que l'on reconnoit qu'il n'y a pas à se fier à eux, et qu'il n'y a à se fier qu'en ses propres forces. Viennent ensuite les lamentations sur le manque de moyens. Je crois que M. De Luc arrivera dans le moment favorable. Je ne me suis pas aperçu d'un plus haut degré de défiance contre la France que dans ce moment-ci.'

" Cette conclusion m'a frappé; et (sauf quelque idée contraire de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime]) je me suis déterminé à ne point m'arrêter ici, mais à partir dès après demain (le 31<sup>e</sup>) pour Berlin. Je trouverai bien, j'espère, quelque moyen de parvenir au roi; et, avec l'approbation de sa Majesté de remettre moi-même le mémoire à M. de H[augwitz]; car il me semble qu'il est en lui-même une introduction suffisante, dès qu'aussitôt que quelque chose auroit commencé my Lord Elgin, à qui j'aurois l'honneur de mettre en mains ce fil, est muni des instructions nécessaires pour commencer la negociation. Quant à M. de Stamford, dès qu'il auroit la réponse du Pr[ince] H[éréditaire] d'Orange il se rendroit aussi à Berlin. Il me semble même qu'il vaudra mieux, qu'ainsi nous ne paroissions pas être de la même partie."

" En ce moment s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] nous fait dire qu'elle viendra ce soir vers les six heures."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 30.—" Madame de Rochechouart part demain matin pour Paris. Elle vient d'apprendre que son fils a péri dans le massacre qui a eu lieu dernièrement au caffè de Guerchi. L'esprit de vengeance maternelle se joint encore aux autres motifs que j'avais mis en usage pour mettre en jeu ses talens et son zèle, et nous assure plus que jamais ses services. Elle recommande le silence. Je lui ai promis qu'il n'y avait dans le secret des secrets que vous, Mr. Pitt, et moi. J'ai peur, de vous à moi, que M. Windham, à qui j'en avais parlé d'abord, n'ait commis une petite indiscretion, car on est venu parler à Madame de Rochechouart et lui faire des propositions de la part du Duc de Portland. Elle a refusé, comme de raison, et m'a confié la chose avec une sorte de crainte que je crois avoir calmé. J'ai pris aujourd' hui tous les derniers arrangements de sûreté pour notre

correspondance. J'ai lieu de supposer que son premier exprès nous arrivera avant quinze jours. Je puis, en attendant, vous informer avec certitude que le projet de descente en Angleterre paraît abandonné; les ouvriers de Brest n'étant pas payés, ont quitté l'ouvrage des radeaux, et le défaut d'argent est tel que l'ennemi ne se propose plus que de faire des attaques partielles en chaloupes à rames.

"Merlin triomphe pour le moment, mais sourdement encore, du parti Barras, qui, ainsi que Buonaparte, le laisse agir et gouverner, ne pouvant pas s'y opposer. Il est vraisemblable qu'à la première crise, Barras sautera. Il serait pour cela essentiel de sonder *Merlin* pour le *casus quo*. Buonaparte fait passer des fonds, et des effets, dans l'étranger, et paraît prévoir l'orage qu'il ne pourra pas prévenir selon toutes les apparences. Les généraux des armées sont dévoués au parti Merlin. Le peuple de Paris hait Buonaparte; et la paix de Campo Formio déplaît à toute le monde. On trouve qu'on a laissé l'Empereur trop puissant, et l'on désirerait rompre avec lui. Un mot à Barras; l'emporte-il, y aurait jour à une paix générale telle quelle; si c'est Merlin, on parviendra à rompre la nôtre. *Hoc est in votis.*"

#### LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

*Private.*

1798, January 31. Cleveland Row.—"In referring the application of Captain St. Barbe to the king's Advocate-General for his opinion upon the merits of the case, I had overlooked the circumstance of its being a petition to the king *in Council*. As such, it ought to be forwarded by the petitioners to the Lord President, or to one of the Clerks of the Council. The case, as stated upon that petition, appears to me to be one of singular hardship, and the conduct imputed to the captain of the privateer such as must revolt every man possessed of the commonest feelings of justice. But it is obviously not an instance in which a claim can be made as between Government and Government, the opinion of the King's Advocate being, as I think, conclusive in what he states on that point. How far as an equitable or compassionate appeal to the generosity of his majesty it may be successful, it does not belong to me to say; nor am I quite sure whether, in point of form, such application ought not rather to be made to the king, through his Lords Commissioners of Treasury, than to his Majesty in Council.

"This the petitioners may easily be informed of at the Council Office, and I was only desirous of explaining to you, in answer to your note to Mr. Hammond, that my declining any official interference, as Secretary of State, in a matter not properly coming within the business of that department of the king's government, is not at all intended to preclude such other modes of application as the petitioners may pursue." *Copy.*

## M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, January 31. Brunswick.—“ Mon départ est résolu pour demain matin, car s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] désire elle-même que je ne perde point de temps, mais la conduite que j'aurois à tenir a exigé une bien longue discussion.

“ Dans ce moment, où je suis prêt à exécuter le plan auquel s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'achemine depuis si longtemps, elle s'est ouverte à moi de la manière la plus explicite ; mais malheureusement ç'a été pour me montrer tant de difficultés, que si je les avois toutes connues, je me serois cru incapable d'entreprendre une telle tâche—‘ Mais n'y a-t-il donc point d'autre moyen, Monseigneur ? (ais-je dit enfin)—Non, je n'en connois absolument point d'autre—Eh ! bien, Monseigneur, je ferai ce que je pourrai. ’ Telle a été la fin d'une longue conversation ; et voici ce que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] d'après les raisons qu'elle m'a fait l'honneur de me détailler, mais qu'il m'est impossible en ce moment d'exposer à votre Excellence, a trouvé le plus convenable.

“ Je dois m'adresser directement à M. de H[augwitz] avec une lettre de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dont voici quel doit être le texte ; car je ne l'ai pas encore, mais je dois l'avoir ce soir, quoiqu'il soit déjà tard.

“ Je suis naturaliste et professeur à Gottingue ; j'ai voyagé dans les contrées en vue d'un ouvrage que je dois publier. S' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a trouvé très instruit de l'état de l'Europe ; et de ce qui regarde l'Angleterre en particulier, comme ayant l'honneur d'être au service de la reine, et d'avoir ainsi l'occasion d'approcher le roi ; et ayant aussi l'avantage de jouir de la confiance personnelle de votre Excellence . . . . . Je m'arrête ; car voici la lettre elle-même qui m'arrive à minuit, avec sa copie que je transcrirai ici.

“ ‘ Votre Excellence recevra cette lettre par M. De Luc, ami de my Lord Grenville, et honoré de la confiance personnelle du Roi d'Angleterre ; il m'a fait voir le mémoire que my Lord Grenville désire faire parvenir à la connoissance de v[otre] E[xcellence] et qui, ce me semble, ne s'éloigne pas de vos idées sur l'état actuel des affaires publiques. J'ai conseillé à M. De Luc de ne pas perdre un instant à se rendre à Berlin, pour s'acquitter lui-même de la commission confidentielle dont il est chargé. Il espère avec moi que sa qualité d'homme de lettres et ses relations littéraires avec les Académiciens de Berlin, éloigneront toute conjecture sur le véritable motif de sa course. Je ne puis former que des vœux pour qu'il devienne possible qu'une digue quelconque puisse être élevée contre le torrent dévastateur qui menace de faire écrouler tout ce qu'il ne peut engloutir. ’

“ Dans un billet s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] fait des vœux pour le succès de mon entreprise, ‘ dont en vérité, (dit-elle) *le secret* doit être la base. ’ Ce mot aussi renferme toutes mes entraves. Je dois tâcher de m'approcher du roi, ce que j'apprends n'être pas à present aussi aisé que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me l'avoit fait espérer d'abord ; au moins d'une manière qui

puisse être utile. Il seroit à craindre que l'on compromît le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, en cherchant à arriver par lui. Je n'ai qu'une ressource, mais j'ose m'y confier, celle d'avoir l'honneur d'être au service de la reine; mais c'est à moi de voir comment je pourrai en faire usage. Si les lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire au roi le 30<sup>e</sup> decembre, et le premier janvier, étoient arrivées à temps, peut-être serois-je honoré des introductions dont je sentoie déjà le besoin, et que je sens bien plus aujourd'hui. Mais le temps presse pour tâcher de profiter du moment de mécontentement contre les Francois. Peut-être recevrai-je bientôt de leurs majesté l'appui dont j'aurai grand besoin pour tenir en place.

"Il faudra ensuite que je décide, suivant les circonstances, quand je devrai instruire my Lord Elgin. Tout est si fort hérissé de difficultés, et j'ai si peu de données, qu'en faisant tout ce que mon jugement, après bien des réflexions, pourra me dicter, j'ose implorer l'indulgence de sa Majesté et de votre Excellence. J'espère que M. de Stamford ne tardera pas beaucoup à partir, ce qui me rassure un peu, mais encore nous devons user de beaucoup de ménagemens dans nos communications."

#### FRANCE.

##### *Secret Intelligence from France.*

*Extract.* 1798, January.—"The French rulers' fixed plan is:—Never to make peace with a King of England, but with an English republic.

A former plan was to make England, Scotland and Ireland a *federative republic*.

By an improved resolution, they are to be transformed in three *distinct, separate and independent republics*.

The English East and West-Indy possessions are to be divided between them, except what France takes for herself, for Spain, and for Holland.

The Navy also to be divided, after that the last mentioned powers have retaken the ships captured from them during the war, or other, in their place; agreeable to a secret article by which France has guaranteed to its allies their naval forces *ante bellum*.

Under the column of *Grandes Mesures*: The names of the K[ing] and R[oyal] F[amily] . . , the Princess of W[ales] and the Du<sup>chess</sup> of Y[ork] excepted, those of Ministers, Nobles, Clergymans, Bankers, Merchants and even Farmers.—

Under the column of *Déportation*, the remainder of the English nobility and rich proprietors. Manufacturers who brings their industry over to France and sells there are excepted. Amongst those condemned to transportation is even Mr. F[ox]'s name with the remark:—*Faux patriot; ayant souvent insulté la Nation Francaise dans ses discours, et particulièrement en 1786*. So is Lord M[oir] pour avoir porté les armes contre deux peuples combattants pour la liberté. *Protecteur des émigrés*.—

On the list of *Contributions patriotiques* are the names of Norfolk, Bedford, Bridgewater, and Marlborough each for 400,000 *quinées*.

They have lists of the members belonging to any society whatsoever. Also of patriotic officers in the Army, Navy and Militia. But that number is small, and to most part of their names is added: *Doutoux*. Truguet is to be the commander in chief of the naval expedition against England. Merlin has therefore sent him to push forward the Spanish Navy. But if the King of Spain do not agree to this measure he is instructed to produce a 10<sup>th</sup> of August at Madrid. —*Merlin has said*: Before the conquest of England, a 10<sup>th</sup> of August is necessary in Spain, and an 18<sup>th</sup> Fructidor in Holland: (This last step is all fulfilled:)—

*The Directory in England* is to consist of Paine, Tooke, Sharpe, Thelwall, Lansdown.

*Ministers*.—Earl, Foreign Department.—Cooper, Home Department.

*Waittman*. Finance.—Tierney, Justice.—Hardy, Police.—Tarletan, War.—Russell, Marine.—Combe, Maire of London.—Stanhope, Ambassador to Paris.

*The Scotch Directory*. Muir, Sinclair, Cameron, Simple, Lauderdale, a Sorbelloni.

*Ministers*. Ferguson, Foreign Dep<sup>t</sup>.—Macleod, War.—Campell, Marine.—

*Irish Directory*. N. Tandy, E. Fitzgerald. H. Rowan, A. O'Connor and Racorner or Ocolmer (?).

*The Ministers'* names were not filled up, but twenty-two proposed.

*Gallais* is entrusted with the French plans to their full extent. He prides himself of the friendship and assistance of an opulent man not far from B[a]th.

Gallais is destined to be the first French Ambassador to the English republic."

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private*.

[1798, January.] Duke Street.—“My last letters from Berne are of the third instant. At that date the Deputies had established themselves near Constance with M. de Précý, excepting Bornes, who remained in the Valais to keep open the correspondence with Carnot who was concealed near Sion. D'André was established at Berne under the immediate protection of the Advoyer de Steiguer, and employed by him in framing a plan of co-operation with the party of the two Assemblies in the southern provinces in case the canton of Berne should be attacked; the project of the Advoyer being in that case to march directly into Franche Compté, and to endeavour to make a common cause with the discontented in the interior. Carnot is certainly engaged in a very active correspondence with Paris as



well as with the army. He assured Bornes (what I do not believe) that he might have prevented the explosion on the 18th Fructidor, but that he thought it better on the whole that it should take place."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, January —.]—"Je vous ai promis hier, de vous envoyer aujourd' hui dans notre confiance et amitié ordinaire, la lettre ci-jointe du Prince de Waldeck. Elle est assez intéressante par le nouveau jour qu'elle jette sur des atrocités passées, et elle porte l'empreinte du caractère loyal d'un guerrier pénétré de ses erreurs, qui ne sont pas portées du cœur. Exceptés quelques ames viles comme un Fischer ou un Frossard, qui n'avoient jamais assez de pouvoir pour faire un très grand mal, les trahisons n'ont jamais pris naissance dans nos armées, et le mal passé, présent, et futur, ne doit s'imputer qu' au mauvais esprit des personnes qui ont dirigé les Cabinets. Indépendamment de la mauvaise foi, sur laquelle je ne m'avise pas de prononcer, on peut avoir un faux système en politique; et je ne suis pas convaincu moi-même que le génie *du père Mercy* qui plane encore sur nos bureaux, soit le plus adapté aux circonstances." *French.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 6. Berlin.—"J'ai à rendre compte à votre Excellence d'une première conversation avec M. d'H[augwitz] et je commence aujourd'hui, 5<sup>e</sup>, quoique ma lettre ne doive partir que demain; je le ferai avec autant de précision qu'il me sera possible; mais j'avoue à l'avance que je ne suis pas en état de juger de l'importance du résultat de cet entretien. L'état de l'Europe est un chaos à mes yeux, et je ne sais s'il est quelqu'un qui puisse le débrouiller, ni juger de l'avenir le plus prochain.

"J'arrivai ici le 3<sup>e</sup> à 11 heures du matin. Je me rendis aussitôt chez s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Prince héréditaire d'Or[ange] pour le prier de me diriger dans la manière de faire parvenir une lettre à M. d'H[augwitz]. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] se chargea de l'envoyer par un de ses domestiques. J'écrivis donc aussitôt à M. d'H[augwitz] pour l'informer de mon arrivée; et lui envoyant la lettre de Mons[eigneur] le Duc de B[runswick], je le priai de m'indiquer l'heure à laquelle il pourroit me faire l'honneur de me recevoir. Hier matin je reçus sa réponse, que je crois devoir transcrire ici, pour que votre Excellence puisse juger par là, dès l'entrée, sur quel pied dut s'établir l'entretien que j'eus l'honneur d'avoir avec ce Ministre.

"La lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier, m'a été bien remise; en m'annonçant votre arrivée, elle a réveillé en moi le désir nourri depuis longtemps de faire votre connoissance. Je vous attends ce soir à six heures."

"Voilà en effet comment je fus reçu, et d'un bout à l'autre de la conversation, M. d'H[augwitz] ne cessa pas d'en agir avec moi comme s'il m'eût connu depuis vingt ans; et il ne parut pas

s'apercevoir du temps qui s'écouloit mieux que moi, qui, regardant ma montre au sortir de chez lui, ne pouvois pas croire mes yeux. Il étoit 1½ heure du matin. Mais cela ne dit rien pour moi ; je ne juge pas par les apparences, il s'agit des choses. A cet égard non plus je n'ose juger, mais je tâcherai d'en faire un rapport fidèle et complet à votre Excellence.

“ J'ai lieu de croire que la mission dont j'étois chargée a été connue ici dès le voyage du Duc de Br[unswick] et y fit changer la face des affaires ; qu'elle fut regardée comme une raison d'espérance qu'on pourroit sauver le nord de l'Allemagne que tout concouroit à menacer ; qu'on en a attendu les progrès avec impatience ; que la résolution de fermeté y a été attachée par la perspective des *moyens* que je mis d'abord en avant, et qu'on en voit avec plaisir la réalisation. Il n'y a rien à désirer dans le coeur du Roi ; s'il commandoit l'Allemagne et qu'il eût les moyens pécuniaires, on pourroit tout attendre de lui. Mais il n'y avoit qu'un point à l'égard duquel il pût agir d'une manière indépendante, savoir, la sûreté du nord de l'Allemagne. Il auroit été profondément affligé si le manque de finances l'eût mis hors d'état de tenir cet engagement, dans le cas possible qu'il en resultât une guerre ; aussi, dès qu'il a vu la perspective que l'Angleterre y suppleroit, il s'est entièrement déterminé. Il ne s'agira donc que de conclure cet arrangement de finances pour le cas éventuel ; et, en attendant, toutes les vues de ce monarque se tournent vers une résistance absolue à toute tentative, soit sur les embouchures des deux fleuves, soit en général sur la ligne de démarcation. M<sup>r</sup> d'H[augwitz] s'est expliqué là-dessus à plusieurs fois, d'une manière si positive, que je crois que votre Excellence peut assurer sa Majesté que c'est là un point obtenu ; car je n'ai aucun doute sur l'assentiment du Roi, à qui M. d'H[augwitz] se propose de faire son rapport aujourd'hui, quoique s[a] M[ajesté] garde encore de la suite d'une rougeole dont le commencement a un peu allarmé. (La reine a pris la même maladie). Après que M. d'H[augwitz] aura reçu les ordres du Roi, il me fera avertir de me rendre chez lui ; et dès que la chose sera déterminée, j'irai chez my Lord Elgin qui ignore encore mon arrivée, suivant le désir de M. de H[augwitz] ; mais malheureusement s' Exc[ellence] m'a appris en même temps que my Lord Elgin est très malade ; il y avoit longtemps que sa poitrine étoit menacée ; elle est fortement attaquée à présent, et il y a trois semaines qu'il n'a pas paru à la cour. Étranger comme je le suis ici, où je viens pour la première fois ; devant y rester inconnu jusqu'à ce que l'affaire soit mise dans les mains de my Lord Elgin ; n'ayant pas même pris encore un domestique de place, pour rester plus sûrement ignoré, je ne puis presque bouger de chez moi ; sans quoi j'aurois taché d'avoir des informations plus précises sur l'état de my Lord Elgin. Je désirerois bien maintenant que votre exc[ellence] m'eût fait la grace de me donner quelque instruction à l'égard de my Lord Gore ; afin que je pusse juger si je devrois lui parler ouvertement, au cas que my Lord Elgin ne fût pas en état d'agir de quelque temps.

“ Je regarde donc cette partie du but de ma mission comme assurée ; et comme il ne s'agit que d'un arrangement privé entre les deux cours, si my Lord Elgin a les instructions nécessaires pour conclure le traité, que sa santé lui permette d'agir, ou que je puisse le supplier jusqu' à la signature, je crois qu'il ne rencontrera aucune difficulté. Quelles que fussent les idées de M. d'H[augwitz] (qu'à cet égard pourtant je crois très sincère) c'est si fortement la résolution du Roi que le parti François ne parviendra pas à l'ébranler ; et qu'à cet égard aussi je le crois à l'abri des suggestions de la classe de gens qui, dans l'origine, a failli à faire le plus de mal, c'est celle des égoïstes, qui veulent jouir des places, sans dangers, ni travaux, ni dérangement de leurs habitudes ; et qui, soit de leur propre mouvement, soit entraînés, n'entretenoient le Roi que du besoin de la paix, et faisoient tous leurs efforts pour le détourner de se lier de nouveau avec l'Angleterre.

“ Mais jusques là, ce n'est que le plan même de M. de H[augwitz] ; plan que j'avois moi-même, dès l'entrée, trouvé insuffisant pour la sûreté générale, et que votre Excellence a vu du même oeil. Mais peut-on espérer quelque chose au-delà ? J'avoue avec beaucoup de peine à votre Excellence que je n'y vois aucune probabilité ; non par manque de bonne volonté ici, mais par la nature des choses. C'est sur cela que je désire pouvoir rendre bien clairement à votre Excellence le résultat de ce long entretien, où toutes les faces de l'objet ont été considérées avec beaucoup de patience et de détails par M. de H[augwitz].

“ La mort de feu Roi est venu empêcher l'extrême du mal, mais elle n'a pu réparer celui qui étoit déjà fait, ni ses suites jusqu'ici. La confiance qu'inspirera le jeune monarque donnera lieu, selon toute apparence, à des arrangemens de surété *après* la paix ; mais elle ne peut avoir qu'une influence très bornée sur la paix elle-même ; parceque la situation des choses en Allemagne est devenue si terrible, qu'il faut conclure une paix avec les François à quelque prix que ce soit, pourvu qu'ils consentent à retourner bientôt derrière le Rhin.

“ Il n'est plus besoin de frapper ici les Cabinets sur les vues des François et leur perfidie ; ils l'ont fait eux-mêmes, mais dans la situation où s'est mis l'Empereur, et où il a mis l'Allemagne, on ne peut songer qu'à se sauver du danger présent. La Cour de Berlin peut aisément comprendre comment on a travaillé sur celle de Vienne, d'après tout ce qu'on a tanté auprès d'elle ; elle s'y est refusée, mais Vienne a cédé. Or, jusqu'ici, malgré les instances de Berlin, accompagnées des assurances les plus amicales de concourir le plus qu'il seroit possible à ses arrangemens, Vienne n'a pas voulu communiquer le traité de Campo Formio. On en est donc aux conjectures, et voici celles qu'on a formées d'après tout ce qui se passe. On aura inspiré à l'Empereur de reprendre les vues sur une partie de la Bavière, et il aura saisi cet appât. Alors on lui aura fait craindre Berlin, vu l'opposition que Frédéric II avoit déjà mis au même plan. On lui aura donc représenté que, dès que cet article seroit connu, la Prusse, soutenue peut-être par la Russie, viendrait attaquer la Bohême ;

qu'ainsi il lui importoit de retirer ses troupes de ce côté-là. On doit croire que les François lui ont promis, en même temps, de ne pas passer le Rhin ; mais aussitôt que les troupes Autrichiennes ont été retirées, ils l'ont passé en divers endroits ; et non seulement un gros corps de leurs troupes vit déjà de ce côté du Rhin, et lève des contributions ; mais la partie la plus dangereuse de cette trahison est la foule d'émissaires venus de Strasbourg, pour révolutionner tant les parties qu'ils occupent que leurs voisins jusque, dit-on, à Stutgard ; plantant partout le terrible étendard de la révolte, leur *arbre de liberté*. Je n'apprendrois rien à votre Excellence en lui donnant des détails sur ce nouveau fléau qui devront lui parvenir d'ailleurs ; mais je devois le désigner, comme étant la cause de l'obstacle que trouve dans ce moment le reste de son projet.

“ L'Allemagne est donc dans le plus grand danger possible du côté du haut Rhin ; danger auquel il faut pourvoir sur le champ, et qui ne peut être paré que par un concert immédiat avec Vienne pour cet objet seul, sans l'entraver d'aucun autre ; il faut, dis-je, par des sacrifices, se hâter de faire retirer ces troupes de l'autre côté du Rhin. Voilà tout l'objet des négociations de Berlin aujourd'hui ; il ne peut en embrasser d'autres ; l'Angleterre ni la Russie n'y peuvent rien, cela est trop pressant. Il faut que dans un mois la rive droite du Rhin soit évacuée par la paix de l'empire, ou la contagion révolutionnaire suivra de nouveaux pas des François. Il faut pour cela acquiescer à la condition péremptoire qu'ils mettent à cette paix ; c'est que la rive gauche du Rhin soit leur limite, ce qui oblige le Roi de Prusse lui-même à y céder ses états.

“ Voilà ce que l'Autriche a rendu inévitable par la crainte qu'on lui a inspirée sur la Prusse à l'égard de son traité particulier, dont on ignore encore les clauses, secondées des François quant à des prétentions au deçà du Rhin. Quelle horrible situation ! C'est pour cela que M. d'H[augwitz] regarde comme un port de salut, qui n'est plus même certain, que le traité s'exécute bien vite ; puisque si l'on tarde d'y arriver, les François s'étendront de plus en plus de ce côté du Rhin, ce que l'Empereur ne peut plus empêcher. La révolution de tous les petits états et des cercles de Franconie et de Suabe en seroit la suite inévitable ; puis ils se moqueroient de l'Empereur ; et à l'aide de leur République Cisalpine, ils mettroient l'Allemagne en combustion.

“ Voilà donc aujourd'hui la grande sollicitude de Berlin, dans laquelle je ne pus m'empêcher d'entrer ; et sentant vivement pour l'Allemagne, je pris la liberté de dire à M. d'H[augwitz] ce qui me frappoit comme indispensable dans la forme du traité de paix ; en faisant les plus grands efforts, même des sacrifices, pour engager Vienne à y consentir. Ce seroit, que puisqu'il faut absolument céder à la condition imposée par les François d'avoir le Rhin pour limites, ce fut là le seul objet de traité avec eux par l'Empire en corps ; reservant à traiter dans l'Empire lui-même, sans leur intervention, les arrangements à prendre sur le terrible article des *indemnités* ; de peur que, devenant partie dans ce traité interne, ils n'eussent

le droit de s'immiscer dans les affaires de l'Empire. Que pour cet effet, Berlin devroit déclarer à Vienne qu'il est prêt d'entrer même dans les espérances qu'il avoit conçues de l'appui des François; et qu'il obtiendrait plus de gré à gré que par leur entremise qui exposerait l'Empire à une ruine certaine, comme tous les états le voyoient maintenant avec évidence.

“Je dois dire que l'esprit public qui régnoit dans ce plan parut frapper M. d'Haugwitz, et que, dès ce moment, la conversation prit une tournure qui sembla fondée sur la confiance. Peu à peu il me parla de l'état des choses, sans me regarder comme spécialement occupé de l'intérêt de l'Angleterre, ni se considérer comme ministre de Prusse. Je lui fis parcourir alors un grand enchaînement de causes générales, dont il ne connoissoit que quelques parties détachées, et de son côté il me mit au fait de bien des détails, que je n'avois encore qu'entreus. Il convint de l'importance du plan que je venois de proposer, et m'assura qu'il y butteroit autant qu'il seroit possible; mais il me fit comprendre aussi que s'il y rencontroit des difficultés à cause de quelque engagement de l'Empereur avec les François, il ne faudroit pas, en cherchant à les vaincre, prolonger l'état d'angereux de l'Allemagne; puisque lors même qu'il le voudroit maintenant, avant qu'il pût être prêt à la résistance, ses propres états seroient envahis ou révolutionnés. Mais qu'il falloit sans doute dès à présent préparer les voyes à l'alliance générale et sincère, sans quoi l'Europe seroit perdue.

“Sur cela M. d'H[augwitz] me confia que depuis le retour de M. de Recke, qui avoit été notifier l'avènement du roi, on avoit tout lieu de croire que l'Empereur et son min[istre] étoient outrés de la conduite des François et très allarmés; quoique gardant encore le silence sur leur traité, qu'ils n'osent avouer surtout à cause de la défiance qui y règne contre la Prusse, qui a fait porter ailleurs les troupes Autrichiennes, sous le prétexte ostensible de les faire rentrer dans le pays, ruiné en leur faisant consommer leur paye au dehors. Qu'il falloit, en sauvant le moment, se procurer un peu de temps pour songer au passé et à l'avenir; et qu'alors il ne doutoit pas que tous les anciens gouvernemens ne sentissent le besoin absolu de se réunir sans autre vue que la conservation mutuelle; au lieu que dans ce moment où les armées en mobilité donnent de l'effroi, il n'y a peut-être que l'Angleterre et la Prusse qui soient en état de réfléchir; la première comme séparée par la mer, l'autre comme se sentant en état, avec un secours pécuniaire, et unie à la Saxe et à Hanovre, de garantir le nord de l'Allemagne, au moins pour un temps. Quant à la Hesse (ajouta-t-il) il y a peu de fond à faire sur elle, à moins de quelque événement qui puisse lui faire ouvrir les yeux.

“Considérant alors le bien de l'Angleterre avec le même intérêt (à ce qui me parut) que j'avois apporté à celui de l'Allemagne, ‘Vous voyez (me dit-il) que nous sommes bien loin d'être en état de dicter aucune loi aux François, et qu'il n'y a pas le temps d'appeler la Russie dont la voix, pût-on la faire entendre à temps, ni seroit qu'un vain son. Dans cet état des

choses, il faut espérer que l'Angleterre, avec l'assurance de la conservation du nord de l'Allemagne, pourra tenir assez longtemps pour voir changer la face des affaires. Car quoique sans doute les François, retournés de l'autre côté du Rhin par la paix de l'Empire, aient plus de forces de terre libres, ils n'auront pas plus de vaisaux ; et avant qu'ils pussent profiter à cet égard de leur nouvelle situation, la Prusse et l'Autriche, devenues libres de leur côté, et plus éclairées sur le danger général, pourroient s'offrir pour médiatrices entre l'Angleterre et les François, et le faire peut-être avec succès. Car il ne faudroit pas bien longtemps de retour des troupes Françaises sur leur territoire pour que les suites d'un gouvernement comme le leur se fissent sentir chez eux-mêmes. Ma plus grande crainte est qu'ils ne le prevoyent, et que nous ne tenions pas encore cette paix de l'Empire. En ce cas il faudroit bien, sans doute, que l'Autriche songeât à elle-même. Nous tâcherons de nous en rapprocher confidentiellement autant qu'il sera possible ; afin que dans un cas pareil on puisse songer à la sûreté commune, et y intéresser la Russie et même la Porte.

“ Je crois (continua-t-il) que vous êtes maintenant bien au fait de l'état des choses, et de ma manière de penser. Il y a deux points, le présent, et l'avenir. Il faut pourvoir comme on peut au premier, qui est urgent, sans perdre de vue le dernier, et même en le préparant dès à présent. Vous pourriez donc vous informer à l'avance de ce que l'Angleterre penseroit de la médiation dont je viens de parler, au cas qu'elle devienne possible. Mais si l'Angleterre la trouvoit convenable, il faudroit qu'elle en indiquât précisément les *conditions* ; car (ajouta-t-il, avec les détails de la chose) ce fut le manque de cette cause essentielle qui rendit inutile notre bonne volonté dans un temps où elle auroit peut-être prévenu bien des maux. Nous travaillerions sûrement avec zèle à la paix de l'Angleterre, par affection sincère de relations de famille, car elle existe aujourd'hui sans mélange ; et par une connoissance bien claire que c'est notre intérêt et celui de l'Europe ; et si dans la négociation de cette paix par les deux puissances, en y joignant même la Russie s'il étoit besoin, les François se refusoient à des conditions raisonnables, tous les gouvernements subsistans ouvriroient enfin les yeux, et cela pourroit amener de nouveaux événemens favorables. Enfin, si l'on parvenoit à cette paix, il n'y a pas de doute qu'il ne fallût que toutes les puissances existantes se liassent entr'elles pour la conservation de leur *existence* ; c'est à dire, de leurs *possessions* et de leurs *gouvernemens*.”

“ Je n'ai plus à ajouter qu'un objet particulier ; c'est qu'on croit savoir ici que la crainte est enfin passée en Danemarck et en Suède ; or ces puissances doivent maintenant sentir que l'existence de l'Angleterre est nécessaire à la leur, et la Russie même doit le sentir, comme puissance maritime ; de sorte qu'on est porté à croire que l'Angleterre pourroit en tirer quelque secours, puisque le nord de l'Allemagne étant bien gardé, elles seroient en sûreté par terre. Mais à cet égard votre Excellence est sûrement bien instruit.

“Tels sont les résultats de ce long entretien dont, je le répète votre Excellence seule peut apprécier l'importance; je souhaite ardemment qu'elle y trouve des ressources; mais je crois qu'elle verra au moins qu'il auroit été inutile que j'eusse insisté davantage sur ce qui ne s'y trouve pas conforme à son plan; puisque c'est pour l'avoir repris sous toutes les formes et par toutes les considérations qui purent me venir en pensée, que l'entretien se prolongea si avant dans la nuit.

“Lorsqu'enfin je pris congé de s' Excellence, elle me fit l'honneur de me témoigner la plus grande satisfaction de notre entretien, une confiance entière dans la droiture de mes vues, et un grand désir d'avoir d'autres entretiens avec moi, non-seulement sur l'objet de ma mission, mais sur les affaires générales.

“Je ne rapporte cela à votre Excellence qu'*historiquement*, et afin qu'elle puisse juger elle-même du parti qu'elle pourroit tirer de cette position; car je n'y attache jusqu'ici d'autre prix que celui d'un accès facile; il me faudra plus de temps pour juger de la réalité. Mais avant que votre Excellence puisse me faire l'honneur de me donner ses nouvelles instructions (sans doute à présent dans le paquet de my Lord Elgin) j'espère d'avoir un guide. L'invitation à M. de Stamford ne pu partir d'ici que le soir de mon arrivée, et en supposant que rien ne le retienne, ce que je désire ardemment, je pourrois le voir arriver le 10<sup>me</sup>. Alors je l'informerai de tout ce qui se sera passé, et prendrai ses avis sur ma conduite future avec M. de H[augwitz]; ce qui pourroit être devenu mon département, et nous aurons soin aussi d'informer Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick, à qui j'aurai l'honneur d'écrire demain.

Le 6, vers le soir.—“Je n'ai point encore d'ordre de M. de H[augwitz] ainsi je vais fermer ma lettre; dès que je saurai quelque chose de plus, j'aurai l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence. Ce seroit perdre un courrier que de faire passer ma lettre par Hanovre, ainsi je vais l'adresser à un de mes fils à la cité, sous couvert d'une maison de commerce à laquelle il appartient, sans y'être nommé; et il portera lui-même la lettre à l'office de votre Excellence.”

#### WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, February 7. Cottingley.—“Your Lordship's letter of Monday evening was delivered to me by the messenger Sylvester about an hour since. I have made all my arrangements in such a way as that I shall be able to leave this place on Saturday morning, but I must necessarily pass the whole of that day at Leeds, so that I shall not be in town before Tuesday morning. I shall call at the Office immediately on my arrival to receive your Lordship's commands.

“My engagements would not allow me to set off sooner but in a case of the most urgent necessity, and I had promised the Chancellor before I left London to make some particular

enquiries at Leeds after a branch of the Corresponding Society that has been lately established in the neighbourhood of that town. I have already taken the necessary steps for that purpose, but it would be impossible for me to call on the persons from whom alone I can obtain any real information without paying visits to so many others as will detain me full twenty-four hours in the place.

“It is undoubtedly to be lamented that I could not have remained in Switzerland, but the thing was really *not possible*. I will go further and say not only that the spirit that has now been shown in that country would never have appeared if the question had turned on my residence there only, but that it is my absenting myself, and the manner in which the whole thing was done, that has contributed more than any thing else to attach the people to their governments, and to open the eyes of their governors to the real state of the country when considered with respect to its connexions with France.

“Even now any offer of service from this country must be made with as much delicacy as secrecy. There is yet a good deal of the old leaven in the Secret Council, and the slightest appearance of any thing that should look like a preconcerted communication with the Advoyer de Steiguer would blow all into a flame that even the sense of immediate danger would hardly be able to keep under. If the whole quarrel do not evidently appear to be a *Swiss one* it never can be brought to any good end. I think also that the language I held on quitting the country, and particularly what I wrote to the Advoyer de Steiguer in explanation of my note, was fully sufficient for the first moment, and that more would have done harm; and it seems to me that all that is *now* required is to give a private communication to the Advoyer that a person is on the spot ready to make good the promises that have been given to him, leaving it entirely to the Advoyer to choose the moment at which, and the persons to whom, this communication should be extended.

“There is one thing however that I must not omit to mention as a matter of much real importance. I am very apprehensive lest the canton of Berne should be led to disarm more troops than its safety really requires, on account of the heavy expense to which the government is exposed by having so many men on foot at this season of the year. This evil might be prevented perhaps by a small *secret subsidy*, and your Lordship may probably think it right to give instructions to that effect to Mr. Talbot, or to any other person who may be sent there. I should think that five thousand pounds a month might make the difference between safety and danger. A subsidy of this kind would be dangerous in itself, and difficult to manage for the reasons I have already given; but the thing might be done, and I daresay the Advoyer would find means of applying the money in the way I wish without the Committee of Finance or even the bad part of the Secret Council suspecting where it came from. The Military Committee (which is well composed) must necessarily be in the secret,



"I am upon the whole well satisfied with what I have seen in this country, but great pains are taken to pervert the minds of the lower order of the manufacturers; and I am sorry to say that there seems to be a general opinion among the superior classes that Government is remiss in that article, and that, as the mischief seems to them to come always from London, so they say that there must necessarily be negligence at the fountain head. For instance, it is impossible to make a master manufacturer understand why Government cannot prevent the existence of a paper like the *Courier*, or why it is not stopped at the Post Office before it gets into the hands of his weavers and combers. I have said what I could on the subject, and when I return I shall give Wilberforce some hints that I think he may employ to advantage.

"The Duke of Norfolk's dismissal has given very general satisfaction, and, should his friends attempt to stir, your Lordship may be assured that their efforts would terminate in an address of thanks.

"I am truly too sorry to say that many of the soldiers of his battalion have returned here holding a language not very unlike what passed at the Crown and Anchor. I should not wish to be named as having mentioned this to your Lordship, but I rather think that Government will hear of it in a more direct way."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] February 12. Somerset Place.—"I wish nothing more than that all my colleagues should be in the train of knowing the steps in progress for their own and the public safety. I do wish to put *on paper* how much I feel crippled *on land* in preparatory measures from the distribution of business between the Duke of Portland's Office and mine. It can't go on as it is, and I make no doubt Mr. Pitt will take such measures as occur to him best for giving me either a great deal more or a great deal less to do.

"The papers now in circulation on the subject of naval defence and conjunct operation of land and sea force will show you my ideas on that point, and, to do Lord Spencer the justice that is due to him, I feel perfectly confident that the paper which he *confidentially* brought me this forenoon, and which will likewise be immediately put in circulation, will set every body's mind at ease with regard to the *means* belonging to the naval department, and the use intended to be made of those *means*. If I am enabled to act upon land as I would wish to do, if I am to act at all, in the measures requisite for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland, I will in three months hold an invasion in derision; or rather I shall devoutly pray for the attempt being made, from a conviction that, in some stage or other of the attempt, they must be devoted to destruction.

"I send you an anonymous paper I received this morning. It looks whimsical to state my idea seriously, but if the ruling

power in Spain (be who they may) see that France has nothing else in view but to annihilate them and seize their navy, as I believe to be the case, is it not worth while in some shape or other to try to get their navy into our possession, under a distinct and well explained understanding that all their foreign possessions shall be left by us undisturbed, and that their fleet shall be restored to them entire at the restoration of general peace."

*Enclosure.* An anonymous letter suggesting that the British Government should, without delay, seize or destroy the Spanish navy.

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 13. Berlin.—“ Je me trouve privé de lettres de votre Excellence depuis celle qu'elle me fit l'honneur de m'écrire le 14<sup>e</sup> Janvier, ensuite de celles que j'avois eu l'honneur de lui adresser les 12 et 21 Decembre ; quoiqu'il y ait des lettres de Londres du 30<sup>e</sup> Janvier qui accusent celles du 10 d'Hanovre, et qu'avant cette date j'eusse eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence le 25<sup>e</sup> Decembre, et ensuite le 30, et les 1, 6, et 10<sup>e</sup> Janvier au Roi. Dès lors j'ai eu encore l'honneur d'écrire à sa Majesté le 27<sup>e</sup>, et le même jour à votre Excellence ; puis à elle encore, de Brunswick, les 30, et 31, et enfin de Berlin le 6 de ce mois.

“ Je conçois à quel degré votre Excellence doit être occupée, ainsi je suis loin de trouver son silence extraordinaire ; mais devant néanmoins saisir les momens, je me suis vu obligé de me décider par moi-même d'abord à partir tout de suite d'Hanovre pour me rendre à Brunswick, et aussitôt après pour Berlin, avec l'approbation, il est vrai, et l'appui de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] comme j'ai eu l'honneur d'en informer votre Excellence le 31<sup>e</sup> Janvier. Enfin ici je me trouve absolument seul, car mon ami est retombé malade, et je ne puis l'attendre de quelque temps, si même il se retablissoit assez pour entreprendre un tel voyage en cette saison. Cependant jusqu'ici, d'après les apparences, j'ai la satisfaction de penser que ma détermination a été providentielle ; car mon arrivée ici dans ce moment précis a déterminé cette cour à de nouvelles démarches auprès de celle de Vienne, pour lesquelles il n'y avoit pas un instant à perdre. Je vais avoir l'honneur d'informer votre Exc[ellence] d'une circonstance singulière qui me le fit apprendre dès hier, et sans laquelle je n'aurois peut-être pas revu M. de H[augwitz] de quelques jours. C'est pour cela que je commence cette lettre dès aujourd'hui (12), quoiqu'elle ne doive partir que demain.

“ Dans ma dernière lettre de Brunswick, j'eus l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que Monseigneur le Duc m'avoit extrêmement recommandé *le secret* ; et dans celle d'ici que M. de H[augwitz] l'avoit pressé de nouveau, au point que je ne devois pas voir My Lord Elgin jusqu'à ce que tout fut déterminé avec le Roi. Il m'étoit fort aisé de me tenir

chez moi, puisque j'ai de quoi m'y occuper; mais *cet homme* venu à Berlin pour s'y tenir dans sa chambre, qui n'en sort que pour des momens, et qui est rentré une fois à près de 2 heures du matin, a attiré l'attention *de la police*. J'eus donc avant hier la visite d'un *commissaire*, dont je me tirai fort bien pour le moment; mais je fis parvenir hier une lettre à M. de H[augwitz] dans laquelle, lui exposant le cas, je le priois, s'il étoit possible, d'abrégier mon *incognito*, en me mettant en état de voir my Lord Elgin, et ainsi de me produire dans le monde. Quelle ne fut pas ma surprise, le soir sur la brune, par une forte pluie, de voir M. de H[augwitz] entrer dans ma chambre, venu à pied d'une demi-lieue de distance! Le domestique auquel il s'étoit confié pour son premier message étoit malade, et il n'avoit pas voulu en envoyer un autre. Il me témoigna son chagrin de cet incident, quoiqu'il fut bien aise de voir par là, vu les temps, que la vigilance recommandée à la police étoit observée. Il me dit qu'il pourroit aisément faire cesser l'attention sur moi; mais qu'aussi il pourroit par là donner lieu à d'autres conjectures; et qu'il venoit me proposer, si du moins il ne m'étoit pas désagréable de risquer une autre visite de commissaire, de dire en pareil cas que j'avois l'honneur d'être connu de Madame la Landgrave Louise de Darmstadt, qui est ici, et que pour s'en assurer, on pouvoit s'en informer auprès de M. de H[augwitz], parcequ'alors il pourroit parler de moi sans conséquence: je n'hésitai pas.

“Je reçus comme je le devois une marque d'attention si extrêmement obligéante, et cela ayant engagé une conversation très aisée, son Excellence m'informa que la santé encore très foible de sa Majesté étoit la seule cause de ce que je n'avois pas eu de nouvelles preuves de la satisfaction qu'il avoit de ma venue; que cependant il avoit fait son rapport à sa Majesté, et reçu ses ordres; et il me demanda si je pourrois me rendre chez lui aujourd'hui à 5 heures. Ce qui fut convenu.

“Nous entrâmes cependant en conversation sur les affaires générales; et M. de H[augwitz] m'informa, que fondé sur un commencement tel que celui que promettoit ma mission, il avoit expédié un courrier à Vienne avec tout ce qui pouvoit être capable de produire aussi de ce côté-là un retour de confiance, dans le but de la sûreté commune. Il ne parla plus de la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin comme d'une affaire finale; il pourroit, dit-il, se présenter des circonstances qui fissent changer la face des choses. ‘Que seulement (ajouta-t-il) Vienne s'ouvre entièrement sur les conditions de sa paix, et sur ce qu'il paroît craindre du parti que les François en tirent déjà, et pourroient encore en tirer, dans leur but de renverser tous les états, et alors nous examinerons de concert, et avec la Russie, le parti qu'il conviendra de prendre.’ Après un long entretien sur cette situation présente des choses, s'E[xcellence] s'en retourna chez elle, à pied et par la pluie, et je ferai probablement un voyage pareil à 5 heures, car il ne cesse de pleuvoir.

Le 13<sup>me</sup>. “L’entretien que j’eus l’honneur d’avoir hier au soir avec M. de H[augwitz] ne fut pas si long que le premier, quoiqu’il eût aussi pris le train de détails qui devoit le rendre fort long. Mais malheureusement, avant qu’il fut arrivé au point où j’aurois pu le communiquer à my Lord Elgin, il survint une affaire à s’E[xcellence] qui l’obligea de l’interrompre, et de renvoyer à le reprendre après demain à la même heure. Ce qui me fâche le plus à cet égard, car je crois voir assez à quoi les choses en sont pour les anticiper à votre Excellence, est la circonstance de ne pouvoir aller encore chez my Lord Elgin, et de rester ainsi toujours isolés sous *l’incognito*.

“Cet entretien au fond n’eut rien de plus que la certitude plus grande de ce dont j’ai déjà eu l’honneur d’informer votre Excellence par ma lettre du 6<sup>me</sup>, M. de H[augwitz] ayant parlé cette fois au nom du Roi. Le premier objet est donc déterminé dans ces termes généraux ; que sa Majesté Prussienne donne à sa Majesté Britannique l’assurance qu’elle défendra de tout son pouvoir le nord de l’Allemagne, et ainsi l’emboûchure des deux rivières : comptant de son côté sur la promesse de sa Majesté Britannique d’un subside proportionné aux efforts qu’elle pourroit être obligée d’employer, s’il en resuloit une guerre. M. de H[augwitz] compte alors sur une armée de 147,000 hommes effectifs de la part de Prusse ; et il assure qu’en y joignant les troupes de Saxe, Hanovre, ce qui formeroit une armée de 210 à 220 mille hommes, il n’y auroit absolument rien à craindre de ce côté-ci.

“Le sens du mémoire de votre Excellence à cet égard a été parfaitement entendu ; la Prusse doit se tenir prête pour le besoin, sans attendre de l’Angleterre aucun secours pécuniaire pour cet objet. C’est pourtant une grande dépense, mais la Prusse y pourvoit, et s’occupe de ces arrangemens. Ce n’est donc que du moment où elle devoit faire marcher ce grand corps de troupes, partie de loin, pour l’amener sur la frontière, lui faire ainsi consommer sa paye en pays étranger, et s’y pourvoir de tout le nécessaire, qu’elle attendroit un subside d’Angleterre.

“À ce sujet M. de H[augwitz] m’a dit qu’il étoit informé dès longtemps que le plus grand projet des François contre l’Angleterre étoit de se rendre maîtres des côtes de la mer du Nord jusqu’à Hambourg : qu’il étoit convaincu que le même projet subsistoit malgré la réiteration de leurs assurances, et le désaveu des discours de leurs propres généraux ; et qu’il étoit bien sûr que la conviction seule chez eux d’une résistance absolue qu’on ne manqueroit pas de leur faire prévoir, pourroit les détourner de ce projet. La découverte s’en fit en 1794, tandis que les Autrichiens étoient chargés de la défense des frontières près des Provinces Unies, vers l’Ems. On fut informé alors à Berlin que les François voulusse passer cette rivière, et le Felt-maréchal Möllendorf, étant encore dans ces contrées, reçut ordre du feu Roi d’assister les Autrichiens en cas d’attaque. Ils furent attaqués, en effet, et chassés de l’Ems ; mais le Général Keuler étant venu à leur secours, on battit les François et on leur fit 1,200 prisonniers. Or on trouva dans les poches de quelques

officiers les ordres et les plans pour cette invasion, jusqu' à Hambourg. Ce qui fait considérer par M. de H[augwitz] (et qui se trouve vrai par l'événement) la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne comme une heureuse base sur laquelle, par l'arrangement d'aujourd'hui, repose la sûreté du commerce de l'Angleterre.

"M. de H[augwitz] m'ayant dit encore beaucoup de chose là-dessus, vint enfin à cette conclusion général, que le Roi de Prusse réciproquoit sincèrement le désir de sa Majesté Britannique de renouer des relations intimes ; mais que pour agir avec franchise de part et d'autre, il falloit bien entendre que chacune des deux puissances devoit songer d'abord à son avantage ; puis, et sincèrement, à celui de la puissance amie. Mais je pris la liberté de lui représenter là-dessus que ce n'étoit point ainsi que l'Angleterre envisageoit les choses dans les circonstances actuelles ni que la Prusse devoit les envisager. Que quoique sans doute il fallût bien, d'après la connoissance de la nature humaine, considérer en général les relations entre les hommes sous le point de vue de *premièrement* MOI, *puis* mes AMIS, cet intérêt personnel devoit être déterminé suivant les circonstances ; et que dans les circonstances actuelles, il y avoit un intérêt personnel absolument commun, supérieur à ceux qui étoient supposés par la thèse générale ; savoir, la défense des trônes et de tous les anciens gouvernemens : objet qu'il avoit vu votre Excellence mettre au premier rang dans son mémoire, et sur lequel il ne pouvoit y avoir de dissentiment entre ceux qui connoissoient également le danger.

"Je dois remarquer ici que, quoique M. de H[augwitz] parût dès notre premier entretien informé jusqu'à un certain point de ce danger, il l'étoit bien moins cependant qu'il ne le croyoit. Il avoit été lui-même entraîné dans des loges maçonnnes appartenants aux sociétés secrètes ; et c'étoit de là, et de quelques traits épars, qu'il se croyoit bien instruit ; mais il n'avoit vu ni assez loin dans les lieux et les temps, ni assez profondément, pour juger de toute l'étendue du danger ; desorte que c'est-là un des grands objets qui prolongent nos entretiens, par son application aux détails des circonstances présentes, et nous ne sommes pas encore au bout.

"Cette conversation ramenoit donc l'objet de la quadruple alliance ; mais il ne pouvoit pas en resulter l'évidence de son utilité actuelle, pour *arrêter les mouvemens des François* ; parce qu'elle emploieroit un temps considérable, et qu'il faut pouvoir au moment. Rien ne peut y pourvoir qu'un concert bien prompt avec Vienne ; et jusqu'ici, par les raisons que j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence dans ma précédente lettre (partie à droiture sous couvert de mon fils à la cité) les vues de M. de H[augwitz] dans ce concert n'étoient que d'accélérer ainsi la moins mauvaise paix à Rastadt ; sans négliger les moyens d'acheminer, pour l'avenir, cette alliance conservatrice des Gouvernemens ; et quant à l'Angleterre, le moment où les puissances du Continent, devenues indépendantes, pourroient se présenter comme médiatrices de sa paix ; en un

mot, tout ce qui fut le résultat de notre premier entretien, tel que j'ai eu l'honneur de l'exposer à votre Excellence.

“ Mais il semble se préparer des choses qui pourroient changer les idées de cette cour ; et comme c'est de M. d'[Haugwitz] que j'en tiens une partie, je crois pouvoir en conclure que ce n'est plus que comme un pis-aller qu'il considère cette paix de Rastadt ; mais que s'il se présentoit des circonstances qui remissent les choses en mouvement, sans crainte de nouvelles mésintelligences ou vues particulières, il le verroit avec plaisir, dans le but d'éloigner davantage les François, et de conserver l'Empire plus entier et par là plus harmonisant ?

“ Ces circonstances pourroient provenir de l'Empereur lui-même qui, dans un entretien particulier avec M. le Baron de Reck (envoyé d'ici à l'avènement du Roi, et avec qui s[a] M[ajesté] I[mperiale] se trouvoit en connoissance personnelle) lui a parlé à cœur ouvert sur les François d'aujourd'hui, comme étant devenus sous leur gouvernement une nation traîtresse, avec laquelle il n'y avoit aucune sûreté. L'empereur ne s'ouvrit néanmoins encore sur rien relativement à sa paix, mais on croit savoir d'ailleurs qu'il n'a point consenti à ce dont ils s'emparent sur le Rhin, ni même à toute la rive gauche de ce fleuve. C'est sur ces avis, joins à la certitude actuelle d'un secours pécuniaire de l'Angleterre, et d'après l'idée résultante de notre premier entretien de ne donner aucune influence aux François sur les arrangemens dans l'Empire même, qu'a été fondée la nouvelle dépêche de cette cour à Vienne, dont j'ai fait mention au commencement de cette lettre ; et la dépêche renferme les instances les plus pressantes et les plus amicales de se confier à la Prusse, comme celle-ci veut se confier à l'Autriche, pour se garantir en commun avec l'Empire, et ce qui tient encore en Europe. M. de H[augwitz] me fit aussi l'honneur de me dire que toutes ces démarches étoient communiquées à Petersbourg, pour ouvrir dès à présent des communications confidentielles, et préparer ainsi cette réunion que votre Excellence désire. Mais l'idée de votre Excellence étoit qu'on s'en occupât d'abord, comme pouvant influer sur le présent, à quoi je dois lui dire que je ne vois encore aucune possibilité, si du moins, cette paix de Rastadt doit se faire. Il ne reste donc à cet égard que ce qui revient des dispositions de l'Empereur, qui semblent éloigner cette paix dans un sens anti-François ; et si cela venoit à produire quelque altercation, l'alliance ne seroit peut-être pas impossible. J'ai un contrôle d'informations à cet égard, parceque j'en reçois de Brunswick ; et je l'entretiendrai, en informant aussi de ce côté-là. Jusqu'ici tout est d'accord à quelques détails près ; et si je vois le moment favorable, je serai toujours prêt à remettre l'objet sur le tapis ; surtout si votre Excellence m'honore de nouvelles instructions, maintenant sans doute dans le paquet de my Lord Elgin.

“ Nous en étions encore, M. de H[augwitz] et moi, à ce point de notre entretien lorsqu'un affaire vint l'interrompre ; nous ne pûmes donc dire que quelques mots sur ce qui auroit dû être la conclusion de cette conférence, savoir les stipulations qui me

paroissoient nécessaires à l'égard à l'objet provisionnel. M. de H[augwitz] me demanda à cet égard si j'avois des instructions précises; je répondis que non, mais que j'avois lieu de croire que my Lord Elgin, devant traiter l'affaire officiellement, les auroit reçues. Ce fut alors qu'il me dit que nous reprendrions l'affaire demain à la même heure, et que probablement alors je pourrais en informer my Lord Elgin, pour la suivre avec lui.

“Je languis beaucoup de voir arriver ce moment, car je suis véritablement sur les épines; seul à traiter un si grand objet, et sans avoir reçu de votre Excellence d'autres instructions que celles que renferme la lettre dont elle m'honora le 14<sup>e</sup> janvier; par laquelle j'ai bien été instruit de ce que je devois tâcher de produire; mais non de ce à quoi je pourrais me borner, s'il n'étoit pas possible d'aller au-delà. Votre Excellence comptoit, sans doute, sur les instructions qu'elle a données à my Lord Elgin; mais elle voit pourquoi jusqu'ici je ne pouvois m'en prévaloir directement; et je n'ai osé tenter de chercher à m'en procurer indirectement, ou sous main, de peur de m'exposer à perdre la confiance qu'on me témoigne. Je puis comprendre qu'on craint le parti François, toujours aux aguets, et qu'il faut, pour que cette convention demeure secrète, qu'elle soit terminée lorsque que je me présenterai dans la société comme professeur.

“Le Roi est hors de sa maladie, mais foible, et ses yeux sont encore très affectés. My Lord Elgin est mieux, à ce que j'ai appris avec bien de la satisfaction du Prince d'Or[ange], la seule personne que je voye, avec son secrétaire.”

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, February 14. Bath.—“If some exertion is not made, you must lay your account with the suppression of the regiment of Roll, including whatever inconvenient consequences may result from the measure, either as to the present temper, or future views of the cantons towards this country.

“The Duke of York means to put the continuance of the regiment upon the footing of the Baron de Roll's being able to induce the men to engage during the war; which, it is known beforehand, that he will not be able to do. Why it should be necessary, I am unable to conceive. The opinion that discipline cannot be maintained in a regiment unless the men are engaged for life (or to the end of a war) of which we had some talk at your house the other day, appears to me, the more I consider it or inquire about it, less founded either in fact, reason, or authority. All the former French army was upon that footing (I mean of the men being enlisted for term of years); much, if not all, of the Austrian army is upon that footing; all our own militia, and many at various times, of our marching regiments; yet in no one instance that I can find has discipline suffered. On the contrary it has, in many, been supposed to be promoted by it. If it was not so, how comes the regiment of Roll to have gone on hitherto?

Nor though the discovery was not made till lately, the men have been upon this footing from the beginning; yet no one has ever complained of the regiment, as being deficient in discipline. In short there is a most restless desire to get rid of all foreign corps, at least of those who will not serve in the West Indies. I, on the other hand, must confess a very anxious desire to preserve them; not in this instance because they furnish an honourable provision to men who have sacrificed everything to their adherence to the constitution of their country; nor with any view to the interests of the Baron de Roll, who does not appear to me to be very intent upon the object; but because I do not see the policy at this moment of getting rid of a very fine regiment; and because I can easily conceive, and understand from Wickham, that the suppression of the regiment is likely to have an ill effect in Switzerland.

"It is upon this footing that I communicate these particulars to you. The regiment, you will understand, having suffered great losses as well by the common accidents of service as by the circumstance of two detachments of it having perished by shipwreck, was reduced, at my suggestion, from two battalions to one. At this establishment the Baron de Roll thinks that he shall be able to maintain it, even cut off as it is at present from any direct communication with Switzerland. The experiment will cost nothing except the expense of the regiment in the mean time, which is no greater than that of an English battalion of equal numbers. The quality of the men and the intelligence of the officers is certainly not inferior to what is found in most English regiments. I wish we had many that were equal to them in these respects. By dismissing the regiment at present you anticipate an expense which might otherwise not come till the end of the war, namely what is to be given to the officers under the name of *licenciement*. His Royal Highness, however, is of opinion that its continuance should be put upon the issue which I have above stated, namely of the men's being prevailed upon to engage for the war; which may, I believe, be considered as equivalent to a dismissal.

"I have stated both to His Royal Highness, and in a short note which I added to some papers of General Stuart which were sent in circulation, the substance of the above opinion, both in what relates to our service and to effects which the measure may have in Switzerland. By a letter received just now, I find that my ideas have not so far prevailed as to prevent the intention of proceeding in the course which I have above explained to you, and which, if you wish to endeavour to prevent, you must interpose immediately.

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 17. Berlin.—"Je commence le 15<sup>e</sup> le compte que je dois avoir l'honneur de rendre à votre Excellence de ce qui s'est passé depuis avant-hier. Hier étant le jour que j'eus l'honneur d'indiquer à votre Excellence comme celui qui avoit



été fixé par M. de H[augwitz] pour une conférence finale, j'eus l'honneur de me rendre chez s'E[xcellence], et le sujet de l'entretien fut un mémoire, préparé par elle, en réponse à celui dont j'avois eu l'honneur d'être porteur. Je n'entrerai pas dans des détails sur le contenu de ce mémoire, puisque votre Excellence le recevra en même temps que cette lettre ; la seule chose donc que soit nécessaire, c'est qu'elle soit instruite de l'entretien dont il fut l'objet.

“Selon mon jugement, ce mémoire me parut tout ce qu'on pouvoit espérer dans le moment actuel ; mais je crus nécessaire de définir ce *moment*, pour que M. de H[augwitz] pût bien apprécier l'approbation que je ne pouvois m'empêcher d'y donner. Voici donc la substance de ce que j'eus l'honneur de lui dire dans ce sens, et qui devint l'objet du reste de l'entretien.

“Dans ce jour précis (dis-je à s'E[xcellence]) le 14<sup>e</sup> février, je ne saurois, d'après mon propre jugement, rien desirer en retour des dispositions manifestées par le Cabinet de St. James, au-delà de ce que v[otre] E[xcellence] m'a fait l'honneur de me communiquer. Je crois, dis-je, qu'on ne peut rien déterminer de plus dans ce moment, où le voile qui couvre les dispositions de la Cour de Vienne n'est pas encore tiré, où cependant la marche des François menace de grands dangers prochains, et où, par conséquent, on ne peut s'occuper encore clairement que de la sûreté provisionnelle du nord de l'Allemagne, et d'accélér[er] la retraite des François de l'autre côté du Rhin de la manière la plus prompte, qui paroît à v[otre] E[xcellence] celle d'un traité avec eux. Je conviens encore que si c'étoit-là aussi le point de vue sous lequel la cour de Vienne considère l'état des choses, il faudroit bien s'y tenir quant aux mesures du moment, et ne considérer encore la quadruple alliance que comme un moyen de sûreté pour l'avenir. Mais v[otre] E[xcellence] elle-même, avec une confiance dont je ne puis qu'être extrêmement reconnoissant, m'a fait l'honneur de me dire que si la Cour de Vienne vient à s'ouvrir enfin sans réserve, il est possible qu'on apprenne qu'elle redoute elle-même les suites de sa paix avec les François ; qu'il n'est point vrai qu'elle ait consenti à la cession de toute la rive gauche du Rhin, ni surtout à celle des places fortes sur ce fleuve, et que si elle voyoit sûreté à rentrer dans le conflit, elle y rentreroit plutôt que de rester exposée aux dangers qu'elle a produits elle-même. Or, si un tel état de chose venoit à se manifester en peu de jours, j'ose croire que v[otre] E[xcellence] y trouveroit un motif de reprendre le plan entier du Cabinet de St. James, comme s'appliquant alors à l'état des choses qui seroit redevenu tel qu'il étoit lorsque ce plan a été dressé.”

“M. de H[augwitz] convint absolument de cette distinction, et me dit dans les termes les plus forts ; que d'or-en-avant il devoit être parfaitement entendu entre les deux cours qu'un grand intérêt commun les lioit, et devoit leur réunir les deux autres puissances, celui de leur existence même. Qu'un tel intérêt ne pouvoit que produire un coup d'oeil commun sur les objets, et le concert dans les moyens. Que le plan de se réunir

dès l'abord pour la défense de l'Allemagne, si, dans l'état actuel des choses, la guerre venoit à se rallumer, étoit évidemment le seul à suivre ; et qu'on ne le perdrait point de vue à Berlin ; non plus de le concert pour la sûreté future si la paix se faisoit, ni l'intérêt de l'Allemagne à promouvoir alors celle de l'Angleterre.

“ Les choses étant arrivées à ce point qui étoit final pour le présent, et devant, selon ce qui étoit convenu, communiquer alors toute l'affaire à my Lord Elgin pour être delivré aussi de l'*incognito* embarrassant où j'avois été tenu jusqu'alors, je pris la liberté de prier M. de H[augwitz] de m'expliquer plus particulièrement la raison pour laquelle il avoit exigé ce secret rigoureux, dont maintenant j'aurois à me justifier vis-à-vis de my Lord Elgin. Voici la substance de ce que s'E[xcellence] me dit sur ce sujet.

“ ‘ Nous n'avons aucune raison de cacher aux François des communications avec l'Angleterre ni avec aucune autre puissance ; ils savent bien que nous en avons ; ils prévoient même que ces relations se resserreront de plus en plus à cause d'eux-mêmes ; et ils vont jusqu'à dire que cela doit nécessairement arriver, et que c'est une des raisons pour lesquelles ils doivent profiter de leur avantage actuel, afin de se procurer des moyens de sûreté pour l'avenir, en demandant le Rhin pour limite, et d'en occuper les passages. Il n'y auroit donc eu aucun inconvénient à traiter à droiture entre my Lord Elgin et moi l'affaire actuelle, puisque nous en avons une autre (qu'il m'expliqua) ; parceque le secret auroit été observé, et qu'il est surtout indispensable pour cette affaire particulière, de peur que sa découverte n'ammenât quelque coup de surprise ; car les François sont en mouvement, et nous ne le sommes pas. Mais dans la manière dont l'affaire a été acheminée par vous, et l'entremise seule du duc de Br[unswick] conduit ainsi à la traiter avec vous, le danger de la découverte auroit été augmenté par des communications de votre part avec my Lord Elgin qui, sûrement, auroient été apperçues ; parcequ'il a fallu tout ce temps pour amener l'affaire où elle est. Mais à présent qu'elle est déterminée, et qu'elle sera dans les mains de my Lord Elgin, nous pourrons nous en entretenir comme de toute autre affaire. Et quant à vous, comme vous paroîtrez maintenant parmi ceux que vous vous proposez de fréquenter, et que même, quand le Roi et la Reine seront visible, ayant l'honneur d'être au service de la Reine d'Angleterre, vous devrez voir leurs Majestés comme elles s'y attendent, nous pourrons alors nous revoir, ou chez moi, ou ailleurs, seuls, ou avec my Lord Elgin, comme cela auroit lieu avec tout autre étranger.’

“ Je pris encore la liberté de demander à s'E[xcellence] si, depuis que my Lord Elgin avoit reçu des instructions sur le même objet, il ne s'étoit rien passé entr'eux qui y eût du rapport ; afin que je pusse savoir d'où je devrois partir pour l'informer. M. d' H[augwitz] me répondit que my Lord Elgin ayant été malade, ils ne s'étoient point vus durant tout le temps qui s'étoit écoulé depuis qu'on m'avoit sçu chargé de cette commission.

“Revenant alors au mémoire, sur lequel je n’avois fait qu’une remarque que s’E[xc]ellence avoit approuvée, et à laquelle elle m’avoit promis d’avoir égard, elle me fit l’honneur de me dire qu’elle avoit attendu d’en demander au Roi son approbation formelle que nous l’eussions discuté ensemble; qu’elle le mettroit maintenant sous les yeux du Roi, et en feroit faire ensuite une copie pour me la remettre demain au soir chez elle. Je laissai alors en suspens la manière de faire parvenir cette copie à votre Excellence, jusqu’ à ce que j’eusse eu l’honneur d’informer my Lord Elgin; ce que je dis à s’E[xc]ellence que je me proposois de faire ce matin. En conséquence, étant rentré chez moi, j’allois écrire à my Lord Elgin, lorsque M. Garlike y entra, venant de la part de my Lord Elgin pour me prier de passer chez lui, ayant appris par la *Gazette* que sous mon titre de Professeur de Gottingue, j’étois à Berlin depuis quelques jours.”

Le 17. “Etant allé ce matin chez my Lord Elgin, je l’ai trouvé encore frappé de l’idée qu’il y avoit quelque dessous de carte dans le désir de M. de H[augwitz] de traiter l’affaire avec moi avant que de la lui communiquer. Un doute de my Lord Elgin est suffisant pour que je n’épargne pas ma peine. Il est convenu avec M. de Haugwitz que my Lord Elgin ira demain à 11 heures chez lui; et alors il observera lui-même; mais, en attendant, j’ai informé M. de H[augwitz] que voulant rendre un compte exact à Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick de ce qui s’étoit passé ici, j’allois partir pour Brunswick; ce qu’il a fort approuvé.

“Ainsi je pars encore aujourd’hui, et je ne m’arrêterai pas la nuit si je le puis, afin de ne perdre aucun temps. Je me borne donc à joindre ici la mémoire de M. de H[augwitz], et quand je serai bien instruit par s’ a[ltesse] s[érénissime] je reviendrai ici pour y attendre par my Lord Elgin les instructions qu’il plaira à votre Excellence de me donner; mais auparavant j’aurai l’honneur de lui écrire de Brunswick.”

*Enclosure.*

Confidential *Mémoire* of COUNT DE HAUGWITZ in reply to  
that of LORD GRENVILLE.

“Le Cabinet de St. James ayant manifesté dans un mémoire confidentiel, le voeu de renouer les liaisons qui ont subsisté cidevant entre la Prusse et l’Angleterre, la cour de Berlin s’empresse de répondre à cette ouverture amicale avec une entière franchise.

“Elle s’abstiendra de son côté de toute observation sur les événemens passés. Ce n’est pas le moment où il convient d’y toucher, et il ne s’agit aujourd’hui que de s’occuper des intérêts présents et futurs des deux puissances.

“Toutefois le Roi éprouve une satisfaction secrète en se rappelant que, même après l’époque facheuse où l’intimité de leurs anciennes liaisons a souffert quelque atteinte, la Prusse, fidèle au système que la nécessité des circonstances l’obligeoit d’embrasser, n’en a pas moins continué de rendre des services essentiels à l’Angleterre, en stipulant une neutralité absolue en faveur du nord de l’Allemagne, et en soutenant cette neutralité par des mesures respectables. Elle a sauvé de cette manière l’électorat de

Hannovre, si souvent menacé d'une invasion ennemie. Elle a sauvé le commerce de la Grande Bretagne en lui conservant les embouchures du Weser et de l'Elbe, c'est à dire les débouchés et les points de communication qui lui étoient indispensablement nécessaires sous tous les rapports possibles.

“La Cour de Londres ne méconnoit pas ces avantages, et après avoir consulté plus mûrement les convenances respectives des différentes puissances de l'Europe, elle s'est convaincue elle-même que la Prusse ne doit pas se charger d'un rôle offensif dans la guerre contre la France. Aussi le Roi est-il très décidé de s'en tenir scrupuleusement au système de paix et de neutralité que son auguste père avoit adopté. C'est le seul qui s'accorde dans les conjonctures présentes avec les intérêts de sa monarchie et avec intérêts de ses alliés. Rien au monde ne pourra l'engager à s'en écarter, et il saura le maintenir tant que la République Française sera exacte à observer les stipulations des traités.

“Elle vient de protester encore tout récemment à sa Majesté que les bruits d'un projet d'invasion dans l'électorat de Hannovre ne sont destitues de tout fondement, et que la ligne de démarcation ne sera point enfreinte. Il faut espérer que ces assurances ne seront pas démenties par l'événement, et que les négociations du congrès de Rastadt acheveront de rendre la paix à l'empire Germanique ; mais si l'on pouvoit supposer que le Directoire exécutif fut capable de manquer à ce point à ses engagements ; s'il étoit capable de tenter une entreprise hostile contre l'électorat de Hannovre et les villes Anséatiques, le Prusse, jusques-là inébranlable dans son système de loyauté et de paix, opposeroit aux François une défensive vigoureuse ; elle déploieroit toute son énergie dans cette nouvelle lutte, et elle ne craindrait pas de mesurer l'ancienne réputation de ses armes contre l'ennemi commun. Les mesures imposantes qu'elle a sù préparer pour la défense éventuelle du nord de l'Allemagne aux premières apparences de l'approche du danger, ont pû apprendre aux François ce qu'ils doivent attendre d'une puissance qui se fait un devoir religieux de remplir ses engagements, mais qui exige aussi à cet égard la plus stricte réciprocité. Le Roi a l'oeil ouvert sur tous les mouvemens des armées républicaines, et quels que puissent être leurs desseins, elles ne le prendront pas au dépourvu.

“Il n'en est pas moins vrai, et la cour de Londres l'a senti la première, que si la Prusse devoit rentrer en état de guerre contre la France, si elle devoit se charger efficacement de la défense du nord de l'Allemagne, il seroit injuste de rejeter sur elle tout le poids du fardeau. La sphère de son énergie dépendroit nécessairement des moyens qu'elle pourroit y apporter, et l'Angleterre auroit un intérêt prépondérant à seconder les efforts du Roi.

“Sous ce point de vue il ne se feroit aucun scrupule d'accepter, le cas échéant, les secours pécuniaires que l'Angleterre lui propose, puisque les sacrifices qu'elle s'imposeroit le mettroient en état de la préserver des dangers qui reflueront sur elle par l'invasion du nord de l'Allemagne. Indépendamment de la défense des états de sa Majesté situés dans

l'enceinte de la ligne de démarcation, la défense de l'électorat de Hannovre, et celle des embouchures du Weser et de l'Elbe, feroient l'objet particulier de ses soins ; et ces principes une fois établis, les deux cours n'auroient pas beaucoup de peine à convenir des arrangemens qui détermineroient l'étendue des secours pécuniaires de la Grande Bretagne.

“En attendant, le Roi a déjà prévenu les désirs de la cour de Londres en fournissant à celle de Vienne l'occasion de s'entendre amicalement avec lui sur la pacification finale de l'empire Germanique. Il a mis dans ses explications toute la franchise imaginable, et sa Majesté Britannique pourra s'en convaincre elle-même par les informations qui lui en reviendront.

“Enfin, et pour tout épuiser, le Roi n'a pas laissé ignorer non plus à la cour de Petersbourg les démarches auxquelles il s'est porté envers celle de Vienne. Il les a participées sans délai à l'Empereur de Russie, et la réponse de ce monarque décidera, en dernier ressort, du degré d'intérêt qu'il attache au sort de l'Allemagne.

“Ce cercle de communications et les explications loyales auxquelles les cours de Berlin et de Londres en viennent à présent, suffisent pour constater l'évidence de l'union qui régne de fait entre les quatre grandes puissances de l'Europe, dont les intérêts les plus précieux se réunissent aujourd'hui dans un même centre. Elles manquoient leur but si elles vouloient s'arrêter à des rivalités et à de petites jalousies dans un tems où tous les gouvernemens monarchiques ont une cause commune à défendre ; dans un tems où ils doivent s'entre-aider et s'étayer mutuellement. Telle est la façon de penser du Roi sur la situation présente des affaires, et le Cabinet de St. James en inférera aisément que les cours amies de la Prusse peuvent compter en pleine confiance sur les principes de sa Majesté. Mais si l'Autriche, la Russie, l'Angleterre, et la Prusse parviennent à s'entendre, si elles établissent entre elles un accord sincère, seroit-ce le moment de donner à leurs liaisons une publicité qui augmenteroit infailliblement l'aigreur des François, et qui reculeroit par conséquent de nouveau l'ouvrage salutaire de la paix, dont tout le monde, et l'Allemagne en particulier, a un si grand besoin ? C'est à la cour de Londres à peser la force de ces considérations, et elle voudra bien se persuader que, quelle que soit la forme de ses engagemens futurs avec la Prusse, ils n'en seront pas moins solides quant au fond.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 18. London.—“Il m'en conte infiniment de vous entretenir aujourd'hui sur un objet aussi intéressant pour mon agrément personnel, puisque je m'étais formé le roman séduisant de passer la plus grande partie du reste de ma vie dans un pays que j'avais adopté pour le mien ; mais en considérant que je me serais fait un devoir sacré de montrer le plus grand empressement à vous donner mes conseils, si leur résultats avait été contraire à mes propres intérêts, je ne dois pas être arrêté par une fausse délicatesse en n'osant pas vous remettre

mes idées, parcequ'elles sont aussi conformes à mes convenances qu'elles peuvent peut-être être utiles à l'Angleterre. J'aime à me flatter que je suis assez connu de vous et de vos collègues éclairés et respectables qui composent le Cabinet de S[a] M[ajesté] B[ritannique] pour qu'aucun de vous ne doute de mes sentimens, de la manière dont j'envisage la conduite de ma Cour depuis le 17 d'Avril jusqu'à présent, et de la douleur profonde que j'en éprouve. Tous les événemens passés, ni ceux dont nous aurons peut-être le malheur d'être encore les témoins, ne me feront jamais varier dans mes principes ; ils seront les mêmes jusqu'à mon dernier soupir. *Ce n'est que dans le rétablissement de la monarchie en France que je crois que l'univers pourra retrouver le repos et la sûreté ; et je ne vois de moyen pour amener cette fin désirable que dans l'union intime de l'Angleterre et de l'Autriche, et dans la manière sage et efficace dont ces deux puissances sauront appuyer secrètement les discordes intestines de la France.*

“Voilà ma profession de foi ; et c'est aussi le grand but qu'on a toujours trop négligé, dont on n'a fait d'abord qu'un plan-secondaire, et que des intérêts séparés et momentanés ont depuis fait entièrement perdre de vue, comme la paix perfide et honteuse de la Prusse, et les soumissions avilissantes de la Sardaigne, de l'Espagne, de Naples, du Pape, et de ma propre cour en ont successivement fourni le triste exemple. Je suis trop vrai et j'ai trop de confiance en vous, pour ne pas oser ajouter franchement, qu'il me semble que les tentatives réitérées et toujours sans succès que la cour de Londres a fait pour parvenir à la paix avec la *soi-disante République* ont beaucoup nui à la cause générale. Votre mesure en cette occasion peut avoir été d'une grande sagesse vis-à-vis de la vraiment *grande nation* que vous gouvernez si bien ; mais on ne peut nier qu'elle n'ait flatté l'orgueil de l'ennemi, en lui montrant le désir ou le besoin de voir finir la guerre ; et qu'en outre, cette démarche n'ait encouragé les gouvernements faibles et timides à oser à l'exemple de l'Angleterre s'accoutumer à l'idée révoltante de la possibilité d'entrer en composition avec le monstre exécrable de l'anarchie. Permettez qu'après ce préambule, qui m'a mené plus loin que je ne voulais, je vous présente ici mes réflexions sur la mesure dont vous m'avez parlé jeudi dernier. Je commencerai par examiner 1<sup>o</sup>, les raisons qui vous y détermineraient ; 2<sup>o</sup> le but auquel elle menerait ; et 3<sup>o</sup>, les conséquences qui en résulteraient. Croyez que mes observations ne seront dictées par aucun esprit de parti, mais uniquement par le désir du bien général, qui présuppose de toute nécessité dans celui qui en est animé, un dévouement entier au Cabinet sur lequel se fondent toutes les espérances qu'on puisse encore raisonnablement entretenir. Vous concevrez néanmoins aisément que celui qui n'a pas craint de déplaire à sa Cour, en lui exprimant plusieurs fois combien il blâmait sa conduite, doit dans l'occasion, ne pas hésiter de confier à un ami aussi sage, aussi sûr, et aussi éclairé que vous, ce qu'il croit pouvoir désapprouver dans les projets que vous formez actuellement. Ne voyez dans tout ceci que les

épanchemens secrets de l'amitié. Ils doivent toujours être entiers, sincères, nobles et hardis. 1<sup>o</sup> La Cour de Vienne, après avoir reçu de l'amitié de l'Angleterre un million six cent mille livres sterlings d'avance, et s'être engagée à les rembourser par le moyen d'un emprunt à négocier à Londrès sous le garantie du Parlement, quand et aux conditions que le ministère Britannique indiquerait; après avoir donné à son ministre des instructions et des pouvoirs pour signer une convention à ce sujet, se refuse à la ratifier, et fait même des chicanes de prétentions tout-à-fait hors de propos sur l'entretien du corps de Condé. Je suis bien loin d'excuser ce procédé, dont personne ne souffre plus, et ne ressent plus la honte que moi; mais je ne puis m'empêcher cependant d'observer *qu'on ne fait aucune difficulté de reconnaître la dette; qu'on en promet même le remboursement; et qu'on se borne seulement à s'y refuser momentanément parcequ'on veut recourir à d'autres roies que celle de l'emprunt, qu'on ne juge pas compatible avec l'état de détresse où l'on se trouve.*

“Ce fait incontestable n'excuse nullement le tort réel de manquer à l'engagement pris à l'égard de l'emprunt; mais prouve, en même tems, que ma Cour est bien loin de nourrir l'idée coupable de vouloir escamoter à l'Angleterre les sommes qu'elle en a reçu, puisqu'elle s'occupe précisément des moyens d'effectuer ce remboursement. Oser dire qu'il ne se fera point, c'est parler en l'air, et calomnier sans raison une Cour respectable qui devoit être alors la première à ressentir l'injure qu'on lui ferait en osant la soupçonner et la vilipender à ce point. Je ne vous cacherai pas que mon attachement à mon pays me ferait désirer qu'on y sût au moins apprécier cet outrage, si jamais on nous le ferait. Il ne doit pas être dit, ce me semble, que pour s'être crû obligé de s'humilier une fois, on doive se résigner à recevoir la loi de tout le monde, et à des insultes d'un genre aussi sensible.

“La seule raison qui déterminerait votre ministère à une mesure aussi déplacée serait donc, non pas la crainte de perdre ce million six cent mille livres sterlings (ce qui même ne pourrait pas entrer en comparaison avec les inconvéniens qui en résulteraient) *mais notre seul refus de vous faire ce remboursement d'après le mode primitivement convenu.*

“Ainsi, donc, ce même gouvernement qui s'est laissé tromper par la Prusse sans lui témoigner son humeur d'une manière éclatante, quoiqu'elle lui donnât gratuitement des subsides; qui, après avoir également payé des subsides à la Cour de Sardaigne, y a laissé son ministre quoique ce pays ait fait une alliance avec les régicides; qui, si il avait voulu trouver un prétexte plausible pour nous prouver son juste mécontentement en avait un honorable au moment des préliminaires de Leoben, ce même gouvernement, dis-je, médite actuellement une démonstration presque hostile, *parcequ'on veut le rembourser (d'une somme au fond peu considérable entre des grandes puissances) d'une manière différente de celle qui convient à ses formes parlementaires.*

“2. En prenant la détermination de cette mesure si peu réfléchie, vous manqueriez absolument le but que vous vous proposeriez ; car, certainement, ce n'est point en vous brouillant avec nous que vous nous engageriez à vous payer de la manière que vous le désirez ; et ce ne serait point non plus, j'espère, en nous montrant une humeur insultante, que vous nous en imposeriez au point de nous faire obéir. J'avoue, de bonne foi, que si j'étais appelé aujourd'hui au timon des affaires, je remplirais immédiatement tous les engagements contractés. La probité, l'honneur, la raison, et mon sentiment me feraient une loi de rompre sur le champ la paix honteuse que nous avons conclu avec l'anarchie, à laquelle je vouerais une guerre acharnée, dont l'issue la plus malheureuse n'est point encore comparable, selon moi, aux fleaux de toutes espèces qui sont nécessairement les suites inévitables de tout accommodement quelconque avec les tirans actuels de la France, sous quelque forme qu'ils se présentent, et quelque masque qu'ils prennent. Je me lierais avec vous plus intimement que jamais par conviction, et inclination ; mais je ne me laisserais point effrayer par des menaces, de quelque côté qu'elles me viennent.

“3. Il me reste encore à vous parler d'une partie des conséquences incalculables qui résulteraient de l'exécution de la mesure que nous discutons. Elle deviendrait la base de la dissolution totale de notre alliance, et peut-être de l'inimitié future, et très prochaine, de nos deux Cours ; car les Chargés d'Affaires qui resteraient pour quelque tems à Vienne et à Londres ne pourraient pas travailler aussi efficacement que M. Eden et moi au maintien de cette bonne intelligence si indispensable. Pourraient-ils prendre la même responsabilité sur eux ? qui sait d'ailleurs si la personne qui me succéderait ne se laisserait point influencer par les préjugés que cette levée de bouclier de votre part serait faite pour inspirer contre vous. L'aigreur assez naturelle en pareille occasion, soigneusement nourrie par les bons offices François et Prussiens, amènerait bientôt une rupture entière, dont le résultat serait une alliance forcée entre nous et les régicides. Je frémis et recule à cette idée. Vous en concevez comme moi et l'horreur et les suites. Ne nous cachons cependant pas que le Cabinet Anglais seul aurait, en dernière analyse, achevé cet affreux ouvrage. Nous sommes loin jusqu'à présent d'en nourrir la pensée. Croyez qu'elle nous répugne toujours. Je le sais *positivement*, et je puis l'*affirmer*. Nous ne sommes que des dupes avides et faibles ; effrayés par la France, et *trompés* par la Prusse. Ne nous forcez point au désespoir, la fin en serait trop odieuse. Faudra-t-il que le sort de l'Europe dépende peut-être d'un différent *sur un mode de remboursement* ? Daignez vous souvenir, que lorsque vous avez donné l'ordre fatal du rappel de votre flotte de la Méditerranée, j'ai osé vous prédire que vous aviez prononcé l'arrêt de la perte de l'Italie. L'événement n'a que trop justifié mes craintes ; puisse-je me tromper aujourd'hui, mais le danger me paraît bien plus grand encore. Après vous avoir dit ici tout



ce que l'honnêteté et mon attachement personnel à l'Angleterre m'ont également inspiré, il ne me reste plus qu' à soumettre mes idées à votre sagesse. Il va sans dire que ce papier très confidentiel n'est que pour vous et M. Pitt; et que je vous prie de me le renvoyer après en avoir pris connaissance. Je crains bien que ce ne soit le dernier de cette espèce que vous receviez de ma part."

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, February 19. Berlin.—"I never was in a situation of so much delicacy as that in which M. De Luc has placed me. Your Lordship's full instructions and communications of the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, and the flattering terms in which you mention me in your letter of the same date to M. De Luc, set my personal feelings at rest. But the conduct of that gentleman, as it has defeated your Lordship's wish of engaging in our favour the influence and interposition of the Duke of Brunswick, has, at the same time, thrown a slur on this mission. And M. De Haugwitz will certainly be industrious in having it believed that, in fact, a person in the service of England has been charged by his Majesty with a secret negotiation in behalf of Great Britain, without the participation of the King's Minister. On the business itself I have no observation to offer; nor have I any reason to doubt the honesty of M. De Luc's intentions. But the service has certainly met with an insult from his conduct. And on that account and to obviate the inconveniences from the event, I address myself with confidence for your Lordship's assistance."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1798, February 20. Cleveland Row.—"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your private letter of the 27th November, and am very sensible of the terms in which you speak of my endeavours to promote your wishes on all occasions in which it has been possible for me to do so, under all the embarrassing circumstances of the present times.

"With respect to what you say of the complaints of Mr. Eton, I know no ground which that gentleman can have to speak otherwise than with gratitude of the manner in which you have acted towards him. I never had taken any engagement with him for recommending him to the situation of Secretary of Legation at Petersburg; but, on the contrary, distinctly explained to him when he left England that his success in that object must depend on circumstances of which I could then say nothing to him. It is true that I had it then in my mind to make an arrangement for that purpose. I have since satisfied myself that the King's service—the only object I could have in view in such an appointment—will be better promoted by a different arrangement; and I have accordingly submitted to his Majesty the nomination which I officially announced to you last week.

“ When Mr. Talbot arrives, I am persuaded that you will find in him a diligent and willing assistant in such points as come within the sphere of that situation ; and his connection with a part of my family makes me desirous that you should show him such attention and kindness as I am willing to believe his character will fairly justify. Beyond that I say nothing in his favour, or that of any other person.” *Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 20. Brunswick.—“ J’eus l’honneur d’écrire à votre Excellence de Berlin, le 17<sup>e</sup> de ce mois, dans un paquet que my Lord Elgin devoit faire partir le 18<sup>e</sup> par un courrier pour Hambourg, après qu’il auroit eu ce jour-là une conférence avec M. de H[augwitz] sur le mémoire de ce ministre que j’ai eu l’honneur d’envoyer à votre Excellence dans la susdite lettre. Votre Excellence aura vu qu’elle fut commencée le 15 par le compte que j’avois l’honneur de lui rendre de ce qui s’étoit passé depuis ma lettre précédente entre M. de H[augwitz] et moi, tant avant la remise de ce mémoire que dans l’audience où il me fit l’honneur de me remettre pour le transmettre à my Lord Elgin ; qui avoit approuvé que j’arrangeasse avec M. de H[augwitz] le moment où ils pourroient en conférer, pour qu’ensuite il lui fut remis officiellement. Mais je finis cette lettre à la hâte le 17<sup>e</sup> par l’incident survenu que my Lord Elgin persistoit à trouver un dessous de cartes dans la marche qu’avoit tenue M. de H[augwitz] en voulant suivre d’abord l’affaire avec moi seul ; quoique, pour lui en indiquer la raison ainsi que les déclarations de M. de H[augwitz] au sujet de ce mémoire, je lui eusse donné, comme à votre Excellence dans la lettre que j’avois l’honneur de lui écrire, copie de la minute que j’avois faite, d’abord au sortir de cette audience, de ce qui s’y étoit passé à ces deux égards.

“ Il est souvent nécessaire d’avoir de la défiance, mais on peut la pousser trop loin ; et tel homme qui, en certaines circonstances, a donné de justes raisons de se défier de lui peut, en d’autres, mériter de la confiance ; et si alors on y manque, il peut en résulter d’aussi grands inconvéniens que de trop de confiance en d’autres temps.

“ J’avois beaucoup de raisons de faire cette distinction des temps à l’égard de M. de H[augwitz], mais je n’aurois pas voulu, pour moi-même, fixer seul mon opinion à cet égard ; et quand j’aurois été déterminé, je n’aurois pas eu assez de poids auprès de my Lord Elgin pour fixer son jugement. Je proposai donc que, puisque le mémoire de votre Excellence avoit été destiné à parvenir à M. de H[augwitz] par l’entremise de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, qui plus que personne se tenoit au fait des dessous de cartes, je partisse tout de suite pour venir informer s’ a[lt]esee s[érénissime] de tout ce qui s’étoit passé, et en avoir son jugement ; ce que my Lord Elgin approuva. Je partis donc dès le soir même, après m’être prouvé par lettres l’approbation de M. de H[augwitz]. J’ai marché jour

et nuit, et je suis arrivé ce matin à 7 heures. J'ai eu l'honneur d'en informer aussitôt s[on] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qui m'a fait celui de me recevoir à 10 heures et de m'accorder un long entretien.

“ Mon information a été facile ; car ayant les minutes des lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence dès mon arrivée à Berlin, il m'a suffi de les lire à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] en y ajoutant, chemin faisant, bien des détails dont les longueurs, et de quelques-uns même la nature, ne m'avoient pas permis de les insérer dans ces lettres, quoiqu'ils eussent servi à fonder mon jugement.

“ Après toute cette information s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a fait l'honneur de me dire que sa satisfaction alloit au delà de ce qu'elle avoit attendu ; puis qu'elle voyoit maintenant dans la cour de Berlin toutes les dispositions qu'elle y avoit désirées, sans les y avoir encore espérées jusqu'à ce point. Qu'elle n'avoit eu aucun doute sur les dispositions du Roi ; mais qu'il y avoit un grand parti à surmonter, à la tête du quel étoit le Prince Henry qui, plus ou moins, avoit eu de l'influence sur M. de H[augwitz] ; ce qu'elle avoit bien aperçu sans rien prévoir qui pût ôter à ce ministre la confiance du Roi. Que par tout ce que je venois de lui communiquer, il étoit manifeste que le mémoire de votre Excellence, et la manière dont il avoit été acheminé dans ces circonstances critiques, avoit fait reprendre le dessus à l'Angleterre, et que le ministre s'étoit par là entièrement détaché de ce parti pour suivre un chemin plus assuré.

“ ‘ Cela est très évident (a remarqué s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] par la manière ouverte avec laquelle il vous a parlé sur la situation dans laquelle il s'étoit trouvé sous le feu Roi, sur ce qu'il pense des François sous leur gouvernement actuel, sur la manière dont la Prusse devoit considérer son traité de paix avec ce gouvernement perpétuellement en révolution, et tentant de tout révolutionner, s'il y avoit lieu à former une nouvelle coalition pour la guerre ; enfin sur tout ce qui se passe maintenant entre Berlin et Vienne. S'il eût dit cela à quelque autre ministre on pourroit le soupçonner de duplicité, en le comparant aux choses passées ; mais le dire à quelqu'un qu'il a lui-même annoncé au Roi, et à qui il a rapporté que s[a] M[ajesté] le verroit avec plaisir ; à quelqu'un qu'il sait être en communication intime avec moi, et à qui il a témoigné si fortement son approbation de ce qu'il vouloit venir me faire un rapport détaillé de toutes les particularités de leurs entretiens, porte à mes yeux le caractère de la sincérité. Car il savoit bien que vous ne manqueriez pas au besoin de faire usage, tant auprès du Roi qu'après de moi, de tout ce qu'il vous auroit dit. D'ailleurs il est un des plus riches particuliers par des terres en Silésie ; et il n'avoit besoin que d'ouvrir les yeux, comme il les a maintenant ouverts, sur les plans des François, pour devenir un des plus ardens soutiens des monarchies. Et j'ajouterai que lorsque je fus à Berlin, et lui parlai du premier mémoire que vous m'aviez apporté de la part de my Lord Grenville, il fut le premier à me presser d'en faire part

au Roi ; ce qui a donné le branle à toute cette affaire. Je ne vois rien d'ailleurs que de très fondé dans tout ce qu'il vous a dit des choses actuelles. Il avoit raison de vous imposer absolument *l'incognito* jusqu' à ce que vous eussiez acheminé l'affaire à un point déterminé, et de demander qu'elle reste toujours secrète ; car je sais qu'il est fortement épié par le parti du Prince H[enry] qui rapporte tout aux François. Il a eu raison aussi de penser que, dans le moment présent, on ne pouvoit s'occuper définitivement que de l'article concernant la sûreté du nord de l'Allemagne ; car il est très vrai qu'on ne sait encore à quoi l'on pourra amener la cour de Vienne. Mais dès qu'il s'engage si positivement à prendre l'objet de la quadruple alliance, ou après une paix à Rastadt pour la sûreté future, ou tout de suite au cas que ces conférences se rompent, enfin quand il a approuvé votre idée de ne donner pour objet à la paix avec les François que ce que l'Empire en corps leur cederait sans les faire intervenir dans les arrangemens intérieurs, vous assurant qu'il y butteroit, je ne puis disconvenir qu'il ne voye très bien les choses, qu'il n'ait de la suite dans ses idées, et qu'elles ne tendent maintenant au bien général ; surtout puisqu'il embrasse dans ses considérations la sûreté de l'Angleterre comme essentielle à celle de l'Europe. C'est (a ajouté enfin s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime]) ce que je prendrai la liberté d'exposer, dans sa généralité, à sa majesté Britannique, dans une lettre que je vous prierai d'acheminer.'

"D'après ce jugement porté de M. de H[augwitz] par s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] (qui je l'avoue étoit déjà le mien) il se présente un objet de grande considération. On savoit à Berlin, et l'on sait ici, que l'on inspire toujours de la défiance à Vienne pour cette cour, et qu'à présent on l'appuie sur M. de Haugwitz. Or il est très possible que ce soit une nouvelle ruse pour empêcher la réunion des deux cours. Si donc ce que j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer à votre Excellence, et le témoignage de monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic dans sa lettre au Roi (que je viens justement de recevoir, et que je prie votre Excellence de faire parvenir à sa Majesté) lui inspiroit de la confiance dans les vues actuelles de ce ministre, et leur durée, j'ose représenter à votre Excellence s'il ne conviendrait pas d'en informer le ministre de sa Majesté à Vienne, pour qu'il veille à ce qu'on n'emploie pas ce nouveau prétexte pour traverser les vues de la cour de Berlin. Ne trouveroit-elle point aussi qu'il conviendrait que les mêmes remarques fussent communiquées à my Lord Elgin ; de peur que, continuant dans sa défiance de M. de H[augwitz] quand les causes ne subsistent plus, il ne manquât peut-être les momens où une communication confidentielle pourroit amener, par le changement des circonstances, tout ce qu'on peut désirer de la cour de Berlin ; et qu'il y eût sur ce sujet une correspondance entre les ministres de sa Majesté à Berlin et à Vienne ; ce qui leur serviroit mutuellement de contrôle de la marche de M. de H[augwitz]. Cette remarque, suite naturelle de l'entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a été suggérée par M. de Stamford.

“ J’ai eu la satisfaction de trouver mon digne ami assez bien pour songer à se rendre vers la fin de la semaine à l’invitation de Monseigneur le Prince héréditaire d’Orange, ce qui sera aussi le temps où l’on pourra voir le Roi.

“ Quant à moi, n’ayant pas pris congé de M. de H[augwitz] et devant lui rapporter, ainsi qu’à my Lord Elgin, les idées de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, il faut aussi que j’y retourne ; et je le devois par la seule raison de ce que Leurs Majestés m’ont fait l’honneur de témoigner qu’elles désiroient me voir dès qu’elles recevraient compagnie. Mais s’ a[ltesse] s[érénissime] souhaite de plus que j’y retourne à cause de la confiance personnelle que M. de H[augwitz] m’a témoignée, et qu’il a exprimée à s’ a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dans une lettre ; afin qu’ayant de nouveaux entretiens avec lui, tandis qu’il saura que j’aurai l’honneur, de même que M. de Stamford, d’approcher le Roi dans le particulier, il soit ainsi toujours mieux persuadé que le Roi saura tous les détails de ce qui s’est passé entre nous, et que s[a] M[ajesté] est plus intimement instruit des sentimens de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic ; ce qui lieroit de plus en plus ce ministre à la marche qu’il commence à tenir, non seulement quant aux principes, mais à leurs conséquences dans les changemens des circonstances qui pourroient être amenés par la réponse de Vienne aux dernières dépêches de Berlin.

“ Gardant la minute de celle lettre, je crois devoir, vu l’importance qu’elle pourroit avoir dans le moment présent, assurer son arrivée en envoyant un duplicata à votre Excellence par le courrier prochain ; et j’aurai l’honneur d’y ajouter ce qui pourroit s’être passé dès lors, et peut-être quelques autres détails que le temps ne me permet pas de me rappeler, ou de joindre ici.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, February 22. Cleveland Row.—“ J’ai reçu comme une nouvelle preuve d’amitié et de confiance de votre part, les observations confidentielles que vous m’avez communiqué par rapport à l’intention dont je vous ai parlé jeudi dernier. Vous pensez bien que je ne me suis pas porté à une pareille idée sans y avoir songé avec toute l’attention qui j’ai pu y donner. Je ne vous en ai parlé que pour vous seul, et à cause du rapport que cette affaire aura avec vos intérêts et arrangemens personnels. Elle me feroit, sans doute, infiniment de la peine, et celle que j’éprouverais en vous perdant ne serait pas la moindre. Mais j’ai toujours eu pour principe, que pour les grandes puissances, comme celle-ci, le premier point de tous c’est de ne pas se laisser insulter ; et qu’en dernier analyse, il vaut mieux s’exposer à quelques inconvéniens, que de faire voir qu’on ne sait pas soutenir dans l’occasion le rang et la position honorable de son pays.

“ Vous vous rappelerez, s’il vous plaît, que bien loin de souffrir, comme vous le dites, *sans aucun signe de mécontentement* la conduite du feu roi de Prusse, nous avons d’abord déclaré le traité rompu de fait, et nous nous sommes refusés au paiement

de ce qui restait du subside convenu, en sorte que, depuis ce moment jusqu'à la mort de ce monarque, il n'y a jamais eu la moindre intelligence ni confiance entre les deux Cours; et s'il eut alors retiré son ministre, comme on s'y attendait ici, nous en aurions fait de même.

“Voilà la seule remarque que je vous ferai sur l'objet des observations que je viens de lire encore, avec toute l'attention que méritent la conduite et les principes du digne ami qui me les envoie; et qui, certainement, ne doit pas être, non plus que nous, responsable de toutes les calamités que la conduite inouïe de sa Cour a déjà produite; ni de celles, selon moi encore plus grandes, qu'elle paraît devoir produire dans la suite des circonstances où l'Europe se trouve.

“Je ne garde votre papier que pour le montrer à M. Pitt; après quoi je ne manquerai pas de le renvoyer, comme vous le desirez.” *Copy. French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

*Private.*

1798, February 22. Cleveland Row.—“I have not written to you sooner on the subject of Baron Rolle's regiment, because I had, before I received your letter, heard from Rolle himself upon the subject, and had in consequence requested that the taking any definitive step upon it might be suspended till it could be considered in all its bearings. I have this morning seen Rolle, and have stated to him an idea which had occurred to me of employing a part of his officers to raise a second battalion in Switzerland, to act there in case of open hostilities between France and Switzerland. The uncertainty of the accounts from Paris as to what is doing in the cantons, and the long suspension of news from Germany, six mails being now due, make it very difficult to judge what is likely to happen in that quarter. If the country is completely revolutionized, the regiment will probably be compelled to leave our service. If open war takes place, a part of it at the least might be employed as I have stated above; but, in the interval, it appears clearly right not to precipitate any measure upon it. I have therefore told him he might go to Edinburgh for a fortnight, and when he returns he will probably learn the final resolution on the subject, which, I am persuaded, may in any event be easily arranged in a satisfactory manner to his wishes as far as I collected them to-day.

“I have repeated applications from the Agents of the Royalists, who seem very desirous of involving their business again in confusion, and creating fresh intricacy by mixing this department in their concerns. I have always referred them to you, and will continue to do so, as I am confident no other channel of conducting the business is so good as that in which we have now placed it.” *Copy.*

## W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

- 1798, February 22. Park Street, Westminster.—“I perfectly agree with you in the propriety of suspending any decision respecting the regiment of Rolle, till further accounts shall be received from the Continent. But I am afraid such suspension will not be effected by the suspension of anything to be done on your part or mine. The Duke of York’s letter is now on its way; and is conceived, I apprehend, in such terms that, combining with the ready disposition which it will meet with in General Stuart, will produce its effect, if something is not sent the next post to stay it. The Baron de Rolle has, I understand, already signified to His Royal Highness the inutility of his attempting to induce the men to re-engage upon a new term, and this, as I conceive (for I am not well informed of the state of the fact) is so stated in the Duke’s letter that, after a renewal from General Stuart of the proposal formerly made, he is very likely to proceed in reducing the regiment. I cannot but think, therefore, that you had better write a line to His Royal Highness suggesting the propriety of suspending the measure till an opportunity shall be given of considering it under all its relations. Lord Minto, to whom the Baron de Rolle has applied, has, I know, strongly enforced to Mr. Dundas the value of the regiment in a military view, and particularly the great advantages to be derived from it in such service as that of Ireland.

“I was about to write to you at the moment when your letter was brought to me, on the subject of our negotiations with the representatives of the southern armies of Royalists. It is of great consequence that they should not have the hope of playing off one department against another; the efforts of which hope I have already felt in the conversations which have lately been held with them. At first, I am persuaded, they would have taken as a boon anything that had been offered them, without an idea of any claim of right. Their pretensions afterwards rose to a very high pitch. But they are now subsiding again; and will be willing to take whatever sum shall appear to be reasonable; less than which I would not wish to propose to them. My unwillingness on the other hand to exceed in any considerable degree what is reasonable is founded, not merely on my regard to the public money, but upon a view to the future difficulty of obtaining any money for services of this sort, should such occasions ever again arise.”

## M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 23. Brunswick.—“Regardant la lettre que j’eus l’honneur d’adresser d’ici à votre Excellence le 20<sup>e</sup> de ce mois, comme importante à cause du jugement de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic sur l’état des choses, et sur les dispositions du Cabinet de Berlin, j’exécute ce que j’eus l’honneur de dire à votre Excellence à cet égard, en lui en envoyant ci-joint une copie.

“C'est, je crois, un des points les plus importans dans ce moment que de bien juger M. de H[augwitz], aussi ai-je donné la plus grande attention à m'assurer du jugement qu'en portent s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et M. de Stamford, d'après leurs observations et les miennes; et c'est le résumé de ce jugement que je vais prendre la liberté de présenter à votre Excellence.

“Il faudroit douter de tout, si l'on doutoit que M. de H[augwitz] ne fût sincère maintenant. Il le doit pour son intérêt particulier, dès qu'à présent il a ouvert les yeux sur la réalité et la nature des dangers; car il n'est pas dans le cas des *parvenus*; c'est un homme très riche en terres, qui n'avoit pas songé ci-devant à se mêler des affaires, et qui aujourd'hui sent très fortement que des particuliers tels que lui ne peuvent conserver leur état que par la conservation des trônes. Il le doit encore parceque le Roi lui-même est sincère, et qu'il voit bien aujourd' hui que Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic tant par lui-même, que par les personnes qu'il honnore de sa confiance, sera attentif à ce que s[a] Majesté voye toujours la vérité. Il le doit enfin, ou plutôt même il est évident qu'il le veut, puisqu'il s'est prononcé avec moi, qui a l'honneur d'être une de ces personnes, d'une manière trop précise et avec des détails trop particuliers pour qu'il n'ait pas pris décidément le parti d'exécuter ce qu'il professe.

“Pourquoi donc a-t-il été si différent dans les affaires passées? C'est de cet examen que dépend le jugement qu'on peut porter du degré de confiance qu'on peut prendre dans la durée de ce qu'il est à présent. C'est donc ce que j'ai cherché d'après les divers entretiens que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec lui; dans les quels dès l'abord, d'après ce qu'il avoit eu occasion d'apprendre de moi, il m'a parlé du ton de la confiance.

“Il n'auroit point songé de lui-même à entrer dans les affaires; ayant tous ce qui pouvoit satisfaire ses goûts; passant l'été dans ses terres et voyageant les hivers. Mais il avoit été personnellement lié avec le feu roi tandis qu'il étoit prince royal, et ils avoient de l'amitié l'un pour l'autre; dans un de ses voyages, il avoit eu aussi l'avantage de se lier personnellement avec l'empereur Leopold, voyageant alors; et ce fut ce monarque qui l'engagea à entrer dans les affaires, en désirant qu'il fût nommé ministre de Prusse à Vienne. Cela eut lieu, mais ne dura pas longtemps par la mort de cet empereur. Il revint alors à Berlin et le Roi le plaça dans le ministère. Voilà ce qu'il m'a fait l'honneur de me ré citer.

“A juger de la manière dont il se comporta dès lors, d'après ce qu'il a bien voulu m'en dire lui-même comparé à ce qu'on en sait, il paroît qu'il prit goût à manier les affaires et à les diriger, et que comme il avoit beaucoup vu le monde, il se flattoit de connoître les hommes; et il avoue qu'il s'étoit trompé à cet égard. Mais on peut juger que lorsqu'il l'aperçut, manquant des connoissances qu'une longue expérience seule peut fournir, il n'avoit pas non plus la fermeté qui résulte de ce qu'on se sent les moyens d'être *soi-même*, ni probablement cette rigidité de principes qui empêche



de se laisser entraîner par les autres sans voir clair, ou de biaiser pour ne pas rompre avec eux ; enfin, sans avoir assez de connoissances du nouvel état des choses dans le monde pour n'être pas entraîné par des gens adroits dans des mesures auxquelles il n'auroit pas consenti s'il eût vu où on le menoit ; ni assez de franchise pour reconnoître ensuite qu'il avoit eu tort. Desorte qu'aujourd'hui pour se justifier des maux qu'il reconnoît bien avoir été produit par le Cabinet de Berlin, il représente fortement la manière dont il avoit été entouré, combien il a souffert, combien peu il a été maître de diriger les affaires, pour faire sentir la différence des temps à présent, qu'il a le bonheur de servir un monarque qui voit tout par lui-même, et qui voit les choses comme il auroit fallu toujours les voir. Votre Excellence aura bien apperçu cette disposition dans son mémoire, celle, veux-je dire, de *justifier* le passé ; et il m'a dit à cet égard que le Roi lui-même avoit une grande délicatesse sur la mémoire du roi son père. Aussi n'ai-je pas cru devoir m'aheurter à ces apologies ; d'autant plus que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'en avoit averti ; il s'agit des dispositions actuelles, et c'est sur cela que j'ai dirigé mon attention.

“Quant à l'Angleterre, je ne saurois rien désirer au-delà de ce que m'a dit uniformément ce ministre dans tous nos entretiens ; par opposition à ceux qui travaillent toujours à inspirer au Roi que l'Angleterre lui est inutile ; puisque les puissances ses rivales sont sur le continent ; et qu'une puissance continentale telle que les François, pouvoit seule le rassurer. ‘Cela seroit vrai,’ dit-il, ‘si la nation Françoise étoit différente, et si son esprit rémuant n'étoit mis en jeu aujourd'hui par une faction infernale. Mais un appui tel que celui-là tend à tout renverser. Il n'y a donc que l'Angleterre qui soit pour nous une relation sûre, en tant que rivale nécessaire de ce pouvoir énorme, et qui ne peut nous faire que du bien comme nous pouvons lui en faire ; ce qui produit un lien solide, comme étant fondé sur les intérêts communs.’

“‘Je vous prie’ (me dit-il, dans notre dernier entretien) ‘d'exprimer ces sentimens, aussi vrais chez moi que chez le Roi, à my Lord Grenville, puisque vous pouvez lui parler sans l'appareil diplomatique, comme je le fais ici avec vous. Il y a par exemple, (dit-il), un objet qui a déjà occasionné plusieurs fois des altercations dans le conseil, et que je désirerois bien de voir finir. Ce sont deux réclamations que nous avons à faire au gouvernement d'Angleterre ; l'une de ce qui est dû à une de nos provinces pour le passage des troupes Angloises, et dont les comptes sont arrêtés ; l'autre pour des saisies de toiles appartenantes à nos marchands Silésiens. Les intéressés nous font de vives réclamations ; nous les avons transmises plusieurs fois au gouvernement Anglois, et nous n'avons point de réponse. Je ne vous cache pas que j'ai à lutter à cet égard contre ceux qui ne sont pas portés pour l'Angleterre, et que, dans peu, je serai obligé de donner ordre à notre résident à Londres de faire une nouvelle réquisition formelle. Faites-moi le plaisir d'en prévenir my Lord Grenville afin que cette affaire

particulière n'entrave pas la marche des grandes choses qui doivent maintenant occuper de concert la Prusse et l'Angleterre.'

"Je ne promis rien à cet égard, parceque ç'aurait été une trop grande présomption à ma part; cependant puisqu'il l'a énoncé avec un tel motif, je crois devoir prendre la liberté de le rapporter à votre Excellence.

"J'ai maintenant exposé à votre Excellence le jugement qu'on porte ici, d'après tout l'ensemble des circonstances, sur ce qu'on peut penser de M. de H[augwitz], et comme il est de grande importance que le cabinet de sa Majesté pénètre de plus en plus dans ce caractère, nous avons cru devoir, M. de Stamford et moi, avec l'approbation de s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] former le plan suivant. M. de Stamford ira le premier à Berlin, et cherchera d'obtenir une connoissance précise de l'état des choses, en particulier de ce qui regarde M. de H[augwitz] et il en fera part à my Lord Elgin. Je m'y rendrai donc séparément; et pour avoir un motif de mon absence auprès de ceux qui attendoient de m'y voir, j'irai passer par le Mecklenbourg jusqu' à Strelitz, pour avoir l'honneur de rendre mes hommages à monseigneur le Duc, comme j'en suis convenu par lettres avec M. de H[augwitz].

"Arrivant ainsi à Berlin quelque temps après M. de Stamford, et par cette route, nous ne paroîtrons avoir l'un avec l'autre d'autre relation que celle de l'amitié, et je profiterai de ses observations pour me diriger dans les relations de bienséance avec M. de H[augwitz]. J'espère d'être alors près de recevoir, chez my Lord Elgin, les ordres de votre Excellence, si elle juge à propos que je profite de ma position auprès de ce ministre; ce que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] paroît désirer.

"J'avois déjà eu l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence un des motifs qui m'obligoient de retourner à Berlin; c'est que M. de H[augwitz] m'avoit informé que leurs Majestés désiroient de me voir. Ce motif est devenu plus fort par une lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de Mons[eigneur] le Prince hér[éditaire] d'Orange, dans laquelle s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me fait la grace de me dire, ' . . . je crois d'autant plus former l'espoir de vous revoir ici que je puis vous informer qu'ayant communiqué au Roi votre départ et les raisons qui vous y ont déterminé, s[a] m[ajesté] m'a témoigné désirer de faire votre connoissance personnelle.'

"J'en étois ici, hier, de cette lettre lorsque s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] nous fit anoncer, à M. de H[augwitz] et à moi, qu'elle ne tarderoit pas à venir pour nous communiquer des choses importantes de Berlin; et peu après nous eumes l'honneur de la voir arriver, me disant d'abord, 'voici ce que vous trouverez, sans doute, nécessaire de communiquer en Angleterre.'

"Rien, en effet, ne sauroit me paroître plus nécessaire, puisque l'une des pièces donne à la fois et la première connoissance des dispositions de la cour de Vienne, et une plus grande certitude sur celles du cabinet de Berlin; car nous eumes lieu de juger qu'on a fait cette communication à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pour avoir son sentiment; et en même

temps, elle mit beaucoup d'intérêt à discuter avec nous la réponse qu'elle devoit faire. Quant à l'autre pièce, elle ne justifie que trop M. de Haugwitz de penser qu'il faut d'abord songer au moment présent. C'est une information venue à Berlin par le résident de Prusse à Francfort. J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer copie de ces deux pièces à votre Excellence.

" Cette information de Francfort donne un tableau aussi juste qu'effrayant de l'effet que produit sur la rive droite du Rhin la perspective de ces fatales *indemnités* (comme je les nommois déjà dans une de mes lettres) dont les révolutionnaires intérieurs et extérieurs se servent pour disposer à la révolution tous les peuples dont on annonce le *changement de maîtres* ; et qu'ils annoncent pour cet effet, même au-delà des vues les plus exagérées de la cour de Vienne et d'autres princes. Ce tableau fait frémir pour les suites ; car non seulement il fait prévoir qu'aucunes de ces *compensations* ne pourroient se réaliser, puisque leurs objets échapperoient des mains à mesure qu'on les découvreroit ; mais l'esprit révolutionnaire, s'étendant par là, attaqueroit sûrement les contrées voisines.

" Voilà donc à quoi buttoient les François en inspirant l'idée des *indemnités*, et en promettant leur appui à cet égard à l'Empereur et à d'autres princes ; comme ils l'avoient tenté auprès de la Prusse qui l'avoit refusé ; et toujours attentif aux intérêts de ma chère patrie adoptive, je sentis vivement ce qui pouvoit en refluer sur elle.

" En me pénétrant fortement de cet objet, je fus frappé de l'idée que rien ne sauroit prévenir ce coup fatal qu'une renonciation bien prompte de la cour de Vienne, comme de celle de Berlin, à toute indemnisation par laquelle des peuples changeroient de maîtres, et à une déclaration publique de cette résolution à la Diète de Rastadt ; ce que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] approuva entièrement.

" Mais où est l'homme capable de faire saisir cette vérité à Vienne, si elle est bien saisie à Berlin, comme il paroît qu'elle l'est aujourd'hui ; et de travailler à lever les obstacles imprévus, tandis qu'il y a si peu de temps ? S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et M. de Stamford qui connoissent le min[istre] de Prusse à Vienne, le regardent comme incapable de produire un tel effet ; car, dans des temps comme ceux-ci, toutes les instructions possibles des cabinets ne sauroient pourvoir à la nonchalance, l'incapacité, ou le manque de lumière des agens ; et aujourd'hui le moment manqué ne revient plus.

" Voilà qui a rappelé à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] l'idée de M. de Stamford pour Vienne, comme étant lié avec Berlin, et qui très probablement en obtiendrait la confiance. Il ne faudroit qu'un motif de l'y faire arriver, et cela le plus tôt possible. Je prends donc la liberté d'exposer à votre Excellence ce que pense à cet égard s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et à quoi M. de Stamford acquiesce, si son degré actuel de santé se soutient.

" Des relations de M. de Stamford avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Prince d'Orange sont connues ; et l'on soit

comment les François se comportent dans le pays de Nassau. Rien donc de plus naturel que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le chargea d'aller à Vienne avec des lettres de créance, pour prier l'Empereur de lui accorder son intervention à cet égard. Cela suffiroit; le reste s'opéreroit sous les directions du cabinet de sa Majesté et de celui de Berlin, en l'introduisant pour cet effet, de part et d'autre, aux ministres respectifs à Vienne. Si le roi approuvoit ce plan, il me semble que sa Majesté pourroit aisément engager Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange à envoyer à M. de Stamford à Berlin cette mission, qui ne pourroit qu'être utile à s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] elle-même, et à laquelle votre Excellence joindroit ses instructions.

"On a été si souvent prévenu par les événemens, et ils ont à présent une marche si rapide, que j'ose espérer que sa Majesté et votre Excellence voudront bien pardonner à un zélé et fidèle serviteur d'ouvrir les idées qui lui sont suggérées par des personnages de confiance, ou que lui inspirent les objets qu'il voit de si près. Cependant, je l'avoue, je ne suis jamais sans un sentiment d'inquiétude en me sentant encore, dans cette rapidité de mouvemens, sous les seules instructions de votre Excellence du 14<sup>e</sup> janvier; et j'ai besoin de me rappeler toujours que je ne suis ainsi en action que par la confiance dont sa Majesté, votre Excellence, et M. Pitt, m'honorèrent dans un moment où, sans instructions, et par mon zèle seul, je tachai d'amener un fil dans leurs mains.

"Il est vrai qu'il a passé ici plusieurs paquets et lettres pour moi, tandis que j'étois prêt à partir de Berlin ou en route; et s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] est si inquiète elle-même de ce que je n'ai point de lettres d'Angleterre, qu'elle me fit la grace de m'offrir d'envoyer une estafette à Berlin, pour en rapporter ces lettres; ce que j'aurois sûrement accepté si j'avois pu présumer qu'il y en eût de votre Excellence. Mais M. de Stamford qui les a reçues et fait partir, et qui a reconnu la main et le cachet de M. le Baron de Steinberg et de M. le Comte Wallmoden, les seules personnes par lesquelles une lettre de votre Excellence auroit pu me parvenir, m'a dit que ce n'étoient que de simples lettres. D'ailleurs des lettres, qu'il auroit toujours fallu attendre un certain temps, ne pouvoient influer sur ce dont je devois avoir l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence. J'attendrai cependant ici le retour de toutes ces lettres.

"J'ose donc prier votre Excellence de me faire la grace de m'envoyer le plutôt qu'il lui sera possible ses instructions particulières et générales sur la conduite que je dois tenir dans les circonstances présentes ou qui pourroient survenir; et de vouloir bien le faire dans le paquet pour my Lord Elgin, auprès de qui je serai, j'espère, avant qu'elles puissent arriver; et M. de Stamford y attendra aussi la détermination du Cabinet de sa Majesté à son égard.

"Quant à moi, je laisserai à la décision de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] d'après ce qui pourroit venir de Berlin si, malgré les convenances qui me font désirer de n'y arriver que quelques jours après M. de Stamford, et de passer par Strelitz, pour

donner une apparence plus indépendante de lui à l'honneur que j'aurai d'approcher leurs Majestés, il ne conviendrait pas que je me rendisse plus tôt auprès de my Lord Elgin et de M. de H[augwitz]. J'aurai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, le courrier prochain de ce que s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] aura jugé convenable; et j'y joindrai copie de tout ce paquet. Car s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] attache une importance très grande à assurer l'arrivée de toutes ces informations à sa Majesté et à son Cabinet; d'où je conclus aussi celle qu'y attache le Cabinet de Berlin; car je n'ai jamais vu encore s' a[ltesse] s[érénissime] aussi fortement décidée à concourir à tout ce qui pourroit sauver l'Europe, et s'en occuper si fortement; pourvu (et c'est sur quoi il faut nécessairement se régler) qu'elle puisse se reposer sur quelqu'un qui agisse, et en qui elle ait une entière confiance pour la discrétion et la pureté des vues."

*Enclosure (1).*

— to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

1798, February . Berlin.—“Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse a reçu une lettre de main propre de sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne dans laquelle elle déclare être toute disposée à entrer avec s[a] M[ajesté] P[russienne] dans un concert étroit, ayant pour objet de maintenir autant que possible l'empire Germanique dans son état d'intégrité, et d'écarter à cette fin toute vue d'agrandissement qui seroit trouvé y être contraire. S[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] décline néanmoins absolument la communication des articles secrets faisant partie de son traité de paix conclu à Campo-Formio avec le gouvernement François; alléguant pour raison ‘que s'il existoit réellement de tels articles, l'impossibilité de les communiquer en seroit une conséquence toute naturelle, et que s[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] prioit pour cette même raison de ne point insister sur ce point.’ Quelque inattendue que soit cette réserve, il nous semble toutefois urgent, dans l'état actuel des choses, de répondre à cette déclaration de s[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] dans ce sens que s[a] M[ajesté] P[russienne], d'après les ouvertures données par s[a] M[ajesté] l'Empereur, ne doute en aucune manière qu'elle n'ait sincèrement à coeur la conservation de l'empire Germanique, et que, par conséquent, s[a] M[ajesté] P[russienne] se tient fermement assurée que rien ne sauroit être contenu dans le traité de Campo-Formio qui pourroit empêcher un concert entre s[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] et elle, dont le but seroit la dite conservation. J'espère qu'en tenant cette marche, nous parviendrons à déjouer les projets très manifestes des François de semer partout la discorde, comme le plus sûr moyen d'accélérer l'exécution de leur plan de bouleversement général.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure (2).*

REPORT OF THE PRUSSIAN RESIDENT AT FRANKFORT ON THE MAIN.

“Je m'empresse de vous transmettre le résultat de mes recherches et de mes observations sur l'influence morale du système révolutionnaire François dans cette partie de l'Allemagne,

et sur la manière dont les agens démocrates cherchent à agiter les pays de la rive droite du Rhin, et à y semer le germe de l'insurrection. Depuis longtems déjà j'ai suivi cet objet important avec attention, et ma conviction intime me porte à regarder les innovations qui se préparent comme très dangereuses. Ce ne sont plus actuellement les agens François, mais les clubistes d'Allemagne dont les efforts sont dirigés vers l'explosion d'un soulèvement dans ces contrées. Les effets en deviennent de jour en jour plus sensible, surtout depuis la reddition de Mayence. Cette ville renferme un comité révolutionnaire, présidé par le trop fameux Professeur Hoffmann, homme dangereux, qui dans l'excès de sa funeste ambition voudrait renverser tous les gouvernemens. C'est lui qui s'est mis à la tête de cette assemblée démocrate, et qui travaille à un plan étendu pour exalter l'esprit des peuples. Les motifs et les moyens ne lui manquent pas. D'abord l'incertitude qui règne sur la tournure des négociations, et sur le sort définitif des pays qui doivent servir de compensation fait naître de l'inquiétude chez les habitans, et leur fait appréhender des changemens dans la forme des gouvernemens qui leur donnent des maîtres Protestans, ou leur préparent un régime plus dur. Voilà autant de motifs qu'on fait valoir pour se lever contre des échanges et des mutations de supériorité territoriale. La longueur des négociations laisse le tems de poursuivre ce plan qui doit entraîner le bouleversement de tous les états monarchiques ; c'est l'ancien et primitif but de la révolution. Je citerai à l'appui de ce que j'avance l'exemple de Francfort sur le Mein, et de ce qui se passe sous mes yeux. Le sort futur de cette ville paroît décidé. On la croit positivement destinée au Landgrave de Hesse-Darmstadt. Cette perspective répand ici une grande fermentation parmi le peuple. Aussi on le travaille déjà dans le sens révolutionnaire ; et je sais de bonne part que les habitans de Sachsenhausen sont excités et payés pour se soulever et se déclarer libres au moment où les troupes du Landgrave de Hesse-Darmstadt voudront prendre possession de Francfort sur le Mein, et dans ce cas ils seront soutenus par les François qui systématiquement veulent et doivent donner du secours à toutes les nations qui cherchent à se rendre libres. Je crois en général qu'on ne sauroit assez faire attention aux projets ultérieurs des François qui sûrement renferment encore des vues étendues. Si pour le moment ils ont renoncé à l'invasion du nord de l'Allemagne, la prolongation du séjour de leurs troupes sur la rive droite du Rhin annonce des entreprises non moins dangereuses."

#### CHARLES ARBUTHNOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 27. Stuttgart.—"Although I am not desirous of troubling your Lordship on a subject which is now settled to my perfect satisfaction, yet I think it my duty to mention that on my first arrival here some difficulties arose with regard to my reception.

"In consequence of Count Zeppelin's being offended at my neither having a copy for him of the King's letter to the Duke,

nor a private letter for him from your Lordship, it was intimated to me that I could not be considered at Stuttgart in any other light than that of a simple individual to whom, however, every proper civility would be shown. As there are here at present several ministers with missions of an exactly similar nature to mine, I should, if such a conduct with regard to me had been adopted, have been placed in a most awkward situation; but, what was of much greater consequence, I knew the Duke had been persuaded that, as no letters of credence had been given to me, there was a most evident design of treating him personally with disrespect. On these accounts I lost no time in writing a letter to Count Zeppelin, in which I informed him that the etiquette observed in my mission was such as was always observed in England on similar occasions; and I took care to accompany this representation with expressions which I thought would be personally most flattering to him, as, in consequence of the near connection between the two Courts, it was very much my desire that this affair should be settled amicably. Such, fortunately, was the immediate consequence of my letter, of which I have not enclosed a copy from a wish to save your Lordship the unnecessary trouble of reading it; but, however, it is my intention to preserve one in case it should hereafter be required. It may not be amiss to mention that one of the chief reasons for the difficulties started by Count Zeppelin with regard to the manner in which I have been accredited is the idea he has that he himself when in England was not treated with proper distinction; and on this account, most probably, he has made the Duke believe that the terms made use of in the King's letter to His Serene Highness were not such as his near connection with him might have given reason to expect."

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, February 27. Brunswick.—"À peine mon paquet du 23<sup>e</sup> (dont j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint le duplicate à votre Excellence) étoit parti, et tandis que mon ame entière étoit pénétrée de la situation dangereuse où j'y avois peint les choses, que, coup sur coup, de nouvelles informations me firent comprendre que ce tableau étoit loin d'être exagéré. Tout est en mouvement pour produire quelque explosion; et l'Empereur est encore leurré par ses *articles secrets* qu'il se croit, sans doute, autorisé à ne pas communiquer, parceque probablement ils ne concernent que l'Italie et autres contrées hors de l'Allemagne; mais par lesquels on le mène encore, le bandeau sur les yeux, à exposer d'abord l'Allemagne elle-même, et peut-être la Suisse, pour le conduire enfin à sa propre perte.

"Les indices épars de ce projet sont sous tous les yeux, mais ils ne sont rassemblés et rapportés à leurs vraies causes que par quelques hommes clair-voyans, dont les uns désespèrent, et les autres ne sont pas écoutés. Pour eux l'Europe est certainement près d'être écrasée si marche des affaires entre les puissances

qui subsistent encore ne change beaucoup ; si elle ne sort pas de la marche lente, et assujettie à des règles diplomatiques établies pour des temps bien différens.

“ Comment les François ont-ils opéré ce changement qui non seulement étonne mais étourdit presque toutes les têtes ? C’est en répandant partout des gens de génie, bien affectionnés à leurs vues, avec carte blanche pour former des projets, et les exécuter aussitôt, s’ils en voyoient les moyens. C’est ainsi que l’Italie a été conquise par Buonaparté, que la Hollande a été soumise, et que la rive droite du Rhin et la Suisse vont leur appartenir aussi par association, comme par degrés toute l’Europe, si l’on ne se hâte. Or il est impossible que la diplomatie commune, sans des aides extérieurs moins assujettis aux formes et pourtant appuyés de la confiance, non plus que les maximes militaires des anciens temps, sans un centre de confiance sur les lieux, puissent suivre cette marche-là.

“ Votre Excellence a sûrement les nouvelles de Suisse et en voit toute l’importance ; on les a de même dans ces pays-ci, mais on ne fait attention à leur caractère que lorsque le petit nombre d’hommes clairvoyans les font sentir ; et il y en a bien moins encore qui soient à portée de les faire remarquer à ceux de qui seuls peut dépendre le sort de l’Europe. Je prie votre Excellence de me permettre de lui exposer ce qui s’est passé dans le Pays-de-Vaud, que je connois depuis longtemps, et en parlant des lettres de mon frère dans ces dernières circonstances, peut-être s’y trouvera-t-il des traits qui ne lui étoient pas connus.

“ Il faut considérer d’abord qu’il n’y avoit point de pays plus heureux, ni où les gens de la campagne le sentissent si bien ; et depuis longtemps ils s’étoient prononcés contre les révolutionnaires. On comptoit encore là-dessus au commencement de janvier. On connoissoit bien les gens qui buttoient à la révolution ; mais on espéroit qu’ils n’en viendroient pas à bout, à cause du peuple ; parce qu’on ne prévoyoit pas que les choses n’étoient que suspendues ; *leur tour n’étant pas venu*.

“ C’est cette marche qu’il faut étudier dans l’affaire seule du Pays-de-Vaud. Tout est sûrement prêt partout pour la révolution, malgré la bonne volonté des peuples, prononcée en divers endroits, comme on vient de le voir dans le Pays-de-Vaud, et on la vu précédemment dans celui de Cologne. Mais il suffit que les François *aient le temps de s’approcher*, et ces dispositions des peuples ne servent à rien. Ils font prendre patience à leurs *associés*, en leur représentant qu’ils ne peuvent pas être partout à la fois, mais que *leur tour viendra* ; il est venu pour les *associés* Suisses, et il est important d’observer tout ce qui se découvre par là dans le Pays-de-Vaud ; ils ne le cachent pas ; ils sont si sûrs d’avoir endormi l’Empereur et d’autres puissances qu’ils parlent tout haut, pour que leurs autres *associés* les entendent en tout pays, et qu’ils prennent patience *jusqu’à ce que leur tour vienne*.

“ Voici d’abord l’adresse du commandant des troupes Françaises au premier lieu qu’il avoit choisi pour point d’appui ; ‘ le Général de Brigade Menard, commandant les troupes Françaises d’Italie



sur la frontière de Suisse, au *Comité chargé des pouvoirs de la ville de Nion* . . . . . salut et fraternité.’

“On voit donc déjà ici que dans la petite ville de Nion il y avoit éventuellement un *comité* prêt à s'emparer des *pouvoirs* dès que les François seroient à portée; et il s'en est découvert de semblables dans toutes les petits et grandes villes du Pays-de-Vaud; tandis qu'on en étoit dans la plus profonde ignorance; n'appercevant que des mouvemens et discours séditieux, croissans à mesure que les François approchoient.

“Que nous découvrent encore les premiers mots de cette adresse! ‘*Vos vœux* (est-il dit) *sont exaucés*. La république Française vous offre sa protection, ses secours. Le Directoire exécutif m'ordonne d'employer tous nos moyens *pour vous rendre libres*, pour l'entier exercice de vos droits et réclamations. Vos ennemis seront les nôtres . . . . . l'armée d'Italie vous couvre; c'est à vous à vous rendre dignes de hautes destinées auxquelles le Directoire veut vous faire parvenir.’

“Ainsi le Directoire avoit déjà les *vœux* des *associés* du Pays de Vaud, comme il les a sans doute des révolutionnaires de tous les pays, et à mesure que ses troupes s'en approcheroient, ces *vœux* seroient *exaucés*.

“Les *meilleurs peuples* pourroient-ils rassurer les souverains contre ces associations, si l'on n'arrête pas cette marche des François? L'exemple du Pays de Vaud va encore nous montrer comment ils rendent cette bonne volonté impuissante. Voici que mon frère me marque à cet égard, dans sa dernière lettre du 13 de ce mois. ‘La crainte qu'inspiroient les habitans loyaux fit hâter l'entrée des François, à la réquisition du *comité de Nion*; elle eut lieu le 28 Janvier, leur première halte fut dans cette ville qui leur donna le premier *baisé fraternel*; et aussitôt on y rassembla toutes les barques et bateaux pour aller chercher les troupes arrivées en Chablais.’

“Voilà comment un premier point d'appui leur donne le moyen d'aller en avant, à l'aide de tout ce que le Pays peut fournir, sur quoi leurs *associés* ont déjà jetté les regards pour s'en saisir aussitôt, en intimidant les gens bien-intentionnés, qui étant sans concert, ne peuvent rien au premier moment.

“Dès qu'il fut connu dans le reste du Pays que des troupes étoient déjà arrivées à Nion, et qu'on alloit en avoir de Chablais, tous les *comités chargés des pouvoirs* dans les autres villes furent en mouvement; et avant qu'on pût y songer dans la terreur, ils envoyèrent barques et bateaux pour amener promptement ces troupes; qui arriverent à Ouchy sous Lausanne, et à Vevey. Les voilà donc aux deux extrémités et au centre du Pays-de-Vaud.

“On se berce encore communément de l'idée que les déprédations de ces brigands les rendant de plus en plus odieux aux peuples, ils seront enfin arrêtés. Mais on ne distingue pas les gens; ils sont sans doute odieux aux vrai peuple; mais que peut-il contre de tels moyens? Il n'a rien pu à Genève, en Hollande, à Cologne, à Clèves, et il n'a rien pu non plus dans le Pays de Vaud. Dès que les troupes Françaises furent arrivées,

leur commandant requit de l'argent et des vivres : 700,000 de Suisse (43,750l.) et des vivres *régulièrement*. Or qu'importe aux *comités chargés des pouvoirs* que le pays soit ruiné, pourvu qu'ils triomphent ! Aussi le *comité central*, avec le langage hypocrite devenu commun aux démagogues, fit-il la proclamation suivante. 'Chers concitoyens, notre situation est fâcheuse, mais il ne faut pas donner à des *plaintes inutiles* le temps qui doit être employé à agir. *L'armée protectrice* doit être nourrie ; nul sacrifice ne doit nous coûter pour remplir cet objet . . . . Il faut à *tout prix* compléter la *somme* qui nous est *demandée*, non comme une contribution, mais comme un emprunt, ayant pour hypothèque *tous les biens* du *ci-devant souverain*, et les *propriétés communales*.'

" Ces gens-là ne s'embarassent pas des absurdités ; ces *biens* du *souverain* sont ces mêmes *droits féodaux* qu'ils veulent abolir ; et les *propriétés communales* sont le patrimoine sacré auquel tout enfant né dans le Pays de Vaud avoit part ; c'est-à-dire la propriété la plus sûre du peuple lui-même. Chacun voit cette horrible absurdité ; mais *l'armée protectrice* rend tout raisonnable, et elle saura bien soutenir les *comités chargés des pouvoirs*, quoique chargés dès à présent de l'exécration du peuple, comme cela revient à Genève.

" Voilà donc le système complet développé sur un pays particulier ; et si l'on n'ouvre enfin les yeux, son exécution s'avancera de proche en proche jusqu'au fond de l'Inde.

" Compteroit-on sur aucun traité, aucune bonne intelligence, aucun service même rendu à cette faction ? Je ne puis m'empêcher de copier ici à ce sujet une remarque de mon frère dans sa dernière lettre. 'Quand les François craignirent que les Autrichiens n'entrassent en Alsace par le pays de Bâle, ils crièrent aux Suisses *maintenez votre neutralité* !—Les Suisses la maintinrent. Les Autrichiens n'entreprirent point de la violer. Mais les François, à force de tromperies, *n'ont rien à craindre maintenant de l'Empereur* ; et ils ne se contentent pas de violer cette *neutralité* des Suisses, ils viennent porter chez eux le trouble et le malheur. Jusques à quand dormira-t-on d'un sommeil de mort ! Puisse la nation Anglaise persévérer dans son énergie ! Elle deviendra alors, je l'espère en Dieu, l'archange qui foudroyera enfin l'orgueil satanique du Directoire François.'

" Je l'espère sans doute moi-même. Je voudrois mourir le jour où je cesserois d'espérer que l'Angleterre puisse sauver le monde, et ainsi elle-même ; mais elle ne sauvera pas par son énergie seule, si elle ne vient à servir d'exemple ; et si tout tomboit autour d'elle, elle-même tomberoit enfin. Il faut donc qu'elle travaille toujours à inspirer aux puissances qui se soutiennent encore sa sagesse et son courage. Elle l'a tenté dès longtemps, elle y butte sans cesse, et pourtant l'effet n'avance qu'avec lenteur, tandis que le mal s'avance à pas de géant.

" Dans de pareilles circonstances, la crainte d'être accusé de présomption ne doit point empêcher l'homme de bien de parler de ses amis ni de lui-même. Au mois de novembre passé, il n'y avoit rien attendre du Cabinet de Berlin ; il avoit le bandeau sous les yeux, et dans cet avenglement, il se défioit de l'Angleterre ; ce

mal, probablement, ne subsiste plus. Mais le Cabinet de Vienne, qui a encore le bandeau sur les yeux, poussé à la défiance contre la Prusse, s'appuie toujours sur la trappe tendue à tous les souverains ; et la Russie, avec un bandeau encore plus épais, croit à sûreté parcequ'elle est éloignée ; ne voyant pas que, même avant la dissolution de l'Allemagne, la révolution de la Turquie et celle de la Pologne pourroient la séparer de cette base encore subsistante, bien aussi essentielle pour elle qu'elle peut lui être dans son état actuel.

“Ce n'est pas la diplomatie commune qui a produit le premier effet salutaire dans cet état des choses ; c'est la confiance accordée d'abord par l'Angleterre à deux hommes, zelés pour le bien, qui depuis plusieurs années s'occupoient douloureusement entr'eux des progrès du mal ; qui en connoissent toutes les racines, en voyent toutes les branches, en prévoient toutes les conséquences si l'on n'y remédie à temps ; et qui portant partout ces documens dans leur ame, n'ont besoin que d'être autorisés à agir. Dans ma lettre précédente, je pris la liberté d'offrir à votre Excellence la continuation de la vigilance de l'un des deux, dirigée sur la cour de Vienne ; aujourd'hui, que l'horizon s'obscurcit de plus en plus, je me détermine à lui offrir humblement celle de l'autre pour Petersbourg. Oui, malgré mon âge, je ne craindrois dans de telles conjonctures ni la fatigue du corps, ni les travaux de l'esprit qu'une telle carrière présente, dès qu'on m'y croiroit utile ; *terar, dum proficiam*. Voilà ce que mon coeur m'a inspiré à la vue des dangers qui s'approchent ; je prendrai maintenant la liberté d'exposer à votre Excellence comment cela s'est arrangé ensuite dans mon esprit.

“Le plan entier, comme la partie qui regarderoit M. de Stamford, suppose nécessairement le concours du Cabinet de Berlin. Il faudroit, dis-je, pour le succès de ce plan, pouvoir présenter Berlin, avec l'Angleterre, comme également persuadé du danger général, et comme résolu de concourir de tout son pouvoir, pour le prévenir, aux arrangemens nécessaires à cet effet sur le continent. Ce concert avec Berlin est sans doute encore à produire ; mais nous ne désespérons pas, M. de Stamford et moi, qu'étant ensemble à Berlin, nous ne pussions amener les choses à cet égard au point qu'on y vit avec plaisir cette proposition venir d'Angleterre.

“Il faut pour cela y faire sentir, ce que je crois déjà prévoir, que les François pourroient bien dans ce moment laisser Berlin en repos ; mais que ce ne seroit qu'un nouveau leure. Ils voyent déjà les préparatifs pour la défense du nord de l'Allemagne ; et leur plan n'est point *militaire* uniquement, il est aussi *politique*. Ils soupçonnent déjà sans doute que la Prusse et l'Angleterre vont s'unir, et ils se tiendront tranquilles de ce côté pour quelque temps, afin qu'on s'y endorme dans la sécurité. Mais ils ont des *associés* dans ces contrées, et en particulier à Berlin, et quand ils auront révolutionné le Sud, ils n'auroient qu'à venir auprès des gens arrangés à l'avance pour se déclarer *comités chargés des pouvoirs*, et qui sauroient paralyser l'armée, comme ils l'ont fait en France, et probablement en bien d'autres endroits. On sentira

donc probablement en général qu'il faut se hâter d'éclairer Vienne et Petersbourg, et il ne faudroit pas alors longtemps pour acheminer le plan de concert pour cet effet.

"Jusqu'ici donc, le plan n'en a été considéré qu'entre M. de Stamford et moi; et il restera dans notre esprit jusqu'à ce que nous apprenions le jugement qu'en aura porté votre Excellence. Nous n'en ferons ainsi mention jusqu'alors, ni à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ni à qui que ce soit à Berlin. Mais dans cette vue, M. de Stamford désire que je ne tarde pas à m'y rendre, afin d'être auprès de M. de H[augwitz] et de l'étudier lorsqu'on recevra de Vienne la réponse aux nouvelles dépêches, pour le juger s'il est possible dans ce moment-là; parceque très probablement M. de Stamford sera à portée d'en savoir le vrai; puisque le Roi a fait communiquer les précédentes à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], qui nous a sûrement fait l'honneur de nous les communiquer, ou par sa participation, ou sachant qu'il le pouvoit.

"J'avois compté qu'en partant tout de suite d'ici, mon détour par Strelitz ne me prendroit guère plus de temps qu'il n'en falloit pour recevoir à Berlin l'honneur d'une réponse de votre Excellence à ma lettre du 31<sup>e</sup> Janvier. Mais l'état allarmant des choses, qui affecte beaucoup s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] nous a retenus ici quelques jours, M. de Stamford et moi, pour y réfléchir avec elle et entre nous; et je me propose aussi d'avoir l'honneur d'envoyer d'ici par le courrier prochain un duplicata de cette lettre à votre Excellence; alors donc, en allant à droiture à Berlin, je n'y serai peut-être pas plus tôt que sa réponse."

"J'ai considéré d'abord, pour ma tranquillité sur l'événement de l'entreprise, que si cet effet du zèle des deux amis étoit sans succès, il ne pourroit du moins en résulter aucun autre inconvénient que celui de leur dépense, car il ne s'agiroit que de les adresser aux ministres de sa Majesté dans les Cours respectives, comme des personnes en qui elle prend confiance, pour chercher de nouveaux moyens indirects de déterminer ces Cours à entrer bien promptement en liaison avec l'Angleterre et la Prusse, et leur communiquer les informations ou les fils qu'ils pourroient découvrir pour parvenir aux traités, ou conventions provisionnelles, sur lesquelles ces ministres auroient eux-mêmes les instructions nécessaires.

"Tel seroit donc le seul branle que l'Angleterre auroit à donner à ce plan; et dès que nous l'aurions reçu, my Lord Elgin étant informé, ce seroit à nous d'abord à employer avec lui nos moyens pour que le Cabinet de Berlin se déterminât à nous accorder une même confiance, et un même appui auprès de ses ministres respectifs. C'est là, ce me semble, que peut se trouver la plus grande difficulté. Cependant nous espérons que, durant le temps qui s'écoulera jusqu'à la réponse de votre Excellence, nous pourrons avoir des occasions de faire connoître au Roi et à son ministre et l'importance d'un prompt rapprochement, et qu'ils ne risqueroient rien en nous accordant leur confiance pour l'accélérer. Si donc votre Excellence nous autorisoit à agir, et qu'alors nous parvinssions à faire approuver ce plan à Berlin,

nous pourrions nous mettre aussitôt en route, chacun pour sa destination, après en avoir informé votre Excellence.

“ J’ai besoin à chaque instant de me pénétrer de la pureté de mon zèle et de l’urgence de quelque nouveau moyen, pour oser particulariser un plan sur lequel ma première espérance est seulement que votre Excellence daignera l’écouter patiemment de ma part ; mais s’il est convenable, il faut le hâter ; ainsi je continuerai à le détailler, en parlant d’abord de la partie qui m’en concerneroit, où il peut y avoir le plus de difficultés imprévues, et où l’éloignement seul en est une très grande.

“ Nulle difficulté personnelle n’ébranleroit mon zèle, s’il étoit approuvé du Roi et de votre Excellence. Je serois prêt ainsi à partir seul pour Petersbourg ; mais je ne le trouverois pas convenable ; et je désirerois, pour le bien de la chose, d’avoir un adjoint tel que je puis heureusement le proposer à votre Excellence, qui m’accompagnât dans le voyage, m’assistât dans le séjour, et pourvût aux accidens possibles. Je pourrois aisément mettre votre Excellence à portée de prendre elle-même des informations sur cet adjoint ; mais comme ce seroit ici, dans sa totalité, une commission de grande confiance, il lui suffira sans doute de comprendre que je ne puis me tromper dans mon jugement. L’adjoint que je prendrois donc la liberté de proposer à votre Excellence est un fils de mon frère, âgé de 34 à 35 ans, sans autre émolument que sa dépense. Outre l’Anglois il sait l’Allemand, que je ne sais pas, quoique je voyage ainsi en Allemagne. Mais à mesure que je m’éloignerois de ces contrées, mon embarras augmenteroit, et quand j’atteindrois la Russie, je serois *helpless*.

“ Je compterois que le temps que mon neveu emploiroit pour se préparer, n’excéderoit pas celui dont votre Excellence auroit besoin pour le rendre porteur de toutes ses dépêches relatives à cet objet, dans lesquelles elle voudroit bien être aussi explicite qu’il lui seroit possible, à l’égard de ses instructions tant aux ministres de sa Majesté à Berlin, Vienne, et Petersbourg, qu’à M. de Stamford et à moi. Ce qui suppose, à l’égard de M. de Stamford, que votre Excellence seroit munie de la lettre de créance de Monseigneur le Prince d’Orange, dont j’ai eu l’honneur de lui parler dans ma lettre précédente.

“ Quant à moi, surtout accompagné de mon neveu qui est éclairé dans l’histoire naturelle, je ne serois pas embarrassé d’être bientôt connu à Petersbourg comme voyageant dans ce but. Mais si cela pouvoit me servir de couverture, ce ne seroit rien si je n’avois pas le moyen d’approcher l’Empereur ; et c’est uniquement parceque cela ne me paroît pas difficile, si le plan lui-même étoit approuvé de leurs Majestés, que je me suis arrêté à cette idée. Car ayant l’honneur d’être connu depuis longtemps de s’altesse royale Madame la Duchesse de Wurtemberg, il suffiroit que sa Majesté la reine, en donnant son consentement à cette longue absence, daignât me faire la grace de témoigner à Madame la Duchesse qu’elle souhaiteroit qu’elle et Monseigneur le Duc me fissent l’honneur de m’accorder des lettres d’introduction auprès de leurs Majestés Impériales, pour que j’osasse compter sur la bonté de s’altesse royale quant à la manière pour produire la

confiance personnelle en général. Il me suffiroit donc d'être informés par votre Excellence que mon auguste maitresse a eu cette bonté pour moi, pour que je partis avec tranquillité. S'altesse royale pourroit me faire la grace de m'adresser ces lettres chez le ministre de sa Majesté à Petersbourg.

"Si sa Majesté et votre Excellence trouvoient ce plan utile, et qu'il fût résolu, il suffiroit que votre Excellence voulût bien nous faire la grace, à M. de Stamford et à moi, de nous l'écrire d'abord, et de nous autoriser à travailler tout de suite, de concert avec my Lord Elgin, à y acheminer le Cabinet de Berlin; nous nous en occuperions en attendant l'arrivée de mon neveu; et si à son arrivée nous avions perdu l'espérance de réussir, il s'en retourneroit à Londres.

"M. de Stamford, vu sa foible santé, auroit aussi besoin d'un aide avec lui; mais si le plan réussissoit, il espéreroit d'en obtenir un de Berlin. Car ce seroit-là un objet commun et de confiance mutuelle; et par cette considération, la tentative même me paroîtroit très utile; car ce seroit un moyen sûr de sonder le Cabinet de Berlin; et si le plan réussissoit auprès de lui, il le lieroit avec celui d'Angleterre d'une manière bien forte, comme fondée sur un intérêt commun, alors aussi reconnu qu'il est réel.

"Votre Excellence jugeroit elle-même, en cas d'approbation de ce plan, si les ministres de Vienne et de Petersbourg à Londres pourroient être engagés à le seconder, soit directement, soit par des avis; avantage que M. de Stamford pense, d'après de premières relations, de pouvoir obtenir pour lui, comme pour moi, des ministres des deux cours à Berlin.

"Enfin, si votre Excellence me faisoit la grace de m'envoyer mon neveu, elle pourroit lui faire donner un chiffre qu'il communiqueroit aussi à M. de Stamford et qui nous serviroit, soit pour la correspondance entre nous, soit pour celle que nous aurions l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Excellence; à qui je dois avouer qu'à mon âge, et par le manque total d'habitude d'un tel moyen, je serois incapable d'en faire usage sans assistance.

"J'ai maintenant satisfait à ce que mon devoir m'a dicté: je puis voir mal; mais j'ose espérer que votre Excellence me pardonnera la liberté que j'ai prise de soumettre ce plan à sa considération. M. de Stamford ne part qu'aujourd'hui, parceque nous avons voulu considérer ensemble tous les détails que l'exécution de ce plan pourroit présenter à notre vue, et cette lettre part avec son entière approbation; mais si l'idée générale avoit celle de votre Excellence, elle la dirigerait comme elle le jugeroit à propos."

*Postscript.* "Comme je finissois hier fort tard cette lettre pour aujourd'hui, nous eumes l'honneur de recevoir, M. de Stamford et moi, un billet de s[a]lt[te]sse s[érénissime] contenant ce peu de mots. 'On me marque de Berlin que, depuis le dernier courrier, on n'y a point eu de nouvelles politiques. Mais de Rastadt on me mande que l'ultimatum des François y est arrivé, qu'ils insistent absolument sur toute la rive gauche du Rhin, et qu'ainsi il faudra bien en venir aux *sécularisations*.'

“M. de Stamford devant partir de bon matin, nous allâmes nous coucher sur cette terrible nouvelle; mais je n'ai pu fermer l'œil qu'avec des rêves agités, et je me suis levé de grand matin, pour avoir encore un entretien avec mon ami. Or j'avoue à votre Excellence que je l'ai sollicité de ne pas attendre l'autorisation de l'Angleterre pour tâcher de se rendre à Vienne, au moins sous celle de Berlin. Car ce traité placeroit toutes les mèches pour mettre le feu aux mines de l'Empire, même sous la forme que j'avois proposée de ne traiter avec les François que pour les limites, et de réserver à l'Empire seul les arrangemens intérieurs. Au point où sont arrivées leurs vues, les François jetteroient tout à la tête de l'Empereur, auroient toutes les complaisances possibles avec lui, ou son Cabinet, pour le pousser à ce traité; sûrs que dès qu'on commenceroit ces *sécularisations*, par l'Empire ou par eux, il y auroit des révoltes de tout part, et que le feu s'étendrait rapidement de proche en proche sans qu'on fût plus à temps de l'arrêter. M. de Stamford sentant l'urgence de ce que je proposois, m'a répondu, 'Oui, si seulement je pouvois être appuyé du Duc!' Je lui ai promis de travailler à ce que cela fut, et dans cette espérance, il tâchera de faire sentir au Roi l'importance d'un moyen prompt, et de déterminer sa Majesté à demander au Prince héréditaire d'Orange de lui donner quelque sorte de prétexte d'aller à Vienne. S'il a ce premier assentiment, il s'abouchera avec my Lord Elgin, puis il travaillera auprès de M. de H[augwitz] à quoi j'espère d'être à temps de l'aider. Mais auparavant, comme cela ne sauroit réussir sans que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ne se prononce fortement auprès du Roi en faveur de cette mesure, je vais travailler à l'y engager.

“En attendant que votre Excellence nous ait fait l'honneur de répondre à cette lettre, je tournerai toutes mes vues ici et à Berlin, de concert avec M. de Stamford, pour tâcher au moins de gagner du temps, en retardant la décision de Rastadt par la Prusse; et si à l'arrivée de la réponse de votre Excellence, M. de Stamford étoit déjà parti pour Vienne (ce que je désire extrêmement) et qu'elle eût acquiescé en tout, ou en parti au plan proposé dans cette lettre et dans la précédente, on lui enverroit tout-de-suite ce renfort. Alors il seroit à souhaiter que la lettre de créance de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange pût arriver par le courrier. J'ai peur que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ne soit à Bath, ce qui retarderoit; mais au moins il seroit essentiel que M. de Stamford fût informé le plus tôt possible, s'il peut l'attendre.

“Je sens de plus en plus que dans un temps comme celui-ci, il faudroit qu'il y eût un *Cabinet mobile* pour le bien, comme les François l'ont pour le mal. Car je ne puis douter qu'ils ne fassent parler le *Directoire* quand ils veulent; et il y a même apparence que ce *Directoire* ostensible n'est rien, qu'il y en a un secret qui le fait parler et agir comme il veut.”

#### OFFICIAL MINUTE. FOREIGN OFFICE.

1798, February. Downing Street.—“The inclosures in Mr. Talbot's dispatch No. 7, of the 13th December, are two memoirs

submitted to the consideration of Government by several of the proscribed\* French assembled at Neufchatel on the — November:—the one marked A was drawn up by M. Vauvilliers, the one marked B by Mr. Camille Jordan.

“They are in substance the same, but I think the latter both more accurate in its statement of facts, and more clear and precise in its manner of specifying the demands and opinions of the meeting. M.M. de Précy and D’André were present, and are to be considered as agreeing with the Deputies in every point. It is also stated in the *mémoires* as a fact that the Director Carnot was of the same opinion.† It is to be observed, however, that subsequent to the date of the meeting, Carnot had connected himself with the Lameths and with the Deputies Dumolard and Portalis who refused to attend the meeting, and whose political opinions are known to be very different from those of the Deputies assembled. The *mémoires* contain:—1 Observations on the present state of France considered with respect to Great Britain as well as the rest of Europe, and on the danger which threatens every civilized nation, if the present usurped government be not overthrown.

2. “A summary of the reasons that should determine the British Government to take an active though secret part in the affairs of France, to make a common cause with the Moderate Party, and to support that Party with effect as before the 4<sup>th</sup> September, independently in the *first instance* of any question about this or that form of government. These two points are well treated, but they contain no argument materially new, the greater part of those employed having been discussed on some other occasion, and those which have not, being from their very nature almost self-evident.

3. “An assertion that notwithstanding almost the absolute power that the Government of France certainly possesses at this moment, there are yet sufficient elements to enable its enemies to bring about its destruction.

4. “A discussion of all these different elements, in which the state of the publick opinion and of the finances—the situation and spirit of the armies—the composition of the two assemblies—the division in the Directory—the connexions of Carnot in the interior—his correspondence with Buonaparté, and many other points are fully examined and considered.

“These two points are well treated—they certainly contain some new matter, and many old subjects are considered in a new point of view. The whole, however, is more fully and more clearly discussed in a series of letters from M. d’André which are delivered to Mr. Canning for your Lordship’s perusal.

5. “A plan of operations in most respects the same with that which was adopted before the 4<sup>th</sup> September, insisting particularly

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\* Deputies names: Vauvilliers, Camille Jordan, Lemérér, Polypard, Couchéry, Praire, Blain, Bornes, Andréo de la Lozère.

† It appears as well from Mr. Talbot’s dispatch as from a private letter that I have received by this last post that Carnot’s opinion had been collected by the Deputy Andrée de Lozère, who was present at the meeting.



on the necessity of supporting the Philanthropick Society, and on influencing the ensuing elections. This plan, however, is considered as consistent with a general insurrection in the southern departments which, it is said, will probably happen in case any extraordinary requisitions should be put in force for carrying on the war; and with a blow to be struck at Paris, for which the Deputies say they have a plan prepared which they are ready to submit to the British Government.

6. "A demand of funds without specifying any particular sum, only desiring that an English commissary may be sent to the frontiers of Switzerland, as well to superintend the expenditure as to judge of the necessity or expediency of employing an extraordinary sum on any particular occasion.

"A particular *mémoire* has been sent to me on that subject by M. D'André, which I enclose with this observation, that from the money returned from Paris after the 4<sup>th</sup> September the expenditure of the months of October, November and December had been provided for on a scale of about £3,500 a month. It is possible, and I think probable, that some part of this sum has been economized, otherwise the Deputies would be without any resource for the month of January—but this is a point that can only be ascertained on the return of Mr. Talbot. Were it not that he had been hourly expected for these last ten days, I should have submitted to your Lordship the propriety of giving a provisional credit of £3,500 for each of the two months of January and February."

#### M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 3. Berlin.—"En conséquence de ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence dans ma lettre d'hier, après avoir eu un nouvel entretien avec s'altesse sérénissime, et avant que de me mettre en route pour Berlin, je fais partir ce peu de lignes pour Hanovre, destinées pour le prochain courrier.

"Comme il s'écoulera ainsi trois jours avant que cette lettre parte, et les événemens marchans à pas accélérés, je ne doute pas que votre Excellence ne reçoive par la même malle de plus grands détails sur les objets dont s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a fait l'honneur de m'informer.

1° "Le projet de révolutionner la Souabe, dont j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de parler à votre Excellence, se prépare et s'annonce publiquement.

2° "On a découvert le même complot en Ost-Frise, et les troupes Françoises augmentent en Hollande.

3° "Les François exigent Manheim, Ehrenbreitstein, et Philipsbourg.

4° "Et pour faire passer ces prétentions M. Waitz, ministre du Landgrave de Hesse à Paris, qui est de retour, s'est chargé de la proposition au Roi de Prusse de prendre ce qu'il lui plairait pour indemnisation de ce côté du Rhin, avec l'appui et sous la garantie des François; ce qui a été refusé.

“ Il semble que la Providence ait permis que je pusse avoir tant d’entretiens familiers avec M. de H[augwitz] sur les vues de la faction qui conduit les troupes Françaises, et que je remisse aussi mon dernier mémoire à s[on] altesse sérénissime avant ces événemens ; car ils ne peuvent en ignorer les causes, ni le seul remède. Aussi s’a[lt]esse s[érénissime] est elle fortement de l’avis du prompt départ de M. de Stamford pour Vienne, et fera sûrement ses efforts pour qu’on en sente la nécessité à Berlin ; mais elle tourne toujours les yeux vers l’Angleterre, et m’a fait promettre de lui communiquer aussitôt ce que je pourrois recevoir de votre Excellence.”

The EARL OF CLARE [Lord Chancellor of Ireland] to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 6. Dublin.—“ Will you excuse the liberty that I take in addressing this packet to you, and requesting that you will have the goodness to send one of the pamphlets to the Marquis of Buckingham. I was induced, at the earnest solicitation of Lord Camden and many other of my friends, to undertake the very laborious task of revising a most inaccurate note of what fell from me in the late debate in our House of Lords. And although I found it impracticable to retrace the whole of a very detailed statement, I have been enabled to recover the outlines with tolerable accuracy. Your Lordship who heard Lord Moira on this subject, will be surprised to see that he denied in distinct and positive terms his having advanced any charge against the Irish army in his statement made in the British House of Lords, and that he asserted as positively his observations on the danger of Parliamentary Reform to have been restricted to Great Britain.”

COUNT STARTEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 7. London.—“ Vous aurez demain matin ma première lettre officielle au sujet de la mission de M. Ransonet. Elle ne regarde absolument que le payement des intérêts en arriéré de l’ancien emprunt de 4,600,000*l.*, négocié en 1795 ; et prend en considération les moyens de pourvoir à ce que nous ne soyons plus dorénavant en arrière sur cet objet. Il paraît que M. Eden a plus appuyé sur ces intérêts que sur l’affaire du million six cent mille livres, le sujet de la convention non ratifiée. M. Ransonet a l’ordre de répondre au cas qu’on en fasse mention, que cet article, sur lequel on est décidé à vous satisfaire comme sur les autres *quant au payement*, regarde le département des Affaires Étrangères. M. de Thugut se l’est réservé, et me promet une instruction très prochaine, que sûrement l’envoi de mon dernier courrier, arrivé à Vienne le 7 de Février, aura décidé d’une manière plus positive, et plus conforme à vos désirs.”

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, March 7. Naples.—“I profit of the opportunity of a Neapolitan messenger’s going to London to inform your Lordship that Mr. Livingston arrived here on Sunday last from Trieste by sea, and brought me your Lordship’s letters of the 22nd of December last, and your Lordship may depend on my punctual execution of the instructions therein contained. I have the satisfaction of assuring your Lordship that there is every appearance of Mr. Livingston’s succeeding in his commission both to the satisfaction of his Majesty, as to that of his Royal Highness Prince Augustus, although nothing has been finally settled except his Royal Highness having consented to leave Naples as soon as possible, which indeed is necessary at this critical juncture. I do not apprehend that this kingdom is in immediate danger of being invaded by the French, as they are not in sufficient force at Rome, where they have not more than eight thousand men, and not above twenty thousand more in all Italy. But there can be no doubt that, whenever they shall see a favourable opportunity, they mean to overturn this government, and plunder this country as they have done the rest of Italy, notwithstanding their peace, and constant professions of friendship; and this government, I am rejoiced to see, is daily and seriously occupied in putting this country in the very best state of defence.

“Your Lordship will, by the papers from Paris, have been informed of what has passed at Rome, as messengers are kept constantly going from thence to Paris. At present they are occupied in forming the new government, having quelled many little insurrections of the Romans in Rome and its neighbourhood; but the differences between the French officers and their generals and commissaries still subsist.

“Yesterday I was honoured with your Lordship’s private letter of the 27th of January through the channel of Sir Morton Eden, and am most grateful for the kind and friendly explanations you are pleased to give me relative to my plan of retreat, and for the assurance of the continuance of your Lordship’s friendly protection. I mean to profit of the very first opportunity to get to England, according to the King’s gracious permission, either by land or sea; but as I think I have little chance of a secure conveyance home by sea, I hope to be able, in the spring, to get a passage from Manfredonia to Trieste in one of his Sicilian Majesty’s armed vessels, and so on to Vienna. As I am totally ignorant of the present political state of our Court with respect to that of St. Petersburg, but see the importance of there being at this moment a perfect understanding between them, should our Government have a wish to try any new ground with the Emperor, perhaps it could not employ a person that would be more agreeable to his Imperial Majesty than me. I had the honour of attending, some years ago, the Great Duke and Duchess of Russia, by their particular desire, during their whole stay at Naples, and lived with them in the utmost confidence, since which

his Majesty has several times honoured me with his correspondence, and invited me to his Court. I throw this out to your Lordship, not with any wish or view of serving myself, but out of pure zeal and earnest desire of serving my good King and country to the utmost of my ability; and it would be of little consequence to my private concerns whether I should return home a few months sooner or later, or travel some leagues more or less. If your Lordship would be so kind as to send a line in answer to this hint directed to me under cover to Sir Morton Eden, I should either receive it at Vienna, or it might be forwarded to Naples, in case I should not be able to get away as soon as I expect."

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 9. Berlin.—"J'arrivai ici avant hier matin, et j'ai déjà eu plusieurs entretiens avec M. de Stamford, qui me conduisent à avoir l'honneur d'écrire dès aujourd'hui à votre Excellence, quoique je n'aie pas eu encore l'avantage de voir my Lord Elgin, chez qui je me propose d'avoir l'honneur de passer ce matin pour le prier de vouloir bien envoyer dans son paquet cette lettre pour votre Excellence, dont le sujet est indépendant de l'entretien que je désire avoir avec lui.

"M. de Stamford, lié déjà avec le min[istre] de Vienne, et s'étant mis en relation avec celui de Petersbourg, a été ainsi à portée d'apprendre des choses qui nous étoient inconnues à Brunswic, et qui changent beaucoup à nos yeux la nature des difficultés, sans changer celle du danger, qui procède toujours des défiances quoiqu'elles aient changé de forme.

"J'aurois attendu de pouvoir former un jugement sur ce nouvel aspect des choses, si je ne voyois déjà très clairement l'inutilité de l'idée que j'avois eue de prendre la liberté de me proposer à votre Excellence pour aller à Petersbourg. Je sentois bien qu'il y avoit de ce côté-là quelque obstacle, puisque rien n'avançoit; mais je n'en connoissois pas la nature; puisqu'il paroît que l'Empereur connoît assez le danger pour être déterminé à agir conformément au besoin. Ainsi je dois retirer le plus tôt possible la proposition que le zèle m'avoit engagé de faire à cet égard, espérant que sa Majesté et votre Excellence voudront bien me la pardonner, vu que je ne pouvois connoître ce que je n'ai appris qu'ici par la venue de M. de Stamford.

"Je souhaite que le plan suivi par ceux qui veulent le bien, plan fort différent de celui dont j'avois pris la liberté d'ouvrir l'idée à votre Excellence dans ma lettre du 20 Février, se trouve le meilleur; quoique si même il réussissoit, ce ne pourroit être qu'avec du temps, et cependant on n'a jamais pu dire avec plus de vérité *periculum in mora*.

"Quant à ce qui nous regarde, M. de Stamford et moi, qui ne pouvons rien dans la diplomatie et dont l'unique objet étoit le roi, il nous paroît aussi toujours plus évident que c'est-là le point où il faut tendre, sans quoi l'on n'avancera pas; et que selon toute probabilité, on ne parviendra pas à déterminer sa Majesté sans l'influence du Duc de Brunswic, ou immédiatement, ou comme dirigeant.

“M. de Stamford a déjà eu l'honneur de voir le roi, mais en public ; il attend l'effet de la promesse de sa Majesté de le recevoir en particulier. J'espère aussi d'avoir cet honneur, et nous ferons alors l'un et l'autre tout ce qui sera en notre pouvoir. Mais le point sur lequel nous prévoyons qu'il faudra réunir nos efforts, c'est de travailler à déterminer s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à venir ici le plus tôt possible. Car, dans l'état où nous voyons les choses, l'idée du voyage de M. de Stamford à Vienne devient aussi inutile ; c'est ici que se trouvent des difficultés imprévues ; et il n'y a qu'un personnage du rang et du caractère de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qui puisse entreprendre de les surmonter.

“ Monseigneur le Duc voit maintenant tout le danger et son seul remède. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] résiste à agir personnellement, par une timidité habituelle très forte ; elle s'étoit enfin confiée en notre venue ici, avec la permission de parler en son nom ; mais c'étoit la dernière ressource sur laquelle elle pût compter par des intermédiaires ; si elle étoit sans effet, ce que ne pouvons juger encore, il ne resteroit que l'intervention de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] elle-même.

“ Je ne devois pas tarder d'avoir l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence, soit sur l'objet précis de Petersbourg, soit sur ce premier coup d'œil d'un état de choses qu'elle pourra sans doute comprendre, en comparant les informations qu'elle reçoit d'ici avec idée que je pris la liberté de lui communiquer dans ma lettre du 20 Février. Si, en continuant d'observer ce nouvel état de choses, je venois à former quelque jugement fixe, je croirois de mon devoir de prendre la liberté de le lui présenter franchement.”

#### M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 10. Berlin.—“ Quand je réfléchis que depuis la lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence le 21 Decembre à laquelle elle me fit l'honneur de répondre le 14<sup>e</sup> Janvier, voici la 21<sup>e</sup> que j'écris, je ne puis que me sentir extrêmement isolé ; mais je ne songe qu'à remplir mon devoir avec toute l'attention dont je suis capable.

“ Je viens de porter chez my Lord Elgin une lettre pour votre Excellence datée d'hier, mais je n'ai pu avoir l'honneur de le voir, parcequ'il étoit occupé avec quelqu'un. Au retour j'ai trouvé une occasion sûre de faire parvenir une lettre à M. le Comte de Wallmoden à Hanovre, et j'en profite pour lui envoyer celle-ci, parceque partant de là, je pourrai m'y expliquer plus ouvertement que dans celle d'hier, qui, sans être en chiffre, devoit partir d'ici. Je prends donc la liberté d'envoyer d'abord à votre Excellence un duplicata de cette lettre, et de m'expliquer plus clairement sur son objet, en remontant à celle que j'eus l'honneur de lui écrire le 20<sup>e</sup> Février.

“ Dans cette lettre, après avoir rendu compte à votre Excellence du jugement qu'avoit porté Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic sur le mémoire de M. de H[augwitz] que j'avois eu l'honneur d'envoyer d'ici à votre Excellence, et des raisons de s'

a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pour penser qu'il falloit continuer de travailler avec ce ministre, j'ajoutois, d'après l'idée que m'avoit suggérée M. de Stamford, que si votre Excellence portoit le même jugement, il y auroit peut-être des precautions à prendre pour prévenir les défiances qu'on inspiroit à Vienne contre M. de H[augwitz] ; ce qui pourroit bien être une artifice pour consumer le temps ; de quoi votre Excellence pourroit prévenir les ministres de sa Majesté à Vienne et à Berlin, afin qu'ils agissent en conséquence des relations naissantes avec ce ministre.

“Mais dans les entretiens qu'a eu M. de Stamford avec my Lord Elgin et avec les ministres de Vienne et de Petersbourg, il a trouvé que ce sont ces ministres eux-mêmes qui ont de la défiance contre M. de H[augwitz] à cause de communications qu'il leur a faites ici de ses dépêches aux ministres de Prusse à leurs cours, qui ensuite s'y sont trouvées différentes.

“Nous sommes frappés, M. de Stamford et moi, que c'est-là la situation la plus allarmante où pussent se trouver les affaires dans ce moment de crise. Il ne nous appartient pas de juger si ces ministres ont raison de s'écarter de M. de H[augwitz], mais je dois exposer à votre Excellence combien une telle situation est malheureuse.

“M. de H[augwitz] ainsi délaissé par les ministres des trois cours, tombe de plus en plus entre les mains des gens qui veulent écarter la guerre, et il se tourne plus vers le ministre François, dans l'idée d'écarter le mal par négociations ; ce qui est sa pente naturelle ; car il ne peut venir à l'esprit qu'il veuille lui-même produire un mal qui retomberoit sur lui. Mais ce n'est pas un homme clair-voyant, et il se laisse séduire ; et comme ce n'est pas non plus un homme de grand génie, il regarde la finesse, quelque fois jusqu'à la duplicité, comme des moyens nécessaires aux ministres.

“Sans doute que les circonstances exigeroient un ministre bien différent ; mais réussira-t-on à le déplacer ? Le Roi, tout bon qu'il est, est bien jeune ; tous ses entours veulent prévenir la guerre, et ils approuvent le plan de négociations du ministre ; voilà un bien fort plastron contre les coups qu'on pourroit lui porter.

“En attendant, quand on approcheroit familièrement le roi (ce qui, suivant les apparences, sera difficile, d'une manière du moins suffisamment intime) on ne sauroit aujourd'hui que conseiller à sa Majesté ; car les résolutions pressantes à prendre, ne pourroient encore passer que par les mains de ce ministre ; et si les min[istres] des trois cours qu'il l'agiroid de réunir avec la Prusse ne sont pas disposés à travailler avec lui du ton de la confiance, il seroit impossible de réussir dans un tel traité.

“Conseilleroit-on au roi de renvoyer ce ministre ? Ce seroit une tentative bien hasardeuse, que nul homme, excepté le Duc de Br[unswick] s'il le vouloit, n'oseroit tenter ; et il est fort douteux qu'il le voulût.

“Quand la faction auroit amené elle-même un tel état des choses (ce dont on ne peut douter qu'elle ne soit capable) il ne

seroit pas possible qu'elle en eût imaginé un plus désastreux ; car tandis qu'ainsi on ne fait rien, ni ne peut rien faire, elle prépare tout de toute part pour frapper les plus grands coups, par conquêtes et révolutions.

“Il étoit de mon devoir de représenter cet état à votre Excellence, pour qu'elle veuille bien s'en occuper dans sa sagesse ; les jours s'écoulent, et M. de Stamford n'est point invité par le Roi ; ce que nous craignons être un signe que les entours de s[a] M[ajesté] l'en éloignent, et qu'au lieu d'y être introduit par le désir de s[a] M[ajesté] elle-même, il ne faille qu'il lui soit nommé par my Lord Elgin lorsqu'il remettra ses lettres de créance. Peut-être même qu'après un seul entretien (à moins de circonstances dont on n'ose se flatter) il sera prudent qu'il retourne à Brunswic, de peur qu'un plus long séjour ne donnât lieu, à cause de lui, d'augmenter des insinuations qu'on n'a que trop commencées contre le Duc.

“Quant à moi, je puis rester sans conséquences ; parceque depuis deux jours que j'ai commencé de me produire chez les Académiciens, je suis déjà dans leur torrent, et n'y paroîtrai pas déplacé. Ainsi je me détermine à attendre ici la réponse de votre Excellence, pour y recevoir ses ordres ; à moins que quelque autre lettre que je dois naturellement attendre de sa part dans l'intervalle, ne me donne déjà des ordres.”

#### THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 10. Castle of Good Hope.—“Here I am in most perfectly good health after a very tedious passage to this place, and after a detention here of six weeks, occasioned by the necessity of repairing the frigate, and by the continuance of contrary winds. I am now on the point of embarking for Madras. I have left commissions with Mr. Barrow (one of Lord Macartney's private secretaries) and with Lady Anne Barnard to send you plants and seeds, and I believe you will receive one packet of them by this conveyance. Pray remember me most kindly to Lady Grenville. I shall write to you a full account of my ideas of the Cape, when I get on board the frigate.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO M. DE LUC.

1798, March 13. London.—“Par le long retard des malles toutes vos lettres, jusqu'à celle du 23 Fevrier, me sont entrées presqu'au même jour ; ce qui vous expliquera les raisons de mon silence, ne recevant rien de votre part.

“Je vous envoie celle-ci dans le paquet de Lord Elgin, rien n'étant plus important dans les circonstances actuelles que d'ôter au ministre Prussien l'espoir, s'il pourroit l'avoir formé, d'établir avec le gouvernement du Roi une négociation non-officielle, et qui ne passât pas par l'entremise du ministre de sa Majesté à Berlin. Cette remarque me paroît d'autant plus nécessaire que, sans être le moins du monde surpris que vous ayez acquiescé à la demande de M. de Haugwitz à cet egard, je dois cependant

vous avouer que je n'ai rien trouvé dans les raisons alléguées par ce ministre qui dût, naturellement, le porter à désirer cette espèce de mystère ; lui-même ayant désavouée la seule valable, celle de ne pas exciter la jalousie des François par l'apparence d'une communication plus fréquente qu'à l'ordinaire entre le ministre de sa Majesté et lui.

“ Quant au fond de l'affaire, il me semble qu'elle se réduit aujourd'hui à très-peu de choses, sans, cependant, que nous devions négliger ce qu'elle nous présente de favorable aux intérêts de l'Europe. Le Cabinet de Berlin se montre persuadé du danger dont les progrès des François menacent l'Europe. Il rejette hautement toute idée d'y parer par des mesures offensives de sa part, même de concert avec les autres Cours, si cela étoit possible. Il paroît croire que le remède le plus efficace c'est de conclure la paix la plus promptement possible avec les François, pour leur faire, par ce moyen, repasser la Rhin, sans cependant expliquer de quelle manière le simple rappel des troupes fera cesser les intrigues, la circulation des libelles, la propagation du venin révolutionnaire dans les pays de la rive droite, déjà trop infectée de ce poison destructeur. C'est dans ce sens qu'il se propose de travailler à Rastadt et à Vienne, tout en donnant les plus fortes assurances de son désir d'établir entre les quatre grandes Cours l'intelligence la plus parfaite, et même de concourir à la pacification de l'Angleterre, après que celle de l'Allemagne sera terminée. C'est aussi à cette époque qu'il renvoie toute idée d'alliance ostensible, telle que nous l'avions proposée ; et ce n'est que dans le cas seul, ou par une attaque sur ses frontières, ou (ce qui revient à la même chose) sur les pays du nord de l'Allemagne, il sera de toute nécessité entraîné dans une guerre inévitable, qu'il se propose de profiter des dispositions favorables du Roi pour des secours pécuniaires.

“ C'est toujours beaucoup d'avoir au moins amené ces explications, d'avoir reçu l'assurance qu'on est enfin convaincu de l'étendue du danger, et de la nécessité de s'entendre pour l'écarter.

“ Les dispositions personnelles du Roi de Prusse semblent non seulement nous garantir la sincérité de ces aveux, mais aussi nous en promettre pour l'avenir des effets plus sensibles que les circonstances nous permettent d'en recueillir aujourd'hui.

“ Il s'agit donc de cultiver ces dispositions, tant par la teneur et la forme amicale des communications officielles qui auront lieu sur ces objets, que par l'impression que les personnes qui ont l'honneur d'approcher le Roi de Prusse pourront faire sur son esprit. Dans cette vue le voyage du Général Stamford ne pourra manquer d'être d'une grande utilité ; et persuadé, comme je le suis, du soin qu'il mettra à communiquer librement avec Lord Elgin, je sens que la cause commune en retirera des avantages de la plus haute importance. Je suis non moins convaincu qu'à votre retour à Berlin, ou cette lettre devra probablement vous trouver, vous ne manquerez pas de mettre à l'accomplissement des mêmes objets ce zèle éclairé que vous avez déjà montré, et



qui vous a engagé à travailler avec tant d'ardeur, et dans une affaire si hérissée de difficultés.

“Ce sera toujours avec un vrai plaisir que je recevrai les observations que votre position vous mettra à même de me communiquer.”

*Postscript.* “Lord Elgin vous communiquera la lettre que sa Majesté écrit en droiture à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Duc de Brunswick, en réponse à celle qui lui est parvenue par la dernière malle.” *Draft.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, March 13. Cleveland Row.—“You will see by my official papers of this date that I have very much entered into your feelings respecting the line which Count Haugwitz persuaded M. de Luc to adopt towards you. It is a very great satisfaction to me, in a situation which I had so little foreseen, to have communicated to you already in so full a manner what I had done and written on the subject, because it must have removed the possibility of your imagining that I entertained the idea of encouraging double negotiations, from which you were to be kept at a distance. I detest the system, and never have nor never will employ it; nor can I imagine what view Count Haugwitz had in it, though it is evident that it was he who overreached de Luc's caution in this instance.

“What I have now done will, I am confident, meet your wishes, and as the whole business is entirely referred to you, I trust it is impossible that any impression contrary to what you would desire can have been made at Berlin. It is with the same view that I abstain from sending any answer to Haugwitz's memorial till I receive it officially from you; but, on the other hand, I am sure you will not let any appearance of dissatisfaction on your part towards him injure the great interests which we have at stake. I greatly doubt his sincerity, but it often happens in such cases that the appearance is pursued so far that the reality is unawares produced.” *Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 13. Berlin.—“Enfin les malles sont arrivées en Angleterre. Votre Excellence a reçu les lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire jusqu'au 13 fev[rier] inclusivement, et elle a eu la bonté, le 2<sup>1</sup> de ce mois, de me faire dire par M. Hammond qu'elle me feroit l'honneur de m'écrire le courrier suivant. Me voilà donc près d'être sous de nouvelles directions de sa part, ce dont je sens depuis longtemps le besoin. Mais, en attendant, comme les informations sont toujours utiles à quelque degré, j'aurai l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence une anecdote qui prouve bien ce que Monseigneur le Duc de B[runswic] m'avoit dit si souvent, et que j'ai eu l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence, de la manière dont le Roi est entouré, et du besoin de s'approcher de lui pour le garantir d'illusions,

“ J’ai sçu l’anecdote dont il s’agit, et peut-être en apprendrai-je d’autres, en changeant ma manière de vivre ici. J’avais appris déjà à Brunswic que M. de H[augwitz] n’avait pas eu tort de désirer, durant nos premières entrevues, que je me tinsse caché autant qu’il me seroit possible ; car, malgré cela, la faction me découvrit et me suspecta. J’ai donc pris cette fois le parti de me répandre d’abord dans le monde, et d’en informer par lettre M. de H[augwitz], en ajoutant que, dès que j’aurois été vu dans d’autres cercles, j’espérois qu’il me feroit la grâce de me recevoir ouvertement ; à quoi il répondit d’une manière fort obligeante. J’allai donc hier laisser une carte à sa porte ; mais je m’en tiendrai là jusqu’à ce que j’aie eu l’honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence. Je suis déjà assez répandu parmi diverses classes de personnes pour entendre beaucoup. Il n’est pas possible de voir un état plus déplorable des choses ; car c’est ici un des grands centres de corruption morale. On y voit la grande masse dans la torpeur, manque de tout principe et de tout caractère, excepté celui de la dissipation ; celle des gens qui agissent pour le mal, le sachant ou ne le sachant pas ; et celle de ceux qui voyent enfin le danger, mais qui en même temps désespérant d’aucun remède, se lamentent la plupart, sans rien tenter pour en arrêter les progrès, parce qu’ils le regardent comme inutile. Ah ! si l’on pouvoit y faire naître *the present English spirit*. J’y fais ce que je puis dans l’occasion.

“ Je vois déjà des personnes de toutes ces classes, et je n’évite point même la seconde ; mais comme c’est par la dernière qu’on apprend à mieux connoître les autres, je m’y lierai davantage, et voici ce qu’une dame de cette classe, mon ancienne connoissance, me récita avant hier. Elle étoit à la cour le jour précédent, celui de la naissance de la Reine, et y faisoit la partie du Prince Ferd[inand] avec le Ministre du commerce, et M. Waitz, envoyé de Hesse, celui dont j’ai eu l’honneur de dire à votre Excellence, dans ma dernière lettre de Brunswic, qu’il est venu ici de Paris pour proposer au Roi de prendre tout ce qu’il voudroit au delà du Rhin à l’aide des François ; mu en cela par les vues de son maître qui voudroit partager ces brigandages, comme le D[uc] de Br[unswic] le sait très bien.

“ A cette table de jeu on vint à parler des affaires ; et M. Waitz dit ; ‘ Je crains que cette descente en Angleterre n’éprouve bien des difficultés. ’ ‘ Vous craignez ! ’ (dit la dame) souhaiteriez-vous donc que ces scélérats réussissent ? ’ L’envoyé fut déconcerté par cette apostrophe, à laquelle sans doute il ne s’attendoit pas, pensant que la dame étoit de son bord ; mais le Prince répondit pour lui ; ‘ sans doute, pour abattre la morgue de ces gens-là. ’ — ‘ La morgue ! Monseigneur, est-ce ainsi qu’il faut nommer la fermeté et l’honneur ? ’ ‘ Mais (dit le Ministre du commerce) ils font le monopole de tout ! ’ ‘ Je vois donc, Monsieur (répliqua la dame) que pour avoir le thé et le sucre à un peu meilleur marché, vous ne vous embarrasseriez pas du triomphe des méchans. ’ La conversation finit-là ; c’étoit dans la chambre du Roi, et l’on parloit avec si peu de ménagement qu’hier je l’appris par un autre canal.

“J’ai cru devoir donner à votre Excellence cet exemple frappant, que j’ai de source de ce que s[on] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m’avoit dit des discours qu’on tient autour du Roi. Or c’est la même chose que m’a dite M. de H[augwitz] en professant le plus fortement possible le système diamétralement opposé; comme j’ai eu l’honneur de la dire à votre Excellence. Il ne voit pas encore, il est vrai, dans les affaires générales tout ce qu’il faudroit qu’il y vit, et par là, il ne fait pas tout ce qu’il faudroit faire; et il l’étude aussi de manière qu’on peut aisément, je l’avoue, le soupçonner de mauvaise foi. Mais on n’a pas essayé la patience et le ton de la confiance pour l’amener à voir, si c’est (comme je le pense) qu’il ne voye pas; ou pour le voir lui-même par des caractères moins équivoques. Cependant je ne tenterai plus rien à cet égard, jusqu’à ce que j’aie de nouvelles directions de votre Excellence.

“Depuis la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur de lui écrire par Hanovre, il y a un premier mouvement produit par l’annonce faite au roi de M. de Stamford par my Lord Elgin en remettant ses lettres de creance; ce qui étoit devenu nécessaire, parceque M. de H[augwitz] n’entendoit rien de l’audience promise; mais my Lord Elgin en informera sans doute votre Excellence par ce courrier; comme l’anecdote qui fait le principal sujet de cette lettre n’est pas très pressée, je vais la faire passer par Hanovre.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO M. DE LUC.

1798, March 16. London.—“Depuis la date de ma dernière lettre, la votre du 27 fevrier m’est entrée. Rien n’est plus juste que les réflexions que vous y faites sur l’urgence des dangers qui menacent l’Allemagne, par la suite du plan de tout céder pour le moment avec l’espoir de pouvoir alors se concerter pour arrêter le progrès ultérieur d’un mal auquel on n’ose résister aujourd’hui.

“L’expérience du passé auroit dû, ce me semble, démontrer toute l’inconséquence de ce plan, aussi bien que la nécessité de s’unir, non pas secrètement et avec toutes les reserves qui la crainte inspire, mais ouvertement, et dans la vue d’en imposer à l’ennemi par une masse apparente de résistance.

“Pour réussir à Petersbourg il faudroit absolument, dans l’état actuel des affaires, que l’impulsion vînt de Berlin, et que cette dernière Cour voulût agir, non pas en se prêtant à demi à des propositions que l’on lui fait de notre part, mais en travaillant de son propre chef, comme pénétrée de son danger, et combattante pour sa propre existence. Il n’est que trop évident combien les choses sont encore éloignées de cet état; et en souscrivant à de demi-mesures, nous ne ferions que prolonger l’illusion dont la Cour de Berlin paroît encore se bercer.

“C’est donc là qu’il faut travailler (d’après mon sentiment du moins) sans songer à aller plus loin, avant d’avoir établi notre plan sur la seule base qui pût y convenir; celle de la co-opération cordiale et entière de la Prusse. C’est pourquoi,

tout en vous priant d'être persuadé combien je suis sensible aux seuls motifs qui peuvent vous avoir inspiré l'idée d'un voyage comme celui de Petersbourg, je ne puis m'empêcher de dire que ce seroit en abuser que de vouloir profiter de cette offre sans qu'il y eut plus d'apparence d'en retirer l'avantage pour la cause commune que vous vous proposez pour but de tant de fatigues.

"Par la dernière lettre qui j'ai reçu de my Lord Elgin il paroît que M. de Stamford étoit déjà arrivé à Berlin. Ce sera avec la plus grande impatience que j'attendrai l'effet que pourront produire ses efforts joints à ceux de Lord Elgin."

*Postscript.*—"Depuis que j'ai écrit la précédente lettre il nous est survenu un nouvel incident, qui mettra à l'épreuve, et d'une manière décisive, les vues de la Cour de Berlin; puisque si elle songe même en aucun cas à la possibilité d'une résistance aux progrès des François dans le nord de l'Allemagne, il est impossible qu'elle permette à ceux-ci d'en retirer d'avance toutes les ressources que ce pays-là pourroit, en cas de nécessité, fournir pour la cause commune. Si vous avez encore l'occasion de voir et de conférer avec M. Haugwitz, je suis bien persuadé, qu'en appuyant sur cette raison, vous parviendrez facilement à découvrir quelles sont ses véritables intentions." *Draft.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CLARE [Lord Chancellor of Ireland].

1798, March 16. Cleveland Row.—"I have many thanks to return you for the publication you have had the goodness to send me. It would be idle for me to compliment you on the ability of the speech, though it would be very difficult for me to say as much as I really think on that subject. But what is, I am sure, much more interesting to your feelings is the universal opinion of all those with whom I have conversed, in which I most cordially concur, of the infinite advantage which will be produced by that publication both here and in Ireland. In this country especially where, as you well know, the most complete ignorance of Irish affairs universally prevails, it has already had the effect of opening the eyes of many well disposed people who required no less authentic and convincing a statement than yours to persuade them that the conspiracy which is carrying on in Ireland requires to be treated in a different manner than an election mob, or a drunken riot in this country.

"If the torrent is to be stemmed in Ireland, I am firmly convinced that measures of the most determined vigour can alone be effectual for that purpose; and if they are successful, I know no individual in the two kingdoms to whom that success will be more due than to you." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, March 17. Cleveland Row.—“I send you under flying seal the answer to the letters which I have received from M. de Luc since I last wrote to you. I leave it entirely to your judgment, but I think much advantage might be derived from your setting him to talk with M. de Haugwitz on this Hamburg business, respecting which it is plain that Haugwitz cannot refuse our request without receding from every word he has said to De Luc.

“I repeat, however, that I leave this to you, and you will see that my letter is drawn with that view.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, March 17. Cleveland Row.—“Je suis affligé de devoir vous dire qu’il n’existe plus le moindre espoir d’obtenir de votre Cour la justice que nous sommes, non seulement en droit, mais dans la nécessité, d’en demander. Eden n’a point reçu de note en réponse à la sienne ; mais il a reçu des excuses et des *put-offs*, dont on ne peut plus se contenter.

“Quand le conseil du roi aura pris ses résolutions définitives, je vous en préviendrai dans notre amitié, qui, j’espère bien, se soutiendra parmi tous les orages politiques que je prévois.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, March 17. Cleveland Row.—“J’apprends par une lettre que m’est entrée ce matin, que le Directoire demande à la ville de Hambourg une contribution de 6 à 700,000 livres sterling. Comme il est impossible que nous puissions voir avec indifférence des ressources que notre commerce a produites mises à la disposition de nos ennemis, j’envoie aujourd’hui par un exprès à M. Frazer, ministre du roi à Hambourg, l’ordre (en cas que cette nouvelle se confirme) de déclarer dans les termes les plus expresses, que le fournissement d’un pareil secours à ses ennemis serait regardé par le Roi comme un acte d’hostilité envers ses états, et que s[a] M[ajesté] agirait en conséquence.

“M. Frazer a l’ordre de communiquer sa note à votre ministre ou agent, aussi bien qu’ à celui de Prusse, et de demander leur appui pour le maintien de la neutralité du nord de l’Allemagne, ouvertement violée par cette demande.

“Vous savez que je suis bien éloigné de vouloir vous compromettre, mais vous jugerez si, et de quelle manière, vous pourrez écrire à votre ministre à Hambourg en conformité de ceci.”

*Postscript.* “On ne le sait pas officiellement, mais les lettres particulières de Falmouth confirment la nouvelle du succès du Commodore Warren en interceptant un convoi destiné pour Brest, et de la plus grande importance à leur armement. Mon courrier

ira de Hambourg à Berlin ; si vous avez quelques ordres, il s'en chargera volontiers." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.

1798, March 20. Cleveland Row.—“The circumstances which have led to my proposing you to His Majesty for the business to be executed at Hamburgh are of such a nature that your speedy arrival there may be of considerable importance. I have therefore no doubt that your zeal for the public service will induce you not only readily to undertake this commission, but also to proceed there with as little delay as German roads will allow, without too great inconvenience to yourself.” *Copy.*

REPORT FROM FRANCE.

1798, March 20. Paris.—“Il est difficile d'établir des points fixes dans un état de choses aussi essentiellement variables que celui-ci.

“Il y a environ trois semaines la réunion Montagnarde ditte de Flore a député sept de ses membres vers le Directoire pour lui proposer d'étendre la durée des fonctions législatives, savoir à cinq ans pour les Cinq-Cens, à dix ans pour les Anciens, et celle des fonctions Directoriales à vingt-cinq ans. On devoit faire approuver cette nouvelle disposition par les assemblées primaires. Le Directoire a fort mal accueilli la proposition et les proposans.

“Il veut décidément se délivrer des Conventionnels, and par conséquent il veut les elections et les *ventrus*. Les candidats Directoriaux sont ici ; *Dannon, Cambacères, Garat, Lenoir-Laroche*, Emery, voire même *Desmeuniers*. La plupart des cercles constitutionnels sont fermés ; quelques-uns des meneurs arrêtés, et les commandans militaires dans le midi ont ordre d'écarter à tout prix les Jacobins, et de tout oser pour y parvenir.

“Il resulte de là que les Jacobins sont furieux. Ils le sont au point de proposer quelquefois au parti contraire une coalition contre le Directoire, ennemi commun ; rien n'a été accepté jusqu'ici.

“Il est probable que les elections rassembleront les élémens les plus discords, et cette discorde doit produire des orages.

“Voilà ce que tout observateur peut appercevoir, et sur quoi il est aisé de bâtir mille conjectures. L'intérieur du Directoire est plus important et moins connu ; vous pouvez compter sur l'exactitude de mes renseignemens.

“Il est certain que B[arras] et M[erlin] ont réciproquement envie et besoin de se perdre—il ne s'agit point entr'eux le doctrine politique, il s'agit de régner. D'un côté M[erlin] a fait instruire contre B[arras] une *procédure* secrète relativement à l'affaire de l'ambassadeur de Portugal ; de l'autre côté Francois de Neufchateau, averti et appuyé par lui, refuse de sortir bénévolement, et prétend courir, et faire courir aux autres la chance du sort.

“L'inquiétude de B[arras] a été assez vive pour qu'il ait rappelé précipitamment Buonaparte de Dunkerque, et pour qu'il se soit rapproché du parti vaincu. Des ouvertures ont été faites, des conférences ont été tenues, des engagements importans ont été pris, enfin des mesures d'exécution ont été arrêtées; on a reculé au moment décisif sous différents prétextes plus ou moins fondés; le Général a accusé le Directoire de couardise.

“Cependant la cause subsiste et les effets se reproduisent. On est revenu plusieurs fois au plan abandonné et on la abandonne de nouveau pour le reprendre encore; avant hier, par exemple, on étoit de glace, hier on étoit de feu, aujourd'hui on est presque résigné à la place de Francis de Neuchateau.

“Vous concevez qu'en tout ceci ma position est très avantageuse en ce qu'elle me lie directement à la chose, mais il est plus fâcheux que je ne puis le dire, d'être privé du véhicule le plus efficace. C'est l'opinion de plusieurs personnes qu'il y a eu telle nuit où quelques centaines de mille francs eussent déterminé, et engagé l'action, et cela même à part, il est désagréable d'être arrêté à chaque pas, et forcé de renoncer à des mesures utiles. On peut être sûr au reste qu'il n'y aura ni prodigalité ni sottises.

“A cet égard la personne dont je vous ai parlé préfère, par de très bonnes raisons, papier sur Paris envoyé directement par un banquier de Basle ou de Shaffouze, avec division de la somme, si elle est considérable, au C. . . .

“Voici à présent quelques anecdotes; il y a eu en séance du Directoire une rixe très violente entre Buonaparte and Rewbell. Le premier a menacé de sa démission, et l'autre lui a, sur le champ, présenté une plume. Il a été visité, et apaisé le lendemain par deux Directeurs. On ne fait que deux sortes de dépenses; la corruption dans les cabinets, et les préparatifs de la descente, sur laquelle on ne recueille d'ailleurs que les informations les plus vagues et les plus contradictoires. On y a versé 29 millions le mois passé. On croit que le nouveau Directeur sera Treilhارد. Les concurrens annoncés sont *Talleyrand*, *Charles Lacroix*, et encore *Emery*.”

#### M. DE LUC to the QUEEN OF PRUSSIA.

1798, March 20. Berlin.—“Comme votre majesté, dans la gracieuse audience dont elle daigna m'honorer hier, ignorait encore que monseigneur le prince Ernest devoit aller à Strelitz, je m'empresse d'avoir l'honneur de lui apprendre, qu'en rentrant chez moi, j'y trouvai une lettre d'Hanovre qui m'informait de son départ le 13. Le vif intérêt que je prends à tout ce qui regarde la maison de votre majesté m'engagerait à partir d'abord pour Strelitz, afin d'avoir l'honneur de m'entretenir son altesse sérénissime d'un objet qui lui tient à coeur; mais un intérêt majeur fait céder celui-là; tandis que chacun s'occupe de ses intérêts particuliers, la base de tous les intérêts est sapée, et elle est prête à s'écrouler sans retour.

“Votre majesté me fit la grace de me dire hier, que j’étais reconnu pour un honnête homme ; c’est le seul bien que j’aie recueilli durant une vie déjà bien longue ; mais j’en suis satisfait, par celui dont j’ai le bonheur de jouir, depuis longtemps, dans la confiance de leurs majestés le roi et la reine d’Angleterre. C’est donc comme honnête homme et devant Dieu, que j’ose prier votre majesté de me mettre humblement aux pieds du roi, pour lui déclarer que je regarde comme l’intérêt le plus pressant de sa majesté d’entendre monsieur le général de Stamford, son fidèle et zélé serviteur, qui n’a d’autre vue que de lui montrer le péril dont son trône, son royaume, tous les gouvernements légitimes encore subsistants sont environnés ; péril qui s’accroît chaque jour, chaque instant, et que quelques jours de plus peut-être rendront inévitable.

“M de Stamford ni moi, ne sommes pas négociateurs ; si nous sommes autorisés à parler avec confiance des dispositions du roi d’Angleterre, c’est parceque nous sommes à portée de savoir certainement que par sa longue expérience sa majesté voit en grand le péril de tous les trônes, et de tout autre gouvernement légitime ; que toutes ses vues ne tendent qu’ à leur conservation commune ; qu’elle ne désire que de pouvoir contribuer à les maintenir, et qu’elle se déterminerait plutôt à être ensevelie sous leurs ruines, qu’à les désertier ; d’après le sentiment intime que ce ne serait pas moins désertier la cause de Dieu que celle de ses peuples, et de l’humanité.

“C’est parceque sa majesté est bien informée que nous n’avons, M. de Stamford et moi, aucun autre sentiment sur les affaires publiques, qu’elle a daigné nous accorder de la confiance ; car envisageant l’état de l’Europe sous le même point de vue général que sa majesté, nous y voyons l’Angleterre comme un point d’appui, indépendamment de son intérêt propre ; et à Berlin, c’est l’intérêt très pressant du monarque et de la monarchie qui nous y occupe, non seulement pour eux-mêmes, mais comme un autre point d’appui de l’humanité.

“Cependant, les bases de ce grand état se minent rapidement, sous lui et autour de lui ; encore *quelques jours* peut-être, et il n’y aura plus de remède ; tandis qu’en voyant promptement, non *le danger* vaguement énoncé, mais sa nature et ses causes, il est probablement des moyens d’y parer.

“J’ose donc supplier sa majesté, au nom d’elle-même, au nom de l’humanité, dont le sort de plus en plus empirant, m’a occupé toute ma vie, de vouloir écouter bientôt M. le général de Stamford ; pour qu’il puisse lui faire connaître ce qu’elle ne saurait voir par elle-même, comme le voit un observateur immédiat tel que lui, de la situation périlleuse des pays qui l’avoisinent et de ses propres états ; afin qu’ensuite elle en fasse l’usage que lui dictera sa sagesse.

“Je ne perds point de temps pour recourir humblement à votre majesté dans cette vue, parceque depuis plusieurs jours je m’efforce à retenir ici cet homme de bien, navré de n’avoir pu parvenir encore à ouvrir son ame à sa majesté pour son propre salut, et ne pensant plus qu’à porter sa douleur dans la retraite ;



et je ne l'ai retenu que par l'espérance que l'accès que monseigneur le prince Ernest avait bien voulu m'ouvrir auprès de votre majesté, pourrait me fournir l'occasion de mettre aux pieds du roi cette humble requête.

“ En n'agissant ainsi que dans les vues d'un homme de bien, zélé serviteur de Dieu, et des rois ses délégués sur la terre, j'ose espérer de votre majesté et du roi le pardon des fautes que je puis avoir commises en m'acquittant de ce devoir sacré.”  
*Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Précis de l'entretien du Roi avec M. de Stamford, le 21 Mars 1798, écrit par ce dernier.*

“ Une lettre du prince Ernest, oncle de la reine, que M. de Luc a remise avant hier à cette princesse, m'a fait enfin parvenir à avoir un long entretien avec le roi.

“ Lorsque j'entrai chez sa majesté je trouvai avec elle le colonel de Kokeritz, son premier aide-de-camp, qui, pendant mon début, resta à quelque distance, et s'approcha insensiblement derrière moi pour écouter ce que je disais. Cela me peina à tel point, que me tournant tout-à-coup vers lui, je lui dis ; ‘approchez, M. le colonel, je ne dirai à sa majesté que ce que vos pouvez entendre, et ce que je voudrais que tous les rois puissent entendre, en même temps que vous.’ Ces paroles déconcertèrent un peu le colonel, mais parurent ne pas déplaire au roi.

“ Là-dessus j'entrai dans des détails sur la marche de la Révolution, ses progrès, les causes de sa durée, le but où elle tend, enfin sur les moyens de s'y opposer ; moyens efficaces, si les quatre grandes puissances se hâtent de les mettre en œuvre, et de se réunir à cet effet ; mais infructueux ou nuls, si chacune d'elles reste isolée. Je m'étendis beaucoup sur ce dernier point ; et évitant soigneusement de nommer M. de H[augwitz] j'accusai de cet éloignement des puissances ce que j'appelai la bête des Cabinets qui, les premiers, avaient traité avec une faction, attachant au mot *France* l'ancienne idée d'état, de puissance. ‘ Quel fond peut-on faire même aujourd'hui (*ajoutai-je*) sur des négociations et des traités avec une faction qui, depuis plus de six ans, ne fait chez elle que délivrer des constitutions, et des lois qu'elle nomme *d'urgence* ; qui ne subsiste plus que par le brigandage, le désordre, et les crimes, qu'elle porte partout où pénètrent ses armées ; et qui ne pouvant se nourrir que par la guerre, craint et doit nécessairement craindre une paix générale, encore plus que l'Europe n'est dans le cas de la désirer !’

“ Jusque-là je n'avais été interrompu (tantôt par sa majesté tantôt par son aide-de-camp) que par ces mots ; *vous avez bien raison ; cela n'est malheureusement que trop vrai* ; mais alors il s'établit un dialogue entre sa majesté, M. de Kokeritz, et moi. Cet officier m'assura que sa majesté voyait les choses telles que je venais de les présenter, et ainsi (*ajouta-t-il*) que j'ose dire les voir moi-même. ‘ Aussi (*dit le roi*) ai-je vu avec inquiétude s'approcher le moment où j' allais me voir forcé à

prendre le gouvernail en main.' 'Je ne cacherai point à votre majesté (repartis-je) que je regarde sa position comme infiniment plus difficile que ne l'était celle où se trouva Frederic II, lorsque les premières puissances de l'Europe se liguerent contre lui ; mais elle ne doit point désespérer de s'en tirer ; une réunion franche, loyale, et sincère entre Berlin, Vienne, Petersbourg et Londres peut les faire triompher de toutes les difficultés.'

"Cela engagea le roi à me parler de la défiance presque invincible de la cour de Vienne. 'Cette défiance (dis-je) existe également, ainsi que j' ai pu le remarquer, quoique peut-être pas au même degré, à Petersbourg ; mais votre majesté saura trouver le moyen de la vaincre, et il est urgent qu'elle le fasse.' 'Certainement ferai-je à cet égard tous mes efforts, et tous les sacrifices qu'on pourra exiger de moi' (repartit le roi). 'Sa majesté est déterminée (continua M. Kökeritz) à renoncer au pays de Cleve, et finalement à toute indemnité, si Vienne veut user de la même modération.' 'Rien au monde, sire (repartis-je), ne saurait être plus propre à vous concilier la vénération et l'attachement de tous les princes de l'Europe, que ce désintéressement généreux. Votre majesté sauvera par là l'intégrité constitutionnelle de l'empire Germanique ; et c'est à ce point qu'il faut s'attacher surtout. Les sécularisations sont un piège des Français ; plus ils insisteront et feront d'efforts pour qu'elles se fassent à leur gré, plus il faudra s'y opposer par tous les moyens possibles.' 'Dans tout cela (reprit le roi) il n'y a que le prince d'Orange qui m'embarrasse extrêmement. Il a été question de lui donner les évêchés de Bamberg et de Würzburg ; mais la cour de Vienne s'y oppose.' 'Eh bien, sire, il ne faut pas y penser.' 'Mais quel dédommagement lui trouver ?' 'S'il n'est pas possible d'en trouver un qui puisse s'effectuer sans qu'il n'en résulte une injustice, je suis persuadé, sire, que monseigneur le prince d'Orange a l'ame trop élevée pour ne pas préférer dans ce cas à une pareille indemnité, la perte des riches domaines qui lui ont été ravis. Mais, ajoutai-je, peut-être serait-il possible de lui procurer un dédommagement en numéraire, qui le met en état de faire quelque acquisition territoriale à sa bienséance. Peut-être aussi pourrait-on faire valoir, lorsqu'il s'agira de ses intérêts, quelques prétensions ou réclamations justes de sa maison sur quelque propriété dont des princes ses voisins se sont mis jadis en possession injustement.' Le roi me parut beaucoup goûter cette idée, et s'en sentit très soulagé.

"Monseigneur le prince Henri vint enfin sur le tapis ; mais je ne rendrai pas compte ici de cette partie de l'entretien, puisqu'il suffit de dire, que le roi est aussi éloigné de sa politique Française, que le ciel l'est de la terre.

"Le roi, ou M. de Kökeritz (il ne me souvient plus lequel des deux) me dit sur la fin de cette longue conversation, que si sa majesté avait paru éviter de me parler d'affaires, c'avait été parce-qu'elle avait craint que je ne voulusse faire des instances pour qu'elle en vint avec l'Angleterre à des conclusions qui ne pouvaient avoir lieu que lorsqu' on serait sûr de la cour de Vienne.

(Je rapporterai à la fin une explication qui précéda ce que M. de Stamford dit ensuite, et qu'il a omis ici.)

“ Sire, dans ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de dire à votre majesté sur la situation infiniment critique des affaires de l'Europe, je crois avoir rencontré le point de vue sous lequel sa majesté Britannique et son ministère l'envisagent ; celui de la nécessité d'une réunion prompte et sincère entre les puissances existantes, si elles veulent se sauver. Quant à des négociations et traités, le Cabinet de Londres a ici son ministre, chargé sans doute des pouvoirs nécessaires à cet effet. Mais (poursuivis-je) qu'il me soit permis de représenter à votre majesté que la communication avec l'Angleterre court dans ce moment de grands risques, s'il est vrai, ce qu'on m'assure, que les Français cherchent à faire une révolution dans la magistrature d'Hambourg. ' Je sais,' répondit le roi, ' que les Français ont voulu y former un club, sans doute dans un très mauvais dessein ; mais j'ai exhorté les magistrats de cette ville à veiller à ce que rien de ce genre ne s'y établisse. ' ' Pourvu,' repris-je, ' qu'on puisse se reposer sûrement sur les mesures qu'ils sont en état de prendre par eux-mêmes pour l'empêcher. Mais il est à craindre que ceux que les Français savent employer pour réussir dans leurs infernales entreprises, ne trompent la vigilance des magistrats ; et que dans le cas d'une explosion soudaine, les moyens d'en arrêter les effets ne soient insuffisants. ' ' Il faudra (répondit le roi après un moment de réflexion) qu'on envoie des troupes. ' ”

“ Ici je me tus, afin de ne pas donner lieu au roi de penser que j'avais été chargé de le porter à cette mesure vigoureuse, dans le dessein de l'engager dans une première brouillerie avec les Français.

(Tandis que M. de Stamford était occupé à écrire ce précis de son entretien avec le roi, je me hâtai d'en informer monseigneur le duc de Brunswic ; et surtout de cet article, pour qu'il ne balancât pas en cas de besoin.)

“ La conversation était là, lorsque M. de Kökeritz me donna une preuve convaincante de ce qu'il n'avait rien trouvé qui lui déplût dans ce que j'avais pris la liberté de dire au roi. Il pria sa majesté de permettre qu'il me montrât la réponse qu'elle avait faite à la dernière lettre qu'elle avait reçue de l'empereur d'Allemagne ; ce que le roi accorda sur le champ. M. de Kökeritz me mena dans la cabinet de sa majesté, et me mit la minute de cette réponse entre les mains ; elle contenait en substance :—des assurances de désir très sincère du roi de s'entendre avec l'empereur sur les affaires de l'empire Germanique ; mêlées, cependant, de quelques plaintes, de ce que sa Majesté Impériale, tout en témoignant le même désir, continuait à ne pas marquer cette confiance et cette ouverture que le roi aurait souhaité de trouver, et qui aurait mis ce désir hors de toute doute. Que cependant, pour oter à sa Majesté Impériale une sorte de défiance qu'elle semblait encore nourrir dans son esprit contre les intentions loyales et franches du roi et de son ministère, le roi proposait à sa Majesté Impériale d'envoyer incessamment à Berlin un ministre chargé de plein-pouvoir

pour y traiter, sous les yeux du roi, avec ses ministres, de tout ce qu'on souhaiterait de convenir, afin d'en venir à une prompte conclusion, et, de part et d'autre, à une ratification finale.

“Jusques-là cette réponse ne renfermait rien que je n'eusse voulu y trouver ; mais la fin était entièrement à la H.[augwitz]. Le moyen proposé pour accélérer la marche des délibérations amenait, si non à décliner la médiation de la Russie, du moins à l'envisager comme un obstacle à la célérité de cette marche, vu l'éloignement du Cabinet de Petersbourg. Ce qui me semblait revenir à dire, ou à faire entendre, que l'on regardait l'intervention de la Russie comme inutile.

“M. de Kökeritz me demanda ce que je pensais de cette réponse ; je me bornai à lui dire, que je souhaitais qu'elle fit à Vienne l'effet que le roi s'en promettait, mais que je ne croyais pas pouvoir m'en flatter. Comme il ne me demanda pas les raisons de ce doute, je n'eus pas occasion de lui expliquer qu'il se fondait sur ce que l'empereur de Russie ne verrait pas avec plaisir que le roi déclinât son intervention dans les affaires d'Allemagne ; ce qui ne pourrait que lui donner de l'éloignement pour la réunion si désirable des quatre puissances, de laquelle dépend leur salut commun.”

(This is the end of General Stamford's account.)

“Lorsque le roi témoigna à M. de Stamford que la raison de ce qu'il avait paru éviter de lui parler d'affaires était qu'il avait crainte qu'il ne voulut lui faire des instances pour qu'il en vint avec l'Angleterre à des conclusions qui ne pouvaient avoir lieu *que lorsqu'on serait sûr de la cour de Vienne*, M. de Stamford lui dit d'abord : ‘Sire, votre majesté a pu comprendre, par la lettre que M. de Luc a pris la liberté d'écrire à la reine sur ce sujet, que sa majesté Britannique ne pense pas à l'Angleterre seulement, mais à tous les souverains et gouvernements légitimes de l'Europe. ‘Oui,’ repartit le roi, ‘et c'est après avoir compris ces nobles vues du roi d'Angleterre, que je me suis fait un plaisir de vous en entendre parler.’

“Ce motif suggéré au roi de n'avoir pas d'entretien particulier avec M. de Stamford, motif que sa majesté considérait seulement comme un objet de prudence, de même que sa lettre à l'empereur dans laquelle elle pensait avoir fait tout ce qui était en son pouvoir pour amener sa Majesté Impériale à une confiance mutuelle, sans avoir besoin de l'intervention, *trop lente*, de la Russie, sont des traits caractéristiques de la conduite de M. de H. [augwitz], et sa majesté croit sincèrement que c'est pour le bien des choses. Cependant, si cette marche continue, rien n'avancera pour le bien, et le mal ira toujours en augmentant.

“Voulant conserver la paix, et séduit par les Français qui la lui promettent si le traité de Rastadt se fait comme ils l'entendent, M. de H.[augwitz] ne butte qu'à ce traité. Sentant bien (je le crois du moins) l'importance pour la Prusse de la conservation de l'Angleterre, il croit avoir assez fait de ce côté-là, en portant le roi à la vigilance sur l'embouchure des rivières ; à

quoi ce monarque paraît bien résolu, à tout risque ; mais, en même temps, il fait craindre à sa majesté qu'une stipulation formelle ne fut dangereuse ; et il lui en donne Vienne pour prétexte, tandis que sa propre crainte est du côté des Français.

“D'un autre côté, par cette même appréhension des Français, il semble craindre une réunion entière avec Vienne, et ne diriger les négociations à cet égard que sur son traité de Rastadt, pour convenir des indemnités, ou, si l'on abandonnera ces indemnités, et conclure sur ce point ; par où il fait paraître que l'intervention de la Russie n'est pas essentielle ; et c'est pour y parvenir plus tôt sous ce point de vue, qu'il a engagé le roi à demander à l'empereur d'envoyer à Berlin un plénipotentiaire, à cet effet seulement.

“Voilà donc le moment dangereux, et ce qui paraît exiger la plus grande diligence dans la mission de M. de Stamford ; non pour déclarer seulement, au nom de s'altesse sérénissime le prince d'Orange, qu'il renonce à toute indemnité aux dépens d'autrui, mais pour négocier quelque autre genre d'indemnité ; parcequ'alors, ayant accès auprès du roi et du ministre, il pourrait veiller à ce que, par quelque combinaison soudaine (qu'on ne peut prévoir, ni tâcher de prévenir qu'étant sur les lieux) on ne termine les arrangements pour Rastadt, en renvoyant à un autre temps l'union entre les quatre puissances. Par où les Français, libres de toute autre guerre, pourraient tomber sur l'Angleterre et son commerce avec toutes leurs forces.

“Tant que ce sont des ministres Anglais seulement qui plaident pour cette cause, il est aisé à ces amateurs aveugles de la paix, poussés par la faction, de représenter aux souverains, et à ceux qui les entourent, que c'est l'intérêt de l'Allemagne qu'il faut avoir premièrement en vue ; et il n'y a que des personnes détachées des marches ministérielles, bien versées dans toutes les ruses de la faction, capables de démontrer que toutes ses paix ne sont nécessairement que des embûches ; qu'elle ne veut exterminer l'Angleterre que pour conquérir ensuite tout le globe à la révolution, malgré la paix ; et qui aient assez de courage pour franchir les obstacles qu'on oppose à la vérité, qui puissent laisser quelque espérance de la faire percer dans ces temps critiques, où la timidité aide au mal.

“Je ne puis, dis-je, que redouter l'arrivée de ce plénipotentiaire de Vienne à Berlin, sous l'influence de M. de H[augwitz] seul ; et c'est dans ce moment qu'il faudrait pouvoir porter d'autres ministres, trop timides, à se présenter au roi, pour solliciter sa majesté à se former un conseil dans un moment si important.” *Copy.*

R. SHEPHERD to [LORD GRENVILLE].

1798, March 21. Portland Road.—“Obscure as is my situation in life, and unconnected with politics, I have long felt reluctant to obtrude on your Lordship this address, lest it should be of less

consequence than I might suspect it. But as the storm in Ireland seems thickening, and the Catholics there require a counterpoise in every accession of strength the constitution can by every means acquire; standing, as I do, in some measure pledged to a few individuals in that country, and not knowing how more indirectly to communicate to your Lordship the ideas I have to submit to you, which, if of any, are of great importance, I rather risk the danger of intrusion than incur, by longer silence and reserve, the possible charge of neglect.

“Three or four months in each of the four last years I passed in Ireland; and, having had leisure to observe many evils that existed there, I might detain your Lordship on the respective means of amelioration that my habits of intercourse with the different orders of people suggested. But I pass over the wretched state of the huddled villagers, which an Act of Parliament obliging the farmer to let to his labourer an acre, half, or quarter of acre, in proportion to his family, at the average rent he pays for his farm, would materially contribute to remove; because I suppose such a remedy attended with inconveniencies of which I am not aware, else it would be assuredly applied. I pass by the savage cruelties of the Catholics, goaded on as they are by their priests; one or two in every town and village; a vicar-general over every district consisting of seven or eight parishes; a regular prelacy; and all robbed, as they suppose themselves, of their emoluments, which, upon a revolution, they vainly hope to regain; to whom may be added a band of friars spewed out upon them from the Irish and Scotch convents since the revolution in France. I pass by the Catholics, as never to be conciliated to Government till some effectual means can be discovered to abridge the number of the priests. And I come to the immediate object of this address, the Presbyterians.

“These, of the Dissenters from the Established Church, are the most respectable in point of property and knowledge, though inferior to the Catholics in number. They talk of reform in Parliament, and repeal of Test Acts. But neither the one, nor the other would satisfy; it would increase their power, and thereby render them more formidable. Reform is on their tongue, but their views extend to revolution. On such an event, they presume on their consequence to give law to Ireland. They in the North have been trained up to the use of arms ever since the American war, and wait the moment of insurrection, in readiness to join any party, cry, or cause, and make the most of it. They want to have a full and equal share of all honours and emoluments in Church and State. The question I have to submit to your Lordship, which I do with all possible diffidence and deference, is whether it would be too great a condescension in Government to let them have it, if such a concession would most effectually contribute to tranquillize the country, and assuredly weaken the sinews of rebellion. The sure means of affecting such a purpose consist in effecting an union in religion between the Presbyterians and the Established Church. The advantages of this project were seen, and the thing itself,

soon after the Restoration, was attempted in England. But many circumstances then concurred to occasion the failure of it, which do not now exist. A hundred and forty years have made a great difference in opinions, a great alteration in the humours and minds of men. Forms are softened, prejudices weakened, and the *petimus damusque vicissim*, is a maxim which mankind are now, much better than they were at that time, prepared to admit.

“When I last visited Ireland, impressed with this idea, I particularly associated with the Presbyterians. I found many both of the clergy and laity disposed to listen to it. Whether the minister was robed in black or white, or whether the communion table stood in this or that part of the church, were circumstances, I plainly perceived, not now likely to break off a conference, with so solid and substantial an object begun. With regard to discipline, they seemed not to object to episcopacy; nor with regard to doctrine, to except to a liturgy; the revisal of that at present established in the Church was the point for which they, of course, contended. Those with whom I have chiefly conversed on the subject, are gentlemen of Dublin, and of the counties of Roscommon, Galway, and Down. I always spoke loosely on it, and merely as matter of conversation, as an event rather to be wished than expected; except with two or three, before I last left Dublin, who seemed more particularly disposed to enter into the subject, and express their wishes that I could by any means discover how the English Government would relish such a plan. No fair occasion offering, by intermediate enquiries, to ascertain such point of doubt, before I returned thither, I have presumed to submit to your Lordship this detail, in as few words as I could find wherein to comprise it.”

#### PRINCE DE REUSS to GENERAL STAMFORD.

1798, March 23. Berlin.—“Je sens profondément la frappante vérité de ce que vous dites dans la lettre que vous me faites l'honneur de m'adresser en cet instant. Mais, en respectant sincèrement vos lumières et vos principes, je me reproche de ne pas vous avoir fait lire les lettres antérieures à celles que je vous montrai hier. Elles vous eussent prouvé que ma Cour a cru voir que celle-ci ne s'arrangerait que sous la condition *de prendre*. Voilà le mal, et voilà ce qui nous fait tenir le langage obscur, je l'avoue; mais que cette Cour-ci (si Haugw[itz] pensait comme son réellement admirable souverain) aurait pu rendre intelligible, en disant, quelles sont les circonstances qui vous forceront *de prendre*? si c'est le soupçon que je veux quelque chose, je le lève, en assurant que je ne veux rien, si vous ne prenez rien. Si vous me le permettez, je me rendrai chez vous, pour vous montrer ce qu'il faut, et nous entretenir sur cet objet. Je vous supplie de ne pas partir sans que vous m'ayez accordé la satisfaction de vous voir, et de vous demander votre précieux souvenir, en vous assurant du tendre dévouement que je vous ai voué pour toujours.” *Copy.*

## PRINCE DE REUSS to GENERAL STAMFORD.

1798, March 24. Berlin.—“C’est une bien bonne nouvelle pour moi, que M. de L[uc] ait la même idée que je vous communiquai hier. Je bénirais le ciel de toute mon ame si vous alliez à Vienne. Si cela ne vous dérange point, venez manger ce midi la soupe avec moi ; nous serons seuls, sans domestiques, et nous employerons quelques heures à causer sur ce projet. Si cela ne vous arrange pas, je vous supplie de me le faire savoir verbalement ; alors je passerai demain chez vous à 11 heures du matin.” *Copy.*

## M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, March 24. Berlin.—“J’ai reçu la lettre dont votre Excellence m’a honoré le 13 de ce mois ; et sensible aux marques de confiance qu’elle daigne m’y donner, je ne crois pouvoir mieux y répondre que de bouche. C’est pourquoi je me dispose à partir pour aller passer quelques jours à Londres auprès d’elle, et avoir l’honneur de mettre aussi aux pieds de sa Majesté le résultat de mes observations. Je ne puis, manque de temps, m’étendre davantage sur le motif de cette résolution ; mais j’ai prié my Lord Elgin de vouloir bien le faire par le courrier prochain, qui me précédera encore, parceque je vais passer par Strelitz.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, March 29. Cleveland Row.—“Je remplis ma promesse en vous envoyant l’incluse. Vous y trouverez non pas les termes, mais les idées générales de ce que j’ai du dire sur les circonstances actuelles. Votre amitié trouvera un intérêt que cette esquisse, sans cela, ne mériterait pas.

“Je renvoye notre affaire pécuniaire à Petersbourg. Du moins cela prolongera-t-il le terme, s’il n’écarte pas finalement le mal.” *Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1798, March 29. Cleveland Row.—“The enclosed sketch having been published this morning and containing, though not the expressions, yet the heads and substance of the speech in question, I have thought that your friendship to me would give it in your eyes more interest than it would otherwise be entitled to. I have therefore taken the liberty of sending it you.” *Copy.*

## RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, March 30.—“I return you a thousand thanks for your friendly note of yesterday, and have read with great satisfaction and pleasure the excellent speech that you were so obliging as to send me. It is only by this animated, firm and explicit manner



of treating the detestable principles which threaten the existence of every society, as well as of human happiness, that we can expect to see a proportionate and successful resistance."

LORD GRENVILLE TO EARL CAMDEN, LORD LIEUTENANT OF  
IRELAND.

1798, March 30. Cleveland Row.—"I send you a very imperfect sketch which I have allowed to be printed of the heads of a speech made in answer to a virulent invective against us all. My principal reason for consenting to the publication in this very crude and insufficient form was my strong desire to give notoriety to some of the facts which it contains, and particularly to the charge made at the close of it, and *not answered*, of a connection between the Opposition and the treasonable Societies here.

"I hope you do not mean to suffer your Parliament to separate without some Act of Attainder against the fugitives. I have been a little considering with myself the principle of our Constitution with respect to Bills of Pains and Penalties, particularly as it is to be collected from the proceeding against Atterbury, held in very good times, and under the direction of some of the ablest lawyers we have had.

"It seems to me that if the existence of a treasonable plot be proved by the conviction *at law* of some of the offenders, and if it can be shown by sufficient evidence, *both* that other persons were generally concerned in the practices connected with and forming a part of that conspiracy, and that unusual means have been used to deprive the public of the testimony of those witnesses by whom the particular overt acts could have been proved, such means being used either with the privy of the persons so concerned, or as a part of the general system and conspiracy in which they were engaged, that, in such case, the power of Parliament to punish by legislative Act, *not going to life or limb*, is unquestionable in practice, and consonant to all true principles of justice.

"The great caution which such a subject as that of legislative interference for the purpose of punishment naturally requires from honest men, has made me desirous that this proposition should be as distinctly stated as I have tried to do it above, and that it should then be weighed and considered; the present moment and circumstances in Ireland being certainly such as to require (if ever) the interposition of Parliament to check by any constitutional exercise of its authority the progress of a rebellion which is almost disputing for pre-eminence and superiority of power with the lawful Government.

"I need not observe to you that this reasoning applies only to Bills of Pains and Penalties against offenders who cannot be convicted by the ordinary course of law, and not at all to Bills of Attainder in default of surrender, the principle of which is obvious and liable to no difficulty that I am aware of. They have not been usual, as I believe, at least not so usual, in the cases where the proceedings have not been instituted against the offenders *in*

*Parliament*; but I do not think that this difference at all affects the principle, or that any good reason can be assigned against enforcing by legislative proceedings the appearance of the King's subjects to answer in the Courts below to charges of treason against them.

"Excuse these suggestions, which very likely your own reflections have anticipated." *Copy.*

NOTE ON SWISS AFFAIRS [by Mr. Wickham].

[1798, March. London].—"I have the most horrible details from Bern, *directly*, of so late a date as the 11th.

"Many of the most respectable officers of the first families of the state were sacrificed as traitors by the soldiers in their retreat. Amongst others General D'Erlach; the Baron d'Erlach well known to the English by his hospitality when Bailiff of Lausanne; General de Gonmoens who commanded the regiment of that name in Holland; and a number of younger men with whom I was intimately acquainted, most of whom have left young wives and large families.

"It appears more than probable that Steigner's life was preserved by four stout peasants, who took him out of the ranks by force, threw him into a cart and led him off to the mountains. The whole country four leagues round is given up to the most horrible pillage, but the capitulation is preserved in the town, excepting that the prisons have been opened, and all the malefactors set at liberty.

"It appears, however, that a strong party has retired to the mountains; but my letter, which in that particular at least must be read with caution as written from Bern itself, gives no hope of their effecting anything.

"Clubs have been established at Bern, and a fraternization has taken place with the Pays de Vaud."

FRENCH AFFAIRS.

CARNOT; AND THE REVOLUTION OF FRUCTIDOR 18, [SEPTEMBER 4]  
1795. *By M. Bornes, an exiled Deputy.*

1798, March —"On demeure toujours étonné comment Carnot n'a pas pris des mesures contre le Triumvirat; il pouvoit tout, s'il l'eut osé. Président du Directoire, maître encore du portefeuille de la guerre, il pouvoit d'un seul mot se rallier la majorité des deux conseils, se rendre maître de la trésorerie par le moyen des commissions des finances et des dépenses, disposer de l'armée en achetant, ou la combattre par insurrection légalement combinée dans Paris et dans les départemens. Si Carnot eut pensé pouvoir donner le mouvement, le maîtriser, et le faire tourner au profit seul de ce qu'il appelle sa république, il ne fut pas demeuré dans l'inaction; mais Carnot d'une part étoit fâché qu'on n'eut pas élevé le ministre Cochon au Directoire; son rejet, l'élévation de Barthélemy, et les petites particularités qui eurent à cette époque lui parurent tenir à un plan Royaliste, et

comme un commencement de proscription contre les régicides. Dès lors il se mit en garde contre la majorité du nouveau tiers. On sait tous les changemens qui s'opérèrent dans le ministère et la naissance du Triumvirat à cette époque ; alors Carnot n'avoit plus personne dans le ministère, il ne pouvoit conspirer qu'en dehors du gouvernement, et il ne voyoit au dehors que des Royalistes. Ce parti de Deputés honnêtes du premier tiers qu'il s'étoit attaché ne lui inspiroit point assez de securité. Ils étoient pour la plus part foibles par caractère, avancés en age dans le Conseil des Anciens ; ils ne lui offrirent pas un parti sur lequel il put compter pour résister ou balancer l'action des Cinq-Cents, qu'il soupçonnoit décidés à saisir la première occasion de mouvement pour rétablir la royauté. Il fit cependant des tentatives auprès de ce parti qu'on apelloit les *rallentisseurs*. Il les pressa fortement de se prononcer, de se mettre au premier rang. Des démarches furent faites aux Cinq-Cents pour y former un parti mitoyen qui, paroissant tout-à-coup, se prononceroit dans un sens bien constitutionnel. Ces démarches ne furent pas sans effet, mais elles étoient tardives ; les négociations devenoient difficiles, et ce parti quoique formé ne trouva point de chefs aux Cinq-Cents qui . . . . ouvrir la campagne sous les auspices de Carnot. Les négociations de ce parti diminueoient les dangers ou les dissimuloient, afin d'accroître le nombre de leurs partisans ; mais, d'un autre côté, on sonnoit l'alarme pour tenir en activité le parti contraire, et il resulta de ces diverses négociations un état de fluctuation pour toute l'assemblée. Barthélemy étoit temporiseur par caractère ; Carnot de son côté n'osa pas prendre un parti décisif dans la crainte de ne pouvoir pas en maitriser le mouvement : il craignoit d'être l'instrument dont on se serviroit pour rétablir la royauté, et d'être brisé par les mêmes mains dont il se seroit servi pour renverser le Triumvirat. C'est ainsi qu'il justifie son inaction, et il l'appuye sur une infinité de détails. Cependant il prévoyoit les dangers, il voyoit les préparatifs, il ne se dissimuloit même pas qu'il en seroit la victime de quelque côté que tournât la victoire, d'être pendu si les conseils l'emportoient, ou d'être fusillé si Barras avoit le dessus. Il crut qu'il devoit se dévouer.

“ Arrive enfin le 17 Fructidor ; à huit heures du soir le commandant de la garde du Luxembourg, faisant sa ronde, apperçoit dans les jardins six ou sept cents hommes armés, tant militaires que bourgeois. Il en fait son rapport au President du Directoire, alors Lépeaux, et ne le trouve pas. Il se rend chez Carnot et le lui fait comme ex-Président.

“ Ce fut pour Carnot le premier avertissement. Il fait dissiper l'attroupissement au nom du Directoire ; les jardins sont évacués, mais les galeries de Barras deviennent le lieu de retraite de tous ces gens armés. Carnot fait apeler Barthélemy, l'instruit de ce qui se passe, et lui propose de fuir ; il étoit encore temps de renverser le Triumvirat, mais Carnot pensoit toujours que le royalisme triomphant le sacrifieroit. Déjà le Triumvirat étoit

assemblé chez Rewbell, et les Ministres ainsi qu'Augereau venoit de s'y rendre. Carnot presse de nouveau Barthélemy de s'enfuir ; il refuse, la finit il semble une lacheté ; il se retire dans son appartement. Quelques heures s'écoulent. Carnot songe à sa fuite ; il essaye les clefs de fausses portes qu'il avoit pratiquées, il se jette ensuite sur un lit de repos. A une heure du matin le commandant de la garde se présente pour l'arrêter. Il s'adressa à son frère, général de division, et il y a, de part et d'autre, des pourparlers de convenances et d'égards. Carnot saisit ce moment, ouvre sa première porte qu'il referme sur lui, fait la même chose sur plusieurs autres, et arrive dans une petite rue d'où il se réfugie chez un ami, chez lequel il a demeuré 17 jours avec le ministre Cochon. L'officier chargé de l'arrestation, ne l'ayant pas trouvé, en fait son rapport à Barras, qui, dans son premier mouvement, renverse son bureau, s'arme, et court faire arrêter lui-même Barthélemy. Carnot part de Paris avec un passeport de négociant Francois, et, arrivé à Geneve, il y reste tranquille pendant un mois et demi ; mais l'ex-Conventionnel Duhem y arrive et le reconnoit dans une promenade publique ; une visite domicilien succède à cette découverte, et Carnot y échappe. Buonaparte arrive le même jour à Geneve ; on lui dénonce Carnot, et ceux qu'on soupçonne lui avoir asyle ; aussitôt il les fait appeler ; il leur fait un crime d'avoir sauvé Carnot ; et semble par les accents de sa colère et de sa fureur jouer le premier rôle d'un drame préparé. Un des deux prévenus répond avec calme et dignité, que sauver Carnot seroit une action qui obtiendrait l'estime du héros de l'Italie, lors même qu'il croiroit devoir le blamer ; 'que s'il étoit coupable, il ne s'en défendrait pas.' Cette réponse est presque applaudie et il est renvoyé. L'autre, moins adroit, se déconcerte, répond sans mesure ; son arrestation est demandée par le Général, et le Gouvernement de Geneve obéit. Mais Carnot croit pouvoir assurer que cela n'est qu'un jeu, et telle est aussi l'opinion du malheureux qui gemit dans les fers, se regardant comme la dupe de cette comédie. Carnot n'est pas sans espoir ; il conserve un parti auquel s'attachent les républicains régicides, et tout ce qui reste de la commission des onze qui fit la constitution de 1795."

*Nota Bene.* "Une seule personne connoit la retraite de Carnot, et c'est par elle que celui qui a écrit ces détails peut communiquer avec lui."

#### FRENCH AFFAIRS.

NOTE OF CONVERSATIONS WITH THE EX-DIRECTOR CARNOT,  
by M. Bornes.

1798, March. Switzerland.—"Jusques au 1 Prairial de l'an 5, Carnot et Rewbell sembloient s'être partagé le gouvernement. Le premier avoit fait son domaine de tout ce qui avoit trait à la guerre, et le second de tout ce qui étoit relatif à la diplomatie. Les autres parties de l'administration étoient concurremment

remplies par chacun des Directeurs ; mais le plus souvent elles n'étoient que des objets de ministère, sous l'influence plus ou moins immédiate de tel ou tel membre du Directoire. Jusques là, Barras s'étoit contenté de marauder dans les affaires de détail, telles que les radiations, marchés, ou nominations aux emplois. Il marchoit d'accord avec Rewbell, comme Carnot avec Letourneur. La Présidence, le suffrage toujours mobile de Larevelliere, l'influence plus mobile encore de différens partis dans le corps Législatif, et d'autres circonstances de ce genre, donnoient alternativement la prépondérance à l'un ou à l'autre de ces partis. Barthélemy, arrivant au Directoire et succédant à Letourneur, pouvoit s'attacher à Rewbell, à Carnot, ou à Barras. Dès ce moment Barras voulut être chef de parti, et il fit à Barthélemy beaucoup d'avances pour se l'attacher. Carnot et Barras étoient divisés par des haines anciennes, et quelque désir que ce dernier dût avoir de se réunir à Barthélemy il se retira pour s'isoler, ou pour se réunir à Rewbell, par cela même que le nouveau Directeur marchoit avec Carnot.

“Carnot fut le premier qui rechercha les Deputés hounêtes du premiers tiers ; il avoit même réuissi à inspirer à quelques uns une certaine confiance. Barras avoit aussi fait cette tentative ; mais les liaisons qu'il conservoit avec les anciens Jacobins, et la déconsidération où il étoit, avoient toujours éloigné de lui les hommes mêmes qui avoient commencé à se rapprocher de Carnot. Cependant quelques affaires importantes négociées au Directoire, au commencement de la session par des Députés honnêtes, telles que ceux des colonies, avoient donné lieu à des rapprochements avec Barras ; il montra le désir de marcher avec le parti constitutionnel ; mais sa haine et sa jalousie envers Carnot le tinrent indécis. On en trouve la preuve dans les paroles suivantes proférées par Barras ; ‘Monsieur Carnot qui a sué le crime pendant quinze mois à côté de Robespierre, est recherché des honnêtes gens ; et moi, pour quelques volées et coups de canon au 13 Vendémiaire et à Toulon, je suis repoussé malgré mes services au 9 Thermidor et depuis.’ Il est donc à croire que si Barthélemy se fût décidé, en homme de parti, pour Barras, Carnot se fut trouvé isolé, mais toujours maître de la majorité ; il est à croire aussi que jamais Rewbell et Lepeaux n'eussent osé tenter le 18 Fructidor.

“Les Ministres sont changés ; mais dans un sens tout contraire à l'attente des honnêtes gens, et alors éclate le Triumvirat. Ce renvoi est le gant jetté : tout ce qu'on fait pour se réserver, fait sentir aux Triumvirs la nécessité d'aller plus loin pour se maintenir. Carnot veut négocier, et l'on se dirige vers Lepeaux ; tout est mis en mouvement pour amener ce dernier à un accord ; tous ses amis et Carnot lui-même échouent, et trouvent en lui un petit Séide, un fanatique prêt à tout exterminer. On ne dit rien de l'approche des troupes, ni de la manière dont cette affaire fut traitée dans les deux conseils ; les détails en sont connus.

“La continuation de la guerre paroît aux Triumvirs le seul moyen de se maintenir ; dès ce moment les négociations dans l'Italie, qui jusques là avoient eu un caractère plus décidé que

celle de Lille, éprouverent des entraves. Buonaparte en fut plus d'une fois étonné; ses dépêches étoient le plus souvent répondues par des simples lettres au nom du Directoire, et signées par le président Carnot; tandis que le Triumvirat, par des arrêtés secrets, contrarioit les dispositions de ces lettres qui dès lors ne présentoient plus au général de l'armée d'Italie que l'opinion individuelle de Carnot.

“Les relations du Directoire vis-à-vis de Letourneur et de Maret à Lille, furent encore plus singulièrement entravées. Le Triumvirat, en faisant naître des obstacles à la paix, faisoit travailler dans son sens l'armée d'Italie. L'esprit Jacobin dominoit entièrement dans certaines divisions. Les liens de la subordination se relâchoient principalement dans celles d'Augereau, Massena, et Joubert.

“Les Jacobins avoient songé de bonne heure à semer des divisions dans l'armée d'Italie. Ils avoient eu l'adresse de faire d'Augereau le héros d'Arcole, au préjudice du général-en-chef qui, au troisième jour, gagna seul la bataille et empêcha l'entière défaite d'Augereau, déjà en défection. Ils avoient même eu le soin de proclamer Massena l'enfant chéri de la victoire, et pour rendre ces généraux les ennemis de Buonaparte, ils commencèrent à en faire ses rivaux. Buonaparte voyoit tous les jours les progrès de cet esprit d'insubordination; il étoit sur le point de n'être plus maître de l'armée; il s'en plaignoit à Carnot; les émissaires du Triumvirat y souffloient la discorde; la division de Bernadotte avoit failli à en venir aux mains avec celle de Massena; alors arrivent les assassinats de Verone; ils sont l'occasion d'une sorte de révolution dans l'armée; les divisions d'Augereau et autres veulent se jeter dans Venise, et semblent vouloir tout entraîner sans attendre d'ordres; mais Buonaparte se trouve maître de son armée.

“La nouvelle de cette événement arrive au Directoire, elle est un triomphe pour le Triumvirat, un sujet d'étonnement pour quelques uns et d'indignation pour le grand nombre.

“Un mois après une disunion s'ouvre aux 500 sur cet objet; mais dans cet intervalle le Triumvirat avoit renversé par son ministre Faipoul le gouvernement de Gènes et l'avoit assimilé à Venise. Buonaparte à peine échappé aux projets des généraux de division qui se rivalisoient, se croit attaqué par le parti honnête du conseil des 500, et il commence à craindre pour lui. Il s'en plaint à Carnot, et lui donne des assurances de son estime; mais il lui montre en même temps combien il est vivement affecté des attaques qu'on semble diriger contre lui.

“Le Triumvirat et le Jacobins accreditent par mille moyens les allarmes du général: ils lui peignent Carnot comme son ennemi, et Pichégrou ainsi que Willot comme des envieux. Les Jacobins redoublent d'efforts pour travailler son armée pour le faire prononcer.

“Le général se tient en mesure; son armée délibère; Augereau est le porteur de ces délibérations. Buonaparte attend l'avènement; il ne voit aucune utilité à se prononcer; il pouvoit, en un instant, perdre toute sa popularité. Le 18 Fructidor arrive:

Buonaparte l'apprend à son armée, et n'hésite pas de lui en attribuer une partie de la gloire. Il renoue les négociations avec l'Empereur : les pousse avec activité : il les termine, et envoie le traité par son chef d'état-major.

“Ce traité n'a point rempli les vues du parti Jacobin qui domine maintenant au Directoire. Barras a emporté comme d'assaut la ratification en menaçant Lareveillere. Ce traité, et tous les actes publics postérieurs de Buonaparte l'ont placé, malgré lui, dans la nécessité de prendre un parti et d'adopter un système ; bien qu'au commencement de sa carrière il n'ait eu peut-être que l'idée de gagner des batailles. Il sait que les événements commandent aux hommes, que rarement en révolution les hommes les préparent à leur gré, et que toute leur force, comme toute leur adresse, consiste à savoir les mettre à profit.

“Carnot ajoute ; ‘Buonaparte paroît persuadé que, pour ‘maintenir son crédit, il a besoin d'être toujours en activité ; il ‘sait que sans armée il n'est rien, et qu'un simple caporal peut ‘s'emparer de sa personne ; qu'avec une armée il peut de grandes ‘choses, en agissant avec mesure, en alliant l'audace avec la ‘sagesse.’

“Jusques ici il a paru saisir l'occasion avec habilité, et sa conduite depuis trois mois dépose en faveur de sa prévoyance. Il se trouve à la fois plénipotentiaire à Rastadt, et général-en-chef d'une armée sur les côtes. On conjecture qu'il se montrera peu à Rastadt ; mais qu'il y fera de fréquents voyages, et qu'il y traitera de la paix, comme il l'a fait en Italie. Il pense, sans doute, que le héros perd de ses avantages quand, placé sur un vaste théâtre, il subit une observation prolongée. On pense encore qu'il pousse avec activité ses préparatifs contre l'Angleterre, et il se créera, pour ainsi dire, une armée par le moyen de son état-major qui l'a précédé à Paris. Déjà il est débarrassé de Masséna, de Joubert, et d'Augereau, hommes que depuis quelques tems les Jacobins ont élevés pour lui créer des rivaux. Il est à croire qu'il ne prendra point de repos, que les fêtes de Paris l'occuperont peu de tems ; qu'il n'y prendra que la part nécessaire pour soutenir l'enthousiasme en sa faveur, et qu'il quittera cette scène dès qu'il aura rempli son but. En lui supposant un système, il ne se développera qu'autant que sa carrière militaire sera terminée, à moins qu'un événement extraordinairement favorable n'en précipite l'exécution ; mais tant que dureront les combats et les dangers, il sera général ; et ce ne sera qu'après ce rôle fini qu'il se livrera entièrement à celui de politique, de législateur, et même de réformateur qu'on lui reproche d'avoir trop tôt annoncé. Le congrès de Rastadt, s'il devient un congrès de toutes les puissances, peut le mettre dans l'embarras, ou dans la nécessité de s'expliquer plutôt ; mais si ce congrès ne présente pas ce caractère, on ne seroit pas étonné qu'il voulût décider par les armes les puissances qui ne s'y rendoient point. On ne seroit pas même étonné qu'il commençât à agir sur l'électorat d'Hanovre avec les armées de Rhin et Moselle, en attendant que la descente se préparât.

“Peut-être cette descente se feroit-elle à la manière des Barbaresques, en faisant jouer auprès des soldats ces deux grands ressorts, l'espoir du butin et le fanatisme de la gloire.

“Telles sont les conjectures qu'on peut faire sur les projets de Buonaparte.

“On peut ajouter qu'il paroît être trop en mesure pour n'avoir que de la défiance, et qu'il roule un plan dans sa tête. Quel est-il ? C'est son secret, et peut-être simplement celui des événemens. Ce qui paroît certain c'est qu'il fait tout pour en profiter ; que s'il a un plan, il ne peut être qu'en opposition avec celui des Jacobins, et qu'il sera un acheminement à l'ordre s'il n'est pas l'ordre lui-même. A côté des événemens dont cet homme peut devenir la cause, on en prévoit d'autres d'un genre inférieur, auxquels vraisemblablement, il prendra peu de part ; on veut parler des intrigues plus ou moins combinées dont on peut tirer parti pour miner et renverser la puissance des Jacobins, ou des efforts partiels qu'on peut tenter à ce sujet.

“La division dans le Directoire peut se terminer de deux manières : par des intrigues qui commencent déjà et qu'il importe d'alimenter : le général ne s'en mêlera guères. Par un coup de main de Barras contre Merlin ; mais à moins qu'il ne soit décisif dans le plan ou dans les idées de Buonaparte, il ne s'en mêlera pas encore ; et ce sera un général de division qu'il fera mettre en avant, se réservant de terminer la longue tragédie de la Révolution.

“Tel est le résumé de quelques entretiens avec Carnot, et le précis de son opinion.” *Copy.*

*Nota Bene.* “In conversing with M. Bornes upon the subject of these notes he mentioned that Carnot attributed the great successes of the French armies, not to any superiority in the troops, but to the great proportion of subaltern officers attached to them, which more than counterbalanced the bad effects of the requisitions. He said it was usual to have 10,000 officers in an army of 50, or 60,000 men.

“According to this gentleman it is Carnot's opinion that 19-20ths of the population of France are royalists.”

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

*Most secret.*

1798, April 1. Whitehall.—“I was so unlucky as just to miss you by ten minutes. I have had Starhemberg with me to read a despatch which he has just received from his Court, dated the 18th instant [of March], and forming part, as he says, of a volume of 55 pages of cypher. What he gave me to read was not above 5 pages out of the 55, but they contain, 1st the old story of complaints against Prussia, who, in conjunction with France, is plotting the ruin of the Empire ; 2nd, that by the effect of these manœuvres, though the whole left bank of the Rhine is ceded, the issue of the Congress of Rastadt is still uncertain ; but, 3rd, that, let that business end as it will, it is evident that there can be no reliance on any peace with a Power *who has*



decided to attempt the subversion of all Europe, and that resistance affords the only means of safety, provided that Great Britain and Austria could come to an understanding on that point; which if they could do, they might agree as to the manner of presenting the business at Berlin and at Petersburg. That the most immediate explanation was necessary, for which purpose another messenger was to be despatched in a week to bring back Starhemberg's answer to this despatch, sent him by one of his servants. The points on which the explanation is to turn are stated to be (*supposant la possibilité et la convenance de l'enter prise*)—1, the means *de s'assurer contre la crainte de défection*, a point which seems to interest us more than them: 2, pecuniary succours on our part, and particularly *des avances* to set the thing going: 3, an explicit declaration whether, *le cas échéant*, we should be able to go on for 1799; and 4, which is extremely pressed, particularly with a view to Naples, a fleet in the Mediterranean.

"I had some little discussion with him on these points, but, in order to abridge the business, he is on Tuesday morning to call upon me with a detailed plan of such engagements as might, in his idea, answer the purpose of his Court.

"I told him as to the Mediterranean fleet that we wished it ourselves, but that no minister would ever advise sending a fleet there without a port to which a ship could look in case of accident or distress of any kind; that to use the ports of Naples or Sicily, for that purpose, would only bring the thing to an issue between France and Naples, possibly before either Austria or Naples were prepared for it; but that, whenever those two Powers expressed their readiness, the one to receive and supply our ships, the other to support this resolution, there would not probably be much difficulty in our doing whatever might be found necessary to assert our naval superiority in the Mediterranean as elsewhere.

"But, as to the general question, putting by for the moment all discussion of money, I did not suppose this Government would embark again in Continental affairs without receiving some assurance or explanation on the subject of the Netherlands, so that, in case of success, that country should not remain to France. We touched a little upon the four possible arrangements on that head. 1. Austria regaining possession of them, which seems almost impossible. 2. Their falling to Prussia as an inducement and price of his concurrence. 3. Their being united with Holland. 4. Their going to some German Power, as a part of a system of arrangement in the Empire. He seems not to think that the second could be made admissible at Vienna, and indeed the whole tone of the despatch to him, as far as I read it, breathes a spirit of the most inveterate animosity against Prussia, distinguishing however the intentions and character of Haugwitz from those which are attributed to the King.

"I thought it worth sending a messenger with this that you might ruminate upon it before we meet. Let me know when and where that shall be. If you do not come to town to-morrow I *could* come to Holwood, but it would not quite suit me." *Copy.*

## W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 1. Hollwood.—“I am much obliged to you for the matter which you have given me to ruminate upon. I will not despair that it may lead to something worth trying; notwithstanding the obstacle of old jealousies towards Prussia (which seem to render any general union almost desperate) and notwithstanding the little reliance on any engagements with Austria, and the difficulty of obtaining ground enough to reconcile this country to fresh pecuniary advances. We must endeavour to overcome all these impossibilities, if, even for the present, Austria is in earnest. I return to town to-morrow morning, and shall probably be employed part at least of the time after I arrive, on the business of the land tax, which I am to move to-morrow. I could, however, easily see you, if you wish it, before the House, or in the evening, as our discussion cannot last in the House. If you see Starhemberg to-morrow it would be as well to desire the Cabinet (which Dundas has summoned) to be fixed at an hour which will not interfere with you.

“On the engagement to go on for 1799 (*le cas échéant* being properly defined) I see no difficulty. On a fleet in the Mediterranean, if a port can be secured, or even occasionally without it, I hope not much. The first and second points you name form the great difficulty, and the second arises chiefly out of the first, and out of the unsettled state in which they leave the former loan. I can hardly believe that they really want advances to set the thing going, and it will be difficult to persuade any one to agree to advances till they show they are in earnest by acting. A declaration from Austria of a determination to protect Switzerland would give us the best chance.”

## LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, April 1. Cleveland Row.—“En songeant à notre affaire, voici une idée qui m'est survenu pour obvier à l'une de nos plus grandes difficultés. Voyez si vous pourrez en tirer quelque utilité.

“Vous concevrez facilement que ce n'est plus que par des propositions faites ouvertement et d'avance au Parlement, qu'il peut être question d'arrangemens pécuniaires quelconques. Il va aussi sans dire que nous devons nous préparer là-dessus à toutes sortes d'oppositions même de la part des personnes les mieux intentionnées. Vous voyez, cependant, l'enthousiasme pour les Suisses. En rendant une déclaration en leur faveur, votre Cour populariserait sa cause ici; et nous pourrions obtenir pour cet objet plus, et plus facilement, que pour aucun autre.

“Sans cela nous nous trouverons toujours dans ce cercle; vous, ne pouvant agir sans être assuré de notre secours, nous, ne pouvant vous assurer ce secours qu'après que vous aurez agi. Car ce serait vous tromper que de vous donner la moindre espérance d'arranger cette affaire sans l'avoir préalablement discutée au Parlement. Or quelle apparence y aurait-il d'avoir

le consentement des Deux Chambres pour des avances qui n'auraient pas été précédées d'une déclaration publique de votre part.

"Songez à ceci, et soyez persuadé de tout mon désir de voir cette grande affaire terminée selon notre vœu commun, et de manière à préserver l'Europe." *Copy.*

#### MINUTE of CONFERENCE with COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, April 1.—"This day Count Starhemberg communicated to me the contents of a despatch which he has received from his Court, dated March 18, 1798.

"It begins with heavy complaints of the conduct of Prussia, whom it represents as forwarding the views of France in order to serve its own ambitious purposes. It states that the overtures made by Count Keller have been wholly insufficient for the establishment of confidence, and much more suited to the character of Count Haugwitz than to that which is attributed to the King of Prussia; and that no progress has been made in that negotiation. That, by the effect of the manœuvres of Prussia, the whole of the left bank [of the Rhine] is ceded to the French, contrary to the intentions of Austria. That, notwithstanding this cession the issue of the Congress of Rastadt is still uncertain. But that, whatever the event may be of that negotiation it is evident that there can be no reliance on a power decidedly bent on the subversion of every part of Europe, and totally regardless of the faith of treaties. That resistance to that power affords the only means of safety, provided Great Britain and Austria could come to an understanding for that purpose; which if they could do, they might then agree on the means of presenting the business both to the Court of Berlin and that of Petersburg. That the most immediate explanation was necessary, and that a messenger would be despatched in a week's time, to bring back Count Starhemberg's answer to this despatch, which was sent to him by one of his own servants.

"The points on which this explanation is to turn are stated to be these, supposing the possibility and expediency of the measure itself to be agreed upon.

"1. The security which each party could give to the other against the fear of separate treaties with the enemy.

"2. The pecuniary aid which Great Britain could furnish to Austria, particularly in the outset of the business.

"3. The sending a fleet into the Mediterranean, which point appears to be pressed with peculiar earnestness, and with a view to the security of Naples.

"4. An explicit declaration whether, if it should be necessary, we should be able to go on for the year 1799.

"No precise moment was mentioned for the renewal of hostilities, nor was any particular case specified as likely to lead to that event; but the proposal is rather rested on the general view of the conduct and designs of France. Great animosity is

expressed throughout towards Prussia. Count Starhemberg is on Tuesday to furnish me with a sketch of his ideas of the details of these proposed engagements."

THE EARL OF CLARE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 3. Dublin.—"Many thanks to you for your very excellent speech. His Grace of Bedford has, in this single instance in his political life, been of service to the State in bringing forth so explicitly the sense of the British peerage of the wickedness and folly which actuate him and his associates. I begin to entertain strong hopes that we shall soon be enabled to get to the bottom of the base conspiracy existing here."

MÉMOIRE CONFIDENTIEL.

COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 4.—Avant de passer aux objets sur lesquels je vous ai promis de vous communiquer mes idées particulières autant qu'elles peuvent se combiner avec celles de ma Cour et les vôtres, et avant de discuter la manière et les possibilités d'établir entre nos deux Cours ce concert si nécessaire, jettons un coup d'oeil rapide sur les trois différentes négociations dont on est occupé actuellement, pour pouvoir en appliquer les résultats aux objets que nous devons, dans tous les cas, traiter confidentiellement, et de Cour à Cour.

"Je passerai rapidement sur la première qui se traite à Vienne entre M. de Thugut et M. de Keller. Elle a été entamée par ordre du Roi de Prusse, et paraissait avoir pour but de se réunir à vous pour sauver l'empire, ou, du moins, la plus grande partie de son intégrité territoriale. J'ai lieu de supposer que les vues du jeune roi étaient justes et nobles; néanmoins, la manière astucieuse dont M. de Haugwitz les a fait présenter, a inspiré des soupçons bien fondés, dont la conduite sourdement perfide des émissaires de Berlin à Rastatt et à Paris n'a que trop vérifié la justice. Quoiqu'à la date du 18 de Mars, M. de Keller continuât de parler encore à notre ministre sur le même sujet, il est vraisemblable que les événements survenus depuis, et la manière dont l'empire a cédé, auront terminé ces conférences.

"Les deux autres négociations se traitent à Berlin. La première est celle que les circonstances ont amené à l'occasion du bouleversement de l'empire, et qui, présupposant au moins tacitement, la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin, n'a d'autre but principal que de régler le mode futur des sécularisations destinées à servir d'indemnités.

"Pour éviter toute chicane avec la Prusse, nous sommes convenus de nous en remettre à l'arbitrage de la Cour de Petersbourg, qui décidera, en dernière analyse, de toutes nos répartitions. D'après cette base connue, je me borne à désirer uniquement que l'affaire de la convention pécuniaire que vous y avez renvoyé, puisse se terminer au gré de vos désirs, au

cas qu'elle ne soit pas déjà réglée auparavant, ainsique j'aime à m'en flatter. La seconde négociation consiste dans les tentatives que M. le Duc de Brunswick fait par lui-même et ses agents, d'après vos directions, pour parvenir à réaliser le projet d'une quadruple alliance, que je regarderais comme le souverain bien s'il y avait moyen de l'établir sur des bases assez sincères et assez sûres pour pouvoir se promettre qu'elle durerait autant que la guerre. Je ne crois pas fixer un terme bien long en limitant ce système à cette époque, car je ne doute pas que les quatre grandes puissances, agissant intimement ensemble, ne viennent à bout en moins d'un an non seulement de rejeter l'ennemi au-delà de ses anciennes frontières, mais même de rétablir la monarchie en France, seul et unique moyen d'assurer au repos durable à l'Europe. J'avoue que la réalisation de cette quadruple alliance, toujours difficile à amener, me paraît de toute impossibilité, tant que M. de Haugwitz jouira de la confiance exclusive du roi.

"Tout ce dont on conviendra confidentiellement entre nos deux Cours devant être également spécifié, particulièrement dans le cas heureux d'une quadruple alliance, nous pouvons passer actuellement à l'examen de ces différents points, en présupposant (comme je ne le crains que trop) qu'on ne parviendra pas à faire rentrer la Prusse en jeu. Dans cette hypothèse, le même but, ou du moins celui de dépouiller les Français de leurs conquêtes, est encore très exécutable si la Russie veut coopérer à nos efforts avec l'activité qu'il est en son pouvoir de déployer. Je crois même que pourvu qu'elle en impose à la Prusse, et qu'elle pese sur elle de manière à la neutraliser, on pourrait encore reprendre les armes avec une espérance de grands succès, quoiqu'ils deviendraient de toute nécessité beaucoup plus lents.

"Il résulte de ce que je viens de dire, 1<sup>o</sup> qu'il faut encore tout employer pour réunir les efforts puissants des trois grandes Cours, et je crois que quelques fussent les sacrifices que l'Angleterre ferait en cette occasion, ils seraient placés à un tel intérêt politique, qu'elle ne devrait pas les regretter. 2<sup>o</sup> Qu'au défaut de la Prusse, il faut au moins tâcher de s'assurer des efforts de la Russie. Ceux qui connaissent Paul I jugent qu'il suffirait pour le faire agir, de lui prouver que la paix avec l'anarchie est impossible. 3<sup>o</sup> Que si l'Empereur de Russie se refusait à agir offensivement, il faudrait le déterminer à contenir sérieusement la Prusse pour, qu'au moins, elle ne nuise pas à la cause; et qu'il soit prêt à tomber sur elle à la première perfidie.

"Sans cette assurance positive de notre allié, il est inutile de se rien promettre, et nous ne ferions que courir à une ruine certaine, qu'il faut alors tâcher d'éloigner en nous compromettant le moins que possible avec le monstre que, dans ce cas, nous abimera tôt ou tard. Je crois qu'on pourrait peut-être se flatter que le concours de la Russie, aidé de quelques démarches faites à propos par l'Angleterre, nous procurerait l'appui du Dannemarck et de la Suède, qui ne devraient pas être négligé dans la circonstance. Notre prépondérance, ou l'humeur même des Français, entraînerait également Naples et peut-être la Sardaigne, du moment où les hostilités recommenceraient en Italie. Le

Roi de Naples peut fournir une armée assez considérable, qui rendrait des bons services pour éloigner l'ennemi de ses frontières, et peut-être pour reprendre les domaines de la Cour de Rome. Ses ports deviendraient également indispensables à l'Angleterre. Les troupes Piémontaises, restées fidèles à leur souverain, pourraient servir utilement pour achever de chasser les Français de l'Italie, lorsque le Roi de Sardaigne, ayant l'air d'être forcé par nos armées victorieuses à prendre notre partie, se serait déclaré contre l'ennemi. En lui rendant ainsi le service important de le délivrer du joug républicain, que pèse particulièrement sur lui, on pourrait encore lui permettre de se dédommager de ses pertes et de ses paix aux dépens de la République de Gênes, entièrement à sa convenance, et le seul pays qui mérite réellement le châtiment le plus exemplaire pour la manière perfide dont il a ouvert les portes de l'Italie aux Français, qu'il n'a pas cessé de favoriser depuis, dans tous les temps.

“ Ces principes une fois posés, il me semble que pour éviter toute perte de temps (ce que je regarde comme de la plus haute importance) il faudrait que vous me missiez, dès à présent, en état de présenter un plan tout fait à l'assentiment de ma Cour, en répondant aux ouvertures que j'ai été chargé de vous faire; de façon à éclairer tellement sur vos intentions qu'il ne reste pas le moindre doute à leur égard; et qu'on soit sûr, qu'en agissant de la manière indiquée, on pourrait compter sur l'exécution réciproque de ce qu'on se croira en droit d'attendre de vous. Je sais que les secours que vous pouvez nous donner sont toujours soumis à la sanction préalable du Parlement; mais je n'ignore pas non plus que, quand vous nous indiquez les moyens de les obtenir, c'est presque nous les assurer; et je connais trop bien par expérience le caractère honnête et les talents parlementaires du ministère avec lequel nous traitons, pour ne pas toujours engager ma Cour à se décider d'après ses conseils, avec la même confiance que d'après ses promesses.

“ En conséquence de cette conviction, je veux avoir l'honneur de vous soumettre mes idées sur les différents points des ouvertures de ma Cour, en les reprenant dans l'ordre dans lequel elles sont faites, et en vous proposant une réponse à chacune. Quand vous les aurez examiné, nous en causerons ensemble, et ce ne sera qu'après que vous m'aurez définitivement informé de votre dernière résolution, que j'en rendrai compte à Vienne.

1<sup>o</sup> *L'entreprise en question est-elle possible, et est-elle convenable aux intérêts des deux Cours ?*

2<sup>o</sup> *Quels seraient les démarches à faire à Petersbourg, à Berlin, et auprès des différentes Cours ?*

3<sup>o</sup> *Quels seraient les moyens et les formes à employer entre nos deux Cours pour se rassurer mutuellement, en cas de reprise d'armes de notre côté, contre toute crainte d'une défection subite de part ou d'autre ?*

4<sup>o</sup> *Quels seraient les secours pécuniaires par lesquels l'Angleterre se déterminerait à subvenir aux besoins extrêmes de nos finances ?*

*Il faudrait une somme assez forte, fournie d'avance, ou pour le moins, au premier moment de notre explosion.*

5° *Le Cabinet Britannique serait-il en mesure et en volonté de continuer la guerre pendant l'année prochaine, 1799 ?*

“Ad 1<sup>um</sup>. *L'entreprise en question est-elle possible ?*

“Il paraît que cette question n'admet aucune doute quant à l'objet des convenances. Quant à la possibilité elle en est également certaine, à moins que la Russie se refuse absolument à tout.

“Ad 2<sup>um</sup>. *Quelles seraient les démarches à faire. . . .* Je crois avoir déjà anticipé cette réponse au commencement de ce mémoire, mais j'ajouterai encore une seule observation ; c'est qu'il faut bien se persuader, et surtout tâcher de faire comprendre à Vienne, que le Roi de Prusse doit être payé du service qu'il rendra même par sa neutralité. Dans ce cas, à la vérité, il ne faut pas lui donner des subsides, mais lui assurer des acquisitions territoriales pour l'époque de la paix. S'il se battait, il faudrait se résigner à lui donner des subsides actuellement, et lui promettre toujours quelque possession à la fin de la guerre. Cette récompense pourrait se trouver dans quelque territoire à sa bienséance dans le voisinage des pays qu'il perd actuellement à la gauche du Rhin, et qu'il recouvrerait alors ; ou, dans le cas que nous faisons des acquisitions considérables en Italie, nous pourrions peut-être lui céder quelque chose de plus en Pologne. Il me semble que si nous écartions par cet arrangement le point de contact que nous avons maintenant avec la Russie, nous ferions une spéculation politique excellente.

“J'avoue que je ne désirerais jamais que les Pays-Bas deviennent le partage de la Prusse. Quoique je conçoive que cet arrangement serait un pis-aller moins fatal que de les voir entre les mains de la France, il me paraîtrait bien dangereux ; et l'Angleterre devrait ne pas perdre de vue que ce serait un nouveau moyen d'augmenter la puissance Française que de lui donner un tel voisin ; que la crainte qu'il aurait de perdre ses nouvelles provinces lui dévouerait entièrement. Je crois d'ailleurs que le Roi de Prusse refuserait cette possession si on la lui offrait ; et que la Cour de Vienne s'opposerait toujours à une telle disposition.

“Ad 3<sup>um</sup>. *Quels seraient les moyens et les formes possibles à employer. . . . ?*

“Je ne vois pas d'autre moyen de résoudre cette véritable difficulté diplomatique, tout pour la forme que pour le fond, que de convenir :—1° du but qu'on se propose, qui ne peut être que de dépouiller les Français de leurs conquêtes, en s'accordant sur le temps qu'on se propose d'y employer. 2°. De fixer l'époque à laquelle, au cas que nos nouveaux efforts fussent inutiles, on ferait de concert des ouvertures de paix à l'ennemie. Et 3°. De prévoir d'avance autant qu'il est possible les seuls cas où l'une ou l'autre des deux Cours, se trouvant dans la malheureuse nécessité de recevoir la loi de l'ennemi, se verrait forcée à une défection subite et partielle ; en stipulant néanmoins que, même alors, elle en prévientrait

son allié aussi promptement que possible. Ce cas ne peut jamais être, ce me semble, que celui du danger imminent du cœur même de la monarchie, telle qu'était peut-être notre position au moment des préliminaires de Leoben. En ayant prévenu réciproquement ses alliés sur une supposition aussi malheureuse que peu vraisemblable, on pourra, je crois, se reposer avec plus de tranquillité sur la bonne foi respective qui se trouvera ainsi à l'abri de tous les événements. Il faudrait s'engager en outre à ne jamais écouter aucunes propositions de paix séparées, quelque avantageuses qu'elles puissent paraître.

“Ad 4<sup>um</sup>. *Quels seraient les secours pécuniaires que l'Angleterre. . . . ?*

“Ce sera à l'Angleterre à nous proposer le montant de ces secours qui ne peuvent être que des subsides. Il faudrait, comme ma Cour l'observe, une somme assez considérable pour le commencement de nos opérations. Il suffirait, que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous le dire plus haut, que vous m'articuliez ces paroles, *‘quand nous aurons appris que vous avez recommencé, nous proposerons au Parlement de vous donner autant immédiatement, et autant par mois.’*”

“Je sais qu'il vous est aussi impossible de prendre un engagement à cet égard, qu'il vous est facile de le tenir sans avoir rien promis. Il serait inutile de rien demander au Parlement avant que nous ne nous soyons prononcé ; et, d'ailleurs, toute démarche sur cet objet révélerait notre projet dont, avec raison, nous voulons faire un secret pour tomber plus inopinément sur les Français.\*

“Je n'ignore pas qu'en nous donnant des subsides vous acquerrez une sorte de droit sur le mode de la guerre, dont nous ferons une partie à vos fraix, et que vous pourrez en conséquence faire des conditions. Elles porteront vraisemblablement sur le recouvrement de la Hollande et de la Belgique, que vous ne pouvez pas vouloir laisser à la France. Notre but doit donc être de leur arracher ces provinces ; et c'est, en dernière analyse, à l'époque de la réalisation de ce projet, soit par la voie des armes ou des négociations, que vous renverrez la paix ; et que vous risquerez peut-être de faire la guerre, et de nous mettre en état de la continuer jusqu'à la fin de 1799. Pour y parvenir il est indispensable de presser l'ennemi sur tous les points. Il semble que l'Empire, ou du moins ses états les plus marquants, devraient y avoir un intérêt majeur ; puisque la reprise des Pays-Bas doit être précédée de celle des provinces à la gauche du Rhin. On devrait donc croire qu'ils seront prêts à faire des sacrifices momentanées pour y contribuer. Mais il faut les y forcer s'ils s'y refusent, et c'est encore un des points de vue sous lesquels, indépendamment de ses autres services, la Russie serait extrêmement utile ; puisqu'elle pourrait plus impunément, et sans en craindre autant les conséquences, exécuter militairement les états de mauvaise volonté.

\* La déclaration que vous m'avez proposée en faveur des Suisses me paraît tout à fait à propos dans cette occasion. J'en ai écrit à Vienne, et j'ai insisté pour qu'on la fit aussitôt qu'on le pourrait, en tâchant d'en faire sentir l'importance.



“Il me reste à dire un mot de la manière dont, à la paix générale, on pourrait disposer des Pays-Bas. Je crois avoir allégué des raisons suffisantes pour qu'ils ne tombent pas au pouvoir de la Prusse. Mais, comme d'un autre côté il est d'un grand intérêt qu'ils soient assez forts pour se défendre par eux-mêmes, je crois qu'on pourrait les réunir à la Hollande ; ce qui formerait un état assez puissant, surtout si, avec le titre de Roi ou de Stathouder, on donnait plus d'autorité au Prince d'Orange, qui pourrait alors former une alliance avec l'Angleterre et l'Autriche ; et peut-être même faire un traité de subsides avec cette dernière, afin qu'elle laisse, pendant les premières années, un certain nombre de troupes dans ses provinces pour les garder, jusqu'à ce que le Prince d'Orange ait eu le temps de monter son militaire au point de croire pouvoir se défendre par ses propres forces.

“Ad 5<sup>um</sup>. *Le Cabinet Britannique serait-il en mesure . . . ?*

“On a répondu à cette question par les deux articles précédents dans lesquels celui-ci rentre absolument.

“Il serait à propos qu'après avoir discuté ces différents points, nous les envoyassions à Vienne, afin qu'en conséquence on entre en campagne aussitôt que possible ; et qu'après avoir commencé, on me donnât l'ordre de terminer sur le champ cette besogne avec vous, si on ne préférerait pas de la finir à Vienne. Comme les circonstances changent d'un instant à l'autre, je crois qu'il vaudrait mieux que nous la terminions ici, car, une fois d'accord sur les bases, nous mettrons sûrement plus de promptitude à notre ouvrage, et nous y apporterions d'ailleurs tous les deux un grand désir de nous entendre, et ces facilités que l'amour du bien, soutenu d'intentions pures, inspire toujours à ceux qui pensent comme vous et moi.”

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, April 4. Cleveland Row.—“I was very much concerned to hear from Lord Granville Leveson that you still continue so much out of order, and that the delay of your leaving Berlin tends so much to impede your complete recovery. It is not the language of mere compliment when I assure you how much I shall regret your absence from thence in so busy and critical a period as the present ; but, upon the best judgment I can form of the present situation of affairs on the Continent, there seems very little probability that by waiting any number of weeks or even months, the circumstances would become more favourable for your journey, while, if I am rightly informed, the delay may be more prejudicial to yourself. In case of your absence, whether now or later in the year, I should feel unwilling that the King's affairs should be left solely in Mr. Garlike's hands, not from the least distrust of him, but because at Berlin, above all places, the weight and consequence attached to higher diplomatic situation, and even to higher rank in life, is likely to be important under the present circumstances.

“ What I should therefore wish to propose to you is this, that you should fix the time of your absence at as early a period as the roads and weather will make practicable, without interfering with the very consideration (that of your health) which alone could induce either yourself or me to entertain the idea of your being absent. Mr. Eliot, who is named to Ratisbon, is ready to set out very soon for his post. He may take Berlin in his way, arriving there some little time before your departure. You will acquaint him with the *carte du pays*, put him upon a confidential footing with Count Panin, and leave him there when you go, charged *ad interim* with the King's affairs, but with the rank and consideration attached to his station in life, and to his diplomatic character at Ratisbon and Munich. I have, as yet, said nothing to him of this arrangement, nor does he guess, I believe, that it is at all in my contemplation. But it has occurred to me as the best means of remedying what I so sincerely lament, and of leaving you perfectly at your liberty, in point of time, without the anxiety of being to decide upon the moment when businesses of such importance would be to be left in the hands of a Secretary of Legation, who, *as such*, must be unequal to the part which a British Minister would be to bear in them. You will write to me, I trust, in the same unreserved confidence as I have used on this whole subject ; and above all, believe that I shall look with real anxiety to the moment when you may be able to resume your functions.” *Copy.*

#### MONSIEUR DE LUC to GEORGE III.

1798, April 4. Rityebüttel.—“ Votre majesté aura sans doute été informée de la résolution que j'avais prise de venir moi-même apporter les informations que j'avais recueillies dans mon dernier séjour à Berlin. Ces informations sont de telle nature, qu'il était impossible de les confier à la poste ; et, surtout, trop variées pour qu'aucun mémoire pût dispenser des informations de bouche. J'ai cru cependant devoir en exposer les chefs dans un mémoire ; et comme d'ici il n'y a plus de risque que celui de voir mon travail aller, avec la malle, au fond de la mer, je crois devoir tâcher de gagner du temps, en le mettant ici humblement aux pieds de votre majesté, qui le recevra sans doute avant que je puisse avoir le bonheur de me retrouver auprès d'elle. Si votre majesté était à Londrès le jour que, s'il plaît à Dieu, j'y arriverai, j'aurai l'honneur de me rendre aussitôt à la maison de la reine ; si non, ce sera chez milord Grenville que j'irai d'abord.

“ Il faut travailler à sauver l'Europe, avant que de chercher à y relever la religion. Celle a été la règle de ma conduite depuis que votre majesté a daigné me confier ses soins pour l'un et l'autre objet. Mais, s'il plaît à Dieu de nous accorder la première de ces faveurs, nous devons songer à nous en rendre dignes, en travaillant à rappeler ses lois dans le cœur et l'esprit des hommes. Car l'abandon de la religion est porté sur le Continent à tel point, que si l'on ne parvient à y remédier, il n'y laisserait jamais rien

de stable, quelsque fussent les traités entre les puissances. J'ai des espérances de pouvoir y contribuer, et, sous les auspices de votre majesté, j'y consacrerai tous mes efforts."

*Enclosure.*

*Exposition succincte des circonstances qui m'ont déterminé à partir pour Londres.*

"Dans un état plus naturel que celui où les choses se trouvent à Berlin, la lettre que le roi a écrite à monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, et les encouragements que nous avons recus, M. de Stamford et moi, dans la dernière lettre dont milord Grenville m'a honoré, auraient probablement suffi pour accélérer la négociation de milord Elgin; mais les propres dépêches de ce ministre, et la lettre que j'eus l'honneur de lui écrire en lui annonçant mon départ, dont je le priai de transmettre une copie en chiffre à milord Grenville, auront déjà sans doute fait comprendre à sa Majesté, et à ses ministres, qu'il y a à Berlin une stagnation invincible par les moyens jusqu'ici employés, et que pourtant il faut chercher à vaincre.

"C'est parcequ'il est impossible de donner par lettres une idée suffisante tant de cet état des choses, que de la nécessité d'employer incessamment quelque nouveau moyen, que je me suis résolu à porter moi-même ces informations; et c'est à en fixer d'avance les objets généraux, afin que sa Majesté et ses ministres puissent voir d'un coup d'œil ce qu'il sera particulièrement nécessaire que j'aie l'honneur de leur exposer de bouche, que ce mémoire est destiné.

- "Lorsque j'eus l'honneur d'écrire ma dernière lettre à milord Grenville, notre espoir à Berlin, qui bientôt n'avait reposé que sur ce que le Roi avait promis à M. de Stamford de le recevoir en particulier, était déjà bien affaibli par un long délai; et il avait été trouvé nécessaire que milord Elgin, dans l'audience qu'il devait avoir de sa Majesté pour lui présenter ses lettres de créance, fit mention de M. de Stamford comme d'une personne que sa Majesté Britannique avait cru propre à représenter, d'une manière moins apparente que par les démarches ministérielles, les motifs qui devaient engager les puissances encore subsistantes à se réunir promptement pour résister à leur ennemi commun. Tel était, dis-je, l'état des choses, lorsque j'eus l'honneur d'écrire ma dernière lettre à milord Grenville.

"Milord Elgin, ayant eu son audience, fit ainsi mention au Roi de M. de Stamford; mais quoique sa Majesté parût satisfaite de cette ouverture, et que probablement elle le fût en effet elle-même, il n'en résulta rien; de sorte que M. de Stamford, entièrement découragé, et dont la santé empirait par le chagrin, était résolu de retourner à Brunswic pour peur que cet état durât encore, ne voyant aucun moyen de le faire changer. D'un côté, cependant, il n'était pas possible de douter des bonnes intentions du Roi; et d'un autre, par les communications que M. de Stamford continuait d'avoir avec les ministres des deux Empereurs, il ne pouvait y avoir non plus aucun doute que leurs Majestés Impériales ne vissent le danger de l'Europe et la nécessité d'une prompte réunion. Comment donc ces dispositions des monarques eux-mêmes pouvaient-elles rester

sans effet, tandis que le torrent de la révolution s'avancait sur eux !

“Prévoyant, dès l'envoi que j'eus l'honneur de faire d'Hanovre du premier mémoire de M. de Haugwitz, seul effet du voyage de monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic à Berlin, que la timidité innée de S[on] A[ltesse] S[érénissime] mettrait bien des difficultés dans la suite de cette négociation, j'avais pris la liberté d'exposer à sa Majesté que quelque moyen subsidiaire d'arriver au Roi de Prusse me paraissait nécessaire ; et lorsque je me vis obligé d'aller à Berlin, seul, et sur une simple introduction de S[on] A[ltesse] S[érénissime] à M. de Haugwitz, ayant l'honneur d'en informer milord Grenville, j'exprimai mon regret d'être réduit à de bien petits moyens ; cependant la nécessité m'obligea d'y avoir recours.

“Informé par M. de Stamford que M. le Baron de Reck, ministre de la Justice, et son frère, chambellan du Roi, étaient deux personnes de grand mérite et bien intentionnées, j'avais employé une personne intime avec eux, et avec qui je suis lié, pour être bien introduit auprès d'eux ; et par degrés, j'avais obtenu leur confiance. D'un autre côté, j'avais écrit à monseigneur le prince Ernest de Mecklenbourg, qui sait que j'avais eu l'honneur, il y a onze ans, de voir la princesse, aujourd'hui la Reine de Prusse, à Darmstadt, pour le prier de vouloir bien, par une lettre de sa part, me procurer le bonheur de me mettre à ses pieds ; et je venais de recevoir cette lettre. Tels furent les moyens que je mis en œuvre ; sur quoi je m'abstiendrai ici des détails, me bornant aux résultats.

“Je priai d'abord monseigneur le Prince Héritaire d'Orange de vouloir bien informer sa Majesté que j'étais honoré de cette lettre, et que je désirais extrêmement de lui présenter l'humble hommage d'un fidèle serviteur de la Reine, sa tante ; ce que sa Majesté voulut bien m'accorder.

“Je n'entreprendrai pas d'exprimer la confiance que m'inspira cette princesse ; elle fut telle, par sa sensibilité à tout ce que j'avais l'honneur de lui représenter, que dans un long entretien, je lui exposai tout ce que j'aurais désiré de pouvoir dire au Roi, et que je me crus autorisé à lui prier de vouloir bien le représenter à sa Majesté, en la suppliant d'entendre M. de Stamford ; ce qu'elle eut la bonté de me promettre. Cependant deux jours se passèrent encore sans aucun effet de cette nouvelle tentative, et le départ de la Cour pour Potsdam était prochain.

“Résolu de faire un dernier effort pour percer ce mur qui semblait être élevé entre le Roi et nous, je me déterminai à écrire à la Reine, la suppliant, au nom de la sûreté de la monarchie et de l'humanité, de mettre ma lettre aux pieds du Roi ; et dans cette lettre je peignis l'état des choses avec toute la force dont je fus capable ; concluant encore par presser le Roi d'entendre un homme dont la probité et les lumières lui étaient connues ; et qui, s'il était refusé, n'aurait plus qu'à aller porter sa douleur dans la retraite. J'eus le bonheur de frapper sa Majesté par un côté qu'on n'avait pas songé à garantir en le circonvenant ;

et dès le lendemain elle fit venir M. de Stamford, qui eut avec elle un long entretien. J'en ai les chefs, jetés sur le papier par M. de Stamford, et j'en sais tous les détails; mais il n'y a qu'une seule circonstance qui laisse quelque ressource; car ce moyen si désiré, le seul qui donnât encore quelque espérance, est aussi demeuré sans effet par tout ce qui entoure le Roi, et qui ne fournit que trop de motifs à la timidité du Duc; ce qui me conduit à parler de M. de Haugwitz.

“Il n'y a qu'un voix parmi les gens éclairés et bien intentionnés pour représenter ce Ministre comme menant la Prusse et l'Europe à sa perte; et cependant je n'ai entendu personne qui l'accusât de le faire, le sachant. Ce qu'en disent ces personnes, c'est qu'il est sans courage, et veut éviter la guerre; que par là il est aisé à tromper, tant qu'on lui présente la possibilité de la paix, ce que le min[istre] Français a l'art de faire; et que, croyant être dans la bonne route, il ne se fait point de scrupule de cacher sa marche par la duplicité. C'est là un fort mauvais ministre, dans des circonstances où l'erreur est fatale; mais comment parer à ce mal, quand personne n'ose s'avancer pour le prévenir! J'ai appris certainement que, pendant le séjour du Duc à Berlin, voyant bien cet état des choses, il tenta de mettre en avant les personnes qu'il aurait désiré voir à la place de M. de Haugwitz. Mais il y eut assaut de *timidité*; on voulait que le Duc lui-même en parlât au Roi, et, sans doute, on avait raison; mais de son côté s[on] a[lt]esse s[érénissime] opposait qu'on l'accuserait auprès du Roi de vouloir s'emparer de lui, et il insistait qu'on se présentât; et c'est par ce conflit que M. de Haugwitz est resté à sa place, comme ministre unique par le fait pour les affaires étrangères.

“Cependant, il est bien évident que, si l'on ne parvient à détruire cette oligarchie de M. de Haugwitz, toute la bonne volonté du Roi sera infructueuse. Sa Majesté ne peut qu'être entraînée par celui qui seul l'entretient ministériellement des affaires; et en qui, de plus, les entours intimes du Roi, quoiqu'aussi bien-intentionnés que sa Majesté, mais aussi peu clairvoyants par manque d'expérience, ont placé leur confiance par le même désir de la paix. Il falloit donc tâcher de former un plan tel que quelques gens de bien eussent le courage de l'entreprendre. J'y réfléchis, et je communiquai mes idées à M. le Baron de Reck, le ministre de la Justice; c'était que lui et quelques autres ministres du Roi, se réunissent pour représenter à sa Majesté que dans les circonstances alarmantes où se trouve l'Allemagne, et en même temps toute l'Europe, elle voulût bien se former un conseil devant lequel elle se fit rapporter les affaires par M. de Haugwitz, afin que le sort de monarchie et de l'humanité ne fût pas entre les mains d'un seul homme qui, avec la plus grande droiture, peut se tromper dans son jugement.

“Dès ce premier exposé de l'idée, M. de Reck la saisit comme le seul moyen de détruire l'influence de M. de Haugwitz, et de presser ainsi l'alliance des quatre puissances. Mais qui osera faire cette proposition au Roi! Voilà toujours la *timidité* chez les gens de bien, et comment les méchants triomphent.

“Je crus que M. de Stamford, ayant eu dès longtemps occasion de fréquenter M. de Reck, aurait plus de pouvoir que moi pour le déterminer. Je proposai donc à celui-ci de voir M. de Stamford, en lui confiant notre mission commune. Cette conférence eut lieu ; M. de Reck convint de nouveau que le moyen proposé était le seul qui présentât quelque espérance de succès. Mais qui osera faire cette démarche auprès du Roi ? On parle toujours du D[uc] de Br[unswick], qu'on accuse d'être trop timide, et l'on suit son exemple.

“J'étais alors résolu à mon départ, et j'en donnais pour motif qu'un ordre de sa majesté la Reine d'Angleterre m'obligeait d'aller à Strelitz ; après quoi, probablement, j'irais faire un voyage en Angleterre, avant que d'aller me livrer à l'objet pour lequel le Roi m'avait fait l'honneur de me nommer professeur à Gottingue. Je priai encore Monseigneur le Prince Héritaire d'Orange de vouloir bien demander pour moi à la Reine la permission d'aller recevoir ses ordres pour Strelitz ; et de témoigner à sa Majesté combien je serais heureux si je pouvais avoir, en même temps, l'honneur de me mettre aux pieds du Roi. J'obtins l'un et l'autre, et le Roi me reçut avec tant de bonté, que je me sentis dès l'abord la plus grande confiance.

“Je ne dissimulai point à sa Majesté combien j'avais désiré ce moment, pour pourvoir l'entretenir de l'état de l'Europe ; non pour l'Angleterre seulement, mais pour sa propre sûreté, à laquelle je voyais avec douleur que rien encore ne tendait. Je ne puis exprimer tout ce que je sentis pour ce jeune monarque, en le voyant se prêter à ma franchise, avec la bonté la plus naïve, et le plus grand intérêt ; en un mot, l'effet en fut tel sur moi que je me crus obligé en honnête homme, et pour lui-même, de ne pas laisser échapper ce moment de lui représenter le danger qu'il courait à n'avoir qu'un seul ministre ; et après avoir exposé à sa Majesté toutes les raisons qui devaient la déterminer à se former un conseil, je finis ainsi : ‘Enfin, Sire, le ministre qui, dans des circonstances aussi périlleuses que celles où se trouve l'Europe, circonstances telles qu'une seule faute de jugement peut devenir fatale aux trônes et aux monarques eux-mêmes, prend, néanmoins, sur lui tout le fardeau de l'événement, montre par là ou son imprudence, ou des vues obliques. Car tout homme, prudent et droit, devrait demander lui-même que la responsabilité ne reposât pas sur lui seul.’

“Durant cette effusion de cœur, le Roi m'écoutait avec la plus grande attention ; et la Reine, avec un intérêt touchant, portait ses regards tantôt sur sa Majesté, tantôt sur moi. Enfin, lorsque je me retirai, le Roi me fit l'honneur de me dire : ‘J'avais bien appris que vous étiez un honnête homme, mais vous venez de me le prouver bien fortement ; je vous reverrai avec beaucoup de plaisir à votre retour d'Angleterre.’

“Quelles heureuses dispositions chez ce jeune monarque ! Faudrait-il qu'elles fussent rendues infructueuses. J'allai aussitôt chez M. de Reck pour lui faire comprendre combien il y avait à espérer d'un Roi qui considérait les représentations franches d'un simple individu, tel que moi, comme l'acte d'un honnête homme ; et je l'animai, autant qu'il me fut possible, à

s'acquitter du même devoir, lui qui était un des ministres de sa Majesté. M. de Stamford aura entretenu, jusqu'à son départ, les dispositions que cela fit naître chez M. de Reck; après quoi il aura été à Brunswic, pour tâcher de ranimer le courage de s[on] a[ltesse] s[érénissime].

“Voilà quelques préparatifs pour un changement de choses; mais nous connaissons trop bien, M. de Stamford et moi, tout ce qui peut venir le traverser, pour ne pas sentir qu'il faut de nouveau mettre quelque chose en mouvement qui entretienne celui-là. Nous avons cru en trouver le moyen dans un objet de son entretien avec le Roi; et c'est ce qui est le principal motif de mon voyage; car, s'il obtenait l'approbation de sa Majesté, il n'y aurait pas un moment à perdre pour travailler à son exécution.

“Ce sont ces malheureuses *indemnités*, qui préparent la ruine de l'empire et de l'Europe. Elles sont pressées pour cet effet par les Français, et M. de Haugwitz ne veut pas le voir: il y butte toujours, et c'est là la cause des mésintelligences entre Vienne et Berlin, quoiqu'en dise ce ministre; il faut passer par-dessus lui à cet égard, et chercher un moyen pour que le Roi et l'Empereur s'expliquent mutuellement par quelque autre route; car nous avons, M. de Stamford et moi, de deux côtés tout lieu de croire que l'Empereur n'attend que d'être sûr de la Prusse, pour prendre la résolution de résister aux Français. Quant au Roi de Prusse, M. de Stamford ayant pressé auprès de sa majesté la nécessité de renoncer à tout démembrement de ce qui reste de l'empire, le Roi, en acquiescant à la force de ses raisons, ajouta néanmoins: ‘Mais le sort du Prince d'Orange me tiens à cœur; nous pensions pour lui aux évêchés de Bamberg et de Würzburg, mais l'Empereur s'y oppose; que faire donc?’ ‘Sire (répondit M. de Stamford) je crois son altesse sérénissime trop juste et trop bien pensante pour vouloir des indemnités, non seulement aux dépens d'autrui, mais au risque de la chute de l'empire et de la sienne propre. Mais je croirais qu'il serait possible d'améliorer le sort de ce prince infortuné, en le mettant en état de faire quelques acquisitions territoriales autour de sa principauté de Nassau, et de la relever de l'état où les Français l'ont mise et en l'aidant à revendiquer des territoires qui ont appartenu à cette principauté.’

“Le Roi parut très soulagé de cette idée; ce qui manifesta ses dispositions propres. Nous sûmes que M. de Haugwitz devait en avoir été informé, et il était essentiel de savoir quel effet cela avait produit sur lui. J'y étais admis comme tout autre étranger, ainsi j'allai le voir. Il mit lui-même les affaires sur le tapis, et je l'amenai aux *indemnités*, sur quoi il me répéta encore: ‘Sans doute qu'il serait bien à souhaiter qu'on pût les éviter; mais nous ne pouvons pas abandonner le *Prince d'Orange*, qu'il faut soulager des grandes pertes qu'il a subies.’

“Voilà donc la pierre d'achoppement qu'on présentera sans cesse au bon cœur du Roi, et qu'il est très essentiel d'enlever. Il ne serait pas difficile, ce me semble, à sa Majesté Britannique de faire sentir à Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, que toute poursuite d'indemnité, aux dépens de quelque autre état de l'empire,

serait fatale à tout l'empire, et ainsi à lui-même; et qu'il peut, au contraire, contribuer à le sauver, en donnant l'exemple d'une renonciation formelle. Or, d'après cette idée, si son altesse sérénissime pouvait être déterminée à donner plein pouvoir à M. de Stamford de faire cette déclaration en son nom au Roi de Prusse et à l'Empereur, avec les instructions nécessaires pour négocier quelque autre manière d'améliorer sa principauté, M. de Stamford, autorisé par là à approcher le Roi et l'Empereur, aurait une force très grande pour faire le bien général.

“Le min[istre] de Vienne à Berlin ayant mérité, par ses confidences à M. de Stamford, d'être consulté sur cette idée, l'a saisie avec la plus grande avidité, comme la première lueur de sauver l'Europe; l'assurant que s'il pouvait porter à l'Empereur la certitude que le Roi de Prusse serait ferme dans une nouvelle coalition, il s'y prêterait sans balancer. Enfin, ayant cru devoir aussi aux deux Messieurs de Reck la communication de ce projet, ils m'ont parus résolus, si cette perspective s'ouvrait, de faire auprès du Roi, avec d'autres ministres, toutes les démarches nécessaires pour qu'elle ne fût pas infructueuse.

“Tels sont les textes principaux des choses que je me suis déterminé à venir humblement offrir à l'attention de sa Majesté et de ses ministres, et sur lesquels je pourrai leur donner de bouche tous les détails qu'ils me feraient l'honneur de me demander.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL SPENCER.

1798, April 7. Dropmore.—“I have this morning received your letter which, I need not tell you, has very much spoiled all the dreams in which I was indulging myself of Austrian succour, of France driven within her antient frontier, and of Europe saved.

“It is impossible for me to doubt that you would feel as anxious as I should to realise these dreams; or even to take the chance of their being realised, if it were possible to do so. As that cannot be, I can only lament this fresh instance of the ill fortune which pursues us, and prepare my answer accordingly.” *Copy.*

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] April 7. Downing Street.—“Lord Spencer brought me yesterday a rough statement of the naval force, which by no means satisfied me that we may not send a fleet into the Mediterranean, if the other parts of the plan can be arranged. Nor did his opinion seem to be decided upon it. I desired him to send the paper to you, that you might forward it to me with your proposed despatch. I hope you will still think it worth while to draw that despatch, as the best way of bringing the whole subject under consideration, and then fix a day for a Cabinet. I will be ready at any time; but Wednesday, not sooner than twelve nor later than one, would suit me best, if it suits you. The Duke of Portland goes to Bulstrode to-morrow, and desires you will send to him there to let him know the



time. As far as I have thought since on the Austrian business, my doubts are of a very different sort from those founded on the deficiency of our naval force. I think I see many symptoms of the spirit of the country awakening so much on the idea of meeting and defeating invasion, that I doubt much whether they would like to exchange the prospect of that conflict for a remote and perhaps lingering war, supported for a longer period and without a decisive issue, at our expense. This, however, is a very nice point to judge, and on which I own my opinion is not decided ; but I wish we should fully consider it.

“ We have further accounts yesterday and to-day from Manchester, showing the activity of the societies there, and furnishing clear charges of treason against four persons for administering oaths to soldiers, binding them, among other things, to assist the French, and to endeavour to establish here a Republican Government. A person will be sent down to-morrow with warrants and proper instructions to seize these persons, and, at the same time, all the secretaries of the societies whose names we know, and all other persons on whom, from information on the spot, sufficient suspicion shall attach. Every precaution, I think, is taken to render the measure effectual, and I hope it may lead to a great deal. If the evidence turns out such as I expect, it will lay unquestionable ground for the immediate suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and, I think, for further and new measures. I put down very hastily yesterday evening the outline of such a Bill as I think the circumstances will require and justify. I am certainly not afraid you will think it *too strong*. The Attorney and Solicitor General to whom I have shown it, both approve the ideas, and are clear that some such measure is necessary. I have got from the Solicitor the Bill which we prepared four or five years ago, which I send you because the subject is connected with this, though the provisions then proposed would not reach the object we have now.

“ Macdonald's note applies to my proviso as well as to that proposed in the former Bill. I shall be at Wimbledon till two to-morrow, and return there in the evening, after dining in town. On Monday I go to Hollwood to wait your summons. Our prisoners from Manchester of course cannot be here before the end of the week.

“ I do not make out on what ground you think it clear that we must withdraw our force from Portugal.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, April 7. London.]—“ Permettez à votre ami d'ajouter quelques mots à la lettre officielle très insignifiante que j'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer. Les dernières malles m'ont apporté beaucoup de détails sur ce qui se passe chez nous, et je puis vous assurer que nous nous conduisons *moins mal* qu'on ne le craint. Je sais que nous avons le projet de ratifier cette éternelle convention. Nous voudrions être bien avec vous. La nécessité de dégainer de nouveau commence à se faire sentir. Thugut le désire au fond, et peut-être pourriez-vous en hâter la décision.

Je vous soumettrai mes idées de vive voix sur plusieurs points la première fois que j'aurai l'honneur de vous voir, et quand vous me donnerez un rendez-vous. Vous daignerez vous souvenir alors que ce sera votre ami qui vous ouvrira son cœur, et non pas le ministre son portefeuille." *French.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 15. London.—" Mon dernier courier m'a apporté une continuation d'instructions, entièrement conformes à celles que j'avais reçues par le premier.

" On insiste avec raison sur une prompte décision, puisqu'en effet, l'urgence des circonstances n'admet aucune perte de tems. Quoique nos besoins soient très considérables, on me donne à entendre qu'on parviendra sans grandes difficultés à régler l'article des secours pécuniaires, parceque nous sommes constamment disposés à *entrer loyalement dans la situation de nos alliés.*

" On me réitère l'ordre de presser l'envoi d'une escadre dans la Méditerranée ; et, en effet, si vous ne vous déterminez pas promptement à cette mesure indispensable, les Français vont être incessamment les maîtres, non seulement de toute l'Italie, mais encore du Levant. Je dois appuyer de mon mieux M. de Circello, qui reçoit des instructions de sa Cour à ce sujet qu'il m'a communiqué en entier, quoique je ne l'ai informé des miennes, qu'en autant qu'elles concernent la seule partie de la flotte à envoyer dans la Méditerranée. On m'apprend, en outre, qu'il s'établit enfin une sorte de rapprochement entre nous et la Cour de Berlin, sous les bons offices de la Russie ; et que les événements de Rome et de la Suisse commencent à faire impression sur l'esprit du jeune Roi, dont le caractère paraît honnête ; mais on ajoute que le comte de Haugwitz ne cesse de le travailler dans le sens contraire. On désirerait que vous engageassiez le Duc de Brunswick à renforcer encore l'esprit et l'effet de ses premières insinuations, et que vous donniez l'ordre à lord Elgin de râmer continuellement dans le même sens.

" Une autre dépêche que vous lirez également comme celle-ci, puisqu'elles sont toutes les deux en chiffres François, me dit d'insinuer au P[rin]ce Frédéric d'Orange (ce que j'ai déjà fait) de revenir bientôt à Vienne, parceque l'Empereur se propose de *l'employer d'une manière analogue à l'estime que sa valeur et ses éminentes qualités lui ont inspiré pour sa personne.*

" Je me rendrai demain chez vous selon vos ordres à une heure, mais comme je songe précisément dans ce moment même, qu'il pourrait vous être agréable (pour éviter toujours toute perte de tems) d'avoir un abrégé succinct des ouvertures officielles que j'ai à vous faire (mon dernier mémoire n'étant que confidentiel, et renfermant beaucoup d'idées qui n'expriment que mon désir personnel) je viens de tirer une copie à la presse des deux petites feuilles ci-jointes qui contiennent la classification des objets dont j'ai à vous entretenir, et je vous en envoie l'original. Elles n'étaient faites que pour aider ma mémoire, mais peut-être

trouverez-vous utile de les parcourir, ou même de les garder. Excusez leur griffonnage ; cela n'était écrit que pour moi.

“ J'ai eu un petit mot de Madame de Rochechouart par une voie indirecte. Elle m'annonce des nouvelles importantes sous très peu de jours, et renouvelle encore la parole qu'elle nous a donnée, dont elle nous promet des preuves très prochaines.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 15. Somerset Place.—“ I received your letter this evening just before I left Wimbledon. I shall be glad to speak with you on the subject as soon as you please ; indeed, I have wished to have done so for some days past in consequence of a proposition made to me by Lord Minto to put himself at the head of a corps of French emigrants ; and I am not sure if that mode of benefiting by their services would not in some views be less exceptionable than an enrolment of them in distinct corps. I have wrote to Lord Minto that I took it for granted you would be in town on Wednesday, and I should be glad to meet him along with you.”

*Postscript.* “ At any rate it is clear that there should be an allotment made for the aged, infirm, or infant *émigrés*, in some safe central places.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798], April 17. Somerset Place.—“ I have a summons from you last night to attend a Cabinet to-day at 12 o'clock. I am so occupied this forenoon it is impossible for me to be there. At 12 o'clock I have a meeting with all the commandants of the various corps in London and its environs in order to point out to them, in presence of the Duke of York and Lord Harrington, the various positions they are to take for the security of the cities of London and Westminster in the case of alarm ; and, after that meeting, there is another with the Duke of York and Lord Cornwallis and Mr. Pitt, with the colonels of militia regiments in town, in order to talk over the subject of flank corps, about which many difficulties are started, and much very inconvenient delay is created.”

*Postscript.* “ Don't mention to anybody the cause of the last meeting. It is a most unfortunate difference of opinion. Your brother, Lord Berkeley, and some more militia officers are strongly of one opinion upon the legality of separating the flank corps ; and Mr. Pitt, I think, leans to the doubt. Lord Euston and others, equally good officers, are of an opposite opinion ; and Lord Cornwallis, Sir William Howe, and Sir Charles Grey are all clamorous on the subject, and insist that if parts of the militia cannot be embodied into light corps under the commands of officers expert in light infantry service, they become comparatively of little use. Guess then in what an awkward predicament I find myself. For more than a month the business has not been, although ordered, carried into execution from this unfortunate collision of opinions. It might, no doubt, be very

speedily settled by a very short Act of Parliament, but you are well aware of the disagreeable state in which Government is placed by any measure in Parliament relative to militia, when perhaps the one half of the respectable officers would hold one language, and the other half an opposite language, tending to inspire doubts in the minds of the militia privates that the faith of the law was not kept to them. My difficulties are not diminished by a long argumentative letter from your brother to Sir William Howe, with the grounds of his opinion ; and having put Lord Buckingham's letter into the hands of the Attorney and Solicitor General, they have given a positive opinion against his reasoning."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Note of the principal points in the Instructions brought to him by two couriers from Baron de Thugut.*

" 1798, April 18.

Premier courier.

1. "S[a] M[ajesté] continue à désirer d'entretenir les liaisons les plus étroites avec s[a] M[ajesté] Britannique.

2. "Jamais il n'a été question, et il ne sera jamais question (à moins que les procédés les plus ennemis de la part de l'Angleterre ne nous y forcent) d'une alliance avec les régicides. Je puis donner les assurances les plus positives à cet égard en parlant de la peine que nous avons éprouvée qu'on puisse nous soupçonner.

3. "Premières explications à obtenir sur la convenance et la possibilité des mesures à prendre pour empêcher le bouleversement général.

4. "Quelles sont les démarches faites et à faire auprès des différentes cours.

5. "Quels moyens à prendre en cas de reprise d'armes pour nous assurer réciproquement contre une défection subite de part ou d'autre.

6. "Quels seraient les secours pécuniaires que l'Angleterre pourrait fournir ; il faudrait une forte somme fournie d'avance, ou au premier moment de notre explosion.

7. "Le Cabinet Anglais voudrait-il et pourrait-il continuer, s'il le fallait, la guerre pendant l'année 1799.

8. "Armée considérable rassemblée dans le Tyrol et vers la Suisse qui donne déjà de l'humeur à la France.

9. "Escadre à envoyer sur le champ dans la Méditerranée.

10. "Secret à observer sur ces ouvertures."

Second courier.

1. "Lorsqu'on sera une fois d'accord sur un plan solide pour préparer une réunion de diverses Cours contre les projets funestes de la France, l'on parviendra à s'entendre sur les secours, parceque quelque immenses que soient nos besoins, nous sommes disposés à entrer dans les circonstances et dans la situation de nos alliés.

2. "Si l'on n'est pas décidé à Londres à voir avec indifférence les Français se rendre entièrement maîtres, non seulement de toute l'Italie mais même du Levant, il est de la plus grande

urgence d'envoyer immédiatement une escadre dans la Méditerranée. Sans une pareille mesure Naples est perdue, tant la frayeur s'est emparée des esprits. Je dois appuyer M. de Circello sur ce point.

3. "Quoique nous ne soyons pas encore absolument d'accord ensemble, il y a une sorte de rapprochement entre nous et Berlin sous les bons offices de la Russie. Les événements de Rome et de la Suisse, et la perspective effrayante qu'ils offrent pour l'avenir font quelque impression sur le jeune Roi, mais le comte de Haugwitz lutte contre les dispositions vertueuses de son maître.

"L'Angleterre peut y contribuer efficacement en engageant le Duc de Brunswick, qui a déjà fait quelque insinuation utile à Berlin, d'en renforcer l'esprit et l'effet par des nouvelles représentations. Il sera bon que Lord Elgin soit muni de l'ordre de ne cesser de réveiller l'attention du Roi, et des personnes dans lesquelles il a confiance, sur le danger imminent dont l'Europe est menacée, et sur la nécessité d'un concert loyal entre tous les souverains pour subvenir la subversion totale." *French.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

##### *Memorandum of answers on the points of the foregoing note.*

1. "Même désir de notre part.

2. "Persuasion où l'on est ici qu'une alliance entre s[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] et la République Française est impossible, et que la Cour de Vienne ne peut méconnaître dans cette grande crise ni l'étendue du danger qui menace tous les états, ni le seul moyen d'y parer, celui d'une union sincère et générale entre les grandes puissances.

3. "Que les mesures à prendre pour empêcher le bouleversement général nous paraissent non seulement convenables et possibles, mais même faciles dans l'état actuel de l'Europe, si l'on parvient à s'entendre là-dessus de bonne foi.

4. "Que nous n'avons cessé de faire les plus fortes instances partout pour opérer un rapprochement entre les grandes puissances. Que nous avons lieu de nous flatter que les dispositions y sont favorables tant à Berlin qu'à Petersbourg, et que sa Majesté est prête à y concourir en tout ce qui peut dépendre de l'Angleterre.

5. "Que les mesures à prendre à cet égard dépendent en grande partie de l'étendue et de la forme qu'on donnera aux engagements pour la reprise d'armes, et que nous sommes prêts à entrer en négociation là-dessus.

6. "Quant à l'article des secours pécuniaires, la ratification de la convention de 1797 est un préliminaire indispensable à toute discussion sur cet objet. Mais le ministre du Roi à Vienne aura des instructions pour traiter là-dessus, aussitôt que cette ratification lui aura été remise.

7. "Il n'y a rien dans la situation de la Grande Bretagne qui puisse l'empêcher de continuer la guerre aussi longtemps que les engagements de sa Majesté et les intérêts de son peuple pourront l'exiger.

8. "L'affaire des Suisses est regardée ici comme étant de la plus haute importance.

9. "L'article de la flotte ne souffrira pas des difficultés, pourvu que tout le reste s'arrange. Mais le secret est indispensable sur cet objet, surtout pour la conservation de Naples.

10. "Toutes les démarches que l'on a faites prouvent combien on est scrupuleux à ne pas compromettre le secret de la Cour de Vienne. Mais il est fort à désirer que l'on puisse être autorisé de parler librement de ces ouvertures aux autres puissances qui y sont intéressées."

"Tous les points des Instructions apportées par le second courrier sont compris dans ce qui est déjà dit.

"Mais il doit y être ajouté celui des engagements secrets de la Cour de Vienne avec la France. On en a toujours fait un mystère ici. Nous les croyons en partie opposés à nos intérêts, et même contraires à nos droits. Une communication franche à cet égard est absolument nécessaire si l'on veut rétablir la confiance."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to the PRINCE OF ORANGE.

1798, April 18. Downing Street.—"En conséquence de la permission que votre Altesse sérénissime a bien voulu me donner ce matin, j'ai l'honneur de lui expliquer de cette manière l'objet de la communication dont Sa Majesté m'a chargé auprès de votre Altesse. La nécessité d'opérer (s'il est encore possible) une réunion entre les grandes Puissances du Continent pour s'opposer au progrès ultérieurs des Français, et les difficultés que présenteroient à cet égard les prétensions respectives de l'Autriche et de la Prusse pour s'indemniser aux dépens de l'Empire, ne sont pas inconnus à votre Altesse. Elle n'ignore pas non plus combien ces difficultés pourroient tenir à cette stipulation du traité entre le feu Roi de Prusse et le Directoire François par laquelle il était convenu que Votre Altesse sérénissime seroit compensée pour sa renonciation au Stadthoudérat par l'acquisition d'une indemnité territoriale dans l'Empire, laquelle seroit en partie le résultat des sécularisations qu'on méditoit alors.

"Sa Majesté connoissant la justice, le désintéressement, et les sentimens élevés de Votre Altesse a pensé qu'il seroit digne d'elle de déclarer formellement, tant à Vienne qu'à Berlin, qu'elle renonçoit à ces idées de dédommagement par des acquisitions territoriales aux dépens d'autrui, et rien ne pourroit plus qu'une pareille déclaration contribuer à écarter les obstacles qui s'opposent à cette réunion d'où dépend le salut du continent de l'Europe. Sa Majesté m'a donc chargé de lui en faire la proposition, en ajoutant que si elle ne voyoit aucun inconvénient de charger de cette commission si honorable M. le général de Stamford (dont personne ne connoit mieux le mérite distingué) cela pourroit encore être d'un grand avantage pour le succès des objets majeurs dont il est question.

"Les sentimens nobles et équitables que votre Altesse sérénissime a montrés dès le moment que j'ai commencé de

m'acquitter des ordres du roi à cet égard, ne me laissent rien à désirer quant au rapport que je dois en faire à Sa Majesté, et n'ont pu qu'ajouter à la vénération et au profond respect qui m'ont toujours animé à son égard."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, April 19. Berlin.—"I am totally at a loss to express to your Lordship, in terms satisfactory to my feelings, the sentiments which your private letter of the 4<sup>th</sup> instant have produced in my mind. No gratification can be greater than that of seeing your Lordship take an interest in my efforts to fulfil the duties of my situation. But I may be allowed to acknowledge that the cordiality with which you have attended to the account given by Lord Granville Leveson of my health, and the extreme delicacy with which you come to my relief by a suggestion, not only beneficial to his Majesty's service but of a nature essentially to ease the anxiety of my mind, call for the expressions of my warmest gratitude. I should, however, be very unworthy of this testimony (may I call it?) of your Lordship's friendship, were I, on that account, to moderate that zeal which I am thus doubly called upon to exert.

"At the time of Lord Leveson's departure I was indeed very much out of order. It was during the continuation of unusual bad weather which greatly impeded my recovery, and I accordingly solicited a leave of absence. With the change of season, however, the whole state of my health has undergone a sensible improvement. I have now only a local rheumatism which, as your Lordship may perceive from my handwriting, is chiefly in my arms. And it is no longer the opinion that my remaining at Berlin can have those inconvenient consequences against which I had to guard six weeks ago. The consideration therefore of my health, which your Lordship so obligingly says is the only one which would lead you to the idea of my being absent from hence in this busy and critical moment, is no longer in any degree urgent. And, for my own part, I readily forego any advantage arising to me from the leave of absence lately granted, rather than quit my post under circumstances where, as in the present, I have the prospect of being useful. Your Lordship is, I trust, persuaded that this expectation rests upon no opinion of my own abilities, but on a conviction of the difficulty of transferring that kind of confidence that exists between me and those of my colleagues here with whom the business now beginning will come to be transacted. Your Lordship knows the nature of my habits with Count Panin. The extent of his confidence has, of late, been without limit; and, in the present moment, is not less personal, and comprehending private concerns, than dictated by his rectitude of principle, and strong attachment to the cause which Great Britain so nobly supports. The footing on which I am with Prince Reuss is not, perhaps, less essential. An acquaintance of some years standing has established between us a friendship founded, I have reason to hope, on much mutual esteem. This, however, and the being engaged in the same

contest, was insufficient for several months after my arrival here to bring forth that degree of confidence which he has since adopted; and which, I own, appears to me (on my imperfect knowledge) very highly important. At all events I trust the kind of intercourse which exists between us bears, in its utility to his Majesty's interests, some proportion with the satisfaction it affords in the transaction of business.

"There is still another person whose friendship I have experienced this winter in a way for which I cannot be too grateful. It is M. de Rosenkrantz, the Danish Minister at this Court, but for the present at Radstadt. On hearing that I had received orders to communicate what I could collect of the proceedings of the Congress, he has voluntarily furnished me accounts from thence, drawn up without reserve, or care, and has thereby enabled me to forward regular reports to your Lordship. I should here observe that this correspondence from M. Rosenkrantz is unknown to every person here, *without exception*.

"In addition to what I here mention, Lord Leveson will probably have acquainted your Lordship with several circumstances respecting the King of Prussia, and the persons in his immediate confidence, which are likely not to be immaterial on any emergency.

"The events which have taken place here subsequent to the date of your Lordship's letter, and the business which is now before me, lead me to the conviction that advantages such as I have alluded to, are now as interesting as they could be in any possible conjuncture. And I rely on your Lordship's finding in this conviction the motive and justification of my declining a proposal which the state of my health does not render necessary; but which I shall ever consider as the most gratifying proof of your Lordship's friendship and kindness towards me."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798], April 20. Somerset Place.—"I had some conversation with Lord Minto yesterday on the subject of arming the respectable part of the emigrants, and I recommended him to speak with you likewise. For my own part I really have but one feeling upon it, which is to do what is best for themselves; but I cannot help being apprehensive that, amidst the existing prejudices, it may raise a clamour and ferment very prejudicial to themselves. Would it not be right that you should fairly state that to themselves through the Duke d'Harcourt. Perhaps some opening may occur to sound the pulse of the House of Commons upon it on Monday or Tuesday next, when I believe there is to be a Committee on the Alien Bill."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, April 20. Cleveland Row.—"The receipt of your last letter, in which you speak of the King's leave of absence having reached you, but mention that you shall not avail yourself of it



while there is any pressure of public business at Berlin, inclines me to hope that your health is more re-established than I had apprehended; and it would certainly be a very great satisfaction to me to learn that you can remain there, in the present very critical state of affairs, without material inconvenience and danger to yourself.

"I am by no means sanguine as to the general prospect of affairs on the Continent; and yet it is mortifying to see that the whole obstacle, or at least the only insurmountable obstacle, is now to be found in the perverse folly of one man, who, because he has taken a false step in persuading his sovereign to break his engagement and desert his allies, seems now to think himself bound in honour to persevere in the same ruinous folly. If there were any possibility of trusting the Prussian government, I do sincerely believe that Vienna, not from choice but from the sense of necessity, would come forward again with energy, and if so, certainly with success; but they never will trust Haugwitz, nor can I blame them.

"When De Luc goes back, he will, I believe, carry a sort of authority from the Prince of Orange to Stamford to declare his renunciation of all idea of territorial indemnity in the Empire, and to notify this both at Berlin and Vienna. This may perhaps be of use. It will give Stamford another opportunity of seeing the King of Prussia. It may perhaps open to him some access to the Emperor. But with all this, I fear no real good will be done because of Haugwitz; and I do not well see how this or anything else is to effect his removal, with the dispositions of the King of Prussia such as they are described to me.

"If you mean to quit Berlin for any time, which I earnestly hope you may be well enough not to do, pray give me as early notice as you can of it. The arrangement which I mentioned to you in my last private letter will be at any rate impracticable, as I believe family reasons will keep Eliot in England this summer."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

1798, April 23. London.—"M. de Luc, en retournant à Berlin, aura l'honneur de remettre cette lettre à v[otre] a[ltesse] s[é]rénissime. Elle me permettra, j'espère, de profiter de cette occasion pour lui offrir l'hommage de mon respectueux dévouement, et pour la solliciter d'employer encore son intervention efficace pour le succès de la grande cause de tous les gouvernements. M. de Luc aura l'honneur d'expliquer à v[otre] a[ltesse] s[é]rénissime la nature de la commission dont Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange a chargé le Général Stamford auprès des Cours de Vienne et de Berlin. La démarche du Prince d'Orange servira, je pense, en elle-même à écarter des obstacles qui s'opposeroient encore à la réunion de ces deux Cours. Elle y contribuera encore plus en donnant à une personne telle que M. de Stamford l'occasion d'approcher ces souverains, et de leur faire voir le danger qui les menace, et les moyens qui se présentent aujourd'hui, peut-être pour la dernière fois, pour y parer.

“Jamais l’occasion ne fut plus favorable pour faire sentir au Roi de Prusse ses véritables intérêts. V[otre] A[ltesse] le pardonnera au zèle qui m’anime, ainsi qu’à la connaissance que j’ai depuis longtems de ses sentimens et de ses vœux pour le bien, si j’ose la solliciter à y contribuer encore par le poids de ses conseils. Je fais cette démarche non seulement au nom du Roi, mais aujourd’hui au nom de toutes les Cours, qui paroissent n’attendre qu’une détermination favorable à Berlin pour agir de la manière qui seule leur convient. Je puis même lui dire que la Cour de Vienne en sent tellement l’importance et la nécessité, que le ministre Impérial a reçu l’ordre de me communiquer qu’on savoit à Vienne de quelle utilité ont été les conseils de [votre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dans le commencement du règne actuel à Berlin, et qu’on désireroit beaucoup que v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] voudroit s’employer encore pour maintenir le Roi de Prusse dans des sentimens favorables à l’union des deux Cours. V[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qui est plus que personne persuadée de la nécessité de cet union, ne se refusera pas à cette demande. En y acquiesçant elle aura peut-être la satisfaction de sauver l’Europe, s’il en est encore tems.”

*Copy.*

NOTE by LORD GRENVILLE for GENERAL DE STAMFORT.

1798, April 23. London.—“La commission dont le Prince d’Orange a chargé M. le Général de Stamford présente un double avantage; celui d’écarter l’un des obstacles à l’union de deux Cours que l’on fondoit sur les prétensions de la maison d’Orange à une indemnité territoriale en Allemagne; et bien plus encore celui de donner à M. le Général l’occasion de s’adresser encore personnellement au Roi de Prusse, et ensuite à l’Empereur; et de travailler auprès de ces deux souverains à l’acheminement du grand ouvrage de la réunion des Cours contre la France.

“Dans le moment actuel le premier et le principal de tous les objets seroit de disposer les deux grandes Cours de l’Allemagne à s’entendre et à s’unir. Cette difficulté surmontée, les circonstances et l’urgence de la crise ameneroient rapidement tout le reste. On fait déjà des propositions de la part de l’Empereur de Russie pour une alliance défensive. On témoigne déjà à Vienne le désir de se rapprocher de l’Angleterre. Les ministres du Roi dans ces trois Cours ont déjà tous les pouvoirs et toutes les instructions nécessaires pour traiter les détails. Mais si la méfiance continue entre Vienne et Berlin, tout devient inutile. Le caractère et les talens du Général de Stamford ne pourront manquer à contribuer efficacement à produire cette impression sur ces deux souverains de laquelle dépend absolument aujourd’hui le salut du Continent, et la conservation de la religion et de la société civile en Europe.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL of ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, April 24. Downing Street.—“You will receive this by M. de Luc, who will at the same time acquaint you how far he

has been successful in persuading the Duke of Brunswick to take any active step on the present occasion. I send you copy of my letter to the Duke, and of the note which I have given M. de Luc of the object which General Stamford should keep in view, if he sees the King of Prussia again, and if he has the opportunity of getting at the Emperor." *Copy.*

EARL CAMDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 25. Dublin Castle.—“I troubled you with a very long letter and several enclosures upon the subject of our arrests in Ireland, and upon the case of the fugitives. I am not surprised that under the present circumstances you should not have had leisure to reply to me; but whenever you have the opportunity, I should be much obliged to you for your further sentiments upon the subject.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 25. Stowe.—“I do not like to involve you in discussions in which I am concerned; but as I cannot bear the thoughts of being forced (by the silly German project of putting the militia under the care of the army) into discussions in Parliament which must be highly dangerous, and into measures cruelly painful to me, I enclose you a letter to Mr. Pitt, written in consequence of information given me of a *private* meeting of Colonels held by order of the Duke of York; not *advertised*, not *public*, at which my letter was read without notice to me, with a legal opinion from the Attorney and Solicitor General of which I have not heard one iota; and at which Mr. Pitt's name and that of Mr. Dundas were used by Lord Euston and Lord Dundas for the intention of removing my *doubts* by their new Bill. I believe I told you that I had apprised Mr. Pitt of my intention to oppose any such Bill by every exertion, and to resign my command the moment it passed into law. I am confident *he* does not mean to drive me to this necessity, but (if I have been rightly informed of this meeting) I have great reason to fear that he has suffered himself to be overpersuaded to acquiesce in a project which, I will venture to foretell, neither he, nor any one else, can see the end of; for in my conscience I believe that from the moment in which it is distinctly stated to the militia army, through the newspaper debates, that it is intended to battalionise them under the command of the army officers, and to train, discipline, and command them by East India captains of sepoys, you risk the most dangerous consequences. I know that you dislike entering into army details; but the militia principles of fighting under their own officers, and of supplying by the local connexion between officer and man what may be wanting in professional knowledge, and of maintaining by that connexion a constitutional force are so obvious, that I am tempted to hope you will endeavour to save them from the Germanised military Cabinet who have devised this new system; and save me from the pain of calling the attention of the public to it by the most decided conduct.

"I trust I have not said a word to Pitt that can vex him. I really do not mean it; and in writing to you I do not wish to put you under any difficulties; for, if upon consideration you do not think proper to speak to him upon it, you need only seal my letter and send it to him; but I cannot help thinking that you may be of use in keeping things *quiet*."

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 26. Admiralty.—"I am so far from seeing any prospect of sending sooner than we talked of, that I confess I have still very great apprehension of our ability even to fulfil our present stipulation. The last accounts state the force at Brest to be in a greater state of forwardness than we had reckoned upon; and, if they can be trusted, would increase it to thirty sail of the line in two months' time; and all our schemes for raising men are so precarious, that I fear we must not count upon them sufficiently to ground any assurance on them till they shall be much nearer realised than they appear to be at present. The Toulon armament, however, must surely be much exaggerated, or all the accounts we have hitherto received from them must have been totally false. If the force there is really what the last accounts from Turin describe it to be, our detachment to the Mediterranean will be of no avail; for the whole of that plan proceeded on the supposition of their not having more than about ten sail of the line effective. I think we must not on any account give more expectations than have already been given."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 26.—"J'ai reçu par la dernière malle une longue dépêche allemande en chiffres, sur le contenu de laquelle il serait utile que j'eusse l'honneur de vous entretenir. Elle roule essentiellement sur nos affaires d'intérêt; mais j'y ai vû avec plaisir que mes cris, mes instances, et les mouvements continuels que je me suis donnés, ont enfin produit leur effet. Je suis autorisé à vous assurer officiellement et solennellement que nous ratifierons certainement et incessamment la convention. Jamais cela ne m'avait été prononcé aussi positivement. Les raisons par lesquelles on s'excuse de ne s'être pas acquitté plus tôt de ce devoir, et de ne pas s'en acquitter dans le moment même, sont en vérité assez acceptables, en condescendant un peu à notre état de faiblesse et de timidité.

"Je ne doute pas qu'on n'acquiesce actuellement sur le champ à la demande de M. Eden, et je ne pourrai m'empêcher de m'en féliciter un peu. *Labor omnia vincit improbus*. Voilà le cas ou jamais. J'ai, outre cela, d'autres choses à vous communiquer sur le mode de nos remboursements des arrérages de l'ancien emprunt. Je voudrais en causer avec vous avant de donner des instructions à ce sujet à Ransonet."

## The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, April 29. Stowe.—“I am sensible as I ought to be to the very affectionate attention which you have given to the letter I wrote to you ; and though there are many points of opinion on which I see that we do not meet, respecting the legality or policy of this *silly* plan, yet I am not less grateful to you for endeavouring to save me personally from the painful alternative which will be forced upon me, the moment that I am ordered to detach my grenadiers or light infantry for the purpose of incorporating or forming them into battalions. I have well considered the few plain words in the Militia Act which attach on this question, and whatever may be the legal abilities of the Attorney and Solicitor General, I am confident that plain common sense is in this discussion fully competent to decide. I do not dispute the military wisdom which inclines Lord Cornwallis and other officers to press for light troops, as little as I should the naval wisdom of Lord Bridport, who would equally press for seamen and marines ; but I contend that it would not be more illegal or impolitic to send us on board the *Royal George*, than to take our militia from the command of those officers who by law ought to *lead* them, for the purpose of forming them into army battalions under officers of a different service. You will observe that in this question I contend for the militia principle, and set aside entirely the question of the military advantages to be derived from light troops, because those advantages, whatever they are, may be obtained *legally* in other modes. But I certainly ought not to press upon you my opinions in contradiction to those which you have adopted ; and I only recapitulate them thus shortly to convince you that it is not from petulance or from insubordination that I must insist upon dissenting from the proposition of vesting in the Duke of York (from the exigency of the present moment) the power of dispensing with the first principles of the militia. It is a power which he ought not to wish for, and which, unless he is very ill advised by his military advisers, he will not contend for. You will say that the answer of the Attorney and Solicitor General bears him out in conceiving that these powers are legal. I admit that he is *justified* by these opinions *in law*, even though a civil or military tribunal may hereafter think differently from him ; but the impolicy of urging this in the teeth of the wishes (for so it is, though they may not resist) of the militia in general is so obvious, that I should think that even his *voix au chapitre*, if it was proper that it should be the only voice to be heard, should not be given so unwisely ; and I do not feel myself tied up from the discussion of such an order of the Commander in Chief, who, like every one else, must act according to the existing law, and not according to his conception of what ought to be the law ; which I apprehend to be the great fundamental mistake of every general officer I have known, who systematically will consider the militia to be *ipso facto* army, which the law says *it is not*.

“The result of all this (as far as I am concerned) must be very short. If no explanation is intended of the old law, I am

contented to remain quiet: professing in the most explicit manner my determination to *resist as illegal* and to *disobey* at every personal risk, any order (which I shall consider as illegal) for detaching my grenadier, or light company, or any other company, to be formed into or incorporated into any other battalion, or under any other commanding officer whatsoever. And this determination, which I have stated a month since to Sir William Howe, I must repeat to the Duke of York, unless I am relieved from the difficulty by understanding that a detachment of a light corps of 400 men, or more if the whole supplementary militia is called out, from my regiment, under the command of Major Fremantle, will be accepted in lieu of the companies proposed to be formed into grenadier and light battalions. I am willing to put this arrangement forward in any shape which the Duke would prefer, either by writing to His Royal Highness to propose it, or by receiving it at once in the shape of an order from him. But if I am driven to the necessity of *disobeying*, I shall feel it necessary for my own character to call the public attention in every possible mode to the question, as I am very sensible with you that the times are such as to make it very difficult for me to justify myself in public opinion. You will see that I do not mean to put Government under difficulties by this determination. If I had so meant, the steps were very obvious; nor do I mean that the Duke of York should be called upon to compromise his command. But, as I have made (two months ago) this offer, which I believe is unique, and certainly more advantageous to the service (if indeed every light soldier is so serious an object) it may tacitly be accepted, and I shall understand without further explanation that I may be silent. If not, I must feel that I am driven from the service in the cruellest manner, and I must make the best of my battle.

"In all that I have said, I trust that there is nothing that implies the slightest distrust of your anxious and affectionate attentions to me. I may feel that Pitt ought to have apprised me of the change in his opinions after all that had passed, but I really do not feel angry. I cannot, however, but be astonished at the indecency (and I will not use a harsher word) of making my letter, in the hands of Lord Dundas and Lord Euston, the matter of public discussion, at a meeting of colonels assembled by the Duke's order, to which I was not called, or of which I was not even apprised; nor of any opinion having been called for from the Attorney or Solicitor General; nor of the resolutions of this meeting, though called to give an opinion upon those documents. Upon this point you will feel as I do. I had intended to have gone to my regiment for five days prior to the embodying the yeomanry, which I conclude will be in about ten days; but, in this state of uncertainty, I have not spirits to meet my regiment, nor do I think it wise to converse with my officers upon points so near to their feelings and to my own. I shall therefore impatiently expect your intimation of the resolution that may be taken by the Duke of York; for I know you will feel very severely for me, if that resolution should be such as a military Cabinet of German tacticians is likely to recommend to him.

“Putting all this out of the question, the bill which Mr. Dundas has presented and amended is still very exceptionable on the chapter of East India officers. Even if the principle was good (and I disapprove it) yet surely precautions should be taken to limit this power to those only *who are natural born subjects of Great Britain*; for, in the last war, and indeed still, there were Dutch, Portuguese, French, Swiss, Germans and various Eastern nations amongst the officers ‘serving in the land forces’; whom you certainly would not wish to see serving in our militia, particularly in the higher ranks.

“I take it for granted that, as Mr. Dundas has not sent me the warrant for embodying the supplementary militia, though he wrote to me on Thursday to say that he should send it that night, this news from Vienna may have made you pause upon that measure, which may be less necessary if the continental war should break out again. At the same time, I am persuaded that the French will give way upon smaller points, such as Bernadotte’s tricolor flag, provided they can secure the ceded countries, and their Swiss objects. However, I can only reason in the dark upon these points; and, if they should push this matter to extremity, their resolution must be taken upon the conviction that they have more, or at least something, to gain at Vienna, of revolution or of civil commotion.

“You would not like this clause, and yet the purport of it must be added in your bill. ‘Provided always that nothing herein contained shall authorise any Dane, Swiss, Portuguese, Spaniard, Frenchman, Dutch, or German, or any Mohammedan, Gentoo, Hindoo, Topaz, or Malay, now serving, or who hath served in any of the land forces of the said . . . , from serving as a commissioned officer *in the militia*.’

“I have a list of this description, which was given me as a curiosity, a few years since, by an East India officer.”

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, April 30. Admiralty.—“I return you the enclosed, which does not appear to be worth much.

“I have received your note enclosing a letter from Sir W. Scott, and I think it would undoubtedly be very desirable if we could prevent the Neutrals from carrying stores and provisions to Brest, though I am aware of the delicacy of the question. The navy and victualling Boards could not engage to purchase the stores taken without incurring so enormous an expense as very much to distress us; and they have therefore of late been instructed to confine their purchases to such cargoes as could be of use, and were wanted. I suppose you will think it right to give notice before the measure of declaring the blockade of the Texel is taken; and I had not yet given any instruction for it, under a belief that it might be better timed when we sent our regiment to meet . . . , for which question I expect immediately to have an arrangement from Dundas.

“Lord St. Vincent will, of course, keep the instructions we sent him perfectly secret; and, as they were marked *most secret*, will

not think himself at liberty to disclose them to any but those who are to execute them. We must have an instruction from the Secretary of State on the points mentioned in your note of yesterday respecting the subjects of the several new republics of Italy : which should accompany the orders to be sent out to Lord St. Vincent in consequence of the directions which went to him last night, conformably to what was determined in Cabinet on Saturday."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, April. London.]—"Je n'ai encore rien reçu de Vienne moi-même, mais je viens d'apprendre du Chev[alier] Almeyda le contenu de la dépêche de M. de Lima d'une date postérieure à vos informations. Vous saurez que ma Cour, ayant tâché, avec assez de noblesse cependant, de calmer le courroux de Bernadotte, il a répondu qu'il enverrait les conditions sous lesquelles il voulait bien rester à Vienne.

1<sup>o</sup> "Le renvoi de Thugut.

2<sup>o</sup> "Punition exemplaire du chef de la police, et du chef militaire.

3<sup>o</sup> "Que l'on accorde à la mission Française un quartier de liberté et de franchise dans Vienne.

4<sup>o</sup> "Que l'Empereur fasse refaire à ses fraix le tableau des armes Françaises, et le pavillon, et qu'il le fasse hisser au haut de la maison de l'Ambassade, en le protégeant contre toute insulte. Notre réponse a été polie, mais un refus à tout. Bernadotte s'est emporté au-delà de toute expression. Il a juré qu'il viendrait venger cet affront sur la place même ; et, ayant demandé ses passeports, il est parti le 15, en sept voitures à six chevaux, escorté d'un régiment, sans lequel le peuple l'eût mis en pièces. Quelle bonne nouvelle ! je ne me possède pas de plaisir. Je suis comme le juste à l'heure de la mort, qui n'a rien à se reprocher. Je suis le seul ministre de mon maître qui ne s'est souillé de rien de vil, ni de malhonnête. C'est un grand plaisir que cela."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, April. London.]—"Je vous ai promis de vous faire part de vous à moi, et dans notre amitié, de toutes les notions certaines que j'aurais sur Rastadt. Voici où les choses en sont ; je suis sûr de ce que j'avance, et vous pouvez y compter irrévocablement.

"Le traité de Campo Formio, bien loin d'infirmes les préliminaires de Leoben, les sanctionnait ; du moins, certainement, la *bêtise* du Cabinet qui l'a conclu croyait de bonne foi avoir assuré l'intégrité de l'Empire, à l'exception du seul état de Liège, que l'ignorant *Gallo* ne savait pas être partie intégrante du corps Germanique, et qu'il a oublié. Aucun article secret ne stipulait de notre part la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin ; mais les deux plus importants étaient :—

- (1). "*Que, dès le commencement des négociations, nos troupes évacueraient Mayence, qui serait engarnisonnée par les troupes d'Empire, bien entendu que les Français n'y*



- entreraient pas non plus.* Ils ont manqué à cet article exprès, et M. de Cobentzl a cédé à leur désir dans la crainte de voir échapper d'autres objets qu'il avait en vue.
- (2). "Qu'à la paix de Rastadt le gouvernement Français s'intéresserait à nous faire échanger le comté de Falkenstein et ses dépendances avec l'Electeur de Bavière, contre la partie de Bavière que nous désirons. J'ai lieu de supposer que Buonaparte, allant plus loin que ses pouvoirs, ne le comportait à promis que la France ferait consentir le Roi de Prusse à cet arrangement. Notre but était donc, et nous étions dans la ferme conviction d'y parvenir, de faire la paix d'Empiré sur la base de l'intégrité, en accrochant le morceau de Bavière que nous voulions. Cette acquisition ne se combinait ni avec les intérêts de la Prusse, ni même avec ceux de la France.

"La première a poussé la *soi-disante République* à insister sur la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin, afin de pouvoir ou piller l'Empire si on y consentait, et accroître aussi sa puissance en raison décuplé de la nôtre; où bien d'affecter le langage de défenseur de l'Empire, en jettant sur nous l'odieux d'avoir voulu morceler la Bavière. Je puis vous assurer, avec connaissance de cause, que notre surprise en apprennant les prétentions des Français n'a point été jouée, mais les effets en sont les mêmes, car la crainte de voir échapper le *wished-for Bavaria* nous fait tergiverser, et prendre une contenance douteuse que la Prusse et la Russie, ou l'une ou l'autre séparément, déterminera en dernière analyse. Voilà où on en est. Si la majorité des *vota* de l'Empire opine pour la guerre, nous envoyons immédiatement un triple contingent. Toutes mes lettres confidentielles de Vienne m'assurent que Thugut travaille à rompre la paix. On voudrait que l'Empire en reconnut la nécessité. Je doute qu'on parvienne à ce but. Les esprits y sont trop abattus et corrompus. Si on y réussissait, ce succès nous assurerait au moins une co-opération plus active et plus sincère que la lâche défense que l'on a fait jusqu'à présent. Si l'Angleterre pouvait ranimer l'alliance du Nord, je verrais encore couleur de rose; mais le monde est perdu s'il ne change pas bien vite.

"*Ransonet* arrivera sous peu de jours. Il a pris un bâtiment pour lui, voilà la raison de son retard. Je sais qu'on avoue et reconnaît la dette, mais on veut un autre mode de paiement. Cela est mal fait certainement; mais cela n'est ni *roler* ni insulter."

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 1. Hamburg.—"I had the honour to receive by yesterday's post your Lordship's letter of the 25th ultimo, and I beg leave to assure your Lordship that I shall give my most earnest attention to the subject of your dispatch No. 14 of the same date, which I received at the same time, as well as to the whole business entrusted to my care. I am fully sensible of the peculiar importance of the matter to which your Lordship is pleased so particularly to direct my attention.

“The recommencement of the war upon this continent may perhaps be an improbable event, but I hope your Lordship will forgive my expressing my hope that in case it should take place, and that it should be thought advisable to have a person residing at the Austrian army on the part of Great Britain, your Lordship will allow me to act in that capacity, till my brother is sufficiently recovered to resume his station; or to attend the Prussian army should that power enter into the war. My not being a military man would not, I hope, be considered as an objection, many others having been employed in these situations who were not; and Colonel Graham, though now in that profession, having taken to it at a period of life much later than mine.

“I sincerely hope your Lordship will forgive my importuning you on this subject. I should be truly sorry to be guilty of any indiscretion after the kindness and countenance you have been pleased to show to my family; and I beg you will believe that I am much flattered by the choice you have made of me for the care of His Majesty’s affairs here at this moment.”

*Postscript.*—“In my dispatch, No. 2. of this date, I have, for the sake of greater secrecy, omitted mentioning the names which Carnot at present bears, as I wished this to be known only to your Lordship, or those to whom you may choose to communicate it. He has most commonly gone by the name of Jaccart de Ste Croix en Suisse. He had one passport under this name; another under the name of Bernard. He was about a month ago at Augsbourg; whether he is still there I cannot say, but if His Majesty’s Government were desirous of making any propositions to him, or rather of having any indirect application made to him, I might perhaps be able to find him, though he conceals himself with the greatest industry and ingenuity. His passport under the name Jaccart was made out for travelling in Germany, that under the name of Bernard, for Italy.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] May 2. Wimbledon.—“The enclosed paper has been put into my hands by Mr. Keene of the House of Commons. It is confusedly stated, but I think I perceive in it an idea that merits consideration. If there is any numerous body of emigrants who have abandoned all ideas of reunion with France at any period or under any circumstances, I cannot see a solid reason why they might not be formed into a corps, and now sent either to Canada or to St. Domingo as they please, and to aid in their defence in the present moment; but ultimately to be enabled to settle themselves there on allocations of land to be made to them. Indeed this allocation should begin to be appropriated to them immediately, and it would not be incompatible with their military service if necessary. If you think there is anything in this idea, it remains with you to arrange it in concert with the Duke of Portland and Mr. Pitt.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 2. Wimbledon.—“I wish you, in the course of this day, to send me a short memorandum of the result of your conference with the Dutchman who came over to you some time ago, particularly noting what he had undertaken to do. My instructions for the attempt on Ostend and Flushing are prepared; and I at present see nothing to prevent the armament sailing on the fourth or fifth. I wait your memorandum to give my *secret* orders for the detaching the 11th regiment.”

## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 4. Admiralty.—“In the intelligence lately brought from Genoa respecting the armament in the Mediterranean, there is this fact stated, ‘that 4000 casks of a very large size with 10 iron hoops each, and without bung-holes, have been ordered at Leghorn, where about 50 vessels have been taken up and ordered to proceed to the rendezvous at Ajaccio.’ It is not very easy to conjecture what the object of these casks is, but it has occurred to me to be not very improbable that they are intended to attach to ships of a deep draught of water in order to buoy them up, and enable them to pass over some shallows, and if so, this circumstance might possibly indicate the destination of the armament to be to the Levant, or more probably the Black Sea, which cannot (as I am informed) be entered through the Dardanelles by large ships without lightening them considerably. Would it not be worth while to throw out this circumstance to Woronzow, by way of a little stimulus at Petersburg, both for the Emperor to bestir himself, and to urge the Emperor of Germany to act in Italy? I have heard that Woronzow is already a good deal alarmed about this Mediterranean expedition, and this information may perhaps tend to impress him more strongly with the ideas on which his alarms are grounded.”

## M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 4. Brunswick.—“J’arrivai ici le 1 de ce mois au matin, avant la lettre par laquelle, un courrier auparavant, j’avois annoncé à M. de Stamford mon départ par le paquebot suivant, l’informant que je serois porteur des lettres de créances pour lui de Monseigneur le Prince d’Orange, le priant d’en informer Monseigneur le Duc, et de se préparer au départ.

“N’ayant point eu ces informations préparatoires, M. de Stamford étoit dans le découragement; parceque, malgré ses efforts auprès de Monseigneur le Duc depuis son retour de Berlin, il n’avoit pu l’engager à sortir de la route qu’il s’étoit prescrite, d’agir par M. de H[augwitz] ou par les aides-de-camp du Roi, à qui ce M[inistre] est venu à bout de persuader que lui seul entendoit les vrais intérêts de la monarchie Prussienne.

“Mon arrivée, avec les pièces dont j’étois porteur, ranimèrent un peu le courage de M. de Stamford, et nous nous préparâmes à lutter de nouveau contre les craintes et répugnances de s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime], ce qui eût lieu dès le même jour.

“ Je puis dire que la joie brilla dans les yeux de Monseigneur le Duc après la lecture du paquet adressé à M. de Stamford par Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, et de la note de votre Excellence. Il n'y a pas de doute que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ne désire ardemment, et par une conviction intime, cette réunion prompte qui seule peut sauver l'Europe ; et la mission de M. de Stamford lui paroissant un nouveau moyen de la presser, elle en témoigna le plus grand contentement ; mais elle se défendit d'abord d'y concourir immédiatement, comme persuadée qu'elle n'y pouvoit rien.

“ J'eus alors l'honneur de remettre à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] la lettre de votre Excellence ; elle témoigna être sensible à la confiance de s[a] M[ajesté] Britannique, mais ajouta-t-elle encore, on se trompe sur ma position ; je puis moins que personne par des combinaisons qu'on ne voit pas mais que je sens.

“ S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ayant été informée par M. de H[augwitz] de la lettre que j'avois pris la liberté d'écrire à la Reine de Prusse et de son effet, ainsi que de l'audience favorable que le Roi m'avoit fait l'honneur de m'accorder, me demanda si je ne comptois pas de retourner à Berlin ; et ayant appris que je me le proposais sous les auspices de s[a] m[ajesté] la Reine d'Angleterre, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] en témoigna aussi beaucoup de satisfaction ; comptant que les efforts réunis de M. de Stamford et de moi pourroient plus que son intervention, à laquelle elle résistoit encore.

“ Alors commença un très long entretien, dont M. de H[augwitz] fût l'unique objet. Je pris la liberté de rappeler à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le temps où j'acquiesçois à son opinion que ce ministre ne pouvoit vouloir la perte de la monarchie Prussienne, à la conservation de laquelle il étoit lui-même trop intéressé ; et où je pensois aussi avec elle qu'il travailloit sincèrement à lever les obstacles qui s'opposoient à l'union des puissances. Mais parcourant alors le champ des duplicités de M. de H[augwitz] à cet égard même, je racontai à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] l'épreuve où je l'avois mis par l'indemnité du Prince d'Orange ; comment sa fausseté y avoit paru à découvert, et le parti que cela m'avoit fait prendre d'aller tout de suite en Angleterre pour travailler à déjouer son artifice. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] fut très frappée de ce trait caractéristique des artifices de M. de H[augwitz], et nous eumes alors beaucoup plus de force, M. de Stamford et moi, pour la persuader qu'il n'y avoit qu'elle qui pût renverser ce complot évident de tenir la Prusse isolée ; complot auquel il est très possible que M. de Haugwitz se prête malgré lui, à cause de quelque lien secret qui ne lui permet pas d'agir autrement. Nous obtinmes alors de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qu'elle écriroit au Roi pour annoncer à s[a] M[ajesté] l'arrivée prochaine de M. de Stamford, et applaudir à la résolution de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange comme devant servir à acheminer une réunion prompte des puissances, qui seule pouvoit les sauver en commun.

“ Tel fut le point auquel nous arrivâmes enfin dès le premier jour ; et le départ de M. de Stamford fut fixé à aujourd'hui. Il a eu lieu en effet. M. de Stamford va d'abord à Berlin, pour remettre à my Lord Elgin la dépêche de votre Excellence et

s'aboucher avec lui, de même qu'avec les min[istres] de Vienne de Petersbourg et M. le ministre de Reck ; après quoi il partira pour Potzdam. La lettre de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] pour le Roi est partie ; elle est en Allemand, mais M. de Stamford en a eu communication par s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et il l'a trouvé dans les termes ci-dessus exprimés. Enfin M. de Stamford a eu encore la satisfaction, avant son départ, d'apprendre par une lettre de Monseigneur le Prince hér[editaire] d'Orange à Madame la Princesse hér[editaire] de Brunswic, qu'il a informé le Roi de la venue de M. de Stamford et de son but, et que cela a paru faire plaisir à sa majesté.

“Voilà ce que je ne devois pas tarder d'avoir l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence ; j'aurois quelques autres circonstances favorables au même but à y ajouter ; mais un travail pour s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dont j'ai dû m'occuper depuis le départ de M. de H[augwitz], m'oblige à renvoyer ces détails au courrier prochain.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 5. Downing Street.—“I understand there is a strong feeling among many of our friends that some direct notice must be taken of Fox's speech. An idea has been suggested which I think deserves consideration. It is to begin with one of the mesures we talked of, that of ordering him to attend. If he disavows, prosecuting the printer. If he avows, ordering him to be reprimanded, and then (which is the new part of the suggestion) if he offers a fresh insult at the next Whig Club, instead of gratifying him by an expulsion, to send him to the Tower for the remainder of the session ; which, though I hope it would prove a very short punishment, would be enough to assert the authority of the House. I believe there are precedents for this sort of proceeding, but that I will ascertain more correctly.

“The great question of policy is whether there is most danger from leaving him wholly unpunished for such an act of defiance, or from giving him any title to the character of a martyr ; and on this question I own my opinion remains not much decided. A good deal certainly depends on the general feeling. Pray let me know what you think in the course of to-morrow ; for (if any thing is to be done) I must have some meeting on Monday.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 6. London.—“J'ai reçu hier une dépêche du Baron de Thugut mais de très vieille date (du 14). Il me rend compte de l'événement, et présume que Bernadotte partira le lendemain ; ce que nous savons depuis avoir eu lieu. Il me fait entendre qu'il ne doute pas de la reprise des hostilités, et insiste vivement sur une réponse à ses ouvertures, qu'il doit avoir eu actuellement. J'espère que M. Eden aura eu les moyens de nous faire toucher de l'argent promptement, au cas, comme je n'en doute pas, que nous nous ayons ratifié la convention. Cet objet est de la plus haute importance pour porter d'abord des grands coups.

Il ne l'est pas moins de sauver Naples, en hâtant les secours maritimes à lui envoyer. Je voudrais expédier mon courrier mardi. Nous aurons sûrement quelque chose de positif d'ici là. Mandez-moi quand je pourrai vous voir; j'ai encore à vous entretenir sur nos affaires d'intérêt."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, May 7. Dropmore.—"Il me paraît très inutile d'envoyer votre courrier avant que nous ayons quelque chose à ajouter à ce que nous avons déjà dit.

"Quant à vos prétensions, il faudra, s'il vous plaît, que vous m'adressiez un mémoire pour en expliquer la nature, et pour demander que s[a] M[ajesté] veuille bien autoriser quelque personne à en traiter avec M. R[ansonet]. La réponse doit être (je pense) qu'on y consentira volontiers pourvu que M. R[ansonet] soit également autorisé à discuter celles que le gouvernement de s[a] M[ajesté] sera chargé de faire valoir, et que les deux affaires aillent de pair.

"Pour l'amour de Dieu faites qu'on ne renvoie pas à la termination de ces chicanes, le payement des intérêts échus et à échoir. Faites-leur entendre que c'est trop demander, même de notre zèle pour la cause commune, de proposer au Parlement des nouveaux secours pécuniaires, pendant que l'on manque encore à la probité et à la bonne foi sur ceux qui ont déjà été fournis. Songez, je vous supplie, combien ceci est important au succès de la grande affaire qui fait aujourd'hui l'objet de nos espérances, et travaillez y avec votre zèle et succès ordinaire."

*Copy.*

SIR MORTON EDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 7. Vienna.—"On the subject of the very interesting instructions with which I was charged by your Lordship, though I have written very fully in my despatches of this day, I will here add that the present blind and pernicious determination of this Government is the more extraordinary as they appear uncertain as to war or peace, and are making great military preparations. Whatever other reasons they may have for it, I believe that the obstinacy of M. de Thugut's character comes in for its share. On the receipt of your Lordship's instructions I, at first, wished to have an opportunity of discussing the business with him. With this view, in a note which I wrote to him transmitting the packet which Count Stahremberg had sent to his address, I left an opening for him to invite me to call upon him by saying, in allusion to the late arrangement in this ministry which I had occasion to mention, that I trusted that it would not prevent our meeting at times. But, as I received no answer to this note, and as his language to the Russian Ambassador was so unfavourable as to leave no hopes of success, I immediately gave up all idea of that nature. He lives so totally secluded from all society, and has done so since his return from the Low Countries, that there is no opportunity of meeting him except at his Office."

1798, May 7. Brunswick.—“ Quoique arrivé ici le 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois, je ne pus avoir l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence que le 4<sup>e</sup> et ce ne fut presque que pour lui annoncer le départ de M. de Stamford, doutant même que ma lettre fût à temps à Hanovre ; peut-être donc que votre Excellence ne la recevra qu'avec celle —ci, où je vais ajouter ce que j'aurois désiré pouvoir lui communiquer dès ce jour-là.

“ Il ne falloit pas moins que tout ce qui est venu se rassembler ici pour vaincre la résolution où je trouvai Monseigneur le Duc de ne se plus mettre en avant ; persuadé que tous les efforts étoient inutiles. Les choses avoient beaucoup reculé à Berlin, au lieu d'y avancer ; on n'y parloit plus que de s'isoler comme le seul moyen de se garantir ; et M. de H[augwitz] toujours feignant d'instruire s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], toujours aussi témoignant son chagrin de ce qu'on ne pouvoit s'entendre avec Vienne, se resserroit sur le plan d'assurer la neutralité du nord de l'Allemagne. Enfin, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] savoit d'ailleurs qu'on pousoit les choses, sous main, jusqu'à vouloir entreprendre de persuader le Roi qu'il ne falloit pas s'assurer à demi d'être en paix avec la France, mais traiter avec elle ; et que personne n'osoit lutter contre ce parti. Tout cet ensemble avoit tellement fortifié la crainte innée de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] de se mettre en avant dans la politique que M. de Stamford, incertain jusqu'au moment de mon arrivée du succès de mon voyage en Angleterre, n'espéroit plus rien.

“ J'ai eu l'honneur de rendre compte à votre Excellence de l'effet que produisit sur s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le nouveau secours que j'apportois, comme imprévu par ceux qui mènent ainsi les affaires auprès du Roi, et capable de mettre une entrave à leur marche ; elle nous pressa donc, M. de Stamford et moi, de partir pour Potzdam ; mais toujours croyant qu'il valloit mieux qu'elle ne se mêlât de rien, desorte que ce fut beaucoup que nous obtînions ce premier jour la lettre au Roi dont j'ai eu l'honneur de faire mention à votre Excellence.

“ S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'ayant fait l'honneur de m'inviter à dîner le lendemain, j'eus ensuite avec elle une conversation particulière, dans laquelle je m'attachai particulièrement à simplifier ce que les circonstances exigeoient d'elle. La faction, connoissant sa timidité, l'accuse toujours de quelque vue, prévoyant que l'inaction sera son moyen de faire cesser les bruits. Pour empêcher, par exemple, que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] n'eût des relations avec le Comte Panin, et ne fût instruite ainsi des dispositions de sa Cour, ou lui a fait insinuer qu'on la regardoit comme ayant épousé les intérêts de la Russie. On use du même artifice à l'égard de l'Angleterre, pour laquelle on avoit raison de croire que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] étoit portée d'agir, parcequ'elle ne cachoit pas son mécontentement du danger où l'on sembloit vouloir la laisser. Je m'attachai donc à la rassurer à cet égard, par ce qui m'avoit rassuré moi-même, et à lui faire comprendre qu'elle pouvoit se dispenser absolument d'en parler au Roi de Prusse, auprès de qui l'objet unique devoit

être son propre danger ; parceque si s[a] m[ajesté] en étoit enfin profondément pénétrée, elle désireroit elle-même l'union la plus étroite avec l'Angleterre. J'ajoutai que c'étoit ainsi que M. de Stamford et moi nous étions conduits vis-à-vis de s[a] M[ajesté], qui alors s'étoit entièrement prêtée à nos représentations ; et que nous suivrions le même plan, si nous avions l'honneur de l'approcher encore ; mais que personne que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ne pouvoit imprimer ces vérités assez profondément dans l'esprit de s[a] M[ajesté] pour que des sophismes perfides ne pussent plus les y effacer. Cette conversation soulagea doublement s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] ; pour l'Angleterre d'abord, et en y voyant que ce que les circonstances exigeoient d'elle ne pouvoit être susceptible d'aucune mauvaise interprétation.

“ J'avois trouvé ici des lettres de mon frère, renfermant entr'autres des détails sur l'expédition des François vers le Levant ; et en les communiquant alors à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] j'y ajoutai des commentaires qui la frappèrent beaucoup ; de sorte qu'elle désira d'avoir copie de ces informations et mes remarques à leur sujet, dont elle se proposoit de faire usage ; mais craignant que ce ne fût pour M. de H[augwitz] je la priai de me donner un peu de temps pour cela ; me proposant de différer jusqu'à ce que nous fussions parvenus, M. de Stamford et moi, à la détacher entièrement de ce Ministre, en quoi nous fumes très heureusement secondés le lendemain.

“ M. de Stamford seroit parti un jour plus tôt, si s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] n'avoit désiré qu'il attendit l'arrivée du courrier de Berlin, et ce fut ce courrier qui nous fit avancer vers notre but ; d'abord, parcequ'il apporta à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] l'invitation du Roi de venir à Potzdam pour les revues ; circonstance heureuse, sur laquelle porta principalement le nouvel entretien dont je viens de parler.

“ Le même courrier avoit apporté à M. de Stamford une lettre du Comte Panin, qui mettoit M. de H[augwitz] entièrement à découvert ; c'étoit l'information d'une démarche officielle de ce Ministre, faite depuis environ trois semaines (dont votre Excellence est sans doute informée) pour proposer de la part de sa Cour une alliance défensive ; circonstance que M. de Haugwitz, tout en entretenant s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] de ses efforts pour produire la réunion, lui avoit entièrement cachée ; ce qui porta au comble son indignation contre ce Ministre.

“ Enfin le même soir, veille du départ de M. de Stamford, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] reçut des dépêches de Rastadt, trop tard pour une nouvelle conférence ; mais s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] envoya le lendemain matin un de ses palefreniers sur la route de M. de Stamford avec une dépêche qui l'atteignit à la première station ; et elle me fit ensuite l'honneur de m'envoyer copie des informations qu'elle lui avoit communiquées, où la marche déloyale de M. de H[augwitz] se peint encore d'une manière très frappante.

“ J'avois entrepris ce que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] avoit désiré de moi, lorsque cette nouvelle piece vint m'aider à y donner plus de force ; et hier encore, avant que d'avoir fermé mon



paquet, je reçus une nouvelle lettre de mon frère, contenant les réflexions les plus fortes sur le danger éminent de toutes les puissances qui existent, fondées sur des traits caractéristiques des plans suivis sans relâche par la faction. Je joignis donc encore cette lettre à mon paquet, avec un p[ost]s[criptum] à celle qui étoit prête pour s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime].

“J’ai l’honneur d’envoyer à votre Excellence les copies suivantes; No. 1, de la lettre de M. le Comte Panin à M. de Stamford; 2, des informations que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a reçues de Rastadt; 3, des particularités sur l'expédition Française vers le Levant; 4, des remarques que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'avoit demandé de mettre par écrit sur cet objet; 5, de la lettre dont j'ai pris la liberté d'accompagner ces remarques.

“Votre Excellence verra sous ce dernier nombre le résumé du plan que nous avons suivi, M. de Stamford et moi, auprès de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], dont les intentions ne sont pas équivoques, non plus que la résolution de faire tout ce qu'elle se persuadera d'être en son pouvoir. J'aurai l'honneur, avant mon départ prochain pour Berlin et Potzdam, de rendre compte à votre Excellence, par une lettre que j'enverrai encore à Hanovre, de l'entretien que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] veut bien avoir encore avec moi, après l'arrivée de la prochaine poste de Berlin.”  
*Five enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1.*

COUNT PANIN to M. DE STAMFORD.

1798, May 1. Berlin.—“Par la communication dont vous m'avez honoré, et par d'autres avis plus récents, je vois qu'on a caché au Duc les propositions importantes que j'ai faites, il y a environ trois semaines, par ordre de ma Cour. Il s'agissoit d'une alliance défensive entre les deux cours Impériales, celles de Londres, de Berlin et de Copenhague, à l'effet de garantir la sûreté et l'intégrité de tous les gouvernemens. On m'a fait une réponse évasive et dilatoire. Je vous prie d'en instruire s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Elle reconnoitra dans cette circonstance une nouvelle preuve de la mauvaise foi de M. de H[augwitz], et je me flatte qu'elle se déterminera à appuyer de tout son crédit les vues salutaires de ma Cour. Je suis obligé de remettre tous les détails au moment où j'aurai le bonheur de vous revoir; on m'assure que cela est prochain, et je m'en réjouis par bien des motifs.” *Copy.*

*Enclosure 2.*

THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK to M. DE LUC.

“Voici ce que j'ai écrit ce matin à M. de Stampford.

1. Bernadotte étoit encore, le 28, à Rastad; il avoit reçu ordre du Directoire de s'y arrêter, et paroissoit mécontent de la manière dont on avoit pris son affaire à Paris.

2. Treillhard a demandé au chancelier Albini si l'Empire pouvoit continuer de traiter sans l'Empereur. La réponse ayant été négative, il a brusquement rompu la conversation.

3. Dans une conférence entre les ministres de France, celui de Mayence, de Bavière, et de Saxe, Treillhard a averti les autres ministres que la France demanderoit encore à l'Empire, le fort de Kehl, celui de Cassel, et Ehrenbreitstein *rasé*.

4. M. le Comte de Goertz a dit à Rastad qu'il espéroit d'obtenir la neutralité pour l'Empire, quand même la guerre avec l'Empereur devroit se rallumer.

5. Un nommé Rosenssiel, secrétaire de Treillhard, a dit à mon correspondant qu'il considéroit cette neutralité comme impossible, mais qu'il croyoit bien que la Prusse obtiendrait le maintien de celle du Nord." *Copy*.

### Enclosure 3.

M. DE DOLOMIEU, *Intendant des Mines in France*, to —.

1798, March 28. *Extract*.—"Je pars dans quatre jours pour une grande expédition *scientifique*. Je suis associé à Bertholet et beaucoup d'autres chimistes, physiciens, mathématiciens, antiquaires, naturalistes et artistes. Aucun de nous ne sait encore sa destination, et les conjectures du public, et de chacun de nous, sont tellement dissemblables, que d'après les uns ce seroit l'Amérique que nous irions visiter, l'Afrique selon les seconds, l'Asie selon les troisièmes. Mais ce qui paroît certain, c'est que ce voyage sera long, tant sous les rapports de l'espace que nous parcourrons, que sous celui du temps que nous y employerons; on parle de trois ans d'absence. . . . Vous et mes autres amis de Genève vous aurez de mes nouvelles, ou par moi directement, ou par Brochant ingénieur des mines, qui reste à portée d'entendre souvent parler de la caravanne scientifique, sur laquelle je ne puis vous donner pour le moment aucun autre détail.

"Je prends part, mon cher ami, à toutes vos peines; et si cela pouvoit vous consoler, je vous demanderois, qui n'a pas les siennes? Si l'on étoit parfaitement heureux, parfaitement tranquilles sur le présent et l'avenir, peut-être ne partirot-on pas aussi volontiers que je le fais pour un voyage de très longue durée, dont on ignore le but.

"Il y a des personnes qui croient qu'on profite de cette *caravanne* pour écarter quelques individus, et que M. de Dolomieu est du nombre." *Copy*.

### Enclosure 4.

THE SAME to THE SAME.

1798, April 11. *Extract*.—"On ne sait pas quel est le but de ce grand voyage; il n'y a parmi les savans que Bertholet qui soit dans le secret. Ce qu'il y a de sûr, c'est qu'ils vont

s'embarquer à Toulon ou à Gènes, et qu'ils sont probablement à la suite de l'expédition militaire qui s'y prépare. Il est certain aussi que leurs approvisionnemens immenses en *imprimerie*, livres, instrumens, machines de chimie et physique dénotent une très longue absence. Parmi les livres on distingue surtout les voyages au Levant, en Egypte, en Perse, aux Indes, en Turquie, dans la Mer Noire, la Mer Caspienne, le voyage d'Anacharsis en Grèce. On emmène douze ingénieurs géographes, des ingénieurs militaires, mathématiciens, astronomes, chimistes, physiciens, dessinateurs et naturalistes de tout genre; deux professeurs de langues Arabe, Persanne, Turque, et tout cela est enrolé et part sans savoir où on le mène.

"On s'épuise en conjectures. Les uns disent qu'on va conquérir l'Egypte et couper l'Isthme de Suez, pour miner par là le commerce des Anglois aux Indes; d'autres, qu'en outre, comme cette opération seroit longue, on embarque sur la flotte une autre flotte en pièces, que l'on transportera jusqu'à Suez, pour avoir en quinze jours de temps une flotte sur la Mer Rouge; d'autres enfin, qu'on ira attaquer par terre les établissemens Anglois de l'Inde, en faisant traverser le désert, la Perse, et le Mogol à 30 mille hommes. On dit enfin que Buonaparte commandera peut-être cette expedition. Ce qui est sûr c'est qu'il est le principal moteur de l'entreprise, et qu'il y prend un vif intérêt." *Copy.*

*Enclosure 5.*

M. DE LUC to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

1798, May 8. Brunswick.—"En venant mettre aux pieds de votre altesse sérénissime les copies qu'elle m'a témoigné désirer, j'ose la prier de me pardonner si sa bonté m'accordant accès auprès d'elle que je considère comme un point central auquel se réunissent les regards de tous ceux qui désirent le salut de l'Europe, je prends la liberté de lui présenter, dans la feuille ci-jointe, quelques remarques sur ces informations.

"Votre altesse sérénissime l'a vu; la Russie, par son ministre écrivant à M. de Stamford, est venu se joindre à l'Angleterre et à l'Autriche dans la persuasion qu'elle pouvoit seule franchir la barrière qu'on oppose à ce que sa Majesté Prussienne se persuade à temps qu'il ne peut y avoir de salut pour elle et son royaume que dans le salut commun des Puissances encore existantes, auquel chacune doit contribuer de tout son pouvoir. Je n'oserois donc y ajouter une voix aussi foible que la mienne, si je ne pouvois parler d'après mon expérience.

"Je plains profondément ce jeune monarque. C'est le sentiment que j'éprouvai en sa présence, lorsque je l'entendis exprimer de la manière la plus touchante sa résolution de contribuer de tout son pouvoir à sauver l'Allemagne et l'Europe; et que tandis que je voyois aussi sa Majesté écouter avec la plus grande attention ce que j'osois lui représenter quant aux moyens d'y parvenir, je considérois au dedans de moi qu'elle passeroit bientôt sous

l'influence d'un homme qui renouvelleroit toutes ses illusions. Il falloit un sentiment bien vif de cette malheureuse situation de sa Majesté pour m'enhardir à lui représenter qu'elle ne devoit pas laisser dans les mains d'un seul homme son sort, celui de ses peuples et de toute l'Europe ; mais si elle y reconnut ma probité, elle ne pouvoit pas s'assurer de mon jugement ; aussi n'en est-il résulté aucun effet. Ce ne sera donc rien que de présenter la vérité à ce monarque infortuné par un seul homme, si elle ne l'est par quelqu'un qui ait assez de poids pour résister à l'influence de cet homme ; et votre Altesse sérénissime est la seule personne à qui sa Majesté ne puisse refuser à tous égards la plus entière confiance.

“ La communication que v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] daigna me faire hier au soir prouve toujours plus fortement que, si le Roi ne prend pas bientôt d'autres conseils, la monarchie Prussienne est perdue avec toute l'Europe. Jamais le Directoire n'auroit osé braver comme il le fait et l'Empire et l'Empereur s'il n'étoit sûr de la Prusse et de tenir la Russie éloignée par M. de H[augwitz]. Ce concert, dis-je, est évident par tout l'ensemble des avis de Rastadt ; mais on frémit particulièrement d'y voir le *ministre de Prusse* annoncer comme un heureux effet de la position de sa Cour, qu'elle pourroit *obtenir la neutralité de l'Empire*, malgré un nouvelle *querre avec l'Empereur* ; c'est-à-dire qu'elle auroit le pouvoir de rendre l'Empire spectateur tranquille de l'attaque, et peut-être du renversement de la plus forte de ses colonnes !

“ Tous les doutes aujourd'hui sont levés sur le concours sincère de Vienne et de Petersbourg à une prompte union défensive contre l'ennemi commun ; le Roi de Prusse encore à toutes les dispositions et les intentions qui peuvent concourir à ce grand but ; qu'est-ce donc qui, au moment le plus périlleux, arrête cette réunion ?—Un seul homme !

“ Votre altesse sérénissime sait qu'avant que ces dispositions de Vienne et de Petersbourg fussent connues, j'étois disposé à penser avec elle que M. de H[augwitz] ne pouvoit que désirer la conservation de la monarchie Prussienne, à laquelle son propre sort est si lié ; et qu'ainsi on pouvoit compter sur les efforts qu'il disoit faire pour produire la réunion des Puissances encore existantes. Mais depuis qu'on a découvert de tant de manière que c'est lui-même qui élude ce rapprochement, ces preuves de sa mauvaise foi, soit volontaire soit forcée, ne laissent voir que du danger à travailler encore à le ramener ; car le jugement le plus favorable qu'on puisse porter à son égard, c'est qu'il a des chaines secrettes qui le rendent, malgré lui, un instrument dans les mains de la faction.

“ Les détails, par exemple, sur la nouvelle expédition Française, dont j'ai l'honneur d'envoyer copie à v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime], donnent lieu aux conjectures les plus sinistres pour l'Europe ; mais en faire usage auprès de M. de H[augwitz] seroit infailliblement la même chose que d'en parler en présence de la faction ; ce qui exposerait les personnes dont ces détails procèdent, et feroit redoubler les efforts pour prévenir la

résolution que ce nouveau péril doit accélérer. J'espère de la bonté avec laquelle v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a daigné me permettre de lui communiquer mes idées, qu'elle me pardonnera cette remarque, et qu'elle recevra avec indulgence les réflexions que j'ai jettés sur le papier, en considérant les diverses faces sous les quelles se présente ce nouveau mouvement excentrique de la faction, à qui jusqu'ici, faute de prévoyance, on a laissé réaliser les projets les plus incroyables, comme les plus funestes."

May 6.—"N'ayant pu, par quelques incidens, finir hier ce paquet que je me proposois d'avoir l'honneur d'envoyer à v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] je me trouve aujourd'hui dans le cas de pouvoir y joindre la communication d'une lettre de mon frère qui fixe tous les objets relativement à la nouvelle victime de la faction, la pauvre ville de ma naissance, de manière à renforcer tous les traits d'après lesquels je l'ai peinte dans les remarques ci-incluses ; sa tentative trompée de faire émettre un voeu de réunion ; sa fourberie effrontée dans l'anonce publique du l'avoir obtenu ; la nécessité de céder, malgré la plus grande aversion, chez tous les peuples non-protégés dont ses troupes s'approchent ; l'insulte à tous les entendemens dans sa nouvelle tactique de supposer des *insultes à son étendard*, pour prétexte d'hostilités ; et l'insulte non moins grande au sens commun, de prétendre trouver partout des projets de *l'Angleterre* !

"Un seul homme pourroit-il empêcher que le Roi de Prusse ne vît ces forfaits, toujours nécessaires à la cabale vis-à-vis de laquelle on veut le tenir isolé, sans penser (ou en pensant) que c'est le réserver pour la dernière chute, avec le regret dévorant de les avoir aidées toutes par sa sécurité ! Non, je l'espère ; votre altesse sérénissime préviendra sûrement un si grand malheur."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to EARL CAMDEN [Lord Lieutenant of Ireland].

1798, May 9. Cleveland Row.—"I am ashamed to have so long deferred answering your letter ; but I had, according to your desire, put it into the Duke of Portland's hands, and I had some idea that he intended writing to you upon the subject, on which, I think, his opinions seem entirely to concur with those which I have been able to form upon it.

"I have myself no difficulty in saying that, in the case of the fugitives, Parliament ought most certainly to pass Acts of Attainder on default of their surrendering themselves to justice. It would be best (but I don't think at all *necessary*) that these bills should be grounded on previous indictments, found in the usual course of law. If that cannot be done, there must then, I conceive, be some examination of witnesses either at the bar of the House of Commons, or in a secret committee ; or, at least, some papers produced to such a committee, such as may personally implicate the individuals in the charge of treason.

"You will see in the last volume of Hatsell's work, page 300, several precedents, particularly the first, which support this proceeding ; and as the first immediately followed the Revolution

and the rest are all subsequent to it, no objection can be taken against them.

“The case of the bill which passed the House of Commons in 1689, and was agreed to by the Lords with amendments, but was then dropped; that of the Earl of Mar and several others in 1715; and that in 1746 (House of Commons’ Journal, April 29, 1746) are all instances where such a bill was proceeded on *vivâ voce* evidence, at the Bar of the House of Commons. In Sir J. Fenwick’s case, papers only were produced, but I apprehend an indictment had been before found against him. In the case of the Pretender, the attainder seems to be grounded on public notoriety alone; and in the other cases mentioned by Hatsell, there had been a previous impeachment carried up to the Bar of the House of Lords. The cases in the preceding century are of less authority, but in most, if not all of them, there seems to have been some *vivâ voce* evidence heard at the Bar. I have not the Commons’ Journals of the Irish Parliament, and therefore have not looked into the proceedings on originating the Bills of Attainder which, I recollect, passed there in 1689, or thereabouts. But, upon the whole, I have no doubt that the existence of treasonable conspiracy, and charging individuals by name as persons who appear to have been engaged in that conspiracy, and to have fled the country, would be sufficient ground for a Bill of Attainder on default of surrender; nor do I think that this proceeding would be nugatory; because:—1, you would thereby confiscate their property and attain their blood in Ireland, whereas no process of outlawry would stand against the allegation even of the most trivial omission or error, supposing the criminals to return and offer themselves to trial after the evidence is either dead or bought off. And, 2, you might easily, and without the possibility of objection, add to such a bill a clause of the same nature with that in Atterbury’s bill, by which all correspondence and intercourse between him and the King’s subjects was absolutely prohibited.

“If this view of the subject is right, it remains to consider what is fit to be done in the cases of the traitors who have been arrested and are now in confinement, but against whom it may not be possible to bring such evidence to convict them in the ordinary course of law.

“With respect to them the decision is less pressing, because the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act allows you to detain them in custody; and no man can doubt that their cases are precisely those which the Suspension Act was intended to provide for. In the interval it is possible that fresh evidence may be procured; that the measures taken for suppressing the rebellion may give more confidence to the witnesses whom you already have; and by removing from their minds the terror under which they now labour, may induce them to consent to be brought forward; or that the course of affairs may be such as to produce a more evident and unquestionable necessity for a Parliamentary proceeding.

"If, however, that necessity is conceived to exist already, and there are certainly grounds for that opinion, I conceive the whole question will then turn on a comparison of expediency, which it is hardly possible to decide but upon the spot.

"That a Bill of Pains and Penalties not going to life or limb, in cases where legal evidence is wanting, and that by the act of the criminal, or by the nature of the conspiracy, but where the guilt is manifest, and is of a nature which, if legally proved, would affect his life, that such bills are consonant to the principle and practice of our Constitution is of itself undeniable; but it is besides established beyond dispute by the precedent in Atterbury's case, which, I think, appears to have been extremely well considered, and conducted with great judgment and temper.

"But neither the principle nor the advantage of such a proceeding apply, except in the instance of one or two, or possibly three or four leading conspirators, by whose punishment and removal from the means of doing mischief the course of the conspiracy will be either totally stopped, or at least very greatly impeded. Because no precedent nor analogy would bear you out in applying this mode of proceeding to numerous bodies of men; and thus appearing to supersede the ordinary law and course of justice, not in individual cases, but in the general punishment of all treasons.

"Now I am hardly informed of the state of Ireland to judge whether there are any such individuals amongst the traitors; nor if there are, whether they are among the prisoners. Perhaps Lord E. Fitzgerald and O'Connor may be of this description; but the former would be reached by the proceeding against fugitives; and, as the latter is to be tried, it would be hardly possible to attain him after acquitted[al], if that should be the issue.

"Whether there are one or two others whose example would be sufficiently marked to operate to any great degree either to deter others, or to main the conspiracy, you alone can judge; but, unless that is the case, I should certainly not advise the proceeding by bill against them; at least, not till the time arrives when you must decide between that course and the letting them be discharged from confinement, without trial or punishment of any kind.

"I have written you a very long letter, and on a subject on which I must of course be understood to be giving you only my own opinions. But of those I owe you on every account the most unreserved communication, and I have no other wish than that they may be of some use to you. But as such a correspondence is of course extra-official, you will have the goodness not to let it go beyond yourself; unless you should have any wish to show it to the Chancellor, or to Lord Castlereagh, to neither of whom I can have any desire to make the least exception.

"We are still without decisive accounts from Vienna, nor shall we receive them till it is known there how the Directory is disposed to consider the business. If the latter should, on this occasion, moderate their language and pretensions, and there

seem to be some symptoms of their doing so, I should not think that the Court of Vienna, though sensible of their danger, are stout enough to meet it by the only means that can tend to their security.

“The King has this day erased Fox’s name from the Council books, in consequence of his speech at the Whig Club.” *Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 9. Brunswick.—“J’eus l’honneur d’écrire à votre Excellence le 7<sup>e</sup>, et peu après le départ de ma lettre j’eus avec Monseigneur le Duc l’entretien dont j’y avois fait mention comme l’attendant. Son objet principal fut une nouvelle lettre de M. de H[augwitz] à s[on] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dans laquelle, se laissant encore sur la proposition de la Russie, il lui donnoit à peu près les mêmes informations qu’elle avoit reçues elle-même de Rastadt, sur les nouvelles prétentions des François ; et continuoit à lamenter sur les lenteurs qu’apportoit Vienne aux arrangemens, en voulant y faire intervenir la Russie comme médiatrice ; tandis, ajoutoit-il, qu’il seroit si important de s’entendre, pour obtenir qu’ils relâchassent quelque chose de ces prétentions. Son a[ltesse] s[érénissime] me fit l’honneur de me communiquer en même temps une lettre particulière concernant principalement ce ministre, d’après une conversation prétendue confidentielle qu’il avoit eue avec une personne dont l’écrivain la tenoit, et dans laquelle il se représentoit comme fort à plaindre, navigant entre les plus terribles écueils.

“Je venois en ce moment de recevoir une lettre de M. le Baron de Steinberg, où j’avois trouvé une preuve que c’étoit-là le langage que M. de H[augwitz] tenoit aux ministres des Princes d’Allemagne, pour les persuader que c’est l’Empereur ou son ministre qui les mettent en peril ; car M. de Steinberg me disoit ceci, sans doute d’après les informations du Ministre d’Hanovre à Berlin. ‘Je regrette que M. de Thugut à Vienne ne croye oser placer aucune confiance dans le Cabinet de Berlin, et ne veuille traiter avec cette Cour que par l’entremise de la Cour de Petersbourg ; c’est un moyen un peu long et lent pour opérer le bien dans un moment urgent, et si essentiel à nous tous.’ Je venois encore de recevoir une lettre de M. le Comte de Wallmoden, dans laquelle il m’expliquoit un autre artifice de ce ministre, sur un objet connu sans doute de votre Excellence, dans lequel il représente comme un grand désintéressement de s[a] M[a]j[esté] P[russienne] le peu de soin qu’il voudroit lui faire prendre dans les arrangemens pour garantir ses possessions en Westphalie ; comme si toute l’Allemagne n’y étoit pas intéressée.

“J’ajoutai donc tous ces moyens aux représentations que j’avois pris la liberté de faire par écrit à s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le jour précédant, pour lui faire sentir toujours plus fortement le besoin de son intervention ; et elle termina cet entretien à peu-près dans ces termes ; ‘croyez que je m’occupe beaucoup de cet état des choses ; je songe aux moyens d’agir, et je souhaite de vous revoir avant votre départ pour Berlin.



Voulez-vous me recevoir encore demain au soir, ou après demain matin, si vous ne partez pas de bonne heure ?' Je laissai le choix à s'a[ltesse] s[érémissime].

"Hier, vers les 5 heures, Monseigneur le Duc m'ayant fait encore demander si je voulois renvoyer notre entretien à ce matin, je profitai de l'occasion de répondre, en acquiescant, pour lui demander son indulgence sur la liberté que je prenois de mettre sous ses yeux quelques pensées qu'avoit excitées chez moi l'ensemble de ce qu'on voyoit clairement de la conduite de M. de H[augwitz]. Je ne saurois donner à votre Excellence une idée plus précise de l'état où les choses restent ici qu'en lui copiant le petit écrit que j'envoyai alors à s'a[ltesse] s[érémissime] et sa réponse."

### *Copie.*

"On ne peut s'imaginer d'être dans la vie réelle ; on croit être dans un songe quand on voit un ministre de Prusse s'occuper à considérer lequel seroit le parti le moins désavantageux, ou de céder aux François le fort de Kehl (qui appartient à l'Empereur) ou de raser Ehrenbreitstein (qui appartient à l'Electeur de Trêve). Est-il dont arrivé au point de disposer de l'Empire à son gré ?

"Mais ce qui excite surtout le courroux comme l'indignation c'est de voir le Ministre d'un des principaux souverains de l'Empire ne s'arrêter qu'au parti de lâcheté et de démenche, de tâcher d'obtenir quelque adoucissement à la demande d'une destruction totale de la sûreté des confins de l'Allemagne ; demande faite par l'ennemi le plus perfide et le plus fougueux ; tandis que ce Ministre sait, mais feint d'ignorer, que toutes les autres Puissances existantes, et encore libres, se réunissent pour presser la Prusse de prendre enfin avec elles des mesures vigoureuses, afin d'arrêter à temps les desseins de cet ennemi. Veut-il donc à toute force perdre son maître, irriter contre lui l'Autriche, la Russie, le Danemarck, le rendre l'objet de la haine et du mépris de tous les honnêtes gens de l'Europe, et le livrer enfin à la faction !

"Il connoit, dit-il, ses ennemis et il sait de quoi on l'accuse ; sa conscience, ose-t-il assurer, et le Roi, le justifient. Il voit mieux, prétend-il, les dangers dont on est menacé de la part des François que ceux qui blament sa conduite. Mais sait-il donc quelque chose de plus terrible de leur part que le dessein formé par eux, et très connu, de détruire toute association civile ; en y employant sans relâche, par trahison or par force, tout le pouvoir qu'on leur a laissé acquérir ? S'il connoit des desseins plus sinistres encore, il est d'autant plus coupable envers son maître de vouloir l'isoler de tout conseil, et de tout appui. Mais rien ne peut être plus terrible que ce qu'on sait déjà ; et l'on ne peut que juger ou qu'il est, au contraire, aveugle sur le danger réel, ou qu'il n'est qu'un instrument passif dans les mains invisibles, ou, ce qui semble improbable, mais dont on n'a que trop d'exemples, qu'il est lui-même dans le complot. Il n'y a point d'autre supposition possible ; et dans

chacune il est de la plus grande importance pour le Roi (comme pour l'Europe entière) de le tirer de telles mains.'

“ J'avoue que cet écrit étoit le produit d'une grande indignation. Mais peut-on, et doit-on même la retenir dans un moment si urgent ! Voici la réponse que me fit bientôt s'a[ltesse] sérénissime.

“ Si cela ne contrarie pas vos projets j'aurai l'honneur de passer chez vous demain à onze heures. Voyez les choses quand vous serez à Berlin ; voyez la marche des négociations qui vont s'y entamer, et ne prenez aucun parti décisif sur le personnel du Ministre que lorsque vous le verrez agir dans la négociation. Sa responsabilité n'est pas petite, le mal est là et le remède encore incertain ; peut-il revirer de bord, l'ennemi au sein de l'Empire, sans être tout-à-fait certain des autres puissances, et des moyens de la Prusse même ? C'est une situation qui demanderoit toute l'expérience et le caractère d'un Prince de Kaunitz. Je vous rendrai compte demain de mes avis de Rastadt, qui m'inquiètent beaucoup pour le sud de l'Allemagne.'

“ J'attends bientôt ce nouvel entretien. Je conviendrais avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] que pour décider finalement ce qu'on doit penser de M. de H[augwitz] il faut savoir à quel degré il peut être sûr du concours des autres puissances. Mais je ne le disculperai pas de faire semblant de s'ouvrir à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et de lui cacher cependant ce qu'il sait à cet égard ; ni de tâcher d'éviter, plutôt que de rechercher au contraire, les explications de la part des autres puissances sur ce qu'on peut attendre d'efforts de leur part contre cet ennemi *déjà au sein de l'Empire* ; et si s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] paroit encore désirer que je voie M. de H[augwitz], je la préviendrai que je ne le verrai que comme Genève pénétré, par l'exemple de sa patrie, du danger qui menace toutes les nations.

“ Je viens d'avoir cet entretien avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Je ne répéterai pas ce que je me proposais de lui dire, et que j'ai dit de mon mieux, mais je dois avoir l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence des avis que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] a reçus de Rastadt. Ce ne sont que des insinuations, mais on avoit déjà quelque raison de les prévoir par des propos du Prince Henri qui s'y rapportent ; et il n'y a que trop de raison de croire qu'il va se manifester de la part des François un plan pareil, qu'ils n'ont retardé que pour prendre des mesures qui le favorisent.

“ Ce plan est, de rompre entièrement la confédération Germanique, et de partager l'Allemagne en deux grandes divisions, du Nord et du Sud. Il n'est question maintenant pour la division du Nord que d'accorder à ses différens états la neutralité qui peut les éblouir ; mais pour celle du Sud, laissant à part les états héréditaires de l'Empereur, sur lesquels apparemment ils ont leurs vues d'attaques, ils veulent réunir les autres états à la manière de la Suisse, et s'allier avec eux. Buonaparte, dit-on, vient pour cela à Rastadt, avant que d'aller se mettre à la tête de l'autre expédition.

“ Ceci vient d'un correspondant de Monseigneur le Duc, son envoyé à Rastadt, homme très suspect d'entrer lui-même dans ces manoeuvres, et auquel s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] elle-même ne se fie pas, quoiqu' à présent il en paroisse le zélé serviteur. Il est en relation avec un Rosenstiele, secrétaire de Treilhard, qui a un frère dans le conseil des mines à Berlin. Je connois celui-ci, homme de talens, mais dont je n'ai pas été bien satisfait.

“ Je ne saurois douter, par bien des raisons, qu'il n'y ait quelque vue pareille, et que la tentative ne doive bientôt s'en faire. Il seroit donc bien fâcheux que Vienne et Petersbourg n'eussent pas chargé leurs ministres d'être très explicites sur les offres d'une alliance défensive, où ils emploieroient tous leurs pouvoirs, avec les plus grandes facilités pour les arrangemens particuliers. Car *l'incertitude* sera toujours grossie par M. de H[augwitz] pour empêcher le Roi de se décider. J'espère bien que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] donnera de bons avis à sa Majesté, mais je crains toujours que ce ne soit pas d'une manière assez déterminée ni assez pressante, à moins que tout ne soit bien clair et positif dans l'alliance proposée. Elle m'a témoigné encore son impatience que j'aie à Berlin ; je n'aime pas à la voir s'arrêter à de si foibles ressources qui ne sont rien si elle ne les appuie. Cependant je pars dans une heure, et je ferai ce que je pourrai, ne fût-ce que pour être en suite à sa portée à Potzdam. Je serois bien heureux si votre Excellence daignoit m'écrire sous couvert de my Lord Elgin.”

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 12. Berlin.—“ En arrivant ici hier matin, au lieu d'y trouver une lettre de M. de Stamford, comme nous en étions convenus, je l'y trouvai lui-même, ayant déjà exécuté sa commission à Potzdam, où il s'étoit déterminé d'aller d'abord ; réfléchissant dans la route que, comme sa mission étoit directement au Roi, il ne falloit point avoir l'apparence d'être allé à Berlin pour quelque autre but.

“ Le Roi, déjà prévenu par Monseigneur le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, reçut M. de Stamford avec beaucoup de satisfaction et de bonté. ‘ Il seroit bien à souhaiter,’ dit s[a] M[ajesté], ‘ que chacun eût les mêmes sentimens d'honneur que le Prince d'Orange.’ ‘ Et de justice aussi,’ ajouta M. de Stamford, ‘ car c'est la justice maintenant qu'il faut appeler à son secours, pour faire contraste, aux yeux des états et des peuples, avec les déprédations du Directoire.’

“ Cela engagea la conversation sur les affaires générales, et M. de St[amford] fit de nouveau au Roi une peinture très forte des dangers dont tous les gouvernemens légitimes sont menacés, soit directement, soit par tout traité avec la faction. S[a] M[ajesté] acquiesça à tout, mais n'ajouta rien qui pût conduire M. de Stamford à parler des précautions à prendre ; de sorte, qu'il ne crut pas devoir aller plus loin jusqu'à ce qu'il eût les informations nécessaires. Il eut ensuite une longue conversation avec M. de Rökeritz qui roula sur les mêmes objets, sans le conduire pour loin ; c'est pourquoi, étant invité à voir la revue, ce

qui lui laissoit l'espérance d'un entretien plus utile quand il seroit mieux instruit de l'état des choses, il se détermina à venir à Berlin.

“ D'abord à son arrivée ici, M. de Stamford vit my Lord Elgin, à qui il remet le paquet de votre Excellence, et rendit compte de ce qui s'étoit passé à Potzdam. Il vit ensuite les Ministres de Vienne et de Petersbourg qui, l'un et l'autre, lui témoignèrent leur satisfaction très grande de ce qu'un des retranchemens de M. de H[augwitz] étoit maintenant enlevé. Le Prince de Reus en particulier lui dit qu'ayant fait confidence à M. de Thugut de mon départ pour Londres dans ce but, il lui en avoit déjà exprimé le plus grand contentement ; en l'assurant que si M. de Stamford venoit à Vienne, il l'aideroit de tout son pouvoir, quoiqu'il eût pris sa démission de la place de Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ; mais restant Ministre de conférence. Cette démission avoit d'abord fait beaucoup de peine à M. le Prince de Reus ; mais M. de Thugut l'avoit rassuré ; M. de Cobenzel qui a pris sa place étant très zélé pour la même cause ; et il l'a informé, en même temps, que les réstitutions des parties du pays de Nassau, que Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange réclame, seront appuyées de l'Empereur, et n'éprouveront aucune difficulté.

“ Votre Excellence étant sûrement bien informée des instructions qu'ont reçues les Ministres de Petersbourg et de Vienne, je n'en parlerai ici que relativement à l'usage que nous avons déjà fait, M. de Stamford et moi, de ces informations.

“ M. le Ministre de Reck, en conséquence de ce qu'il nous avoit fait espérer que, si mon voyage en Angleterre produisoit ce que nous avions en vue, il parleroit au Roi de son danger à laisser des affaires aussi critiques dans les mains d'un seul homme, ayant sçu en même temps ce qu'on pouvoit attendre dans les prochaines conférences, a fait une première démarche auprès de s[a] M[ajesté], qui a déjà eu assez d'effet pour qu'on puisse attendre qu'en obtenant l'appui de Monseigneur le Duc, M. de H[augwitz] perdrait beaucoup de son influence.

“ C'est-là certainement le point où il faut concentrer ses vues ; car votre Excellence sait, sans doute, ce que M. le Comte Panin a dit à M. de Stamford, que dans la réponse plus que *dilatatoire* qu'il a reçue sur la proposition de sa Cour quant à une alliance entre les Puissances, M. de H[augwitz] a eu assez d'ascendant pour y faire concourir les deux autres Ministres des Affaires Étrangères ; de sorte qu'il paroît que leur réunion à M. de H[augwitz] ne feroit que fortifier son ascendant sur l'esprit du Roi, et qu'il faut tâcher d'y amener d'autres personnes.

“ M. le Chambellan de Reck aussi, ayant été informé par M. de Stamford des dispositions de Vienne et de Petersbourg, et, en même temps, de l'information certaine qu'a eue M. de Stamford, que le Ministre de France a reçu des ordres positifs de presser cette Cour pour un traité d'alliance, en lui offrant les plus grands avantages, a pris aussi le parti de parler au Roi pour le solliciter de tout suspendre jusqu'à l'arrivée du Prince de Repnin ; insistant sur ce qu'il n'y avoit d'appui réel pour les puissances *morales*

que dans des Puissances de cette ancienne classe ; et qu'il y avoit, au contraire, tout à craindre dans des liaisons avec les hommes les plus immoraux qui aient jamais existé, parlant aujourd'hui au nom de la France.

“Ce fut hier que nous eumes cet entretien avec M. de Reck ; je l'ai vu ce matin, et il m'a assuré qu'on pouvoit être tranquille sur ce que tente le Ministre de France à l'égard d'un traité ; mais qu'il ne falloit pas cesser d'agir auprès du Roi.

“Mon principal but dans cette visite à M. de Reck étoit de le presser de nouveau de ce dont nous l'avions prié hier ; c'est de se joindre à nous pour engager Monsieur le Duc de Brunswic, avec qui il est lié, à ne pas perdre l'occasion de sa venue pour opérer essentiellement sur l'esprit du Roi. Pour cet effet je l'ai informé de tout ce que nous avions déjà fait à cet égard M. de Stamford et moi, et de ce qu'il faudroit faire encore, d'après tout ce qu'on sait ici, pour lui montrer la diminution des obstacles et l'augmentation des espérances, pourvu qu'il se montre décidé pour la seul parti sûr. M. de Reck, persuadé de l'importance du concours de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], s'est déterminé à partir demain pour aller l'attendre à Brandebourg, et l'entretenir ainsi avant qu'elle arrive à Potzdamm.

“Je n'ai rien à ajouter, quant à présent, que d'avoir l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence que M. de Stamford a l'honneur de rendre compte aujourd'hui à Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange de l'exécution de son ordre, et l'informer en même temps de ce qu'il a appris par le Prince de Reus des dispositions favorables de l'Empereur pour d'autres indemnités en sa faveur ; sans, néanmoins, entrer dans les affaires générales ; ce dont il a souhaité que j'eusse l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence, afin qu'elle fasse à cet égard ce qu'elle jugera à propos.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May. London.—“Vous aurez demain, ou après demain, le mémoire que vous demandez. Je désirerais bien vous complaire aussi en liquidant promptement l'affaire des intérêts échus et à échoir, mais je crains de n'en pas trouver les possibilités. Nous ferons certainement preuve de bonne volonté ; Ransonet a été envoyé pour arranger cet objet. Il n'y a que deux moyens, que vous nous fassiez ces avances, ou que l'on fasse un emprunt momentané chez Boyd pour les rembourser. Je sais que vous croyez ne pouvoir pas vous prêter au premier de ces expédients, et je ne vous en tourmente plus ; mais ce qui me choque véritablement, c'est de voir la mauvaise volonté de Boyd, qui se refuse à toute avance sans votre garantie ; ce serait user notre crédit en *trifles*, et vous tracasser peut-être sans succès que d'y recourir actuellement pour cet objet. Comment se peut-il qu'un homme, aussi riche que Boyd, aussi entreprenant, aussi intelligent, et aussi heureux, se refuse à une avance de 300 mille livres pour quelques mois. Il devrait se rappeler qu'il nous doit le commencement de son bien-être ; mais comme il est sûr que le gouvernement Anglais payera au besoin les intérêts,

en conséquence de sa garantie, il se soucie peu de notre crédit. Cela m'afflige d'autant plus que je me vois dans la nécessité d'en rendre compte à ma Cour, déjà sans raison (jusqu'à présent) prévenu contre lui, à cause de la prétendue cherté de nos emprunts. Il faudra qu'on trouve à Vienne quelque secret pour faire honneur à ses obligations. Je n'en vois pas d'autre que d'envoyer de l'argent ; mais il faudrait en avoir pour cela. Je ne saurais vous exprimer combien toutes ces choses me chipotent et m'affligent. Il est cruel pour un honnête homme de se trouver dans ma position ; vos bontés seules m'en dédommagent."

EARL CAMDEN to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 14. Dublin Castle.—"Although I have not had time to enter into the subject of your letter, I cannot let the post leave Dublin without thanking you for the communication of your sentiments which I received this morning. Your anxiety for the fate of this country would, I am sure, have alone induced you to give this subject as full a consideration as you have done ; at the same time I venture to flatter myself that the friendship you have always shown me has had some small share in inducing you to take so much trouble. I shall obey your commands in not making your sentiments known except where you mention."

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 14. Berlin.—"As to my health, which I mention in so far as it may have some connection with business here, I have the satisfaction of being able to say that it has improved within these three weeks beyond expectation ; and I have now no interruption from it to apprehend in discharge of my duty.

"Your Lordship will perceive that, in my conferences with Count Haugwitz, no allusion was made to the inserting an article in a treaty of general alliance declaring the war in which England is now engaged not to be a *casus fidei*. In fact I believe that suggestion originated rather with Count Panin than with Count Haugwitz ; some such resource appearing to Count Panin suitable to obviate the difficulty made to his proposal on the ground of Great Britain being at war. Count Haugwitz seems to have a general opposition to the whole plan, and not to have adopted even this partial resource."

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 15. Berlin.—"Le lendemain de mon arrivée ici (le 15<sup>e</sup>) j'eus l'honneur d'écrire à Votre Excellence pour l'informer de ce qui s'étoit passé à Potzdam à l'égard de la mission de M. de Stamford, et du premier aspect des choses. Je ne doute

pas que votre Excellence ne soit bien informée par my Lord Elgin (que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir pour lui rendre compte de ce qui s'est passé à Brunswic), mais l'époque où nous sommes est si importante que je ne dois pas négliger de communiquer à votre Excellence tout ce que j'appерçois, au risque qu'il n'y ait rien d'essentiel.

"My Lord Elgin m'ayant témoigné qu'il regardoit comme très important que Monseigneur le Duc de Br[unswic] se prononçât fortement auprès du Roi ; après lui avoir rendu compte de tout ce que nous avions fait, M. de Stamford et moi, pour l'y engager, je lui fis comprendre que ce qui pourroit retenir s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] étoit l'obscurité qui règnoit encore à ses yeux sur les vraies intentions de la Cour de Vienne, et qu'ainsi il seroit très essentiel de pouvoir lui donner sur ce point des informations précises ; mais my Lord Elgin ne me dit à cet égard que des choses générales.

"C'étoit-là, cependant, le point important pour obtenir un concours direct de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à quelque vue déterminée ; vu les lettres qu'elle avoit reçues de M. de H[augwitz] jusqu'au dernier courrier avant mon départ. Notre espérance étoit donc que M. de Stamford, arrivant à Berlin, y apprendroit positivement du min[istre] de Vienne ce que nous pensions que M. de H[augwitz] cachoit ; et en effet, ce ministre ayant témoigné à M. de Stamford la plus grande satisfaction de son arrivée, 'qui accéléreroit, disoit-il, par la renonciation de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, l'ouvrage si essentiel d'une réunion,' nous ne doutâmes pas qu'il n'eût à cet égard des instructions précises et conformes aux circonstances. Voilà donc ce que nous regardâmes comme essentiel de communiquer à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] avant même son arrivée à Potzdam ; et M. le Chambellan de Reck s'étoit déterminé à l'aller joindre pour cet effet à Brandebourg, comme j'eus l'honneur de le marquer à votre Excellence dans ma dernière lettre.

"Mais dès lors l'aspect des choses a changé à quelque degré, d'abord aux yeux de M. de Reck, et ensuite pour nous-mêmes. Plus M. de R[eck] est à portée du Roi, non seulement par sa place, mais par l'estime de sa Majesté, et par l'habitude qu'il a de lui parler ouvertement ; plus il est prudent dans toute sa conduite, pour ne s'exposer jamais à perdre la confiance que sa Majesté lui accorde. Il connoit aussi intimément Monseigneur le Duc, ses intentions, son caractère, et l'influence qu'il pourroit avoir sur le Roi, s'il se prononçoit décidément ; personne n'a agi plus fortement que lui pour l'y déterminer, et ne connoit mieux tout ce qui se passa ici à son précédent voyage ; il sait par là que *l'evidence* seule peut déterminer s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à l'action ; que la plus grande cause de sa timidité en politique est le doute d'y voir clair ; et que dans ce doute, quoique prenant intérêt aux affaires, elle évite toujours d'y être engagé.

"D'après ces considérations M. de R[eck] ne crut pas devoir partir pour Brandebourg sans être bien assuré lui-même de ce qu'il disoit à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. Il vouloit surtout

tâcher de savoir ce qu'on pouvoit attendre des instructions de la Cour de Vienne à son min[istre] pour les prochaines conférences. Car, si l'on peut compter, comme on paroît le faire maintenant que l'obstacle de l'engagement envers le Prince d'Or[ange] est levé, que l'objet des indemnités n'arrêtera pas, un second objet se présentera immédiatement, pour lequel même les conférences, quoique si prochaines, semblent trop éloignées; c'est la réponse à la nouvelle réquisition des François à Rastadt d'une détermination cathégorique et prompte sur leurs dernières demandes exorbitantes. Il s'agissoit donc de savoir d'abord si le min[istre] de Vienne avoit des instructions précises sur cet objet aussi provisionnel qu'important; et M. de R[eck], s'étant adressé à ce ministre même, il a eu lieu de craindre que ses instructions ne s'étendissent pas jusques-là. Il revint alors chez M. de Stamford pour lui témoigner sa surprise; et ce dernier, malgré les entretiens qu'il a eu avec le P[rince] de Reuss, dont il lui est bien resté la persuasion que la Cour de Vienne désire sincèrement le concours de toutes les puissances dans l'alliance défensive, n'a pu cependant donner à M. de R[eck] aucune lumière sur ce premier pas, quoique si essentiel.

“ Rien donc ne vient nous aider contre une opinion généralement répandue ici que la Cour de Vienne n'en agit pas de bonne foi avec celle de Berlin. Nous espérons encore il est vrai, M. de Stamford et moi, que ces apparences se dissiperont; mais elles sont bien malheureuses dans ce moment, car elles influent comme la vérité même. M. de R[eck] s'est abouché avec tous ceux d'entre les Ministres et autres personnes de conséquence qu'il regarde comme les plus disposées à concourir au bien; il a vu aussi M. de H[augwitz]; et il nous a assuré que celui d'entre toutes ces personnes qui parloit avec le plus de modération de la Cour de Vienne étoit M. de H[augwitz] lui-même, quoiqu'il dise ouvertement qu'il a fait par ordre du Roi toutes les instances possibles auprès de cette Cour pour qu'elle s'expliquât sur ses intentions. Je dois ajouter que c'est là le langage que j'ai entendu tenir à des personnes très bien intentionnées, et à portée d'être instruites; et qu'on augure surtout très mal du renvoy de M. de Thugut et du Ministre de Police, en même temps qu'on voit s'assoupir l'affaire du Ministre François; regardant cela comme une espèce de compromis, signe de pusillanimité dans cette Cour, et qui fait craindre une nouvelle liaison avec elle. En un mot, l'impression avec laquelle M. de Reck et M. de Stamford partirent hier pour Potzdam est celle qu'ils ne se flattent point, dans cet état des choses, d'obtenir de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] qu'elle se prononce décidemment; mais ils feront tout ce qui sera en leur pouvoir pour l'engager, au moins, à se faire communiquer, par les pièces mêmes, ce qui s'est passé avec la Cour de Vienne, afin de juger M. de H[augwitz]. Elle le pourra surtout par des fils que nous lui fournirons, M. de Stamford et moi, d'après des entretiens que nous avons eu avec ce ministre, mais dont le temps ne me permet pas de rendre compte aujourd'hui à votre Excellence.”



## W. WINDEHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 17. Park Street, Westminster.—“I had seen Sir Sidney Smith before I had received your letter, and explained to him that, in the present state of things, no other course could, in my opinion, be pursued but to leave to the Duc de Harcourt the distribution of whatever sums we should allot to the Royalists, reserving nothing to ourselves but the payment of such expenses and gratifications connected with that service as should accrue out of France. The service of communication through the country is not of bulk enough in itself to be made a subject of separate establishment; besides that, it is so interwoven with the general Royalist service in the interior, as to be impossible to be separated from it.

“All that it is required at present is to make advances, not as fast as possible, but faster, in point of fact, than we do, out of the sums already due as debt, or coming nearly under that description. 2,000*l.* of this, which I have lately got, will be sent over in a few days by General Georges, counting as part of the 17,099*l.* of which you may recollect mention in the paper which I gave you. About 500*l.* I have in like manner advanced latterly to Frotté; though, in fact, the whole of 17,099*l.* was properly due to Brittany. The 9,000*l.* for which I compromised the debt to the three southern armies, and of which two thousand has been paid to the Duc de Harcourt, and remitted by Suzanet and others, stands upon a separate account, and makes, as you recollect, no part of the 17,099*l.* When a few more advances are made in discharge of debts for which, like this 2,000*l.* given to Georges, Puisaye is personally responsible, then something may be given to the Duc de Harcourt to be laid out as he shall think proper. When the whole of Puisaye's debt is discharged, then all that remains of the above 17,099*l.* may be given to the Duc de Harcourt.

“The expenses which I say should be reserved for our distribution may, in the present state of the service, be covered by the 400*l.* agreed to be allowed per month, of which I have as yet something in hand; though, if communication with the interior, with a view to furnishing us with intelligence, should be carried on with greater activity, it will hardly continue to prove sufficient. I speak particularly of communication by F. Marcon; for that by Jersey lies principally, and almost entirely, in the hands of the Prince de Bouillon.

“The state of the Royalists in the interior is, as Sir Sydney will have explained to you, dreadful to think of; I mean for want of such small assistance as it is so abundantly in our power, and would be so much to our interest, to give. Less than 500,000*l.* a year, which the charge for maintaining that valuable corps, the provisional cavalry, amounts to, would have sustained the war in Brittany and La Vendée in a manner at least to have saved us the necessity of standing on the defensive here. My own opinion remains unaltered that, whatever coalitions may be formed in Europe, unless the parties shall learn to take for their

allies the Royalists in France, meaning by that, in a larger sense, all that are willing to combine against a Jacobin Government, the present monstrous system will never be overturned, nor Europe be restored to peace and safety. A radical cure of the disorder can, in my opinion, never be effected but in France itself."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.

*Private.*

1798, May 18. Cleveland Row.—"I find on farther information that I was misinformed about M. d'Arens, and that he is not the person who had been so favourably represented to me. I have however taken measures to learn accurately who he is. From Mr. Fraser's conversation I perceive that M. de Verteuil is at Hamburgh, and has occasionally made offers of assistance and information. You will do well to be very cautious with respect to this man. Even if his principles *are* sound, his character is such as to make this caution proper.

"Application has been made to me on the subject of Thauvenay. It is better not to give him an avowed and ostensible protection except in the last extremity. If Mr. Fraser is right in his opinion, a mere renewal on your part of the indirect expressions of interest in M. Thauvenay's safety, which he made use of to the magistrates of Hamburgh, will be sufficient for his protection.

"I am far from being sanguine in my expectations that there will be any occasion for any British mission with an Austrian army this year; but if such an occasion should occur before your brother should be able to resume his functions, I am apprehensive that we could not very well spare you from Hamburgh, where your activity may render us the most essential service, and that, besides this, there might be a difficulty in taking any person not already belonging to the military profession.

"I wish you would be so good as to make it one of the earliest objects of your attention to endeavour to open regular and constant channels of intercourse and intelligence from Holland, and even from Flanders and France, as to all that relates to naval and military preparations. What we get of that sort, though abundant, is all occasional and uncertain; and the service would be very much benefitted by following that subject up with more regularity; which, I conceive might best be done through the means of some mercantile house at Hamburgh, whose correspondence with Holland might be constant and unsuspected. If this could be done to good effect, I should not be disposed to starve the service." *Copy.*

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 19. Berlin.—"Quelque soit le changement que le retour de M. de Stamford et de M. de Reck pourra apporter au coup d'oeil des choses tel que j'eus l'honneur de le présenter, le courrier dernier, à votre Excellence, il peut être utile que je lui

rende compte des entretiens que nous avons eu séparément, M. de S[tamford] et moi, avec M. de H[augwitz] qui se rapportent à ce même état, principalement à cause de l'aspect de la Cour de Vienne en ce moment ; et je vais le faire en attendant le retour de ces messieurs, que j'espère de voir, l'un ou l'autre, avant le départ du courrier.

“Ce furent les deux Messieurs de Reck qui nous pressèrent de voir le Ministre, pour l'entendre lui-même. Nous y avions beaucoup de répugnance, quoique nous le dussions naturellement l'un et l'autre ; M. de Stamford comme ayant été chargé auprès du Roi d'une commission qui regardoit les affaires étrangères ; et moi, comme ne pouvant, après ce qui s'étoit passé entre nous, être à Berlin sans aller lui rendre mes respects. Monseigneur le Duc de Br[unswick] encore nous avoit témoigné qu'il le désiroit ; ainsi nous nous y déterminâmes, surtout pour pouvoir rendre compte de ces entretiens à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dès son arrivée à Potzdam. M. de Stamford fut le premier chez le Ministre, qui lui témoigna sa satisfaction de la commission dont il avoit été chargé, comme pouvant aider beaucoup aux arrangemens à faire avec Vienne, qui étoient très pressans ; surquoi la conversation s'engagea à l'égard des affaires générales. C'est-là un étrange contraste avec sa conduite précédente, qui avoit exigé une renonciation formelle à la part de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, pour en prévenir les effets.

“J'allai le soir du même jour chez M. de H[augwitz] qui me fit l'accueil le plus obligeant, sans paroître savoir la part que j'avois à la mission de M. de Stamford. J'amenai cependant cet objet sur le tapis, et il me tint le même langage qu'à M. de Stamford. Puis, passant de là lui-même aux affaires générales, il me témoigna sa satisfaction de pouvoir s'en entretenir librement avec moi. Le fond des deux entretiens fut le même ; mais comme il y eut en effet moins de gêne dans ce dernier, M. de H[augwitz] m'ayant invité à passer avec lui dans son jardin où nous promenâmes ensemble près de deux heures, je m'arrêterai à ce dernier.

“Quiconque, sans être instruit des raisons de défiance contre ce Ministre, eût entendu cet entretien auroit cru que nous étions parfaitement d'accord ; tant les nuances étoient imperceptibles. Il ne fut plus question de l'Angleterre, passé le premier moment, où il me témoigna sa satisfaction de l'énergie qui s'y déployoit, remarquant qu'il paroissoit qu'elle avoit fait renoncer à l'entreprise ; et lorsque j'en tirai la conséquence qu'il en seroit de même partout, si l'on prenoit la même résolution en commun, non seulement il en fut d'accord, mais il se plut à rappeler les cas où il en avoit été de même ; se montrant convaincu que la plus grande habileté de ces ennemis communs, et la cause de leur succès, étoit dans la ruse et la trahison.

“Passant de là à des objets plus particuliers je m'arrêtai d'abord aux événemens de la Suisse ; et il appuya bientôt lui-même la seule raison qui ait pu me faire supporter son sort ; c'est que ces armées seroient enfin odieuses à toutes les nations. Sur

quoi il m'assura qu'il n'y avoit plus personne à Berlin (excepté un petit nombre de gens bien connus, et qui n'ont plus d'influence) qui, depuis ces événemens, osât encore parler en faveur du Directoire François, tant l'indignation est générale; tellement que M. Caillard, quoiqu'un homme très calculé pour sa place par ses manières et son instruction générale, qui auparavant étoit un grand objet d'attention dans les sociétés, et y paroissoit avec assurance, y étoit aujourd'hui déconcerté et isolé; peut-être honteux lui-même de représenter de tels maîtres. C'est ce que m'avoient déjà dit des personnes qui le rencontrent dans la société.

“La conséquence immédiate de ce sentiment général étoit qu'on devoit être entièrement résolu à ne plus écouter ces gens-là pour aucun traité, ni même dans aucune promesse; sur quoi encore nous trouvâmes entièrement d'accord.

“Ils n'ont cessé (me dit-il) et ne cessent de nous presser à en venir à un traité; mais ils ont lieu d'apercevoir que tous leurs efforts, et tous les motifs qu'ils nous présentent, sont inutiles. Tantôt ils nous disoient que Vienne ne se relâcheroit pas d'une partie de la Bavière, et que nous ferions bien de songer de notre côté à nous agrandir, en quoi ils nous seconderoient. Mais nous avons toujours répondu que nous ne pouvions avoir une telle idée de l'Autriche, et qu'il seroit temps de penser à nous quand elle la manifesterait. Puis ils nous ont représenté, et c'est leur thème actuel, qu'il faudra bien que l'Autriche ou la Prusse s'allient avec eux; que la première le désire; mais qu'ils nous préféreroient, comme ayant plus d'influence sur le Nord, et voyant d'ailleurs plus de penchant entre nos deux nations. Le premier motif peut être vrai, mais le dernier est un double mensonge, car quant à leur nation, ils lui font dire tout ce qu'ils veulent; et pour la nôtre elle les hait, surtout aujourd'hui. Ils ne nous tromperont pas non plus à l'égard de l'Autriche, quoiqu'elle reste si boutonnée à notre égard; elle est trop prudente pour céder à leurs instances; car elle voit bien que ce seroit le signal de l'alliance la plus intime entre la Prusse, la Russie, l'Angleterre, et tout le nord; ce qui la mettroit en danger réel, tandis que son union avec le Directoire ne seroit qu'une nouvelle supercherie à laquelle elle ne s'exposeroit pas.

“Il faut donc au contraire (lui dis-je) se réunir contre un tel ennemi.’ ‘Sans doute (répliqua-t-il) il le faudroit; il n'y aura de sûreté que par là.’

“Ce fut avec cette conformité de principes que nous vinmes à parler des conférences prochaines, où il sembloit impossible de ne pas attendre son concours à la réunion; et qu'ainsi elle devoit avoir lieu, puisque c'étoit de lui seul qu'on attendoit la résistance. Il me témoigna au contraire le plus grand désir, mais peu d'espérance de succès; accusant l'Autriche de manque de sincérité, et de n'avoir en vue que de rejeter sur une défiance mal-fondée de la Prusse, le mal immense qu'elle a fait elle-même. Il me répéta plusieurs fois l'expression de son chagrin de ce qu'au lieu de s'ouvrir confidentiellement avec la Prusse dans tant d'occasions qu'on lui en avoit fournies, et

d'exprimer ce désir de réunion, elle avoit contribué, sans doute, à en répandre le bruit dans toute l'Europe, et l'avoit par sa demande ouverte de l'intervention de la Russie, et l'envoy bruyant d'un ministre plénipotentiaire de cette puissance; que par là enfin les François avoient été conduits à redoubler leurs efforts; sans qu'on eût encore un seul mot de sa part qui put fonder de telles apparences, et montrer ses vues.

“Il y avoit un point bien essentiel (me dit-il) qui pouvoit conduire à des explications ultérieures; c'étoit de se concerter incessamment sur les demandes croissantes des François, à l'égard des quelles la commission de l'Empire ne sauroit prendre parti sans que la Prusse et l'Autriche ne soient d'accord. Notre ministre à Rastadt a eu de constantes instructions à cet égard; nous avons pressé à plusieurs fois le Cabinet de Vienne d'en envoyer au sien, et nous n'avons jamais pu y parvenir; de sorte que les ministres de Prusse et de Vienne, qui auroient dû être les principaux agens dans ce congrès, y ont été des zéros, faisant même un personnage ridicule dont M. de Cobenzel lui-même étoit embarrassé.”

“Je vois là de fortes raisons de suivre l'avis de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissimé]; c'est-à-dire, de suspendre mon jugement sur ce Ministre *jusqu'à ce qu'on le voye dans les négociations*. Il est impossible de ne pas supposer du louche, au moins pour la Prusse, dans la conduite de l'Autriche. M. de H[augwitz] n'en parleroit pas si affirmativement à tous ceux qui conversent avec lui, s'il n'en avoit des raisons; et je ne puis m'empêcher de regretter un peu que le plan d'un voyage de M. de Stamford à Vienne, dans le commencement de Mars, ait été abandonné, sur l'apparence que tout alloit bien de ce côté-là. Si cela est dans l'intention, ce n'est pas du moins dans l'apparence, et il semble qu'on puisse dire de là, que *c'est tout comme ici*.

“Chacun se défie, et en a sujet; la défiance mutuelle produit une conduite réciproque qui la fait croître sans cesse de part et d'autre; et cela durera jusqu'à ce que le ciel envoie quelque homme de bien avec des talens suffisans pour fouiller de part et d'autre dans les replis de la petite politique, l'écarter, et voir assez clair dans les intentions pour pouvoir dire aux deux Cours ‘finissez enfin ces disputes sur la forme, que vont vous perdre, puisque vous êtes d'accord sur le fond qu'il faut se réunir pour se sauver.’

“Mais en attendant, considérons la situation du Roi de Prusse. Il est impossible dans cet état des choses, qu'avec les dispositions les plus conformes à tout ce qu'on peut désirer. il puisse appercevoir aucune raison de se plaindre de son Ministre; et c'est ce que MM. de Reck m'ont fait remarquer, l'un et l'autre, d'après leurs derniers entretiens avec sa Majesté. Si M. de H[augwitz] ne lui montrait pas toujours la plus entière défiance des François, et le plus grand désir de produire une réunion entre les puissances existantes pour la défense commune, il perdrait certainement sa confiance; on la lui feroit perdre, si l'on pouvoit montrer chez lui de la tergiversation à l'un ou l'autre

de ces deux égards. Mais il ne paroît pas que M. de H[augwitz] ait aucune crainte qu'on puisse l'en accuser auprès du Roi; et c'est ainsi qu'il avoit dit que sa conscience et le Roi le justifient. C'est ce qu'il m'a répété à moi-même; et n'ayant rien de certain qui pût me persuader du contraire (comme j'ai eu l'honneur de la faire remarquer à Votre Excellence dans ma précédente lettre) je n'avois rien non plus à répliquer.

“Voilà tout l'essentiel de cet entretien, car je m'abstiens de prendre du temps à votre Excellence pour lui détailler la partie de notre conversation dans laquelle, lui faisant remarquer que tout l'Europe avoit les yeux sur lui, je tâchai de lui faire sentir que puisqu'il disoit que la Prusse n'avoit d'autre dessein que celui de sa préservation, et voyoit le besoin de la réunion pour cet effet pourvu qu'il y eût sûreté dans cette réunion même, son rôle étoit le plus simple; qu'il devoit, dans les conférences prochaines, diriger les choses vers des explications promptes et précises sur ce qu'il y avoit à statuer; en déclarant, franchement, ce que la Prusse exigeroit pour se livrer à cette alliance, qui semble être le sujet de l'intervention de la Russie. Que le moment de ces conférences étoit beau pour un homme d'état; puisqu'il fondera l'opinion publique sur les ministres employés, comme il décidera probablement du sort de l'Europe.

“Ce fut là-dessus que roula la plus grande partie de notre entretien, et je ne saurois rien dire de favorable ni de défavorable de l'effet; en un mot je n'eus pas raison de me retirer mécontent de ce Ministre, et, pourtant, je n'étois pas satisfait. De son côté il me témoigna qu'il me reverroit avec plaisir à son retour de Potsdam.

“Si c'eût été là mon premier entretien avec M. de H[augwitz] sur les mêmes objets; ou si, dans la suite de nos premiers entretiens et de sa conduite, il n'eût pas fait naître chez moi de la défiance, je ne pourrois qu'être très content. Mais je crains son plan fondamental d'éviter la guerre à tout risque, malgré son aveu actuel qu'on ne peut compter sur aucun accord avec de tels ennemis. Vienne l'auroit mis au pied du mur en se prononçant ouvertement. Mais en se contentant de sonder le terrain on l'a mis dans le cas d'attribuer ces demi-démarches à manque de sincérité; et pour peu qu'il reste encore de ce tâtonnement dans les conférences, je crains qu'il ne s'en prévaille pour écarter toute union qui pourroit engager une guerre. Voilà ce que Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic pourroit seul prévenir, en entrant pleinement dans les affaires durant les conférences; mais malheureusement on dit qu'il doit aller directement de Potsdam à Brunswick quand le Roi viendra à Berlin.”

Le 19. “Votre Excellence sera plutôt informée par my Lord Elgin que par cette lettre (qui va par Hanovre) de l'heureuse circonstance de la venue ici de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, et de l'arrivée du Prince de Replin. Mais quel peu de temps avant le départ du Roi! Six jours, dont trois sont jours de revues! J'ai vu M. de Stamford. Il a conversé avec beaucoup de personnes, mais il ne revient pas satisfait de l'apparence des choses. Le Prince Reus le presse d'aller à Vienne. Il faut donc qu'il y

ait quelque chose à faire; mais le Pr[ince] ne s'explique pas, et M. de Stamford ne conçoit pas encore comment il pourroit y avoir du temps. Voilà ce qui entretient le doute. M. de Stamford se décidera suivant les circonstances.

“Monseigneur le Duc m’a fait dire de passer chez lui vers le soir, mais ce sera après le départ du courrier. Si donc j’apprenois alors quelque chose d’intéressant, je ne pourrais avoir l’honneur d’en informer votre Excellence que le courrier prochain.”

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 22. Berlin.—“Votre Excellence recevra sans doute par my Lord Elgin tous les détails de l’état présent des choses, et de leur apparence; cependant il n’est peut-être pas inutile que j’y ajoute le point de vue sous lequel nous le voyons de notre côté. M. de Stamford et moi, avec assez de moyens de découvrir ce qui se passe autour du Roi.

“Il sera bien difficile de vaincre le manque d’intention qui se trouve, probablement, chez M. de H[augwitz] (et qui passe chez ceux qu’il a persuadés de son habileté) d’en venir réellement à une alliance; et l’espérance diminue à cet égard, à mesure qu’il s’exprime plus fortement sur ce que *sans doute elle seroit nécessaire*, sans que, pourtant, on se sente plus de confiance en ses intentions; et le manque de confiance naît surtout de la foiblesse de ses raisons de doute sur la possibilité d’acheminer convenablement cette alliance; parcequ’il doit sentir lui-même qu’elles ne sont rien comparativement à la grandeur de l’objet. Ces raisons cependant sont dans bien des bouches, et l’on peut toujours les tracer vers leur source, quoique chez des personnes qui sont bien éloignées de se fier à ce Ministre; ce sont les raisons aux-quelles j’avois opposé fortement qu’il ne tenoit qu’à lui des faire cesser, en demandant des explications du ton propre à les obtenir. Ce qui m’inquiète le plus, c’est qu’entre ceux qui répètent ces motifs de doute sur le succès, les uns pensent réellement qu’on ne sauroit prendre confiance aux deux cours Impériales, les autres que M. de H[augwitz] n’aidera point à leur en inspirer à elles-mêmes.

“Il est très difficile de pénétrer tous les replis de ce Ministre; mais il faut toujours rassembler les traits. J’en ai beaucoup par moi-même, et en voici un, par exemple, où il y a beaucoup de finesse. Votre Excellence aura vu dans ma lettre précédente le précis de mon entretien avec lui la veille de son départ pour Potzdam; dans lequel je lui avoit bien clairement exprimé ma persuasion qu’il dépendoit de lui de lever tous les obstacles à la réunion sincère qu’il paroissoit désirer, avec tous ceux qui la regardoient comme le seul port de salut. Il eut un entretien avec Monseigneur le Duc de Br[unswick] à Potzdam; et dans celui que j’eus l’honneur d’avoir avec s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime] le lendemain de son arrivée à Berlin, elle me dit que j’avois fait une grande impression sur lui, qu’il témoignoit pour moi la plus grande estime, et la satisfaction qu’il avoit de pouvoir s’entretenir avec moi des affaires publiques; tellement que s’a[ltesse] s[érénissime] regardoit comme essentiel

que je continuasse à le voir, (ce que M. le Chambellan de Reck m'a témoigné aussi désirer) et pourtant, s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] répétoit elle-même les raisons de crainte que j'avois combattues chez ce Ministre !

“Voilà ce qui nous a marqué à M. de Stamford et à moi notre principale tâche ; celle de désabuser s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] sur les intentions de M. de H[augwitz] ; en qui elle paroissoit prendre confiance à cause de ses aveux sur la grande importance de l'objet. Car si elle y comptoit, et n'agissoit pas sur le Roi lui-même, son nouveau séjour ici, qui ne doit se prolonger que jusqu'au départ du Roi, le 25, ne produiroit rien de plus que le précédent.

“Nous nous sommes donc employés à cet effet de toutes nos forces ; surtout en engageant s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] à se mettre directement au fait des intentions du Cabinet de Petersbourg, en cedant pour cela au désir, jusqu'alors sans effet, de M. le Prince de Repnin et de M. le Comte de Panin de les lui exposer eux-mêmes. J'espère que nous avons avancé chemin ; du moins j'eus l'honneur de recevoir hier au soir de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] une lettre qui, pour cet objet particulier, de même que sur le fond des choses, m'a donné plus d'espérance que je n'en avois conçue jusqu'ici. Je n'ai pas en ce moment cette lettre, parceque je l'ai envoyée à M. le Comte de Panin ; d'ailleurs, sa principale force résulte de ce qu'elle est en réponse à une lettre que j'avois laissée le matin chez s'altesse s[érénissime] pendant qu'elle étoit avec le Roi à une revue. Ces revues consomment bien du temps, et obligent à saisir les momens à la volée. M. de Stamford avoit vu aussi s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] un moment après qu'elle avoit lu ma lettre, dont je lui avois communiqué la minute, afin que nous pussions aller de concert.

“Nous ne logeons pas dans le même hotel. Je me propose d'avoir l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence, par un autre courrier, copie de ma lettre et de la réponse de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] par où elle verra mieux encore les difficultés qui sont sur notre chemin ; quoiqu'il y en ait que je ne puis expliquer.

“Cet état des choses retient ici M. de Stamford. On ne peut juger que d'après ce qui se sera passé jusqu'au départ du Roi, de ce qu'il pourroit y avoir à faire à Vienne ; mais alors il se concertera avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et les ministres des trois Cours, sur ce qu'exigeroit la position où se trouveront alors les choses, soit pour lever quelque obstacle, soit pour aider à quelque vue déterminée. Parcequ'ainsi que votre Excellence l'apprendra sans doute, les conférences continueront ici dans l'absence du Roi et de M. de H[augwitz], les deux autres ministres des Affaires Etrangères étant adjoints à M. de H[augwitz] pour cette négociation.”

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 25. Hamburg.—“With respect to M. Ahrens, I have stated in my dispatch of this date, No. 14, the intelligence



which I have received from him. He is very decent in his appearance. I had seen him in the morning previous to the receipt of your Lordship's letter, but however, as the nature of his communication was not such as to call for any confidence on my part, nothing passed which gave me the smallest reason to regret that I had not received it previous to our conversation.

"I shall not fail to observe your Lordship's directions respecting M. de Verteuil, and I beg to assure you that I arrived here with every disposition to be most perfectly on my guard with all these gentlemen, amongst whom there are certainly many respectable individuals, but whom it is not always easy at once to distinguish.

"With respect to M. de Thauvenay, I am happy to find that my ideas have so exactly met your Lordship's. I have not hitherto had occasion to take any step whatever respecting him, and shall certainly avoid it, except in a case of absolute necessity.

"I cannot express to your Lordship how much I am flattered by what you are so good as to say as to the use of which you think I may be at Hamburgh. I am certainly, my Lord, entirely at your disposal."

"From the moment of my appointment to this place it occurred to me that, from its situation, it might afford opportunities of drawing intelligence from many various quarters, more particularly from Holland. I therefore lost not a moment in endeavouring to establish channels of intercourse of various kinds, one of the first of which was that of mercantile houses.

"I am much mortified not to have been able already to have derived more advantage from these sources, as also not to have transmitted more complete intelligence respecting the English residing here and passing through this country; but your Lordship, I am sure, will consider that, arriving here a perfect stranger, having to make a choice of houses for the foreign correspondence, and of agents for procuring information of what is passing here, to choose whom with discernment some time is necessary, much could not be done in the short space of one month.

"There is one person who lately passed through here whom I have not chosen to insert in the list enclosed in my dispatch of this date, from a variety of considerations. This is Sir Lionel Copley. He has been much in opposition in England, and at one time, on the Continent particularly where he is constantly rambling, used most indecent democratic language. He has lately been making a strange sort of journey, having left England in the beginning of March, and since that time having been all over Germany and even as far as Venice. What may have been his connections at Venice I do not know, but in other parts of Italy he was formerly connected with those who have since appeared on the stage of the revolution in their respective countries. He has now just gone back to England. Might I entreat you that, if it can be avoided, any accounts which I transmit of English who may happen to be here may not go into

the hands of the *précis* writer at the Office. Not that I mean to insinuate that any of the gentlemen employed in that branch of the official business have ever been guilty of any indiscretion; but I hope your Lordship will excuse my saying that, as if it became in any degree known it might subject one to a good deal of odium, I am anxious that it should go into as few hands as possible.

“With respect to Sir Lionel Copley, any one who knows him cannot suppose him dangerous as a political man, certainly; but one sometimes sees people so little calculated for these parts who, however, appear in them, that I thought it proper to mention him. At the same time I must say that he appears to have become moderate and reasonable. I have known him long, more or less, and I do not believe he has anything bad in his character.”

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 26. Whitehall.—“Nothing can be more satisfactory than the accounts received from Ireland to-day, as well with respect to the success of the measures that have been taken by the Government, as to the state of the public opinion. The address of each House of Parliament, in answer to the Lord Lieutenant’s message, was carried up to the Castle *instanter*, by the respective Speakers on foot, followed by the whole House. Mr. Vandeleur expressed his particular approbation of the vigilance and *clemency* of Government; and Mr. Dobbs acknowledged that, if he had conceived the designs of the disaffected to have been such as they now evidently appeared, he should not have opposed Government on former occasions.

“In consequence of Lord Castlereagh’s letter, which your Lordship read yesterday, a search for arms has taken place in the most disaffected parts of Dublin, and considerable numbers have been found and conveyed to the King’s stores.

“The yeomanry corps distinguished themselves very much on this occasion; and the lawyers’ corps of cavalry, commanded by Mr. Saurin, is also particularly well spoken of by the Lord Lieutenant.

“The accounts from Wicklow, Kildare, and Tipperary all agree not only that arms to a considerable amount have been given up in the disaffected parts of those counties, but that (to use the Lord Lieutenant’s expression) these deluded persons are delivering up their captains and colonels, and appear impressed with a conviction of the errors into which they had been led.

“Mr. Ryan is much better, though not out of danger; Lord Edward is unwell, and the balls are not yet extracted.

“The paper found at Sheere’s, which your Lordship heard of yesterday, is in that gentleman’s own handwriting. It begins ‘Your country is free. That vile Government which has so long and so cruelly oppressed you *is no more*. Some of its most atrocious monsters have already paid the forfeit of their lives, and the rest are in our hands.’ It concludes in these words

‘Vengeance, Irishmen, vengeance on your oppressors. Remember what thousands of your dearest friends have perished by their merciless orders. Remember their burnings, their sackings, their torturings, their military massacres, and their legal murders. Remember Orr!’

“The Lord Lieutenant, however, concludes by earnestly pressing for more force, were it only for a very short time; being persuaded that the appearance of Great Britain lending Ireland some force at so very critical a juncture would have the happiest effect.

“St. Andrew St. John has been with me to offer to drop his motion, *which he would otherwise make on Wednesday*, if Government would engage either to bring the O’Connors to trial, or to give them leave to quit the country, in which case he and his friends would engage for their retiring to America. I have been authorised to answer Mr. St. John, and have this moment given him the answer, that Government would do what it considered to be its duty, and that Mr. St. John and his friends might take whatever steps they should think most proper.

*Postscript.* “The O’Connors left town this morning.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 27. Stowe.—“Your military honours are before the King, as Sir William Young’s letter notified the hundred men complete including your sergeants, so that in a few days you will be in full possession not only of the *honour*, but also of the *amusement* of yeomanising, which to be sure is most delectable. I thank you most cordially for the very long detail you have given me so kindly of the Irish news. *There, as here*, the spirit and loyalty of individuals have fully answered the call which the Government have made upon them. But I return to the constant burden of my song, namely that this is not a Government under which a man can live in safety where the means do not exist of bringing to punishment prisoners so decidedly guilty as those who, in the course of the last four years, have been acquitted, and those who have not even been put upon their trials. Surely some measure should be devised to meet an evil so fatal as this, for it now seems most clear that juries will not do their duty, and consequently that our ancient practice is inadequate to the crisis. This observation applies much more to England than to Ireland, though I much doubt whether Lord Edward and O’Connor will be convicted there, after the Maidstone lesson. I own that I draw some satisfaction from the desperate attempt plotted for the surprise of Dublin on the 22nd, for it clearly proves the sense which the rebels there entertain of the necessity of the most immediate struggle, and of the increasing strength of Government; and I verily believe that, if Lord Camden’s exertions and prudence tide over the next month, Ireland will be saved. But again and again I press a military tribunal *there*, for the immediate and summary trial of offenders.

"I am extremely happy in the success of your very important and very well digested attempt upon Ostend. The arrangements and the secrecy do great honour to Government, and I trust that you will be encouraged to persevere in this offensive war, which is the only real defensive war. You know how much I have groaned over the want of desultory attempts on the Flemish and Dutch coasts, and you will judge how much I have been gratified by the complete success of this blow. I call it complete, for the subsequent misfortune could not have been foreseen, was not necessarily connected with the blow, and, even if it were so, must have been met with your eyes open, and faced for an object so important as that which you have accomplished.

"I am now very much in earnest in proposing to you the only pledge that I can give of my eagerness for the public service, and which I wish to give in any mode that you can point out to me. I am sure that my regiment will embark anywhere *with me*; and I am ready to propose to them, and to present from them a petition for leave for a bill to enable them to embark for any expedition to the coasts of France and Holland, and for Ireland, where I most certainly will serve as colonel just as cheerfully as I should do here. I have no military ardour; my time of life and my habits put aside any nonsense of that sort; but I have a deep and serious sense of the difficulties of this moment, and I have long since wished to encourage by my example the formation of a force large enough to enable you to *strike in force* at points of the last importance, such as the Texel, Flushing, Dunkirk, Cherbourg, St. Maloes, and even Brest. Pray turn all this in your mind, and believe me most ready to *lead* in proposing such a bill, and to *follow* in whatever military arrangements can arise out of it.

"I shall be at Chelmsford on Wednesday the 6th to meet my supplementary militia there, but I am not quite sure that I shall even go through to London. My son has lamed himself at Wotton; and seems not very sorry that he is prevented from sharing the delights of Chelmsford for some time.

*Postscript.* "*Your foreign Courts* are most despicable, and will look on till their moment goes by. I conclude that Thugut is completely put aside, and with him every idea of Austrian vigour or exertion is gone."

#### M. DE LUC TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 28. Berlin.—"J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence les copies dont je lui avois fait mention dans ma lettre du 22, qui me serviront de texte pour tâcher de lui expliquer l'aspect sous lequel les choses me paroissent en ce moment.

"Votre Excellence apprendra par my Lord Elgin comment les conférences, à peine commencées, ont été à peu près suspendues. La cause immédiate de cette suspension est certainement provenue de la Cour de Vienne, dont, inopinément, le min[istre] a fait des difficultés sur la restitution des balliages qui

pourroit être une indemnité naturelle pour Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange; et comme je ne l'avois que trop prévu, dès qu'un prétexte s'est offert, M. de H[augwitz] s'en est prévalu pour faire traîner la négociation en longueur, vu le départ du Roi et le sien.

“ Cette situation des choses exigeoit un prompt départ de M. de Stamford pour Vienne; ainsi il part aujourd'hui. Le sujet immédiat de son voyage est très simple; puisque le prétexte de la suspension regarde encore les intérêts de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange; mais il a été trouvé d'ailleurs très nécessaire pour les affaires générales; car personne ne peut mieux que lui faire comprendre à la Cour de Vienne combien il est essentiel de ne fournir à celle-ci aucun prétexte de délai. Nous ne saurions douter, d'après tout l'ensemble des choses, que M. de H[augwitz] n'ait intention d'éluder l'alliance, quoique paroissant la désirer; espérant que le temps amenera des circonstances qui en feront abandonner le projet. Et quand on considère que Syèès est probablement accepté pour ministre ici, on ne peut que craindre quelque trame; ou celle dont je présentais la possibilité dans ma lettre à Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, ou quelque autre pire, surtout d'après la venue ici de la comtesse de Silleri.

“ D'après la réponse dont Monsieur le Duc m'honora, et une conversation qu'il eût avec M. de Stamford le jour de son départ, nous avons jugé que s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] avoit eu des entretiens avec le Roi et M. de H[augwitz] dans lesquels on lui avoit donné lieu de croire que les choses étoient en bon train; on lui avoit même montré de la confiance; car elle étoit informée de la réponse que le Roi feroit donner aux ministres des deux Empereurs, d'après laquelle on avoit lieu de bien augurer de la conférence qui devoit se tenir ce jour-là entre les ministres; et s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] partit dans cette espérance; mais le jour même, celle qu'elle nous avoit aussi donnée s'évanouit.

“ Voilà donc encore malheureusement l'influence de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], quoique si essentielle à la chose, réduite à ne s'exercer que de loin; et moi, si mince ressource, redevenu un des instrumens qu'elle croit nécessaire; surtout auprès de M. de H[augwitz]. Cependant cela ne peut avoir lieu qu'au retour du Roi; et partir, pour revenir sans une raison plausible, m'oteroit l'avantage de voir M. de H[augwitz] comme simple étranger qui voyage dans des vues particulières, et qui ainsi ne lui donne point d'inquiétude pour les conséquences. J'ai donc pris le parti de faire un voyage que lui-même et tous ceux qui me connoissent trouveront très naturel, et qui me ramènera ici au temps convenable. C'est une tournée dans les montagnes de Lusace et de Silésie.

“ A mon retour j'aurai des nouvelles de M. de Stamford, et je serai ainsi en état de juger plus sûrement des vues de M. de H[augwitz] pour en instruire s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime], et faire un dernier effort auprès d'elle. Je compte de partir dans trois ou quatre jours, et d'être absent environ trois semaines. Je désire beaucoup d'avoir l'honneur de trouver à mon retour, chez

my Lord Elgin, une lettre de votre Excellence qui puisse, s'il en est besoin, me donner des forces auprès de Monseigneur le Duc, pour qui, certainement, l'Angleterre est un objet majeur."

*Two enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1.*

M. DE LUC to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

1798, May 21. Berlin.—“Les circonstances seules, et la grande bonté de votre altesse sérénissime, peuvent justifier la liberté que je prends en ce moment, et j'espère son pardon si je deviens trop hardi par zèle pour un objet qu'elle désire elle-même.

“Etant allé hier au soir chez M. le Général de Stamford, j'y trouvai M. le Comte de Panin, qui voulat bien m'admettre en tiers. Il nous témoigna le désir extrême que M. le Prince de Repnin avoit d'une audience de v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime], bien moins par aucune vue cérémonielle, que pour lui communiquer ce qu'il est chargé de proposer ici de la part de son maître; et si elle l'approuvoit, d'obtenir ses conseils sur la manière de se conduire pour le faire réussir. Il sait que l'Empereur le désire; en toute autre circonstance ces communications auroient pu avoir lieu durant les préliminaires, mais aujourd'hui cela devient urgent, vu le prompt départ du Roi.

“M. le Comte de Panin nous demanda donc à M. de Stamford et à moi si le premier qui pourroit avoir l'honneur d'approcher votre altesse sérénissime voudroit se charger de lui exprimer ce désir.”

“Par les discours que j'entends tenir à des personnes bien intentionnées, j'ai bien des craintes pour le succès des conférences qui vont s'entamer; j'y reconnois l'art des gens qui veulent les faire échouer; ils montrent le plus grand désir qu'on parvienne à s'entendre, paroissant convaincu du besoin; ce qui entraîne les gens de bonne foi; mais ils insinuent si adroitement des raisons de défiance qu'ils en inspirent, sans qu'on s'en apperçoive quand on n'est pas sur ses gardes. C'est à quoi sont arrivées des personnes autour du Roi en relation intime avec celle qui m'a tenu le même langage, et j'en vois l'effet de proche en proche sur d'autres qui avoient le désir, et d'abord, l'espérance du succès. Or il résulte de là chez moi une crainte particulière dont je ne puis me défendre, parceque, malheureusement, jusqu'ici toutes mes craintes ne se sont que trop réalisées.

“Il ne me paroît point naturel qu'on n'apperçoive dans ces circonstances aucun mouvement des François pour prévenir le succès des conférences; et je redoute quelque ruse. Je crains, dis-je, que tandis qu'on s'accrochera à de premières difficultés pour faire traîner ces conférences, la Directoire ne vienne tout-à-coup à se relâcher de quelque chose de spécieux sur ses exorbitantes prétentions; que les négociations ne soient par là renouées; qu'on ne suspende alors celles dont seules dépend le salut; qu'il ne se montre coulant pour entraîner

une paix, et qu'alors on ne renvoye l'union aux calendes grecques.

“Je n'ai pas besoin de peindre à v[otre] a[ltesse] s[érénissime] dans quel état en ce cas demeurerait l'Europe ; et sûrement les François feront tout ce qu'ils pourront pour que cela soit ; car ils sentent bien que tous leurs desseins seroient rompus si l'union se faisoit en ce moment ; ce qui devrait être pour les puissances un motif pour se hâter de la faire ; tandis qu'ils sont bien sûrs qu'en la prévenant dans ce moment par une de *leurs paix*, ils auroient le temps de suivre à leurs arrangemens autour de ces puissances au Sud et à l'Est, comme ils l'ont déjà fait à l'Ouest, pour les attaquer avec plus d'avantage, et les empêcher de se réunir. Il n'y a, après Dieu, que votre altesse sérénissime qui puisse prévenir cette peste finale de l'humanité, et ce n'est que dans ces jours-ci, ces jours qu'elle passera encore auprès du Roi, que cela lui seroit sûrement possible. Ce seroit en recevant de M. le Prince de Repnin, ou de M. le Comte de Panin si elle préféroit, la communication des propositions de l'Empereur de Russie ; et si elle y voyoit des moyens de salut, de travailler à mettre fortement l'esprit de sa Majesté à l'abri de toute tentative de lui faire chercher sa sûreté particulière dans aucun autre moyen que celui de la sûreté commune, par la réunion.

“Sans ce secours immédiat de votre altesse sérénissime, il y a tout à craindre que ce plan de salut, dont j'eus le bonheur de recevoir la première impression de votre altesse sérénissime elle-même au mois de Septembre dernier, et que voilà amené sous ses yeux au point décisif, n'échoue dans des circonstances bien plus menaçantes qu'elles n'étoient alors.” *Copy.*

#### *Enclosure 2.*

#### THE DUKE OF BRUNSWICK TO M. DE LUC.

1798, May 21. Berlin.—“J'espère de trouver demain après la rentrée des troupes, ce qui sera vraisemblablement entre les 10 et 11 heures, un instant favorable pour recevoir M. le Comte de Panin.

“Le grand point, ce me semble, est de ne pas s'impatienter, de mettre le plus de secret possible à la marche des affaires, et de représenter la réunion des puissances comme le seul moyen qui existe de sûreté, soit que la paix ait lieu, soit qu'elle soit reculée. La France, maîtresse de la rive gauche du Rhin, limitrophe de la Prusse sur le bas Rhin, lui dictera des loix si elle s'allie avec elle, et ne la respectera jamais qu'en tant qu'elle la verra liée avec les deux Cours Impériales, qui feront une masse assez respectable pour en imposer au Directoire. Ce n'est pas à une guerre qu'il convient de viser, mais à ces grands moyens pour l'éviter, et pour prouver à l'Europe qu'il y a des moyens d'arrêter le crime, et pour faire trembler tous ceux qui semblent se jouer des principes. Voilà, en peu de mots, ma confession de foi.” *Copy.*

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 29. [Stowe.]—"I return you Mr. Wickham's very interesting letter, and have to thank you very truly for the very early information of the important news contained in your note. I have no doubt but that the rising on *Thursday* in Kildare was a part of the plot arranged for *Wednesday* night; and in that point of view it is most essential that this should have been so completely defeated; and the proclamation which I have received this morning, putting *all Ireland* under the jurisdiction of military tribunals, will, I doubt not, have the most immediate and useful effects. Upon the whole I am well pleased; for the whole plainly proves to me that the measures of the rebels have been precipitated from the apprehensions of losing ground by every day's delay. And as it seems clear that a French force to any extent cannot be landed in Ireland at present, I trust we shall have settled this rebellion by disarming and punishing, and that we shall have impressed these people very strongly with the idea of their having been *duped* and *abandoned* by France.

"Wickham's letter states that Lord Camden eagerly presses for immediate reinforcement, and presses the consideration of the advantage to be derived from the show of English force assisting in Ireland. I agree most perfectly with him; and having had the opportunity of sounding several of my officers, I repeat that I do not doubt in the smallest degree being able to present a petition to the King (to be laid before Parliament) to request a bill to enable us to serve in Ireland (or on the coasts of France) *at our own request*, and to extend the same powers to any of the militia, not exceeding 5,000 or 10,000 men, *who may request the same*, subject to the King's approbation. I detest the idea of a journey to Ireland, but no consideration shall induce me to hold back upon a proposition and from an object where I think I can serve most essentially; and where, most certainly, I should serve with more pleasure *under* Lake, than, in command as Lord Lieutenant, *over* Sir William Pitt.

"Let me then know distinctly whether you see all this in the same point of view; for if you do, I will advise with you on the *quo modo*.

*Postscript.* "I cannot bear the idea of Mr. Pitt *versus* Mr. Tiernay; surely he ought to have felt that there were duties that ought to have suggested a very different line of conduct than that of staking his life on such a subject, and *versus* such a man."

## LORD GRENVILLE TO BARON DE THUGUT.

1798, May 29. London.—"Dans tous les rapports que les affaires publiques et notre position respective m'ont donnés avec votre Excellence, je me suis toujours fait un vrai plaisir de saisir les occasions qui m'ont été offertes pour lui présenter les assurances sincères de l'estime et de l'admiration dont je suis pénétré pour sa personne, et pour les hautes et éminentes qualités qui la distinguent. Ce ne sera sûrement pas dans le moment où ces rapports vont devenir pour le moins ni aussi fréquents, ni



aussi directs, que je voudrai omettre de me rappeler à son souvenir. Je la prie d'être persuadée qu'en toute occasion je prendrai toujours le plus vif intérêt aux marques qu'elle pourra recevoir de la juste confiance de son souverain ; convaincu comme je le suis, que ses conseils tendront toujours au grand but auquel j'ai eu l'avantage de travailler si longtemps de concert avec elle, et dont l'importance est chaque jour démontrée de plus en plus par des événements toujours renaissants.

“J'ose me flatter que la conduite actuelle de cette Cour-ci offre aux autres puissances un garant sûr et suffisant des intentions nobles et magnanimes du Roi. Rien ne peut être plus honorable que de se trouver chargé d'exécuter de pareilles dispositions ; et je le fais surtout avec un plaisir tout particulier en tant qu'elles tendent au rétablissement de l'union la plus intime entre nos deux Cours, pour la conservation du continent de l'Europe.” *Copy.*

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT DE COBENZL.

1798, May 29. London.—“Je n'ai pas voulu omettre l'occasion que me fournit le départ du courier du Comte de Starhemberg, pour offrir à votre Excellence mes félicitations sur la marque infiniment honorable de la confiance de son souverain, et sur l'occasion qui lui est ouverte pour s'acquérir pour jamais des titres à l'admiration et à la reconnaissance de l'Europe. Sa haute naissance, les emplois qu'elle a déjà remplis avec tant de distinction, et son mérite personnel, tout semble assurer que ce sera par une noble et sage fermeté qu'elle voudra caractériser son administration du département qui lui est confié ; et que dans un moment où le salut de l'Europe dépend, plus que jamais, de l'établissement d'une union et bonne intelligence entre les principales Cours, elle y contribuera par des mesures convenables à la grande crise dans laquelle nous nous trouvons.

“Je m'estimerai heureux si, sous ces rapports, je pourrai mériter sa confiance. Jamais je ne pourrai mieux exécuter les ordres de mon souverain qu'en travaillant avec ardeur et sincérité à rétablir cette union intime entre nos deux Cours qui peut seule sauver le continent de l'Europe de la ruine totale et imminente dont il est menacé.” *Copy.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, May 30. Wimbledon.—“I received yours yesterday morning, with its enclosure which I return. I make no doubt that other militia regiments, at least the officers of them, feel as your brother does ; but I have long entertained an opinion that Government ought not to avail itself of the momentary zeal which may suggest itself on particular occasions to induce bodies of men to depart from the conditions of their original institutions. It may operate advantageously at a particular crisis, but it is remembered afterwards, and, in truth, would interfere with the principles of the militia. A person is not on such an occasion a

*real volunteer* from choice. He must either follow the example set to him, or be looked upon with an inferior degree of respect, and be liable to the imputation of possessing less zeal than others; and (although not immediately) such considerations will weigh in the balance at a future period, when a person is deliberating whether he will or will not enter into a militia or any other volunteer corps. Upon these grounds I cannot look upon the voluntary service of militia regiments (however laudable on the part of the individuals) as a resource to which the country can look under its present deficiency of offensive force. Besides, it ought to be recollected that the great foundation of everything we can do offensively must rest on establishing a sentiment of perfect security at home. That would not be the case if the country was to conceive an idea that their militia force (which in truth is the whole of the regular force exclusive of the Guards) was to be sent out of the country. Unfortunately the Lords Lieutenant of counties, in place of aiding, discouraged the recruiting the supplemental militia into the regiments appropriated to receive them. If they had not done so, we should now have been on velvet with an offensive force adequate to any purpose that can be requisite; but that is over, and we must do the best we can without it; and it shall not be my fault if, with one expedition after another, the coast of France is allowed to sleep sound any one week during the summer. I hope more than one will soon be afloat.

“I suspect the judges are more to blame than juries when justice is not done. If they will be stout, and two-thirds of the jury was made sufficient for condemnation, matters would go on perfectly well.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798], May 31. Wimbledon.—“I send the enclosures for your confidential perusal. No. 1 is already gone; the other two I would not send without a concert with you, in case I should run counter to any assurances or expectations you may have held out to the Portuguese Government. If no such thing stands in the way of it, the strong bent of my mind is to take the King’s sanction, and carry my communication no further than Mr. Pitt, Lord Spencer, and you. If before coming to any general *rendezvous*, the enemy’s force should be scattered, as has been stated, in two or three different places in the Mediterranean, I am strongly impressed with a feeling that, by a sudden *coup de main*, some essential stroke may be struck.”

*Enclosures not found.*

HENRY DUNDAS to [W. PITT].

[1798], May 31. Wimbledon.—“I return the secret despatch which Lord Grenville has put into your hands. The observation you make comprehends the whole that can be stated at this time on that subject. There can be no doubt it would be very eligible to get the force alluded to, and I cannot conceive there

can be any difficulty in combining it with the offensive operations you refer to, provided, as you observe, the force in question is locally situated so as to be able to act in concert with our force, and is not in the neighbourhood of other force to such an extent as that the movements of Waldeck's corps could be controlled by it. It does not occur to me that there can be any objection to Lord Grenville's going as minutely into the subject as he chooses with the gentleman who is come over; only guarding, which his own good sense will lead him to do, against conveying any idea that we have offensive operations in view; and giving to his interviews the turn that our having any such depended on the result of his conferences with the person come over. If it goes so far in treaty as to take the troops for any permanency into our possession, Lord Grenville will do well to have it understood that they may be employed in Jamaica, or the East Indies; I mean particularly the Cape. The reason why I mention particularly Jamaica, Lord Grenville and you will understand more accurately if you will call on John King to point out to you the correspondence which has lately passed between the Duke of Portland's Office and the Island of Jamaica, relative to a force to be maintained at the expense of the island of Jamaica in the event of their not being obliged to maintain any black troops; against which the Assembly of Jamaica have taken a most unreasonable, but a most inveterate prejudice. But it is impossible to reject the substitute they propose; and would certainly greatly facilitate the employment of such a body of foreign troops as those now in question."

#### NOTES ON THE CIVIL WAR IN IRELAND BY LORD AUCKLAND.

1798, May 31. [Dublin.]—"Sir James Duffe yesterday marched against the rebels on Blackmore Hill, near Blessington, in the county of Wicklow; they made off, leaving various articles behind them. They had burnt Lord Downshire's house near to Blessington.

"We hear accounts from Wexford of their murdering *gentlemen*, *Protestant clergymen*, and others; four or five families whom I knew personally have been massacred. Shocking as this is, it has at least contributed to draw off many Protestants who were before among the United Men.

"We have had to-day a very absurd debate; a motion of thanks to Sir James Duffe; a question of adjournment, opposed on the ground of moving for the orders of Government to Dundas; the adjournment carried 90 to 10.

"Throughout the North all is peace and quiet.

"Sir Edward Crosbie headed the rebels at Carlow. He is now being tried by a General Court Martial.

"A commission from Lord Edward Fitz Gerald has been found on a person taken up.

June 1st. "The rebels have burnt the Protestant charter school at Castlecomer.

"General Faucet on the twenty-ninth marched from Duncannon Fort with a company of the Meath regiment.

"The garrison of Wexford have evacuated the town, and is arrived safe at Duncannon Fort.

"Except to the town of Wexford, the communication is open to every part of the kingdom.

"The conduct of the main body of rebels seems to be very improvident; for Wexford lies up in a nook; the bay and river Slaney is on one side, the other open; the troops from Waterford and Duncannon Fort can attack them from the open side, and from Ross also; and they cannot retreat on the other side, because the troops marching from Wicklow, Carlow, and the camp near this town under General Loftus, will shut them up on that side—so that they are between two fires; and should they retreat south or west, they must be stopped by the sea.

"Sir W. W. Wynne landed yesterday, and this day, a number of recruits for his regiment, the terror of the rebels.

"No stir in the North except on the right side. The people called Orangemen keep the country in check, and will overpower the rebels should they stir. If we can rely on keeping down the North, I have no fear as to subduing the rest, and think that we shall be more quiet afterwards than we have been.

"It is a strange circumstance, but, in the midst of this, our revenue receipts are rising, and considerably."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, May 31. Berlin.—"After closing my official letter, I have received a copy, which I have the honour to forward, of the note given by the Prussian Plenipotentiaries to the French Ministers there [Rastadt], on the last demands of France."

#### *Enclosure.*

*"Que le Roi avait appris, avec une peine infinie, les prétentions aussi nouvelles qu'inattendues formées par la République depuis les négociations sur les deux bords de la rive gauche et le principe des indemnités; comme la translation sur la rive droite des dettes des princes perdants sur la rive gauche; et des indemnités de la noblesse immédiate perdant sur cette même rive; la demande de toutes les îles du Rhin, ainsi que des différents points militaires et autres, en deçà du Rhin.*

*"Qu'entre autres, la demande de la démolition d'Ehrenbreitstein avait été très inattendue au Roi; que s[a] M[ajesté] se flattait toutefois que la France changerait encore de sentimens, et serait disposée elle-même à se désister de ses prétentions sur cette forteresse, si elle désirait sincèrement rester avec elle sur un pied d'amitié et de bonne intelligence; puisqu'exiger cette démolition, en conservant en même temps d'autres points militaires sur la rive droite, serait évidemment prendre une attitude offensive et menaçante envers le nord d'Allemagne, et nécessiter de la part de celle-ci, et de*

*celle du Roi en particulier, une continuation non interrompue de mesures de précautions et de défense.*

“*Le Roi est certainement très éloigné d'entrer le moins du monde dans l'idée d'une nouvelle coalition contre la France. S[a] M[aje]sté aime à croire que la République n'annoncera pas des intentions alarmantes en prenant une contenance offensive.*” French.

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 3. Stowe.—“Your kindness in sending me constantly the earliest Irish information has relieved my mind from great uneasiness. I should think from the accounts of this day, that you may now look to an early and successful termination of this rising, as it is impossible for the rebellion to exist, locked up as it now is in the corner of Wexford. The news from the south is the most essential, for I take it for granted that the west is not in a state of preparation for rising; though, if the French Toulon fleet should escape Nelson and Jervis, I should look for them in Galway Bay, or rather in Blacksod, or perhaps Donegal Bay, with a view of communicating in great force with the northern rebels. I see plainly from your letter respecting this Toulon fleet that *you are alive* to it, and without looking too far into that millstone, *I am content*. But I shall not be so unless you urge, upon the spur of this occasion, the question of a Union, which never can be if it be not now. Your arguments respecting the militia are not to my mind conclusive; on the contrary I wish (for the public) that you had accepted my ideas; but individually, I feel glad to be relieved from the chance of going where I feel I ought to have gone, but where I must have gone with great sacrifice of personal feeling. But if you will not send militia, for God's sake send fencibles, of which you have 9 or 10 battalions in England; or Guards, or anything; but send something even if it is only for six weeks. I cannot, however, but urge again and again to you that, by declining the militia question, you make it utterly *impossible* to carry on your system of offensive operations on the coast of France, from which so much might be expected.

“As to your wish respecting the embarkation of our militia in water craft to serve on our coasts, there cannot exist a doubt or difficulty about it; and if upon my arrival at Chelmsford on Thursday (for I sleep in London on Wednesday) I find that you wish me to conduct such an offer, I will undertake it for you in any shape you please.”

LORD GRENVILLE TO MARQUIS CORNWALLIS [Master-General of the Ordnance].

1798, June 4. Cleveland Row.—“I send you a memorandum which I have received from the American Minister. Some of the points, particularly the latter, are matter of very serious deliberation; but with respect to the first articles, it seems to

me that it would evidently be our interest to supply them, if the state of our own resources will allow it.

"I should be much obliged to you to look this paper over, and to let me know your sentiments upon it." *Copy.*

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 5. Duke Street.—"I have seen the Lord Chancellor on the subject of the intended Order in Council for preventing improper persons from coming into this country from Ireland. His Lordship is of opinion that no person ought to be permitted to land without a passport from the Lord Lieutenant or the Commanders of his Majesty's forces, and that the case of *persons flying from the country to avoid the excesses of the rebels* ought to be provided for by private instructions sent from the Treasury and the Secretary of State respectively, to the mayors and Custom House officers. Mr. Pitt is also of this opinion. There certainly will be some difficulty in drawing those private instructions so as that they shall seem to explain and not to limit the King's Order in Council; and yet there is so manifest an objection to making so *large an exception* in the Order itself, that I do not see how the thing can be done but in the way the Lord Chancellor points out.

"I do not think Mozer a likely man to be employed on the Continent with any advantage; but I wish, if possible, to throw the refusal on your Lordship, because I want the man here, and I should probably find him less disposed to serve me if he thought I had thwarted him in what appears now to be his great object. The truth is that *here*, where I have him under my eye, I can ascertain *by other means* the truth of all the information he gives me, which would not be the case were I to employ him at a distance.

"Bayard is about to return to the Continent to-morrow or Friday. I have, according to the instructions I received from your Lordship, long since settled with him that he is to receive a sum of 300*l.* as a gratuity and a consideration for all past services; and I shall desire Mr. Canning to pay him that sum with your Lordship's approbation. If your Lordship could employ him *to give information only*, I am certain you would get it better from him than from any one I know, and I daresay that about 600*l.* a year would be as much as he would require.

"The accounts from Ireland are good as far as they go. Colonel L'Estrange has defeated a large body of the rebels near Vinegar Hill, pursued them with great slaughter for several miles, and taken a position that cuts off the communication of the Wexford rebels with the county of Carlow. An attempt upon the town of Carlow has been defeated."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

[1798, June] 6. Wimbledon.—"I have considered the Portugal business. I really see no good, but the contrary, to arise out of a

long discussion at Cabinet about what force we can allow for the support of Portugal. If it is a thing proper to be done at all, it ought not to be done in a shabby way. I shall prohibit the Cabinet cards from going out to-morrow, or, if they are gone, I will countermand them ; but I will call upon you to-morrow before 12 o'clock, and, after explaining to you what I think we can do without risk, I will then go to the Duke of York and settle the remainder with him, so that it need admit of no delay. I have explained my ideas to Mr. Pitt, who acquiesces perfectly in the result of my statements."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 6. Whitehall.—"On my return home I found the enclosed. I fairly own that my suspicions of Dutheil gain ground every day. He brought me this very young man to my house in the month of February; told me the very history of his sister being arrested, with a long story, of which I did not believe one word, of the means he had employed to get both her and François discharged; and that this young man was sent over to negotiate the affair with him, and to procure the assurance that the sum of money which had been stipulated as the price of their discharge should be paid immediately. What satisfies me of his guilt is that I am certain that he was, at that very moment, acquainted with François's treachery; and that he denied it, though I pressed him strongly on that subject, as well as on some others on which he attempted to deceive me.

"And yet what can be done with this man, master as he is of every secret? It was only yesterday that Bayard, the writer of the enclosed, told me that he had communicated to him his intention of returning to France.

"Does your Lordship see any objection to my sending for him, and questioning him in a natural way about this young man? I sent over by him one hundred pounds to General Badouville in the Temple, which Sir S. Smith tells me he is persuaded he never received. The man is all suspicion, all *chair vire*; and yet by confining my questions and my anger to the supposed non-payment of the money, I think I could learn something from him, without directing his suspicion to the real point.

"The Abbé de Villefort, who is coming over, is his great agent, and most confidential friend. I shall, therefore, for that reason, as well as for many others, be very glad to send him out of the way.

"If anything really serious should come out against Dutheil, there would be no other mode of meeting him than that of confining him under the new Bill."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, June 1-10. Downing Street.]—"You have probably heard the agreeable news that Buonaparte's expedition sailed from Toulon the nineteenth of May, with *twelve* sail of the line and

eight frigates. No mention of the amount of land force, or the destination. I cannot but think that some good event must already have happened, which this west wind, I hope is, bringing to us. In the mean time we must redouble diligence to make use of the few weeks left before his reaching Ireland (if he ever comes). There are one or two leading points, on which I should like much to have an hour's conversation with you, if you could conveniently call here any time this evening."

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 8. Hamburg.—"I had yesterday the honour of receiving your Lordship's private letter of the 1st instant, announcing your ready compliance with my request respecting what I may write from hence on the subject of individuals, for which I return you my best thanks.

"Your Lordship has been pleased to express much more satisfaction than I feel at the way in which I have begun here. Not that any efforts on my part have been wanting, but your Lordship, I am sure, must be sensible that, where all the previous arrangements are to be made, some time must elapse before things can be put in a proper train; and, even with the utmost activity, before much benefit can be derived from one's exertions.

"No means that I can devise shall be unemploy'd for the purpose of tracing out the iniquitous machinations of our disaffected subjects, and their co-operators. I am in hopes of establishing a regular correspondence with Holland, and of finding some intelligent agents who may be sent at no great expense into that country. I am not altogether without hopes of an occasional correspondence with France likewise, but hitherto my progress has not answered to my, perhaps unreasonable, anxiety.

"Mr. Hanbury lately received a packet from an unknown quarter containing a book which he was desired to forward to the Duke of Portland, and at the same time to mention to His Grace that, upon destroying the binding of the book, he would therein find a letter. Mr. Hanbury made up the packet for the Duke and sent it to me, begging I would forward it by the first safe opportunity. I accordingly sent it this morning to Cuxhaven by a messenger who went through this place from Berlin.

"I think it necessary to mention this circumstance to your Lordship to prevent the possibility of any misconception in case it should have otherwise reached you; to prevent I mean the possibility of your imagining that I have any correspondence with any other member of administration than yourself."

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 9. Copenhagen.—"The unfortunate circumstances which have lately taken place in my family, and the distress of mind under which we must all still labour for some time, are the



motives which now induce me to trouble your Lordship with these lines, in order to make a request which the slightest appeal to your own feelings will, I am sure, justify.

"It is fortunate for me that affairs, at present, in this country are not of that consequence or importance as to require any very particular attention from me, as I feel myself wholly incapable of bestowing much thought upon them, however great and unceasing may be my zeal in the service of his Majesty or the common cause; and, as it is possible, though I trust, through the mercy of Providence, not probable, that the approaching trials in Ireland may still involve us in much deeper calamity and anguish of soul, and, consequently, render me still less capable of serving the King usefully in this post, I wish to have his Majesty's sanction to quit it on the first notice which I may receive from my family of an unhappy termination to those trials, on which so great a share of our future happiness and enjoyment of life depends.

"I am, I trust, sufficiently known to your Lordship for you to be certain that I shall make no improper use of the discretionary power to quit my post, which I here solicit; and so distant is it from my wish to relinquish it, on a slight pretext, at a time when I think every man is bound by all that he holds honourable to stand by it, wherever it may be, as long as he thinks he may be useful to his country, that I wish the leave of absence which his Majesty in his bounty may think proper to grant me, to be conditionally restricted to the single event of a confirmation of our fears, and of the more unhappy fortune of our near and much beloved relation who now suffers in confinement."

[LORD AUCKLAND] to [LORD GRENVILLE.]

[1798,] June 9.—"I have a private letter from Cooke written a few hours after the departure of the last messenger, that is about ten or eleven at night.

"It contains nothing material or new; laments the retreat of General Loftus as leaving the county of Wicklow open to the rebels in Wexford. Nothing from General Eustace; mentions the death of Captain Duncan of the Artillery, and adds that General Champagné was to attack the rebels in the Bog of Allen on the sixth."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 10. Chelmsford.—"Again and again I press the immediate embarkation of 10,000 men *of all sorts* for Ireland; for depend upon it that this success will encourage risings in other parts to assist this centre of the revolt in Wexford; and I very much fear that the next accounts will show you a systematic co-operation in the West and South West; and unless you show to a demonstration that your means are equal to the object, believe me you will lose your force in detail. Again I offer my regiment, having consulted my officers, and being confident that the men will be

as zealous as their officers to present a petition to the King, praying that a Bill may be proposed to enable us to serve for six months in Ireland. Indeed the crisis is approaching very fast, and the arguments which you used, though unanswerable in common times, do not apply to a moment so very serious. Pray again consider this, for indeed I wish to be useful. I do not understand why you send the Guards to Portsmouth, for it is *certain* that by the canals you could have deposited them at Liverpool on the fifth day, and the run from thence to Wexford is very short, and not liable to any of the risks which you will run by sending them round the land. Wexford is very open to attack from the sea; for the tide leaves a very hard dry sand of many miles in length, and the effect of a landing there in force would be very decisive upon the rebels, who would be driven out of the town before they had time to know the attacking force, particularly if covered by gun-boats and small frigates. I know that these points are not in your immediate department, but I cannot avoid saying all that occurs to me. The private accounts from Ireland of the horrors in the county of Wicklow are disastrous in the extreme; but as I collect from them that every one is flying from thence to Wales, I cannot but urge the propriety of watching by one or two very active military officers the coasts of Wales, for in that importation there will be much of a very doubtful nature. If you should persist in resisting my offer, I am still at your orders (if you think I can be of the smallest use) to assist you by my local knowledge of Ireland, or in any other way."

COUNT LOUIS C. COBENZL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 10. Rastadt.—"Je viens de recevoir la lettre dont votre Excellence m'a honoré le 29 du mois passé. Infiniment sensible à tout ce qu'elle veut bien me dire d'obligeant, je me tiens très heureux de ce que les nouvelles fonctions que sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné me confier, me mettront à même d'être l'interprète de ses sentiments envers sa Majesté Britannique. Il ne tiendra certainement pas à moi que le concert intime, et la parfaite union, toujours si analogue aux vrais intérêts de nos Cours, mais plus nécessaire que jamais dans les dangers qui menacent l'Europe, ne soient consolidés de la manière la plus indissoluble. C'est le vœu de l'Empereur, qui ne laissera rien désirer de ce qui peut contribuer à un but aussi salutaire. Rien ne me sera plus flatteur que la confiance que, sous ce rapport, je pourrai obtenir d'un ministre aussi éclairé que votre Excellence." *French.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 10. Wotton.—"In the present very critical times every communication is highly interesting to me, and the line which I received from you this morning was doubly so, from my anxiety in having just before heard that Watkin was named in

the *Courier* as being wounded ; the slight contusion of which you speak is certainly not to be regretted, and I do confidently trust that before this reaches you, you will already have had official accounts of some such decisive action as that which you now describe only as a very probable report. All that I hear at this distance of the speed and alacrity with which you are supplying new reinforcements, seems to me to be very creditable to Government, and I take for granted it has not been forgotten to collect something of the naval and volunteer force on the Flintshire coast, for which, as I recollect to have told you, very cheerful offers were made in that country in any shape in which Government would direct it; to Ireland this has always seemed to me a very important object in the present state of things, and even still I conceive it worth attending to, as any force in the neighbourhood of Chester, Park Gate, and Liverpool could not but be highly useful for all military communications between England and Ireland. Major Williams would do best for the Flintshire coast, and, in Watkin's absence, would be assisted by Sir Foster Cunliffe, who is an active zealous man, and was for several years a resident in the city of Chester; to the same purpose Lord Belgrave might quickly make himself useful by going down there. I mention these suggestions loosely, but I daresay they have before now been acted upon, and measures are probably taken by you to draw part of what you can collect towards that coast, as the inconvenience and risk of so long a passage as that from Portsmouth to Dublin is too obvious to escape notice. I do not know to what extent Lord Egremont has offered his services, but if it is true that he has offered to go in person to Ireland, I cannot help thinking that much advantage may be made by his doing so. I do not mean in respect to his Sussex yeomanry; but if he could be persuaded to set the example to our great absentees to go over and personally exert themselves in that country, it seems to me not only that it would give new force and vigour there, but that it would be attended with very beneficial consequences indeed if Ireland saw its English proprietors ready and willing to share the danger of that country, as well as to profit from the rents of it. The pressure of this moment may rouse them to a proper feeling upon this subject, which seems to me an important one, and I know nobody more likely than Lord Egremont, more proper to take the lead, and to influence by his doing so the conduct of others."

WILLIAM WICKHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Secret.*

1798, June 11. Whitehall.—“The official despatches from the Lord Lieutenant, of the eighth instant, confirm the defeat of the rebels at Ross with great slaughter on the fifth, after a most desperate attack on their part. Lord Mountjoye is the only officer named as having fallen on the side of the King's troops. There is no official return of killed and wounded, but their loss is stated to have been inconsiderable.

“The rebels had several *ship guns* with them, but it does not appear that they had any other artillery.

“Bagnal Hervey, and Keogh who lately left Paris, commanded them.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] June 11. Downing Street.—“I am just come to town, chiefly for the purpose of seeing Lord Cornwallis in consequence of a letter I received yesterday from Lord Camden, pressing his coming either as Commander-in-Chief or Lord Lieutenant. I sent it to Dundas, whom I expect every moment, and who has had a *very satisfactory* conversation yesterday with Lord Cornwallis.

“Probably I shall be better able to let you know the result if you can contrive to call in the evening.

“I shall not go out of town till to-morrow. I will give you back your letters when we meet. I keep them now to show them to Dundas.”

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 11. Copenhagen.—“I had the honour to write to your Lordship on the ninth instant, stating my wish to obtain a discretionary power to leave this country for a while on the deprecated event of an unfortunate issue to the approaching trial of my brother Edward; but my anxiety of mind increasing with the miserable state of suspense in which I live with regard to the ultimate fate of that most beloved and unhappy relation, I have this day earnestly to solicit of your Lordship to obtain of his Majesty’s gracious favour the permission for me to return home, on leave of absence, by the first opportunity, if I do not find, in the course of a little time, that alleviation to my pain which may enable me to attend better to the duties of my station than, under the present distressful circumstances, I am capable of doing with advantage to the service of the King.

*Postscript.* “There is nothing new in this part of the world, excepting that the arrival of ten sail of the line of Russian men of war, and three frigates, is daily expected in the Sound on their way to England. The Russian Minister, M. de Kascheleff, has received the official notification of their approaching departure, and has been so good as to send me notice of the same.”

LORD AUCKLAND to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] June 12.—“I have received a letter of the ninth this morning from Dublin. It contains the account of ‘an insurrection in various parts of Antrim; we had lost some men at Antrim, but, on the whole, had been very successful. Poor Lord O’Neil is dangerously wounded. We have good hopes for the North, where we have very many loyal and well armed.

“The New Ross battle was a great one. The rebels’ loss in killed and wounded was not less than 4,000. General Johnson behaved most gallantly.

“We are moving on in good force upon Wexford.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 12. Chelmsford.—“Your bulletin was the more interesting as a check in the arrangement for contracting this rebellion within the narrow district which it now occupies must have been of the most serious consequences. I should hope that there is now no doubt but that the very essential post of New Ross will be maintained till your Waterford force arrives, and *are moved up by water* to it. But I am very anxious that troops should be sent to attack Wexford from the sea, as it is very accessible from that quarter, and a few gunboats or sliding-keel sloops would effectually protect and secure such an operation, which, if successful, would be *conclusive*. I again return to my old cry, militia; and only observe upon your last letter that I hope you will be successful in converting your comrades, notwithstanding the difficulties (which I am perfectly aware of) from colonels who will not go, and from Lords Lieutenants of the sort you describe. I have no vanity to gratify in making the offer to go to Ireland and shall therefore be content to do it at any time and in any mode that may be pointed out as most likely to serve your purpose; but I trust that, as I well know that my officers and men would not bear that any other corps should precede them in this offer, you will not keep me back till we play second or perhaps tenth fiddle in such a concert. I am well aware that nothing can be done but by a new Bill; but as *volenti non fit injuria*, I conceive that the best mode of introducing a Bill for that purpose, under any limitations, would be by stating to Parliament the *petition* of certain corps that they might be employed in Ireland. However on all this I wait the notification of your wishes, and mean to give you the strongest proof of my confidence in you by trusting the matter to you.

“I am very happy to hear that Lord Cornwallis’s mission is resolved, and I sincerely hope that Pelham will return with him, because, unaffectedly, I think that my sins would be much visited upon my brother Tom; and because, having surmised from various circumstances that such a thing was very much in the wishes of Government, I will fairly own that I think the situation very much below his calibre and time of life; and I had arranged in my mind the intention of suggesting to you (in the contingency of Lord Cornwallis’s mission to Ireland) the advantage of sending (as in the case of Lord Essex) a civil Lord Deputy to act under a military Lord Lieutenant. I do not enter into the details of those advantages, for they must be obvious to you; and of all persons I know my brother is most fit for such a situation, and the precedents always place commoners in that commission. Pray ponder well upon this, which will be recommended to you by the opportunity it presents of *bringing up poor Tom’s lee-way*, independent of the thousand other advantages from it.

“As your troopships are now all gone to Ireland, pray suggest the immediate necessity of sending to Bristol and Liverpool to secure some means of embarking troops from those ports, which

must be your two principal points in case you should *at last* do what I always contend you ought to have done *at first*. They are the only two ports that can give an immediate supply of large ships, and their position, as with respect to Ireland, and to the stations of the English militia, particularly recommend them.

“Of your Irish leaders, Keogh is the only one whom I know personally ; you have not described Harvey, but I conclude him to be one of the Harveys of Wexford. Bagnell is too common a name for me to ascertain the man from the surname ; but I suspect him to be a Bagwell (I think James), a cousin of Beauchamp Bagwell, and living on the borders of the county Carlow. Pray continue to feed my impatience with Irish bulletins.”

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, June 12.]—“I have seen Lord Cornwallis, who is ready to go exactly in the way one should wish, as Lord Lieutenant.

“He wishes Pelham, if well enough ; and if not, is most anxious for your brother.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 13. Aylesbury.—“Your note of this day’s post was a very welcome relief from the anxiety which had been produced by your letter of the preceding day, but it is not from personal motives, strong as they are, so much as from public motives, that I rejoice in Pelham’s continuation in office in Ireland ; to me it seems of very considerable importance that a continuance of government should be secured in this new arrangement, and I see by your note that my ideas upon this subject extend beyond the line which you have adopted, and apply as much to Lord Camden as they do to the secretary. By the removal of Lord Camden some little shake is given to the government which actually exists there, and great inconvenience is incurred by the succession of new claims which always takes place upon the succession of a new Lord Lieutenant ; added to this it must be considered that Lord Cornwallis will, for the present, be so much called upon in his military capacity in Ireland, that he will have few if any means of attending to all the civil arrangements, which it is important to keep in the hands of English Government in Ireland, but which he will be obliged to leave entirely to the discretion of the Irish Cabinet ; all this variety of embarrassment might, as it appears to me, be most effectually assisted by making Lord Camden and Lord Cornwallis Lord Deputies, instead of recalling Lord Camden and replacing him by Lord Cornwallis ; nor am I aware of any difficulty in making any such arrangement, either of delicacy to the parties themselves, or of any inconvenience which is likely to result from this joint government. Lord Cornwallis would in this shape add to the authority of Commander-in-Chief all that power which is generally at variance with the Lord Lieutenant, and the civil arrangement of the country would go on in the same track, and be retained to

the English Cabinet much more effectually than it can be, if by being nominally given to Lord Cornwallis it really falls into the hands of the Irish Cabinet; ultimately too, when the rebellion is suppressed, the civil counsels of Lord Cornwallis will afford the opportunity of any new shape, about which Lord Camden alone might feel hampered, but which the two Lord Deputies might with greater facility adopt; a lesser circumstance, but still of some value, is, the novelty of this appointment, which engaging something more of public attention, would perhaps have good effect in Ireland by holding out the prospect of some great and general plan of arrangement."

MEMORANDUM by LORD GRENVILLE.

"Infantry in Great Britain, June 18, exclusive of Fencibles.

Guards	-	-	-	-	-	4500
Regt. Infantry	-	-	-	-	-	4882
Of these only 1 regiment complete	-	-	-	-	-	900
Remains only	-	-	-	-	-	3982

"Which are divided among fourteen regiments, and consist (to the amount of 1500) of recruits from the . . . militia, and many of the remainder, raw recruits."

*Endorsed* :—June 18, 1798.

"This is the statement on which I asserted in the House of Lords that, without explaining particulars, the amount of regular infantry in this country was not sufficient to furnish a further detachment of 12,000 men to Ireland, or even to allow of sending any more reinforcements there (except by means of the militia), without the greatest inconvenience to the public service, and totally cramping our means of acting, in any case, on the enemy's coast, to destroy preparations."

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 18. Naples.—"Having so good an opportunity, I cannot resist the pleasure of sending to your Lordship the enclosed copy of a most interesting letter, for the perusal of your Lordship and of your select friends."

*Enclosure.*

THE QUEEN OF NAPLES to LADY HAMILTON.

1798, June 11.—"Je désire savoir comment va votre santé après toutes les agitations de la journée d'hier, et de cette affreuse incendie. J'ai été, on ne peut pas plus, touché de la lettre, que vous avez eue la complaisance de me faire traduire, du respectable et brave amiral; oui, c'est à la seule venue de la valeureuse escadre Angloise dans la Méditerranée que nous devons le départ de l'escadre Républicaine sans commettre de violences sur nos territoires; mais cette même escadre peut retourner; on en prépare une seconde en toute hâte à Toulon qui sera, dit-on, escorté par leurs amis et alliés, dont le roi et moi rougissons de prononcer le nom, comme alliés de ces monstres. Nos dangers

sont donc bien éloignés d'être passés; les lettres mêmes de hier annoncent la marche hâtée d'un nombre de vingt-cinq milles hommes qui vient en Italie, partie de la Suisse, partie de la France; les Républiques leurs esclaves, Cisalpines et Romaines, ont eu l'ordre de s'armer; toutes ces nouvelles indiquent mauvaise intention contre nous, et ayant en mer des forces si considérables, on n'est jamais sur, car la foi de leurs promesses, écrits, assurances, ou traités, n'a aucune valeur, l'expérience ayant trop prouvé ce qu'ils sont, et ce qu'on peut leur croire. Je vous prie donc par l'amitié que vous m'avez toujours témoignée, et par la confiance qui m'attache si sincèrement à votre grande et respectable nation, d'assurer Lord St. Vincent de notre estime, confiance, comme de notre éternelle reconnaissance pour la promptitude avec laquelle il est accouru à notre défense, à laquelle j'attribue le départ de l'escadre son ennemie, sans commettre vers nous d'hostilités; et auxquelles je désire bien sincèrement que pas un de leurs batimens ne revoie plus les mers, mais qu'ils subissent le sort que je leur souhaite, et que les hommes comme les élémens et toute la nature se combine à les détruire pour le bien de l'humanité. Je vous prie de dire au digne et attaché chevalier votre époux, qu'il veuille bien représenter à sa Cour, nation, comme au valeureux amiral, que si dans ce moment même nous ne pouvons point suivre ce que notre coeur nous inspire, en ouvrant tous les ports à l'escadre entière, remplissant les différentes demandes, qui produiroit une guerre immédiate et ouverte, ce n'est que l'effet de la nécessité, et prudence, devant nous concerter de commun avec les puissances de terre, nommément l'Empereur; et c'est à quoi on travaille avec suite et chaleur pour, s'il étoit possible par un sincère concert général, tomber sur les monstres, et détruire une hidre qui, à la longue, nous dévorera tous; mais que jusque à ce concert arrangé, et qui nous permette de leur déclarer et agir selon nos sentimens, nous devons agir avec circonspection; que, malgré cela, toutes les facilités, soit en admettant dans des ports rapprochés les batimens, soit en rafraichissemens, vivres, secours, nouvelles, tout sera fourni, donné avec plaisir et promptitude, nos sentimens étant tous dévoués à votre brave nation; et que nous n'attendons que la réussite des négociations que nous poussons avec une vigueur, et un sentiment que nous ne retrouvons point dans les autres, qui nous fera suivre et d'abord en remplissant toutes les conditions demandées, que notre coeur approuve; et qu'une alliance bien concertée nous unisse comme nos coeurs et sentimens le sont, et ont toujours été, par des liens et intérêts réciproques. Je recommande cette lettre à votre discrétion et prudence; elle pourroit infiniment me compromettre: ce n'est que le pays et l'état que je crains d'entraîner en malheur, en avouant aussi hautement ma haine, et l'exécration que mon coeur ressent pour eux; car pour moi personnellement je me fais gloire de l'avouer hautement, et le prouver en toute occasion. Je vous prie donc que cela reste entre nous; mais, surtout, ne manquer aucune occasion d'assurer votre brave respectable nation et l'amiral que



le roi mon époux, son fils, mes futurs petits enfans nourissons tous les mêmes sentimens d'amitié, confiance, reconnoissance à vous tous, et que ces sentimens dureront autant que ma vie."

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, June 26. Hamburg.—"In my dispatch, No. 24 of this date, I have the honour of enclosing to your Lordship some notes, which have been put into my hands by a person whom I employ to watch the motions of the Jacobins here. They contain a great deal of stuff, as most of these papers do, but they are the beginning of a plan which may lead to interesting discoveries. The person in question is known for his ability in this way. I have erased one passage to the following effect, or rather in the following words, thinking that it might be more agreeable to your Lordship to receive this information in a private letter, than that it should appear in an official one; '*Les espions d'Angleterre en France sont presque tous connus du Directoire. On croit qu'il est parvenu à cette connoissance par le moyen de deux domestiques François qui sont chez Lord Grenville. Ceux-ci prennent note de toutes les personnes qui vont chez ce Lord, et l'envoient en France.*'

"This is very likely wholly without foundation, but your Lordship knows how much false information one is exposed to. And even were it true, it does not appear that it would lead to the knowledge of almost all the English spies in France."

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, June 26. Copenhagen.—"The fatal catastrophe which has closed the lamentable scene of our distress, is not of a nature to restore me to that peace of mind which is necessary in a situation abroad, where few can join in sympathy of pain with me, and where it is one of my principal duties, and one difficult to be dispensed with among strangers, to see and mix with society and the world. I am not, indeed, equal to that task, and I have most earnestly in consequence to entreat your Lordship to grant me leave to visit my mother and family in England, who have much need of all the comfort that is to be derived from seeing so near a relation as myself to the lost and much beloved object of all their affections.

"There is, it is true, nobody here with whom I can leave the business; but if such a person should be sent out by your Lordship, he may be assured to find every paper marked with its proper label to his hand that he may want, and these I shall deposit under lock and key, with my seal affixed to them, in the hands of the Russian Minister, a man of the first character and my particular friend; if he is prevented from coming out immediately to receive them from myself.

"To induce your Lordship to comply with my earnest solicitations I need not add that the agent for my estate in Ireland has been inhumanly murdered by the insurgents in the county of Kildare, and that I wish much to consult my brother Leinster, who is in London, respecting the appointment of another."

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 1. Berlin.—“ M. Garlike ayant eu la bonté de m'informer qu'il expédioit un courrier à Votre Excellence, je prends la liberté d'en profiter pour m'expliquer plus ouvertement sur des causes générales dont elle a sûrement connoissance, mais auxquelles j'ajouterai peut-être quelque éclaircissement. C'est sûrement un grand problème pour ceux qui observent le danger évident qui menace tous les trônes, que de voir un monarque se conduire comme si ce danger lui étoit inconnu, et c'est ce problème que je vais tâcher de résoudre.

“ Le moyen qu'on employe pour tenir le jeune monarque dans l'ignorance des choses qu'il lui importeroit si fort de bien considérer, c'est la disposition qu'on lui a reconnue à garder le secret de ses pensées ; disposition qu'il a manifestée fortement comme Prince royal, et à laquelle on a adroitement applaudi comme marque d'un grand caractère, en même temps qu'on entreprenoit de diriger ses idées qu'il ne paroisoit pas disposé à se former lui-même par l'application.

“ Voilà sur quoi l'on a bâti avec habilité, et ce qui a donné aux meneurs la certitude qu'il ne les pénétreroit pas. Ils n'ont pas voulu avoir l'apparence de le tellement environner qu'il ne pût entendre qu'eux ; mais ils savoient bien qu'il n'aime pas les longues conversations politiques ; et jugeant quelles seroient les choses qu'on représenteroit d'abord à sa Majesté dans les momens qu'on pourroit saisir, ils les lui ont exposées eux-mêmes avec de grands détails ; de sorte qu'avec quelque force, par exemple, qu'on peigne le système des meneurs de la nation François, leur dessein de renverser les trônes, l'illusion de traiter avec eux, et la nécessité qu'il y a pour les souverains de se réunir pour se garantir mutuellement, on ne dit rien à sa Majesté à quoi elle n'acquiesce, et n'ajoute même des preuves par les faits. Mais quand on vient à en tirer la conséquence qu'il faut donc se réunir, ‘ Vous avez raison (répond sa Majesté) mais vous ne voyez pas tout ’ ; et comme il s'arrête alors sans rien ajouter, on ne peut jamais savoir à quoi il seroit nécessaire d'en venir pour le convaincre, ni à quel point même les espérances dont on le berce pour sa propre sûreté lui ferment les yeux sur les conséquences du danger des autres. Car il est malheureusement une autre cause générale qui influe sur tout, et qui certifie ce qui a été dit dès longtemps par les vrais philosophes, que la religion révélée seule peut faire porter les vues du devoir sur la société entière, et que la prétendu religion naturelle laisse à l'égoïsme toute sa force. On croit devoir songer à soi sans s'embarrasser des autres ; on ne se fait donc pas une étude de leur intérêt, et le cercle d'attention se rétrécit tellement qu'on perd même l'habitude d'examiner comment l'intérêt des autres peut se lier au sien propre ; de sorte que dans les occasions urgentes, à moins que ce motif du devoir ne soit remplacé par beaucoup d'attention et de génie, on est à la merci de ceux à qui il convient de défigurer ce côté du tableau. Tels sont les hommes avec qui le Roi vit le plus

familièrement ; on les trompe, et ils contribuent à entretenir chez lui l'illusion ; et cette barrière est invincible par le secret que fait le Roi de ses motifs aux personnes bien intentionnées, qui seroient résolues de le détromper, s'il leur en fournissoit les moyens en leur parlant ouvertement.

“ Quel moyen de surmonter un tel obstacle ! Nous n'avons pu en concevoir d'autre, M. de Stamford et moi, que la communication immédiate de souverain à souverain, non sur les détails, mais sur les principes, tels que les causes du danger commun, et la nécessité indispensable d'y pourvoir en commun. C'est pour cela que nous réitérâmes nos efforts auprès de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick tandis qu'il étoit ici, en lui présentant ce motif comme devant enfin le déterminer à agir directement ; et c'est aussi la raison de ce que je vais avoir l'honneur d'ajouter.

“ Votre Excellence a eu la bonté de me faire accuser par M. Hammond la réception des lettres que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire les 4, 7, 12, et 15 May ; depuis j'ai eu encore l'honneur de lui écrire le 29, et de l'informer que, pendant l'absence du Roi et de M. de Stamford, je me proposois de faire une tournée d'observations d'histoire naturelle. Je pris Dresde pour le commencement de ma route, et je m'y procurai diverses introductions ; entr'autres auprès de M. le Baron de Gultsmidt par M. le Comte Charles de Brühl, et de M. Elliot par my Lord Elgin.

“ M. Elliot m'ayant reçu d'une manière très obligeante, je lui communiquai mon dessein de tâcher de m'approcher de s'a[ltesse] Electorale, à quoi il eut la bonté de prendre intérêt, en m'assistant de son influence, et m'instruisant des dispositions de cette Cour pour que je pusse m'y diriger. J'eus l'honneur de voir d'abord M. de Gultschmidt, qui, par la connoissance de mes ouvrages, me fit l'honneur de me recevoir très cordialement, m'assurant que j'étois connu de la même manière par l'Electeur. J'eus ensuite l'honneur de voir M. le Comte de Loof et M. le Comte de Marcolini ; et ce dernier me fit l'honneur de me mener à Pilnitz pour m'y présenter à s'a[ltesse] E[lectorale] qui avoit bien voulu m'y recevoir comme homme de lettres, instruit cependant par M. Gutschmidt que je désirois beaucoup d'avoir le bonheur de l'entretenir sur l'état de l'Europe, dont il m'avoit trouvé bien instruit dans notre conversation.

“ Je ne perdis pas du temps à peindre cet état, sachant par les deux ministres et par M. Elliot que s'a[ltesse] E[lectorale] en étoit pénétrée ; mais, je m'attachai aux obstacles qu'éprouvoit à Berlin la réunion si importante, et aux vains efforts que feroient des simples particuliers pour les surmonter, si des souverains éclairés ne travailloient directement à dissiper les fausses lueurs dont étoit environné celui dont dependoit si fort le salut de l'Europe.

“ S'a[ltesse] é[lectorale] eut la bonté de m'écouter avec beaucoup d'attention, et comme elle étoit informée de la démarche de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, j'eus l'honneur de lui apprendre le départ de M. de Stamford pour Vienne, et ses vues, ce qui lui fit beaucoup de plaisir ; et en général, s'a[ltesse]

é[lectorale] manifesta tous les sentimens d'un prince, nonseulement très instruit, mais vertueux et ferme.

“ M. de Thugut ayant témoigné à M. de Stamford qu'il souhaitoit, qu'à son passage à Dresde, il s'y entretint avec les Ministres, il y a présenté le même tableau que moi avec de nouveaux détails, et a pressé de même la nécessité de l'intervention des souverains eux-mêmes, comme s'agissant d'un nouvel état de choses qui les intéresse tous de la même manière; et nous ne sommes pas sans espérance que s'a[ltesse] é[lectorale] ne s'y détermine.

“ Je ne dois pas entrer dans des détails sur le voyage de M. de Stamford, puisque votre Excellence aura eu sans doute déjà communication par Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange d'un premier rapport qu'il a eu l'honneur de lui faire de Vienne, et l'aura de celui qui part par ce courrier; outre qu'il en a communiqué toutes les circonstances à Sir Morton Eden, à my Lord Elgin, et enfin jusqu' à Dresde à M. Garlike. Votre Excellence l'y aura vu représenter à l'Empereur combien il importeroit que s[a] M[ajesté] continuât d'écrire elle-même au Roi de Prusse, se fondant sur le motif que j'ai eu l'honneur d'exposer ci-dessus.

“ Mais il y a une circonstance très fâcheuse, dont M. de Stamford n'a pas fait mention dans ses rapports; c'est que M. de Cobenzel, qui conserve du crédit, ne marche pas entièrement de concert avec M. de Thugut; que malgré ce que doivent lui faire comprendre les suites de sa négociation de Campo Formio, il ne cesse point de chercher à négocier avec les François, ayant pour cela des conférences à Selze avec Neuchateau; ce dont on se sert ici pour ôter au Roi toute confiance en la Cour de Vienne; sous prétexte qu'on ne sait point lequel des deux ministres l'emportera dans l'esprit de l'Empereur, et qu'il pourroit y avoir là une nouvelle paix, tandis qu'on sollicite ici des déclarations plus ou moins hostiles. Tout cela s'aplaniroit avec de la bonne intention, en se demandant mutuellement explication de ce qui offusque; c'est ce que je disois à M. de H[augwitz]; mais comme cela sert beaucoup son plan de ne pas remuer, il ne le fera pas; comme, d'un autre côté, il y a peu d'apparence que M. de Cobenzel veuille cesser de négocier, tandis qu'on ne doute pas qu'il n'y ait des négociations ici.

“ Voilà Siéyès qui, dit-on, renouvelle la réquisition de dédormager les Princes de la rive gauche du Rhin, par les sécularisations sur la rive droite; système infernal, qui enfonceroit de toute manière le poignard dans ce qui reste de l'Empire. J'ai sollicité M. le Chamb[ellan] de Reck, qui sent tout l'odieux et l'insidieux de cette réquisition, d'en faire usage pour frapper l'esprit du Roi.

“ M. de Stamford, dont l'état après ce voyage exige quelques précautions, se propose après *l'hommage* de partir pour quelque bains; d'autant plus qu'il trouve sa commission spéciale terminée, et que sans un renouvellement par de nouvelles instructions de Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange, il n'a plus de motif de rester ici. C'est ce qu'il m'a chargé d'avoir l'honneur de représenter de sa part à votre Excellence, pour

qu'elle en juge suivant sa sagesse. Il ne met point en balance son besoin de repos dans l'état de sa santé, et s'il étoit trouvé utile à quelque chose, il s'y employeroit de tout son pouvoir.

“En attendant comme, malgré l'expérience du passé à l'égard des efforts qu'on peut attendre de la part de Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswick, c'est pourtant sur lui que se tournent toujours les regards pour le moment où ses propres illusions sur le Ministre d'ici viendroient à cesser, il est important de conserver les relations avec s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime]. C'est pour quoi, comme elle a temoigné que son jugement final de ce Ministre dépendroit de sa marche dans la négociation, M. le Comte de Panin, le plus ferme et le plus éclairé des négociateurs, sera en correspondance avec M. de Stamford, par le désir de s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] et pour son instruction.

“Quant à moi, qui me vois bien plus inutile, je ne crois pas cependant devoir quitter Berlin avant que de connoître les intentions de votre Excellence à cet égard. Je puis y rester sans conséquence jusqu'alors, et pour tout le temps nécessaire, parcequ'on connoît bien mes relations avec les naturalistes et leur but. Mais, dès que mon séjour ici n'auroit plus d'autre utilité, j'irois me vouer tout entier aux autres fonctions pour lesquelles notre auguste monarque, vrai *Défenseur de la Foi*, a daigné m'honorer de sa confiance. Car je sens plus que jamais que si la Révélation ne redevient pas la règle des hommes, quelque effort qu'on fasse d'ailleurs, le renversement de la société qui n'a jamais reposé que sur elle est inévitable.

“J'ai l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence copie d'une lettre de la même personne dont elle a déjà eu une sur l'étrange expédition de Toulon, à l'égard de laquelle tous les détails sûrs peuvent avoir quelque utilité; et quoique votre Excellence reçoive bien sûrement toutes les intelligences de la Suisse; comme quelques pièces peuvent cependant échapper, je prends la liberté d'en joindre une bien caractéristique de l'état où se trouve ce pauvre pays.

“M. de Stamford a engagé M. l'Avoyer Steiguer à venir ici. J'ai eu l'honneur de connoître autrefois ce vénérable magistrat, et nous ferons tout ce qui dépendra de nous, M. de Stamford et moi, pour diriger ses informations au Roi sur les objets qui pourroient le plus ébranler sa sécurité.”

*One Enclosure.*

*Enclosure.*

1798, May 13, on board the *Tonnant*, Toulon.—“Avant de partir, mon vertueux ami, je viens vous dire adieu, et vous demander quelque intérêt pour une caravane savante destinée à parcourir l'Égypte, l'Arabie, la Perse, et les Indes, pour y reporter les lumières de la philosophie et de toutes les connoissances humaines, lesquelles se sont bien accrues depuis qu'elles sont sorties de ces mêmes contrées, où elles ont pris naissance pour venir en Europe. Mais notre mission ne ressemble pas à celle des anciens philosophes, qui, après avoir étudié à Héliopolis ou Thèbes, revenoient dans leur patrie répandre les connoissances

qu'ils avoient acquises, et n'employoient d'autre moyen que celui de l'éloquence. Si nous avons aussi des moyens de séduction et de persuasion, nous en avons encore d'autres qui ont réussi aux successeurs de Mahomet quand ils ont voulu propager sa religion. Nous avons la puissance des armes; nous aurons les droits de la victoire pour convaincre les peuples que nous sommes plus savans qu'eux puisque nous sommes plus forts. Car le bon emploi de la force est maintenant associé à la science. Puissions nous leur persuader aussi, par notre conduite envers eux, que nous somme également bons et vertueux.

“ Je suis au moment de partir; au moins l'ordre en est donné, et nous ne dépendons plus que du vent. Si nous n'avions pas avec nous Buonaparte, ses talens et sa fortune, nous croirions qu'il manque encore beaucoup de choses pour assurer le succès de notre grand expédition; mais avec lui notre confiance est entière, l'enthousiasme des troupes de terre embarquées sur les vaisseaux est extrême; elles sont accoutumées à vaincre sous ce général; il seroit à désirer que cette ardeur se communiquât aux marins, qui ne la partagent point encore, et dont le nombre n'est rien moins que suffisant.

“ Je suis embarqué sur un vaisseau de 80 canons, commandé par un de mes amis qui a été mon élève; ce qui me procure pour le temps de ma traversée tout l'agrément possible. Notre caravane savante surpasse le nombre de cent; nous avons aussi des artistes, des littérateurs, des poètes; et à chaque instant retrouvant ici des gens de ma connoissance auxquels je ne soupçonnois pas l'ardeur des voyages, je m'étonne de voir réunies autant de personnes qui semblent étrangères au but apparent de notre entreprise.\* Je ne suis pas peu étonné moi-même d'être associé à une expédition militaire, ayant renoncé depuis longtemps au métier des armes, et sachant que les sciences aiment le repos d'esprit et la liberté d'agir, qui ne peuvent se trouver au milieu des camps et des appareils militaires. Je crains donc d'être encore longtemps sans pouvoir exercer mon métier de naturaliste. Jusqu'à ce que nous soyons solidement établis en Egypte et partout ailleurs, nous ne pourrons étudier les montagnes de la Thébaïde et de l'Arabie, que lorsque nous ne craindrons plus d'être inquiétés par les Bedouins.

“ J'aime mieux arrêter ma pensée sur les contrées que je vais visiter et les choses extraordinaires que je vais voir, que de la tenir fixée sur les parens et amis que je laisse en Europe. Mon coeur est profondément affecté de m'éloigner d'eux, et de savoir qu'il en est bien peu qui soient heureux. Je désire bien vivement que, pendant mon absence, la tranquillité publique s'affermisse et que la paix se fasse, afin de vous trouver tous à mon retour dans une situation plus propice. Mettons notre confiance à la Providence, et espérons que nous reverrons. Lorsque je marcherai péniblement dans les sables brulans de l'Arabie, je regretterai plus d'une fois l'air pur et frais des hautes Alpes.

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\* On a fait dans les derniers temps de l'expédition une recrue de gens de loi.

Mais il faut se laisser entrainer par la destinée, et recevoir avec la même fermeté les maux et les biens par lesquels la fortune nous éprouve.

“Je pourrai recevoir des nouvelles de mes amis lorsque, m’adressant leurs lettres à Toulon, ils y joindront au titre de membre de l’Institut National, celui d’employé à la grand expédition.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 5. Wimbledon.—“You will learn from Cauning the arrangement proposed respecting India and Portugal, in consequence of talking over the business with Dundas. I hope it will answer both purposes satisfactorily. The possibility of augmenting our Mediterranean force must, I conceive, depend entirely on the degree of expedition with which we raise men here, or on the certainty of having the permanent use of the Russian fleet, or on some arrangement such as we discussed yesterday with America. I do not see any other prospect, unless you point at any local means of augmentation in the Mediterranean, which I am not aware of, and in the present state of the war, can hardly conceive.

“I will write to Lord de Dunstanville about his living, on which I can only refer him to the Chancellor.

“I was not the least aware of the impression you suppose in the Duke of Portland’s mind, but will certainly take measures to prevent its being confirmed, which I hope there will be no difficulty in doing.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 6. Dublin.—“I have not time to say much to you, nor do I see my way clearly enough through all the difficulties of this moment to form any very decided opinions respecting the state of this kingdom. But it seems as if the moment was very critical, and certainly it will require Lord Cornwallis’s best exertions to save Ireland from a very long and a very fanatical war. Much as I had trusted to my knowledge of this country, I had not a conception of the extent to which the religious differences are now carried; or of the creed of persecution, preached by both sects, as indispensable to the peace of the country. The barbarities and the bigotry of the Catholics can only be equalled by the project of *extirpation* of which *all good Protestants* talk with great composure as the only cure for the present, and the only sure preventive for the future. Nor do I find *one* who does not believe that it is the interest and intention of Great Britain to fight that battle *usque ad internecionem*. My opinions have been eagerly sought, and as cautiously withheld, save from the *one person* whom I thought they might assist; and I am happy to find he agrees with me *in toto*, but the *quomodo* must be most difficult. I do not choose to write by the post all I think upon subjects so nice, but I see the moment and the panic fitting fast away. In the course of a few days I shall be able to

judge of the effect of Lord Cornwallis's pardons; at present I am persuaded that neither he nor any one else can calculate upon the effect of the proclamations and of the change of his system. But I hope he is prepared with *what is to follow*.

"Adieu. I am interrupted and have only time to say that I am well, and very much worried, and that I have taken refuge from all politics in my barrack room up three pair of stairs."

*Postscript.* "Believe me that Pelham's return would do infinite mischief, for he is sunk in character here very much. I could not have imagined that he had degraded himself so much in *everyone's* mind to the degree I find he has. It is only in confidence that I tell you, that *the one person* told me *he hoped to God that Pelham would not return*. I enclose a bulletin. Pray read all this to Tom, with many thanks for his letters."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 6. Richmond.—"Je vous rend mille graces, pour la communication confidentielle (dont je vous assure que je n'abuserai d'aucune manière) et pour les sentiments que vous exprimez à mon égard à cette occasion. Rien ne me flatte tant que l'estime et l'amitié d'une personne que j'aime et que j'estime autant que vous. Vous vous souvenez, j'espère, que dès le premier jour que j'ai eu l'occasion de vous parler à votre entrée dans le département des Affaires Etrangères, dans un moment où nos deux pays, ayant déviés de leurs vrais intérêts, étaient encore remplis de méfiance et de rancune réciproques, je vous fis ma profession de foi politique, qui a été, qui est, et qui sera toujours que rien ne peut être plus avantageux pour nos patries que d'être bien unies entre elles; que c'est de toutes les alliances la plus naturelle et la plus réciproquement utile; et que si, depuis quelques années, elles ont malheureusement oublié leurs propres intérêts, il est temps de revenir au vrai système de leur politique; et que, si le ministère anglais désire de renouer l'ancienne liaison et amitié entre les deux pays, il trouvera toujours en moi le coopérateur le plus zélé pour cette œuvre si salulaire; que je me flatte de trouver en vous plus de disposition que n'en avait votre prédécesseur pour cet objet; et que, dans ce cas, j'ose vous assurer d'avance que vous serez content de moi. Effectivement j'eus le bonheur de rencontrer en vous le ministre que je cherchais vainement depuis sept ans que j'étais ici. L'heureuse réunion de nos patries est votre ouvrage. Vous l'avez fortement voulu, et vous l'avez exécuté. Aussi vous m'avez attaché à vous pour la vie, je vous suis reconnaissant pour le bien qui en est résulté pour les deux pays; et si j'ai mérité votre amitié et votre confiance, c'est par le zèle que vous avez trouvé en moi pour cette réunion, dont l'honneur vous est dû tout-à-fait.

"Avec ma profession de foi politique, partout où je serai, je ne m'écarterai jamais de ces principes gravés dans mon âme; mais je doute que je puisse être utile étant à Pétersbourg; car il y a des circonstances assez fréquentes où un homme peut faire



mieux de loin que de près ; et je vais vous expliquer mon cas avec la confiance illimitée que j'ai en vous. Partout ce que je sais par moi-même, et partout ce qui me revient de bonne source du caractère de l'Empereur ; il est juste, est bon, mais vif, ne supportant pas les contradictions, ne souffrant pas même les représentations les plus ménagées et les plus circonspectes ; c'est ce qui fait qu'il se dégoûte si facilement de ceux avec qui il est à traiter d'affaires, et que ces personnes se retirent des affaires, ou ont la bassesse de rester après avoir perdu sa confiance, et étant maltraités par lui. Le prince Bezborodko est une exception unique d'un homme qui se conserve dans une considération permanente ; mais il ne le doit qu'à un caractère tout-à-fait unique dans son espèce. Je le connais parfaitement, étant lié avec lui depuis 1779. Cet homme, avec un génie sublime, et les talents les plus rares, les rend très souvent inutiles par une bonhomie poussée au dernier excès. Avec des lumières supérieures, il cède à ceux qui en ont beaucoup moins, pour éviter la dispute ; rester tranquille et éviter le trouble est son suprême bonheur. Il est incapable de parler avec fermeté à son souverain, même à ses égaux, pas même à ses inférieurs. Il cède à tous, comme un mari débonnaire le fait envers une femme acariâtre pour avoir la paix dans le ménage. Ce n'est que quand on le consulte sur une affaire où on n'a pas pris de parti encore, et qu'il se voit le maître de donner son opinion, qu'il la donne, et que cette opinion est vraiment toujours lumineuse. C'est avec ce caractère qu'il s'est soutenu près de vingt ans sous la feu impératrice, malgré que plusieurs de ses amants ont fait des tentatives réitérées pour le chasser. Il se soutient à présent, et se soutiendra longtemps. Il est à désirer qu'il conserve son crédit ; car s'il ne donne pas tous les avis qu'il aurait pu donner, au moins il est incapable d'en donner des mauvais. Quand à moi, dans quelque place que je me trouverais auprès de la personne de l'empereur, je suis sûr de ne pas tenir trois mois, car n'ayant pas les talents du prince Bezborodko, je n'ai pas non plus cette facilité, ce pliant de caractère qui lui est particulier. Je ne pourrais jamais m'empêcher, coûte qui coûte, de représenter contre toute chose qui me paraîtrait injuste ou impolitique ; ce qui me ferait chasser comme un censeur incommode, avec lequel il est insupportable de traiter d'affaire. Je serais donc chassé d'une place que je ne désire pas d'avoir, et je ne retrouverais plus le poste de Londres que je désire de conserver, parceque je me trouve parfaitement heureux dans ce pays depuis qu'il est uni d'amitié avec le mien. Je puis, en restant ici, être moins inutile pour la continuation de cette heureuse union. L'Empereur, comme je vous l'ai dépeint, est foncièrement bon et juste. Aussi, dès que le premier moment de vivacité est passé, il revient par réflexion et par lui-même à la raison que le premier mouvement avait offusqué. C'est ce qui fait l'avantage de ceux qui ont des relations avec lui de loin, et par écrit, sur ceux qui traitent avec lui de bouche. Si j'avais eu la permission d'aller en Russie par congé quand vous m'avez demandé d'arrêter ici l'escadre de l'Amiral Makaroff, malgré

l'ordre précis de l'Empereur pour son retour immédiat, et si, au lieu de lui exposer par écrit toutes les raisons irréfragables qui m'ont induit à le désobéir, je serais venu moi-même les lui exposer de bouche, il n'y a pas de doute qu'il m'aurait maltraité de parole, et m'aurait renvoyé du service comme un homme tout-à-fait incapable; mais ayant lu ma dépêche, et s'être exalté peut-être dans sa mauvaise humeur, le calme de la réflexion le fait revenir sur le droit chemin, et il a éprouvé ma conduite parcequ'il avait trois jours de distance entre la réception de ce que je lui ai écrit et la réponse qu'il devait me faire. Dans d'autres circonstances, de moindre importance il est vrai, mais que je n'aurais pas pu faire de bouche, j'ai réussi en écrivant. Aussi je suis résolu de m'excuser d'accepter telle place qu'on m'offrira sans excepter aucune; et pour excuse je plaiderai l'état de ma santé, qui effectivement se détériore toujours pendant les hivers qui sont à Pétersbourg, de toute autre durée et intensité qu'en Angleterre. D'après cet exposé je me flatte que vous approuverez mon plan, qui est de vivre dans ce pays que j'aime, où je suis parfaitement heureux, et où je puis être de quelqu'utilité pour le maintien de l'harmonie entre nos deux patries. Pardonnez-moi la prolixité de ce billet; mais je ne pouvais être laconique, ayant à m'expliquer à fond, et à ouvrir mon cœur à un ami dont je désire d'avoir toujours l'approbation. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous répéter combien je vous suis attaché; c'est un sentiment qui ne finira qu'avec mon existence."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, July 1-7.] London.—"Voici ma première lettre officielle pour entamer notre besogne. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous mander bien que M. de Thugut avait déclaré que l'affaire du million six cent mille livres regardait directement le département des Affaires Etrangères, et que M. Ransonet n'avait d'autre instruction à cet égard que celle de parler hautement de notre volonté et résolution de faire honneur à tous nos engagements quelconques. Les lettres que j'ai reçues de Vienne aujourd'hui me donnent l'espoir presque certain de recevoir incessamment des ordres conformés à vos désirs. Daignez donc vous armer encore d'un peu de patience à ce sujet. Il n'y a rien de pis que de brusquer les choses, surtout quand elles peuvent bien tourner. Je vous connais assez pour ne pas douter que vous seriez le premier à regretter une démarche dictée par la vivacité, si vous voyez après coup que vous aviez obtenu par bonne manière ce que certainement la menace n'opérera pas. Encore une fois, vous savez que je ne vous trompe pas; je crois que vous serez content, au moins ne serez-vous plus longtems en doute.

"Quant aux propositions de Ransonet, comme elles regardent essentiellement les prêteurs de notre emprunt de 4,600,000*l.* il en parle aujourd'hui à M. Boyd, et j'aurai l'honneur de vous en entretenir le jour que vous jugerez à propos. Je vous proposerais les différens modes; et nous conviendrons, de vous à

moi, de celui que je ferai adopter à ma Cour. Vous me trouverez, j'espère, dans cette occasion tel que je me flatte que vous avez toujours dû me juger, savoir, *honnête, franc*, et désirant par-dessus tout, de faire *ce qui vous est agréable*."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, July 7. Dropmore.—"Je viens de recevoir votre lettre, et je n'ai pu qu'y reconnaître le même caractère et justesse d'esprit que je vous connais depuis si longtemps. C'est avec un vrai plaisir que je me suis toujours rappelé la manière franche et vraie dont vous me parlates, dès notre première conversation, de vos sentiments par rapport à l'union de nos deux pays. Je vous répondis peu de choses alors, parceque je n'étais pas autorisé d'aller plus loin, et que je ne voulais pas entreprendre de vous tromper. Cependant mes sentiments n'ont jamais varié à cet égard ; et dès le moment que les circonstances m'ont permis de travailler à ce rapprochement, je me suis félicité de trouver en vous un coopérateur zélé, unissant à des talents et des connaissances supérieures, cette droiture et probité sans lesquelles tout le reste n'est rien.

"Avec ces sentiments à votre égard (et ils sont bien sincères), je le regarderais certainement comme un très grand bonheur de vous voir à la tête des affaires à Pétersbourg, et de savoir que je pourrais, dans toutes les occasions, m'ouvrir à vous avec la même franchise que dans nos conférences ici, et compter avec la même confiance sur ce que vous pourrez me dire en retour. Je ne puis, cependant, que reconnaître la force des raisons que vous alléguiez ; et quoique je pense que votre caractère inspirerait certainement de la confiance là, comme partout ailleurs, je sens aussi que le premier mouvement d'impatience s'accommoderait mal d'un homme accoutumé de dire son avis, et de le soutenir avec liberté et fermeté. Continuez, je vous prie, de m'accorder votre estime, et soyez persuadé que vous n'avez pas d'ami plus sincère ni plus attaché que moi." *Copy.*

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, July 7. Copenhagen.—"I cannot but feel flattered by the wish which you express in your private letter of the 21st June for me to continue abroad and not to urge my request for leave to return home. Your expressions of concern and regard for me have not, either, been lost upon me, and I feel every wish on my side to do that which may be most agreeable to you.

"Your letter has occasioned a combat within my breast between my public and domestic duties, and I am disposed to sacrifice my private wishes to the service I owe my sovereign, if those of my family, and especially of my distressed mother, can be reconciled also with that determination. I have this day written home in confidence to those who see her most to inquire exactly into the state of her health and spirits ; and I must be

guided by their answer as to my ultimate resolution. Your own heart will account to you for what I experience on this occasion ; your own feelings will plead my excuse ; and the esteem you are so good as to express for me will acquire additional strength from the freedom and candour with which I have explained myself."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, July 8. Dropmore.—"Je vous suis infiniment obligé pour toutes les expressions flatteuses de votre billet. L'approbation de ceux qui ont du caractère et de l'élévation d'âme est bien faite pour nous consoler des chicanes et des tergiversations qui se multiplient de jour en jour.

"Je regrette infiniment cette prise de Malthe. C'était le seul moyen d'échapper qui restait à Buonaparte ; et encore dans trois jours celui-là allait aussi lui être coupé, si Nelson l'avait pu joindre. Le blocus sera long, fatigant, et très décourageant pour nos officiers et équipages. Vous saurez, apparemment, qu'après avoir tant sollicité cet escadre, votre Cour semble aujourd'hui se refuser aux seuls moyens de le mettre en état de lui rendre quelques services. *Nil admirari* est une leçon dans laquelle je me perfectionne de jour en jour ; et si c'est là en effet le vrai secret du bonheur, j'aurai des grands obligations à votre ministère.

"Mes sentimens pour vous ne varieront jamais. Je ne sais de Boyd que ce vous me marquez." *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, July 8.] York Farm.—"Depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire, j'ai reçu, par l'occasion de l'arrivée du courier de M. le Chevalier Eden, des nouvelles dépêches chiffrées, assez volumineuses, de ma Cour. En tirant la quintessence de l'enveloppe entortillée dont elles sont revêtues, j'y découvre :—

1. "Un vrai désir de recommencer les hostilités, et la conviction que l'on sera toujours obligé d'en venir à ce parti.

2. "L'envie de s'entendre avec vous sur un objet d'un intérêt aussi majeur.

"Ces deux volontés sincères sont balancées et même paralysées :—

(1) "Par un orgueil très plat qui fait qu'on se gendarme de la manière décidée, et exclusivement préalable de toute autre négociation, dont vous exigez la satisfaction. Vous savez comme je pense à ce sujet, aussi je me dispense des réflexions.

(2) "Par la crainte qu'en vertu des secours que vous pourrez nous donner, vous ne vouliez dicter impérieusement la mode des opérations militaires.

(3) "Par une autre crainte, assez naturelle à la vérité, que les secours que vous méditez de nous donner, ne soient pas suffisans, puisque vous refusez de les articuler."

"On a peur en outre (et cette timidité honteuse n'a jamais cessé) que si on ratifiait avant d'être sûr des moyens de faire la

guerre, la France ne prit sur le champ ce prétexte pour tomber sur nous avant que nous ne fassions en mesure de lui résister.

“J’ai toujours fait profession de vous parler avec franchise, et je ne m’en écarterai pas dans ce moment-ci. C’est à votre sagesse à décider si vous voulez nous remettre en jeu, si vous jugez la chose essentielle au salut de l’Europe, ou non. Dans ce dernier cas abandonnez-nous, et laissez rouler le monde vers sa ruine ; mais si vous voulez encore sérieusement sauver l’Europe, sacrifiez un instant une dignité soi-disante à un intérêt majeur et réel. Les plus raisonnables seront ceux qui agiront avec le plus de gloire. Articulez

(1) “Le montant des secours,

(2) “Que vous ne vous mêlerez point du plan de campagne, et

(3) “Chargez-vous de l’entretien du corps à employer en Suisse.

“Voilà le résumé de ce que je crois que le courier que j’attends de Vienne, m’apportera l’ordre de vous proposer officiellement. Ce serait gagner un tems bien précieux que de la prévenir, et vous pouvez disposer de moi. Vous me reconnaîtrez dans cette occasion comme toujours, j’ai mis de côté tous les détours pour aller au fait. Je suis sûr que de cette manière, en mettant, comme de raison, la ratification comme *conditio sine qua non*, mais non pas comme préalable impérieux avant d’ouvrir la bouche, vous l’obtiendrez immédiatement, et les hostilités recommenceront sur le champ. Nous venons de faire des achats énormes de magasins et de provisions. Tout est prêt. Il ne faut que donner la première impulsion. Elle est dans vos mains ; mais la déclaration que M. Eden a voulu exiger si positivement, en annonçant seulement que l’escadre Anglaise *arriverait* dans la Méditerranée, ne pouvait jamais réussir. Ce n’est pas en nous roidissant que nous nous entendrons, et l’univers sera la dupe d’une obstination réciproque de dignité entre deux Cours, qui en s’en sacrifiant mutuellement les apparences, actuellement se sauveront du malheur, aussi horrible que certain, d’être bientôt forcées d’en faire le sacrifice réel à l’anarchie.

“On me mande, en outre, qu’il vient d’être signé un traité défensif entre notre Cour et celle de Naples, et on m’autorise à vous en donner part ; mais en vous demandant le secret, parce que la ratification n’en est point encore arrivée. Ceci est d’un bon augure pour nos projets à vous et à moi. De grâce un peu plus de complaisance, et tout peut aller encore.

“Vous jugez bien que cette lettre n’est autre chose que l’effusion de ma confiance dans le sein d’un ami aussi sûr que respectable et éclairé. Nous en causerons quand vous le jugerez à propos.”

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.

*Private.*

1798, July 8. Drommore.—“I am much obliged to you for the hint contained in your private letter on a subject which I should have been very sorry you had not mentioned to me. The intelligence is, however, wholly unfounded. At the beginning of

the war I parted with the only French servant I had because I knew that if he was honest he would not be thought so. Since that I have only Englishmen in my service. Many of the names contained in the enclosure in your last dispatch are those of persons whom we know to be concerned in the treasonable correspondence." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, July 10. Dropmore.—“ Permettez-moi de vous le dire avec franchise : vous perdez votre tems et vos peines en voulant raisonner sur la conduite de votre Cour.

*“Que res. Nec modum habet, neque consilium ratione modoque. Tractari non vult.*

“ Nous nous sommes connus depuis assez longtems pour que j'ose me flatter d'avoir quelque droit à être cru *de vous*, quand je vous affirme que la condition préliminaire que nous avons demandée est nécessaire, non pas parceque nous la voulons, mais parceque la réussite de toutes nos mesures pour vous aider y tient absolument.

“ On veut mieux connaître notre constitution et la marche de nos affaires à Vienne que nous le faisons, nous qui en sommes chargés. Soit. On aura tout le loisir de s'en repentir. J'espère bien que l'Angleterre se sauvera du naufrage général ; et si même cela n'était pas, nous aurons succombés en combattant, et non pas en cédant lâchement à nos ennemis, et en ne montrant de la résolution que contre nos amis.

“ Je vous parle à cœur ouvert, et d'ami en ami. Le Secrétaire d'Etat en écrira dans le même sens au ministre du Roi à Vienne, mais dans des termes plus officielles.” *Copy.*

BARON DE THUGUT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 10. Vienna.—“ J'ai été vivement touché des expressions remplies de bonté et d'obligeance de la lettre dont votre Excellence m'a honoré en date du 29 mai. Rien n'aurait été plus flatteur pour moi que d'avoir obtenu, pendant ma gestion des affaires étrangères, le précieux suffrage d'un grand homme d'état tel que vous, dont l'énergie et les talents supérieurs font depuis longtems l'objet de ma constante admiration. J'espère que vous ne douterez nullement qu'aussi longtems que l'Empereur daignera m'accorder quelque part dans sa confiance, les efforts de mon zèle tendront toujours vers le but important d'une union intime entre les deux couronnes, que je regarde comme le moyen le plus efficace pour prévenir, s'il en temps encore, l'effrayante catastrophe, dont l'Europe continue d'être menacée. Mes principes à cet égard ne varieront jamais ; les sentiments personnels de nos deux souverains et la profonde estime qu'a inspiré à sa Majesté la noble et inébranlable fermeté que sa Majesté Britannique ne cesse de déployer dans les circonstances les plus difficiles, doivent garantir le succès de nos vœux communs, et le concours efficace des lumières et des soins de votre Excellence me fournit un

nouveau motif de certitude à cet égard. J'aime donc à me flatter avec confiance, que l'Europe devra encore son salut à un accord parfait entre les deux couronnes sur toutes les mesures que les conjonctures demandront ; et le gouvernement Britannique y apportera, j'en suis sûr, d'autant plus de facilités, qu'il ne saurait échapper à la pénétration d'un Cabinet aussi éclairé, que l'union entre les Cours doit, de toute nécessité, être fondée sur la base d'égard mutuel pour les convenances réciproques. L'Empereur est bien décidé à aller avec empressement au-devant de tout ce qui pourra cimenter les rapports les plus étroits entre les deux couronnes. Mais sa Majesté espère avec confiance de la justice et de l'amitié de sa Majesté Britannique, qu'elle voudra bien, en bon et loyal allié, entrer de son côté dans les considérations que peuvent prescrire à l'Autriche ses circonstances particulières, aussi bien que la situation des affaires générales."

LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, July 12. Dropmore.—“ Je vous restitue la lettre du comte Razamowski. Je crois comme lui que Thugut songe à la guerre comme à une chose inévitable ; mais je suis bien persuadé qu'ils ne se résoudront jamais à la faire, si ce n'est pour la défense de Naples. Encore, peut-être, même pour cet objet-là, ils n'agiront qu'après coup. Ce que Razamowski propose est absolument inexécutable. Le public ici n'est déjà que trop prévenu contre la mauvaise foi de la Cour de Vienne, et malheureusement avec trop de raison. Et toute l'éloquence de M. Pitt lui-même ne persuaderait point au Parlement qu'il soit convenable ou raisonnable de contracter de nouveaux arrangements pécuniaires avec des gens qui se refusent, non seulement à exécuter, mais même à ratifier leurs anciens engagements, et cela après en avoir retiré tout le profit. La raison qu'ils allèguent est encore moins faite pour persuader. Car comment croire qu'ils exécuteront de bonne foi un concert pour le renouvellement de la guerre, au moment où ils avouent que la crainte des François les empêchent de remplir leurs promesses, et de ratifier un traité conclu et exécuté de notre part longtemps avant la conclusion du traité de Leoben.

“ Nulle doute que la Suisse n'ouvre le champ le plus favorable pour de nouvelles opérations. On aurait dû en profiter au commencement ; on le pourrait encore aujourd'hui, mais pas avec autant d'avantage. On savait que nous étions très disposés à y coopérer. On n'en a rien fait ; et, j'ose prédire, qu'on n'en fera rien.” *Copy.*

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, July 12. Berlin.—“ In addition to my public correspondence of this day, I have merely to add (what I came under a promise not to mention in an official letter) that M. Siéyès, since his arrival here, has received the instruction *de ne rien brusquer*.

“Would your lordship have the goodness to acquaint Count Woronzow that Count Panin, being engaged in conference with the Prussian minister, has literally not had a moment to avail himself of this messenger's departure, of which I had no time to apprise him.”

M. DE LUC to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 12. Berlin.—“J'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence le 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois, en profitant du départ d'un courrier que lui expédioit M. Garlike, pour prendre la liberté de m'expliquer plus ouvertement qu'on ne peut le faire par la poste; et dans le même but je vais profiter du départ de M. de Stamford afin que ma lettre soit sûre jusques dans les états du Roi. Il n'y a rien de particulier dont je puisse avoir l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence; puisque, entr'autres, M. de Stamford ayant informé my Lord Elgin de tout ce qui le concernoit depuis son arrivée, elle le saura déjà par ce moyen. Mais comme nous nous entretenons sans-cesse, M. de Stamford et moi, de ces sujets, tâchant de former notre jugement d'après ce que nous observons chacun de notre côté, je crois qu'il peut y avoir quelque utilité à ce que je repasse ici sur le même champ, en accompagnant les faits particuliers des faits généraux, parceque cela peut aider à déterminer ce qu'on a à attendre cette époque, ce qui me semble important quant aux considérations pour l'avenir.

“Il y a ici un fond d'éloignement pour rentrer dans aucune liaison dont une nouvelle guerre puisse être la suite, qui offusque tous les esprits quelles que soient les intentions; éloignement qui les fait incliner vers tout ce qui peut promettre la durée de la paix, et tire un rideau sur toutes les considérations qui, si on les eût toujours présentes, devroient faire sentir qu'il n'y a point de paix à se promettre à moins que de ne se prononcer fortement sur tout ce qui est nécessaire pour l'assurer, et de montrer qu'on ne craint point la guerre si elle est nécessaire pour cela.

“On peut ramener ceux chez qui le désir du bien est sincère à tous égards; sur quoi je ne dissimulerai point que je n'en connois de tels que ceux qui, ayant de la religion, ont le système de la Révolution en horreur sous ce point de vue, bien plus que pour la perte de la fortune ou des rangs, avec laquelle je vois qu'on s'arrange dans cet état des choses beaucoup plus aisément qu'il n'auroit été naturel de le penser, pourvu qu'on sauve sa vie. Mais le principe religieux même, le plus solide de tous, et qui n'est malheureusement pas commun, n'empêche pas les illusions, chez les uns pour la possibilité de conserver la paix, chez les autres sur l'impossibilité de rien faire dans ces circonstances; et l'on est sans-cesse obligé de rapeller aux uns ce qui doit ôter toute espérance de paix avec l'esprit révolutionnaire, quelque éloignées que soient encore ses armes; aux autres le moyen évident d'arrêter ses progrès par la réunion. Voilà en sommaire ce que nous trouvons, M. de Stamford et moi, dans tous les rangs; et l'habitude l'a fortifié à un tel point ou que tout courage est détruit, ou qu'on pense et agit comme si l'on



étoit dans une isle inaccessible, d'où l'on pût considérer, avec compassion peut-être, mais sans danger pour soi, le fleau qui se promène sur l'Europe et menace déjà les contrées voisines.

“Ce qui augmente le mal c'est qu'il y a beaucoup de cette disposition dans la Cour même qui s'est mise en avant pour la faire cesser ; qu'ainsi elle n'agit point avec une forte conviction, et n'emploie pas tous ses moyens pour lever les obstacles à la réunion qui est son but. C'est ce que M. de Stamford a eu lieu de voir depuis son retour. Il a trouvé le Comte P[anin], celui des Ministres de cette Cour-là dont la solidité des principes politiques et les vraies lumières faisoient le plus espérer, actuellement hors de toute influence, et très abattu par une cause qui, peut-être, n'est pas inconnue à votre Excellence. Connoissant l'étendue de sa pénétration et la droiture de ses vues, quand je viens à me rappeler l'éloge détaillé que m'en a fait M. de Haugwitz, et le regret qu'il me témoigna dans notre dernière conversation de ce qu'on lui avoit donné un supérieur, ce Ministre me paroît toujours une plus grande énigme.

“Le Comte P[anin] n'est donc plus rien dans les conférences ; et M. de Stamford, ayant profité d'une ancienne connoissance avec le Pr[ince] de Repnin, fut d'abord très affecté de le voir entrer jusqu'à un certain point dans la défiance de ce Cabinet contre celui de Vienne, et ne point profiter de sa situation pour acheminer des éclaircissemens ; semblant prendre son parti sur ce qui en arriveroit, comme si l'événement ne concernoit pas la Russie autant que l'Allemagne.

“Voilà ce qu'on trouve si généralement. Si dans la conversation on parle historiquement de la distance où étoit la Révolution quand elle a commencé, des progrès qu'elle a fait en étendue et en proximité, et de ses moyens ; des derniers événemens de la Suisse, des mouvemens dans le cercle de la Souabe, les villes Anséatique, et l'Ostfrise ; du rapport que peut avoir l'expédition de Toulon avec les mouvemens dans la Grèce, la Turquie, la Pologne, la Prusse méridionale ; quand on lie à tout cela les déclarations répétées des François sur leur plan général, cet ensemble frappe enfin jusqu'à persuader l'existence d'un tel plan ; mais on l'oublie quand il s'agit de la politique, dont on ne change point la routine.

“C'est dans cette disposition d'esprit, cette espèce d'assoupissement que M. de Stamford trouve le Prince de Repnin. Il ne lui fut pas difficile de rappeler à son esprit tous les faits qui auroient dû mettre plus d'activité dans ses démarches pour l'intérêt de son propre pays ; mais il avoit participé à la défiance contre la Cour qui par la seule demande de l'intervention de la sienne auroit dû la dissiper. Mais on n'a point de confiance au Ministre de cette Cour. C'est encore le malheur du moment que tous les Cabinets se défient les uns des autres avec assez de raison, et que cela s'étende, réciproquement, jusqu'à celui qui sert aujourd'hui de médiateur, et c'est pour cela qu'on ne peut presque espérer le dénouement de ce malheureux noeud que lorsque les souverains se rapprocheront eux-mêmes.

“Il étoit heureux que M. de Stamford revint alors de Vienne, et qu’il put instruire le Prince de Repnin de ce qui s’y étoit passé au sujet de sa mission ; mais comme cependant il ne vit pas que cela eut assez d’influence, il se détermina à reciter à ce Ministre une conversation qu’il avoit eue avec M. de Thugut dont il n’a pas fait mention dans ses rapports, comme n’étant qu’un entretien spéculatif entre deux personnes qui se parlent librement et sans conséquence. Il a cru convenable cependant que j’eusse l’honneur de le communiquer à votre Excellence, à cause du but pour lequel il l’a rapporté au Prince de Repnin.

“Dans la conversation familière, M. de Thugut demanda à M. de Stamford comme militaire, qui a fait la guerre de sept ans, et s’est toujours occupé d’objets relatifs à sa profession, quelle frontière la Prusse pourroit se faire pour sa sûreté contre la France ; si par exemple l’évêché d’Hildesheim pourroit la lui procurer. M. de Stamford, après s’être fortement prononcé contre les sécularisations comme étant un leurre des François qui ameneroit la révolution au sien de l’Allemagne, et ne parlant que comme militaire, répondit à M. de Thugut que cette acquisition ne serviroit à rien pour la sûreté de la Prusse, comme trop près de son centre, n’ajoutant rien à sa situation militaire, et laissant au dehors toutes les positions avantageuses, la Hesse en particulier, qui seroit libre de se déclarer pour l’ennemi venant de l’autre côté du Rhin. Que la seule ligne militaire dans le malheureux état des choses pourroit être le long de l’Ems, dont l’embouchure et une partie du cours appartient déjà à la Prusse, qui passe par Munster et se lieroit au pays de Paderborn ; mais que, devant aussi embrasser le pays d’Osnabruck aujourd’hui possédé par le Duc d’York comme appartenant à la maison d’Hanovre, la ligne seroit coupée à ce point ; ce qui empêcheroit les dispositions militaires pour la fortifier et y embrasser la Hesse. M. de Thugut dit alors ‘mais ne pourroit-on pas offrir de transporter les droits du Duc d’York et de sa maison sur l’Evêché d’Hildesheim ?’ ‘C’est ce que je ne puis considérer,’ répondit M. de Stamford ; ‘je dis seulement que pour la formation de cette ligne idéale Osnabruck est nécessaire ; mais je ne la considère qu’en spéculation ; toujours convaincu que, plus on voudra faire de tels changemens en Allemagne, plus on approchera sa catastrophe.’ M. de Thugut acquiesça à cette réflexion, regrettant cependant qu’on ne pût voir de moyen qui donnât à la Prusse une frontière forte contre l’ennemi commun du côté du Rhin ; et sans s’expliquer sur ce que l’Autriche, en ce cas, pourroit demander de son côté par la même raison.

“Cela montre malheureusement, quoiqu’il ne fût question que d’une conversation spéculative, que les idées se promènent encore où elles ne devraient plus aller, et qu’on ne s’occupe pas uniquement du seul moyen de salut. Mais comme dans ces idées mêmes M. de Thugut montrait son désir que la Prusse, considérée dans l’état de séparation, fût en sûreté contre les François, ce qui devoit agir bien plus dans le plan de réunion, M. de Stamford crut devoir en faire usage pour persuader le

Prince de Repnin que ce Ministre n'avoit pour la Prusse que des dispositions conformes à ce qu'exigeoit l'état des choses, et cela parut faire de l'impression sur lui.

“ Il est à cet égard un point particulier sur lequel il n'y a ici qu'une voix, et chez les personnes mêmes les mieux intentionnées qui, dans l'occasion, seroient à portée de parler. C'est sur la déclaration que le Cabinet de Berlin a faite à Rastadt que le Roi n'entendoit point qu'on cedât aux François les têtes de ponts sur la rive droite du Rhin, ni toutes les isles ; déclaration que Vienne n'a point appuyée. J'ai renvoyé à M. de Stamford des personnes importantes à qui j'ai ouï citer ce fait comme une raison péremptoire de défiance contre Vienne ; et il ne lui a pas été difficile de la lever, d'après ses entretiens à Vienne, comme il l'a fait aussi auprès du P[rince] de Repnin.

“ Si cette déclaration eût été destinée à produire quelque effet, et qu'on eût voulu par là connoître les intentions de la Cour de Vienne, on auroit dû lui en communiquer le plan, pour la faire de concert. Mais on craint si fort tout ce qui pourroit avoir l'apparence hostile la plus reculée, qu'on a craint de s'engager par ce concert ; et en même temps que le Ministre de Prusse faisoit cette déclaration à Rastadt, il continuoit de déclarer que la Prusse ne vouloit point de guerre, et qu'elle étoit résolue à rester dans sa neutralité. Aussi les François n'ont-ils tenu aucun compte de l'autre déclaration ; sûrs que le cabinet de Berlin ne veut entrer dans aucune nouvelle coalition ; et leur dernière note à Rastadt, connue de votre Excellence, est d'une insolence qui devroit révolter, si l'on ne s'étoit accoutumé à souffrir leurs insultes qui, pourtant, ne sont pas sans dessein ultérieur.

“ Telles furent les représentations que fit en particulier M. de Stamford au P[rince] de Repnin dans leurs premières conférences, et il en résulta chez ce Ministre le plan de presser cette Cour. M. le Comte de Fink lui promit qu'on lui donneroit un *Declaratum* des propositions précises qu'on feroit à la Cour de Vienne ; il lui en indiqua même les articles, dont le Pr[ince] fut très content ; ce qui commença de donner quelque espérance. Mais dans la dernière conférence que M. de Stamford a eue avec le Pr[ince] de Repnin il a appris que cette espérance s'étoit évanouie, parceque ce Ministre ayant eu une conférence avec M. de H[augwitz], celui-ci a prétendu n'avoir connoissance de rien de pareil, et a décliné de donner un *Declaratum*.

“ M. de Stamford trouva le Pr[ince] de Repnin très offensé de telles menées, où il voyoit un dessein formé de la Cour de B[erlin] de décliner la réunion ; mais il n'en tiroit d'autre conséquence que celle de terminer les conférences dès qu'il seroit bien sûr qu'elles seroient inutiles. M. de Stamford, très affligé de ce découragement, travailla à faire comprendre au Prince qu'on ne devoit pas attendre des représentations de la Russie, mais de son poids de briser cette barrière. Que le dessein, soit aveugle, soit pire encore, de conserver la neutralité en de pareilles circonstances, devoit avoir quelque cause qui resisteroit à de simples représentations, même à la perspective de la rupture des conférences dont

il y avoit lieu de croire qu'on ne seroit pas fâché. Qu'il falloit opposer une crainte à une autre crainte ; et que comme ces évasions n'avoient pour motif que de ne pas s'attirer à dos les François, et de se conserver au contraire en bonne intelligence avec eux, il seroit peut-être nécessaire que s[on] E[xcellence] déclarât qu'elle voyoit ainsi qu'on préféreroit de conserver des liaisons trompeuses avec les ennemis déclarés des trônes, à en former de solides avec l'empereur son maître, dont l'intérêt étoit le même ; et qu'elle ne pourroit se dispenser d'en instruire sa M[ajesté] I[mpériale] pour qu'elle avisât aux conséquences que la persévérance dans un tel dessein pourroit avoir pour l'Allemagne et pour elle-même.

“ Le P[rince] de Replin sentit la force des représentations de M. de Stamford ; mais il ne se déclara pas sur le parti qu'il prendroit. Il est certainement à souhaiter qu'on mette plus de force dans les représentations, mais il faudroit plus que cela ; il faudroit des offres positives et bien claires de secours immédiat ; sans quoi je doute du succès ; parceque je sais que la défiance de M. de H[augwitz] en cette Cour égale celle qu'on y a de lui. Lorsque je lui ai représenté l'avantage d'avoir l'appui de la Russie, et que, sur les raisons qu'il me donnoit d'après l'expérience de ne pas compter sur les promesses de cette Cour, je prenois la liberté de lui présenter mes idées sur les moyens d'en assurer l'effet, il revenoit toujours à cet argument ; ‘ nous tenons la neutralité ; nous croyons pouvoir nous y procurer sûreté, en joignant la prudence à la force intérieure. Dans une telle position nous pouvons attendre ce que le chapitre des événemens amenera pour augmenter cette sûreté ; au lieu qu'on ne voit pas tout ce qui pourroit arriver qui trompât l'attente lorsqu'en y comptant on auroit une fois renoncé à ce rempart, et donné un prétexte au François de recommencer des hostilités sur la ligne de démarcation, qu'ils savent bien que nous sommes résolus de défendre dans l'état des choses.’ Voilà qui ne s'ébranle point, et malheureusement il ne me paroît pas que rien se prépare qui puisse l'ébranler.

“ Pour ne rien négliger M. de Stamford, devant naturellement rendre compte au Roi de sa mission à Vienne, ce qui pourroit lui donner occasion d'entretenir encore une fois sa Majesté, lui a fait demander, il y a huit jours, par le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, la permission de se rendre auprès d'elle. Le Roi lui fit répondre qu'il le verroit avec plaisir ; sa Majesté le devoit, puisque c'est-là un objet qui l'intéresse ; cependant, quoiqu'il ait eu l'honneur de la voir le jour de l'hommage, il n'a point encore été appelé ; de sorte que voyant que la saison des bains s'avance, et en ayant absolument besoin, il s'est déterminé à écrire à l'un des aides-de-camp du Roi, fixant son départ au 13<sup>me</sup>. Je saurai ce qui en sera résulté.

“ Les deux ministres de Russie et le ministre de Vienne voient son départ avec peine, et voudroient également qu'il revint, par la simple possibilité qu'il pût se présenter quelque circonstance où il seroit utile ; et ils lui représentent à cet égard que bien d'autres princes ont des envoyés ici qui y ont moins d'intérêt que le Prince d'Orange. Quant à lui il n'en voit pas l'utilité, et son

séjour ici lui est extrême[me]nt pénible ; mais son premier désir étant le bien, si votre Excellence y voyoit quelque avantage, et que Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange y en trouvât pour lui-même, il céderoit à cette considération si sa santé se remet.

“ Il reste encore pour ressource l'arrivée de M. l'Avoyer Steiguer qui, pourtant, tarde beaucoup ; quoique sur les représentations de M. de Stamford il se fût déterminé à venir. M. de Stamford a prié M. le Prince Reuss que s'il arrive, il ait la bonté de le prévenir que je désire d'avoir l'honneur de le voir avant qu'il aille à la Cour. En ce cas je suivrai le plan qu'a déjà commencé M. de Stamford en lui représentant que s'il veut produire quelque effet, il ne doit pas présenter une perspective de guerre ; mais employer tout le poids de son caractère, de son âge, et de sa malheureuse expérience, pour dissiper chez le Roi toute autre idée de sûreté que dans l'union des puissances ; et pour cela je tâcherai de le mettre au fait de toutes les illusions qu'on travaille à inspirer à sa Majesté.

“ Le Roi fit inviter hier M. de Stamford à Charlottenbourg, où d'abord sa Majesté le reçut dans le jardin, et débuta ainsi : ‘ Vous voilà de retour de Vienne M. de Stamford, je suis bien aise de vous voir.’ M. de Stamford rendit d'abord compte à sa Majesté de ce qui regardoit le Prince d'Orange, mais comme cet objet se lioit à des arrangemens à prendre, et ceux-ci aux choses générales, il y fut bientôt amené. Alors, commençant par le désir sincère d'une réunion exprimé par l'Empereur lui-même, et par son Ministre, il répéta à sa Majesté, avec toute la force possible, ce que la situation des choses a d'allarmant pour tous les états ; à quoi le Roi, comme à l'ordinaire, acquiesca sans restriction. Mais quand M. de Stamford conclut de tout cet exposé qu'il n'y avoit donc point de salut que dans la réunion, le Roi parut en douter, sans s'expliquer davantage. C'est fut assez cependant pour M. de Stamford pour qu'il pût continuer quelque temps, et entreprendre de convaincre sa Majesté que, dans les circonstances actuelles, il n'y avoit point de secret possible de Cabinet comme moyen de sûreté ; que toute la situation des affaires étoit palpable pour les hommes attentifs ; que les moyens et les ressorts des ennemis étoient manifestes, et continuoient d'opérer sous les yeux de tout le monde comme les gens éclairés l'avoient depuis longtemps prévu et prédit ; et qu'il étoit tout aussi visible (puisque sa Majesté convenoit qu'il n'y avoit point de foi à ajouter aux engagemens des François) qu'aucune puissance n'étoit en état, séparément, de pourvoir à sa préservation, et que leur réunion seule pouvoit les sauver. Le Roi ne répondit rien, et l'entretien finit.

“ Après le dîné M. de Stamford eut une conversation avec l'aide-de-camp du Roi, le col[onel] Kökeritz, écho passif de M. de Haugwitz, mais un écho qui eût été probablement redressé pour être trop précis, car il découvrit le déplorable pot aux roses. Les accusations banales contre la Cour de Vienne furent d'abord employées ; fondées sur des apparences, qu'on ne cherche point ici à pénétrer, et qu'on ne s'étudia pas assez à lever de l'autre côté. Cependant M. de Stamford, moins gêné avec le col[onel] qu'avec le Roi, le mit tellement à cet égard même au pied du mur

qu'il lui échappa de dire ; ' enfin ils veulent que nous garantissons une paix, ou une trêve de l'Allemagne, et *nous ne le voulons pas*, parceque nous ne voulons pas nous exposer à la guerre.'

"Voilà donc un parti pris quand tout s'écrouleroit autour d'eux ; car c'est dire qu'ils ne se mettent pas en peine du reste de l'Allemagne ; et le Roi, qui n'est pas en état de se tirer par lui-même des lacs de ces gens-là, se met, par son silence, hors d'état d'être assisté pour s'en délivrer. On a beau voir encore que Malte, l'imprenable, a été prise sans résistance ; il a beau être évident que tout est menacé du même sort dès que ces gens-là auront le temps de s'en approcher ; que quelque éloignée que soit cette nouvelle approche vers Berlin, passant ensuite par Naples, par la Dalmatie, par où que ce soit, la ligne de circonvallation s'étend ; malgré, dis-je, tout cela, les uns ne veulent pas convenir, les autres sont incapables de voir qu'il ne sauroit y avoir de salut qu'en se hâtant de se réunir pour frapper le corps de cette hydre avant que ses cent têtes qui vont tout dévorant, n'aient détruit tout moyen de lui porter des coups efficaces. Quel malheur qu'on ait pu offusquer à ce point les yeux du souverain de qui dépendroit ce moyen de salut, autant pour lui-même que pour l'Europe ! Une torpille infernale engourdit deux cent mille hommes, par un seul homme.

"Votre excellence ne voit que trop par ces détails ce qu'on peut attendre des conférences ; les moyens n'y sont point arrangés pour détruire cet engourdissement ; le Duc de Brunswick seul le pourroit ; mais M. de Haugwitz le connoît, et l'endort d'espérances comme il est endormi lui-même (car on ne peut s'expliquer autrement sa conduite) ; et l'on compte sur sa répugnance à se mêler d'affaires d'état. Cependant il ne faut pas abandonner ce Prince. Il y a une conférence aujourd'hui ; le Comte P[anin] y sera ; votre Excellence sera sûrement informée de son résultat ; M. de Stamford l'attend afin de le porter à Brunswick, où, avant que de continuer sa route vers les bains de Rehbourg, il fera tout ce qui dépendra de lui auprès de s'a[ltess]e s[érénissime]. Il peut venir un temps où ses yeux s'ouvrent sur les maux que produit son immobilité.

"Avant que M. de Stamford n'eût vu le Roi, le Prince Héritaire d'Orange avoit ajouté l'expression de son désir qu'il revint à celle des Ministres de Russie et de Vienne ; sur quoi il répondit de même ; qu'il ne sauroit en voir l'utilité ; qu'il falloit de plus fortes mains pour écarter ce qui entoure le Roi ; mais que, d'ailleurs, cela dépendroit du Prince son père, à qui, s'il le jugeoit à propos, il pourroit communiquer ses idées à cet égard. Cependant, voulant au moins laisser une pierre-d'attente, M. de Stamford dit au Roi (d'un ton demi-sérieux, demi-badin, comme avec son ancien élève) qu'en partant il ne pensoit pas prendre tout-à-fait congé de sa Majesté, et pourroit bien revenir lui rendre son hommage ; à quoi le Roi répondit qu'il le verroit toujours avec plaisir. On sait maintenant ce que cela veut dire, mais la porte reste au moins entr'ouverte.

“ Pour être bien sûr que ces pages renferment un tableau fidèle de la situation des choses, j’irai chez M. de Stamford les lui lire avant que de les cacheter, et les lui remettre sous couvert à M. le Baron de Steinberg. Si donc votre Excellence n’y voit point de changement, elle saura ainsi qu’il les a approuvées.

“ Quant à moi, si je n’avois pas marqué à votre Excellence dans la lettre que j’ai eu l’honneur de lui écrire le 1<sup>er</sup> de ce mois, que j’attendrois ici ses ordres auxquels j’obéirai toujours, j’aurois besoin aussi de partir, pour me soustraire un peu à tous les sentimens que j’éprouve. Cependant je ne me relâcherai point d’employer le temps qui s’écoulera jusqu’à la réponse dont j’espère qu’elle voudra bien m’honorer, pour saisir toutes les occasions de tenter de faire quelque bien.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 13. York Farm.—“ J’ai l’honneur de vous envoyer une lettre de part du Grand Duc de Toscane, que j’avoue avoir oublié depuis huit jours dans mon tiroir. J’ai reçu hier de Pétersbourg des nouvelles instructions aussi douloureuses pour mon cœur, qu’elles sont extravagantes, à l’égard de cette ennuyeuse et éternelle ratification. M. de Cobentzl me paraît se donner bien des airs à ce sujet. En vérité si je ne me croyais pas autant Anglais qu’Autrichien, et que je ne fusse pas aussi attaché que je le suis à cet excellent pays, votre ami aurait depuis longtemps envoyé promener tous ces sots et vils ministres qui ne sont pas dignes d’avoir un homme d’honneur pour exécuter leurs plans ; mais je suis trop bien ici pour m’en aller ; et d’un autre côté, tant que mon digne père vivra, il ne me serait pas possible d’habiter l’Angleterre sans y être employé. Il faut donc se résigner et supporter beaucoup de choses pour un plus grand bien. Mais rendez-moi, je vous prie, la justice de croire que je souffre beaucoup intérieurement. Après ce préambule, que la sensible amitié et l’honnêteté de Lord Grenville saura apprécier et pardonner, j’aurai l’honneur de vous prévenir qu’on m’ordonne de vous dire de nouveau mille choses, et de faire encore des tentatives pour savoir ce que vous nous donnerez avant de ratifier. C’est de la Russie que ces ordres viennent actuellement. Le Comte de Woronzow doit m’aider et m’appuyer. Je prévois que je ne réussirai pas plus que les autres fois ; mais comme je connais les êtres à qui j’ai à faire à Vienne et à Pétersbourg, je vous prie de trouver bon que nous nous écrivions, l’un et l’autre, sur cet objet ; afin que vos réponses prouvent au moins que j’ai obéi à mes instructions, en vous assiégeant encore. Je suis trop triste, trop irrité, trop indigné et en même temps humilié pour avoir le cœur de vous en parler moi-même. Je vais passer deux jours avec ma famille à Tunbridge, et c’est de là que je vous bombarderai. Adieu ; plaignez votre ami, il mérite bien votre estime.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, July 15. Dropmore.—“ Je vous restitue la dépêche qui vous charge d’une très mauvaise affaire de la part du Grand Duc

de Toscane. Vous jugerez mieux que moi ce que vous pourrez et devrez faire à cet égard ; n'étant pas, je pense, accrédité ici de la part de ce prince. Si vous m'en écrivez officiellement, je pense que vous trouverez bon que, pour cette raison, je m'abstienne à vous répondre là-dessus, en renvoyant la négociation aux soins de M. Wyndham et de Sir H. Nelson, qui la poursuivront bien mieux que nous. Je vous prie d'être bien persuadé que ni les affaires de cette petite Cour, ni celles de la grande Cour qui vise à se rendre petite, ne changeront jamais rien aux sentimens personnels que je vous ai voués pour la vie." *Copy.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, July 18. Tunbridge Wells.]—"J'ai reçu la réponse officielle que vous vous êtes donné la peine de m'écrire. Elle est parfaite, et bien adoptée aux circonstances. Je désire plus que je n'ose l'espérer qu'elle produise enfin l'effet que nous voudrions. Croyez que je ne manquerai pas d'en écrire encore par le courier d'aujourd'hui, avec toute la force que j'ai coutume d'y mettre. Je suis venu passer ici quelques jours avec ma famille. Je retourne demain à Londrès, et j'y serai à vos ordres si, par hasard, vous aviez encore quelque chose à me dire. Nous avons lieu de nous flatter, ce me semble, d'une nouvelle victoire navale. J'en attends la confirmation, et les détails avec toute l'*eagerness* d'un bon Anglais."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, July 19. Dropmore.—"As I understand that you have not derived from the baths of Töplitz the advantage which you expected, I cannot help suggesting to you whether it would not be best that you should avail yourself of the present state of affairs in order to return here, and to take whatever precautions may be advisable previous to your entering upon another winter at Berlin.

"Although this mode of communication does not allow of my entering more particularly into the subject, I may say, generally, that you see enough to satisfy you that no disadvantage is likely to arise to the King's affairs for their being left for the present in Mr. Garlike's hands. I entertain a very favourable opinion of his discretion and judgment, and do not think it likely that during your absence any necessity can arise for a temporary arrangement of any different sort. But if that should be the case I could easily contrive it, without breaking in upon whatever plan you shall find best for the complete restoration of your health, which I am very desirous you should effect absolutely and not partially, before you begin another German winter.

"I have not sent you any fresh leave of absence, considering your former one as in full force, but I will take care fully to explain the circumstance to the King, who is indeed already fully impressed with the zeal which you have at all times shown for his service.



“ I am confident I need not dwell upon the unwillingness which I feel to lose, even for a time, the benefit of your assistance at such a post as that of Berlin, but it is for that very reason that I am anxious you should avail yourself of the present moment to remove the seeds of illness which might, hereafter, interrupt your services at a more inconvenient time.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD.

*Private.*

1798, July 19. Dropmore.—“ I have only time by this mail to mention to you that I am making arrangements for supplying your place during a temporary absence from Copenhagen ; and that you may prepare for leaving that place as soon as a person can be sent out for that purpose, which shall be with as little delay as possible.” *Copy.*

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 21. Wimbledon.—“ I did not know that so many officers from Switzerland were in this country or in the situation you describe. I have not had an opportunity of conversing with the Duke of York on the subject since the receipt of your letter. He was here yesterday, but as the King and Queen were of the party, I had no opportunity of talking with him. I imagine, however, that the difficulty of seconding these officers on the battalions of the 60th arises, partly from the numbers of our own unattached officers whom the Duke takes the earliest opportunities of introducing again into the service, and partly from the circumstance of the 60th regiment having been lately recruited very effectually by taking into it the men of the foreign regiments serving in the West Indies, and at the same time incorporating with them a good number of their officers. At the same time, if it is a matter of policy to keep up an intimate connection with Switzerland, and some expense must be incurred for that purpose, the best way for this country to execute that purpose is in the shape of military aid from them. I shall talk with Wickham upon it, and when I am sufficiently master of the *carte de pays*, I shall bring it under Mr. Pitt's attention ; for in truth it is a question of expense and of that only.

“ The education of our young military men is an object calling loudly for attention, and I flatter myself from a plan which has been laid before me (and of which the Duke of York and, I believe, Lord Cornwallis approve) to be executed under the superintendence of Monsieur Jarré, there is a prospect of a system for that purpose being established. I believe, however, that the radical defect of our army arises from the abuses which have been introduced into it by the rapid promotion of young officers. It is impossible they can know the duties of subalterns, or, of course, of their profession, for they are hurried through these inferior situations into the rank of field officers before they have either studied or practically exercised the elements of their

profession. Our army has gradually suffered in some of those material respects from the death of the old Duke of Cumberland; but, from the good dispositions of the present Commander-in-Chief, *who has the advantage of being a Prince of the Blood*, it will be the fault of those about him if a very few years does not make an important change to the better in the British army. But, if this is to be accomplished, we must not run wild with economy on the return of peace, for upon the application of that principle indiscreetly at the conclusion of the last war, our regiments were frittered down to a state of perfect inefficiency, and, excepting in the East Indies, we began this war without one regiment fit for service; and the West India conquests were made by taking away the flank companies of all the few regiments we had, and they were from that time reduced to a state of weakness they have never recovered. Lord Amherst was a worthy and respectable old man, and nobody shall ever hear me say a disrespectful thing of him; but the mischief he did in a few years will not be repaired but by the unremitting attention of many. I have been inadvertently led into a longer digression than I intended, and you will be relieved from any more prosing by my being summoned to breakfast."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 23. Dublin.—"My letters to you will have informed you that the rebel cordon round Dublin has been entirely broken through, and that gradually the whole has been getting quieter. Every hour now gives us details of the success of the *country* against the small plundering parties who have ventured to assemble, and in a few days I should hope that the roads will be secure, at least during the day; but it is necessary that the most immediate exertions should be made in re-establishing confidence in the country by a proper disposition of *disciplined* troops in the room of the yeomanry and militia, who, though they have saved the country, have certainly made it pay most severely for this protection. I know that Lord Cornwallis feels as I do upon this point, but his generals (I believe the worst in Europe) do not seem to have an idea of enforcing any one of the first principles necessary for a soldier. The rapine and cruelties of the troops have, in many instances been as atrocious as they have been mischievous to the public service. Lord Cornwallis knows that in many instances the surrender of individuals and even of parties has been checked; and, in some, the wretches actually *refused* when suing for the proclamation pardons. The entire surrender of the Kildare corps took place on the twenty-first. It was offered to Lord Cornwallis, *through me*, on the fifth, but the universal jealousy entertained of the good faith of the King's officers and troops constantly prevented the actual surrender, till they could receive assurances either under Lord Cornwallis's hand or mine. The first could not be sent without real difficulties; the latter was not fitting; till, at last, hurt by the danger of the delay, and by the sacrifice of at least 2,000 men who had perished in the

interval, I offered to Lord Cornwallis to go out (as Colonel) with terms to them, or to write a letter to the father (whom I had known) of young Aylmer. He accepted my last proposal, and saw it before I sent it; and in 24 hours after this letter was communicated, their Generals, Aylmer and FitzGerald, answered my letter, and with 13 colonels surrendered to General Wilford; and their army gave up above 5,000 pikes and firelocks, with all their cattle, horses, sheep and plunder, and have received protection and pardon. These chiefs are prisoners of war in the Castle. I have refused to see them, but they requested Captain Browne of my regiment, who guarded them yesterday, to assure me that *they* could answer for the rebellion being at an end in Wicklow, Wexford, Kildare, and Meath; and that they had no reason to believe that it could show itself in any other part of Ireland. They were full of contempt of the general officers who have acted against them, and of resentment against the Dublin Directory who induced them to rise under the assurance that *all Ireland* was to rise on the 23rd May. There is no doubt from their general language that many of the demagogues in Parliament have been very deeply dipped with them. The Duke of Leinster is now very openly talked of; and *it is certain* that all the men most active in this rising in Kildare have, within these few months, received from him very valuable leases upon his estate, or are in other respects dependent on him. Still, however, I do not think that it is the wish of Government to press that inquiry as far as I think it ought against him and others. This proclamation and the general tenor of Lord Cornwallis's very meritorious conduct has raised much ferment amongst the very violent Orangemen, who have formed a very dangerous society, professing very loyal principles, but certainly united as a body almost *in every town* in Ireland in contradistinction to the Catholics; and wherever they have not been suffered to be formed, namely, in the counties of Kerry, Clare, Galway, Sligo, Mayo, all which are Catholic counties, not a man has stirred, nor has a United Irishman taken arms. It is, however, understood that the Catholics there are only quiet because the Protestants are so. Now this sort of *loyal association upon Jacobin principles* must be grappled with, or the Government must be given up to them; and yet I protest that I do not know what in theory I could advise. Numbers certainly look to a Union as the only solution, but I cannot disguise from myself the *certainly* that, though it might be carried in Parliament, and may possibly be approved by the bulk of the Catholics if they could see advantages in the concoction of it, yet the opinion of the Presbyterians would be general and strong against it; and many of the Catholics would, on such a question, join the nonsense against the sense of the people. In this statement, however, there is nothing new, and nothing that those who have considered the question did not expect; and therefore the question is to be measured nearly on the data which we discussed some time since, saving only that I am of

opinion that the difficulties in Parliament will be *fewer* than I imagined. However that and every other question upon which it may be possible for the army to take a wrong turn must be postponed until a system of discipline and subordination has been established, in aid of the spirit of loyalty which hitherto has been the only link to connect the whole together, or to bind it to the public service. I must say distinctly upon this head, that I fear everything from the licentiousness, the *disobedience*, and the independence of control in every being of this army, from the Lieutenant-General (not Lake) down to the drummer. With 43 generals now actually serving here, there is a very small number indeed from whom the country has derived the smallest advantage, or who are capable of giving it; and the confusion and disobedience arising from all these *separate* commands have been productive of the most serious consequences. The militia officers and their corps are under no sort of control, nor is there a regiment effective within a large proportion to the numbers it returns. In short, the whole of this system must totally and entirely [be] changed; and till that is done, Ireland is not safe for a moment. My advice is instantly to recall or strike off one half of your generals who are worse than useless, and particularly your brigadiers of Irish cavalry and Irish connections, for whom there cannot be the slightest occasion, and from whom much is to be feared, and nothing can be hoped; immediately to re-assemble the militia and fencibles, and to inspect each corps most minutely in its numbers, clothing, arms, and accounts. My next idea is to send some of your best skeleton or weak corps in exchange for the Irish corps, and to spare no trouble to complete a regular efficient army in the room of that which Lord Camden's (must I say) weakness, Lord Carhampton's mad violence, and, above all, Sir R. Abercrombie's total insufficiency and fatal order for free quarter has completely ruined. And once more be assured that, till this is done, Government is in the power of any popular clamour that catches hold of the popular mind, in which the army is likely to partake; and whenever the immediate danger of the rebellion is over and the plunder that attends it, the army is perhaps just as likely to think wrong as right.

"In all these discussions you will see that I consider the rebellion *at an end*. I certainly do, and I am every hour more sanguine in my hopes that the predatory war, which I so much dreaded, will neither be long, nor serious. I do not know Lord Cornwallis's ideas exactly on the detail; but his general system is that of some few barricaded houses as posts in the worst passes. I have had, *entre nous*, a great deal of the most confidential conversations with him, which he courts very much, and which perhaps are not entirely useless to him. I agree with him that for the present he can look to nothing but to prorogue his Parliament, and to reform his army. He is very anxious in the decided preference which he gives to Lord Castlereagh; in which, for many reasons which he stated, and others which have been stated to me from other quarters, he is clearly right.

"I wish you to tell Tom that I have turned very much in my mind your and his suggestions. I do not like his putting himself to sleep out of Parliament for 400*l.* per annum; nor do I see any daylight at present that can help him or you; but, I again repeat I am ready to assist in arranging *it* for Lady Carysfort. Astle's office is reformed already. Does poor Bruce's vacancy offer any means? Fremantle is too fat and too rich to be tempted to foreign parts. I fear that I have very little the means *here* of suggesting, but I will lend myself to any thing for what I so much wish as I do his objects, and that for Lady Carysfort.

"As to my pilgrimage you must see from all this detail that Lord Cornwallis will keep us as long as he can; for the English militia is almost the only garrison he can trust to, and by the help of a very sharp discipline I hope to keep our Royal Bucks untainted. He does not (in confidence to me) see any chance of our release sooner than September; and I have told him that in this, as in everything else, I can have no wish but for the public service; though I feel ten thousand difficulties and awkwardness of every sort and kind, that make me at times very petulant and *unhappy*. Indeed I have sacrificed more than my fair share in undertaking this thankless voyage; however, *le vin est tiré*, and I will drink it as as gaily as I can."

*Postscript.* "Could not you let the King know how *handsomely* I have waived my rank as one of the oldest army colonels, and have offered to Lord Cornwallis to serve under any brigadier or any officer of any rank, or in any way he may think most useful; for that I have left my army commission in England on purpose to avoid all discussions of that sort."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July 24. Richmond.—"Je suis bien fâché de la nouvelle que vous venez de me donner de la rupture des négociations entre l'Autriche et la Prusse à Berlin. Il est visible que la récente arrivée de l'abbé Séyès et ses intrigues ont déterminé cet événement. Il est plus que probable que la France va attaquer l'Autriche. Les nombreuses troupes qu'elle a eu le temps d'envoyer en Lombardie, qui avait été dégarnie pendant cinq mois: celles qui sont venues tout fraîchement en Suisse pour renforcer l'armée qui y était déjà; la correspondance querelleuse que commence à avoir le Commandant Français en Suisse avec le Général Autrichien du voisinage; et l'occupation de la citadelle de Turin, sont les préliminaires et les indices certains de cette prochaine rupture. La maison d'Autriche regrettera, mais en vain, d'avoir consumé inutilement les magasins de sa grande armée en Italie, et d'avoir manqué de reprendre la Lombardie dégarnie de troupes Françaises, et de n'avoir pas prêté la main aux braves Suisses qui, dans les petits cantons démocratiques, n'étaient pas encore subjugués; tandis

que, dans les grands, le peuple n'attendait qu'un appui pour secouer le joug qui venait de leur être imposé.

"Je m'attends que la Cour de Vienne, au moment qu'elle sera attaquée, criera partout qu'elle a été surprise, et se plaindra de la perfidie Française, et ne sentira pas à quel point sa conduite est imbécile et stupide." *French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD.

*Private.*

1798, July 26. Cleveland Row.—"I have this day seen Mr. Ogilvie, who has mentioned to me that it was the wish of your friends here that you should not return to England this year. This being the case, I conclude from what you mention to me in your last letter that you would wish me to suspend taking any step to provide for the conduct of the King's affairs at Copenhagen, and I shall accordingly do nothing further in that business till I hear again from you. I beg you to believe that I sincerely feel for what you must have suffered." *Copy.*

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, July 27. Grünemwald.—"The two last posts have brought me neither letters, nor newspapers from England. But a foreign *gazette* informs me that I have had the misfortune of losing my brother. This loss, however severe (and long habits of the most intimate affection render it severe indeed) would not have induced me to trouble your Lordship on my own account. But I cannot help dreading its consequences to my mother, whose weak state of health, very acute feelings, and unbounded fondness for my poor brother, will make this shock very hard for her to bear. And it is particularly aggravated by the apprehensions which my letters are, I perceive, insufficient to destroy, namely, that *my* illness is still of a dangerous nature. The proofs I have experienced of your Lordship's kindness and friendship encourage me to address myself without hesitation to you, under these painful circumstances, and to request that you will enable me to come for a short time to England, in order to give to my mother that consolation which, I am persuaded, my presence alone can afford her, and which, if necessary in her situation, is a duty that my obligations to her leave me no choice in executing."

July 27, evening. "Since closing my other letter of this date, Prince Reuss and Count Panin have come to inform me that Count Cobentzl is expected here immediately. However painful any delay must be in the execution of the plan I have so earnestly laid before your Lordship, I am free to confess it is impossible for me to leave Berlin until it is known what is the object of Count Cobentzl's mission, and in how far my attendance may be called for. I make this confession the readier as, while on the one hand I am determined not to neglect or abandon my duty, I am equally convinced on the other that your Lordship will enter

into the feelings of anxiety and impatience with which I protract my stay at Berlin ; and will permit me to come to England as soon as I can with propriety."

LORD ROBERT FITZGERALD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, July 31. Copenhagen.—"I had the honour yesterday to receive your Lordship's private letter from Dropmore of the nineteenth, and though I wrote last post to say I should not now avail myself of your obliging offer to send me a *congé*, I hasten to assure your Lordship how extremely sorry I am for all the trouble I have been the occasion of to you ; and that I shall think myself happy if, in continuing at my post, your Lordship perceives my earnest wish to do that which may be most agreeable to you."

RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, July 31. Margate.—"By private letters from America as late as the third instant, I learn that the Senate has passed a Bill, 14 to 4, annulling our treaties with France, and no doubts are entertained that it will likewise pass the House of Representatives. As a circumstance of very considerable weight in proof of the spirit and temper of the country, I have the pleasure to mention that the House of Representatives of the *State of Massachusetts*, on the twenty-eighth ultimo, unanimously passed a resolution that the Senators and Representatives of that state in Congress should move an amendment of the constitution of the U[nited] S[tates], declaring that none but natural-born citizens and those who were in the country at the Declaration of Independence, shall be eligible to the office of President, Vice-President, Senator or Representative of the United States.

"The late intelligence from Paris throws some light upon the system of the Directory. Talleyrand, at the close of a long letter to Mr. Gerry, on sending him his passport to return home, after informing him that the Directory, as a measure of precaution, had laid an embargo on all American ships, says, "*telle est la répugnance du Directoire à considérer les Etats Unis comme ennemis, que malgré leurs démonstrations hostiles, il veut attendre qu'il y soit irrésistablement forcé par les hostilités réelles.*"

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, July —.] Wimbledon.—"I have yours of last night. I have it not in my power to give you any explanation about the order respecting *Monsieur*. I signed it in consequence of Huskisson having prepared it by orders of Mr. Pitt, and I understood it a measure settled at Lord Spencer's the evening before, in consequence of a letter from *Monsieur*, and I was not surprised at any wish of the kind coming from him in his forlorn state. But, if there is any thing misunderstood about it, there can be no difficulty in remedying it ; and if you wish any order about it

before I come to town, send to Huskisson, who will do anything you please about it, till Mr. Pitt and you meet. For my part I have not any opinion, far less a wish about it."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798, July. York Farm.]—"Vous jugez bien que ce n'est pas mon cœur qui a dicté la lettre officielle ci-jointe, mais il fallait absolument obéir aux volontés de ma Cour, et lui prouver que j'avais accompli ses ordres. On me croit tellement prévenu en faveur de ce pays qu'on s'imagine que je ne me suis pas acquitté avec assez de chaleur de cette désagréable commission. Ayez donc la bonté de me répondre ce que vous voudrez à la charmante missive que vous recevez de moi, et ayez, de grâce, celle de me l'envoyer dans la journée de jendi prochain, pour que je puisse la faire passer au héros de Campo Formio par l'occasion du courier que M. de Woronzow expédiera vendredi prochain. Je ne vous demande pas de vous voir, cela ne me ferait que de la peine actuellement. J'attends un tems plus prospère ; peut-être viendra-t-il bientôt. *Dum spiro spero.*"

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, July. York Farm.—"Madame de Rochechouart vient de revenir de Paris, et elle apporte des détails bien intéressans sur tout ce qui se passe ouvertement et secrètement dans ce cloaque d'iniquité. Je suppose que vous serez bien aise de lui parler vous-même, et de l'interroger à fond sur plusieurs objets. Elle est en mesure de répondre à tout. Elle a tout vu avec sagesse et intelligence, et connaît à fond tous les meneurs, leurs caractères, leurs goûts, leurs vices, et les manières de les prendre. Ce qu'elle m'a dit sur les projets de ces scélérats contre nous confirme ce dont je me doutais depuis longtems. Ils ont déjà organisé dans leurs conventicules la République d'Autriche, qu'ils nomment *Austrarie*, Dieu sait pourquoi. Les Directeurs en sont nommés *in petto*, et j'en connais quelques-uns. Donnez-moi mes ordres pour Madame de Rochechouart. Vous ne regretterez pas de lui avoir parlé. Elle se rendra au bureau ou chez vous, le matin, et à l'heure que vous fixerez.

"Si vous voulez l'employer, elle retournera en France quand vous le lui direz. Quand vous voudrez me voir, vous me le ferez dire. Je n'attends que les nouvelles du brave Nelson, pour écrire à fond à ma Cour par courier, ou par estafette."

FRENCH AFFAIRS.

*Report of a conversation with M. de Talleyrand [by  
Madame de Rochechouart].*

1798, July.—"Je vais vous rendre compte d'une conversation que j'ai eue avec le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le quinze de Juillet de cette année. Cette conversation, étant improvisée, imprévue, sans conséquence, vous y verrez peintes et expliquées naturellement les pensées du Ministre ; et les idées généralement



adoptées par le Directoire. (J'ai fait la note de cette conversation aussitôt après avoir quitté le Ministre.)

*Moi.*—“Vous ne pensiez pas que l'Angleterre fut en état de soutenir une défense aussi énergique ; je crois que vous vous trompez aussi à l'égard de l'Empereur.”

*Le Ministre.*—“L'Angleterre ne peut pas se soutenir plus longtemps que dix-huit mois avec son système : et l'Empereur tout seul ne nous embarrasse pas aujourd'hui ; le dernier traité de paix le livre entre nos mains ; nous lui avons fait un bien petit présent, ou pour mieux dire, un fatal présent, en lui donnant l'état de Venise ; il lui faut cent milles hommes pour le conserver ; par là, nous épuisons ses finances comme s'il faisait la guerre. S'il se détermine pour la guerre ; faites attention que nous disposons des Républiques qui l'entourent. Elles sont déjà inquiètes, ambitieuses ; elles seront bientôt guerrières. Nous avons toutes les places fortes du Piémont, tous les postes, passages et communications de la Suisse. Nous voilà entièrement maître de la Méditerranée, ce qui est d'une grande importance. Quand au Rhin nous sommes mieux que jamais, l'Allemagne est entièrement découverte ; l'Empire est dessous, et croyez moi, par la suite *nous ferons quelques choses de la Suisse.*”

*Moi.*—“D'après ce que vous me dites, il me semble que la paix tiendra l'Autriche, et que l'Empereur a tout à perdre à attendre du tems une meilleure situation ; ici son intérêt étant très clair, je crois qu'il le verra comme nous le voyons ; il doit donc en résulter la guerre.”

*Le Ministre.*—“Non jamais (soyez en sûr)—le Cabinet de l'Empereur ne se déclarera le premier ; *on nous laissera encore aller longtemps, où nous voudrions et comme nous voudrions.* Ce Cabinet est désuni.—M. de Thugut ne nous aime pas, mais le crédit de M. de Cobenzel tient au système de la paix : à moins qu'il n'y ait quelques changemens dans les intrigues de cette Cour, qui en est toute remplie. L'Impératrice sera retenue par la crainte de voir s'abîmer le trône de sa mère, la reine de Naples. D'ailleurs quand je leur supposerais assez d'énergie pour déclarer la guerre, quels sont leurs moyens ?—des finances en mauvais ordres, plus d'argent de l'Angleterre, un mauvais système de guerre, des officiers lâches, ignorans, et corruptibles. Si vous avez rencontré *Berthier*, il vous aura peut-être dit combien ont coûtés quelques états-majors de leurs armées ; il y a des choses incroyables à cet égard. Si nous entrons en Allemagne, nous ferons une guerre terrible, nos armées ne nous coûteront pas un sol. La guerre sera pour nous un système d'économie toute pure.”

*Moi.*—“Je vois que vous supposez toujours que l'Empereur sera tout seul dans la contestation. Votre ambition démesurée, et votre plan de changer le système social de l'Europe, sont à découverts aujourd'hui pour tout le monde. Du milieu de leurs ruines, l'Italie, la Hollande et la Suisse vous abhorrent. Le Roi de Prusse et la Russie, menacés comme les autres, se convainquent chaque jour qu'il est question de leur sûreté personnelle. Cette conviction ne peut-elle pas amener une coalition ?

*Le Ministre.*—“ Nous sommes revenus de la peur de coalitions ; il y a un principe de haine, de jalousie, de défiance entre les Cabinets de Berlin et de Vienne qui avant tout les guidera, et même les aveuglera dans leurs négociations. J’ai obtenu, comme vous savez, que Siéyès serait envoyé en Prusse. Il a dans son portefeuille de quoi déterminer ce Cabinet au repos. Nous lui donnons pour rien, ce qu’il n’oserait espérer après la plus belle campagne. Siéyès est très habile et nous sommes très généreux. Quand à la Russie elle fera des menaces d’un côté, et des promesses de l’autre, qui ne meneront à rien. Cet empereur n’a pas une politique guerroyante ; il s’occupe de petites choses. Je sais que l’Angleterre travaille beaucoup pour le décider ; mais elle n’est pas favorisée. Certes si la Russie le voulait sincèrement et grandement, nous pourrions être fort embarrassés ; surtout l’Angleterre l’aidant de son argent. Mon opinion particulière est, que si Catherine eut vécu cette année-ci, nous aurions courus de grands risques par notre conduite folle et gigantesque.

*Moi.*—“ Je pense tout cela comme vous, et puisque nous parlons avec confiance, j’ajouterai que si la République était renversée, nous y gagnerions tous et peut-être vous aussi.”

[*Postscript by Lord Grenville.*]

“To this my informant adds that Talleyrand wrote to the King this year to offer his services, and to give assurances of his attachment. Malhabile qui s’y fie !”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO RUFUS KING.

*Secret.*

1798, August 3. Dropmore.—“ I am very much obliged to you for the interesting information contained in your letter of the 31st July. The spirit which the United States continue to display in the present crisis of their affairs affords the best prospect, and the surest means, for the maintenance of their consideration abroad, and of their tranquillity at home. You know how sincerely I concur with you in every wish that you can form for the success of the wise and dignified measures which your Government is pursuing.

“ In my opinion the tone of Talleyrand’s last letter to Gerry, on sending him his passports, plainly shews that those measures have already produced a great part of the effect to be expected from them. But if this affectation of friendship and conciliation succeeds in imposing upon your people, and induces them or their government to relax its efforts, the whole of what has been done will be useless ; and the same course will be to be again pursued with less expectation of ultimate success. You know I am never very sanguine in what I say to you of continental affairs in Europe. If all or any of those Powers whose ruin is either completed, or in the regular progress of completion, had shewn half the energy that has been displayed by the British and American people, they would have been safe, we should have been triumphant, and America would have been a tranquil

and uninterested spectator of the troubles which the infernal spirit of atheism and modern philosophy had produced in France. It would be too much to persuade oneself that they are yet fairly roused from their fatal lethargy, and impressed with a true sense of the nature of the crisis in which they are placed. There are however, just now, appearances more favourable with respect to Austria and Russia than we have lately been accustomed to see. Between the former of these Powers and Naples a defensive alliance has been concluded for mutual support against France; and any attack by the French against Naples for receiving or supplying our ships (which the Neapolitan government has engaged to do) is to be considered by Austria as a *casus federis*. This stipulation seems to render the renewal of the war almost certain, and Austria is preparing for it accordingly. The conferences at Seltz are entirely broken off. Cobenzl and Neuchateau had both orders to demand satisfaction on the affair of Bernadotte, and as neither was authorized to *give it*, nothing was settled on that head. Cobenzl had also orders to remonstrate and treat on the subject of the Italian and Swiss revolutions since Campo Formio; and Neuchateau refused to talk on these events, which had happened, as he said, by the will of *the Italian and Helvetic nations*. Nothing was therefore agreed to, but the whole negotiation was referred back to the ordinary channels of intercourse, and the negotiators separated, as I learn, *with great mutual politeness*.

"I mention these particulars to you in confidence, not to be talked of here, but with full liberty to state them to your Government, to whom, I conceive, it may be very important to be accurately informed of them. If there was more energy and union on the Continent, I should think the prospects of the present moment very favourable; but, be the conduct or the state of the Continent what it may, you may be assured that neither the principles nor the conduct of this country will vary." *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 5. Walmer Castle.—"I have reason to think the connexions of Lord E. Fitzgerald will be active in endeavouring to represent the Bill of Attainder against him as unjust and unprecedented; and I have had a letter on the subject from the Duke of Richmond, to which I have returned as yet only a very general answer, not knowing in fact the degree of evidence on which the Bill is founded, nor the state of precedents. If you have an opportunity without trouble to yourself of looking into books to see what cases have occurred here of such proceedings against persons deceased, or of talking to any of our lawyers upon it, I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me all the learning you collect, or as much of it as will conveniently travel by the post. I feel very impatient to hear something more on the subject of union, and have been ruminating on some new ideas on the subject, which I will endeavour to put on paper,

and send you for consideration and correction, as soon as the attractions of the sea-side will allow me."

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 5. Berlin.—"Pardon me for recommending the utmost secrecy on *my* having made the communications contained in my official letters of this date.

"I have not time, nor indeed would it be interesting to your Lordship for me to repeat a variety of proofs which Count Cobenzl gave yesterday in his private conversations with Prince Reuss, Prince Repnin, and Count Panin (to which I was occasionally admitted) in testimony of his political sentiments such as I have traced them. But I have grounds to believe that, among his various reasons for quitting Vienna at this conjuncture, one which he will give to be understood is that the Emperor means to attend the army in case of a war; not as Commander, but in order to be on the spot, and to give all necessary orders without delay. And that Baron Thugut will accompany him. If so, Count Cobenzl would not wish to remain at Vienna, where little business will be done. Those who know Count Cobenzl intimately, are inclined to think that, seeing the probability of a war, and knowing the aversion to it of the inhabitants of Vienna on whom he relies, he has thought prudent to leave to Baron Thugut the odium of the measure. Count Cobenzl appeared a little hurt on the arrival of the intelligence brought by this messenger from Petersburg; having, in the course of the day, professed it to be his only object in going to Russia to procure support from them for Austria.

"I am quite ashamed to bring myself so frequently under your Lordship's notice, but I am justified in believing that you enter into the delicacy of my position; having, on the one hand, the permission to gratify a very ardent desire of giving relief to the deep affliction of my family, and being, on the other, detained here by the strongest sense of duty. What I would venture to request (and it would be a very essential favour) would be that your Lordship would take the trouble of writing a line to Lady Elgin, saying that business of a most important nature is unexpectedly come before me here, and may keep me longer at Berlin than I had foreseen. A word from your Lordship to that effect would, I know, satisfy my mother's anxiety. I cannot yet foresee what turn matters may take here. Count Panin proposes making his communications this day to Count Haugwitz. And the knowledge of the conduct of the Court of Petersburg may possibly give great importance to the discussions between that Minister and Count Cobenzl. At all events, your Lordship may be well assured that I shall not quit my post as long as I conceive my services can be of any use."

W. PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 6. Walmer Castle.—"I see no difficulty in issuing 5,000*l.* by a Treasury warrant out of the vote of credit to

Almeida, or any one authorised by him to give a receipt for the service of Portugal. But I think the issue should be recommended in a letter from you to the Treasury, in the same manner as any issue for secret service.

"I have felt rather uneasy at the very imperfect accounts of the discovery obtained from the Irish traitors ; and I wrote, two days since, to Lord Cornwallis, with the view of drawing from him a little more information, and also of urging the necessity of bringing forward the great work of Union, which can never be so well accomplished as now.

"I have written to Long to furnish the 5,000*l.* on any application from your Office."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 6. Somerset Place.—"I have read Monsieur Malouet's paper with infinite satisfaction. Indeed he has wrote in French what I proposed to state this day to the Cabinet, only that my ideas go upon a larger scale ; perfectly however within our certain reach if we lay aside extravagant projects on the coast of France. I confess myself out of all patience on that subject. We have the means of commanding a glorious peace if those means are steadily and vigorously pursued, and it would be unpardonable to throw it all away in quest of imaginary and hazardous projects, equally ruinous to us and to those who are the objects of them."

#### SIR JAMES CRAUFURD to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, August 7. Hamburg.—"I had the honour to receive by the last post your Lordship's notification of my appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the circle of Lower Saxony.

"I beg leave to return your Lordship my most sincere thanks for your goodness in recommending me to the King for this office. I am the more sensible of it, and the more flattered by it, as the difficulty of placing people in the foreign line has undoubtedly been considerably increased by the events which have occurred within the last five years. And I shall think myself extremely fortunate if, by my exertions here, I shall prove myself in any degree worthy of the choice you have been so good as to make of me.

"There is one object, one of the earliest of my attention on arriving here, in which I fear I have not much to expect. I mean the establishing a correspondence with Holland by means of a commercial house. I have caused the most extensive enquiries to be made, observing the necessary circumspection ; but I have been uniformly told that, such is their fear of exposing themselves to the resentment of the Government, none of the merchants or any people of credit in Holland ever write any political news of importance. From the difficulty which I have experienced in attempting to establish a correspondence, I have thought of sending some proper person into the country who might observe what is passing in the ports ; but I wait to know your Lordship's sentiments on this

subject, as, in all probability, you have many people in England who offer themselves for this service, whom you employ in this way, and I therefore might be incurring an unnecessary expence. And the delay occasioned by my waiting for your instructions is inconsiderable. But I apprehend that, if I am to take any step of this kind, it should not be deferred much longer, as, if anything is undertaken from the ports of Holland or Flanders, the autumnal season will probably be chosen for that purpose.

"At the same time that I am exerting myself to the utmost, it is but just that your Lordship should be made acquainted with the obstacles that I have to encounter, in order that I may not be unmeritedly blamed in case certain parts of the business should at any time appear not to have been sufficiently attended to.

"What I allude to is this. When Siéyès was appointed to Berlin, I conceived that a very active communication would probably, if not certainly, take place between him and the Jacobins here. I therefore wrote to Lord Elgin stating this idea, and recommending to his particular vigilance all persons passing and repassing between Berlin and Hamburgh; and hinting that I thought it would be advisable to have persons at the different inns to furnish him with intelligence of this nature. There was surely nothing illicit in this, nor any thing but what is practised by, I was going to say, every foreign minister; and which I am sure ought to be practised by all. To this letter I received the enclosed answer. It seems to be written rather in haste; and indeed there is no other way of accounting for the obscurity of it. For how what I recommended—and I can assure your Lordship it was nothing more than I have stated—can be construed into *an interference in the internal concerns of the country* I am at a loss to conceive. That an English minister should watch the steps of a French minister, and of all those who communicate with him, appears to me the first of his duties; nor, I apprehend, would any Government feel otherwise than obliged to a man who, by his vigilance, should discover the existence of a Jacobin conspiracy in their country; far would they be from *complaining* of proper, secret, circumspect attempts to unravel one.

"I am sensible that what I have here said might, in the eyes of some people, have an invidious appearance; but I can assure your Lordship very sincerely that I have no such motive. I have no ill will towards Lord Elgin; but, on the contrary, really esteem him for his good nature and honesty of character; but the matter in question is connected with so important a part of my mission that it is incumbent on me, in justice to myself, to show that all that depends upon me has been done."

*Enclosure.*

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO SIR J. CRAUFURD.

*Private.*

1798, July 14. Berlin.—"Your letter in cipher came to Berlin during my absence. I do not yet see how far I can continue

to adopt the measure you propose. Nothing can be more active than the police against foreign ministers. Everything we do, and every one we see is known. And I am aware ministry at home would be very angry were I to allow any complaint to be made against me for interference in the internal concerns of this country.

"The negotiation between Austria and Prussia, under the mediation of Russia, is drawing towards a close. The Prussians seem very anxious to confine themselves within the prescribed line of neutrality, and that I presume to be motivated by the presence of Siéyès, whose solicitations they are very anxious to prevent. I believe Prince Repnin will soon quit Berlin. He is yet undecided, and therefore what I mention is only between ourselves. But he loses expectation of doing anything to purpose. Siéyès hitherto is very quiet. Poland, however, seems to occupy him."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to EARL SPENCER.

1798, August 9. Dropmore.—"I this morning received from the Office the copy of Mitchell's letter to the Admiralty. It does not appear to me that Wrangel's proposal is very materially different from what M. D'Asp stated to me, but I should be very glad to know how it strikes you before I send any answer to the official letter. There is a letter from the King of Sweden to the King on this subject amounting almost to a declaration of war. I have desired Hammond to send it to you." *Copy.*

#### EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 9. Admiralty.—"The only material difference in the Swedish captain's proposal appears to be his refusing to go and join the Lisbon convoy at Spithead, from whence it is about to depart, and which, if he does not agree to, will produce considerable difficulty in effectually watching him and preventing his taking the convoy into French or Spanish ports. By a letter we had this morning from Captain Mitchell, he seems to have entertained a doubt whether it was not required of him to take the Swedish convoy under his protection as he would a convoy of his own; whereas, if I understand the agreement with M. D'Asp correctly, all that we wish is that some ship or ships of ours should accompany it; and we have answered his letter accordingly. We have had an account to-day of another Swedish convoy being brought into the Downes yesterday, but the particulars have not reached us."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] August 10. Walmer Castle.—"I have received your letter with its enclosures, which I return, and have, as you desire, wrote to Mr. Bruce. I perfectly adopt the idea that there ought to be some such offices as some of those in question, which ought to be sinecures, and given as rewards, in place of being

looked upon for the performance of duties. But I am sure, when you examine the subject with your own eyes, you will be satisfied that Mr. Bruce's office cannot be permitted to remain on that footing; or, at least, if it is, some other must be appointed not to be a sinecure, but to do those very duties which Bruce's commission supposes to be done by him. In fact, some of the material ones actually have been done by him. I don't mention all the researches made by him under my directions at the early period of the institution of the present establishment of Indian government, because, whatever was done under that order, was strictly connected with the Office out of whose funds he was paid, and by whose clerks he was assisted. But, more recently, when the situation of the country in a peculiar manner called upon me to look to the internal defence of the country, I was naturally desirous to know what had been done by our ancestors under similar circumstances; and we all knew that an accurate research into the proceedings of Queen Elizabeth, at the period of the threatened Spanish invasion, must afford material suggestions. I directed Bruce to make a research, and, when many of the original documents were brought to me, I was shocked to see that, in a country like this, its ancient muniments should be going so rapidly to destruction as these seemed to be going. The research, however, was made, and a collection from it prepared, which contains all that could be found, and perhaps all that practically useful for the purpose I had in view was worth having; and it was some consolation to find that, in a period of as much energy as was that of Queen Elizabeth's preparation against the Spanish Armada, ideas and measures similar to those which I was meditating, had been, many of them, anticipated by that able Princess. How was this done? for there was not one article necessary for the execution of it in the Register's department. It was done in a room at the India Board, with the aid of the clerks there, and such further aid as could be hired for the purpose; but it was done to the great interruption of the business of the Indian Department, with which, in truth, it had no concern. More recently Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Portland wished him to be employed, and applied to me for the purpose of searching into all the records, both here and in Scotland, with a view to the Irish union; and, accordingly, after much labour and research carried on by the same aid and by the same means as the former research had been, a Report was made to the Duke of Portland, printed and distributed by him. The printing excepted, all the other expense was defrayed, as formerly, out of the establishment of the Indian Office. Within these same months, Mr. Pitt (and, I understand, the Duke of Portland) have expressed an earnest wish that an accurate search should be made into all the Irish records and correspondence in this country, in order to put Ministers in possession of all the information which those materials may afford respecting the connexion between the two countries. Those who know me will not impute to me any disposition to obstruct any public



service that can be suggested to me, or executed by any body who may be more immediately under my protection; but your Lordship must feel that, if without the means of doing any duty whatever except what I can accidentally afford to him, he is to be called upon, out of a salary of 132*l.*, to bestow twelve or fourteen hours per day upon the business of his Office, it is not perfectly fair to him; and, I am sure, impossible for me, with any propriety, to interrupt the business of another Department, in order to aid business with which it has no concern. These have been my sentiments for near two years past; but, perhaps from a ridiculous feeling that Mr. Bruce was originally a *protégé* of mine, and still more from an idea that you had not much disposition either to the measure or the man, I delayed till lately urging the arrangement; and then I only did it upon Mr. Pitt stating to me that, if I wished it to be done, you would rather I would do it without your participation. Being decisively of opinion that the measure is a right one, and being convinced that there is not another man in the world to be found who would rest the joy of his life in being buried in old records, and happy whenever he should be called upon by any Secretary of State to report the result of his researches, I am perfectly ready to avow the responsibility of recommending it; but I am sure your Lordship will not believe that I can have any wish to hurt any person under your protection; as, indeed, till I received your letter, I had never heard nor understood that there could be any collision among them."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 12. Wimbledon.—"Two [hours] ago I received a letter from General Don with some enclosures. They do not give a very promising picture of the dispositions of the Court of Prussia. How far it is proper to take any other steps than those already used to counteract the intrigues of the French Government you are the best judge; but it would be wrong in me not to convey to you all that has reached me on the subject."

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 13. Walmer Castle.—"Your learning respecting attainders is quite satisfactory as to *law and precedent*. I have sent your notes to Carthew, desiring him to make a copy, and forward the original to you. I own I should like also to see on what grounds you think the *reason and justice* of such a proceeding equally unquestionable. It may be said that the law of forfeiture equally affects heirs without their being heard; but then the person whose life is interested in the cause, and who is best acquainted with the case, has had an opportunity of making a defence. Here the whole proceeding may be *ex parte*; or at least the defence rest with those who are incapable of making it to advantage. I state these doubts of course with a strong wish

to have them solved. I wait most impatiently to hear from Ireland, though I do not think there is so much mischief to be expected from what has passed as you seem to do. I have written by mistake on a half sheet and have not time before the post to add any thing to it. I am extremely well, and I hope gaining gradually a stock of health, for occasions when it will be more wanted than here.

"I shall probably be in town in about a week."

#### THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 15. Dublin.—"Though you are, of course, well informed about all that passes here, I cannot close my letter without saying something upon what I have been able to observe of the state of the public. I have reason to think that the Lord Lieutenant's sentiments both as to men and measures coincide so much with mine that I shall have particular satisfaction from the support which I shall give to his government. But it is certain that the lenity he has shown to so many leaders of rebellion is very unpopular here, and condemned more generally and more loudly than you may be aware of. I am however of opinion these clamours are not to be dreaded, and proceed in a great measure from certain political intriguers, who are apprehensive that he means to rely more upon his own judgement than theirs. In this description I do not include the Chancellor. The noise will soon subside, and those who are most forward in making it, when they find they cannot gain their ends, will be eager to atone for their conduct by any compliances that may be required from them; for there is no union or concert between them; on the contrary their distrust of each other is notorious and extreme. The policy to be pursued for the future security of the country is however a question of as much delicacy as importance. Whatever I hear of the opinions of others, and whatever suggests itself to me, I shall communicate to you when we meet; and in the meantime shall only observe that the minds of all with whom I converse seem to me earnestly fixed upon an Union. How far the present circumstances of Great Britain, the present numbers of both Houses of Parliament there, and the state of the war, may admit of the Government turning their thoughts to a measure of such consequence I cannot guess; but I am persuaded that while the terror of the late rebellion is fresh, it would be received as a most important boon to Ireland. It is what I never have wished for, and what indeed I have always been disinclined to, perhaps from a view of my own private interest, and because I thought it very possible to do without it; but I have seen and heard so much of the furious animosities by which the people of this country are impelled against each other, that I am forced to alter my opinion, and really believe that we can never be well governed without it."

H. ELLIOTT to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, August 15. Dresden.—“I beg leave to trouble your Lordship with a few lines, upon a subject, which, though not immediately connected with the duties of my situation at this Court, will, I presume, be thought worthy of your Lordship’s attention.

“In the present contest between the established Governments of Europe, and the destructive ambition of the French Republic, civilised society has been exposed, perhaps, to greater danger from the extension of the tenets of impiety and anarchy, through the medium of the press, than even from the success of the French arms. The partisans of revolution and innovation have not been more active in any country than in Germany; and, unfortunately, the German universities have been the centre of a spirit of democracy, which has from thence been diffused into all the various classes of what are styled the learned professions.

“Among the other topics which assist the sale of political pamphlets and journals in the empire, there is none more universally resorted to than an indiscriminate abuse of the British Government and all its measures. These secretly obtain the support of those Cabinets which have hitherto shown themselves as ill inclined towards Great Britain, as blind to their own real interests. Although the German language is not supposed in England to be the channel through which any extensive effect can be produced beyond the limits of the empire, I beg leave to observe to your lordship that, in the northern countries of Europe, in Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, German is more generally read than French, particularly among the middling ranks of society. And the gross misrepresentations of conduct, and misstatements of facts, contained in German publications, seldom meet with a contradiction; but Anarchists, Deists, and Republicans have, through them, vented their malice against England, without encountering an opponent. It must indeed be confessed that, by such means, they have contrived, in some degree, to render unpopular the only Government and the only cause for the success of which all honest men of all countries ought equally to unite their efforts.

“The splendid reputation of the Rev. Mr. Marsh of St. John’s College, Cambridge, for deep erudition has, without doubt, not escaped your Lordship’s notice. His theological works, his translation of Michaelis, and his assiduous labours during many years residence at Leipsic, have given his name great weight among the *literati* of Germany, particularly as he possesses the very unusual talent of being able to write equally well in German and in English. To this I must add that there does not exist a better man, nor a more loyal subject, or one who has, upon all occasions, proved himself more attached to the true interests of his country. It is from this principle that Mr. Marsh has already undertaken the defence of Great Britain against the attack of Achenholz and other writers, published in German periodical works.

"Having entered the field of controversy, he finds the cause he supports worthy of a more important work, and he has resolved to lay aside, as much as possible, his other pursuits, to stand forth the champion of his country, by publishing in English and in German, *a general defence of the measures of the British Government since the beginning of the French Revolution*. With this view, he has applied to me for various publications and papers necessary for the completion of his purpose, which I have no means of obtaining here. Perceiving the general expectation raised in Germany from Mr. Marsh's laudable undertaking, I have written to him that, although I cannot myself furnish him with the materials he asks for, I consider his intended work as being of sufficient importance as to justify me in venturing to solicit your Lordship's assistance, through the means of Mr. Hammond, with whose enlightened zeal for the honour and interest of Government I am well acquainted, and to whom I have written upon the subject.

"May I therefore be allowed to encourage Mr. Marsh to send Mr. Hammond a list of the various pamphlets and publications he stands in need of, to be transmitted to him to Leipsic by any of the King's messengers who may be going occasionally through that place to Vienna. I presume also to suggest that it would be eligible that such pamphlets and publications should be sent to Mr. Marsh free of expense; as I am fully convinced that the work he is engaged in will be materially conducive to benefit the political interests of Great Britain, in all those countries where the German language is the usual vehicle for information."

#### FRENCH AFFAIRS.

##### *Memorandum by Lord Grenville.*

1798, August 16.—"M. de Calonne told me to-day that Madame de Rochechouart in her late journey to Paris had met Rewbell at the house of Talleyrand. That in the course of conversation the former asked what the dispositions of the English Government were, and when she professed total ignorance on this head, he followed his former question up by asking (if England wished for peace) whether it would not consent to an armistice, in the course of which many difficulties might be smoothed. This she said was spoken in a manner that seemed to indicate a wish that it should be repeated in England, and was accompanied with some expressions that they did not see why it should be concluded in England that the Directory was averse to peace. But as she could make no answer to these questions the conversation (as M. de Calonne stated to me) ended there.

"I am inclined to believe that more passed, and that this Madame de Rochechouart, who has openly announced her intention to return to Paris, has undertaken to make this communication and to bring back the answer. I made no reply whatever to any part of this statement, but immediately turned the conversation off to other points."

## WILLIAM PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 16. Walmer Castle.—“If I thought there could be any hesitation or difference of opinion on the subject of the answer to be sent to Russia, I should not lose a moment in coming to town. But I am persuaded we shall all agree most cordially in going as far to meet this overture as our pecuniary resources will allow. On that point I am happy to think we are much more at ease than in the period of October 1796, and I think it perfectly clear that we may safely go the full length which we did in our proposal of a treaty at that time. I mean that, on condition of Russia furnishing an army of 60,000 men, we should engage to pay 300,000*l.* preparation money on the ratification or, if necessary, on the *signature* of the treaty; and afterwards 100,000*l.* per month, with the power of discontinuing payment on a notice and advance of two months; and should also pay after the war, as a debt, a further sum to be computed at the rate of 50,000*l.* per month (or even if necessary a sum greater by one-third) for the time the treaty shall be acted upon. You will observe that this goes (as far as money is in question) to the full extent of the utmost concessions authorized by your secret dispatch in 1796, Number 20. Another concession was there admitted for reducing the number of Russian troops to 50, or even 40,000; which I should think now either ought to be excluded, or directed only to be yielded in case it should be absolutely impossible otherwise to conclude the treaty. I see no necessity for inserting what was proposed to be the 2nd article of the treaty, subjecting it to the approbation of Parliament. All subsidy treaties are so, of course, as to their *permanent* effect; but, as to the remainder of this year, we are both authorized and enabled by the vote of credit; and with a view to a permanent engagement, it seems to me to stand best in the usual form, without any special reserve that implies distrust of the measure. The provision in the 5th article for discontinuing the subsidy on notice, seems still a necessary precaution in case we should unexpectedly find the remittance too inconvenient; which, though much less likely than in 1796, will not be thought impossible.

“This is perhaps the point most likely to occasion difficulty, as I see from Whitworth’s dispatch, Number 56, he had in that negotiation agreed (though contrary to his instructions) to wave it. He seems indeed totally to have mis-conceived the view with which it was inserted. I suppose the treaty can hardly be made at present to last longer than for the year 1799, though (with the liberty on our part of discontinuing on notice) a longer term, or during the war, would be preferable for us.

“I had written thus far when I received your note by the post this morning. I have determined in consequence to come to town, and will be there between twelve and one on Saturday. I could not without a good deal of inconvenience to others, as well as myself, come sooner; and I hope no time will be lost with respect to the Russian business, as you will probably prepare the instructions in the meantime.

"With respect to Ireland, a day can make no difference. I am quite of opinion that the dispatch, even with the corrections I have suggested, is better withheld.

"I hope your accounts from Sir Morton Eden give sufficient reason to believe that Austria has really taken its decision."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 19. Wimbledon.—"Mr. Pitt came out with me yesterday in the carriage to Wimbledon, and we naturally were led to pursue a little the train of our deliberations in Downing Street. Mr. Pitt stated a doubt how far the country would adopt the idea cheerfully, and we agreed nothing could be more prejudicial to every interest, if they were revolted by it. As usual the subject haunted me in the course of the night, and, when I rose in the morning, I put down in writing the train of thinking in which the subject had cast up to me. I showed it at breakfast to Mr. Pitt, who seems to feel more strongly than he did before the doubts that were floating in his mind, and we agreed that I should send the enclosed to you for your consideration.

"The Duke of York has been here this morning, and you may safely pledge yourself to leave two of the regiments now there, and to add another regiment of infantry within six weeks or thereabout. It is likewise our intention to strengthen the regiments now there, so that, in fact, the British force will be rather increased than diminished by the arrangements now making. Say nothing more of cavalry, for, although a regiment of cavalry might be got, if essential for any very beneficial purpose, it could not for a considerable time be done without material inconvenience."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 21. Richmond.—"Je serai demain chez vous entre trois et quatre heures, et je vous attendrai pour avoir la satisfaction de causer un peu avec vous sur nos affaires, et sur la nouvelle que vous avez l'amitié de me communiquer. Je vous avoue que j'ai l'incrédulité de St. Thomas sur la nouvelle que l'officier Turc a apporté d'Egypte à Constantinople; et, à moins que vous n'ayez reçu d'autre part la confirmation, la frayeur d'un Turc ignorant n'est pas une autorité valable. Au reste, je les aime mieux en Egypte ou en Crimée, ces gueux de Français, qu'à Thessalonique d'où ils auraient pu donner la main à Passanan Ouglu, lui laisser des officiers et des ingénieurs, et aller eux-mêmes attaquer la Maison d'Autriche en Croatie, en Esclavonie, et en Dalmatie où on n'est nullement préparé à se défendre. Le climat d'Egypte fera ce que les armes Russes auraient fait en Crimée, si Bonaparte aurait pu y arriver.

"Ce qui me paraît le plus improbable est que Nelson ait devancé, et qu'en retournant de là, il n'ait pas rencontré les

Français ; d'autant plus que dans cette saison les vents dans toute ces parties de la Méditerranée, pendant les trois mois d'été, sont constamment au *west*, et que celui qui navigue vers l'Égypte doit aller fort vite ; du lieu que celui qui part de là ne peut avancer qu'en convoyant. Ainsi Nelson devait, à son retour, ne pas manquer les Français.

"A tout événement, il faut se réjouir de ce débarquement en Égypte, car c'est une armée perdue pour la France."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 24. Richmond.—"Je vous envoie ce que j'écrirai à l'Empereur. Examinez, je vous prie, si je vous ai bien compris ; et si j'ai ajouté ou omi quelque chose de ce que vous m'avez dit, ajoutez ou effacez vous-même, et renvoyez-moi mon papier, car c'est la copie d'un brouillon que j'ai écrit si vite, que je ne puis plus le déchiffrer moi-même ; et que le seul homme qui peut déchiffrer ma mauvaise écriture quand je me presse d'écrire, a passé deux jours à copier cette pièce.

"J'espère que vous enverrez un de vos couriers avec le mien, tant pour porter les pouvoirs au M. Withworth, que pour pouvoir vous rapporter la nouvelle de ce qui sera fait à Pétersbourg, en conséquence de ces dépêches. En me renvoyant l'incluse, ayez la bonté de me faire savoir quand vous comptez envoyer votre courier, pour que le mien puisse être prêt, et partir en même temps.

"Je vous prie aussi de faire mettre dans la *gazette* l'arrangement que vous avez déjà agréé pour les passeports au sujets Anglais, afin que je puisse l'envoyer à l'Empereur. Si d'aujourd'hui au départ du courier vous ne venez pas en ville, et que vous recevez quelques nouvelles intéressantes, que je puisse me faire le mérite de les communiquer à l'Empereur, ayez la bonté de me les communiquer en m'écrivant."

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, August 25. Dropmore.—"Je vous renvoie votre dépêche, dans laquelle j'ai trouvé ce que j'avais à vous dire, énoncé avec beaucoup plus de netteté et de clarté que je peux me flatter d'y avoir mis. C'est précisément le sens des explications dont j'ai été chargé. Si j'avais quelque chose à y ajouter ce serait peut-être la remarque simple mais frappante, que pour les frais de l'année courante, on a imposé ici sur chaque particulier un impôt calculé sur le dixième de son revenu disponible, et que si quelques-uns ont trouvé le moyen de se soustraire à cet impôt, d'autres (et en plus grand nombre) l'ont augmenté par des contributions volontaires, jusqu'à le montant du cinquième de leur revenu. Ce qui prouve non seulement l'effort que nous faisons, mais aussi la nécessité absolue où le gouvernement se trouve de consulter l'opinion publique ; aujourd'hui si bien prononcée en faveur des mesures vigoureuses,

mais qui pourrait si facilement être changée en la choquant par des mesures même qui, sous d'autres rapports, auraient pû être utiles.

"Nous n'avons absolument rien de nouveau. J'ai chargé Hammond de vous expliquer mes difficultés au sujet de l'insertion dans la *gazette* officielle, de l'arrangement relatif aux passeports." *Copy. French.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 26. Dublin.—"I have this moment received your very unwelcome letter of the 21st, which too truly establishes the fact that Buonaparté has made his landing good at Alexandria. The after game, as far as Nelson can be concerned in it, may prosper, but I fear very much that the Turk will add one more (from internal commotions assisted by this armament) to the melancholy chapter of fraternised governments. Still, however, I have as little doubt but that Buonaparté must ultimately be undone.

"Our Irish news from Mayo is unfortunately a blank, for the mail coach with the despatches was stopped by a party of rebels, who collected in the night at the eleven-mile-stone from Dublin near Kilcock, and took the mails and the despatches. From the other parts of Ireland there does not seem the slightest expectation of disturbance, except that parts of the county of Meath are feverish. It is impossible however not to see that the slightest check would produce the most mischievous effects. Under this idea Lord Cornwallis has given orders for a strict defensive until the force collected is amply sufficient to ensure success. He collects his infantry at Athlone, and his cavalry at Longford, and forms a reserve at Tullamore. But a considerable force is pushed over the Shannon, and if their numbers amount only to about 1,000 or 1,200 men, it is not impossible but that General Hutchinson has already attacked them.

"I am now to state to you the situation in which personally I have been placed by the measures taken by Lord Cornwallis on the 24th. I heard this news from the Officer Commanding the artillery here, having just received orders from Lieutenant-General Craig to parade 350 men for an immediate move. Though I was a little hurt at receiving orders in that way from Lieutenant-General Craig without the slightest communication (as usual) from Lord Cornwallis, I wrote instantly to him to offer and to request that I might move with my detachment, or that I might command the two detachments (namely, the Warwick and mine) and to offer my services in any way in which my local knowledge or any other circumstances could make me useful. To this I received a dry note thanking me for the offer, but stating 'that it was his intention that the detachments should be commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel or a Major.' The next day, yesterday, my detachment was increased to 500 men, and I then wrote another note to press the same thing, and to intimate very strongly, though in the easiest terms,



my confidence that if he left Dublin he would not leave me and my regiment to *faire la guerre des pots de chambre*. In answer he sent Lord Hobart to me to state verbally that 'he felt it awkward to write upon it, but that he was very sorry to be obliged to decline my offers which were very handsome.' In consequence of which Freemantle is gone with the command of *both detachments* amounting to near 900 men, and my present *duty* is to take care that the barracks are swept clean; nor is the slightest explanation given to me by Lord Cornwallis, who is this morning gone off *with my detachment* to Tullamore where they all arrive this night. Now as I have not the slightest military vanity, I have no difficulty in saying that this command would have been very painful to me from its responsibility; but I felt it a very serious and very marked duty which I was bound to undertake, and I most certainly feel that I am disgraced and degraded by the order which leaves me here at such a moment, and under such a commander as Lieutenant-General Craig, with whom I am upon the best terms, but who is an old woman. In consequence of all this, I have writ the enclosed to Lord Cornwallis, which I trust you will think very temperate; but I never will forgive you if you do not agree with me in thinking me and our Bucks cruelly used in being left at such a moment to take care of Newgate gaol, Kilmainham gaol, Bridewell infirmary, Penitentiary House, Prevots, Marshalsea prison, Naval Hospital, Bank of Ireland, exclusive of the usual guards (not very flattering) which you remember. In short I am so thoroughly sickened of the whole business that a very little more oil upon the flame will make it break out; for both the regiments, officers and men (except Lord Hertford, which, *entre nous*, is the secret history of Lord Cornwallis's refusal of *my offer*) are outrageous at the general treatment of this very meritorious body, on this very thankless, laborious, and now disgraceful duty; and as soon as the French are driven out of the country, I am persuaded that a memorial will be signed to both the Colonels, complaining of the manner in which we have been employed.

"But all this is nonsense when we look to the very serious and critical situation of the country if there should be any check, or if Lord Cornwallis should be killed; in either case I am persuaded that the mischief would be incalculable. I trust to his prudence and skill with thorough confidence for our security against the first contingency; and I am fully of opinion that, if we have no check in destroying the French, we shall have no rising, though it is possible that there will be partial and petty insurrections; but I tremble for fear of the latter, because I see no solution short of that which I proposed to you with so much personal pain to myself. Since I wrote that letter it has occurred to me that you might send to Lord Hobart (who is here) either an active commission of Lord Deputy to execute civil and usual business in Dublin, of which there are several precedents; or a dormant commission in case of Lord Cornwallis's death; or else send the dormant commission for me; but for God's sake

remember that I will not, for *any* consideration, hold it for more than three weeks or a month; and that I only press it because I know that the appointment of the Chancellor and Speaker as Justices would instantly, from party feelings, *create* a rebellion."

*Postscript.* "Letters just arrived from General Hutchinson at Castlebar stating that he was arrived there yesterday morning, the 25th, with about 2,400 men of all sorts, and that he was going on in the evening; that all was quiet, and not a man had joined the French. No other news. Lord Altamont from Westport writes to the same effect. Letters from Meath of this day at 12 o'clock state all quiet at their chapels, and no rising."

#### RUFUS KING to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, August 26. Margate.—"If your information is not so late, the enclosed letter, which I pray you to return, will communicate intelligence of some importance.

"Talleyrand with much earnestness urged Mr. G[erry] to wait at Paris for instructions, which he expressed his belief to be on their way, and which would remove all his scruples respecting his power to treat separately with France. We see the explanation of this scheme in a motion that has been made in the House of Representatives to address the President, requesting him to instruct Mr. G[erry] to treat separately with France, on the basis laid down in the instructions originally given to him and [his] colleagues. The proposition was treated with great and uncommon indignity, and negatived by 51 against 31 voices."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1798, August 27. Drogheda.—"I return you your letters with many thanks. The papers to-day give us General Washington's letter, which is, I think, extremely well written, and calculated to produce the best effect. We have nothing more about Buonaparte or Nelson, nor can we, I think, expect to hear yet, as the letters from Constantinople were of so very recent a date.

"The French are, thank God, a good deal too late in their Irish expedition. Two months ago a debarkation would have been matter of some uneasiness; now, I trust, it cannot but terminate more advantageously for us than if the thing had not taken place." *Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 27. Dublin.—"The French had begun to entrench at Killalla, but on Saturday they seemed to have gathered confidence in consequence of some information that they had got of an intended rising at Sligo, and pushed out a great part of their force. But upon coming up with the pass at Ballina found it occupied by the 6th Dragoon Guards, and did not attempt it, but

retired to their former ground. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Thomas Chapman followed them, and writes as late as yesterday morning that they were busy in strengthening their entrenchments, and had warped their ships close in under their works. Chapman had a few infantry, but did not mean to act or to do more than to secure the pass. He says that a few Killalla inhabitants had joined them, but not one man from the country; and that he had found every assistance in men and tools. General Hutchinson writes from Castlebar on Saturday night that he was waiting for some guns which he had sent for, and which would be up in the night, and that on Sunday morning he should move with 3,400 troops and ten pieces of ordnance, and thought he should be able to attack them on Monday morning. Lake will be there by that time. The country are all loyal, and have furnished pioneers, and cars, and cattle to any extent.

"But the best news is that Lord Cavan writes from Londonderry that, on Saturday morning, the wherries which he had ordered to sea fell in off Lough Swilly with the *Melampus* and two other frigates (said to be the *Doris* and *Dryad*) and delivered Lord Cavan's information of the French ships, which has been acknowledged by Captain Moore or Lord Ranelagh (I cannot make out which) who went about immediately, and hoped to be at Killalla on Sunday by noon.

"The wind blew heavily on Saturday night against them, but we know that the French ships were there yesterday morning at 9 o'clock. It appears therefore that the chapter of Irish invasion will be soon closed. Every part of Meath and of the suspected counties perfectly quiet. The party who stopped the mail yesterday were all cut to pieces, about eleven o'clock yesterday, by some dragoons and yeomanry, and the mail coaches of this day are all arrived *without escort*.

"You will have seen O'Connor's impudent manifesto printed in the papers of this morning. I do not know what will be done with him, but I well know he ought instantly to be executed; for his intention at such a moment is too manifest."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 28. Dublin.—"The news of this day unluckily contradicts Sir Thomas Chapman's account of the frigates remaining in Killalla Bay, for it appears by General Hutchinson's letter of the 26th at noon, that the frigates had sailed early on that morning, and were out of sight when an officer from him went in with a flag to General Kilmaine to summon him. The answer had not been received. Hutchinson had received Lord Cornwallis's orders not to move, and remained at Castlebar with 3,400 troops, and the certainty that the French did not exceed 800. How far he may be deceived I know not, but it certainly looks as if he was now strong enough to *brusquer la chose*, and the loss of five or six days is incalculable. Lord Cornwallis was last night at Kilbeggan, 45 miles from Dublin; and is this night at Longford, 54 miles from it, so that he seems determined to

keep the matter afloat till he has collected force enough to ensure success against any and every possible chance. I certainly do not know his reasons, but he clearly risks a great deal by this conduct, which after all may be wise, but which does not suit with the fever of the moment. The frigates which sailed on Saturday from Lough Swilly were the *Diana*, *Cerberus*, and (supposed to be) the *Doris*; and on Sunday morning about noon a very heavy cannonade was heard off Lough Swilly; but I fear, though the wind was at south west, the French frigates could not have got round so far from Killalla in that time. The *Hazard* sloop of 18 guns brought another of the Mauritius frigates with troops into Cork.

"You will have seen the details of the debate respecting the manifesto of Emmet, O'Connor, and M'Nevin. The House was unanimous (even the most violent anti-attainders) in the necessity of excepting these three from the indemnity, and giving them up to trial. Lord Castlereagh was the only dissentient, which between ourselves is not very wise; and stated that they had been immediately confined as close prisoners. This manifesto has evidently occasioned very great ferment, and ought, according to my poor ideas, to be pursued as the overt act of 'endeavouring to bring the King, his Parliament, and his government into odium and contempt'; which in itself is a new treason to which the compact of Government with them could not apply. There seems every disposition in the House to push the matter to its fullest extent, and there is much folly in our *now no-Government* interfering to check such a disposition. Lord Castlereagh is (to use our Eton phrase) to *stay out sham* till he gets Lord Cornwallis's directions on this matter. In the mean time, I am, as usual, very angry at being left in Dublin degraded and ridiculous."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 28. Dublin.—"One hour after I had closed my letter unfolded the official mis-statements of Hutchinson's force, and of the steps taken by the French. All that I wrote to you I received from Cooke, or from the different Offices; and, during the whole of yesterday, they attempted to keep as a profound secret the news of the entire defeat of our troops under Hutchinson, but actually commanded by Lake. The secret was instantly whispered; and I (who *knew*, and had told Cooke that I had proof that Lewins, the agent from O'Connor to France, had landed with them, and had sent up the account to his friends four hours before Government received theirs) soon heard the fact, which can hardly be mis-stated because nothing could be more complete. Our artillery (8 pieces) evidently had the advantage, and every thing promised most fairly when the stray shot of some of the French guns opened on our infantry, who gave way instantly in the most cowardly manner, particularly (as I hear) the Fraser fencibles and the Kilkenny militia. The enemy occupied Castlebar, and last night they had pushed on to Tuam. Lord Cornwallis

was at Athlone and states that the enemy had been joined by great numbers, and that he was not in force to move forward to attack them. I understand from the Quarter-Master-General's Office that this night he is to be joined by the Guards, 2nd, 29th, and 100th, all of which are invaluable, for nothing more could be more abominable than the misconduct and cowardice of the Irish militia.

"In the midst of all this we have no Government, or any thing like one, in the capital, where people talk of a rising with the same coolness as they would of any other event. It is known that the rebel leaders (not in prison) all left Dublin yesterday, and the consternation in Dublin must invite all the mischief that can be done. I still am persuaded that there will be no rising in Dublin, but I am *most sure* that there will be risings in Meath and Kildare. But the real mischief is the no-government in the no-hands of Lord Castlereagh and General Craig. I have been urging, but without any success, that a Committee of Council (of which I am not) should assemble and sit to carry into execution the Lord Lieutenant's orders, and to provide for the security of Parliament and of Dublin; with the hopes that a Government so constituted might supply in the publick mind the absence of the Executive Government, and might (which is the real reason and object of my anxiety) find itself seated in the saddle in case of Lord Cornwallis's death. For God's sake do not hesitate but send a Lord Deputy, which would at once solve every difficulty, either as temporary, or as a provisional government; for I am convinced as I am of my existence that Lord Cornwallis's death would, *rebus sic stantibus*, annihilate every chance for salvation; and most particularly so if, by the same misfortune to General Lake, the army fell to General Craig, who is folly itself, and so weak that Lord Castlereagh did not even trust him last night with this secret. The garrison of Dublin has been most wantonly thinned; we have barely 1,100 infantry in the town, and the whole neighbourhood calling out for troops. I trust you will send us strength from England, but I know not where to advise that they should land, for if the rising takes place it will be universal. Galway will fall of course, for from Tuam the French have cut it from all succour, and the inhabitants are very bad.

"I repeat however that I see no reason for solid alarm, if we had a Government; but it is too hard to fight the cause of government, without even the appearance of one.

*Postscript.* "I have thought it right to press Lord Cornwallis to appoint a Committee of Council, that its authority might be constituted, received, and acknowledged in case of any accident to him."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 30. Dublin.—"After Lord Cornwallis had wrote word to the Duke of Portland that Lake had been forced to evacuate Tuam, and that the French had occupied it, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh to stop the letter, for that the officer who

had reported it to him appeared to be deranged in his mind, and that Lake had collected 1,800 troops there, and meant to hold it. This has materially altered the face of things; particularly as Lake has since repossessed Holymount. The French have sent in twelve officers on *parole*, and 300 prisoners (not having men to guard them) and from them it is ascertained that they lost 70 killed, nearly as many wounded, and that they cannot leave Castlebar. From various circumstances it appears that they expect co-operation of landing elsewhere, and from the extreme civility of their Commanding Officers, they evidently see and prepare for their fate. They cannot bear the Irish who have joined them, and very serious quarrels have already arisen between them. Now for our loss; 59 killed, 29 wounded, and above 400 missing! The 6th of foot (only 60 men) and the *Fraser's* behaved most gallantly; the Longford and Kilkenny militia began the rout, and every militia man ran before the enemy got within musket shot of them. Our force was about 2,500 troops, exclusive of yeomanry, who behaved very well. *Nine* guns are lost, with tumbrels, *et cetera*. The French were completely beat by our superior artillery till they ceased firing at our guns and threw their shot at our infantry, who gave way instantly. In short, never was so disgraceful a scene. Lord Cornwallis moves this day to Ballinamore, half way to Tuam, where all his British troops assemble, namely the Guards, 2nd, 6th (a handful), 54th, 29th, 100th, Royal Bucks, Warwick, Sutherland's, together with the Fraser's, the Suffolk, and one other fencible. His last idea was not to mix a single Irish man with them. His artillery is the British brigade, and in a letter I had from him this morning he appears confident. I am not sure that all this force can assemble before to-morrow at Ballinamore, but if the French retire from Castlebar he will push them; if not, he will wait one day for the co-operation of General Taylor's brigade, who will be at Boyle this night.

"I have now the mortification to tell you that the result of my correspondence with Lord Cornwallis will probably be my resignation of my commissions. I take this night to think it over, but I fear it is impossible for me to submit to the disgrace which he has thrown upon me; and it now is too late to retrieve it. I am sure you will be pleased with my letter to him, and you will be more pleased to know that, though I am so bitterly hurt, I have not consulted on the matter with any one person, nor has a single being seen my correspondence, though every one knows how much I am hurt by his refusal to permit me to command *my own* detachment, at a time when I had not so many men left at Dublin as he had taken from me. In short I am made miserable, but I will not forget myself, nor can I resign while my regiment is in Ireland; though I may to-morrow lay before the King the correspondence, and request his leave to retire as soon as my regiment is recalled.

"Dublin gets quieter from the precautions taken; but I still tremble for the state of the adjacent counties. All the mails are

arrived safe, which is one proof of their quiet, but all the disaffected are very busy. For God's sake send a Lord Deputy or a Provisional Commission."

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW, at London.

1798, August 30. St. Petersburg.—“Par nos réscripts qui vous ont été envoyés précédemment, vous avez vu qu’afin de détourner toute dispute et malentendu entre nos alliés, qui auroient pu causer non seulement de l’empêchement, mais même un mal réel à la bonne cause, nous avons employé à Vienne nos représentations, afin qu’à l’égard des difficultés survenues avec la Cour de Londres sur des emprunts et les secours d’argent, on se sert d’un arrangement à l’amiable et amical. En conséquence de quoi nous avons reçu, tant de la part de notre ambassadeur Comte Razoumovsky que de celle du Comte Cobenzel retourné à son poste, des informations que l’Empereur des Romains, désirant sincèrement finir cette affaire à l’avantage réciproque, la remet à notre médiation, nous priant d’en devenir l’arbitre. Par délicatesse et par égard pour la dignité de nos deux alliés, nous ne voulons pas nous approprier ce dernier titre; mais agissant uniquement d’après notre amitié envers eux et d’après la liaison de nos intérêts communs qui dans les circonstances actuelles, difficiles, et dangereuses, exigent de notre part des efforts analogues et énergiques, nous sommes prêts à contribuer par nos bons offices à la décision de cette affaire. Le paquet que porte le présent courier contient des instructions données par le Comte Cobenzel au Comte Stahremberg, et dont les copies sont jointes ici pour votre information. La connaissance que vous avez vous-même de la nature de cette affaire, la certitude de l’utilité et de la nécessité de la finir, et des observations locales, vous donneront des moyens suffisans, après vous être concerté avec le Ministre de l’Empereur des Romains, pour l’arrangement convenable de cette affaire, afin d’oter par là pour les tems à venir toute tendance au refroidissement mutuel, et pour ne pas occasionner de nouvelles difficultés dans les opérations contre l’ennemi, qui réussit encore plus par la mésintelligence entre les alliés que par la force des armes. Il dépendra de votre prudence d’employer auprès de deux côtés en notre nom des insinuations les plus fortes pour leur rapprochement.”

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT PANIN, at Berlin.

1798, August 30. St. Petersburg.—“A l’arrivée de l’Ambassadeur de sa Majesté Impériale Royale, Comte Cobenzel, auprès de notre Cour, il s’est expliqué avec notre ministère que, comme conformément aux instructions qui vous ont été données par notre rescrit du 21 Julliet, la négociation entamée sous notre médiation entre les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, malgré son peu de succès, n’a pas été rompue, il n’existe non seulement aucun inconvénient pour son renouvellement, mais, au contraire, il est nécessaire pour l’intérêt de la cause commune de l’emmener à

une conclusion. En conséquence de cela, il transmet des instructions au Prince de Reuss, dont vous recevez ci-joints les copies pour votre information, qui contiennent les demandes que l'Empereur notre allié, en rentrant pour sa sûreté et pour préserver l'intégrité de l'Empire Germanique, en guerre contre les François, juge absolument nécessaires, et qui, d'après la part active que nous y prenons, nous intéressent pareillement. Après avoir convenu avec le Prince Reuss, vous ne manquerez pas d'employer de nouveau tous vos soins pour enlever le Roi de Prusse à l'arrangement de cette affaire, et à l'assurance que ses engagements positifs seront scrupuleusement remplis par des faits et non par des phrases seulement. Si le Roi de Prusse, sans même entrer dans la coalition, désireroit, pour la sûreté de nos provinces acquises en Pologne, faire des stipulations de concert avec nous et l'Empereur des Romains, ou même séparément avec nous, vous pourriez, d'après les pleins pouvoirs que nous vous avons donnés, les conclure dans des termes claires et propres. Nous nous réservons de vous mûnir des instructions ultérieures sur les affaires générales, lorsque nous recevrons les réponses de Londres et d'autres Cours, et alors nous vous mettrons encore mieux en état de vous expliquer plus en détail, et plus décisivement avec le Cabinet de ce pays-là."

SIR JAMES CRAUFURD TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 31. Hamburg.—"I must beg your Lordship's permission to trouble you with a few words on a subject on which I never thought of touching whilst I considered myself as here merely on a temporary footing; but on which, being now by your Lordship's goodness placed in a permanent situation, it becomes absolutely necessary to make a representation to you.

"The fact is that, in consequence of the immense increase of expense of this place, owing to the extraordinary influx of strangers from every part of Europe which the circumstances of the time have produced, I find myself wholly unable to live here with decency, I aim at nothing more, upon the ordinary appointments, with the addition of my private income.

"In laying before your Lordship the real state of things here one might well be suspected of exaggeration. The rise in the indispensable article of a house is so enormous, that in many instances, the rent has within five or six years been *quadrupled*. And now an *ordinary house* is not to be had for less than about three hundred pounds a year, and *with difficulty for that*. Though this is the most remarkable article, yet in everything else also the dearness is excessive.

"Your Lordship will, I hope, do me the justice to believe that I am not absurd enough to aim at anything like representation. My establishment is that of a mere private gentleman; but, at the same time, as British minister placed in one of the most frequented resorts in Europe, it is difficult to avoid seeing occasionally at my house the various people who come



recommended to me, as well as those of the town. There are many, too, from whom a minister frequently receives services, and those often not the least essential, to whom he can make no other return but that of asking them to his house. There are various writers, as well as others, whom I think it advisable—particularly at this moment when all these means are so industriously employed by our enemies—to cultivate and conciliate; all of whom it is impossible to pay, and who are flattered by this mark of attention. In short, the advantages which a minister has when he has the means of doing this are sufficiently obvious. At a place where there might be little to do, or where circumstances might be different, all this might possibly be unimportant; here it undoubtedly is otherwise.

“Strongly as I feel the necessity of this, I perhaps should not have ventured to mention it to your Lordship had it been wholly without a precedent to make sometimes extra allowances to foreign ministers.

“I do it with the greatest repugnance. An application for an increase of pay, immediately after your Lordship has so very handsomely taken the first opportunity of conferring a diplomatic place upon me, at a time too when these places are scarce, may perhaps at first sight indicate something unreasonable and beggarly; very foreign, I flatter myself, to my disposition. Did my fortune enable me, I should be happy to take the ordinary course of the service, and your Lordship certainly never should have heard from me on this occasion; but my affairs are much deranged, neither by my fault or my father’s certainly, but by the unfortunate events of the war.

“There is an arrangement which might be made in the event of the renewal of the war on the Continent, which would obviate the necessity of any additional allowance to me, which would be highly advantageous to me, and certainly not disadvantageous to His Majesty’s Government, perhaps productive of some saving.

“Supposing that the war should re-commence, England would probably subsidise more than one foreign power. The money must pass through this place. The arrangement to which I have taken the liberty of alluding is, that I should be allowed to make these payments, or a part of them, if there is more than one subsidy. My not being in a commercial line would be no obstacle; I could just as easily manage this as commissaries frequently do great money transactions. I should be contented with profits inferior to those, so enormous, of the merchants; and it might perhaps be more advantageous to Great Britain that the payments should be made to the foreign powers by drawing bills on London, than by the former mode of remitting the money.

“The intelligence which was some time ago given to me respecting two foreigners who, it was pretended, were in your Lordship’s service, regards, as I have since found, two of the men at your Office; but I am strongly inclined to believe it is wholly without foundation. It came to me, indirectly, from Verteuil, and was very possibly said merely for the sake of

giving himself some merit in my eyes, as is so commonly the case with the whole race of spies. All he had to say against these men was that they took down in writing the names of all persons who come to the Office, which appears natural enough when a servant has a great variety of people to announce."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, August 31. Dublin.—"No news this morning, except reports, which I am much inclined to credit, of the French having capitulated. The force and movements of Lord Cornwallis you will collect from the enclosed, which are the latest *post* letters; but you will observe that these letters do not state the two battalions of Guards, the 2nd, 29th, 54th, and 80th, who were to join Lord Cornwallis at Ballinamore from Portumna Bridge over the Shannon; the bulk of whom, *it is known*, will be there this night. The rebels who have joined are not 2,000 of all sorts and sizes, and the conduct of the French has discouraged such a junction by refusing to hang yeomanry prisoners made by them, in return for the rebel Irish hanged by us. *I know* that the game is considered to be *up* by the French as well as the rebels, and that some of the French officers complained to some of our prisoners of the deception of their Government, who had promised them a co-operation of another expedition and of a general rebellion. I have nothing to add but that Dublin is most quiet, and that the morning reports from all the patrols in Kildare, Wicklow, and Meath are equally good. The mails are all arrived, and no rising or appearance of one anywhere.

"For myself, I at present say nothing but that Lord Cornwallis has broke my heart by refusing me leave to command the detachment of my own regiment; and confining me to Dublin under circumstances such as the present has left me no possible alternative. I wrote to him this morning to desire his permission for me to transmit the correspondence for the King's information; and as soon as the French are disposed of, I must take my measures for doing myself justice in whatever way may appear wisest. But I will not be degraded by any man, and you will feel for me as warmly as I can do myself. Such is the *dénouement* of my cursed Irish journey, in which I certainly looked to much misery, but not to oppression and humiliation."

*Enclosure.*

JOHN EDWARD FREMANTLE to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

1798, August 29. Athlone.—"After a very fatiguing march of sixteen miles from Tullamore to this place, we encamped near Athlone, under the command of General Moore and Lord Huntly, with the two brigades (20 light companies), the Hundredth regiment, 8 pieces of artillery, and our brigade, which I command. We were joined during the night and early this morning by the Reay, Sutherland, and Suffolk Fencibles, the Armagh and the Downshire, with a troop of the Hompesch. Our brigade is

ordered to be [in] readiness to march at a moment's notice, but with whom I know not. I suppose you have heard of Hutchinson's being surprised at Castlebar. Lake arrived there about one in the morning, and the French came in about seven. They had no notice of their approach before five. We have lost six pieces of cannon. The Kilkenny regiment bolted, or, I understand, our artillery would have succeeded. The Frazer Fencible and the Sixth behaved uncommonly well, the former saved their cannon. Many of the officers of the Sixth, I hear, are killed. Lake has retreated to Tuam. No blame whatever is attached to Lake; he had not fourteen hundred men. The French with croppies were estimated at two thousand. We have in our army about six thousand seven hundred infantry. I am sorry to say that Lord Cornwallis is very unwell; they attempted to bleed him last night, but no blood could be produced; however he rode out, and placed the advanced sentries on the other side of the Shannon. We have had some few drunken men, but in general the men have behaved well, so have the Warwick. If possible somebody shall write again the day after to-morrow. My comrades desire to be remembered to their brethren in Dublin."

*Postscript.* "The Seventh Dragoon-Guards, I understand, join us to day. Lord Cornwallis is now out, looking for a position for us on the other side of the town, where we go to about seven this evening. The French have retreated from Castlebar about twelve miles. Lake is encamped the other side of Tuam. No rebels have joined them except those in Killala, which report Astle has just brought up from Athlone. Any further accounts I hear to-morrow your Lordship shall immediately know. Lake's present force is not known; the 5th Dragoon Guards are come, the 7th coming. I hope General Taylor and his *nine hundred men* are safe, and have retreated, as I understand it was not possible for him to join Lake. Tell Badcock the saucy Sixth, if possible, behaved better than ever, though they have suffered in officers, I fear, greatly. Lord Henry always desires the Warwick to copy us, and then he is sure they will do well; we have as yet done them up in every thing."

*Note by Lord Grenville of the heads of a conference with Count Woronzow, Russian Ambassador in London, on the project of a new coalition against France.*

1798, August. London.—1. "Les différences qu'il y a entre notre situation actuelle et celle de 1796, surtout par rapport à l'Autriche, qui depuis ce tems-là a fait sa paix séparée en nous abandonnant seuls à la rage d'un ennemi auquel, heureusement, nous avons su résister avec fermeté et succès.

2. "Les dépenses que nous faisons aujourd'hui pour le soutien des autres.

£200,000 pour le Portugal, et qu'il est même question d'augmenter.

£500,000 destinés à la Suisse.

£1,500,000, à peu près, pour la flotte de la Méditerranée, qui quoiqu'elle nous y soit sans contredit de quelque utilité, n'y auroit certainement jamais été envoyée que sur les instances de Vienne et de Naples.

3. “£100,000 par mois avoient été destinés pour aider l'Autriche, si elle eut voulu établir un concert sincère, et surtout remplir ses anciens engagements. Mais puisque nous n'avancions pas depuis le mois d'avril, nous consentions bien volontiers à transférer ce secours à l'objet de la marche d'une armée Russe, pour être employée à des opérations que l'on réglera du consentement commun des trois Cours, sachant d'ailleurs que c'est là le moyen le plus efficace d'aider l'Autriche elle-même.

4. “Mais comme ces opérations ne peuvent être réglées qu'en concert avec celles de l'Autriche, nous prions l'Empereur de Russie d'agir efficacement à Vienne pour persuader au Gouvernement Autrichien.

1. “De remplir ses engagements avec l'Angleterre, sans quoi nous ne pouvons contribuer à le secourir, soit directement comme il en étoit question, soit indirectement par la coopération qu'on nous propose aujourd'hui.

[*Marginal note.* Cet article tient à la nécessité des discussions Parlementaires, et est pour cette raison d'une nécessité absolue. Tout notre crédit seroit employé en vain pour faire passer de nouveaux subsides, sans la ratification de cette éternelle convention.]

2. “De s'ouvrir franchement sur ses plans de guerre et de paix, et sur le moment où il agira.

3. “De tenir, en attendant, une marche plus capable d'encourager les foibles, et de rassurer les bien-intentionnées dans toute l'Europe.

5. “Sur ces bases le Roi se prêteroit (*par l'entremise de votre Cour*) à un concert avec l'Autriche, où elle pourroit stipuler.

1. “Pour que la flotte reste dans la Méditerranée.

2. “Sur les secours à donner respectivement aux Suisses *pour recouvrir leur indépendance.*

3. “Sur les plans militaires auxquels la coopération des secours de votre Cour, et de celle-ci, seroit employée de la manière ci-dessus mentionnée.

6. “Et pour éviter la perte du tems, notre ministre pourrait déjà signer chez vous une convention provisoire, où il seroit stipulé quel seroit le montant des troupes que S. M. L'Empereur mettroit en marche, en retour du secours ci-dessus mentionné, si le concert venoit à s'effectuer. Mais que cette convention n'auroit son exécution qu'au cas où, d'après l'établissement de ce concert, Sa Majesté se verroit dans le cas de demander, et Sa Majesté Impériale d'accorder la marche des troupes à ces conditions.

“La somme pour les payes extraordinaires seroit réglée sur le pied de projet de 1796, mais d'après le nombre des troupes employées; et resteroit comme dette à être liquidée après la conclusion d'une paix faite d'un commun accord.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 1. Dublin.—“ I write merely because I would not leave you uninformed one day at a period when every hour is critical. The army was yesterday at Ballinamore and moves this day only eight miles to Newton Bellew. The heat of the weather has prevented the Guards or the 2nd and 29th from coming up; and Fremantle writes me word yesterday from Ballinamore that it is doubtful whether the Guards can come up to the army, but that the 2nd and 29th are to join the army at Tuam; to which place it marches on Sunday; so that you see by this account that Lord Cornwallis cannot even *look* at Castlebar till Tuesday evening. His *return* last night is now lying before me, and he had in camp last night at Ballinamore 6,766 rank and file! All this is exclusive of the *débris* of Hutchinson’s army (sent to Athlone to *learn discipline and courage*) and of General Taylor’s force of 1,437 men at Boyle, and of the force which is to join at Tuam. Surely as *versus less* than 1,000 French, assisted by certainly *less* than 2,000 croppies, this does seem a very cautious proceeding; and from that very caution it is in effect more hazardous, as every day lost gives the chance of another flotilla or of a rising, though I acknowledge that no immediate systems of insurrection have appeared. I am confident that the French looked to another flotilla. *I know* that they have been, through correspondences, urging an insurrection in Dublin. Under these circumstances I must own that I think Lord Cornwallis takes a most heavy responsibility on himself by this most unaccountable delay; and the lesson he teaches as with respect to another invasion, even if every Frenchman now here capitulates, is very alarming. The officers who are come in all hold one language of the unreserved manner in which the French speak of this enterprise; however they are endeavouring to organize some of the croppies and some of the Kilkenny and Longford run-aways.

“ I now find that three more militia corps are coming over if you can induce them to embark. I trust Lord Cornwallis will not make upon their commanding officers the experiment he has made upon me; and yet if he does not, he makes the veto which he has put upon me if possible more degrading. I am haunted at every moment by these reflexions, which the observations of every one naturally suggest to me; and only wait for Lord Cornwallis’s permission to send you the correspondence respecting my claim to command *my own detachment of my regiment*.

“ It is indeed melancholy that in such a moment the feelings should be so severely wounded of those who wish to do most; and that I should be to worry myself and all that is dear to me with complaints of this nature where there is no remedy.

*Postscript.* “ No Government in Dublin! Good God! how can Lord Cornwallis venture such an experiment as to undertake to conduct all the details with a Parliament sitting, himself at 100 miles distance without a single man of business with him; liable

of course to the risk of his profession, and liable to the chance, in case of a serious rising in the most disaffected counties, namely Meath, Westmeath, Longford, or Kildare, to be completely cut off from Dublin.

"I again implore you to think of a Lord Deputy or a provisional government (not that of the Lord Chancellor and the Speaker), notwithstanding the reasons you have given in your last letter against it.

"Remember that even if there were not insurmountable objections to the nomination of Lord Clare and Foster to take the government, they could not, as both Houses are actually sitting.

"I enclose you Lord Cornwallis's answer to a very long letter from me urging him to appoint a Committee of Lords of the Council (of which I could not of course be one) to carry his orders for the security of Parliament and of the metropolis into execution."

*Enclosure.*

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

*Private.*

1798, August 31. Camp at Ballinamore.—"I received yesterday your very kind and friendly letter, and return you many thanks for pointing out freely to me the measure which appears to you to be necessary at this important crisis.

"There are however, in my opinion, many weighty objections to it, which I have not at present time to detail; and as I feel confident that the enemy in this quarter are not in sufficient force to give me any serious trouble, I trust that (unless another French flotilla should arrive) all will again soon be quiet, and that consequently there will be no occasion to alter the present course of things."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 5. Dublin.—"No news this morning from the army except the eternal and inexplicable delay of their movements. The Guards are all halted by Lord Cornwallis's orders at Rosscreea and Birr, to keep in check any idea of insurrection in the south; and on Sunday the 2nd, the 29th had joined three miles west of Tuam, so that the army was brigaded and complete. On Monday they marched only *two* miles, and yesterday to Hollymount, only *eight* miles, from thence they have fourteen Irish miles (eighteen English) to Castlebar, so that it is not possible that Lord Cornwallis can even *look at* the enemy sooner than to-morrow morning, consequently we cannot hear the result in Dublin sooner than Saturday morning. The artillery was all up, and was even upon their ground before the infantry on Sunday, so that no delay has been occasioned by them. You will easily judge the impatience upon this subject when every hour is invaluable, for great exertions have been made to create risings,

and to operate in every way on the public mind, and in many parts of the country they have succeeded in raising plundering parties. Reports had been spread for the last ten days that the night of the 4th was fixed for a general rising both in town and through the country, and you have no idea what a panic this had spread all over Ireland. I need not add that nothing was ever more quiet, for every mail coach is come in and reports that not a soul was to be seen on any one road; and as to Dublin, I never saw it more quiet, for during the whole of my rounds (which I always ride alone) for upwards of three hours, from eleven to two last night, I literally did not meet or see any living being save the patrols.

“You will probably have heard that a Major Plunkett, who has been most active in organising Roscommon and other parts of Connaught, surrendered himself at Elphin (*to the Bishop*) on Monday morning; and that circumstance seems to answer for the peace of Roscommon, of which Lord Cornwallis was with reason so jealous, that he sent General Lake to take the command at Boyle from General Taylor. We hear of the very zealous and handsome offers from the militia regiments in England. The *whole* will be unnecessary, but some ought to land in the south, and it would be advisable to have a force at Liverpool, Chester, or Whitehaven, or Bristol, ready to embark for Newry, Dublin, or Wexford, in case of any unforeseen rising, or of any possible accident to Lord Cornwallis’s army.

“As for myself I cannot describe to you the hundredth part of all I feel on the subject of my disgrace. I have not yet heard from Lord Cornwallis in answer to my last, and I feel that, though I asked only for one word by Captain Taylor’s pen, yet that I am bound to wait for some days longer before I take steps to enable me (as soon as the French are disposed of) to resign my degraded and disgraced situation. The arrival of the other British militia will increase my difficulties, for the colonels of those regiments will certainly not quit their corps; and Lord Cornwallis will be obliged to let them serve *in their present rank*, after refusing me leave to serve with my own regiment in *any rank*. And in the meantime you will observe that my hour of real duty and service will have passed by. All this is indeed a most bitter pill, and now, never can be palliated or done away.

*Postscript.* “A small rebel party occupied Blessington for an hour last night, but there was nothing to plunder. They are chiefly deserters (and therefore the more dangerous) from amongst the disaffected of the 5th dragoons, the Cavan, Antrim, King’s County, and Wicklow militia.

4 o’clock. “A messenger just come from Lord Cornwallis to say that he pushed on last night to within six miles of Castlebar, and that he had arranged his attack for this morning. Lake is gone to Boyle to take the command, not only of Taylor, but of General Dunne at Longford and Athlone, and of General Nugent, who has garrisoned Enniskillen and has pushed on to Sligo. If, therefore, Lord Cornwallis is successful not a man can escape.

General Moore is to lead the attack, in which my detachment is included; and, whether the regiment does well or ill, think what my feelings must be in either contingency."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 8. Dublin.—"It is now 7 o'clock p.m., the latest hour for the mail, and no messenger from Lord Cornwallis. The public impatience and discontent is at high beyond all description. He has suffered himself to be completely out-generated by the French, who were in his net; and with numbers (as it now appears) ridiculously small for the immense body that he laboured at the expense of so many days to collect. They slipped Lord Cornwallis, and afterwards slipped Craufurd, and got by Tobercarry to Collooney, where they passed Thursday [Wednesday?] night; on Thursday morning by 2 a.m. they were clear of that town, and from *that hour*, or rather from General Lake's hour of date at 8 a.m. of that day, no one has heard by any accident one word, save General Lake's opinion that they meant to be (on that night, namely Thursday) at Manor-Hamilton, on their way to Enniskillen. But variety of objects present themselves if (as is expected) they find Enniskillen too well secured by General Nugent. They may have occupied Sligo; they may have pushed to Belleck (weakly guarded) between Ballyshannon and Lough Earne; or they may have turned rapidly to the south, and by holding a course west of Lough Earne, they may have pushed to Belturbet, the worst part of Ireland, and cut Lord Cornwallis from Dublin. We have now four mails due from England: we have no Government in Dublin; we have no communication with our Lord Lieutenant; we have a formidable insurrection (however gallantly the Longford yeomen, commanded by Lord Longford, have checked it at Mullingar) in the middle counties; we have a mass of rebellion suffered to gather every day under a General Holt, who has for the last four days occupied Blackmoor Hill in Wicklow, while General Eustace has been *reconnoitring* him; and we have not, as far as I can judge, the slightest confidence in any one. Such *is* the state; a victory may do much, but the lesson that Lord Cornwallis has taught the French and Irish Directories is *most fatal* to Ireland; and I am bound to say to you (what I protest solemnly I have said to no creature breathing) that I believe *all* is owing to Lord Cornwallis's misconduct.

"I do all I can to keep up the spirits of others, but my own are indeed very low. It is *certain* that the number of French are not more than 800 *most discontented*, and the number of rebels with them at Colooney were not 2,000 *of all sorts*. Lord Cornwallis's effective force, including Lake's, are (by the Adjutant General's return) about 11,000 *troops*! exclusive of yeomanry and other auxiliaries.

*Postscript.* "Again, and again, I press for troops to Newry, if you hope to save Ireland, in case Lord Cornwallis has been checked, or in case the French are got into the north."



## COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, Sept. 9. York Farm.—“Voici encore une nouvelle persécution de Madame de Rochechouart pour vous et pour moi. Si ce qu'elle dit est vrai (comme une petite partie peut l'être). M. Wickham la mène un peu rudement. Il est vrai que, si on écoutait les scélérats, il n'y aurait personne de pendu. D'ailleurs, tout ceci ne me regarde en rien, et je me borne à vous faire passer ce que je reçois. C'est bien assez de tous les tourmens qu'on vous donne journellement, sans que j'y ajoute encore. Il me paraît, d'après ce que m'écrit le Comte de Dietrichstein, que l'Empereur Paul se conduit au mieux. Je ne doute pas que nous n'imitions bientôt ce bel exemple. Les Français eux-mêmes nous y forceront à la fin, pourvu que les secours pécuniaires que vous vous déciderez peut-être à donner à la Russie, ne soient pas pris aux dépens de ceux que vous nous destinez. Je ne le crois pas, car, dans ce cas, ma malheureuse disposition à voir en noir, que les événemens n'ont que trop justifiée, me ferait apercevoir dans cette détermination une nouvelle source de jalousie, de mésintelligence, et de reproches. *Quod Deus avertat*. Vous rendez trop de justice aux sentimens qui m'anime, pour me savoir mauvais gré de mes craintes et de ma sincérité.”

## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, September 10. Admiralty.—“I have returned the papers you sent me to Hammond. With respect to augmenting our naval force in the Mediterranean, I can only state that we have now in that sea a larger force (nearly by one-third) than in our most sanguine expectations we had formed an idea of having; and the consequence is that Lord St. Vincent remains with only sixteen or seventeen sail of the line off Cadiz; and though we have full reason from experience to hope that this may be enough to keep the Spanish fleet in awe, it is not quite what I should, on the whole, judge it right for him to have with him, were it possible to reinforce him. We are about to send fresh ships from home, but they will but serve to replace such as are unfit to remain abroad in the winter, and by this relief our home squadron is cut down as close as possible.

“I don't know how Sir Sidney would like to be taken from the command of the fine ship he has now got in order to go and assist the Turks; to send him in his ship for that purpose would be absolutely impracticable, and there would be very great difficulties in the way of sending him in any other.

“I am very glad that on the latter subject of your letter I can give you a better report, for, in the course of last week, a paper was received from Sir James Marriott (which I immediately gave to Pitt) proposing, on account of his infirmities, to resign his situation, but on terms which appeared very extravagant. Pitt said he would enquire about it, and I will immediately write to him to know whether he has made up his mind on the subject. At all events, it must end in getting rid of Sir James, but he seemed to have much doubt whether Sir W. Scott would take it.

“ I am extremely desirous of getting out of town on Wednesday night if I can, therefore should be glad if you could come to town at any time most convenient to you on Wednesday morning, and I will endeavour to get Pitt to come too.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 10. Dublin.—“ The messenger of yesterday went off in 5 minutes after he came to Dublin, that he might take no private letters. I now enclose to you the details of this complete victory of General Lake. You will observe that Lord Cornwallis let them slip him at Castlebar; that he missed his second plan of pinning them into Mayo by occupying Colooney, near Sligo; that he missed his third plan of pinning them to the West of the Shannon by occupying Carrick on Shannon; and that nothing saved Ireland but the exertions of his infantry, who, having marched 14 Irish miles on Friday, marched again at 10 o'clock on the same night, and completed 26 Irish miles by eight next morning, total 40 Irish or 51 English miles in little more than 24 hours. You will observe that, at the last, the enemy had the start of Lord Cornwallis in this race, which they acknowledge was for Dublin. I learnt on Saturday night that they had crossed the Shannon. I proposed immediately to Lieutenant-General Craig and to Lord Castlereagh to let me move instantly to Trim, where there is a strong post, to head and check them. This was refused from fears (too well founded) for Dublin; and it now appears that Sourazin's plan was to reach Kells, 12 miles from Trim, on Sunday, and to endeavour to get by Trim on Sunday night. The Guards were moved by Lord Cornwallis's orders from Tullamore, and would have been in Dublin yesterday by 3 o'clock p.m., but were stopped on account of this victory. The Leicester (or at least part of it) came in this morning at nine, so that we should have been run very close indeed. Every one is loud in complaint of Lord Cornwallis for being so completely and repeatedly out-generaled.

“ Since writing this, I have received your letters from Dropmore, and feel most fully all your difficulties. It is impossible for me to know what will be the result of Lord Cornwallis's conduct towards me. He has not yet condescended to direct one line to be written to me, in answer to my request that he would permit me to send our correspondence to be laid before the King. I cannot therefore foresee either his line or my own. But things cannot rest where they are, and I know of no alternative, particularly after the difficulties which I collect from your letter as existing with you. But for God's sake, in justice to me on another point, distinguish between the decided opinion I entertain of the wisdom of extending the King's mercy to the rebels who should acknowledge their individual guilt, and should tell all they know *short of names*, and the folly of suffering them to mount upon a horse so high as that which, it now appears, Lord Cornwallis has suffered them to ride. I knew the *impossibility* of convicting some of the worst of them; I knew the effect

that would be produced by this supposed treachery both in the minds of their followers, and of their friends, and of their French allies. But do not believe that any consideration should have induced me to have acceded to such a paper as is now produced ; which I never saw till about ten days since, and which you cannot reprobate as weak and criminal more than I do. But the measure of amnesty was, and is still in my mind, most wise with its exceptions, and the subsequent events have clearly shown the advantage of it ; for if the Kildare rebels had continued in arms, I protest I do not know how they could have been forced ; and you will remember that the whole of our north-western army has, for the last eighteen days, been supplied with every military store, and with *their daily bread*, along this very line.

"The Banishment Bill is equally imperfect and disgraceful ; but I say no more upon it, as it is before you for correction ; but for God's sake enact their confession into a record of conviction, and attach the penalty on the party being found at large *in any of his Majesty's dominions*, otherwise the mischief will be incalculable. As to *our other object*, every day convinces me that it is attainable, but it is impossible that it should prosper in the hands of one who will consult no one, either here or in England. Friar Bacon's head has spoken twice ; take care that it does not speak '*the time is past*.'

"What is now to become of *us* ? I recommend *myself* to your protection, for I am most miserable at all I see, and all I feel.

"Tom could show you my letters which speak distinctly my reprobation of such a *treaty* as that which now appears to exist, *pari passu*, between Lord Cornwallis and O'Connor and the others.

"Citizen John Moore (President of Connaught) is born at Alicant, has an estate in Mayo from the death of his elder brother, has lived the last five years in the Temple, and was a very active *personal* friend of Mr. Fox in the *Whig Club*, of which he was a constant member and attendant. He came to Ireland about three months ago. *Pray do not let this anecdote be lost.*"

*Enclosure.*

MAJOR JOHN EDWARD FREEMANTLE to the MARQUIS OF  
BUCKINGHAM.

1798, September 8. St. Johnstown Camp.—"I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Lordship, that the whole of the French and rebel army have surrendered themselves prisoners to General Lake. Our column, under Lord Cornwallis, marched from Carrick about 10 o'clock last night, and reached Mohil by eight in the morning, when every preparation was made for beginning the action ; but unfortunately the Sutherland fencibles and Downshire militia had missed their road from the darkness of the night, which delayed us an hour and upwards, during which time the French decamped, but fell in about eleven o'clock with General Lake's column, who had not been joined by Moore.

We saw the action from our left; it lasted about half an hour. The light third battalion of Irish light infantry stood the chief of the action; and charged the French who were posted behind some turf, upon which they immediately surrendered; about 600 French, and 400 croppies only who are by this time nearly demolished, for no quarter has been given them. Our fellows took six, but did not kill them owing to their begging for their lives so piteously that they could not butcher them in cold blood; for which they were abused by some of the officers of the baggage guard."

*Postscript.* "I have just seen George Lake; he says there are eight hundred French prisoners."

#### THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, September 12. Blackheath.—"Having been under the necessity of remaining constantly in the country since I had the honour of seeing you, I have not been able to apply to Taylor, who would have copied the enclosed papers much better than you will find them written; but they are quite accurate. Allow me to repeat the promise I gave on receiving them, that your Lordship would observe the utmost secrecy regarding them.

"The first paper contains P[rince] Reuss's proposal on opening the negotiation, and the Prussian answer. That and the two which accompany it, comprise the whole of what was given by the Prussian Ministers.

"Besides these papers, there was the *Project* of a convention drawn up by P[rince] Reppin; the *answer* of the Russian Ministers on the No. 2 (enclosed); and the *observations* sent from Vienna to the Russian ministers on the project of Convention. I regretted much not having been able to procure copies of the whole; but I believe that the accounts of them contained in my correspondence were exact.

"If I mistake not, I mentioned to your Lordship that after the last conference Count Cobentzl expressed, even to persons connected with the Court, much ill-will against Prussia.

"My private letters from Berlin, since my leaving it, inform me that his language grew more violent, and his disappointment appeared to be very great on finding that he was to receive no snuff box from the King of Prussia."

*Three enclosures.*

#### *Enclosure 1.*

*Réponse des Plénipotentiaires de sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse aux ouvertures faites par Monsieur le Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté l'Empereur-Roi dans la conférence du 21 Mai.*

"Les ouvertures que Monsieur le Prince de Reuss, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté l'Empereur-Roi a faites dans la conférence du 21 Mai, et le précis qu'il en a communiqué aux Ministres du Roi portent sur les propositions suivantes.

1. "Que si sa Majesté Prussienne veut bien se désister de toute prétentions d'indemnité aux dépens de l'Empire, pour elle et pour la maison d'Orange, sa Majesté Impériale renoncera également à toute prétention semblable, soit pour elle-même, soit pour le Duc de Modène, et l'Archiduchesse sa fille.

2. "Que si cette première proposition n'est pas agréée, et que le Roi insiste sur un dédommagement à la charge de l'Empire pour ses provinces transrhéennes, l'Empereur exigera pareillement une indemnité pour ses pertes et sacrifices.

3. "Et que dans le cas où sa Majesté Prussienne demanderait en outre, une indemnité pour la maison d'Orange, l'Empereur ferait aussi valoir les droits du Duc de Modène, et de l'Archiduchesse Béatrice, en leurs qualités de feudataires de l'Empire.

"Le Roi n'hésite pas un instant de s'en tenir aux principes de modération et de désintéressement qu'il a déjà manifesté plus d'une fois à sa Majesté Impériale dans sa correspondance immédiate ; et quelques légitimes que soient ses titres d'indemnité, il préfère d'y renoncer en plein pour contribuer de son côté, autant que possible, au maintien de l'intégrité de l'Empire ; mais en faisant ainsi le sacrifice gratuit des provinces qu'il a perdues par la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin, il accepte, très expressément, la déclaration que la maison d'Autriche renonce, de la manière la plus positive, à toute indemnité et prétention aux dépens de l'Empire ; et il s'ensuit par conséquent que sa Majesté l'Empereur se contentera, pour tout dédommagement, des extensions territoriales qu'il a obtenues en Italie par la paix de Campo Formio, telles qu'il les possède actuellement. Après avoir écarté de la sorte tout projet d'indemnité, de compensation, d'acquisition, ou d'agrandissement, le Roi s'adresse à l'amitié de sa Majesté l'Empereur pour lui demander un service qui peut lui être rendu sans entraîner le moindre inconvénient ; c'est la suppression de tous les procès qui ont été élevés devant les tribunaux de l'Empire au sujet des affaires de la Franconie, et la concession du privilège *de non appellando* pour les principautés d'Anspach et de Bareuth, d'après la promesse formelle que sa Majesté Impériale en a donnée en 1791 et 1792. Il s'agit de considérer que les districts recouverts par le feu Roi sont autant de propriétés légitimes qui ont été injustement détachés des anciennes possessions de la maison de Brandenburg en Franconie, au mépris de ses pactes de famille, sanctionnés par les chefs de l'Empire ; et quoiqu'il resterait encore à réclamer à ce titre d'autres prétentions valides du même genre, s[a] M[ajesté] ne songera pourtant pas à les faire revivre ; et elle se borne uniquement à la *conservation du status quo* actuel. Les propositions sont trop faciles à remplir pour que la Cour de Vienne n'y accède sans aucune discussion quelconque. Et d'autant plus qu'elle paraît être suffisamment convaincue des droits incontestables que le Roi serait le maître de faire valoir à la charge de l'Empire. Puisque, sans produire d'autres prétentions au nom de s[a] M[ajesté] Impériale, les Pléni[potentiaires] Autrichiens au congrès de Rastadt ont proposé, et l'articulé de leur propre chef dans un

aperçu remis à ceux de s[a] M[ajesté] Prussienne, l'évêché de *Hildesheim* comme pouvant servir d'indemnité à ses pertes territoriales. Ainsi, et en se désistant aujourd'hui encore de cette acquisition, qui serait à plusieurs égards si fort à sa convenance, le moins que le Roi puisse se réserver c'est l'aplanissement des affaires de la Franconie. Et il est hors de doute que tout l'Empire se fera un plaisir d'y applaudir, d'une voix unanime, s'il peut à ce prix se libérer de ses obligations vis à vis de la Prusse.

“Le même esprit de conciliation et de modération qui a dicté les sacrifices que le Roi vient de s'imposer pour lui-même, présidera pareillement aux ouvertures qui lui restent à faire relativement à la maison d'Orange. Les deux Cours Impériales connaissent le vif et tendre intérêt qu'il est autorisé à prendre aux malheurs non mérités de cette illustre famille. Et elles n'ignorent pas non plus qu'elle avait conçu l'espérance de les voir réparer par un dédommagement convenable. Néanmoins, et puisqu'il serait à prévoir qu'il résulterait d'un tel arrangement de nouvelles difficultés pour le grand ouvrage de la pacification de l'Allemagne, les Princes d'Orange sont les premiers à renoncer aux avantages de l'indemnité dont on les avait flattés ; et ils consentent à supporter avec résignation les pertes et les injustices dont ils ont été les victimes. Le seul soulagement qu'ils réclament c'est le recouvrement des bailliages de l'électorat de Trèves, qui sont situés sur la rive droite du Rhin, et sur lesquels ils ont à faire valoir les droits les plus légitimes. Le Roi se fait un devoir d'appuyer cette réclamation si modeste, et il y ajoute la condition que la maison d'Orange-Nassau soit mis en possession de ces districts, en vertu d'un arrangement à prendre entre les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, et sans être exposés aux termes interminables de la voie judiciaire. Telles sont les réponses du Roi sur les objets qui ont été agités dans la première conférence. S[a] M[ajesté] se flatte qu'elles seront de nature à satisfaire complètement l'attente de s[a] M[ajesté] l'Empereur.”

#### *Enclosure 2.*

*Observations que les Ministres du Roi ont ordre de participer à Monsieur le Maréchal Prince de Repnin, sur le projet de convention éventuelle, qu'il leur a communiqué confidentiellement au sortir de la conférence du 14 Juin 1798.*

“Le Roi a reconnu dans l'expédient d'un arrangement préalable à conclure entre les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, le désir sincère et très louable qui anime M. le Prince de Repnin d'abrégé des longueurs nuisibles à l'intérêt commun, et, en applaudissant ainsi complètement à l'idée de l'acte projeté, sa Majesté a fixé d'autant plus mûrement son attention sur les stipulations qu'il renferme.

“L'Article 1 pourra être adopté dans toute son étendue tel qu'il est ; et comme il est destiné à mettre en évidence le désintéressement des deux Cours, et leur renonciation formelle à toute prétention, à toute vue, qui serait de nature à léser les possessions des co-états de l'Empire, il conviendrait encore d'y

ajouter la clause suivante : ‘que les deux puissances contractantes promettent et s’engagent en particulier, de veiller à la conservation intacte et de respecter elles-mêmes l’intégrité plénière des états séculiers et héréditaires de l’Allemagne ; de manière qu’ils soient à l’abri de toute cession, aliénation, et échange quelconques.’ Ce corollaire, si propre à tranquilliser les membres du Corps Germanique, a été proposé déjà par les ministres Prussiens à ceux de s[a] M[ajesté] l’Empereur dans leurs pourparlers de Rastadt ; et il achevera de sanctionner ici de la part des deux Cours l’acte de leur renonciation solennelle.

“ Il se présente une autre considération essentielle qui appartient encore à l’article 1.

“ Monsieur le Prince de Repnin se rappellera que dans la conférence du 14 Juin, il fut question de la note verbale du 23 Mai, et nommément du passage où il est dit : ‘ qu’en renonçant à toute indemnité et prétention aux dépens de l’Empire, s[a] M[ajesté] l’Empereur se contentera, pour tout dédommagement, des extensions territoriales qu’il a obtenues en Italie par la paix de Campo Formio, telles qu’il les possède actuellement.’

“ A cette occasion Monsieur le Maréchal observa : ‘ qu’il serait injuste de vouloir faire renoncer d’avance la Cour de Vienne aux indemnités futures qu’elle pourrait acquérir un jour dans le cas d’une nouvelle guerre, ou par des échanges volontaires.’

“ Et M. le Prince de Reuss ajouta : ‘ que sa Cour ne consentirait jamais à confondre la paix de Campo Formio avec celle de l’Allemagne.’

“ Les ministres du Roi n’ont pu se dispenser de rendre compte à s[a] M[ajesté] de cette explication, et elle a dû en être frappée.

“ Sa façon de penser ne lui permet assurément pas de nourrir contre la Cour de Vienne le moindre sentiment d’envie ou de la jalousie ; et s’il arrivait malheureusement que cette puissance fut entraînée dans une seconde guerre contre la France, il y aurait de l’injustice sans doute à lui disputer dès à présent les indemnités qu’elle pourrait acquérir dans la suite hors de l’Allemagne, pour prix de ses efforts ultérieurs. Mais il est une autre chance à laquelle il est impossible de ne pas s’arrêter. Les engagements particuliers que Sa M[ajesté] Impériale a déjà contractés, et les négociations séparées qu’elle poursuit encore avec la République Française, continuant toujours à rester couverts des voiles du mystère, n’est-il point permis de poser un hypothèse qu’au défaut des acquisitions que l’Empereur des Romains se proposait d’abord de faire en Allemagne, il peut s’être réservé d’y substituer d’autres acquisitions territoriales, soit en Italie, soit ailleurs ; et que, par un tel revirement, il saurait se dédommager des sacrifices qu’il apporte à l’Empire ? Ne s’en suivrait-il pas que le Roi de Prusse, n’ayant pas les mêmes facilités d’agrandir ses états ailleurs qu’en Allemagne, se trouverait dans le cas d’avoir fait une renonciation unilatérale, dont la Cour de Vienne recueillerait les bénéfices ? Cette réflexion tient naturellement à l’ordre actuel des choses, et non à des contingents futurs.

“ Le Roi est donc obligé de consulter les intérêts de sa monarchie pour obvier aux désavantages d’une chance qui peut être regardée comme possible ; et il faudrait, par conséquent, ou que la Cour de Vienne le rassurât à cet égard par une explication claire et nette, qui serait insérée dans la convention éventuelle, ou que s[a] M[ajesté] conservât la faculté de s’indemniser de la perte de ses provinces transrhénanes dans le cas où l’Autriche parvint à se procurer de nouvelles acquisitions hors de l’Allemagne, pour se dédommager du désistement de ses prétentions à la charge des états de l’Empire. De cette manière, l’égalité des chances se trouverait rétablie entre les deux puissances transigéantes, et c’est la conservation de cette parité qui doit être un des principaux soins de la Cour médiatrice qui est intervenue dans la négociation.

*Article 2.*—“ Dès la première conférence, les ministres du Roi ont fait sentir à Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires des deux Cours Impériales, l’extrême différence qu’il y a entre le recouvrement des *cinq bailliages Trévinois*, sur lesquels la maison d’Orange-Nassau a des droits légitimes, et le nouvel établissement que l’Empereur cherche à ménager en Allemagne à la maison de Modène, ou plutôt à l’Archiduc Ferdinand et à ses descendants ; c’est à dire, à une des branches de la famille Impériale. La Cour de Vienne persiste cependant à demander une *parité* pour les deux maisons, et faute de pouvoir fonder sur des droits réels ses prétentions en faveur de celle de Modène, elle les recommande au Roi à titre de complaisance réciproque. Mais si l’Empereur attache un certain prix à l’assentiment qu’il accorde aux réclamations de la maison d’Orange, le Roi sera dans le cas de répondre à cette marque d’amitié par un retour bien plus important. En parlant des indemnités qui doivent revenir aux princes lésés par la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin, on n’a eu en vue jusqu’ici que les *états séculiers*, et la Cour de Vienne propose, tout à coup, le rétablissement et l’indemnisation des *trois Electorats Ecclésiastiques*. Il est notoire que cet objet majeur est entièrement étranger aux intérêts de la Prusse, et que l’Autriche seule y peut gagner. Si donc le Roi y prête les mains, et s’il concourt à faire obtenir aux trois Electeurs Ecclésiastiques des indemnités proportionnées à leurs pertes territoriales, ce ne serait qu’en autant que la Cour Impériale consentirait au faible arrondissement qui doit échoir à la maison d’Orange, sans qu’il puisse être question, en sus, d’une concurrence de celle de Modène.

“ Il n’y a rien à observer sur les *articles 3 et 4*. Le 5 a pour objet une déclaration que les Cours de Vienne et de Berlin auraient à faire en commun au congrès de Rastadt, pour s’opposer aux prétentions des Français sur la rive droite du Rhin, et pour accélérer la retraite de leurs troupes au delà de ce fleuve. Plus cette démarche est importante, plus il est nécessaire d’en peser les conséquences, et de s’en expliquer à cœur ouvert.

“ Monsieur le Prince de Replin étant convenu lui-même que la déclaration à faire devrait être rédigée *poliment, et de manière à ne pas provoquer la guerre*, il s’agit de considérer si on peut se flatter qu’elle produira son effet ; ou si plutôt la République ne



l'envisagera pas comme le premier résultat d'une coalition formée contre elle. Cela étant, la réponse est aisée à prévoir ; elle sera négative ou évasive.

*“ Mais quels seraient alors les moyens que la Cour de Vienne se proposerait d'employer pour soutenir sa thèse ?*

*“ Et quelles sont les mesures auxquelles elle s'attend de la part du Roi ?*

“ C'est sur quoi les deux puissances doivent s'entendre d'avance ; et pour ne pas laisser la Cour Impériale dans une incertitude dont elle pourrait avoir à se plaindre, le Roi, fidèle à la franchise dont il se fait une loi invariable, n'hésite pas un instant de la prévenir qu'il n'outre-passera pas les bornes qu'il s'est prescrites par son système de neutralité ; qu'il doit s'astreindre à la défense du nord de l'Allemagne, et qu'il ne saurait se porter à des mesures offensives et lointaines. C'est à la Cour Impériale à calculer les siennes en conséquence, et à prendre en considération, après l'explication qui vient de lui être donnée, en combien la déclaration à faire en commun, par elle et par la Prusse, lui paraît convenable, et dans ce cas, en quels termes cet office devrait être conçu.

“ Le roi souscrit en plein à l'article 6.

“ Il consent aussi selon l'article 7 à employer ses bons offices et ses soins pour procurer la neutralité à l'Empire, dans le cas très fâcheux d'une nouvelle rupture entre l'Autriche et la France ; mais les deux Cours Impériales ne sauraient se refuser à la réflexion qu'il y aurait peu de fond à faire sur une *neutralité sans garantie* ; et elles sont trop justes pour s'attendre que la garantie du Roi puisse embrasser l'Allemagne entière jusqu'au Rhin. Elle resterait circonscrite dans l'enceinte de la partie septentrionale dont il a pris jusqu'ici la défense.

“ Par une suite de ces mêmes principes, la reprise des hostilités en l'Empire, qui est supposée dans l'article 8, n'apporterait aucun changement au système de neutralité que la Prusse a suivi depuis l'époque de la paix de Basle. Le roi s'engage à le maintenir dans toute sa vigueur. Mais ce sera dans les termes de la convention de neutralité arrêtée avec la France ; et, à cet égard encore, s[a] M[ajesté] n'a pas voulu laisser le moindre doute à la Cour de Vienne.”

### *Enclosure 3.*

[Rejoinder of the Prussian Ministry to a reply from the Russian Plenipotentiaries to their foregoing observations on the project of a Convention proposed to them by Prince de Repnin.]

“ Les ministres du Roi n'ont pu se dispenser de mettre sous les yeux de s[a] M[ajesté] la réponse que Mess[ieurs] les Plénipo[tentiaires] de s[a] [Majesté] l'Empereur de Russie leur ont remise dans la conférence du 16 Juillet, sur les observations auxquelles a donné lieu le projet de convention éventuelle dressé par M. le P[rince] Repnin.

“ Le Roi serait fâché de voir naître le doute que l'addition proposée pour l'art[icle] 1, pourrait avoir été dictée par des motifs de défiance et de jalousie. Il est loin de nourrir une façon de penser si opposée à son caractère ; et si peu compatible avec

le désir qui l'anime d'amener entre sa Cour et celle de Vienne le système d'une harmonie réciproque et parfaite. Il n'a pas encore renoncé à l'espoir d'établir et de consolider cet heureux accord. Et il se flattait d'y parvenir d'autant plus sûrement, en donnant à s[a] Majesté l'Empereur des Romains l'exemple de la plus grande franchise, et en lui demandant le retour. Il leur importait donc, de part et d'autre, de fixer avec une entière précision les sens des stipulations dont il voulait convenir, et d'entrer pour cet effet dans des explications plus claires et nettes. Si la Cour de Vienne n'est pas dans le cas d'agréer celles que les ministres de Prusse ont été chargés de proposer dans leurs dernières observations, la faute en est certainement aux circonstances, et le Roi est très disposé à en respecter la raison, sans vouloir l'approfondir. S[a] M[ajesté] n'en est pas moins persuadé, cependant, qu'on se serait entendu beaucoup plus aisément, si on avait pû éclaircir quelques doutes qui subsistent encore, et dès lors, probablement, telle ou telle précaution qui dans le moment présent peut paraître nécessaire, serait devenue inutile. Mais, faute de pouvoir en venir à ces éclaircissements tout de suite, ne vaudrait-il pas mieux de laisser provisoirement de côté les objets énoncés dans l'*art[icle]* 1; d'en reprendre la discussion après que le temps y aura répandu un plus grand jour; et de s'occuper, en attendant, de l'arrangement des indemnités revenant aux princes de l'empire lésés par la cession de la rive gauche du Rhin, arrangement qui, selon les intentions des deux Cours, a fait proprement le but principal et primitif de la négociation actuelle.

“Le Roi est prêt à traiter cette matière compliquée avec s[a] M[ajesté] Impériale, et il ne demande pas mieux que d'y apporter toutes les facilités qui dépendent de lui. Il a cru s'apercevoir dans la réponse de Messieurs les Plénipotentiaires Russes que la Cour de Vienne semble toujours attacher un grand prix au projet de procurer à la maison de Modène une indemnité en Allemagne. Quelle que puisse être la différence d'opinion de s[a] M[ajesté] sur cette proposition, elle tâchera pourtant de se rapprocher autant que possible des idées de s[a] Majesté l'Emp[ereur] des Ro[maines], et elle l'invite de s'en expliquer plus particulièrement. Si la Cour de Vienne veut réellement établir un principe de parité entre la maison qu'elle protège et la maison d'Orange-Nassau; s'il s'agit de faire éprouver à l'une et à l'autre au même degré les effets de la complaisance que les deux Cours transigeantes sont à même de se témoigner réciproquement dans cette occasion, le Roi ne la laissera pas échapper pour donner à s[a] M[ajesté] Imp[ériale] une preuve de plus de son amitié et de sa bonne volonté. Mais il suppose aussi, qu'après avoir déféré encore en ceci aux vœux de la Cour de Vienne, celle-ci ne cherchera pas à multiplier inutilement le nombre des sécularisations; et que, n'ayant pas d'autre parité à offrir à la Prusse, elle n'insistera pas non plus sur les dédommagements dont il a été question (en passant) dans une des conférences précédentes pour les Electeurs Ecclésiastiques.

“Il reste encore une réflexion à faire, ou plutôt à répéter, sur la neutralité que la Cour de Vienne voudrait assurer à l'Empire

Germanique, dans le cas où il éclaterait une nouvelle rupture entre l'Autriche et la France sans que la pacification de l'Empire eût été amenée à une heureuse issue. Messieurs les Pléni[potentiaires] Russes ont déjà reçu du Roi la promesse que s[a] M[ajesté] consent à employer ses bons offices et ses soins pour y disposer le gouvernement de la République; et rien en serait oublié, sans doute, pour amener une résultat aussi intéressant. Mais si le Roi, en suivant l'impulsion de sa loyauté, indique dès à présent aux deux Cours Impériales la mesure des efforts qu'il est capable de consacrer à ses co-états, il est impossible qu'on lui sache mauvais gré de cette franchise. Pour être efficace, la neutralité qu'on a en vue doit être *garantie*; et la Prusse est hors d'état de se charger seule de cette garantie dans toute son étendue. En la bornant à la partie septentrionale, que sa position géographique lui permet de défendre mieux que le reste, elle couvre plus que la moitié de l'Allemagne, et ce n'est pas un léger fardeau qu'elle s'impose. Serait-ce trop prétendre ensuite que d'inviter la Cour de Vienne à pourvoir à la sûreté de l'autre moitié, qui est le plus à sa portée; et d'employer pour cet effet les moyens qui sont à sa disposition. Ce partage est dans l'ordre naturel des choses, et à cet égard encore, il ne s'agirait que de bien s'entendre pour assurer mutuellement la reconnaissance des états de l'Empire, et leur rendre les services les plus réels."

#### H. FAGEL to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, Sept. 12. Wimbledon Common.—"Some unforeseen business, which I can not put off, makes it absolutely necessary for me to be here at the end of this week, and early in the beginning of the next, and thus, to my great disappointment, puts it out of my power to wait on you at Dropmore, as you had kindly proposed to me. I shall be very happy if you will allow me to repair this loss, as soon as it will suit your convenience. In the meantime I return you the enclosed papers, upon the contents of which I shall be very glad to have some conversation with your Lordship. All I can say at present of the persons mentioned in Mr. B[entinck]'s letter is, that they are very little known to me. They may, for aught I know, possess some influence in the provinces (of Friesland and Groningen) to which they belong, but I don't think they have had any material share in the government previous to the French Invasion of 1795. The thing which to me appears to be of the greatest importance, particularly after what you confided to me at Dropmore, is to ascertain the real disposition of the leading men, under the present system, in the Province of Holland, which Province has always given, and must by the natural consequence of its wealth, and local situation, and for many other obvious reasons, give the impulse, whenever a change takes place in the Republic. This circumstance it is that will make the intelligence expected through the channel you mentioned so extremely interesting. I am perfectly satisfied that being once sure of Holland, the rest would follow as a matter of course. This certainly does not preclude the use

there may be in keeping up the connexions and correspondence alluded to in Mr. B[entinck]'s letter, but I don't believe that the persons therein mentioned, notwithstanding the zeal and good intentions they may have, are at all equal to the task of bringing about a change in the Republic, independently of the good will, efforts, and management of some person or persons possessing power and means of influence in the Province of Holland. I think my Lord, the knowledge you have of the interior of the Republic, will make you agree with me in this opinion. The confidence which you have shewn me on so many occasions, has induced me to explain myself thus plainly and confidentially to you upon a subject which it is natural for me to take to heart, and upon which I am not entirely unable to form a judgment. Much more might be said upon this matter, but which I wish to reserve till I have the pleasure of conversing with your Lordship."

LORD GRENVILLE to MARQUIS CORNWALLIS [Lord Lieutenant of Ireland].

*Private.*

1798, September 13. Cleveland Row.—“During your absence from Dublin, I felt it quite impossible to trouble you on the subject of the inclosed papers. You will recollect that we had formerly some conversation on the business, and I think you then seemed to be of opinion that although we could not suffer the American Government to employ the British manufacturers yet that the Ordnance here might afford them some limited supply.

“Not knowing to what degree you are enabled to mix with the labors of your present situation any attendance or superintendence of the details of the Ordnance here, I am not sure whether I do right in troubling you upon this subject; but Mr. King's applications are so pressing, that I am under the necessity of giving him a definite answer.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 14. Hollwood.—“When I saw Huskisson yesterday, he did not know where Koehler was. I have just now learnt from him that Koehler is with Lord Mulgrave, and set out with him the day before on his return to Beverley. Huskisson had before told me that they were particularly intimate. This has led me to think whether our plan might not be much improved by endeavouring to prevail on Mulgrave to undertake the mission (as a temporary one) accompanied by Koehler. He might also, I conceive, be accredited in a civil capacity, and might be of great use in bringing the Russians and Turks to some understanding. The *éclat* of his being sent to Constantinople would do good rather than harm, and he would be the fittest person for settling terms with Koehler, and for keeping him in order, both during the time of his being employed and afterwards.

“If the war is renewed in Italy, we shall want some military man of rank with the Austrian army, and the prospect of that

situation, as soon as he had accomplished the immediate objects at Constantinople, would probably be a great temptation to Mulgrave to go. I am in hopes you will like this project, and if you do, I am sure you will have no objection to sending for Mulgrave, or writing to him immediately upon it. From the nature of the commission the proposal will come most naturally from you ; and besides I am going to Walmer on Monday."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 15. [Dublin.]—"The landing of the British force has been invaluable to us, inasmuch as it has put the country completely in our hands, both against a foreign and a domestic foe ; but I expect *nothing* to result from these immense means, and therefore I shall not be disappointed. Ireland will be peaceable while it is governed (as at present) by the 150,000 men now armed in it ; but as I am confident that no arrangement will be formed to secure the country against the repetition of the same evils arising out of the same causes, I am equally confident that the strength and treasury of England will have been wasted only for the temporary possession of Ireland, not for her lasting security or connexion with us.

"If any thing could add to my sense of the imbecility of Lord Cornwallis's government, it would be the enclosed proclamation which appeared last night, and which, in the wording of it, gives an amnesty to *any persons* however criminal (deserters included) who have joined the French, provided they bring in a French musket ; but leaves within the danger of the law all persons however penitent who have lost, broken, or destroyed their French musket. I cannot tell you what an effect of indignation this state paper has produced, hatched without the slightest communication with any person breathing, at the very moment when we know that Castlebar has been attacked by these very insurgents armed with French arms, and Westport actually plundered, and (as the accounts of this morning state) held in force by these rebels and about forty French who have got together in that small town.

"I should have thought that the precipitation of the former measures, and the disgraceful capitulation with Messrs. O'Connor and Company, would have taught some discretion in these measures ; but indeed the whole is very grievous, and the open contempt of the Government very mischievous. Imagine the Speaker cutting short a conversation at a dinner of near 20 persons with, 'Come, don't let's talk of him ; he is a damned silly fellow.'

"In short, his measures and his campaign have produced a change most disadvantageous to the only object you and I have in all this, namely the peace of Government in both kingdoms.

"Lord Hobart sails for England on Monday ; he will tell you in as plain terms as he has told Lord Cornwallis that all this will not do. He will likewise discuss with you most fully the

question of the measure which we all have considered so carefully. We do not quite agree, but he certainly is competent to give to you the completest (and I am sure the most correct) information upon that point, and I wish you to discuss it with him, because, as he and I do not quite agree, I think his ideas may be useful to you. I say nothing of my own misery here, as you cannot help me, and I am sure that you feel for me; but, *que diable faisois-je dans cette galère!*”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 15. Richmond.—“Les couriers tombent sur moi comme la grêle. Je n’ai pas encore réexpédié mon second, que je viens de recevoir un troisième, expédié de Pétersbourg 16–27 Août. Quoiqu’il ne m’a apporté que des choses auxquelles nous avons lieux de nous attendre, vue l’activité et le zèle que l’Empereur met depuis quelque temps, c’est à dire depuis qu’il a compris le danger commun, j’ai reçu pourtant des papiers qui prouvent l’élévation de son âme et la manière généreuse dans laquelle il agit envers les Turcs. J’ai reçu la communication des ordres donnés à nos ministres à Constantinople, à Vienne, et à Berlin, et la copie du traité d’alliance qui va se faire entre la Russie et la Porte. Sur cette dernière il n’y a que la Cour de Londres que l’Empereur désire d’informer.

“Les papiers que j’ai reçus sont volumineux, et, malheureusement, en Russe; il faut du temps pour les traduire, et les mettre au net, ce qui ne pourra pas être avant mercredi. Je vous suppose à la campagne, et si vous ne venez pas mercredi en ville, je vous demande la permission de venir mercredi dîner chez vous à Dropmore.

“Mon intention dans ce cas est de venir une heure avant le dîner, pour que vous ayez le temps de lire le tout; car, ayant à renvoyer le courier vendredi, je n’aurai que le jeudi à faire une réponse, par conséquent je dois revenir ici mercredi au soir.

“Le courier a passé par Berlin, et m’a apporté une lettre du Comte Panin, que je vous envoie en original, vous priant de me la renvoyer tout de suite, après en avoir tiré une copie, si cela vous est agréable.

“Je joins ici une lettre pour vous que mon courier m’a apporté du chevalier Whitworth. Faites-moi l’amitié de me dire si milord Elgin retournera à Berlin.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, September 16. Dropmore.—“Je vous restitue, avec mille graces, la lettre intéressante du comte Panin, qui vraiment lui fait honneur. Je vous félicite de la conduite de votre Cour. Si quelque chose peut encore éclairer celles de Vienne et de Berlin sur le précipice qui est sous leurs pas, c’est la conduite de l’Empereur de Russie, mais tout ce que je reçois de Vienne n’est que foiblesse sur foiblesse.

“Je ne puis pas absolument décider dans ce moment si c’est mardi ou mercredi que je viendrai en ville, mais je serais bien fâché de renoncer au plaisir de vous voir ici. Je vous en préviendrai dès que je saurai quel jour je dois être en ville, et nous arrangerons le reste selon votre convenance.” *Copy.*

MARQUIS CORNWALLIS to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, September 18. Dublin Castle.—“No branch of the Ordnance business has given me so much anxiety and uneasiness as the situation in which we stood in regard to small arms, of which article, when I came into office, we were almost entirely unprovided. The loss of arms in Holland, and still more in the West Indies, have exceeded all bounds of calculation; and we have since been called upon to provide in the first instance for the supplementary militia, and afterwards for the general arming of the country.

“In order that we might pursue an uniform system as well in our transactions with the manufacturers as in the distribution of arms, I requested the Surveyor General (General Ross) to take the peculiar superintendence of this branch of the Department, and to manage the correspondence and all the transactions with the manufacturers, who were prepared to take every advantage of our difficulties and distresses.

“I have desired General Ross to wait upon your Lordship, and to lay before you the amount of our present stock, with our probable receipts and deliveries, and your Lordship and his Majesty’s confidential servants will then be enabled to judge how far it may be in our power to assist the American Government.

“I shall only add that I am perfectly persuaded that it would be better for us to give them every fire lock in our store than to allow Mr. King to employ our manufacturers.”

COUNT PANIN to the EMPEROR PAUL.

*Secret.*

1798, Sept. 18. Berlin.—“Le Ministre des Révolutionnaires François résidant ici reçut, il n’y a pas longtems, un paquet de Kocziusko à l’adresse de votre Majesté Impériale pour le faire parvenir par mon canal à sa destination. Siéyès, prévoyant (comme il l’a avoué lui-même) que je me refuserois avec mépris de toute communication avec lui, ne pouvoit se résoudre comment remplir la commission dont il étoit chargé. A cette occasion il dit entr’autres ‘il vaudroit mieux envoyer ce paquet par la voie d’un négociant, mais qui auroit le courage de le remettre à son adresse au risque d’aller en Sibérie.’ Je n’ai pas pu découvrir comment ce paquet a été transmis à Siéyès, si c’est directement par Kocziusko ou par le Gouvernement, mais d’après les informations que j’en ai, il faut conclure que l’enveloppe ne contient pas seulement une lettre mais encore un paquet. J’ai aussi lieu de croire que le Ministère d’ici n’ignore pas ces circonstances,

par la perlustration ou par des espions destinés à surveiller Siéyès.

“L’annexe à cette rélation m’est parvenue par un canal sûr, quoique pas par l’entremise secrète connue à votre Majesté Impériale. Cette note sert de réponse à celle qui a été remise par le Comte Haugwitz, dont je n’ai pas pu avoir de copie, mais son principal contenu est inséré dans ma relation du 21 Aout.”

*Enclosure.*

LE CITOYEN SIÉYÈS to COUNT HAUGWITZ.

8 Fructidor, Année 6. Berlin.—La note remise le 2 fructidor à l’envoyé de la République Française par le ministre d’Etat et du Cabinet ne s’annonce que comé une réponse à l’entretien qui avoit eu lieu huit jours auparavant entre M. le Colonel de Zastrow et le citoyen Siéyès au sujet de la paix continentale ; mais l’envoyé de France ne peut se dispenser d’y voir une offre positive et nouvelle, qui quoique non provoquée de sa part, exige qu’il la recoive avec les sentimens d’intérêt et d’amitié qui l’ont dictée. Cette offre est celle des bons offices du Roi pour applanir des difficultés qui, suivant la note, se sont élevées de nouveau entre la République française et la Cour de Vienne depuis le traité de Campo Formio. Le soussigné ignore si, en effet, il s’est élevé entre ces deux Puissances des difficultés assez graves pour appeller utilement l’interposition des bons offices de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse ; mais il doit se montrer infiniment sensible à une attention qui prouve au moins la part amicale que Sa Majesté seroit disposée à prendre aux intérêts de la République française, dans le cas où de telles difficultés viendroient à s’élever. Dans cette hypothèse le soussigné a cru convenable de faire connoître ces bonnes dispositions à son gouvernement, et il a l’honneur d’en prévenir le Ministre du Cabinet. *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 19. Dublin.—“Not having been very well for the last two days, I should not have written but to remove any anxiety that you might have even for a moment from hearing of a second landing of the French, which is piously believed in Dublin. The fact is that, on (I believe) Sunday, a French brig stood into the isles of Arran, and from thence to Burton Coningham’s famous *job*-harbour of Rutland which used to plague me so much, on the north-west point of Ireland ; they landed Napper Tandy and about thirty men, and announced arms for 3,000 men ; they remained on shore a few hours till they caught a boy with the post, and having opened it and found by the newspapers that the French were taken, they re-embarked, and, the wind being at south-west, they stood eastward round towards Lough Swilly.

“At the same time we got the news of the Cork mail coach having been stopped and plundered last night at Kilcullen Bridge



by Holt and his banditti, with whom Lord Cornwallis has been *negotiating* through a *protected* rebel, one Byrne, till Holt has collected about 500 deserters, at the head of whom he offers protection to all deserters who will join him; and Generals Eustace and Wilford, the one at Wicklow and the other at Naas, have allowed him to plunder all the country between their posts. When you add to this the ill humour arising from the plundering parties now in arms in Mayo, and the proclamation which pardons every body for every possible offence who brings in a French musket (*nota bene*; I have bought one from a grenadier of mine who killed the French owner of it) you will judge of the disposition to cry 'praise and honour on *his* head' who has not yet above 120,000 men in arms under his orders!"

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO HENRY DUNDAS.

1798, September 20. Dropmore.—"I received the enclosed this morning by your directions. I have no doubt that Mr. Sullivan may be accurate in what he states of the danger to be apprehended from Zeman Shaw, especially as by your sending his letter to me I conclude that your opinion coincides with his. But my ignorance of the subject makes his explanation very unsatisfactory to me as to the second point, which is that of the means which the Emperor of Russia possesses of counteracting such a league as Mr. Sullivan describes. He does not state what it is that he wishes Russia to do, whom she is to attack, nor where her army is to march. The story of a projected attack on Bengal in 1791 has, I believe, found its way into Eton's book. I never gave it the smallest credit, nor do I now. Such a thing might be talked of at Petersburg to flatter the Empress's vanity, or it might be talked of by her amongst those romantic projects which she was fond of indulging in conversation, but I am confident it was never seriously in contemplation: and this for one solid reason among many, namely, that it was perfectly known at Petersburg, from the first hour of the armament, that it would not terminate in war.

"In my apprehension the making such a proposal at Petersburg as Mr. Sullivan suggests, would only tend to give that Court a persuasion that we are dependent on them in a quarter where nature has separated us by limits more insuperable than the *oceanus dissociabilis* which Horace speaks of.

"If I am wrong no one is more able to set me right than yourself; but do it, if you please, with a map in your hand, and with a calculation of distances, a reference to history, and a consideration of the present state of the intervening countries between Petersburg and Calcutta.

"It is impossible to be better disposed than both Russia and the Porte are in the present moment, but it is in Europe and Africa that I look to reap the benefit (or at least the *direct benefit*) of their aid. In its consequences that aid may doubtless be of the utmost importance to India."

## EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 21. [Althorpe.]—"Your letters of the 18th and 19th reached me yesterday. In respect to Captain Mudge I will take as early an opportunity as I can to give him employment.

"On the subject of your other letter I agree very much with you in what is to be wished by us; the only difficulty appears to be in the execution of it. In consequence of our last conversation, I wrote last week a long letter to Lord St. Vincent giving the outline of our ideas for the employment of the fleet in the Mediterranean, which will point out to him the general line of instruction we wish to be given; and I am not quite sure that much more precise instructions can be given considering the various circumstances which may arise, and may require to be acted upon before any directions can be sent from home. However, I will talk over the whole of this subject more particularly with Admiral Young, in whose opinion and discretion on naval matters I have great confidence, on my return to town, where I shall be on Sunday next; and will at the same time see what are the best arrangements that we can make on the subject of supplying officers to the Porte. There are many reasons for preferring Sir Sidney, but at the same time there are some difficulties in the way, but none, I believe, that may not be surmounted."

## CAPTAIN H. TAYLOR to WILLIAM WICKHAM.

1798, September 24. Dublin Castle.—"I transmit to you enclosed copies of information received from Major-General Myers at Cork. The only thing that could, and has as yet, been done in consequence, was immediately to communicate the intelligence to Major-Generals Nugent, Champagné, and Trench, and to direct the troops to be on the alert and in readiness to move. Should they attempt the landing either in Killebeggs Bay, or in Lough Swilly, the troops upon and in the neighbourhood of the Shannon, namely, the Guards, 2nd and 29th and 100th regiments, the 1st and 2nd Light Infantry Battalions, and the Downshire Militia and Reay Fencibles, can immediately assemble and march by Belturbet or Enniskillen; the Sutherland Fencibles from Newry, the North Gloucester from Drogheda, and West Suffolk from Dundalk, would move to the same points. These troops, with what General Nugent would assemble in the North, will, it is hoped, be equal to any thing the enemy could bring, without suspending in any degree the operations of the troops ordered into the counties of Wicklow and Wexford, and that of Mayo. The same troops, in great measure, would march, in the event of a landing in Sligo Bay, or south of it, towards Galway; and, if necessary, or in the event of their landing still more to the south, a considerable force might be assembled and march from the neighbourhood of Limerick and even Clonmel, without even then suspending the above operations.

"The garrison of Dublin, consisting of the Warwick, Bucks, Leicester, and South Lincoln, would not be reduced; and parts of the Bedford, West Kent, and Worcester would relieve the troops in Louth, would reinforce those at Trim and Mullingar in Meath and West Meath, which counties are subject to be disturbed. The Northumberland Fencibles would, when relieved by one of the above regiments at Mullingar, proceed to Longford. By these movements the country in our rear would be kept quiet, and the garrison of Dublin would be sufficiently strong if necessary to detach to the county of Kildare. Of course, the sending back the parts of the militia regiments to England cannot but be suspended at present. We know nothing of the North Hants as yet.

"Lieutenant-General Lake was ordered to direct the operations in Wexford and Wicklow, but will be relieved by Sir C. Asgill. Holt is said to have left Wicklow and got into the barony of Forth. I shall not fail to send you the intelligence of every thing that may occur.

"Should they land in any point so as to render General Trench's stay in Mayo too dangerous, he will fall back upon Athlone." *Copy. Endorsed*: "Military dispositions in Ireland."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 24. Dublin.—"Our news is very short, namely, Mayo very unquiet and apparently forgot in the distribution of troops; Lieutenant-General Lake with 400 men ordered and gone to hunt Holt in the Wicklow mountains; Teeling just hanged, and Tone under trial; *all* the other prisoners made at Ballinamuck brought up to Dublin, and *all* relieved for transportation, and put on board what is termed a crotty-ship; Chief Baron Yelverton arraigning in every company the courts martial of murder; Mr. Egan, Judge of Kilmainham, telling a jury in his charge that no credit is to be given *in any case* to an informer employed by Government to deceive and to betray; the yeomanry all put off duty, and the crotties employed in murdering them separately; every one loud against Lord Cornwallis, some with reason, but most without any; and *all*, whether government or rebels, stating the certainty of another attempt, which Lord Cornwallis says he expects in about a month."

#### M. DE LUC TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 24. Berlin.—"Ayant trouvé ce matin M. Garlike prêt à expédier une dépêche à votre Excellence, je lui ai dit à la hâte quelques nouvelles circonstances que je désirois lui faire connoître; mais M. le Comte de Panin m'ayant dit depuis que j'avois encore un moment pour ajouter quelque chose à son paquet, je m'empresse d'en profiter.

"Peu après la dernière lettre que j'eus l'honneur d'écrire à votre Excellence, M. de Haugwitz me fit témoigner, par un de ses amis devenu le mien, qu'il étoit fâché de ce que je ne venois pas le voir familièrement comme il m'avoit témoigné le désirer, et je

profitois de cette invitation. Plus je lui ai parlé fortement comme je pense, plus il m'a pressé de le voir souvent; et enfin, lui parlant de départ, il m'a prié de rester, m'assurant que les circonstances changeroient suivant mes désirs, et qu'il souhaitoit que j'y fusse. Lui-même m'a pressé d'aller à Potsdam voir Monseigneur le Duc de Brunswic, et m'en a facilité les moyens. S'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] m'a témoigné sa surprise de tout ce changement chez M. de H[augwitz], et m'a demandé des explications de ce qui s'étoit passé entre nous, ce dont elle a témoigné son satisfaction, m'assurant qu'il l'avoit trouvé très changé suivant ses désirs, et m'invitant à continuer de le voir. J'ai pu donner en même temps à s'a[ltesse] s[érénissime] des informations importantes, à s'engager à en recevoir d'autres de M. le Comte de Panin, en le voyant en particulier. Cet entretien a eu lieu, et Votre Excellence apprendra bien des choses favorables par ce courrier. À quoi je ne pouvois ajouter que cet exposé succinct, que je devois à Votre Excellence, des raisons qui m'ont retenues ici."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 26. Dublin.—"I have endeavoured to give every attention to your questions respecting that measure to which we look with so much impatience, and I have discussed it very much at length with the person whose opinions are likely to have so much weight with you. I have found in him a very strong and decided disposition to stake the whole upon it, because he appeared convinced with me that nothing short of *it* could be substituted as a measure or system adequate to the task of establishing a decided British government in Ireland. He is strongly convinced that all power given to the Catholics will be used by the mass of them against England, and any connexion with her; but appears more doubtful than I should have expected of the power of the Catholics to crush the Protestants, supposing England unable or unwilling to embark her means in such a quarrel. But these opinions do not shake his decided ideas in favour of our measure, though I plainly see that he would be averse from the coupling with it that which we look to, namely, the abolition of such of the remaining restrictions on Catholics (particularly as with respect to eligibility in Parliament) as may then be removed without the slightest risk to the Protestant ascendancy, secured as it would be by a Protestant Parliament in London, even though Irish Papists should be eligible in the Irish part of the limited House of Commons. He seemed to lean to the idea of leaving *all* the existing restrictions where they are, and stated that the greatest bonus that could be held out to the Irish Parliament to induce them to acquiesce in the measure, would be the certainty that by an union the gate would be completely barred against any further concession to the Catholics. Such he seemed to think would be the expectation of most of the Northerners, whose prejudices and eagerness must be very attentively looked to on

this subject ; while, on the other hand, the great temptation to the Catholics would be the hope of gaining some share, though obviously an imperfect one, in the legislation if not in the executive government of the country. To all this I have urged that if the measure does not go to the full extent of settling all questions of future Catholic claim, and all questions of Parliamentary reform, it is very incomplete, and perhaps *que le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle* ; and this I find is the opinion of many people, who being thoroughly convinced of the impossibility of satisfying both Catholics and Protestants, are averse from moving the question, fearing that, even if it should be carried, still the great object of it would be missed. I took the opportunity of this long conversation to discuss with him (as a part of this arrangement) my ideas respecting a full and complete establishment for the Catholic and Presbyterian Churches. It is unnecessary to go into the details of our conversation on that head, since he agreed with me that it would be insanity to attempt the measure without this arrangement. I pressed the doubt stated in your letter, and urged it in its full force before I gave him my opinion, and he agreed with me in giving it no weight, supposing always that the stipend was ample for all ranks and lucrative for the highest orders ; and supposing always that the question of tithes was put to sleep by some arrangement for a corn rent or a land allotment. I cannot describe to you the importance which all ranks appear to annex to some arrangement of this sort respecting tithes, which they state as being a *sine quâ non* for the peace and quiet of the country, and which would certainly operate as a very general and universal premium to all religions to taste any measure of which this formed a prominent feature. I am not insensible to the delicacy of this ground, but I am firmly of opinion that it must be grappled with, and may be turned to the greatest advantage. I do not state this as *necessarily* forming part of our measure, but as one that in policy and wisdom you will not separate from it. But to complete your system of connecting these Churches with the Government of the country, you must be prepared to give certain legal powers of suspension, deprivation, and expulsion by law both to the Catholic Church government and to the Presbyterian government assembly, for without such powers your measure will be incomplete.

“Very much of the question of the eligibility of the Catholics to sit in Parliament must turn upon the opinion of it in England ; for it is obvious that if England and Scotland are not prepared to do away so much of the Test Act as prevents Catholics sitting in the united Parliament, the question ought not to be stirred here ; and it is a point of such magnitude on your side of the water, and involves so many collateral considerations, that I doubt whether you are ripe to give an opinion upon it. Perhaps it might not be impossible to admit Irish Catholics to sit for Irish seats in the united Parliament, on the same footing as Scotch Presbyterians may sit by law for Scotch seats ; but it is obvious that English Catholics would assert claims with real foundation,

and English Dissenters with none ; but both sects would press upon you at such a moment, with great inconvenience to your measure. I have at different times digested a plan for the formation of the united Parliament, which, at least, has the advantage of being applicable to the system of a Parliament limited only to Protestants, or partially opened, or generally opened ; and the leading principle of my plan is to keep all the existing rights of election entire, though I reduce the numbers to one half. I have explained it generally to Lord Hobart, and I amuse myself in varying it from time to time as improvements occur to me ; assuming as a *datum* that the proportion should be, in the House of Commons from 100 to 120 members, and in the House of Lords about 80 ; the whole to be chosen under the existing rights of election, and the surplus disposed of in the shape of election committees, and committees on private bills, to be chosen by the House *for the session only*, and to sit in Dublin for those purposes. Something of this sort must be formed, for I find every one strongly impressed with the impossibility of sending their disputants, or parties to private Bills, to London for the purpose of battling their private concerns, or fighting an election question before a committee in London.

“ But I again return to the Catholic question, for the whole in my mind turns upon *that*. If this measure is understood by them to be proposed for their advantage, it is possible that you may derive great advantage from them, and so *vice-versa*. Still, however, this or any other statement or modification of the project must remain open to all the difficulties which arise out of the heat and intemperance of two very hot-headed and ill-blooded parties, mutually undervaluing each other's strength, pretensions, and situation in this country ; and, at last, it must be decided by the wisdom of English Government ; and you will be to consider your means for carrying your plan into execution by looking to the English force of all descriptions, which is the only real force upon which you can depend. I have thought very much upon it, and though I do not pretend to underate any of the *very* many momentous difficulties that must occur, I have no difficulty in saying that *I think the measure may succeed to the full extent of an open Irish proportion ; and that I do not see any possible salvation short of such a measure, connected with the ideas which I have thrown out*. You will clearly understand that when I give this opinion, I look only to Irish side of the question ; for I cannot pretend to judge how far it might or not succeed in England.

“ But, conceiving myself bound to consider very well every possible bearing of this question, and to divest myself of every prejudice, and looking to those through whom this great work is to be conducted, I hold myself called upon to say distinctly to you that I believe, first, that Lord Cornwallis will not undertake the measure whenever the moment of execution arrives ; and, secondly, that such is the universal impression to his disadvantage, that I solemnly protest I believe it will prosper less in his hands than in those of any possible person to whom it might be committed,

I should not dare say thus much to everyone ; but to you who know that *no* consideration would induce me to undertake it, and that I do not look to any possible A. B. or C. for such an undertaking, I have no difficulty in speaking my mind ; and I trust that I do it without heat, or without any one leaning or improper bias whatsoever. From the moment Lord Cornwallis landed, he has professed to govern without the slightest communication with any of the many persons from whom he might have derived much useful information. Lord Castlereagh has neither the abilities nor the means of supplying the great deficiency of materials that must arise out of such a system of no communication. The common routine of Office has almost in every instance been put by, and the exertions of individuals have, *to my knowledge*, been employed with much pains and success to mislead for the purpose of exposing. The ill disposition of the Speaker, the incapacity of Lord Castlereagh to so great a situation, and the conduct of all persons in office, very naturally malicious in return for this no-confidence, has thrown the House of Commons loose to a series of such measures and such bills as never disgraced a legislative assembly. Much however of this has been tolerated so long as the impression continued of the advantage to be derived from his very superior military talents ; but the history of the last three weeks has given a very different turn to the public opinion upon this subject ; and it is painful to hear everything that is said respecting his conduct, his military objects, and the extreme risk incurred, as well as the disgraceful encouragement given to the enemy by collecting near 20,000 men to form a *cordon* from Enniskillen round to Galway, out of which *cordon* the French slipped, and but for the unparalleled march of the infantry would have got first to Dublin. I do not mean by all this to say that Lord Cornwallis deserves a twentieth part of all that is said respecting him ; but the mischief is done ; and I fear that much of the means are lost which he had in public estimation for the very interesting measure upon which so much depends. I will however fairly own that part of this mischief may be repaired by sending hither a Minister (as Secretary) of a very different description to conduct *all the civil* business of the country ; but I much fear, from what I hear and see, that Lord Cornwallis would not be easily *led* ; and unless he is so, I cannot see how the system can be changed ; for even if he could alter his manner and conduct to those who could assist him here, it is too late for them (recollect what I told you of the Speaker) to alter their's. I cannot yet discover that he has suffered the word union ever to escape his lips, save to the Lord Chancellor, whose opinions he knew before he came hither, and Lord Hobart, and me ; and I know that Lord Clare, as late as yesterday, was persuaded that he had not collected any *one* opinion from any one person whose ideas might have been doubtful. Lord Castlereagh has given him some names *pro* and *con*, and I have added to those lists, as have, in some few instances, Lord Clare and Lord Hobart ; but I do not believe that he knows any thing more on that chapter. Add to all this that his measures arising out of

the actual state of the country are inexplicable. I always have thought, and still think, the extension of mercy (on confession of guilt) wise and politic, after the very many examples made to the amount of 300, who were *executed* in different ways during the rebellion. You know my opinion upon the *mode* in which this measure was conducted; but the extension of that system to a rebellion in aid of, and acting with a French force landed here, is inexplicable. Fourteen Longford militia men taken in arms have been hanged; so has Blake the general, and Teeling and one O'Dowd. Tone is under trial, and Moore (the President of Connaught) ordered for trial. But all the other prisoners taken at Ballinamuck or since are, *without exception*, ordered to be transported, and are actually taken out of prison and put on board for that purpose. Of the rebels now in arms under Holt in Wicklow not one is tried; and of those put into the croppieships (as they are called) by Lord Camden, and since his departure by the different General Officers, a list of above 200 are now *pardoned*, upon the terms of entering into the *King's land service*, from which they may be discharged next day. And these people are to be disembarked, as Mr. Swan told me, who shewed me the list, on Saturday or Sunday next, and turned loose to any regiment who will take them. Add to this the famous French musket proclamation, and it completes a system of such complete imbecility that there is no safety to individuals but in turning rebels. At least such is the very avowed and open language of every one. I have asked what number have taken the benefit of this proclamation, and I can say from the best authority that, on Saturday last, not *one* musket had been delivered; and I enclose a Sligo extract which will sufficiently explain why they are not given up.

"In the midst of all this arrives notice of the French fleet being out; and every yeoman has already been disbanded, and with reason outrageous at being given up to be murdered in their separate houses or beds, by the insurgents in every part of the kingdom."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] September 28. Dunira Lodge.—"I received yours with the enclosure last night. It had been sent to you in common course from the Office, on account of the mention made of Russia. I only myself received it two days ago, and could not therefore give any special order with regard to it; but it is a general order to send to every Department any thing that comes to me, which, in any ways, bears upon the business of any other Department.

"With regard to the letter itself, I cannot say it gives me any new information; for it requires no great sagacity to discover that, if any confederacy is acted upon to overthrow our power in India, Zemaun Shaw must be a material link in that chain; because it has been and is the ruling passion of that family to restore the throne of Delhi, and its resources are considerable both in men and money. I believe his revenues are not



much less than three crores, which is not inferior even to those of Tippoo. In conjunction with France and Tippoo, there can be no doubt of his being a formidable enemy to us, because by his means our Bengal force and revenue would be kept in play at the time the united efforts of France and Tippoo were employed against us in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar. I don't mean to say that the difficulties of Zemaun Shaw are not great in the execution of such a project. He must either subdue or conciliate the Seiks. He must lay his account of being opposed by the Scindian branch of the Mahratta power, in whose hands is now centered what remains of the ancient Mogul authority. These difficulties must be overcome before he can reach us; and although he would be aided by some of the Rohilla tribes from predatory or other interests, I should not apprehend from him any serious calamity if our resources were not called for to act in other still more pressing quarters. Of course I can only write here from general recollection, but it is one of those Indian positions, which I have laid up in my own mind, that Zemaun Shaw ought to be looked upon as a very formidable part of any confederacy that may be formed against us in India. There is a minute of Sir John Shore upon some of the consultations of the Bengal Government, professedly on the subject of Zemaun Shaw, and his views and resources. I shall desire Mr. Cable to send you a copy of it. In that minute, if I am not greatly mistaken, one of the difficulties stated to attend the execution of Zemaun Shaw's projects arises from the distracted state of his own family, one of the branches of which is supported by the existing power in Persia. I know not whether right or wrong, but I have conceived that the influence of Russia in Persia is very great; and, if that is the case, even the knowledge of Russia being in habits of strict amity and connexion with us, would operate so on the power of Persia as to create indirectly an efficient counterpoise to check the ambition and projects of Zemaun Shaw. In short, if the power of Persia was to take a part against him, he durst not leave the confines of his own dominions; or, if he was to act he might be compelled to take a part to annoy, in the place of supporting, the projects of France.

"As to the point whether Russia had views of attacking us in 1791, or whether the proposed route was or was not practicable, I really cannot take upon me to decide; and I cannot follow your advice of having recourse to my maps, for I have none here of a nature to direct me in such an investigation. I remember some years ago to have bestowed some attention upon it, and I was disposed to think it impracticable, chiefly from the difficulty of provisions in some parts of the progress; but having seen what bread the Russian soldiers and sailors are contented with, I confess I should be sorry to think our security in any great quarter rested solely on such a basis. Mr. Eton has often stated that the plans and details of that expedition were still to be got among the papers of Potemkin; and if there is any chance of its being got, we should do wrong not to send him to bring them, if he can by *any means* procure them.

"There is one direct way in which Russia can be of use to us. She can let the East India Company, if necessary, have ten thousand of her troops in their pay ; and such an aid would be of the utmost importance, if a large French force was to be acting either on the Malabar coast or in the Carnatic, in conjunction with Tippe; and, if the Turks and Russians are really about to act in concert together, there would be no difficulty of bringing them by the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to Gibraltar, or Minorca, if it should fall into our hands.

"By a note from the Admiralty received last night, I hope there remains no doubt that at last Sir Horatio Nelson has fallen in with the French fleet. If the action has been decisive, it, I would hope, puts us on velvet in the Mediterranean, and indeed every where in Europe ; but alas ! it comes too late for India. I hate to indulge retrospective melancholy, but in this instance I cannot relieve my mind from it. If we had not been too incredulous as to the object of Buonaparte's armament, I think such instructions would have been given to Sir Horatio Nelson as would have prevented him from leaving Alexandria, after he had once reached it in the auspicious and promising way he did. What a change that circumstance would have made on the state of this country ? I must close the subject, for it almost drives me mad to think of it."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 28. Dublin.—"The county of Mayo, after having been completely left to its fate, save and except Castlebar, and after having been *plundered and laid waste* for 14 days after the battle of Ballinamuck *for want of troops*, was recovered on the 22nd by General Trench ; who has taken all that remained of French, and has killed above 2,000 persons in arms, and made no rebel prisoners ; in which he is right in an economical point of view, as Lord Cornwallis will soon find the expense of victualling all he takes (and will not hang) very heavy. Yesterday two Irish artillery men who deserted, and were found in French uniform at the French guns at Ballinamuck, were pardoned on condition of serving in the West Indies ! and 97, being the *entire lot* of Ballinamuck prisoners, were put on board a transport ship as *poor deluded men who were not leaders*, without one legal example having been made whatsoever. All our troops are now moving south ; and poor Lake, having in vain hunted Holt, is now gone down to collect troops at Mallow."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, September 29. [Dublin.]—"I enclose you our bulletin and congratulate you that it is now ascertained from authority that on the 26th, which makes the 18th day after the battle of Ballinamuck, *five* muskets had been given up in consequence of the proclamation. I enclose to you two papers which are amusing. The note to General Trench is sufficiently impertinent

for a Frenchman at the head of a French army ; but for a Frenchman at the head of rebels I think a different measure of treatment should be held out than that of a common prisoner of war. The other is a copy taken just now out of the pocket of Tone who is this moment hanged, having been taken under the name of Smith, acting as adjutant in the French army. He refused a priest, and said he gloried in the principles and name of a Frenchman. You will observe that Killibegs was their object, as settled in their original plan ; and you will observe that a debarkation there puts them within the line of the defence of Lough Erne and its lower waters. This would not be of any great moment if there was a force to check them at Donegal, *but there is none*. You see that Tone in this letter speaks of ‘any other squadron,’ and of the assistance to be derived from the fishing boats. This very point was suggested to Lord Cornwallis even before this landing ; but even with the past experience, no one step has been taken for instructing any person in any part of Ireland on this head, or on the more important chapter of breaking bridges and roads, nor is this duty committed or recommended to any one. I have heard this morning from Kilkenny and from Wexford. The rebels are in force in the county of Kilkenny, and Holt is master of the whole low country round Lord Carysfort’s estate at Arklow, and very narrowly missed taking your friend General Eustace on Tuesday last. I should not write to you all this unpleasant nonsense but that I know that every day’s post is interesting to you, and I trust that Tom shares all these communications.”

*Enclosure :*

M. TONE to ———.

Donegal Bay, Fructidor 5.—“ The day I embarked at Rochelle I wrote to you ; in that letter I gave you an account of our force, but as it might have miscarried, I shall repeat its contents. We are nine hundred infantry and about one hundred *chasseurs* and *canonniers*, with twenty or thirty officers *à la suite*. We have, besides three field pieces, six thousand stand of arms, and a very adequate quantity of ammunition. I should also mention a large quantity of helmets and odd clothing of various colours which the General found in the magazine at Rochelle. Pat will look droll in a helmet without any corresponding article of dress. To come to our actual situation, yesterday morning we arrived at the mouth of the bay, after a passage of thirteen days, without seeing anything. We stood up towards Killybegs harbour with a light breeze, and got within two hours’ sail of our landing place, when the wind died away. This is damned unlucky, as it has entirely deprived us of the advantage of surprise. The wind springing up contrary in the evening, we stood right across the bay to the county of Mayo side, where Killala, I believe, affords a place proper to debark. Night and the want of a pilot obliged us to anchor in the middle of the bay. This morning we are under way again, and endeavouring to get into Killala, the wind

not being very good. I refer you to the map, where you will see that we are in sight both of Killybegs and Killala bays, without the power of entering either. Pause here, my friends, and pay a compliment to my patience, which suffers me to write in such a situation. You cannot expect coherency; we are surrounded on all sides by very high mountains; if there is an aristocrat within ten leagues of us, he is with his glass on the top of some hill watching our motions, and sending expresses in every direction. These are pleasant speculations. I hope the rogues won't have the wit to destroy all the fishing boats round the bay, for we are in great need of some to help us to debark. We have not as yet seen a single boat and be damned to them. *On dit*, that we shall be in Killala in a couple of hours; our grenadiers will debark in our own boats, and if there be any fishermen, the rascals shall be made useful. I have no more to add. You shall have a line from me written on the back of my hat; I have seen a print of Buonaparte in that attitude.

One o'clock in the afternoon.

"I ask pardon of the gods for having repined. We are close in with Killala, and have taken a little brig, a thing absolutely necessary as our frigates are too large to run close in. We have also some fishing boats. The pilot, who is *up*, gives us the best intelligence in the world. There are scarcely any troops to oppose us, and Jemmy Plunkett is at the head of the insurgents who are up in the county Roscommon. We have also taken a lieutenant of the Prince of Wales's regiment of Fencibles, going from Sligo to Killala to take the command of, or rather join a company of infantry there with his servant; and a gentleman of Sligo with him. A yeoman, though I believe an aristocrat, offered to lay a guinea that, if we please, we will be masters of Sligo to-morrow without firing a shot at us. God bless you. My postscript shall be dated from Killala. *En attendant*, I apprise you that we hear nothing of any other squadron having arrived. Burke considers this letter as from himself.

Killala, Fructidor 6.

"Yesterday evening we landed, and drove sixty yeomen and regulars before us like sheep. A few of our grenadiers only were engaged. We killed two and made a dozen prisoners. The people will join us in myriads; they throw themselves on their knees as we pass along, and extend their arms for our success. We will be masters of Connaught in a few days. *Erin go Bragh.*"

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 2. Dublin.—"As to Ireland, we know nothing of French ships; nor have the usual symptoms shewn themselves by which on former occasions it was easy to foretell that an invasion was expected. I told you in a former letter that if the wind held as strongly at south-west off the French coast as in Ireland on the 19th and 20th, it would be clear that they must have run back to L'Orient, and the very long interval from the 17th September to the 1st October (for all the country mails are come in this

morning) without their appearance off Ireland, strengthens this conjecture. God grant it may be so; for all I see, and all I know assures me that the defeat of an invasion of 3,500 men will not be as *speedily* as your wishes or mine would lead us to expect. My views and my fears are very gloomy on the subject of Ireland, and the public opinion is equally desponding. Lord Cornwallis is now employing two obscure men to enquire, and to liberate at their discretion from the gaols and prison ships, men 'improperly committed by the civil or military power, or improperly convicted by military tribunals.' You will hardly believe that I quote the words exactly, as stated by Mr. Justice Swan, one of these Inquisitors, to be the nature of his employment. In consequence of which, amongst very many others, Murphy the feather merchant (in whose house Lord E. FitzGerald was hid, and who was in the room when Lord Edward was taken), *committed for high treason*, was yesterday liberated, to the indignation of all Dublin, without the slightest communication with any one of the law servants of the Crown. This system has been pursued now for about ten days, and has struck such a damp that the country justices and juries (it is now assize week) have refused to act in some of the counties, and the witnesses have almost universally absconded. What to advise you to I protest I know not; but I owe it to you and to myself to say that I have not met a single person who does not agree with me that the country never bore so gloomy an aspect; and that there does not exist one grain of confidence in the talents of Lord Cornwallis, who has thrown away the greatest game that ever was put into the hands of man. Lord Carysfort goes to England in a few days; he will tell you how very generally this distrust is spread; and increased if possible by his announcing on Saturday last, not to Parliament, not to the Privy Council, not to his Cabinet, not to individuals high in office or in situation, but to the corporation of hosiers! an intended change of system; an answer which they printed and sent round *most decorously* to all members of Parliament. Of this answer no one person whatsoever was apprized till the 'master of the hosiers' announced it. Indeed it is most true that if this man ever had talents, he has left them on the other side of the water; and (what is more important) will be a most unprofitable servant, either to the exigency of the present moment or to the *hereafter*. For though 'if it were done, it were well it were done quickly,' yet I solemnly protest I do not conceive it possible that *it* should prosper in his hands."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 2. Richmond.—"Je me réjouis avec vous et je vous félicite bien sincèrement sur la belle victoire du brave Chevalier Nelson, dont nous avons la nouvelle certaine, et qui est encore plus brillante que nous ne l'avons cru auparavant. Je vous envoie l'extrait d'une lettre que j'ai reçue hier de mon ami Kotchoubey, et la copie de celle que le Capitaine Capel m'a apportée du Comte Rasoumowski."

*Enclosure 1.*

M. KOTCHOUBEI to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, August 25. St. Petersburg. *Extract*.—"Je ne sais si je vous ai marqué que le comte Cobenzl est de retour ici. Il a eu la permission de venir faire sa cour à leurs Majestés à Gatchina, où je l'ai vu parfaitement bien accueilli. Il conte mille choses de Buonaparte, qu'il arrange, je crois, un peu à sa façon; mais convient néanmoins que le grand génie perce partout. Nous avons reçu hier par Constantinople la nouvelle qu'il marchait sur Caïre. J'ai lu différentes proclamations faites par lui en Egypte, et dois convenir, comme je l'ai toujours dit, que personne ne connaît mieux les Turcs que les Français."

*Enclosure 2.*

COUNT RASOUMOUSKOI to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, September 8-19. Vienna.—"Je vous écris deux mots de chez le Chevalier Eden, où je mène suis rendu en grande hâte pour voir le Capitaine Capel, envoyé par l'Amiral Nelson avec la nouvelle officielle de la grande victoire remportée sur les Français dans la baie d'Abukir. Je ne vous en détaillerai pas les circonstances; le résultat en est que de treize vaisseaux de ligne qu'avait l'ennemi, neuf ont été pris, deux brûlés, et deux se sont sauvés. De trois amiraux, l'un a été tué, c'est Bruyers; l'autre pris, Blankett; le troisième était à bord d'un de ceux qui ont échappés. Ce grand événement qui annule la marine Française, qui aura les suites les plus importantes sur toute l'Italie, se passait au moment où douze vaisseaux Russes venaient de passer les Dardanelles pour joindre les Anglais; au moment où notre Cour, indépendamment de vingt mille auxiliaires, en promet soixante mille à l'Autriche. Si celle-ci ne profite point d'une pareille circonstance qui peut et doit inmanquablement réparer ses malheurs, et changer de la manière la plus avantageuse la face de l'Europe menacée de sa perte, l'Autriche sera cause de nos malheurs à venir, et responsable devant la postérité. Je n'épargnerai certainement ni soins ni arguments pour appuyer sur cette opinion, mais sera-ce avec succès? Je n'ose m'en flatter. La position fatale vis à vis de l'Angleterre offre une pierre d'acchoppement, que le Cabinet le plus généreux des deux doit ôter; ce n'est pas celui de Vienne."

*Copy.*

EARL SPENCER to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 3. Admiralty.—"In answer to your two notes at once, I think upon the whole (having turned and returned the subject in my thoughts as much as I can) that there is not now the occasion there appeared before for sending another ship up the Mediterranean. You will see by the further despatches arrived to-day that Nelson has taken the only measure which in his state he could take, and which appears the only one required for the present, of blocking up Alexandria and the mouth of the

Nile by a good squadron ; and by that means entirely cutting off the French army from its supplies, of which all the intercepted letters represent them as being in the most pressing want.

“The Turk, you will also see, has decidedly taken his part by a most magnificent declaration of war ; and as the Russians have brought supernumerary officers to assist on board the Turkish fleet, I should be apprehensive of danger from our sending any out, unless we were desired to assist them in that manner. If any ship was to be sent, Sir Sidney and his *Tiger* would, I think, be the best to send ; but I hesitate very much on the necessity of sending him now, as every thing seems to be in so perfectly good a train in the Levant.

“I wish things were as well at Vienna. I fear nothing but our giving up the point about the convention will now bring Austria forward, even if that will, and it is very possible the French may make their peace ; though I cannot help having still hopes from the Neapolitan interest, and Naples must be at war with France. The accounts from Malta are most encouraging ; and having come through Naples, I hope our naval people will be sufficiently apprized of them to act upon them even before our directions arrive.”

B. GARLIKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, October 3. Berlin.—“What I have now the honour of communicating to your Lordship was confided to me in a private conversation with Count Panin. In the opportunity which he had of talking with the Duke of Brunswick at the Potsdam review, his Serene Highness asked him whether, in the possible case of the renewal of hostilities on the part of the German powers, it had occurred to them to fix the boundaries of the respective countries which might become practicable at the peace. Count Panin answered that he did not believe that anything respecting it had been suggested by either of them ; that he was much struck with the penetration and foresight of His Serene Highness on the subject, and that with the Duke’s permission he would mention it to the Emperor. Count Panin accordingly wrote to His Imperial Majesty, and with so much secrecy, that the letter was directed to be delivered *en mains propres*.

“The light in which Count Panin considers the Duke of Brunswick’s question is that the object of it had previously furnished matter of conversation with the King of Prussia, and that it was made for the purpose of discovering how far the Emperor might be disposed to consent to a considerable acquisition of territory to Prussia on the side of the Low Countries, if, in the course of events, it should become *necessary or practicable*. He told me that he did not believe Russia would object to such an aggrandizement, and that a new Prussian frontier on that side might become desirable for the future tranquillity of Europe.

“At the same time, it was evident from the manner in which Count Panin spoke and dwelt on this point, that he thought it

neither unlikely nor unreasonable for Russia, in such a possibility, to look for some cession (he did not say, nor express the idea of an equivalent) from this country. Some allusion was made to the port of Memel.

"Although this letter may be a premature reference to the discussion of such important questions, I have nevertheless thought it best on the whole to submit it to your Lordship. *I am certain that Count Panin had no view in speaking of it to me*; and I take the liberty humbly and earnestly to suggest that it be not mentioned to Count Woronzow; and that, whenever in your Lordship's judgment it may appear expedient to favour a discussion of this nature, on grounds which the subject itself presents, no allusion be made to this conversation; it having been quite confidential with the Duke of Brunswick; and Count Panin not having meant that the part of it he mentioned to me should lead to any ministerial communication between the Courts concerned."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 4. Richmond.—"J'ai reçu encore un courier. Les paquets qu'il m'a apportés pour vous ont été envoyés tout de suite à votre bureau. Les dépêches dont il était le porteur ne sont relatives qu'à vos démêlés avec l'Autriche. Starhemberg vous demandera sans doute une entrevue, parcequ'on m'a envoyé la copie de ce que Cobenzel lui écrit officiellement, et dans un ton d'un ministre dirigeant. Il est nécessaire que nous nous visions aussi, et que cela soit avant que vous ayez vu Starhemberg. Vous en verrez la cause par les papiers que j'ai reçus de Pétersbourg et Berlin, et que je vous communiquerai le jour que vous voudrez bien m'indiquer. Le courier que je devais expédier demain, partira toujours demain au soir. Les affaires Turcs exigent l'expédition de ce courier, mais il m'en restera encore un, celui qui est arrivé ce matin. J'ai averti Monsieur Hammond pour qu'il prépare ces paquets pour Pétersbourg pour demain vers minuit."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO RUFUS KING.

*Private.*

1798, October 4. Dropmore.—"I have not a great deal to add to what I last stated to you on the subject of continental politics. Russia has, as you may have seen, taken a decided part, both by the liberal tender of assistance to Austria, and by the still more liberal step of actually sending a fleet to Constantinople, and putting *that* and a Russian army (which is on the frontier) under the orders of the Russian Ambassador there, to be employed, on the requisition of the Porte, for the defence of the Ottoman territory.

"We have taken several advice-boats with Bonaparte's dispatches, and a number of private letters, some of the latter written since the action of Alexandria. All are in a desponding



style, describing difficulties much greater than were expected. The army is wasted by disease, and continually harassed by the country troops and the Arabs. Even a letter cannot be sent from Cairo to Alexandria without an escort of 600 horse. On the whole, I really think that, without being sanguine, we may consider that business as over. The Porte declared war against France on the 2nd of September.

"The councils of Austria are still wavering and irresolute; and if the insolence of the Directory is so far humbled by this last blow; as to induce them to hold out fresh lures to Vienna of acquisitions in Italy, I would not answer for it that the Austrians might not catch at the bait, though they see the hook, which it no longer conceals.

"I have been desired to suggest to you an idea which might (it is conceived) be beneficial to both our countries, in the essential article of raising supplies with as little pressure as possible on our own people. It is that, by mutual agreement, *we* should retain so much of our drawbacks on sugars, and *you* charge the export of that article for foreign consumption with such duties, as would supply to both of us a considerable revenue drawn from foreign countries, on an article in which our two nations have no competitors, nor are likely to have any. If you think anything of this sort practicable, Mr. Pitt would, I know, be very happy to be allowed to converse with you upon it, and if possible before the mail goes out. *Copy.*"

LORD LOUGHBOROUGH to [WILLIAM PITT].

1798, October 5. Weymouth.—"I cannot resist the desire I have of expressing my thoughts to you on the subject of the last dispatches from the two Imperial Courts. The obstinacy of the Court of Vienna seems so perfectly irrational as well as unjust, that I strongly suspect that either Monsieur Thugut has misunderstood, or Sir Morton Eden has ill explained the object of his instruction to insist upon the ratification of the Convention of May, 1797. In the recital of M. Thugut's last conversation, he is stated to have said that His Imperial Majesty's finances were in *such a state* as to permit no idea of *fulfilling at present* the engagement of that convention; and, in the sequel of the discourse, he rests the refusal on the unprovided state of the Emperor's treasury. All this (and, as I recollect, the preceding dispatches were in the same stile) seems to imply that the ratification was to be followed up by an immediate payment of the money due according to that convention. Our idea, I think, was only to require an avowal of the engagement in form, but to give every reasonable allowance for the pecuniary difficulties of Austria, and forbear insisting on immediate payment. If this idea had been fully explained to M. Thugut, it seems impossible that he should answer as he has done, because the answer does not apply to the demand.

"Supposing, however, that for some incomprehensible reason the Austrian Cabinet should persist, and that Lord Grenville

should not find in his conference with Count Starhemberg that Sir Charles Whitworth's expectations of his being authorized to give way to the mediation of Russia are well founded, will it not deserve the most serious consideration whether it is not fit for us to waive the point for the present, and make the compliment to Russia. It is much more a point of honour than of immediate interest; and the object to which we should concede it is so immense, that I confess it seems to me we should be nearly as much in the wrong as Austria were we to persevere, at the risk of defeating the greatest combination of force that ever could have been formed against the enemy. Our present fortunate situation enables us, without any loss of dignity, to extend our aid most liberally; and I am convinced you will find the public ready to go any lengths you can propose in pushing vigorously the war, and enabling Austria to take the field for recovering Italy, and especially Switzerland. I don't risk this opinion merely on conjecture. But I happened yesterday to fall into conversation with a person who is a very good judge of the temper of the city, and the disposition and abilities of the moneyed men; I mean Williams, the father of the present sheriff. He is strenuous for the most vigorous and extensive prosecution of the war, and makes not the least doubt of the most prompt and abundant supply of money. He conceives that the opening the trade to the Levant and the Turkish dominions will give a great spring to commerce; and that the war itself is really become popular with the manufacturers and merchants.

"I propose to be in town on Tuesday; had the weather remained as it has been ever since I came, I should have left this coast with some regret; but Mr. Smith has sent his Elisian wind to us, which makes the prospect as obscure as his dispatches. Lord Clare informs me that he shall set [out] after the prorogation to-morrow for London directly, which will stop my journey to Yorkshire; as I have persuaded myself that I have a great deal to say both to you and to him on the subject of his journey, which has been very much the employment of my thoughts, till our late victory gave them another direction.

"The length and perhaps the stile of my letter may point out the bad weather we at present suffer. . . ."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 6. Richmond.—"Mon courier est parti hier au soir, et a pris vos dépêches pour le Chevalier Whitworth. J'ai reçu hier-au-soir votre lettre et je vous rend mille graces pour la nouvelle que vous m'avez donnée de la déclaration de guerre de la Porte contre la France, et de l'arrestation de Ruffin et de tous les Français dans l'empire Ottoman. Tamara m'écrit pour m'accuser seulement la réception d'une de mes lettres, et s'en rapporte à ce que j'apprendrai de vous sur les affaires Turcs. Milord Spencer, chez qui j'ai dîné avant hier, m'a dit que la déclaration de guerre des Turcs est très originale. Si elle ne sera pas insérée dans la *gazette* de ce soir, je vous prie de me la

communiquer. Je vous prie aussi d'ordonner à Monsieur Caning de me montrer les dépêches qui viendront de M. Smith de Constantinople. Je ne demande pas des copies, mais je viendrai une fois par semaine au bureau pour les lire, au moins celles qui peuvent m'être montrées; car vous sentez bien qu'il m'est très important d'être au courant des ces affaires, et que ni Smith n'a pas le temps d'écrire à votre ministre, ni Tamara à moi, et que chaque'un d'eux doit supposer que votre ministre à Pétersbourg, et moi ici, nous sommes informés par les ministres respectifs.

“Quand à l'objet du courier que j'ai reçu, ce n'est pas une affaire pressée; ce n'est qu'une nouvelle infamie de Cobenzel, qui tâche de justifier sa Cour chez nous aux dépens de l'Angleterre; mais dans cette affaire même je vois la sagesse de notre ministère. Je bénis le ciel, en vérité, de ce que l'Empereur a auprès de lui le prince Bezborodka, et son neveu Kotchoubei; car on ne saurait avoir plus de jugement, plus de probité, et plus d'élévation d'âme que ces deux dignes ministres d'un si grand empire. Starhemberg est indigné contre Cobenzel, et je le plains bien de servir une Cour tiraillée en différents sens par des fourbes, des coquins, et des imbéciles qui la gouverne. Je crois que Starhemberg vous écrira officiellement; je vous supplie dans ce cas de différer votre réponse jusqu'à ce que j'ai la satisfaction de vous voir. Si vous ne venez pas la semaine prochaine à Londrès, faites le moi savoir mercredi ou jeudi. Je me dégagerai alors de tous les engagements que j'ai, et je viendrai dîner chez vous samedi prochain. Je viendrai vers les trois heures pour pouvoir causer, et je vous demande la permission de retourner le soir à Richmond. Je ne crains pas les voleurs, ayant deux hommes à cheval bien armés, et la route qui n'est que de deux heures, et qui est bonne, ne m'incommode nullement. Je rumine dans ma tête un expédient que je prendrai la liberté de vous proposer pour la réponse à ma Cour, et au misérable mémoire du pacificateur courier de Campo Formio.

“Milord Spencer m'a dit aussi, qu'on a intercepté beaucoup de lettres de Bonaparte, et d'autres généraux et commissaires Français; entre autre de Tallien. Il me semble qu'à moins qu'il n'y ai quelqu'inconvénient à cela. On ferait bien d'imprimer ces lettres, quand ce ne serait que pour faire voir aux Français avec quelle impudence le Directoire trompe la nation.”

#### WILLIAM PITT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798.] October 6. Hollwood.—“I will meet you in town on Monday, and write by this messenger to Canning to summon a full Cabinet at eleven on Tuesday. You will understand the King's letter the better from reading one which I received to-day from the Chancellor. Both the King and the Keeper of his conscience seem to me very sanguine, and I much fear the French will submit so far as to induce Austria to prolong its present wretched system. And even if this should prove otherwise, and Austria again engage with us, I see no reliance to be placed on

such an engagement which could justify the payment of any subsidy to that Court. We do enough if we procure them the full co-operation of Russia; and give Switzerland the means of acting. This I believe we can do, without very material inconvenience at present, or any fresh risk as to the future. But I am much afraid of going beyond two millions in the whole amount of subsidy, which Russia, Switzerland and Portugal will require, and I have not a notion that a direct payment to Austria will be tolerated, till they have, *at least, ratified* expressly the convention; I think, not till they have begun to *execute* it.

“On all this, however, I keep my mind quite open, till we have fully discussed it.”

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 7. Richmond.—“Je vous suis bien renaissant pour les ordres que vous avez bien voulu donner à M. Caning. Il vient de m'envoyer la déclaration de la Porte.

“J'ai toujours aimé ces bons Turcs, et je les aime de plus en plus depuis qu'ils se conduisent si bien. Ils se conduisent d'une manière à faire rougir leurs Majestés Apostolique et Catholique. Que Dieu bénisse ces bons Musulmans !

“Puisque l'Amirauté fait difficulté de se séparer du *Tigre*, elle devrait au moins donner quelqu'autre vaisseau au Chevalier Sidney Smith. Ce n'est pas le vaisseau, mais sa présence, qui est nécessaire en Turquie.

“Je vous supplie aussi de travailler que Keller [Koehler?] soit envoyé, et envoyé en Sirie auprès de ce Pacha qui avec cent milles hommes doit entrer en Egypte. Les Turcs ne cèdent à aucune nation du monde en fait de courage. Je les ai vus de près; j'ai fait toutes les campagnes de l'avant dernière guerre sous les ordres du Maréchal Roumentzow; j'ai vu dans toutes les occasions que le Turc est brave au suprême degré; mais il est ignorant de discipline et encore plus ignorant en fait d'artillerie. Les Vizirs que nous avons contre nous avaient trois fois plus d'artillerie que nous, mais ne savoient pas s'en servir. Je ne connais pas Keller, mais il a la réputation d'être habile dans cette partie; et il a l'avantage d'avoir été déjà en Turquie, et de connaître la manière avec laquelle il faut se prendre dans ce pays-là. Pour l'amour de Dieu pressez le départ du Chevalier Sidney Smith et de Keller à ——— au plus vite ces scélérats de Français.”

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 8. Melville Castle.—“Mr. Cabell has transmitted me a letter sent from your office to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, containing intelligence of the French sending out emissaries to India by neutral vessels from Sweden and Denmark. We will of course put our governments abroad upon their guard against them, but I submit to you if it would not be right to remonstrate to those neutral powers against the exercise

of such unfriendly acts. I cannot pretend to say it is strictly against any principle of the law of nations to carry out foreigners in neutral ships ; but, our situation with regard to India is so particular a one, I am sure no neutral nation can pretend to justify such a conduct, and at the same time pretend to entertain the smallest sentiment of amity towards us. If they persevere in it, we can certainly distress them very considerably by discountenancing them in every way possible in India. Did not Denmark lately apply to you for saltpetre ? While they pursue such a conduct they certainly cannot expect that or any other kind of indulgence from us."

LE CHEVALIER CHARLES DE THUISY to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 10. Richmond.—" Oserai-je croire que votre Excellence lira avec quelqu'intérêt la relation que je prends la liberté de lui envoyer ; si elle dit comment Malte fut trahie, elle dit peut-être aussi ce que les traîtres ont à craindre.

" En effet, *My Lord*, les massacres des chevaliers et les méfiances du peuple indiquent que la grande majorité n'avoit été ni consultée, ni corrompue ; que si ses trésors sont partis sa haine reste, et que tous les Maltois croient peut-être déjà que le bras couvert d'or de St. Jean, devant le quel ils se prosternoient, les chatie aujourdhuy de leur infidélité, et de leur crédulité.

" Mais, *My Lord*, si le besoin de se venger, et de réparer de grands torts pouvoit se combiner avec les effets de vos victoires, et les efforts de vos flottes, me permettriez-vous, oserois-je vous avouer l'espérance que ce n'est pas sans dessein que la Providence a voulu que les étendards de la religion fussent apportés en Angleterre, que Sa Majesté put nous y rallier, et nous dire ; ' allez joindre L'Amiral Nelson, il vous conduira devant Malte, vos drapeaux reveilleront des souvenirs prêtieux, vous laverez vos rochers de votre sang, et par votre mort, ou par vos succès vous apprendrez à l'univers que vous ne meritez pas vos malheurs.' "

*Enclosure.*

*Relation de la prise de Malte par le commandeur de Thuisy, membre de la congrégation de guerres.*

*Extract.*

1798, August 24. Pisa.—" Malte étoit minée depuis longtemps par la pénurie due à ses pertes et aux dilapidations protégées par la foiblesse du dernier grand maître.

" Le secrétaire du trésor (titre du chef des finances) le commandeur de *Boredon de Ransijat*, après avoir pendant vingt ans travaillé à sa ruine, étoit devenu le chef connu des principes novateurs qui devoient tôt ou tard consommer notre perte. Bien des gens avoient prévu le danger, et il étoit d'autant plus grand que l'argent nous manquoit de plus en plus chaque jour, qu'on ne s'en procuroit que par des moyens précaires et ruineux, et que par cela même on avoit du réformer plus de la moitié des forces de terre et de mer.

“ Il se préparoit donc depuis quelque tems un orage bien noir, et des chevaliers zélés avoient souvent averti. Ils auroient désiré qu'on fondit le trésor de l'ordre de St. Jean, et que, n'ayant pas une personne capable de commander en cas de siège, on attirât à Malte un général expérimenté et connu pour la défendre. Ainsi donc on manquoit de tout ce qu'il falloit pour se défendre, et même pour vivre, car les bléds exceptés, on n'avoit *ni bois, ni charbon, ni bestiaux*, et surtout point de toutes ces espèces *d'aggrêts indispensables* pour soutenir un siège, comme affûts de canon.

“ Telle étoit la position de l'isle quand, en janvier dernier, on vit arriver de Gênes un secrétaire de Faypoult, le Sieur Poussielque, qui, sous prétexte d'une vaine mission, y vint habiter pendant cinq semaines chez un banquier de son nom, gardien du port, et déjà très connu par ses sentimens patriotiques. Le dit secrétaire apportoit des lettres de recommandations pour tous ceux qui pouvoient le servir en ses projets ; il donna des banquets scandaleux aux principaux amis de la révolution, se lia étroitement à tous ses coopérateurs, enfin arrêta tous ses plans. Ainsi tout étoit préparé quand, le 6 Juin, on vit arriver dans le canal de Malte la première division de cette flotte fameuse qui s'étoit préparée depuis longtems. Alors des lettres tranquillisantes et perfides de *l'ex-commandeur Dolomieu*, embarqué sur l'escadre, et d'autres, communiquées à propos par son ami le commandeur *de Boredon de Ransijat*, parurent assourir les inquiétudes. Cependant on fit des préparatifs, des affûts, des cartouches, mais au lieu de faire sortir de la ville, ou d'enfermer, les gens suspects, d'y faire entrer avec leurs provisions tous ceux du dehors qui pouvoient la défendre, et au lieu de s'enfermer dans les murailles, on divisa, on dispersa tous nos meilleurs chevaliers (surtout les François) dans les insuffisantes batteries, et tours de la côte, et à la tête du régimens des milices de la campagne, et dans tous les postes que étoient pour le service de l'artillerie, sous la direction du commandeur de l'artillerie, le *commandeur de la Bardouanche* l'ami et l'allié des conspirateurs. Lui et les autres chefs des ateliers avoient fait manquer les vivres, et munitions de toute espèce. En sorte que quelques émissaires mêlés dans les milices leur persuaderent sans peine qu'elles étoient trahies, et bien plus, que c'étoit les chevaliers envoyés à leur tête pour les commander, et surtout *les chevaliers françois*, qui d'intelligence avec leurs assaillans *vouloient les livrer à l'ennemi*. Jamais, en effet, la perfide et la machination ne furent mieux ourdies ni plus habiles. Aussi dans tous les postes, et même dans les forts de la ville, la méfiance vraie ou simulée de tous les soldats Maltois devint générale. Au dehors tous les jeunes et braves chevaliers vouloient rassembler leur troupes, et ils s'en voyoient abandonnés. D'autres vouloient les porter en avant, et on croit qu'ils *vouloient les livrer, les réunir à l'ennemi* ; et bientôt, sous ce *prétexte*, quatre chevaliers *périront*, massacrés par leurs propres milices ; et neuf autres furent aussi fusillés, mutilés, blessés, et entraînés par leurs soldats, liés et garotés, à la ville, et jusques dans le palais du grand maitre, qui étoit gardé à vue par plusieurs factieux qui signoient des ordres, et qui s'étoient rendus les maitres absolus.

“Cependant la descente étoit déjà effectuée *sur sept points différens*. Buonaparte escorté, dirigé par l'ex-chevalier *Picot de Moras*, capitaine de génie qui nous avoit quitté depuis deux ans pour l'aller joindre, et par l'ex-chevalier *Barras* et autres Maltois bannis, étoit débarqué à la *Calle St. George* d'où le brave chevalier de Préville commandant de la mauvaise tour, sans munitions, sans vivres, et abandonné des siens, avoit été obligé de se retirer.

“J'ai omis de dire que le 9 juin, à l'arrivée des deux autres divisions de la flotte, Buonaparte envoya le consul François demander verbalement de sa part au grand maître l'entrée de tous nos ports pour toute sa flotte. Le conseil s'assembla et répondit que par ses traités avec les puissances, par sa neutralité et pour sa propre sûreté on ne pouvoit recevoir plus de quatre batimens de guerre à la fois. Le consul, porteur de cette réponse, ne revint point, et le lendemain, dès la pointe de jour, on vit toutes les chaloupes effectuer le débarquement.

“Quoique le bailli de la *Tour du Pin*, chevalier très zélé, très actif, et membre ainsi que moi de la congrégation des guerres, eussions sollicité depuis longtemps de prendre des mesures de précaution très nécessaires, entre autres le rétablissement de certaines batteries enlevées non sans cause, et aussi le transport de dix mille barils de poudre du magasin général de la *cottoner*, qui par le succès d'une descente au port de Marsa Scirocco devoient aisément tomber au pouvoir des ennemis, ce ne fut que le jour du débarquement même qu'on obtint des ordres pour le second objet, devenu bien plus difficile par les circonstances. Le bailli de la Tour du Pin demanda le commandeur Thuisy pour son second. On leur donna des soldats pour faire la chaîne de là jusqu'à la mer, et quinze chevaliers pour escorter les poudres jusqu'aux différens forts ou magasins; mais quel fut leur embarras en arrivant au magasin général lorsqu'ils virent, qu'à dessein ou autrement, on y faisoit manquer les mulets, les charettes, et tous les moyens de transports. Cependant le bailli de la Tour du Pin alimenta de provisions les différens forts, mais non sans péril; car il falloit faire filer des barques à travers des coups de fusils que les Maltois dechainés contre les Grecs (il y en a beaucoup à Malte) tiroient contre eux sur le rivage. Le lendemain nous eûmes bien plus de peine encore; car on avoit si bien persuadé aux habitans des parties enceintes par la cottoner, qu'en enlevant ces poudres nous voulions leur ôter les moyens de se défendre, que je ne trouvai plus personne qui voulut revenir avec moi, et que le bailli de la Tour du Pin et un troisième furent obligés d'exécuter, tous seuls en partie, cette mesure que l'on jugeoit encore nécessaire.

“La nuit du 10 au 11 vit s'élever dans la ville tous les bruits, toutes les terreurs. Les femmes, les enfans, les fuyards accourus du dehors, y accrurent l'embarras et la confusion. Au bruit de coups de fusils tirés dans la rue de France par l'effroi d'une escalade de ce côté, je me rendis au palais. Mais quel fut mon étonnement d'apprendre que d'après une députation des *barons*, des jurats, et d'autres laches forcenés qui étoient venus représenter l'urgence de la capitulation, le conseil alloit s'assembler au milieu

de la nuit. Cependant beaucoup de nos meilleurs baillis étoient absens, et étoient employés aillieurs. Cependant le conseil s'assemble, et la surprise augmente quand on y voit entrer cinq *de ces fongueux députés Maltois*, oser être témoins des délibérations, et exiger même de voir la lettre écrite à Buonaparte. Bien plus on les voit chercher, amener *des trompettes* pour y recevoir l'ordre d'aller avertir les forts, et les ennemis de la trêve, et timpaniser au milieu de la nuit notre précoce déshonneur. Et tandis qu'ils ne sont que sujets dans l'isle, ils exigent que pour dresser les articles de la capitulation, on députe *quatre d'entre eux* contre deux seuls membres de l'ordre, sous la médiation du ministre d'Espagne, et l'on fait sortir *le commandeur de Boresdon de Ransijat du fort St Ange*, où il avait demandé d'être enfermé *plutôt que de se battre*, pour être le chef, l'organe de cette déshonorante députation. Ainsi la fameuse place de Malte est livrée au dedans et au dehors à ses ennemis ; ainsi l'ordre abandonne, commet son fort au plus ancien, au plus dangereux de ceux qui ont conspiré sa perte. On les voit capituler lâchement, avant que le siège même soit commencé, et recevoir en vingt-quatre heures la loi d'un ennemi qui n'a pas encore attaqué ses remparts. Mais comment s'opposer à ce conseil, à cette capitulation ? C'est au milieu de la nuit qu'elle se décide. Tous les chevaliers sont éloignés et dispersés, les baillis les plus fermes, les plus inébranlables dans le sentier de l'honneur sont absens, la trahison environne le chef, et le destin de cet ordre illustre est prononcé.

“Buonaparte entré le 11 au soir dans la ville, fut occuper le palais du marquis Parisi, noble Maltois. On croyoit qu'il iroit rendre sa visite au grand maitre, mais lui, au contraire, attendoit que le grand maitre à notre tête fût lui faire la sienne, et le grand maitre s'y refusa. Aussi, dit-on, que ce fut alors que Buonaparte, peu content, intima à tous les membres de l'ordre de partir sous trois jours. Il n'en donna que deux aux chevaliers Portugais, et que trois heures au chevalier O'Hara, ministre de Russie.

“Boresdon de Ransijat, nommé président de la commission du gouvernement provisoire, commandoit au grand maitre, avec Regnault de S<sup>t</sup> Jean d'Angély. Il étoit sous Buonaparte le souverain de l'ordre, et du pays dont il avoit organisé la perte. Regnault de S<sup>t</sup> Jean d'Angély avoit été membre de l'Assemblée Nationale, et l'avocat payé de l'ordre pour l'y défendre. A Malte il étoit commissaire du Directoire.”

“En peu de jours on efface, on renverse partout, dans les auberges des langues, et jusques dans de palais du grand maitre présent, jusqu' aux moindres vestiges des armes, de la religion, de ses chefs.

“Les François trouverent intact *le trésor de St. Jean*, de même *toute l'argenterie de l'Hôpital et des églises de l'Ordre*, qui furent dépouillées aussitôt de leurs richesses. Toutes les pièces brisées devinrent des lingots. Le prieur et les chanoines conventuels expulsés de l'église de S<sup>t</sup> Jean, elle divint le cathédrale de l'isle, et l'on vit, le jour de S<sup>t</sup> Jean même, l'évêque y officier sous le daïs du grand maitre, assisté des chanoines mitrés de la cité vielle.



Mais la vraie richesse de l'ordre, le trésor qu'a perdu avec Malte toute la noblesse Francoise et des autres états, ce sont ses archives. Elles sont tombées dans leurs mains, sans qu'aucune prévoyance ait pu les en préserver.

“Le second jour Buonaparte fit publier, afficher l'ordre *d'une presse générale*, et embarquer sur sa flotte tous les matelots de l'isle, les gardes du grand maitre et tous les soldats enrégimentés, et en même tems il amena avec lui quelques uns de nos plus jeunes chevaliers, qui sans scavoir où donner de la tête, n'ayant aucun espoir de rentrer en France, ni aucune ressource pour aller allieurs, se sont livrés au désespoir. Ah malheureux jeunes gens !!!

“Si Buonaparte nous a traité avec une si grande rigueur, ce fut, dit-on, à cause de notre malheureux grand maitre, dont il n'étoit pas content. Cependant nous eûmes à nous louer du *général Vaubois gouverneur de nos isles*, de son second; en tout les officiers de la flotte et de l'armée nous plaignoient et partageoient nos malheurs. ‘ Nous connoissons mieux que vous mêmes, nous ont-ils dit, tous vos moyens; nous scavons que vous ne pourriez pas vos défendre. Cela s'est passé à Malte comme en Suisse où nous etions, et vous ignoriez peut-être que tous les conjurés avoient fait le serment de vous massacrer tous, au signal de la première bombe.’

“Le grand maitre est parti pour Trieste le 17 juin; c'est-à-dire, le premier de nous tous, amenant avec lui une douzaine de ses membres, dont quelques-uns étoient de sa maison.

“Le 24, la municipalité fit afficher l'ordre à tous les ex-chevaliers ou membres de l'Ordre de quitter Malte sous quarante-huit heures; et en effet nous partîmes entassés sur les premiers batimens Ragusoïs qui si trouverent dans le port.

“Nous avons vu placer, installer, et récompenser, comme de raison, tous ceux qui avoient contribué à notre perte. Le commandeur Boredon de Ransijat secrétaire du trésor, le commandeur de Bardouanche commandeur de l'artillerie, le commandeur servant Touzard ingénieur de la place, le chevalier de Fay commissaire des fortifications, le Donat Doublet secrétaire du commandeur Royer pour France, le Chevalier Poussielque capitaine du port, les prêtres Breward, Annibale, Beaufort, et beaucoup d'autres de S<sup>t</sup>. Jean, des barons, des jurats, adjudans, avocats, notaires, tous placés en ce moment.

“Les passeports de tous ceux qui ont quelques droits de rentrer en France nous adressent à Antibes, à un commissaire qui devra nous y juger. Les autres nous dirigent à Barcelone et à Livourne. On a fait payer à chacun des membres de l'ordre seulement 250 livres tournois, c'est à dire, dix louis. Je vais rejoindre près de Gènes Madame la duchesse de Brissac.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 15. Dublin.—“Long before this the Chancellor will have been with you, and he will, I doubt not, have told you explicitly that (right or wrong) the clamour against Lord Cornwallis is increased, increasing, and not likely to be

diminished ; that his total want of *all* communication has created indisposition in many quarters that may be very mischievous to our great object ; and that no opinions upon that great measure have been asked from any person whatsoever, as far as he knew, or as I can gather from many quarters who would wish to have been spoken to. In short I am bound to tell you that nothing can go on worse than the whole system of Government in the opinion of those who are to be governed ; and that I certainly join with them in the opinion that the future is as little promising as the past has been creditable.

“As to my return I have not a word to say, but to thank you for all you feel and say upon that subject. My application to you was on the supposition that some part of the force was to return ; and, if so, I should imagine that no difficulty ought to exist in sending home *first* those who *first* embarked ; and perhaps on consideration (if Lord Cornwallis proposes to send any back) it might not be inconsistent with your views for my credit to propose that it should be stated to Lord Cornwallis that many advantages would arise to the measure of encouraging the British militia to embark, by returning to England first those who had been longest absent, in order to remove the prejudice that has been industriously spread that they are to be considered as regular troops and to be draughted.

“I fear that Nelson has undertaken for more than he can easily perform with respect to the transports in Alexandria, for I fear that in that shallow water they will be too well secured ; however I depend upon our Russian ally, and trust that he will be usefully employed in the Archipelago ; and as to the progress of Buonaparte, I have little idea that he can ever move from Cairo ; and if so, a few weeks sooner or later makes very little real difference in the chapter of his final ruin. Europe now opens a vast field, and I *hear*, from other quarters, that *you* are not idle.”

#### W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 16. Hollwood.—“I return you the King’s letter which is full of good sense. I think in the proposal actually gone to Russia, we offered an additional sum for any body of troops to be put under our direction. At least we talked of it, but I am not sure whether we did not relinquish the idea as hopeless.

“I have had two very full conversations with Lord Clare. What he says is very encouraging with a view to the great question of the Union, in which I do not think we shall have much difficulty ; I mean, in proportion to the magnitude of the subject. At his desire I have written to press the Speaker to come over, which he seems to think may be of great importance. I endeavoured to learn what he really thought about the general state of things in Ireland. He seems to believe that the want of that communication which had formerly been made even too much a matter of course, has produced some dissatisfaction, but that the ill-humour does not go far ; and that everything may be

set right if a Secretary, who can speak with the authority belonging to his station, is sent over immediately. Pelham, I am sorry to find from the Duke of Portland, is still hesitating, but he is now coming to town and must decide.

"I have seen King, whose conversation gives much greater hopes for my tax than you formed from his letter. Our revenue for the year to the 10th of October surpasses all expectation, and will materially aid next year's Budget.

"I understand from Lord Spencer, you have a new account of the French plan of invasion, which I wish much to see.

*Postscript.* "Since sealing this letter I have received the enclosed from Lord Darnley, to which of course I shall give no answer till I hear from you; though I take for granted you will not think a *volunteer* mover of an address is to be rejected, considering how much asking is usually necessary."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 16. Richmond.—"Voici un griffonnage énorme, que je vous supplie d'avoir la patience de lire presque au bout. Je vous prie aussi d'effacer, de tailler, de corriger, et d'ajouter tout ce qui vous plaira, et de me le rendre après demain, jeudi, quand je viendrai chez vous à Dropmore. Vous trouverez, sans doute, que je me suis trop étendu et appesanti sur nos griefs contre l'Autriche. Je l'ai cru nécessaire pour éclaircir cette affaire, qu'on n'a jamais bien compris chez nous, et que les Autrichiens ont embrouillé, et ont faussement représenté à Pétersbourg. Le mémoire que le Comte Cobentzel a présenté à notre Cour, qui ne m'a pas été envoyé, mais que le Comte Starhemberg m'a montré, n'est qu'un amas de mensonge et de calomnie contre l'Angleterre.

"S'il s'est permis tant d'impudence par écrit que n'aurait-il fait verbalement? Il faut donc éclairer l'Empereur qui est porté par inclination et avec raison à croire plutôt le ministère Britannique que celui de Vienne, si avili à la face de l'univers. Du reste, je ne copierai ma dépêche que d'après vos corrections. Vous savez mieux les affaires, vous en avez tout l'ensemble, tandis que je ne connais qu'une partie.

"Je vous prie aussi de me rendre, quand je serai chez vous, les papiers que je vous ai envoyés il y a quelques jours."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 18. Dublin.—"At last the long expected details are arrived, and the letter I enclose to you will set your mind completely at ease with respect to any project of French invasion. I have another letter from George Nugent, stating the frigates which have escaped to have thrown even their guns overboard. You will observe that the *Canada* brought in no prize with her, and that the four ships named in the letter with the *Hoche* and the three frigates are not yet arrived. The gale of yesterday evening and night was remarkably heavy from the south-east, so

that the crippled ships will have great difficulty in escaping. There is a report that Tone (brother to the one hanged), and the cleverest man amongst the united Irishmen, is on board the *Hoché*.

“How happy should I be if this could relieve me from this cursed pilgrimage, but I fear that cannot be; and yet I clearly see that the only thing for which it is wished that we should remain *will not be*.”

*Enclosure.*

E. COOKE to [the MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM].

[1798, October 18. Dublin] Castle.—“I have not been able to send your Lordship a word till this moment.

“Sir J. B. Warren writes from Lough Swilly, the 16th, that, on the 12th, after a long action, four French ships struck, among them the *Hoché* of 84 guns. He left the prizes with the *Robust*, *Magnanime*, *Elthalrin*? and *Amelia*. A brig went off at the beginning of the action which, he thinks, was Napper Tandy’s. The ships full of troops *et cetera*; they tore their papers after the action.

“He thinks, on account of the gales, the ships which escaped will be so crippled that they must fall into our hands; they had thrown boats, spars, . . . over board.

“After Sir John’s letter was sent off, the *Melampus* appeared with another frigate in tow, which she had been sent in pursuit of. Thus we have five.”

COUNT PANIN to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, October 18. Berlin.—“Dans plusieurs entretiens confidentiels que j’ai eu en dernier lieu avec M. le Comte de Haugwitz, il m’a fait des ouvertures d’un tel intérêt pour le gouvernement Britannique que je crois devoir en faire part à Votre Excellence, pour que Milord Grenville puisse prendre des mesures préalables, au cas où les idées du Ministre Prussien s’accorderoient avec les siennes. Le papier ci-joint expose l’état de la question, et les points sur lesquels je pense qu’il seroit utile de donner des ordres à la mission de Berlin. J’en ai fait lecture à M. Garlike, en le priant d’y conformer son rapport; mais cette démarche a eu plutôt pour objet de lui donner personnellement un témoignage d’égard que tout autre motif. Si Milord Grenville désiroit d’encourager M. de Haugwitz, et si vous-même, M. le Comte, jugés convenable que je lui parle dans ce sens, je n’hésiterai pas à la faire; mais je vous avoue qu’il répugneroit à ma délicatesse de traiter la moindre affaire d’une des Cours alliées, à l’insu de la personne qui la représente ici.

“Votre Excellence voudra bien observer que c’est Haugwitz et non le Ministre du Roi qui a fait ces ouvertures, d’où il résulte qu’on peut également leur donner suite, ou les ensevelir dans l’oubli.

“ Je puis me tromper, mais je pense qu’il étoit de bonne foi en parlant de ce projet. Malgré cela, il n’y a guères d’apparence qu’il se décide de le négocier formellement avant que L’Empereur des Romains n’ait tiré l’épée, et qu’on ne voie des forces imposantes en Allemagne.

“ Je vous supplie M. le Comte de me faire connoître le jugement que Milord Grenville portera de l’exposé ci-joint, ainsi que votre opinion personnelle.”

*Enclosure.*

*Exposé des questions qu’il faudroit soumettre à Milord Grenville.*

“ Depuis l’époque où on remarque un changement dans les opinions de M. le Comte de Haugwitz, ce ministre a parlé dans plus d’une occasion avec chaleur du danger qu’il y auroit de laisser la Hollande sous le joug des François. Il a dit même en propres termes, il n’y aura point de paix stable, ni de sûreté pour les Puissances, tant que la Hollande et la Suisse seront dans leur état actuel. Il est à observer que M. de Haugwitz traitoit cette question de son propre mouvement sans provocation quelconque, mais aussi *toujours confidentiellement comme une opinion personnelle*. Il est allé plus loin, et en parlant de la possibilité d’une coopération active de la Prusse dans la guerre actuelle, il a dit que le but principal de cette coopération seroit la délivrance de la Hollande ; et en cherchant à prouver les grands avantages qui en résulteroient pour la cause commune et pour chacune des Puissances en particulier, il finissoit toujours par dire, ‘ reste à savoir le prix que l’Angleterre attache à cette opération, et ce qu’elle donneroit pour en faciliter les moyens.’

“ Il paroissoit regretter de ce que Sa Majesté Britannique ne s’étoit pas jusqu’ici expliquée à ce sujet.

“ On a objecté au Ministre d’Etat qu’après les déclarations réitérées de sa persévérance dans le système de neutralité, et le refus de toutes les propositions de la Russie et de l’Autriche, on ne pouroit guères s’attendre à Berlin à des explications de la part du Cabinet de St<sup>e</sup>. James, puisque rien n’en faisoit augurer le succès. Que si la Prusse vouloit coopérer au plan général, elle devoit manifester cette intention d’une manière claire and précise ; que la Grand Bretagne auroit probablement plus de facilité à soutenir aujourd’hui les efforts de la Prusse par des secours pécuniaires, que lorsqu’un embrassement général sur le Continent rendroit bien moins utile l’appui du Roi de Prusse, puisqu’il s’agiroit alors de sa propre défense.

“ Par les réponses de M. de Haugwitz il sembloit que ce Ministre ne doutoit pas de la prestations de subsides pour la délivrance de la Hollande, quelque soit l’époque où on le demandroit.

“ Comme il est assez vraisemblable que M. de Haugwitz n’en restera pas à ces insinuations, et qu’il cherche à pénétrer d’avance jusqu’à quel point la Cour de Londres seroit disposée à soutenir l’opération dont il s’agit, il seroit peut-être utile d’avoir en réserve quelques instructions sur les questions suivantes.

1° “ Les dernières dispositions de la Cour de Londres en faveur d'un subside, telles qu'on les a annoncé à MiLord Elgin, sont elles applicables à ces cas, et peut-on en faire usage si M. de Haugwitz entre en explication directe avec celui qui est chargé des affaires du Roi ?

2° “ Si le Ministre se borne d'en parler dans le ton amical et confidentiel au Comte de Panin, comme il a fait en dernier lieu, trouvera-t-on nécessaire que l'Envoyé de Russie lui réponde d'une manière encourageante et en quels termes ? ”

COUNT PANIN to COUNT WORONZOW.

*Secret.*

1798, October 18. Berlin.—“ Notre Cour n'a aucune connoissance de ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer par la présente. Je n'en ai pas fait rapport comme, depuis quelque tems, j'ai passé sous silence bien des choses dont Haugwitz me parle dans le ton amical et confidentiel. Voici les motifs de cette réserve : s'il est véritablement de bonne foi il ne se bornera pas à ces premières insinuations, et il exposera les mêmes idées dans une correspondance secrète qui m'est connue. Alors ayant des garants de sa sincérité, je pourrai rendre compte de ces ouvertures d'une manière à écarter tous les doutes. Si, au contraire, il se donnoit un nouveau démenti, j'aurai l'avantage d'avoir prévenu une cause d'aigreur et d'animosité contre la Prusse. Au reste les véritables intentions de Haugwitz ne peuvent pas tarder à s'éclaircir. Je me flatte que Votre Excellence, en se rappelant ces observations, voudra bien engager Milord Grenville à ne pas faire paroître mon nom dans les relations qui pourroient s'établir sur la base que je vous présente aujourd'hui.

“ Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange a bien voulu se charger de ce paquet, et je profite des bontés de Son Altesse pour vous faire passer, M. le Comte, les pièces les plus intéressantes de mon portefeuille.”

“ Les dernières lettres de Constantinople annoncent qu'une division de la flotte Angloise, restée dans les passages d'Alexandrie, a brulé toute la flotille qui se trouvoit à l'embouchure du Nil. Il est possible que cette nouvelle ne soit pas encore parvenue à Londres. Les Ministres du Roi la donnent pour autentique. Ils m'ont aussi confirmé l'insurrection de Malte. Un commissaire est venu en personne faire ce rapport au Directoire, et dit que la garnison s'est renfermée dans la citadelle. Il prétend qu'elle a pour six mois de vivres.

“ Kosciusko a quitté Paris sous le nom de Dufresnoy ; les uns disent qu'il va s'embarquer à Hambourg pour se glisser dans nos nouvelles provinces, et y rassembler ses partisans ; d'autres assurent qu'il va joindre Panvan Oglou.

“ Quoiqu'il en puisse être, je profiterai de cette circonstance pour mettre à exécution les derniers ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous transmettre, en proposant une convention sur les secours mutuels qu'on se prêtera pour arrêter la sedition. Je ne manquerai pas de rendre compte à votre Excellence de mes démarches à cet égard.

“Je n'ai pas oublié le conseil dont elle m'a honoré relativement à M. de Kotchoubey; et dans une occasion importante où le Prince de Bezbrodsko ne peut guères se dispenser de me répondre de main propre, je l'ai prié d'en charger son neveu, s'il manquoit de loisir; en ajoutant que je me ferois un honnèur d'entrer en relation avec lui.

“Le prompt départ du Prince d'Orange m'oblige de remettre à une autre occasion ma réponse aux dernières communications que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire.” *Copy.*

#### B. GARLIKE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 19. Berlin.—“I have not had the honour of writing the confidential dispatch of this day's date without the apprehension inseparable from the premature discussion of the important point to which it refers. I do not understand that, on this occasion, Count Haugwitz made an allusion to the idea of territorial acquisition suggested in a private conversation by the Duke of Brunswick to Count Panin; but I believe that the latter was not inattentive to the two questions relative to pecuniary and territorial compensation for the eventual co-operation of this country, coming, though at different times, from His Serene Highness and from the Prussian Minister. With regard to the first of those modes, Count Panin has written, I believe, in the sense of the dispatch he enabled me to write to your Lordship. It will give me great pleasure to convey to that Minister the answer which your Lordship may judge proper to return to the two questions he has brought forward.

“I have been favoured with the reading of a memorial of Prince Henry of Prussia in behalf of France and against the allies; but it was not in my power to have a copy of it; and, as Count Woronzow will shew it to your Lordship, I will not attempt to express the nature of that extraordinary performance.”

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1798, October 21. Dropmore.—“I have received your letter of the 8th. I have not the least idea that the French emissaries are sent out to India in Danish ships with the knowledge or concurrence of that Government; but, considering the nature of their trade there, I doubt whether they have the means of preventing it. This however you know much better than I do, and I will very willingly make any representations you may wish on the subject.

“As to the Swedes, more than half the people there, particularly in trade, are as great Jacobins as Rewbell or Talleyrand, and the Government is little better.

“Nothing will do with them but menaces or force; and for that sort of language or measure we must have positive proof.”  
*Copy.*

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

*Mémoire of the Duke of Brunswick, on the co-operation of Prussia and Great Britain to expel the French from the Dutch Republic.*

1798, October 22.—“ Il est en vain de prétendre que la Prusse abandonne le système de neutralité une fois adopté, aussi longtemps que la guerre ne se déclare entre l'Autriche unie à la Russie et à Naples contre la France; même alors la Prusse ne pourroit convenablement rentrer en lice qu'en déployant ces forces pour le rétablissement d'une paix générale, dont les bases seroient stipulées d'avance entre l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, la Russie, et la Prusse. Comme il est nécessaire de séparer dans cette guerre les intérêts de la nation Française d'avec ceux du Directoire, il seroit de la plus grande importance de déclarer qu'on n'en veut aucunement à la France, point à ses anciennes possessions ni à la forme de gouvernement qu'elle s'est donné, mais qu'on veut concourir au rétablissement d'une paix générale; que tous les sacrifices que l'on a faits doivent prouver qu'ils n'ont servi qu'à augmenter la dureté des conditions imposées par le Directoire, et que la liberté rendue à la Suisse et à la Hollande doivent servir de base à la paix générale, et donner les moyens à l'Angleterre de s'expliquer sur les restitutions à faire à la Hollande, redevenue un état libre et consistant par lui-même. La guerre en Italie, sur les frontières de la Suisse, dans le sud de l'Allemagne, et une coopération des armées navales Angloises, Russes, et Turques dans la Méditerranée, pourroient alors faciliter des démarches vigoureuses de la part de la Prusse sur le Bas Rhin, combinées avec une entreprise sur la Hollande. Toute entreprise sur la Hollande doit rouler sur les bases suivantes : (1) S'accorder parfaitement d'avance sur quels principes on veut rétablir l'ancienne forme de gouvernement en tout ou en partie. (2) Se former sur ces principes le parti le plus considérable dans les Provinces—Unies que possible, et convenir avec lui de livrer, soit Coevorden, Groeningue, ou telle autre place au parti d'Orange. (3) Rassembler sous le Prince Héréditaire d'Orange l'ancienne armée Hollandoise dans ce poste. (4) Faire avancer une des armées Prussiennes sur les frontières de l'Overyssel pour couvrir et favoriser ces opérations, tandis qu'une autre armée Prussienne occuperait les armées Françaises entre le Rhin et la Meuse. (5) Avoir par l'Angleterre les vaisseaux plats dans la Zuyder Zée, avec quelques canons, pour transporter de Stavern dix à douze milles hommes dans la Nord-Hollande. (6) Cette opération devroit être favorisée par une armée Prussienne ou alliée qui passeroit l'Issel, se portant sur le Greb; et par des démonstrations des flottes Anglaises, soit sur la flotte Hollandoise dans le Texel, soit sur les côtes de la Zeelande. (7) Les troupes Hollandaises transportées en Nord-Hollande se porteroient avec le gros sur Beverwyk, et une autre partie sur Buykslooten vis à vis d'Amsterdam, où les menaces et la préparation des esprits par le parti d'Orange



devroient faire recevoir les troupes Hollandoises, à la tête desquelles le Prince Héréditaire se trouveroit en personne, avec des plein pouvoirs du Prince Stadhouder pour le rétablissement de l'ordre des choses. Ceci est le précis d'un mémoire beaucoup plus étendu d'un homme qui n'est rien dans la politique, qui n'a aucune influence dans la Cabinets, mais qui se fera employer pour l'exécution de tous les plans qui peuvent tendre à rétablir l'ordre, et à sauver l'espèce humaine du joug avilissant sous lequel la France la tient enchainée." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 23. Dublin.—“The country is still very much disturbed by the nightly plunderers who have succeeded in Wexford, Wicklow, and parts of Kildare and Meath, in driving off every gentlemen; and the unexplained and unaccountable lenity of Lord Cornwallis, who will execute none save where *murder is proved*, and has turned loose from the crotty ships near 400 of the most dangerous and desperate, has given to friends and foes a most decided opinion that it is less dangerous to be a rebel than to be a loyalist. In short the public confidence in Government is shaken to such a degree that it appears from the Office for passes that more persons are now emigrating than at any period of the rebellion. I do not know how far individuals will commit themselves to you or other Ministers, but I cannot conceal from you that there is not one man whom I have met who does not speak more or less openly his sentiments of indignation on Lord Cornwallis's government. Now all this would not annoy me if it did not *tirer* a consequence very deeply, and if I did not see the game of Great Britain completely thrown away at the most important and fortunate moment by the grossest mismanagement. These feelings certainly tend very much to embitter my residence in Ireland, for I could submit with patience to every inconvenience if I was assisting in repelling invasion, but that is all over; in putting down a rebellion, that too is at an end; or if I saw the least probability that the measure, to which alone I look for the future repose of this country and of Great Britain, were likely to be furthered or assisted by my regiment; but I am thoroughly convinced that Lord Cornwallis will not (if he can avoid it) attempt it. I doubt very much whether he has not thrown away much of the means that any man would have of carrying it through, and I am confident that *he* will meet difficulties that no other man would experience from the disinclination which is hourly increasing against him from various important and from many trifling causes. You have now seen Lord Clare, and you have heard from him the very long and interesting conversations which we had together. Our ideas agreed exactly. I opened to him my idea of making from a committee of Privy Council a Board of Trade (and of finance) as in England, for questions and measures that Government might refer to them; and to make Foster Lord President; but I stated it as *my own thought*. He jumped at it as an arrangement highly useful to the country, and peculiarly eligible as with

respect to the man whom it would bring forward, and as the only safe Board that Government ought to have in this country except for the details, as revenue stamps. But he agreed with me that unless Foster would co-operate heartily in the business nothing could be done, and he doubted with me whether he ever would draw heartily with Lord Cornwallis.

"Adieu, I write to you all that can be useful, and am very impatient to hear from you the result of your deliberations on this point.

*Postscript.* "I think it doubtful whether the British militia will consent to stay in this country (which they detest) beyond the time limited in the first Bill; unless they have some Frenchmen or croppies to amuse them.

"Lord Cornwallis has contrived by a comment upon the sentence of a general court-martial (in my mind very injudicious and intemperate) to set all the army wild against him. You will hear more about it, as it is drawing on to further consequences; Lord Enniskillen is the President."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 25. York Farm.—"J'ai l'honneur de vous envoyer huit pages de radotage de notre Crispin de Pétersbourg. Ce maudit homme gâte tout; il m'ennuie, m'impatiente, et m'indigne. Plaignez-moi, et renvoyez-moi ce barbouillage diplomatique de Cobentzl, après l'avoir lu.

"Pourquoi M. Whitworth convient-il que nous avons raison? Il travaille aussi à gâter ma besogne, ce me semble."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 26. Dublin.—"I have this morning received yours of the 21st, and most heartily do I thank you for your kind attention to my situation here, which has led you (as far as you can go) to arrange that 'first come first served'; putting always out of the question any sudden resolution that *he* may take, whose resolutions have in many instances been as sudden as they have been tenaciously adhered to.

"Your next intelligence would, six weeks ago, have made me very happy, because I should then have been more sanguine in my hopes of the success of this great measure, than I can be now; for I verily believe that the want of all confidence in him increases hourly, because every day he appears to narrow his communications, and to offend, or to abandon the civil government wholly; while at the same time he does not seem anxious to make his military government useful or respected; and I am most confident that, if anything can shake the success of this measure, it will be the character and conduct of Lord Cornwallis. However, *le vin est tiré*, and for many reasons I am glad that you have taken your decision; but the first *sine quâ non* is that the Speaker must be had; and I protest that I do not know how it will be possible to induce him to communicate with Lord

Cornwallis in the habits and with the confidence necessary. I believe that I have much weight with him, but I never have even sounded him for fear of doing mischief, and I will not hazard anything that can derange your plans; but if you think I can *speak to him*, I will do it. He is jealous that he does not stand well with Mr. Pitt; but Lord Clare will tell you what he and I agreed upon as the sure mode of engaging him, and as the proper situation for him. You will clearly understand that I do not want to be busy; but I see very clearly that you will not have many means of gaining the knowledge of his intentions and views; and I protest that I think *he* may make the difference of carrying the question or not.

"This letter of yours has determined me to the resolution of sacrificing my personal feelings in a point which I never can forget or forgive; which has hung upon my mind most heavily, but which I have ceased to state to you because it could only hurt you to know me so miserable in a matter where you could not help me. I had given a month's labour to draw up a complaint in the shape of a memorial to the King, enclosing and referring to Lord Cornwallis's correspondence with me when he refused to permit me to serve with my regiment, and told me 'that in many particulars it would materially injure the public service.' I had left my reparation to the King; but I had stated in the strongest terms my claim to this reparation in the most marked manner, or [to] withdraw myself and my regiment from the command of one who had deliberately thus outraged me. I had fixed the day of the King's return from Weymouth for transmitting to him through the Duke of Portland (officially) this memorial in a private letter; and had written out the whole. I have passed this morning since I received your letter in turning it in my mind, and have at length burnt the whole performance, that I may not be tempted to a step which may be of consequences very interesting to so great a measure. I mention this because it will shew you how much I have this great step at heart, and because it is the surest pledge to you that there is nothing I will not do to assist in it.

"You say nothing of your plans, and ask for mine; I will prepare that for the representation which I have discussed with Lord Clare, and will work upon your ideas if you will open them. But the *sine quâ non* are, a most efficient Secretary, and Pelham is not the man; and a most conciliating Lord Lieutenant, and you cannot mend Lord Cornwallis; Lord Clare, and he is most steady; and Mr. Foster, who, I think, clearly may be had, but it must be in his own way; and I wish you would allow me to *try* with him."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT STARHEMBERG.

1798, October 27. Dropmore.—"Je vous restitue avec bien de rémercimens la dépêche de votre Chef in *partibus*. En vérité je vous plains d'avoir à exécuter de pareilles instructions, et je trouve l'Angleterre bien et bien heureuse de ne pas être dans la dépendance de ceux qui font de si beaux raisonnemens.

“L’assertion à l’égard de Whitworth est tout aussi bien fondée que celle relative à un autre de mes amis, que l’on accuse d’avoir aussi agi contre les instructions et l’intérêt de sa Cour. J’en ai la preuve entre les mains.”

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. PITT.

1798, October 28. Dropmore.—“I send you Whitworth’s last letter. This incident is extremely embarrassing, because one sees plainly that, at the bottom of all these fine protestations, the project is to make us first pay Austria a subsidy of a million or 1,500,000*l.* for going to war when she cannot help it; and then pay Russia as much more for assisting her. I know that, all other considerations apart, the amount of this demand is alone sufficient to put our compliance with it quite out of the question. But the difficulty is how to manage the business so as to put it in any more practicable shape, and what that shape should be. What is, I think, above all important is that it should not fall back into the old situation of our paying the whole to Austria, leaving her exertions (?) to rest on no better security for the exertions of Russia. The whole must be mixed up together to form a dose that will be palatable to the country, or of any benefit to us. Cobentzel’s last instruction to Starhemberg about the convention (brought by Whitworth’s messenger) was even more extravagant than the former, and you see by Eden’s despatch that our successes in the Mediterranean have no effect in giving either vigour or decision at Vienna. It sounds whimsical, but I am inclined to think that in this state of things, urgent as the moment is, the best resolution we can take is to do nothing; to declare that we consider the negotiation at Vienna as at an end; and to say, but without the least tincture of ill-humour, that we must now wait for proposals from our allies, those which we had made having failed.

“If however any better scheme occurs to you, I should be very glad to discuss it with you, and if you will give me dinner on Tuesday, we may talk the whole subject over.” *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, October 28. Dropmore.—“J’ai reçu une dépêche de Whitworth qui m’a bien affligé en m’informant que votre Cour a voulu renvoyer l’arrangement de nos affaires à un concert avec l’Autriche, qui, selon toute apparence, ne s’effectuera jamais. Cependant comme notre ministre me renvoie pour tous les détails à vos communications, je serai bien aise de vous en parler. Je serai en ville mardi, sur les deux heures. Pourrez-vous passer chez moi à cette heure? Si non, faites-moi savoir quand je pourrai vous voir.” *Copy.*

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 29. Woodley.—“I shall be in town to-morrow, and very glad to see you at dinner, when we may talk over the state of the negotiation, which is certainly full of difficulty.

"It will be, at all events, impossible to give more, at the utmost, than two millions to both Courts, allowing nothing for Switzerland, and stinting Portugal as much as possible. If for this we could get a Russian army at our disposal, in return for the Russian share of our subsidy, perhaps we might diminish the difficulty as to Austria, by making the payment to her an engagement to her and Russia jointly, and dependent on *both* continuing to act with the force and for the purposes to be stipulated, on the side of Germany and Italy, exclusive of the separate Russian force to be employed under our immediate direction. All this however supposes that Austria shall agree to satisfy us on the subject of the convention, and to take her part decisively, of neither of which there are any symptoms at present; and I am afraid there is as little prospect of the Directory driving the business to a point. I am not therefore very sanguine in my hopes of any thing, but our continuing to fight well our own battle; and Europe must probably be left for some time longer to its fate."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 29. Richmond.—"J'allais vous écrire pour vous demander une entrevue, quand j'ai reçu votre billet. Je serai demain, mardi, à 2 heures dans votre maison en ville, comme vous me l'indiquez. Je suis mécontent de la dépêche que j'ai reçu, et que je vous communiquerai. C'est encore une intrigue de ce gueux de Cobenzel. Il ne faut pas se décourager pour ça, et attendre quelle sensation produira chez nous les représentations et les nouveaux expédients que porte le courier que nous avons expédié le 19 de ce mois. En attendant, il faut être ferme. La force de la raison, appuyée par la force d'âme, doit prévaloir sur les basses intrigues. Vous avez pour vous la justice et l'intérêt général de l'Europe; l'Autriche ne vous oppose que les vues rétrécies d'un vil intérêt, et d'une vanité ridicule, croyant ou s'élever seul dans le démembrement de l'Europe, ou avoir à elle seule la sagesse et la puissance de la sauver, sans s'apercevoir qu'elle sera la première à être engloutie dans le gouffre que la France nous creuse à tous."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, October 31. Richmond.—"En vous renvoyant la proclamation polyglotte du trop fameux Corse, avec bien des remerciements, je vous joins ici la lettre du Chevalier Whitworth. Vous êtes censé ne l'avoir pas vue, et je vous prie de me la renvoyer. C'est un honnête homme qui ne connaît pas toutes les fourberies de Cobenzel, de ce vil Scapin politique; et il est naturel qu'il ait été trompé par lui. Ce gueux qui a égorgé Venise, et vendu Mayence, a trompé mon Empereur et son ministère. S'il ne sera pas démasqué, ce ne sera pas de ma faute."

[GEORGE CANNING] to [LORD GRENVILLE.]

*Private.*

1798, November 1. Downing Street.—“I have been with Colonel Brownrigg about the gazetting Colonel Koehler, and I find not only that he cannot be gazetted on Saturday, but (if I am not very much mistaken both as to what I think I gather from Colonel Brownrigg’s conversation, and as to what I understand from a draft of a letter from the Duke of York to your Lordship, which is sent to-day for his Royal Highness’s signing, and will be sent to you to-morrow) the Duke of York *entirely disapproves* of the whole business of Colonel Koehler’s mission. I will mention to your Lordship the several points upon which Colonel Brownrigg stated the Duke of York’s opinion, in such a manner as to lead me to form this conclusion, which your Lordship will, of course, have the goodness to understand me as only mentioning *privately* to you (as I am by no means commissioned to speak of them) and only because, if you were to go on in the business with the notion that the Duke of York approved *in the whole*, and was difficult only as to particular military points, it would probably hardly ever be brought to any settlement; supposing (I mean) that I have collected His Royal Highness’s sentiments rightly.

“With regard to Colonel Koehler himself, Colonel Brownrigg says (and the Duke of York’s letter to your Lordship states in *guarded* terms) that His Royal Highness does not pretend to give any opinion *against* employing him; that he *may* be a very fit person; that his knowledge of the language and manners of Turkey is undoubtedly a great point; that perhaps, with some other steady and experienced officer to guide and control him, he might do very well; but that, to say the truth, he *does* think that there is some risk in giving him such ample discretion, and so large a military commission as seems intended; that he *does* think he will disappoint the hopes that he has raised. Nevertheless, if it shall be ultimately determined that he should have such a command given him (which is no business of His Royal Highness to determine) the Duke of York can of course have no objection to submitting his name to the King for the temporary and local rank of Br[igadier] Gen[eral]. But he wishes it to be understood that it is not of his doing.

“As to the officers whom Colonel Koehler has selected, the greatest part of them, the Duke observes in his letter, belong to the Ordnance Department; that if the Lieutenant-General’s permission is obtained, he can, of course, have no objection to their serving, and none to their having the local rank which may enable them to serve. I mentioned that your Lordship, after your conversation with the Duke of York yesterday, seemed to consider this as fixed; and that I was actually come to consult about gazetting Hope and Holloway, as well as Colonel Koehler himself. Of this Brownrigg said he knew nothing; that all that the Duke of York meant to have understood was that *he* should not interfere in the business; that it belonged exclusively to the

Ordnance; that if they thought fit to send Hope and Holloway, *he* would not refuse his good offices; but he had no voice in the matter and nothing at all to do with it, except barely laying the names before the King.

“Upon the subject of the officers of the Line the letter of the Duke of York speaks more decisively, and Colonel Brownrigg more strongly than the letter. His Royal Highness thinks the selection made by Colonel Koehler utterly improper; young, raw, inexperienced officers, none of them having seen *much* service, and one of them a boy of 17 years old. I mentioned your Lordship’s having omitted to speak to His Royal Highness yesterday about the rank to be given to the senior officer of the Line; and having seen Colonel Koehler since I left you, and having learned from him that his senior officer had refused to go, that he had not yet filled up his place, and that he wished, by way of propitiating the Duke of York, whom he suspected not to be very friendly to the arrangement, to request of His Royal Highness to nominate such person as he might think fit, I told Brownrigg that such was Colonel Koehler’s wish; to which he answered that he believed His Royal Highness would not undertake to do any such thing; that the qualifications which Colonel Koehler required (justly he had no doubt) in the officer who was to fill this department were not easy to be found united in any officer, much less in one of a rank and standing to serve *under* Colonel Koehler; that for such officers he, the Duke of York, should look, if any where, in the higher ranks of the army; but that he (in short) washed his hands of the whole business; that he would (as is before said) recommend for local rank any officer and Colonel Koehler himself, if it was ultimately thought right to send him upon the establishment proposed; but that he had great doubts [on the whole subject].

“The letter concludes with saying that, as to the Ordnance stores, the Duke of York cannot conceive for what they are necessary, if the Turks have (as Colonel Koehler’s *mémoire* states) an admirable train of artillery, furnished with all proper appurtenances. Colonel Brownrigg adds that the Ordnance are as little persuaded as the Duke of York is of the necessity or propriety of Colonel Koehler’s arrangements; particularly that Colonel Malcolm (with whom Colonel Koehler has most intercourse upon the subject) is surprised at the nature and extent of the preparation made, and the powers granted to Colonel Koehler.

“I have thought it best to trouble you with this detail (which I wrote down immediately after conversing with Brownrigg) that you may form your opinion as to the best mode of removing those obstacles in the way of Colonel Koehler’s arrangements of which, from what your Lordship reported of the conversation with the Duke of York yesterday, you did not seem to be aware; and the letter alone (though that is pretty strong) might not perhaps without a knowledge of Brownrigg’s commentary upon it, put you fully in possession of His Royal Highness’ opinion.

“If I were to judge from what I have heard to-day, I should suppose that the Duke of York, though he will not decidedly

negative any arrangement that is pressed, will at least not assist very cordially in forwarding the execution of it.

"At all events nothing will be done but with the utmost and most punctilious form; a formal recommendation, for instance, is required from Sir W. Howe of the Artillery and Engineer officers, before His Royal Highness will lay their claims for rank before the King."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, November 2. Dropmore.—"Mille graces pour la communication de la lettre intéressante du Comte Panin. Dans la dépêche que Garlike m'a écrite par le Prince d'Orange, il m'a parlé de ces idées, mais avec moins d'étendue; et le Prince m'a parlé fort au long, et avec beaucoup d'emphase, du changement de dispositions qu'il croit avoir aperçu depuis quelque temps à Berlin.

"Avec tout cela, je ne me livre point aux idées flatteuses d'une coopération générale, quelque évident que soit, selon moi, l'intérêt de toutes les Grandes Puissances de mettre fin à cet état de choses qui les épuise, et les mine, même au moment où ils paraissent jouir de quelque intervalle de repos.

"Il me semble surtout qu'à l'égard de notre assistance on nous met toujours dans un cercle vicieux. La Prusse ne veut agir qu'avec nos secours; et *après* avoir vu l'Autriche se mettre en avant. La Russie de même, et l'Autriche attend *pour* se mettre en avant, de s'assurer de nos secours pécuniaires, et de la coopération de la Russie, ainsi que de la neutralité de la Prusse. Nous ne pouvons suffire à mettre en mouvement les armées des trois Grandes Puissances continentales.

"La somme de deux millions que nous avons cru pouvoir destiner à des objets continentals, est, en elle-même, extrêmement forte, vu l'urgence de nos propres besoins, et les moyens auxquels nous sommes obligés d'avoir recours. De l'augmenter il n'y a aucune apparence. Il ne peut donc s'agir que de la meilleure manière de l'employer pour la chose publique. Je pense que cela ne peut se faire que par l'établissement d'un concert général, et quadruple alliance, comme nous l'avions proposé au commencement de cette année. Là on conviendrait des opérations, des moyens, et des objets, tant de la guerre que de la paix. Il n'est pas facile (je le sens) de concilier tant d'intérêts, surtout entre des gouvernements tels que ceux de Vienne et Berlin; mais sans cela je ne vois guère d'espoir de faire rien qui vaille.

"Lord Clare doit passer ici mardi en son chemin pour retourner en Irlande. C'est pourquoi je ne viendrai en ville que mercredi matin. Si vous pourrez, en attendant, m'envoyer une partie des pièces que vous avez reçues je vous en aurai bien d'obligation. Je vous restitue avec cette note les deux lettres du Comte Panin, et leur incluse." *Copy.*



## COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 4. Richmond.—“ Je suis tout-à-fait de votre avis sur le cercle vicieux autour duquel tournent les Cours du continent. Tout en avouant qu’elles sont en grand danger, elles croient, en même temps, que c’est l’Angleterre qui doit s’épuiser pour les sauver. Sans quoi elles veulent rester dans cette inactivité qui ne retardera que de peu de temps leurs chutes inévitables. Si j’ai une mauvaise idée sur la foi Autrichienne, je n’en ai pas une meilleure sur la foi Prussienne; l’une et l’autre vaillent bien l’ancienne Punique.

“ Je vous envoie tous mes papiers avec prière de ne pas prendre copie, et de me les renvoyer jeudi, dans ma maison en ville. Je consente que vous les lisiez à monsieur Pitt mercredi, où vous le verrez sans doute, mais pas à personne d’autre. Vous verrez par la dernière pièce du recueil que je vous envoie ce que c’est que ce Duc de Brunswic, et combien peu on doit se fier à lui. Je crois que le Comte Panin se trompe sur le prétendu retour de sentiment du comte Hawkwitz, et je crois ce dernier d’accord avec le Duc. Ce ne sont que des fourbes qui, à force de finesse, sont incapables de concevoir des grandes idées, et de prendre des mesures énergiques qui seules peuvent sauver l’Europe, qui se perd par les jalousies et l’avidité de s’agrandir des cours de Vienne et de Berlin.

“ Si je n’avais des affaires qui me retiennent mardi à Richmond d’une manière à ne pouvoir m’en dégager, je serai venu vous demander à dîner à Dropmore, pour avoir la satisfaction de faire la connaissance de mylord Clare, pour le grand caractère duquel j’ai une très grande estime. J’aurais eu aussi le plaisir de jouer quelques parties d’échecs avec vous; mais je ne puis bouger d’ici après demain.”

[GEORGE CANNING] to [LORD GRENVILLE.]

1798, November 4.—“ I understand that the Duke of York withdraws his objections to Colonel Koehler’s plan, and that I am to expect a letter from Bröwnrigg in the course of a day or two, saying (without any reference to what has passed) that if Colonel Koehler will send in a list of the officers of the Line whom he wishes to take with him, sanctioned by your Lordship, His Royal Highness will give them the necessary permission, and lay their names before the King for local rank, and taking no notice of any other point. This being the case, perhaps your Lordship might think it best to suspend the sending any answer to His Royal Highness upon the general subject until Bröwnrigg’s letter arrives, which may make such a discussion unnecessary.”

THE EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, November 4. Brighton.—“ I regret extremely that the attention I am obliged to pay to the means recommended for the recovery of my health prevents my having the honour of waiting

upon your Lordship and mentioning, in a more satisfactory manner than by letter, what I now beg leave to lay before you.

"Having been for some weeks out of the way of business, I have had no opportunity of acquiring any knowledge of the proceedings and intentions of Government relative to the object I have in view. But, on considering how infinitely the present contest is likely to be influenced by the union of Turkey and Russia with Great Britain; how essentially the future greatness of France may be obstructed by our firmly establishing, and maintaining an interest in Turkey; and how much our trade in the Levant and in the Mediterranean may hereafter be augmented by a proper improvement of the present dispositions of the Ottoman empire; it has occurred to me as possible that it may be in your Lordship's intention to send to Constantinople an English representative equal in rank and situation to the Imperial and French Ministers at that Court. Should that supposition be founded, I would venture to bring myself under your notice for that embassy.

"The many gratifying marks of kindness I have experienced from your Lordship encourage me to submit this suggestion to you, without further detail, and without making application or communication to any other person on the subject. I feel confident that your Lordship would not advise me to undertake any mission that was not quite eligible for me; and I am equally sure you will rightly appreciate my motives for proposing to engage in this new service.

"If your Lordship should have any commands for me on this occasion, they will find me at Brighton, where I mean to pass some time for the benefit of warm sea bathing. My health has, I confess, been one inducement with me for bringing forward the idea contained in this letter, since I have much benefit to expect from a change of climate, and a sea voyage."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 5. Dublin.—"I send you a memoir to which I have given the greatest attention, and upon the outlines of which I have consulted some of the wisest and coolest heads in this kingdom. I have read it to the Lord Chancellor, who highly approved it; and it obviates so many of the difficulties that, if you are not startled by the numbers, I think you will find grounds in this plan on which you may build your measure. As I have heard nothing from you respecting the Speaker, I have not dared converse with him. You will have known before now that he declines the journey to London, because it was proposed to him through Lord Cornwallis, who enclosed Mr. Pitt's letter to him; this, however, does not alter my opinion that he may be induced to assist cheerfully, though it is obvious that the public service must suffer by the folly of Lord Cornwallis's conduct to this man, who is certainly one of the most useful servants of the English Government, and I must say one of the most manageable, provided he sees a disposition

to confide in him. I repeat that, for many reasons, I have had no confidential communication with him on this point; but if Mr. Pitt and you wish it, I will try to manage him, or at least I will endeavour to know his ideas. But I entreat you to believe that he is much too important a card to throw away, from his faculty of doing good if he will work with you, and of doing mischief incalculable if he works against you. I am now employing myself on a project for an establishment for the two great dissenting Churches, the Catholics and Presbyterians of this kingdom, having a most decided opinion that they must be connected (by means of a general assembly of each as in Scotland) with the Crown; that powers of control must be given to correct the misconduct of the teachers, and that they must be made independent of their flocks. I am endeavouring to collect the proper documents for such a project, but I beg you to prepare your mind and that of others for the idea, which I hold a *sine quâ non*, both for the present effect of such a measure on the union, and for the future tranquillity of Ireland. I, of course, confide all these ideas to you, but, if you approve them, you will of course shew them to Mr. Pitt. Lord Cornwallis told Mr. Beresford on Friday last that he had not spoken on the subject to any creature breathing save the Lord Chancellor, and I believe he spoke true. Beresford has conversed with me very fully and appears decided, though he fears that the opposition to it will be most violent unless Mr. Foster is induced to take part with you; which *he*, Beresford, says would be done if Mr. Pitt discussed the measure personally with him instead of Lord Cornwallis, with whom Beresford seems to think he will never act cordially.

“I have now to mention to you, and through you to Mr. Pitt, my earnest wish that if you should appoint Commissioners in any stage of this business, or in the conclusion of it for signing the articles, I may be named. You will see that my motives for this wish must be obvious, and they are at least pardonable. Perhaps my vanity may lead me to think that I have given as much time and consideration to the subject as any one, and most certainly I have advantages that every one has not.

“But whatever is to be done, do it quickly; for every one here of all parties and opinions agrees that the time is fast *passing by*. Nothing is here done by Government to lead the public mind, and every industry is exerted by pamphlets and newspapers to mislead; and the clamour is chiefly raised upon points which, from what I know of Mr. Pitt’s ideas and yours, are least likely to stand in the way. But it is indeed ‘*mirabile, mi fili, quam parvulâ sapientiâ*’ every part of the civil business of this country is conducted; and I wish I could think more favourably of the result of the military arrangements which *he* has made. But be they what they may, this country never will forgive him for leaving Wicklow, and Wexford, with the greater parts of Meath, Kildare, and Westmeath, and of the country within four miles of Dublin, in a state so insecure that the communications (except of

the mails which are escorted) are almost stopped. And this with 71,000 *effective regulars* and 47,000 *yeomanry* !”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 5. Minto.—“The enclosed letters appear to me of sufficient importance to be transmitted to your Lordship, although it is probable that they may inform you of nothing you are not already acquainted with. It would seem, however, that the matters alluded to were not thought ripe, at the date of these letters, for a direct communication to your Lordship, and it is principally this circumstance which has led me to consider them as worthy of your attention now. Your Lordship must, I am persuaded, have been informed from other quarters of the good disposition of the Duke of Brunswick ; but it is just possible the steps he took at Berlin to gain the King of Prussia, and the success he supposes himself to have had in leading that prince towards the measures and the system he approves of, may not yet have reached your Lordship ; and I have presumed to think some notice of the application to our Government which seems in contemplation might not be unacceptable. The letters were entrusted to me by the Comte d’Artois ; and your Lordship will see by the Duc de Serrent’s letter of the 1st November (which accompanied the last of the two letters from Brunswick) that the Comte d’Artois is desirous of communicating to Government anything that is thought interesting, although some anxiety is expressed that the secret of this correspondence may be kept. In these circumstances I know nobody to whom they could be communicated with so much propriety as your Lordship. I think it right to add that if your Lordship should think the correspondence of *Monsieur*, which is very extensive, likely to furnish any information of moment, it will be easy for me to encourage a very unreserved communication from that quarter, and to convey what is interesting to you in such a manner as not to commit your Lordship personally, or Government, further than you may wish. In doing this I should not abuse the confidence the Prince is disposed to put in me ; nor could I indeed accept of any confidence from him, of which I should not be at perfect liberty to make this use when I thought it proper. I cannot conclude this letter without expressing the great satisfaction with which I learnt that the mind of the King of Prussia (and his Minister) is, at least, in suspense on these subjects. Some degree of wisdom and honour in a King of Prussia seems to have been the grand desideratum in the affairs of Europe since the commencement of this contest. Your Lordship must be much better informed, but I cannot help thinking with much pleasure that this young man is not to be despaired of, though he is much worked, no doubt, on one side.” *Three enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1.*

————— to SON ALTESSE ROYALE, *Monsieur*.

1798, October 1. Brunswick.—“J’ai encore aujourd’hui à déposer dans le secret intime du cœur de *Monsieur*, des notions

aussi sûres qu'elles sont intéressantes, et qui confirment pleinement celles que j'ai transmises par mes deux dernières.

“L'excellent Duc s'est héroïquement conduit dans son séjour de Potsdam. Il y a parfaitement exécuté tout ce qu'il s'était proposé en partant de Brunswick. La transcendence du Prince Henri, et la sorte d'empire qu'il avait pris sur le Roi son neveu, a été attaquée, ébranlée, au point de n'en avoir plus rien à craindre. On est parvenu à faire sentir au jeune monarque la honte et le danger auxquels il exposerait sa gloire personnelle et sa couronne, en se laissant guider par les conseils de son oncle. Ce dernier avait remis, depuis peu de jours, un mémoire détaillé sur la conduite que la Prusse avait à tenir dans le cas où la guerre se renouvellerait. On croit que ce mémoire était, en grande partie, l'ouvrage de l'abbé Siéyès, dont le Prince est le protecteur affiché. L'objet qu'on se proposait dans cet écrit, ne tendait à rien moins qu'à déterminer s[a] M[ajesté] Prussienne à se lier étroitement avec la France républicaine contre l'Autriche, sa seule et véritable ennemie. On a promis au Duc de ne pas même le lire.

“Le succès du Duc a été si complet, non seulement sur l'esprit du Roi, mais aussi sur celui du Comte de Haugwitz, qu'on s'est expliqué provisoirement sur la nécessité et les moyens d'avoir en état de mobilité, et de marche immédiate, un corps de 60,000 hommes pour renforcer au besoin, si le cas l'exigeait, l'armée commandée par le Duc.

“Il était important de s'assurer par cet arrangement de prévoyance, contre le plan qui pourrait tenter le Directoire Français dans l'espoir, et pour couvrir leur désastre d'Alexandrie, de marcher sur Bremen et sur Hambourg, avant que la négociation qu'ils peuvent savoir être commencée entre les deux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, soit terminée, et que le concert désiré puisse être établi et réglé.

“Le Comte d'Haugwitz a été jusqu'à prier le Duc de pressentir la Cour de Londrès sur la quotité du subsidé que l'Angleterre fixerait dans le cas où la Prusse rentrerait en activité contre la France, et le Duc s'en est chargé. Mais je sais que, par réflexion très sage, depuis son retour ici, il a écrit fort au long pour demander lui-même à Berlin des explications détaillées sur la force réelle de l'armée Prussienne à employer, et sur la nature des services qu'elle aurait à rendre, sous le prétexte de prévenir par là tous mésentendus dans la confection du traité à convenir, mais dans le véritable objet de s'assurer d'abord par la réponse du ministre de sa sincérité, et ensuite d'accélérer la conclusion de cet arrangement avec la Cour de Londrès. Le personnage dont j'ai annoncé dans ma dernière le départ immédiat pour Berlin, y sera vraisemblablement chargé de presser cette réponse du Ministre, et du soin de la faire rédiger conformément au désir du Sérénissime négociateur.”

*Enclosure 2.*

LE DUC DE SERENT to LORD MINTO.

1798, November 1. Edinburgh.—“*Monsieur* me charge de vous adresser la copie d'une nouvelle lettre qu'il a reçue de Brunswick,

et qui fait suite à celle qu'il m'a ordonné de vous communiquer dernièrement. Le secret de cette correspondance étant nécessaire pour qu'elle puisse être utile, son Altesse Royale s'en rapporte sur cet objet, comme sur tant d'autres, à votre prudence, pour ne rien compromettre si vous jugez qu'il soit avantageux pour votre Gouvernement de lui transmettre cette information."

*Enclosure 3.*

— to SON ALTESSE ROYALE, *Monsieur.*

1798, October 11. Brunswick.—“ Un incident, dont je n'ai pu percer le mystère qu'hier, a dérangé l'exécution du voyage de Berlin, que j'avais annoncé dans mon dernier rapport particulier. Voici quelle a été la cause de cette variante. Le Comte d'Haugwitz a su que c'était à la réquisition même de la Cour de Vienne que l'armée auxiliaire de Russie avait fait halte, après son passage du Bog; et il a, sur cette démarche du Cabinet Impérial, conçu le soupçon qu'il était déjà occupé à négocier secrètement avec le Directoire Français, pour se faire accorder en Italie de nouvelles cessions des territoires qui sont à sa bienséance, à titre de complément des articles du traité de *Campo Formio*. Plein de cette méfiance, le ministre s'en est fait un titre, en écrivant au Duc, pour lui recommander la plus grande réserve dans les démarches convenues avec Son Altesse Sérénissime relativement à la Cour de Londrès, dans la supposition d'un nouveau concert de vues et d'opérations entre les deux Cours de Vienne et de Berlin. La conclusion de la dépêche du Comte d'Haugwitz était de nature à faire craindre que ce nouveau grief n'indisposât assez la Prusse contre l'Autriche, pour lui faire adopter des mesures absolument opposées à celles qui avaient été arrêtées à Potzdam en dernier lieu. L'excellent Duc a appelé au moment même de la réception de cette intéressante dépêche, l'homme qu'il honore de sa confiance, auquel il l'a communiquée, et avec lequel il a concerté sa réponse; que j'ose assurer avoir été telle, et pour la dignité des expressions, et pour la pureté et la noblesse des sentiments, qu'elle ne laisse rien à désirer, non seulement pour écarter toute méfiance de la tête de M. d'Haugwitz, mais même pour convaincre le ministre que, quand même l'Autriche (ce qu'on ne croyait pas) serait en négociation avec le Directoire, il n'en conviendrait pas moins à la dignité et même à la sûreté de la couronne Prussienne, de se rapprocher de la Cour de Vienne pour combattre l'ennemi commun de toute l'Europe; et que toute rivalité devait être nécessairement suspendue dans la crise actuelle. Cette réponse a produit l'effet qu'on s'en était promis. M. de Panin a travaillé dans le même sens, et dans le même temps, M. d'Haugwitz; et on ne retarde à marcher sur les errements qu'on avait adoptés à Potzdam, que jusqu'à l'arrivée du Prince Héréditaire d'Orange, qu'on attend ici le 17 du courant; et qui en partira pour Londrès après avoir concerté ici avec le Duc, et le personnage destiné au voyage de Berlin, la marche respective de la négociation, et des arrangements dont ils seront chargés, chacun de leur côté.”

LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

*Private.*

1798, November 6. Dropmore.—“I return you the two letters which you had the goodness to leave with me. I think I collect from them that the persons with whom Mr. M[urray] has conversed will not treat with us about the means of delivering their country from the yoke of France, unless we first agree that the P[rince] of O[range] and the Stadholderate shall be set aside.

“This condition we consider as wholly inadmissible as a preliminary to such a discussion; nor can we give the least expectation that it would even be the result of it. We hold it to be impossible to restore, and still more to maintain, the tranquillity of that country by the exclusion of the most numerous party in it.

“The object of England is what you stated to Mr. M[urray] and what it has been for above a century. To see in that country a rational, free, and efficient government, capable of providing for its domestic happiness, and of maintaining a real independence with respect to *all* its neighbours. The persecution of one party for the past, or its exclusion, or that of the other party for the future, are equally incompatible with these objects. Those persons, whoever they may be, who concur in this wish, would find in England a willing and a powerful assistant; but there is nothing in the present relative state of Great Britain and Holland which could tempt us to embark in any more limited plan, at the risk of increasing, instead of destroying, the internal divisions of that country, and thereby exposing it to become avowedly and permanently, what it is now in substance, but for a time only, a conquered country, annexed to the present Government of France.”

*Postscript.* “I need hardly repeat that if, on the grounds stated in this letter and in yours of the 16th August, there is any disposition to open a discussion with us, our disposition remains the same; and it would be for them to name the place and person where and through whom they would communicate. We would immediately give the necessary instructions to a fit person on our part.” *Copy. Three enclosures.*

*Enclosure 1.*

RUFUS KING to W. V. MURRAY.

1798, August 16. London.—“It is almost certain that the war will soon be renewed, at least between Austria and France. The political timidity of Prussia will prevent the king from acting; but a war with Austria supported by Russia would favour any disposition that may exist in Holland to emancipate themselves from France. It will be difficult for England by any formal act to discard the Prince of Orange, though as I have before told you, and as the past history of England and of Holland proves, the non-existence of the Stadholderate will not impede a friendly

and useful connection and treaty between the two countries; a reform would perhaps be preferable to an abolition of the Stadholderate.

"W——th has reported to me a conversation with S—— that passed, I believe in your presence, and which may be made the commencement of at least an informal negotiation between Holland and England. No one can approve the old constitution of Holland. England desires to see and would gladly assist in any suitable manner to establish a rational, free, and efficient government in that country; she would engage to all persons perfect security against every sort of personal or other inconvenience on account of the past, and would moreover, become the guaranty against the abuses which might be apprehended from the weakness of the Prince of Orange.

"The portion of authority which he or his family should retain in the new system would be matter proper for discussion; and you may say that a person on the part of England will meet such person on the part of Holland, by which I mean all the Provinces, as shall be sent to any convenient place that they shall name confidentially to confer upon these important concerns." *Copy.*

*Enclosure 2.*

W. V. MURRAY to RUFUS KING.

1798, September 7. The Hague.—"I received your letter in cypher, of the 16th August, the 2nd instant, but could not answer by the post of the 3rd, because of circumstances and the necessity of caution. The answer was, that it would not do; 'that no plan containing any share of the Prince of Orange in government will do'; and that 'if England would give up the Prince of Orange, and agree to let the present constitution stand, and if Prussia (in concert with Great Britain) would cede a tract of country convenient to them (Holland) and useless to her (Prussia) on the east side of the Ems river, that then they would give a sum, or if more agreeable a fixed annual stipend, to the Prince of Orange.'

"I know nothing of the gentlemen with whom Mr. W—— had the conversation in this affair. It is known but to four Dutch—and he is not one—though now it is probable he may be.

"I can add nothing to the inducements in sound policy, which I have already, I think, with repetition stated.

"The object is very important, namely, to drive the French out. That alone is worth a war. The actual state of things presents the only means that ought to be used with good faith. The object once attained, the nation would be free to choose, consistently with that good faith which would be gratified by withholding all interference at such a time." *Copy.*

*Enclosure 3.*

W. V. MURRAY to RUFUS KING.

1798, October 6.—"I have again been asked about the subject of my last by the same person.



"This proceeds both from the hopes entertained, and in the gravest manner, of success; and from the prospect of war, because in case of war all things ought to be previously understood and arranged. I was asked on this subject, solicitously, yesterday.

"You have spoken to me of Wads affair; if that course and business is more agreeable and more feasible *in the settlement of our accounts*, say so and mention your arbitrator. I hate cyphers, and therefore speak without; you will understand me. My own opinion, is, nor can it be formed on your idea, that that is not so substantial a house as the other. I know little of the broker whom he mentioned, except that his reputation is excellent; but in our affair I know nothing of him. I do not like to hazard any further in these sorts of speculations, nor to extend credit, and therefore I did not ask him if he would act.

"What you say to me will be delicately used. You would wish to know the state of parties here. Without adding anything to what I have mentioned often, I will say only what I think will follow the commencement of a war on the Rhine. I think that the party spirit will be high if F[rance] withdraws her troops, but that this fervour will be without effect, as long as England withholds the pledge which I have often mentioned as essential to the expulsion of the French." *Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 7. Dublin.—"I told you yesterday how much I feared that the indolence of Government would give great advantage to the exertions which were made in many quarters to raise a clamour against the union. I then knew that it had been proposed to the lawyers' corps to assemble as a corps, and to come to very strong resolutions against it, *pledging their lives* against such a measure. I was in hopes that it would have been prevented, and that the friends of Government would have succeeded in their statements of the dangerous impropriety of such a step; but I have this morning (*what I conceive certain*) information that such a meeting is to be called immediately, and that resolutions of that nature will be carried. I have reason to think that they will delay it for two or three days in order to ensure the co-operation of the attornies' corps, who are to do the same; and they hope that this practice will be universal. Lord Cornwallis was informed of the intention on Saturday last, but I have no reason to think that he has consulted any one upon it. Lord Charlemont is very much at the bottom of this, and employs one Plunkett, a barrister brought into Parliament by him, who is very active and clever; and Mr. Barrington has been equally busy on the same business. I know that the discontent against Lord Cornwallis has likewise operated strongly in this question, and unless the whole system of civil government is changed, be assured that the House of Commons will run riot not only on this, but on every other point made by Government. You cannot change Lord Cornwallis, but you may insist upon a

change of his system ; and you ought to send a real Minister to the House of Commons instead of Lord Castlereagh, who, if he had the abilities of an angel, cannot *do* all that a Minister must *do* in that station.

“In short, undeceive yourself and your friends if you expect any success upon any points so long as the machine is left to chance, as at present. I owe to you this explicit declaration, and the misery I feel is relieved by endeavouring to make you feel these points as I do.”

LORD MINTO to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 8. Minto.—“ Since my last, I have received the enclosed from the Duc de Serent, which I take the liberty of forwarding for your perusal.”

*Enclosure.*

LE DUC DE SERENT to LORD MINTO.

1798, November 6. Edinburgh.—“ Voici encore un extrait d’une lettre arrivée dernièrement de Brunswik. Quoiqu’elle ne réponde pas à beaucoup près aux espérances qu’avaient données les premiers rapports, son Altesse Royale m’a ordonné de vous en donner communication, afin que vous ayez une égale connaissance du véritable état des choses dans le moment.

“ Il paraît aussi que la conduite actuelle de la Cour de Vienne présente des incertitudes inquiétantes.

“ Je ne sais si je me fais illusion, mais il me semble que l’Angleterre serait bien plus indépendante de la politique privée de ses alliés, si elle dirigeait ses principaux efforts dans le sens qui peut donner le plus de consistance au parti royaliste de l’intérieur de la France. C’est un allié qui pourrait devenir bientôt plus puissant qu’aucun autre. Il serait forcément plus dans sa main, et il faudrait plus d’un demi-siècle avant qu’il pût cesser de demeurer dans sa dépendance.”

*Extract.*

1798, October 18. Brunswick.—“ Les explications que le Duc avait demandées au Comte d’Haugwitz, ainsi que je l’avais marqué, ne lui ont point été envoyées par ce ministre : et la négociation que ce Prince devait entamer à Londrès a été suspendue. La méfiance a prévalu dans le Cabinet Prussien, et, malgré toute la force des raisons qui ont été exposées dans la réponse du Duc au Comte, ce dernier s’obstine dans ses soupçons de négociation particulière et perfide. Cela ne laisse pas de donner ici peine et travail au personnage qui doit retourner à Berlin ; mais malgré cette reprise d’incertitude et de méfiance suspensive, le Comte de Panin marque cependant être assez content de la façon franche avec laquelle le Comte d’Haugwitz traite avec lui.”

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 10. Dublin.—“ I say nothing upon your very interesting packet which I got yesterday, as I have been very

hard at work upon it; but it is highly gratifying to me to see how exactly our ideas have tallied upon the essential points, in the very difficult question of parliamentary arrangements. I still think my *projet* for the House of Commons is better than yours, and perhaps discussion of the subject may suggest something better than both. But *that* (as far at least as Lord Cornwallis is concerned) will not take place, for he professes to know nothing of what 'Ministry are doing about it in England,' and therefore leaves it, and all the clamour and machinations on the subject, to absolute chance. *Lord Castlereagh is gone into the North*, and Cooke is the only thing that remains like a Government, for His Excellency does not now come to Dublin more than twice a week, and sees no one in the Park. His table for himself and his family is of eight covers, and twice a week he has 12 covers; this (as you see) leaves him completely uninformed of every thing; and all this at such a moment, with such an object, and with such means. I am very uneasy about our British militia, for their disinclination to the service increases every moment, exactly in proportion to the increasing disgust with which they hear themselves treated for the '*treachery*' of the measure of sending them here to force a union. Add to this the unusual fatigue of very very severe duty, and the sickness which has increased in all our regiments for want of proper barracks and accommodations, and you will see how easily they will listen to any idea of returning home. I still hope we may manage to engage the Royal Bucks and Warwick to stay till spring, *but I am sure* that they will not stay longer; and if any of the other corps should (as we understand the Dorset have done) insist upon returning when the act expires, I will not answer for our people, nor for the Warwick, of whom Lord H. Seymour (their real colonel) thinks as I do. This is a most serious consideration to you; and as Lord Cornwallis never has had the slightest communication with any of us upon it, I wish you to bear it in your mind. The numbers now sick, of the British militia, are near 900, and they increase in spite of every care.

"Tone has just been tried; he desired to give the court-martial no trouble; acknowledged that he was an Irishman, and in the service of the French Republic; gloried in having been the instrument of uniting three millions of his fellow citizens against the oppression and tyranny of England, and of having procured from 'the great nation' that assistance for the recovery of their liberty which had so unfortunately failed. He was stopped in parts of his declamation addressed to the Catholics of Ireland, for whom, he said, he was happy to lay down his life; and requested of the court that they would copy the humanity of the French Directory and government who, in judging to death Charrette, Sombreuil, and others who had fought in opposition to them, had reconciled their death to the feelings of a soldier; and he therefore begged to be shot 'not so much from his private feelings, as from a sense of respect to the uniform he wore.' He finished by requesting that the sentence might be sent to Lord

Cornwallis instantly, and hoped His Excellency would confirm it, and order it to be executed within the hour. Notwithstanding all this he was much agitated, and I cannot help thinking that he means to destroy himself before Monday, on which day it is supposed he will be hanged."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 11. London.—"J'ai été bien sensiblement touché de la première partie du billet aimable que j'ai reçu hier de vous. Vous me rendez justice en comptant sur mon attachement à tout épreuve pour vous, et sur le zèle le plus ardent, prêt à me faire tout entreprendre pour la succès de la bonne cause. Dans le moment où votre lettre m'est parvenue, j'allais vous écrire pour prendre la liberté de fixer votre attention sur le même objet, et vous parler du parti que je crois qu'il y aurait à tirer du mouvement assez prononcé qui a actuellement lieu dans la Belgique. Je me trouve heureux d'avoir rencontré votre idée. Ce n'est pas la première fois que cela m'arrive depuis que nous nous connaissons ; et mon petit amour-propre en est trop flatté pour que je puisse m'empêcher de m'en glorifier avec mon respectable ami.

"J'ai songé avec beaucoup d'attention à la manière d'établir cette communication avec la Belgique. Il s'agissait d'y trouver une personne sûre, sensée, bien-intentionnée et qui ne fut pas assez bête pour se compromettre mal à propos, ainsi que ceux qui l'employeront. Il fallait, en outre, quelqu'un qui ne marquât point actuellement, et qui soit de nature à pouvoir marquer par la suite. Ayant été à peu près élevé dans les Pays-Bas que je ne puis m'empêcher de regarder comme une seconde patrie, j'y connais des individus bons, mauvais, et indifférens de toutes les classes ; et j'y ai encore beaucoup de gens qui m'y paraissent dévoués. Mais j'ai toujours observé que la bêtise et la maladresse y gâtent souvent les affaires beaucoup plus que la mauvaise volonté. Ce peuple est capable de tout quand il est bien conduit. Il n'y a point de sacrifices qu'il ne soit prêt à faire, point de danger qu'il ne soit disposé à affronter, point d'acte d'héroïsme pour lequel il ne soit susceptible d'être électrisé, pourvu qu'il soit bien conduit. Mais, 1, il ne sait point se diriger par lui-même ; et 2, il est peu de personnes parmi ses concitoyens en état de les mener. Il en est une, cependant, et *peut-être la seule* qui soit capable de remplir nos vœux si elle veut s'en charger ; et qui serait, en même tems, assez honnête pour nous avertir de l'impossibilité de rien réaliser d'essentiel, en nous en donnant les preuves, si elle était convaincu de cette triste vérité. Cet homme est mon beau-frère *le Duc d'Ursel*. N'oubliez pas que c'est votre ami qui vous parle, et non le ministre de l'Empereur. Je crois nécessaire de vous faire connaître celui que je vous propose.

"Marié très jeune à la fille du Duc d'Arenberg, sœur aînée de ma femme, il est entré de bonne heure au service de l'Empereur, et n'a pas tardé à s'y distinguer de manière à être

avancé promptement. Il a fait notre petite guerre de Bavière ; et lorsque nous avons été au moment de rompre avec les Hollandais au sujet de l'affaire de l'Escaut, il était déjà général, et destiné à commander un corps considérable sous le Duc Albert. Une raison prématurée, une réputation bien méritée, d'une probité scrupuleuse et sévère, et une connaissance exacte des loix et du gouvernement, lui avait dès lors attiré l'estime de ses concitoyens, qui voyaient dans lui le seul *noble* dont on pût attendre quelque chose. Il ne trompa pas leur confiance, car, sous le ministère du Comte de Belgioso, lorsque l'Empereur commença à tenter ses innovations fatales aux Pais-Bas, le Duc d'Ursel fit au souverain des représentations respectueuses et fermes. Mais le peuple, ayant voulu se porter à des extrémités encore inconnues jusqu'alors, il parvint par son sang-froid, et l'empire qu'il avait su prendre sur lui, à l'arrêter plusieurs fois au moment de son explosion. En ouvrant l'histoire du tems, vous y verrez que le Duc d'Ursel a souvent exposé sa vie pour mettre des bornes à ce prétendu patriotisme Flamand. Quand il crut voir, sous M. de Trautmansdorff, les esprits exaspérés à l'excès des deux côtés, il prit le sage parti de se faire employer à l'armée d'Hongrie, qui combattait les Turcs, et prouva par là à son pays dont il idolâtrait la constitution, et au souverain qu'il servait avec honneur, combien son caractère était éloigné de toute intrigue ou faction. Il se couvrit de gloire au siège de Belgrade, dont la prompte reddition fut due au Prince de Ligne, sous les ordres duquel il commandait immédiatement. Quoiqu'il eut pris la résolution de ne pas retourner aux Pais-Bas pendant ces tems de trouble et de confusion, la probité le força, malgré lui, de demander un congé pour y passer quelque tems, en apprennant les persécutions et les mauvais traitemens de toutes espèces que la bêtise, l'insolence, et la dureté de M. de Trautmansdorff avaient fait éprouver à sa femme. Il passa par Vienne avant de se rendre chez lui. J'y étais alors. Il vit l'Empereur Joseph qui le traita avec la plus grande distinction, lui donna un régiment, et le pria de s'employer avec la sagesse et l'influence qu'on lui connaissait pour ramener les esprits égarés. Le Duc d'Ursel, ayant reçu la parole de son maître d'obtenir une réparation prononcée des insultes faites à sa femme, ainsi que celle de revoir la constitution de son pays dans toute sa vigueur, promit à l'Empereur de se dévouer entièrement à ses intérêts, en le prévenant en même tems, que pour le mieux servir, il aurait l'air, dès qu'il serait dans la Belgique, de quitter le service militaire. Je puis vous certifier que le Duc d'Ursel partit de Vienne dans cette intention, et il aurait travaillé dans ce sens si, peu après son arrivée, il n'avait pas eu lieu d'être convaincu que Joseph l'avait trompé. Les inconséquences du Gouvernement redoublèrent, et tout ce que le Duc d'Ursel put faire de mieux fut de rester tranquille. Il fit alors le plus de bien qu'il put dans l'ordre des choses du moment, et refusa tous les commandemens et honneurs militaires que les Patriotes voulurent lui conférer, en n'imitant point

l'indigne conduite de plusieurs autres grands seigneurs du païs. Quand la Belgique rentra sous la domination Autrichienne, le Duc d'Ursel tint toujours une conduite très passive, ce qui était assez simple de la part d'un homme qui avait à se plaindre de son souverain. Les Français conquissent, et perdirent depuis en quelques mois de tems, la Belgique sous *Dumourier* ; et je dois rendre la justice à mon beau-frère en disant que pendant cette première invasion, il me faisait passer secrettement à la Haye toutes les notions et renseignemens qu'il jugeait pouvoir être utiles aux progrès des armes Impériales. Son bon esprit lui faisait sentir dès lors ce qu'il doit mieux sentir encore à présent, que tout était préférable à la domination régicide. Lorsque l'Empereur vint faire son apparition *théâtrale* à Bruxelles, et qu'il eut juré solennellement *cette jameuse 'joyeuse entrée,'* suivie de si près d'une honteuse sortie, le Duc d'Ursel se dévoua de nouveau tout entier à la bonne cause, mais ses avis et ses conseils ne furent point écoutés de ceux qui voulaient perdre la plus belle province des états de mon maître. On alla jusqu'à rejeter l'offre prêt à être exécutée d'une levée de soixante mille hommes. Vous savez ce fait comme moi, en ignorant peut-être que lui seul pouvait l'organiser dans tous les vus. Quand on eut abandonné les Païs-Bas, le Duc d'Ursel se souvenant qu'il était père de famille, et croyant qu'il pouvait produire plus de bien, ou plutôt empêcher plus de mal, au dedans qu'au dehors, se détermina à rester. Peut-être lui en a-t-on fait un nouveau crime chez nous. Je l'ignore. Quoiqu'il en soit, en voyant le sort qui attend les malheureux qui ont tout abandonné pour la Cour, je ne puis pas le blâmer à un certain point.

"Il a trouvé le moyen de m'écrire une ou deux fois. Ses sentimens n'ont point varié, mais il lui a été impossible de se prononcer d'aucune manière. Il est suspect aux Français et à leur parti ; adoré et estimé des *bons* Belges. Sa femme est à Bréda depuis deux ans, et la tyrannie Française ne lui a pas permis depuis ce temps de rejoindre sa famille et son époux. Que cette circonstance doit encore plus l'aigrir contre les régicides.

"Je vous demande pardon de cette longue digression, mais elle était nécessaire pour que vous connaissiez comme moi l'homme que je vous recommande, et que je crois préférable à tous ; parce-que :—

"1. Il est parfaitement honnête jusqu'au scrupule.

"2. Parcequ'il est animé du désir du véritable avantage, bien entendu, de son païs.

"3. Parcequ'il y est estimé, aimé, et respecté.

"4. Parcequ'il est doué d'une tête très froide, qui ne lui fera pas prendre des chimères pour des réalités.

"5. Parcequ'il est gentilhomme ; ce qui joint à la probité dont je vous ai parlé, l'empêchera de se charger d'une besogne impossible, uniquement pour escamoter quelques centaines de livres à l'Angleterre, comme ont fait tant d'autres.

"6. Parceque par l'esprit, l'instruction, la sagesse, et les talens militaires qu'il a, il pourra réussir dans tout ce qu'il se chargera d'entreprendre.

“Après ces premières données il s'agit :—

“1. De trouver les moyens de lui faire passer nos désirs.

“2. De le déterminer à y répondre, et

“3. D'établir une correspondance.

“Le second point est peut-être le plus difficile. Je m'offre à me charger de le tenter. La connaissance que j'ai de son caractère me donne quelque espoir. Je saurai mettre son ambition, sa sensibilité, et son patriotisme en mouvement ; mais il faut que je puisse lui promettre que, par la suite, les Païs-Bas ne seront pas cédés à la France par l'Angleterre, et que quelque soit le souverain auquel ils échoiront en partage, on leur conservera leur ancienne constitution, et privilèges. Je sais que le Duc d'Ursel, comme tous ceux qui aiment vraiment leur païs, préfère la domination de l'Empereur à toute autre. Il va sans dire, qu'en cas de fraix, on l'indemnifierait de ceux qu'il serait obligé de faire. Si mon beau-frère voit une chance quelconque de remplir nos vues, je crois que je le porterai à s'en charger ; mais rien ne l'y fera consentir s'il croit l'exécution impossible. Dans l'une et l'autre supposition, je vous garantis sa discrétion comme la mienne propre, car il est bien important que le plus profond secret règne dans toute cette négociation, et nommément vis-à-vis de ma Cour, dès son premier principe. L'honnête homme qui vous écrit vous donne sa parole. Vous n'avez pas sous vos ordres de ministre Anglais plus fidèle ni plus zélé.

“La manière de faire parvenir nos propositions s'exécutera facilement, ce me semble, en confiant avec toutes les précautions que la prudence et l'usage de notre métier font inventer, une lettre à un de mes gens affidés, dont la femme est à Bruxelles, et qui ira la voir avec un passeport neutre. On n'y sait pas qu'il est à moi, en tout cas il dira que je l'ai renvoyé. La réponse à notre lettre et son envoi doivent être remis à la sagesse de notre correspondant.

“Quant à la nature des ouvertures par lesquelles on débiterait dans cette affaire importante, vous les déciderez, et me donnerez vos ordres. Voilà, je crois, les principaux éclaircissements que vous pouviez désirer. Vous verrez par la longueur de cette dépêche *in quarto*, dont je vous ai ennuyé, et par la manière dont elle est griffonnée, que je n'ai pas perdu un instant pour vous faire part de toutes mes idées ; vous retrouverez ici plus que jamais cet abandon tout-à-fait aveugle de confiance que l'amitié m'inspire toujours quand je traite avec vous. Si vous voulez discuter cet objet, ou prendre quelque résolution à cet égard, donnez-moi vos ordres. Je me rendrai quand vous voudrez, et où vous voudrez, soit à Dropmore ou ailleurs. Permettez-moi de vous faire observer que si on veut produire quelqu'effet, il faut saisir l'occasion aux cheveux. *Fugit irreparabile tempus.*”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 12. Dublin.—“There having been much appearance of ferment this morning, I have only time to tell you that Tone cut his throat, but will live to be hanged. However

Lord Cornwallis took so much time to consider whether he would hang him or not that, in the mean time, Curran moved the court of King's Bench for a *habeas corpus*, which was granted. The Provost-Marshal was directed to make no return, and a *capias* was moved and issued against him, so that our civil and military powers are distinctly pitted against each other. The present orders are to hang him to-morrow, but his Excellency is so versatile on this subject that it is still doubtful. The sentence was that his head should be fixed upon the most conspicuous part of Dublin, *which his Excellency was pleased to disapprove!* What folly is all this."

*Postscript.* "Cooke tells me that he warned Lord Cornwallis of this on Saturday!"

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 12. Richmond.—"Par un moyen que nous avons avec le Comte Panin de nous écrire sans craindre aucune perturbation, il vient de m'envoyer la copie de deux rescrits qu'il a reçu de l'Empereur. Ils étaient en Russe. Je les ai fait traduire par mon fils en Français, afin que vous puissiez les lire. La traduction n'est pas élégante; elle est d'un enfant de 16 ans, mais elle est exacte. Vous me la rendrez quand nous nous verrons; et vous pourrez la communiquer à Monsieur Pitt.

"Vous ne m'avez pas renvoyé tous les papiers. Il y a quelques pièces qui manquent. C'est pourquoi je vous supplie de chercher parmi vos papiers, parmi lesquels les miens se sont égarés peut-être. Je vous fais mes compliments sur les affaires des Grisons. Cela va entraîner la guerre entre la France et l'Autriche, quelque peu d'envie qu'à la dernière de la recommencer."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 13. Dublin.—"The consummation of Lord Cornwallis's incapacity seems drawing on very fast. He has suspended Tone's execution till further orders; he has directed Major Sandys (the acting Provost-Marshal of Ireland) to put in for answer that his reason for not obeying the *Habeas* of yesterday was '*because Tone could not be moved with safety*,' and he has directed all courts-martial now sitting to be suspended. I could not have believed all this if Lieutenant-General Craig had not shewn me his orders, and if Sandys had not shewn me his answer, prepared by Kemys the Crown Solicitor. The consequence of this is an order, moved by Curran, for bringing up Tone in the custody of the sheriff so soon as he can be moved, which order is only delayed under an assurance that it is not intended to carry the sentence of the court-martial into execution *for some days*, and a peremptory order made (upon motion) for committing Sandys. In this manner has Lord Cornwallis completely overthrown the whole system of military tribunals that were sanctioned by proclamation, to which the judges were parties, approved by Parliament; and the result of it will be, unless he again changes his system, a general gaol delivery of every suspected person (by



*habeas*) not in the custody of the civil power. Such is the firmness and vigour of his conduct in the case of the man who glories to this moment (and so told the court) that he was the man to rouse three millions of his fellow subjects to a sense of their debasement from that bane to all their prosperity, their connexion with Great Britain ; that he had first suggested the doing this by French assistance ; and that he died happy in having been the instrument to obtain it. And to this glory Tone is too truly entitled, for you know that his assertions are most true. I enclose to you the account drawn up by order of Government for their newspaper, and much softened ; and yet you will see how strong the language of this man has been stated in their narrative.

“ Since I wrote this, I am assured that Lord Cornwallis will hang this man *as soon as he is a little better*, and that he means to stand his ground and to abide by the military courts. If so his conduct is tenfold more unintelligible.

“ God protect us from such absolute imbecility, the result of which, I will venture to foretell, will shock and loosen the little government now existing.”

*Postscript.* “ Thank God the Chancellor is landed, and I hope he will at least give this man a little common sense. Holt surrendered himself yesterday, and is this morning arrived at the Castle. I very soon expect that he will be allowed to go to *England*, in the same manner as Byrne and others who have been permitted to go there (where they cannot be touched) in their way to ‘some state in amity with the King.’ Aylmer and the Kildare rebels are to go to *England* next week. A pleasant transportation ! ”

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 13. Richmond.—“ Vous verrez par la liste que j’inclus ici, les papiers que vous ne m’avez pas renvoyés parmi ceux que je vous ai communiqués. Je vous conjure de vous donner la peine de les chercher sur vos bureaux et tables ; et s’ils ne sont pas chez vous, ou chez Monsieur Pitt, en ville, ils doivent être chez vous à Dropmore, où je vous supplie de regarder la première fois que vous retournerez à la campagne.

“ Permettez-moi de vous réitérer ma prière pour la communication des nouvelles de Constantinople. Peut-être que M. Canning attend qu’il y ait quelque chose de bien intéressant pour me le communiquer, et qu’il suppose que les affaires ordinaires et courantes ne peuvent guère m’intéresser, et c’est pourquoi il ne me les envoie pas. Mais c’est précisément celles-là qui m’intéressent, et peuvent mener à comprendre mieux les autres, surtout quand on connaît la Turquie comme j’en ai eu l’occasion. J’ai beaucoup vécu avec les Turcs ; j’ai été six ans dans leurs pays ; j’ai été employé dans les négociations du Maréchal Roumentzow avec quatre grands vizirs consécutifs ; j’ai été employé dans la négociation de la paix de Cainardji ; en un mot j’ai beaucoup étudié les affaires de la Turquie, et je m’intéresse à tout ce qui s’y fait, particulièrement dans l’époque où nous

sommes. Je vous supplie donc de lui ordonner de m'envoyer les copies des dépêches de M. Smith, excepté celles que vous croyez que je ne dois pas voir. Il n'a qu'à me les envoyer dans ma maison en ville, d'où on m'envoie ici tous les jours les paquets qui me sont adressés."

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 14. London.—"Voici la lettre telle que je l'écrirai avec de l'encre de sympathie. Vous pouvez garder ce papier puisque j'en ai le double. Vous voyez que je n'ai pas perdu de tems. J'ai gardé presque toutes vos propres expressions; votre note m'a paru parfaite. Je serai à vos ordres avant midi. Je me charge de demander le passeport à M. King, *pour un de mes gens qui retourne dans son pays*. Le paquebot, un bâtiment, vous regarde. Je ferai, si vous le trouvez bon, les petites avances nécessaires du moment, dont je vous remettrai ensuite, ou à mesure, le compte à vous-même.

"C'est bien le cas du *to be or not to be* de Shakspear, et nous allons enfin, j'espère, *take arms against a sea of troubles*."

*Enclosurc.*

COUNT STARHEMBERG to the DUKE D'URSEL.

1798, November 14. London.—"Votre probité, vos talens, votre manière de penser, et votre patriotisme bien entendu, sont trop connus par les preuves que vous en avez donné si souvent, pour que l'on n'ait pas recours à vos lumières et à votre secours dès le premier moment qui semble fournir une lueur d'espérance de pouvoir arracher votre malheureux pays de l'état affreux d'oppression et d'infortune de toutes espèces sous lequel il gémit. Vous êtes la première et la seule personne à laquelle on se soit encore adressé; et vous étiez la seule qui méritât de jouer le rôle honorable qu'on vous destine, si les circonstances le permettent. Il fallait votre courage, votre prudence, et votre discrétion. On en est aussi convaincu que de votre dévouement à toute épreuve pour une si belle cause; et, en conséquence, l'Angleterre, animée du même attachement qu'elle a toujours conservé pour votre patrie, et n'ayant en vue que le but qu'elle se propose depuis plus de deux siècles, de protéger et de garantir la liberté, le commerce, et l'indépendance constitutionnelle de ses provinces qu'elle a un si grand intérêt de soutenir contre la France, désirerait que vous lui fassiez parvenir, par mon canal, des éclaircissemens en réponse aux demandes suivantes. Il est inutile de vous faire observer qu'il est urgent de savoir au plustôt à quoi s'en tenir sur cet objet.

"1. Quel est l'état actuel du pays, la force des insurgés, et généralement leurs moyens de résistance?

"2. Quelles sont les forces que le Directoire y a déjà, ou qu'il destine encore à y être employées?

"3. Y-a-t-il quelqu'espérance de pouvoir se flatter d'une résistance solide et permanente, si l'insurrection était appuyée

par les secours de l'Angleterre ; surtout si la guerre se rallume sur le Continent ?

"4. Quels sont les secours dont on aurait le besoin le plus pressant, et quel moyen y aurait-il de les faire arriver ?

"5. Croyez-vous à la possibilité d'ouvrir, au moins momentanément, une communication avec le país, soit par Ostende ou par un autre endroit de la côte, car on enverrait immédiatement ici les armes et munitions déjà prêtes à être embarquées d'un moment à l'autre ?

"6. Voudriez-vous, par la suite, vous charger d'un rôle ostensible, et entreprendre de concerter avec l'Angleterre les moyens de délivrer votre patrie du joug qui l'opprime ; ou, si vous y voyiez des obstacles qu'on ne prévoit pas, voudriez-vous vous ouvrir confidentiellement sur l'état des parties et des dispositions, et sur les personnes qu'il serait à propos de mettre en avant, et de soutenir pour la réussite de cette utile et glorieuse entreprise ? Je ne vous dis rien ici qui ne soit sanctionnée par la volonté du ministre avec lequel je suis personnellement assez intimement lié pour m'être chargé de vous faire ces ouvertures en son nom. Ma conduite vous prouve mes sentimens pour la cause et pour vous.

"J'ai donné peu d'argent au porteur de la présente pour l'empêcher de paraître suspect ; faites-le vivre, et payez-lui son retour. Il va sans dire qu'on vous remboursera exactement les fraix de toute espèce que vous pourrez juger convenable de faire pour le grand but. On attendra votre réponse avec impatience. La poudre de noix de galle, que vous ferez dissoudre dans un gobelet d'eau, vous fournira une encre qui ne paraît qu'en passant sur le papier un pinceau trempé dans une dissolution de vitriol. Quand l'encre est trop forte, elle paraît un peu jaune sur le papier ; il ne s'agit que de l'affaiblir en y mêlant plus d'eau."

LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

*Most Secret.*

1798, November 16. Downing Street.—"The present state of affairs appears to afford a greater degree of probability than has yet appeared of a renewal of the war between Austria and France. And there is also much reason to hope that the dispositions are more favourable than they have hitherto been at Berlin to the idea of co-operating with the other Powers engaged in this important contest.

"It appears, however, by recent information from that quarter, that the Prussian Government not only hesitates to take its part till Austria shall be actually engaged in the war, but that it is also desirous of now establishing by previous concert the ultimate objects to which the efforts of the Allied Powers are to be directed.

"This wish is the natural effect of the prevailing jealousy between Austria and Prussia ; and difficult as the establishment of such a concert must appear, no other mode could perhaps be so effectual for preventing a repetition of the circumstances which produced the dissolution of the last confederacy against France.

"But with such dispositions at Berlin and Vienna, they will have little confidence in the execution of any engagements which they may contract with each other on this subject; and the first appearance of success will open a wide field for new distrust and jealousy.

"The intervention of Russia affords the only remedy for this evil. There is no doubt that the influence of Russia at those Courts is sufficient both to insure their punctual execution of those engagements, and to create that confidence between them in this respect which is necessary to success. So much has already been done by Russia for the establishment of a concert between these Powers, and the sentiments of the Emperor of Russia appear to be so much in unison with those of His Majesty respecting the present situation of affairs in Europe, that His Majesty flatters himself with finding in his ally every disposition that can tend to facilitate the completion of this important work.

"It is therefore His Majesty's pleasure that you should express to the Minister of His Imperial Majesty, His Majesty's opinion that no time should be lost in bringing forward at Vienna and Berlin a distinct proposal in the Emperor's name for a plan of general cooperation against France; and that this proposal will come with infinitely more weight and effect, if it be brought forward as one complete and digested system, proposed by H.I.M. to his allies, than if the same proposals were to be gradually worked out from the tardy and reluctant explanations of Austria and Prussia.

"His Majesty would recommend that the Russian Ministers at Berlin and Vienna should be instructed to propose the immediate conclusion of a treaty between the four great powers: the basis of which should be the employment of their united efforts to reduce France within her ancient limits; (an object of evident and pressing interest to the future tranquillity and independence of Europe) and to which every other Power should afterwards be invited to accede.

"On this principle would easily be grounded such engagements as might satisfy the mutual jealousy of Austria and Prussia by limiting and defining the separate advantages which they should respectively acquire from the success of measures, the great and general advantage of which would be the deliverance of Europe from that state of disquietude and danger in which it must ever remain, if France should at a peace retain her conquests.

"The views of Austria appear now to be principally directed towards Italy, where her success would certainly afford least ground of jealousy to Prussia. No objection could reasonably be made at Berlin to the effect of any measures which should lead to the recovery of all the former dominions of Austria in Lombardy; provided it were distinctly understood that no further encroachment should be made on the possessions of the other Powers of Italy. And the reconquest of the Milanese, added to the acquisitions already made by Austria in Italy would, it is conceived, furnish a sufficient indemnity to

that Power for those exertions which indeed her own safety indispensably requires her to make both on the side of Italy and Swisserland. It might therefore on this ground, and in conformity to the principles of the negotiation already established between Austria and Prussia, be expressly stipulated that no indemnity should be sought by Austria in Germany.

"The disposition of the King of Prussia to act eventually on the side of Holland for the restoration of the House of Orange, and for the re-establishment of a solid and efficient government in that country have been intimated to His Majesty; and nothing could more effectually tend to consolidate the tranquillity of Europe, than the success of measures to be taken for this purpose, in which H.M. would willingly co-operate in so far as could in any manner depend on him. It is uncertain whether the Court of Berlin has in view any, and what, objects of separate advantage in addition to that general benefit which would result from the restoration of the tranquillity and security of Europe. It seems therefore very important that the King of Prussia should, on the present occasion, be invited to explain himself confidentially and fully on this head, and to define and limit by precise stipulation the nature and extent of any such advantages, if any such are in his contemplation. It being sufficiently evident that there are many objects of this description which might, in a great variety of modes, be rendered consistent with the general principle of this plan, and with those which the Emperor of Russia has already recommended to the adoption of his allies in the negotiation above-mentioned.

"From the establishment of the general basis of treaty already laid down, the independence of Swisserland and Holland will necessarily follow; as well as the restoring to the German Empire those parts which were to be ceded to France by the negotiation of Rastadt, and the compelling the French to renounce the possession of Savoy and the Netherlands.

"But as these last Provinces cannot probably under all the circumstances which have occurred be replaced under the dominion of Austria, and as it may well be doubted whether these acquisitions would be an object of ambition to either of the two great German Powers, it will remain to be considered what plan will be most effectual to provide for the defence of this highly important barrier against the future encroachment of France. None has here occurred which is thought equally effectual and practicable as the uniting those Provinces to the Dutch Republic under the administration of a Stadholder, and with such provisions as may be best adapted to the maintenance of their respective civil and religious constitutions. But on this head His Majesty would willingly receive the suggestions of his ally, directed as he is confident they would be to the same object to which His Majesty looks, that of securing those Provinces as far as possible from again falling a prey to the restless ambition of France; a point the accomplishment of which must always be regarded by His Majesty as being at least equally important

with any other object in the whole range of the extensive interests which would be to be adjusted in such a negotiation.

"If it should be found practicable on discussion between the four Great Powers to agree on these leading and principal features of a future arrangement, the smaller objects which may be connected with them would, it is presumed, be easily adjusted, and His Majesty would propose that the whole plan should be guaranteed by all the four Powers to each other, and that they should enter into the most solemn engagements not to lay down their arms till it shall have been accomplished, and to exclude from the benefit of it any one amongst themselves who should in any respect deviate from the engagements to be thus taken both as to the objects themselves, and as to the means to be employed for their attainment.

"His Majesty has been induced by his entire reliance on the sentiments and principles of the Emperor of Russia to enable you to open yourself thus fully and confidentially on all the different points which respect the final settlement of Europe. But important as these details are, it is still more so that some adjustment should be made by the powerful intervention of the Emperor of Russia, who can alone quiet the jealousies of Austria and Prussia, and by his guarantee give to those Powers a confidence in the mutual execution of their engagements to each other. You will therefore labour to the utmost to induce the Russian Government to adopt, if not this precise plan, at least some definite plan grounded as much as possible on similar principles, and to authorize M. de Panin (or such other Minister as may be judged proper for the purpose if, contrary to His Majesty's wishes, any different choice should appear necessary) to enter in His Imperial Majesty's name into the necessary stipulations of guaranty, and of perseverance in the war till the objects in view shall have been accomplished.

"In the hope of your succeeding in these representations it is His Majesty's intention to send a minister to the Continent (and in the first instance to Berlin) amply instructed and empowered to treat and conclude on every point that may have reference to this important and extensive negotiation. This appointment will be announced to you as soon as it is regularly made, and it is probable that the person in question shall arrive at Berlin some time before any instructions from Petersburg, given in consequence of this dispatch, can reach that Court." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF ELGIN.

*Private.*

1798, November 17. Cleveland Row.—"I have hitherto delayed answering your letter from a desire to turn the subject fully over in my own mind, and to consider it as it regards both the public interests and your own situation, to which you do me only justice in believing that I shall not be inattentive on such an occasion. The more I have reflected on it the more satisfied I feel that the idea is in every point of view eligible, and that the appointment of a person of your rank and situation to that

embassy may be productive of material public benefit in a great variety of points. Under this impression I have taken the liberty to submit the idea to the King's consideration, and I have the satisfaction to find that His Majesty entirely approves of it. With your permission therefore I will immediately set about making the necessary arrangements; but before I speak to the Turkey company about it, which is one of the first things to be done, I should be glad to hear from you respecting the state of your health, and at what time you think you could without danger undertake such a voyage." *Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1798, November 17. Cleveland Row.—“I received your letter from Scotland respecting the permission to Denmark to export saltpetre directly from our Indian possessions. As I was then daily receiving similar applications from America and Portugal, I did not communicate to the Danish Minister your opinion that the permission might be granted, but have hitherto given him dilatory answers only.

“An idea has occurred to me that it might be better to let these powers specify their demand, and then that the East India Company might contract to deliver them that quantity here, within as short a time as they could themselves get it from India.

“You will best know whether this idea is worth any thing, or whether it is better to let them all have the permission to export t themselves from Bengal.”

THE EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 18. Fort William.—“I have received your kind letters of the 9th January, 11th April, 3rd May, 1st June, and 16th June, and also some letters of recommendation of different persons. I have written two or three short notes to you overland, and now, such is the continual pressure of my business here, that I fear I shall not have time to enter into one-tenth part of the topics which I should wish to talk over with you. In the first place let me express to you how strongly I feel your kindness to my family, of which I have not only found many proofs in all your letters, but have received particular accounts from Lady Mornington. I need not say that this is a new tie of friendship and affection between us, but the old are so numerous as not to require this addition. I was dreadfully shocked at the malicious and exaggerated account of the riot at Barbadoes, and most happy to hear that your mind and Lady Grenville's had been set at ease on that subject. I had heard from King of the state of your anxiety at the worst moment, and I resolved not to allude to it in any of my letters to you until I learnt the truth of the story from yourself.

“I return you many thanks for your zeal and diligence in the affair of the Chief Remembrancer's patent; I concur with your opinion entirely on every part of that question, and am very

much pleased with the manner in which the whole business was conducted. I trust entirely to you and to Pitt to put Richard's life into the reversion patent whenever circumstances may favour such a measure, or if any accident should happen to me.

"You will see that a voluntary contribution has taken place here; the sum from all India will be about 300,000*l.*, most of the subscriptions are annual during the war. You must recollect that now there exist few overgrown fortunes in India; the only capital among the civil and military servants is the annual saving of income, and the accumulation of that saving. The general rule adopted in the Company's service was to subscribe one month's salary annually during the war; I exceeded the rule by a few hundred pounds, in order to make up a round sum of 3,000*l.*, annual subscription. The general spirit of loyalty and zealous attachment to every right principle is very strong here; and in calling out the militia I have found great alacrity in the offers of personal service. I have been a colonel before, and am become one again; but, as you may believe, I am obliged to leave the details of the regiment to the lieutenant colonel commandant.

"I am most happy to find that all your blue devils are vanished, and that you are at length satisfied with the spirit and energy of England.

"I should be glad to have two sets of your Homer on large paper; but do not send them here. I should also wish for two sets of the small paper; one of which I should be glad to have sent out to me. The large paper will be a beautiful book; and this climate, from its various plagues of damp, heat, and insects, is fatal to books.

"My health has been much better on the whole since I have been here than I ever remember it to have been for so long a period in Europe; this I attribute to the great regularity of my life, and to the continual exertion of my mind, relieved by the great variety of the business of this vast empire. There is also something to be attributed to the constant sense of good intentions, accompanied by a very large powers of putting them into execution. To these considerations I think I may add the complete success of whatever I have attempted, and the prospect of the approbation and applause of every man at home who understands the interests of India, and is attached to those of Great Britain. Lastly, although my household is magnificent, and my table open to every respectable person in the settlement, and to all new comers, I find my savings far greater than I expected. Under these circumstances I think it not impossible that your dream of Clifden may be realized; it so happens that it is a favorite castle in the air of my own. You will observe that our joint castle of governing the world is no longer a baseless fabric; and when you have read the papers annexed to this, you will perhaps not think me a *sleeping partner* of your throne. But all this vision will vanish, unless you send Lady Mornington out to me by the next ships. There is now no objection to her appearance, as my authority and character are perfectly



established ; and I believe you know enough of her character to be satisfied that no part of her conduct will ever be injurious to me. Her society here is absolutely necessary to my comfort ; and without her, I fear, I shall not have fortitude to remain here long enough to accomplish all my grand Financial, Political, Military, Naval, Commercial, Architectural, Judicial, Policial Reforms, and to make up as large a Treasure as Aboulcasem of Basras (Bassora's ?). All this might be effected within five or six years from the day of my embarkation at Cowes. But I leave you to judge of the necessity of her society while I give you some idea of my private life. I rise early, and go out before breakfast, which is always over between eight and nine. From that hour until four (in the hot weather) I remain at work, unless I go to council, or to church on Sundays ; at five I dine, and drive out in the evening. At present, I drive out at five, and dine a little after six. No constitution here can bear the sun in the middle of the day at any season of the year, nor the labour of business in an evening. After dinner therefore nobody attempts to write or read, and, in general, it is thought necessary to avoid even meetings on subjects of business at that time ; for, in this climate, good or ill health depends upon a minute attention to circumstances apparently the most trivial. Thus in the evening I have no alternative but the society of my subjects, or solitude. The former is so vulgar, ignorant, rude, familiar, and stupid as to be disgusting and intolerable ; especially the ladies, not one of whom, by the bye, is even decently well-looking. The greatest inconvenience, however, arises from the ill-bred familiarity of the general manners ; this evil is chiefly to be attributed to the folly of having placed Sir John Shore in the government general. His low birth, vulgar manners, and Eastern habits, as well as his education in the Company's service, his natural shyness and awkwardness, added to indolence, timidity, and bad health, contributed to relax every spring of this government from one extremity of the empire to the other ; and at the seat of the government established a systematical degradation of the person, dignity, and authority of the Governor General. This is the true character of the last government ; never did there exist in India one more inefficient in its control over the subordinate presidencies, more careless or timid with respect to all our foreign relations, more incorrect and even partial with respect to the distribution of patronage, nor (to complete the picture) one so little feared or respected by any branch of the civil or military service, or by any description of natives or Europeans residing at the very seat of the supreme power. All this is quite for your private information. The effect of this state of things on my conduct has been to compel me to intrench myself within forms and ceremonies, to introduce much state into the whole appearance of my establishments and household, to expel all approaches to familiarity, and to exercise my authority with a degree of vigour and strictness nearly amounting to severity. At the same time I endeavour, as much as it is compatible with the duties imposed on me by the remissness of Sir John Shore, to

render my table pleasant to those whom I admit to it, and to be easy of access to everybody. I am resolved to encounter the task of effecting a thorough reform in private manners here; without which the time is not distant when the Europeans settled at Calcutta will control the government, if they do not overturn it. My temper and character are now perfectly understood; and while I remain, no man will venture *hiscere vocem* who has not made his mind up to grapple instantly with the whole force of government. But it required some unpleasant efforts to place matters on this footing; and you must perceive that I am forced to fly to solitude for a large portion of the twenty-four hours, lest I should weaken my means of discharging my public duty.

"Your sally is very good, particularly the parody of *Πρὶς Στράζου*, but the bishops must have been in a very high state of twadley not to have smoked you. I am sick of Europe, excepting England; there, I have just now told Pitt, you have at length taken your station on an impregnable position, if any can be so in these times—*Huc tandem concede, hæc ara tuebitur, omnes aut moriére simul*.

"With respect to Asia I refer you to the annexed papers, which however (as I know Dundas to be a little jealous of interference in Indian politics) you will not say you have received from me; but you will ask him to state his opinion on my conduct, and to furnish you with the means of judging it. I will avow honestly to you (and you know how fastidious I have always been with respect to my own public exertions) my conscientious belief that to my single effort is to be attributed the salvation of your Indian empire from the greatest danger which has ever threatened it. Read the papers according to their numbers, and not to their dates. Your indignation will be raised against my old friend\* Lord Hobart's petty faction among the *commis* and subordinate military officers at Fort St. George. But I entreat you to urge Pitt and Dundas to fulminate instantly against that faction, and to call on me to dart the bolts which I have shaken, but delayed to strike; without this, my authority is gone; and although I have not directly said so to Dundas (for obvious reasons) I tell you that, if this be not done, I will instantly put the government into Clarke's hands, according to my powers, and return home.

"You will enjoy my gentle conquest of an army of fourteen thousand men under the command of French officers in the service of the Nizam. My dispatches do not mention a curious fact, that the standard of this army was the *Tricolor Flag*; the only one of that description erected on the continent of India. This standard has fallen into my hands; and I shall send it home as the best comment upon the whole policy of making an effort to crush the French influence in India.

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\* Dundas will show you my private and secret correspondence, which will explain this passage.

"Nelson's glorious victory, the accounts of the state of Buonaparte's army, and the vigilance of our squadron on the coast of Malabar and at the mouth of the Red Sea (where I hope Blanket is by this time arrived) will probably preclude the French from aiding Tippoo for this season. If they should come, be it remembered that I called out the army in the Carnatic and on the coast of Malabar on the 20th of June; that, on the 8th of July, I ordered measures to be taken for the subversion of the French party at Hyderabad; and that on the 22nd of October I had completely annihilated that party, the existence of which would have proved the most powerful obstacle to a successful war with Mysore, and the source of most effectual assistance and co-operation to France. I admire beyond all Greek, Roman, British, or any fame, the provident, bold, and (as it deserved) gloriously prosperous measure of reinforcing Lord St. Vincent in the face of a menaced invasion and of an existing rebellion at home. Never was a public measure taken with more wisdom or spirit. I cannot doubt that this success must awaken Europe, unless she be for ever fallen, but I trust it must also prove a substantial reduction of the power, resources, and audacity of the enemy.

"I have told Dundas that I trust those who were the advisers of this measure will not condemn me for having detached a force from the Carnatic (in the face of Tippoo's menaces and of the clamours of the Hobartins) for the purpose of crushing the French party in India before it could be reinforced from France.

"I was not surprised at the Irish rebellion; you have taken the best preliminary step to the restoration of order in sending Lord Cornwallis, but I hope you will not suffer the difficulties of an Union to delay or prevent that necessary measure. They are great, but they never appeared to me insuperable; you must found the Union on the most comprehensive basis so as to leave no room for future claims of justice, and, with this view, you must not shut your eyes to the question of the Roman Catholic pretensions. I am most happy to hear of the gallant and honorable conduct of Lord Buckingham in offering his services in Ireland. There is a story of Lord Abercorn which forms a striking contrast with your brother's conduct.

"The account of Pitt's duel made me tremble. I am happy the effect of it was such as you describe; his own complete heroism I never doubted; but I felt it disgraced in being opposed to so base-born an antagonist. I must tell you, because Pitt's modesty I suppose will not permit him to mention it, the *bon mot* of the Advocate-General of Bengal on the subject. He has lodged all his fortune in the English three per cent. consols. He said: 'I do not understand by what right Mr. Pitt has suffered Mr. Tierney to fire two shots at my three per cent. consols.' This *bon mot* contains all that can be said of this perilous duel; I hope this will be the last shot at the consols.

"I delight in the *Anti Jacobin*; the American negociation, and Stone's letters; your preface is excellent.

"I assure you I have never yet mounted an elephant, although I must confess that I believe the circumstance is to be attributed

merely to the accident of my not having been at liberty to visit the upper provinces. Here they are not much used, as they frighten horses and ladies. At Fort George the Nabob of Arcot visited me with twenty elephants adorned with splendid castles, and a number of palankins of all shapes from a snake to a peacock.

“My next letters shall contain some account of the appearance of the country, ceremonies, *et cetera*. I trust you will continue to favor me with your friendly letters (Tippoo’s constant conclusion); write anything and everything; it is a comfort not to be conceived by any person who has never been so far removed from heaven and heaven’s light, to receive a good dispatch from England.

“I send you by Mr. Stokes, the bearer of this letter, a collection of plants and seeds from our Botanical Garden; you shall have a better collection soon. If Lady Grenville wants anything from Cabul to Assam, let her command her slave. I desire to recommend Mr. Stokes very particularly.

“There remain two or three points on which I am anxious to say a few words.

“If Lady Mornington should come out to me, it would be very desirable that the Queen should be prevailed on to receive her at Court before her departure. I know you will give any assistance you can to carry this point. I have not mentioned as particularly as I ought to have done my sense of your kindness in bringing Richard to Dropmore, and in examining his progress; pray work him well. I need not recommend my boys to your protection, in the event of Lady Mornington’s leaving them.

“If I have not formed an unjust or extravagant estimate of the service which I have rendered here, it will probably occur to you in England to confer some mark of honour upon me which may tend to strengthen my hands, and to raise my authority and consideration as well among the inhabitants of the Company’s provinces and with the subordinate governments as with the native princes and powers. Do not suppose me to be a second Abercorn when I tell you that, on principles of public policy, you ought to do something of this kind (if you approve my service); and that no honor which the King can give is too high for this office, of which the magnitude and splendor cannot be either overrated or too much extended. The Garter was given to Lord Cornwallis before he had done anything here; and an arrangement was made by which it was given to him when no vacancy existed. ‘*Nos, ut nondum iidem,*’ yet may pretend to have struck a blow which has remedied in a great measure the main error of the treaty of Seringapatam, and enabled us to reduce the power of Tippoo within due bounds. The Garter sent to me in India as the reward of my late treaty and of my orders for assembling the army in the face of all counteraction, would give a degree of vigour to my power which I should not abuse; means might be taken (even if there should be no vacancy), of creating one, by making foreign princes supernumerary knights; or it might at

once be laid down as a rule, that *graat* merit in the *graat* administration of this *graat* Empire might be a case for the extension of the number of knights; for I have always understood that this honor is considered as the peculiar reward of statesmanly service. This is the only honor which I should feel with real pride. But if this be not done, I really think my rank in the peerage ought to be raised. Perhaps it might then be practicable and desirable to obtain the remainder for Richard in default of legitimate male issue, and it might also be proper to give my daughters their rank as if legitimate, as was done in the case of Lady Mary Churchill. All this is stated *sub modo*, supposing you to agree in my estimate of my services. I have said nothing to Dundas or Pitt on this subject; you will talk to them and to the Speaker upon it, if you please, and if you find that my conduct has made the impression which I expect. If the Garter were to be sent to me, I dare say Lord Clive would very readily accept the pinchbeck. This gives me occasion to say that he is a worthy, zealous, obedient, and gentlemanlike man, of excellent temper; but neither of talents, knowledge, habits of business, or firmness of spirit equal to his present situation. How the devil did he get there? Did he go thither merely in the hope of supplanting me? Was he encouraged in that hope? or *ideo ne tantum renerit ut exiret*? While I am talking to you of myself, I wish to apprise you that if anything should ever happen to Dundas to remove him from the Presidency of the Board of Control, I look to that situation in Cabinet as my *meta viarum*. If you can find anybody more likely to satisfy you in it, put him there; let Pitt know this idea of mine at a proper time. The President of the Board of Control ought to have no other business but India. Dundas knows and feels this, and the public will soon feel it also, if they have not done so already.

“God bless you. It is a great delight to me to perceive in all your letters and conduct since my absence that all this dreadful space of half the convex world which obtrudes between us has not impaired your regard.”

*Postscript.* “I rely on you to state my conduct to our royal master with every degree of advantage.

“I suppose Lady Grenville would not like a *chicken rhinoceros*! I have sent one home not more than a year old; it was a *nuzzen* from the Nabob of Dacca. Rhinoceroses do not come within the law.”

*Enclosure:—*

*Extract of a general letter from the Right Honourable the Governor General to the Honourable the Court of Directors.*

1798, November 21. Fort William.—“While I was engaged in considering the means of improving the internal order and management of your finances, I received intelligence which led me to apprehend the approach of a war with Tippoo Sultan aided by a French force. Your Secret Committee is in possession

of this intelligence, of which the result on my mind was a firm conviction that the safety of your possessions in the peninsula of India demanded that your armies should be placed in an active and early state of preparation for war. Accordingly, having apprized the governor of Fort St. George as early as the 8th of June of my apprehensions of the designs of the enemy, and having directed his attention to the probability of our being involved in hostilities, on the 26th of June I issued my final orders to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay for calling your armies into the field on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. These orders have been executed, and I trust that the subsequent disclosure of the projects entertained by France against the British empire in India, and the adventurous and daring spirit with which those projects have been prosecuted, will sufficiently justify to your Honorable Court the measures of precaution which I deemed it my duty to adopt for the defence of your territories; although the immediate effect of those measures has necessarily occasioned a large increase of your expenses, a diminution of your commercial investment, and a suspension of the improvements which I had hoped to have accomplished in the state of your pecuniary affairs.

"It would have been a most improvident and mistaken economy to have hazarded the permanent safety of the British empire in India, and to have abandoned the sources of your commercial prosperity without defence to the attack of the enemy, for the purpose of preserving a specious and delusive appearance of security in a conjuncture of real danger.

"I am persuaded that the wisdom and justice of your Honorable Court will readily approve the policy of sacrificing a degree of temporary advantage to the important object of providing an effectual protection for the foundations of your trade and revenue, and for the lasting tranquillity of your possessions in India.

"Under the expectation of an approaching war with Tippoo Sultan aided by the French, the state of our alliances with the country powers became an anxious object of my consideration.

"I have submitted a full detail of my opinions and proceedings upon this subject to your Secret Committee; but it is my duty in this place to request the attention of your Honorable Court to the condition in which I found our alliance with his highness the Nizam, and to the happy improvement which circumstances have enabled me to effect in the nature of our connection with that prince.

"The corps commanded by French officers in the service of the Nizam which, during the last war with Mysore, amounted to no more than 1,500 men, and was at that period of time so defective in point of discipline as to be rather an object of contempt than of jealousy to your governments in India, had gradually augmented its numbers and improved its discipline under the command of the late Monsieur Raymond, until at the period of my arrival in India it had nearly reached the number of 14,000 men, and had attained a degree of discipline superior

in every respect to that of any native infantry in India, excepting the sepoys entertained in your service.

"The corps formed the largest and most efficient branch of the military establishment of his Highness, and the French officers had acquired a considerable ascendancy in his dominions, and had manifested on several occasions the symptoms of a disposition so arrogant, overbearing, and adventurous as to excite alarm in the minds of his Highness and of his ministers. Although his Highness had entered into no engagement or obligation which in any degree bound him to retain this party in his service, and although their sudden dismissal would at any moment have been warranted by every principle of justice, and their continuance at Hyderabad threatened the independence if not the existence of his Highness's throne, yet the Nizam and his ministers confessed their inability to check the growth of a power of which they acknowledged the dangerous influence, and dreaded the destructive effect.

"The principles of the French officers commanding this army were avowedly the same with those of the persons who for some time past have exercised the powers of government in France, and their enmity to the British interests was declared on all occasions. While this army, commanded by Frenchmen of such principles and views, and of such uncontrolled power, remained in the service of the Nizam, his Highness's alliance must have proved a source rather of danger than advantage to the Company in the event of a war with Tippoo Sultan; and that danger would have been greatly aggravated by any coöperation which might have been afforded to Tippoo from France. Various other considerations will occur to the wisdom and experience of your Honorable Court to prove the direct and collateral effects which the existence of a numerous armed French party in the centre of the Deccan must have produced, whether in time of war or of peace, upon the whole frame of your political interests in India. Under these circumstances the expulsion of the French party from the Court of Hyderabad appeared to me to be a necessary part of that system of precaution and defence by which I hoped to be enabled either to encounter the pressure of war or to secure the advantages of peace.

"With these views, on the 6th of July I instructed the Acting Resident at Hyderabad to open a negotiation with his Highness the Nizam, proposing an addition to the British detachment serving at Hyderabad, and stipulating for the dismissal of the corps commanded by French officers in his Highness's service.

"A new subsidiary treaty founded on this basis, and embracing other collateral arrangements (particularly such conditions as appeared necessary for the removal of all causes of jealousy, and for the restoration of union and concord between our two allies the Pishwah and the Nizam) was signed by his Highness at Hyderabad on the 1st of September, and ratified by me in council on the 18th of the same month.

"By this treaty an increase is made in the British subsidiary force serving with his Highness of 4,400 men, and an increase

in the annual subsidy paid by his Highness of about nineteen lacs of rupees; the former subsidy having been 53,713 Arcot rupees *per mensem*, and the subsidy under the new treaty being 201,425 Arcot rupees *per mensem*, or 2,417,100 Arcot rupees *per annum*.

"The substance of this treaty was communicated to the Pishwah both previously and subsequently to its conclusion, and at both periods he expressed his entire approbation of the nature and tendency of the new engagements, as well in their operation upon the interests of the Mahrattah empire as upon those of the Nizam.

"On the 13th of July I ordered the government of Fort St. George to assemble such a force in the Guntoor circar as might enable me to fulfill the subsidiary engagements of the Company under the new treaty at the earliest possible period subsequent to its conclusion. This measure was executed with the utmost degree of promptitude and alacrity by Lieutenant-General Harris (at that time uniting in his person the offices of Governor of Fort St. George and Commander in Chief on the coast of Coromandel) to whose zeal, public spirit, and prompt obedience on all occasions wherein I have entrusted him with the execution of my orders, I am happy to be able to bear this public testimony.

"The British detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts reached Hyderabad on the 10th October, and on the 22nd of October, under the orders of his Highness the Nizam, and with the coöperation of a body of his cavalry, surrounded the camp of the French army, disarmed all the sepoys, and secured the persons of all the French officers then in the camp. This operation was happily effected without bloodshed and without contest. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the sepoys having imprisoned their officers, the Resident at Hyderabad and Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, with the consent of the Nizam, judiciously availed themselves of this favorable opportunity to execute this important measure without difficulty or danger.

"The amount of the French force disarmed on this occasion was about 11,000 men, from which circumstance your Honourable Court will observe that a part of the corps was absent on detachment. Measures have been taken for the arrest of those who commanded the detached force. The French officers, by my particular orders, were treated with every practicable degree of attention and humanity. At the period of their arrest by our troops their persons were in confinement and their lives in danger from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greatest difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered was that of rescuing the imprisoned officers from the violence of their own sepoys. Particular care was taken to save the property of the officers for their use, as well as to obtain from them such arrears of pay and allowances as were due to them from his Highness. Captain Kirkpatrick informs me that he has been completely successful in effecting both these desirable objects. The French officers are



now on their passage to this Presidency on board the Bombay frigate which I had previously stationed at Masulipatam for their accommodation.

"On their arrival at Calcutta it is my intention to receive them with the consideration due to their respective ranks, and to allow them every indulgence compatible with the security of their persons. I propose to send them to Europe by the earliest opportunity, using the precaution of dispersing them in different ships.

"On their arrival in England I have engaged that they shall not be treated as prisoners of war, but shall be immediately transported to France, without suffering any detention for an exchange of prisoners.

"The treaty under which this measure was executed has been already forwarded overland to your Secret Committee, and it now forms a number of the secret dispatch by the *Eurydice*.

"The effect of the measure will I trust be highly favourable to your political interests in the peninsula of India. The British subsidiary force now stationed in the dominions of his Highness the Nizam, while it must tend to cement the connexion between the Company and that prince, and to render him a more useful and efficient ally in the event of war, will operate at all times as an effectual protection to your possessions in the northern circars; and the total subversion of the French influence in the Deccan, under all the circumstances of the present moment, is an event from which I expect to derive not only additional security for your territories, but for the general tranquillity of India.

"Among your servants who have been concerned in the execution of my orders on this occasion I have already recommended Lieutenant-General Harris to your favourable notice. To his name it is my duty to add those of Captain Kirkpatrick and of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts. I found the former in the situation of acting Resident at Hyderabad, and to his zeal, address, discretion, and firmness I attribute the early success of the negotiation intrusted to his management.

"Upon the resignation of Colonel Kirkpatrick I took occasion to manifest my sense of Captain Kirkpatrick's merits by appointing him Resident at the court of the Nizam.

"To the ability and temper of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, acting under the judicious instructions of the Resident, I attribute the complete and satisfactory execution of the articles of the treaty relating to the dismissal of the French army; and his conciliatory and humane conduct towards the officers deserves the highest commendation.

"The rumours which have prevailed of the intended approach of Zeman Shah to the frontier of Hindostan, although of a vague and contradictory nature, appeared to me not wholly undeserving of attention; and I have the satisfaction to inform you that every possible precaution has been taken for the effectual defence of the frontier of Oude.

"I am happy to be able to inform you that although I found the subsidy of the Nabob Vizier considerably in arrears, I have

succeeded in persuading his Excellency to discharge a large part of it ; and in justice to his Excellency I am bound to declare that I have found him sincerely disposed to fulfil his engagements under the treaty concluded by Lord Teignmouth, and to manifest on every occasion a cordial attachment to the interests of the Company. The situation of affairs on the coast of Coromandel, and the necessity of providing against the possible event of a war with Tippoo Sultan, have hitherto prevented me from visiting the upper provinces. But I have not been unmindful of the affairs of Oude, and I trust that I shall soon be able to turn my undivided attention to the improvement of the civil and military establishments of the Nabob Vizier.

“ Although I have deemed it my duty to call your armies into the field in every part of India, my views and expectations are all directed to the preservation of peace, which, in the present crisis, cannot otherwise be secured than by a state of forward preparation for war. In the meanwhile you may rely on my unremitting efforts to confine your expenses within the most narrow limits, and to raise your commercial investment to the highest scale compatible with the indispensable necessity of providing for the security of your possessions.” *Copy.*

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 21. Dublin.—“ Lord Shannon will support the union cordially, and there does not seem a doubt but that Parliament will approve it, provided there could be the means found of repairing the mischief occasioned by this suspension of the martial law, which has done away all confidence of every sort. I have laboured most indefatigably, by every means short of direct communication, to make Lord Cornwallis feel the necessity of resuming his military powers ; but he is determined to view the whole as a *legal question*, and to refer it as such to his lawyers, who of course can give him but one answer. I still however do not despair through Cooke and Lord Castlereagh (who agree with me) to urge him to resume it as a *state question*, and to apply for an indemnity to satisfy his legal doubts ; but, if we cannot prevail, I cannot entertain the idea of continuing in Ireland upon duties which we cannot perform ; and I should deceive you much if I gave you any very sanguine hopes of being able to keep my regiment here, even if I wished it.

“ I am made very happy by Tom’s mission, for I have every confidence in his *savoir*, and the temptation you hold out to him of signing the ruin of French democracy is the proudest bait you could offer to him.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 23. Dublin.—“ I have had a very long visit from Lord Castlereagh upon the subject of the British militia, which ended in his requesting me (from the Lord Lieutenant) not to do anything upon the subject of endeavouring to induce my men to re-engage to serve.

"You will see however that I have, out of all this, drawn from Lord Cornwallis an authorized disavowal of all his imbecility, and a direct assurance of his support of *us*, in our quality of military *versus* the civil courts. You will already have heard that he has sent orders to Castlebar to refuse obedience to citizen's Moore's *habeas corpus*, and to make a special return upon it, in which measure *I may say to you that I have much merit.*"

"We must bring our Catholics to some explicit understanding. It will be asked of you whether *your legate* Erskine is to be trusted as an instrument in leading that silly and headstrong flock to a proper understanding with Government. They are certainly very well disposed, and if we could get a system for Protestant church ascendancy, including tithe and other regulations, and for Catholic and Presbyterian subordination connected with Government, that which has convulsed Ireland for centuries might be *teres atque rotundus.*"

"Lord Shannon, Lord Ely, both *for*. So are *all* the chief Judges *cum multis aliis*, such as Lord Abercorn, Downshire, Northland, Longueville, Altamont, O'Neil, and Ormonde. *Conolly* very eager for it. G. Ponsonby is come over to lead the bar against it. The South are to a man for it."

*Postscript.* "For God's sake, no Commissioners nor Privy Council; but send the whole by King's message to the two Parliaments with all the documents, for you must not keep the public mind too long upon it."

#### LE DUC DE HARCOURT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 25. London.—"La dernière fois que j'ai eu l'honneur de voir Votre Excellence, elle a désiré que je luy fasse parvenir L'état Général des Forces de la République. Je le joins ici, l'ayant reçu hier, et j'ai lieu de croire qu'il est exact. Je suis fâché que l'on n'y ait pas ajouté particulièrement l'état de l'armée de Buonaparte. Mais comme elle diminue tous les jours, il est vraisemblable que l'on ignore l'effectif auquel elle est reduite actuellement. Je mettrai toujours le même empressement à remplir les comissions que vous me donnerez, et à vous informer de tout ce que je croirai utile ou agréable à votre Excellence."

#### *Enclosure.*

A statement of the strength of the French Army, from which its effective force in Europe at this time appears to have been 274,000 men of all arms.

*Postscript by Lord Grenville.* "By Mr. Jackson's letter of 18 October, 1798, it appears that, with the reinforcements then on their march, the French Army in Italy would amount to 80,000 men, of which from 12 to 16,000 were stationed in the fortresses of Piedmont."

#### M. DE LUC TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 26. Berlin.—"Monsieur Garlike ayant eu la bonté de me faire savoir qu'il avoit aujourd'hui une occasion

sûre d'envoyer un paquet à Votre Excellence, je prends la liberté d'en profiter pour lui communiquer mes observations depuis la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui écrire le 4<sup>me</sup> de ce mois.

“L'affaire du Prince de Ratzivill est connue de Votre Excellence, ainsi je me bornerai à ses conséquences à l'égard de M. de Haugwitz ; suites qui appuient ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui dire dans ma dernière sur la haine que le parti François porte à ce Ministre depuis qu'on voit sa résolution de lui résister. La douceur du Roi envers le Prince coupable a enhardi ce parti ; les Princes oncles du Roi ont pris fait et cause pour ce Prince ; et tandis que la résolution prise contre lui étoit un acte du Cabinet dont M. de H[augwitz] avoit été le dernier à connoître la cause, comme déchargé maintenant par son propre désir des affaires de l'intérieur, on a jetté les hauts cris contre lui ; le public a suivi cette impulsion, et le Prince Henri se sentant ainsi appuyé, a osé demander au Roi le renvoy de ce Ministre, déclarant qu'il ne resteroit pas à Berlin tant qu'il demeureroit en place.

“Cependant on a bientôt été informé que, loin que M. de H[augwitz] fût le promoteur de cette affaire, lorsqu'elle avoit été portée au conseil par le Ministre chargé des affaires intérieures, il avoit été de l'avis d'agir avec ménagement. Mais alors on a changé l'attaque, et on l'a rendue par-là plus fâcheuse pour lui, en y entraînant aussi des personnes bien opposées au parti qui la suscite ; on a prétendu qu'il n'avoit conseillé au Roi les mesures douces que parcequ'il avoit été complice du Prince dans le temps où il écrivit la lettre qui fait le délit.

“Dans ces accusations contradictoires, procédant d'un même parti, on voit le but d'attaquer ce Ministre *per fas vel nefas* ; on cherche des prétextes, et à mettre en jeu l'ambition ; de sorte qu'entre les personnes qui ne se livrent pas à ces menées, et qui n'ont aucune vue particulière, il y en a qui craignent que, pour conjurer cet orage manifestement élevé par le parti François, M. de H[augwitz] ne devienne temporisateur, et qu'on ne puisse plus attendre de lui la fermeté qu'il avoit commencé à montrer depuis quelque temps.

“L'amitié que ce ministre veut bien me témoigner m'a mis à portée de suivre l'impression que cette affaire a faite sur lui, de même que ce qui pourroit en resulter chez le Roi. J'ai vu chez le premier tout le calme d'un homme qui ne se reproche rien, et je crois qu'il l'auroit conservé même si le Roi se fût laissé prévenir. Je ne l'entends accuser par personne ni de vues ambitieuses, ni de tirer vanité ou avantages personnels de sa place ; il a une grande simplicité de vie et de manières, et je crois qu'il quitteroit cette place avec sérénité s'il perdoit la confiance du Roi ; mais il m'a assuré qu'il n'avoit pas lieu de le craindre, et que rien n'ébranleroit le plan de conduite qu'il s'étoit formé pour sauver la Prusse et l'Europe de leur danger actuel.

“Quant aux affaires générales, je ne pourrois rien dire à votre Excellence de leur malheureuse stagnation qu'elle ne connoisse bien mieux que moi ; je me bornerai donc aussi à cet égard à ce qui concerne M. de H[augwitz]. Quoiqu'on ne puisse encore

persuader quelques personnes de sa sincérité dans les dispositions qu'il montre depuis un certain temps, et que je voye même leur résistance à cet égard s'accroître depuis cette perspective qu'il pourroit être culbuté, je ne saurois découvrir aucune raison de doute, et je regarderois comme fort malheureux qu'il y en eût de fondés; car le nombre des hommes qui pourroient le remplacer n'est pas grand, et quand on en fait le tour, je ne vois personne qui eût plus la confiance de bons juges. Quand aussi l'on demande ce qu'il faudroit que ce Ministre fit de plus pour persuader qu'il est sincère dans les dispositions qu'il professe, personne ne peut l'indiquer; car tant que la Cour de Vienne tient la même conduite, on ne sauroit penser qu'il convint à la Prusse de s'avancer au delà de sa vigilance sur la ligne de démarcation.

“Voilà ce dont M. le Comte de Panin me paroît persuadé; et trouvant aussi que M. de Stamford avoit déjà formé le même jugement d'après la correspondance de ce ministre avec Monseigneur le Duc de Br[unswick], et qu'il avoit la même idée sur la nécessité qu'il demeure en place, j'ai cru qu'il y auroit de l'avantage à tâcher de produire entr'eux la même relation qui existe maintenant avec M. le Comte de Panin. Pour cet effet j'ai commencé à parler de M. de Stamford comme j'en pense avec M. de H[augwitz]. Il m'a d'abord témoigné franchement qu'il savoit que lui et Monseigneur le Prince Hér[éditaire] d'Orange avoient tâché de lui ôter la confiance du Roi. Personne n'étoit plus à portée que moi de lever cet obstacle en lui rappelant celui de nos entretiens dans lequel je lui avois avoué que, dans le même temps où le Prince et M. de Stamford en agissoient ainsi, je pensois et agissois comme eux; mais que l'un et l'autre, ainsi que moi, nous avions dès lors changé l'idée. ‘C'est ainsi (ajoutai-je) que votre Excellence trouvera M. de Stamford. Il y a cinq à six ans que toutes nos pensées sont communes, ainsi que nos sentimens, sur les affaires politiques. Nous avons vu séparément de bonne heure le danger de tous les états; nous avons déploré ensemble qu'on ne prit pas les mesures nécessaires pour s'en garantir; et nous blâmions tous ceux que nous pensions y mettre obstacle. Jamais nous n'y avons rien mis de personnel; quand nous avons agi, ç'a été par notre propre mouvement, et uniquement en vue du bien. Tel est donc l'homme que v[otre] E[xc]cellence trouvera dans M. de Stamford, avec de grandes lumières militaires et politiques, et la confiance bien précieuse de Monseigneur le Duc de B[runswick], fruit d'une longue expérience de s'a[bl]tesse s[érénissime]. Quand vous vous serez bien connus l'un et l'autre, je suis sûr que ce sera un moyen de vous entr'aider pour un même but.’ M. de H[augwitz] me témoigna sa satisfaction de cet éclaircissement, d'autant plus qu'il devoit voir M. de Stamford le jour même, qui étoit hier, de sorte que je n'ai pu savoir encore ce qui s'étoit passé.

“Dans tous les entretiens que j'ai eu d'ailleurs avec ce Ministre depuis la dernière lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur d'écrire à

Votre Excellence, son langage a été uniforme, et je crois pouvoir le réduire sous deux points de vue, ayant pour base commune sa persuasion, aujourd'hui complète, qu'il ne peut y avoir que malheur pour l'Europe à laisser la France, telle qu'elle est, en possession des pays qu'elle occupe aujourd'hui. C'est d'après cela, dis-je, que l'état des choses se présente à ses yeux sous deux points de vue, d'après ces questions : la Cour de Vienne ouvrira-t-elle enfin les yeux et se résoudra-t-elle à la guerre ? Ou fera-t-elle encore quelque traité avec les François ? Dans le premier cas, il faut que la guerre devienne générale, que chacun concoure à délivrer l'Europe ; dans le dernier, il faut songer à la sûreté de tout le Nord. Or, dans l'un et l'autre cas, dit M. de H[augwitz], les intérêts de la Prusse et de l'Angleterre sont évidemment communs, et ils ne diffèrent qu'en ce qu'il faut l'action immédiate dans le premier, au lieu que dans le dernier il faudroit se concerter éventuellement avec les autres puissances du Nord. Le moment de la décision peut venir lorsqu'on y penseroit le moins, et il seroit à souhaiter qu'on n'eût pas alors tout à faire pour s'entendre. 'C'est ce que je vous ai déjà témoigné' (me dit-il en dernier lieu avec un air significatif). 'Vous savez que je vous ai dit qu'on ne pouvoit rien entamer encore officiellement ; mais que je voudrois que vous pussiez me dire, entre amis qui se parlent à cœur ouvert, que la confiance mutuelle règne assez entre l'Angleterre et la Prusse pour qu'on puisse être sûr de s'entendre bientôt, avec même résolution d'employer chacun ses moyens.'

"Je puis dire en général que dès le temps même où j'étois le plus mécontent de la conduite de ce ministre, par sa temporisation et ses relations mêmes avec les François, dont aujourd'hui je vois les causes principales dans les illusions, je lui ai toujours ouï tenir le même langage à l'égard de l'Angleterre ; par où il m'a attaché depuis que je le connois mieux, parceque je vois un parti bien décidé contre lui pour cela seul. Les villes veulent le commerce de mer et des manufactures. La *Société maritime*, en particulier, repandue partout, qui a à sa tête le ministre de ce département, et des actionnaires parmi les gens de toute classe, s'est laissé entraîner par le parti François à la jalousie contre les Anglois ; et on a fait passer ce sentiment dans le public, à cause des hauts prix du sucre, du café, du thé. Ces gens-là sont infatués de l'idée absurde qu'il y auroit du commerce par mer pour toutes les nations qui ont des ports, si les François abattoient la puissance Anglaise, et que Buonaparte pénétrât dans l'Inde. Voilà, dis-je, ce que j'entends moi-même ; et M. de H[augwitz] en m'en parlant, m'a cité entr'autres un époque où voyant qu'on travailloit fortement auprès du feu Roi pour le faire entrer dans ces vues, après avoir représenté à sa Majesté les raisons propres à la convaincre que ceux qui lui tenoient un tel langage vouloient sa perte et celle de son royaume, il lui déclara qu'il abandonneroit sa place au moment où un tel système prévaudroit ; mais il convainquit le Roi.

"Néanmoins, ce parti, aveuglement intéressé, subsiste toujours ; et toujours aussi il est prêt à se joindre à ceux qui

attaquent M. de H[augwitz]. Il s'est de couverture à toutes les menées Françaises, de prétexte à toutes les insinuations, tantôt à l'orgueil national, tantôt aux intérêts particuliers, contre le ministre qui résiste.

"Je ne puis donc m'empêcher de penser qu'il mérite la confiance de l'Angleterre, et j'ai lieu de croire qu'il éprouveroit de la satisfaction à en recevoir quelque assurance à l'occasion de toutes ses explications avec moi sur ce sujet; car quoiqu'il me traite en ami, il ne doit pas penser qu'elles soient pour moi seul."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November 26. Dublin.—"I do indeed share your impatience for continental movement; but it must be on condition that you share mine for the union, which seems to slacken on your side of the water more than on this, where it certainly gains ground every day. I do not see why it must necessarily take up '*six months*,' for I cannot conceive the necessity of all the preliminaries of Privy Council, committees, and so forth, which are only so many invitations for exhibition of talents of controversy, and for delay. In point of form and of propriety I can see no reason why the King (the common centre) should not lay before the Houses of both kingdoms a project and papers. I will exert myself and do *l'impossible* to urge my regiment to stay for such an object; but I agree with you that, if this object cannot be obtained, there is not the shadow of reason for continuing us here, when our return would certainly facilitate the second edition of the same undertaking. All I beg is that, upon no consideration, may it be told us that we are *compellable* by law to stay. By the bye you did very unhandsomely by us not to give us a slice of compliment in the King's speech, for the zeal of 12,000 such volunteers ought to have [been] treated more handsomely, though we should not have expected all the panegyric that fell to the share of Lord Nelson. I cannot tell you how eager all the South, and indeed all the Catholics, are for the Union. Ponsonby is doing all the mischief he can with the Bar, and Lord Charlemont, who is doting, is as loud as he can be; but I hear of nothing else except Lord Enniskillen, who takes this mode of resenting, *for the present*, the ill-usage which he has personally received, and which, *entre nous*, was the most *illegal* and wanton attack ever made."

#### HEADS OF A UNION WITH IRELAND.

1798, November.

##### Article 1.

The kingdoms to be united; the style to be the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

Succession to remain as by the existing laws.

Ensigns armorial to be settled by the Crown.

Proposed plan of representation.

32 Lords.

6 Spiritual } to be elected by  
26 Temporal } each body respectively.

Query, whether the election of bishops should not be annual, in order to avoid the giving any plea for a constant non-residence.

100 Commoners.

To be chosen as follows:—  
The whole of the rights of election to remain as at present, but each place to choose one member instead of two. From those 150 members, 100 to be chosen by ballot in each year to attend the ensuing session, but with power of exchange by consent among themselves. The other 50 to remain in Ireland as committees on private bills, on controverted elections, and such matters.

Article 2.

One United Parliament. The British part to remain as at present. The Irish part to consist of Spiritual Lords, Temporal Lords, and Commons, to be chosen according to an Act to be passed in the Parliament of Ireland.

Crown may declare present Parliament of Great Britain to be the members of the United Parliament on the part of Great Britain in the first Parliament, but not to last beyond the duration of the present Parliament.

Article 3.

Privileges of peerage and rank of Irish peers, as in the Scotch Union.

Query. Whether the system of the representation of Ireland in the House of Lords would not be greatly improved by preserving to the Crown the power of creating Irish peers from time to time as at present. Such new created Irish peers not to be capable of voting, or being chosen at any election till after the date of one general election (or a term of 7 years) subsequent to their creation.

Article 4.

All members of the United Parliament to take the oaths now required by law in Great Britain, but subject to such change as may be made in this respect by the United Parliament.



It is proposed that a plan for the comm[utation] of tithes by the scale of rent, and also a power of redemption by transfer of stock, should be submitted either to the Irish Parliament previous to the Union, or to the United Parliament immediately after.

This is to be accompanied with the strictest possible provisions for enforcing residence by the authority of the bishops, but under the compulsion of positive laws; according to which the profits of the living *et cetera*, as the case may be, are to be paid to the incumbent only in proportion to his residence, and the remainder to accumulate as a fund for the repair of the church, parsonage, *et cetera*, in the parish in which it shall arise.

*Nota Bene.* Provision to be made for clergy and priests of other denominations in Ireland, but this is not to be done as any part of the Union itself; and the provision to be so given should be made absolutely dependant on the Crown.

Query, Salt, Fisheries, Coals.

Will any special provision on these, or other articles, be necessary?

#### Article 5.

Continuance of the present Church establishment in each kingdom to be a fundamental article.

Provision that in case any commutation of tithes is made under the authority of the United Parliament, the same shall not be less than — per cent. in proportion to rent, and to vary with the rent itself; or than a sum equal to the growing value, to be estimated from time to time according to the price of articles of produce to be enumerated.

#### Article 6.

The tariff of the French treaty of commerce with Great Britain in 1786, to be adopted on import and export between Great Britain and Ireland; the duties never to be increased, but may be diminished by the United Parliament.

All other points to be regulated by the United Parliament.

Special provision for linens, and salt provisions, imported into Great Britain and her colonies.

#### Article 7.

*Revenue and Debts.* The Exchequer, revenues, and debts of each part of the United Kingdom to be kept separate. After the Union, Ireland to pay one-sixth of all annual expense incurred by the United Kingdom, beyond the amount of the

present charge on the consolidated fund, and of the peace establishment of Great Britain, estimated at ——. If the taxes already existing, or to be imposed in Ireland for this purpose should produce a surplus beyond this proportion, it is to be exclusively applied in discharge of Irish debt, or to local purposes of improvement in Ireland. If a deficiency should arise, it is to be made good by additional taxes in the succeeding year.

This proportion to remain fixed for — years, and then to be subject to be varied, or different provisions to be made herein by the United Parliament.

#### Article 8.

Courts of Justice to remain as at present, subject to alteration by the United Parliament.

Appeal in *dernier resort* to the United House of Lords, but with provisions for the examination of witnesses in Ireland, by commission directed to the Lord Lieutenant and Council, to the Court of Chancery, or otherwise.

#### Article 9.

Great Seal of Great Britain to be the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, and to be used in acts of state. That of Ireland to remain, and to be used in private rights.

The Privy Council of Ireland to remain.

The government by a Lord Lieutenant must also evidently, and of necessity, be continued; but this, it is conceived, being a matter relating solely to the manner of exercising the authority now belonging to the Crown, is not properly matter to be inserted in the Act of Union.

## M. DE CAZALÈS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, November.—“Le Roy de France réclame de la justice et de la générosité de Sa Majesté Britannique l'exécution des engagemens pris, il y a deux ans, par le Chevalier Withworth son ministre à la Cour de Russie; ce ministre a promis que l'Angleterre fourniroit à l'entretien du Roy de France dans la même proportion que la Russie. Sa Majesté Impériale aiant fixé sa part à 200,000 roubles, c'est environ vingt-cinq mille livres sterling que l'Angleterre devoit fournir. Cette augmentation de traitement devient absolument nécessaire par l'accroissement de dépense que causera au Roy l'arrivée de la Reine à Mittau, et le mariage de Monseigneur le duc d'Angouleme. Si elle n'étoit pas accordée le Roy se verroit dans l'impuissance d'entretenir ses correspondances avec les différents Cabinets de l'Europe, et celles beaucoup plus importantes qu'il entretient avec les mécontens de son royaume. L'intérêt que Madame Royale inspire généralement en France ne peut que rendre tres utile à la cause des ennemis de la République Francaise son marraige avec Monseigneur le duc d'Angouleme; et quand même les puissances coalisées regarderoient comme impossible de replacer le Roy de France sur son trône, il n'en seroit pas moins d'un intérêt majeur pour l'Angleterre, condamnée à une guerre vraisemblablement bien longue avec cette injuste et turbulente République, de perpétuer la maison de Bourbon, pour avoir toujours un chef à donner aux mécontens qu'un gouvernement aussi violent ne cessera d'y entretenir et d'y faire naître.

“Si l'on considère le Roy de France comm'un Roy à qui il ne s'agit plus que de donner un asile et du pain, deux cent mille roubles pourront paroître suffisans; mais si l'on le regarde comm'une puissance alliée, dont les partisans nombreux, et qui le deviendront tous les jours d'avantage, peuvent servir la cause de l'Angleterre plus puissamment peut-être que les autres alliés du Continent en troublant la France, et en y allumant dans un temps plus ou moins rapproché la guerre civile, on conviendra que deux cent mille roubles sont totalement insuffisans pour lui donner les moiens d'alimenter son parti dans l'intérieur de son royaume. C'est avec la plus grande confiance que ces réclama-tions, et les motifs qui les appuient, sont mis sous les yeux de my lord Grenville. Sa justice, sa générosité, et ses lumières bien connues ne laissent pas douter qu'il ne détermine son Gouvernement à remplir les engagemens pris par Monsieur le Chev[alier] Whitworth.”

*Endorsed by Lord Grenville*:—“Received from M. Cazalès through M. Windham.

“No answer was given, M. C. being told that the application should come through the D. de Harcourt.”

## RUFUS KING TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 1. Great Cumberland Place.—“The newspapers speak in such positive terms of a treaty concluded between

General Maitland and Toussaint, the negro chief of St. Domingo, that I take the liberty to inquire of your Lordship whether any engagement of the nature of that said to have been formed by General Maitland has actually been concluded. Your Lordship knows how materially we are concerned, at the present moment, in this enquiry; and I flatter myself will, on that account, excuse what might otherwise seem a mere matter of curiosity."

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1798,] December 3. Downing Street.—"I find from Mr. Pitt that he had seen in the same light I had done the propriety of not doing more than acknowledging the receipt of Lord Cornwallis's letter till we heard again, in consequence of his having received our opinions upon the legality of the militia not being compellable to remain against their will in Ireland, and the Duke of Portland's letter of Saturday night was upon that principle. I am glad there is an interval from this circumstance to consider still more on your delicate situation; for I confess to you the more I think of it, I feel it the more difficult how to advise you. I shall however think still further upon it, and shall be very happy if any additional circumstances shall come out to enable me to speak to you with more decision than I find myself competent to do in the present moment.

"I see nothing in the transaction at St. Domingo which it is necessary to keep from the confidential knowledge of Mr. King, and if he will take the trouble of calling here at any time he pleases, I shall direct Huskisson to show him everything requisite for him to know."

#### W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 4. [Park Street, Westminster].—"I am pressed by Cazalès to obtain an answer from you to the note which I conveyed to you from him some time since. Besides the general wish of executing, as soon as possible, a commission that has been entrusted to him, he is anxious, I suppose, to give a sample of his activity and success in his new appointment."

#### LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1798, December 4. Cleveland Row.—"Lord Cornwallis's letter, received yesterday, contains an assertion that, in a letter addressed by Lord B[uckingham] to you, the latter has disclaimed all connection with the Irish Government, and has thereby rendered it impossible that any application should be made to his regiment, or to him, to continue in Ireland.

"These are, as nearly as I remember (not having Lord Cornwallis's letter before me), the exact words used by him.

"As this is no longer an insinuation or implication of charge, but a direct assertion, I trust there can be no impropriety in

my requesting you to send me the letter from Lord Buckingham which you showed me at the Cabinet, and any other (if there is any such) which you may have received from him on the subject in question."

*Copy.*

LORD GRENVILLE to W. WINDHAM.

1798, December 5. Cleveland Row.—"I had not the least idea that, in the circuitous manner in which Cazalès sent his paper, he could expect an answer to it. I am unwilling to do any thing to wound or offend an honourable man who has distinguished himself in the cause of monarchy and religion in France. But on the other side, the common *procédés* which are observed in the course of all business of this nature, required that some regular communication should have been made to me of the intention to supersede the Duke of Harcourt whom I am known to think well of, and to appoint Cazalès, who is unfortunately not less known to entertain the most absurd prejudices against some of the King's servants, and to have expressed them with the greatest indiscretion.

"To this change, if it had been communicated to me, I should even have thought (without wishing to press on the unfortunate) that the *consent* of the King's Government was, under all the circumstances, fit to be asked, and it certainly would *not* readily have been given.

"But when no communication whatever has been made to me about it, I should, by receiving and answering notes from M. Cazalès, be acting very injuriously towards the Duke of Harcourt, and countenancing that system of double negotiation which I abhor, and which, I am truly grieved to see, prevails no less at Mittau than it did at Paris."

*Copy.*

W. WINDHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 5. Park Street, Westminster.—"I thought as you do about the answer to Cazalès while the proceeding was to remain a secret from the Duke of Harcourt; and, indeed, rather understood from you that upon a reference to him (the Duke of Harcourt) the answer, if any were given, must be founded.

"Since that time Cazalès, I found, had accepted the office; and as a communication had been made in consequence to the Duke of Harcourt, I took it for granted that a corresponding one had been made to you.

"Undoubtedly they cannot claim to have two ambassadors communicating at once with the King's ministers, and I most heartily wish that they had kept to the one already received. But I should think it would appear like pressing hard upon the situation of the King if we were to limit him in the choice of the person he might wish to employ, provided that no one was proposed to whom there was a very marked exception; or were to interfere in any arrangement which was not to bring any new

and additional person into a communication with Ministry. I really do not at all understand what the footing is on which they propose that Cazalès should stand. They certainly do not mean to displace the Duke of Harcourt; and Cazalès, I take it for granted, does not mean to be, even ostensibly, merely in the situation of Dutheil. I shall say to Cazalès that, till the Duke of Harcourt is declared to be recalled and somebody formally appointed and received in his place, you can have no communication but with him."

#### HENRY DUNDAS TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 5. Somerset Place.—"I was in bed from a severe rheumatism when your note of yesterday was brought to my house this forenoon. I have at last been able by different messages to the Office to get Lord Buckingham's letter to me which I showed you at the Cabinet, and which is the only one on the subject I have. I send it to you. I did not recollect when I received your note the paragraph to which it alludes; but, upon looking it over, I rather think you will find it does contain a position that a communication from the Lord-Lieutenant to him on the subject of his regiment remaining in Ireland was not in *due form*, and that it ought to come from the British Government. I do not recollect what the assertion is in Lord Cornwallis's letter; but if it goes only to the subject of communication respecting the regiment remaining in Ireland, I think such an intimation through the Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant was a pretty direct negative to the Lord-Lieutenant addressing any colonel of militia on that point, if that Colonel entertains the sentiment conveyed in that part of Lord Buckingham's letter which I have underscored. I have not seen your letter to the Duke of Portland, but, upon the whole subject, I can see nothing likely to arise but infinite mischief."

#### The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 7. Dublin.—"The Union has of course occupied everyone, and there is hardly a man in Ireland who has not already made up his mind, one way or other, before it was ever possible for him to dream what may or may not be the terms of it. Cooke's pamphlet has been very universally read; and, allowing for the extreme hurry in which it has been writ, and for the difficulties arising from the uncertainty of the measure in its detail, I think it a very able, and certainly a very useful performance. The clamour against it in Dublin is as violent as anything can be that is urged forward by everyone the most violent, and the most disaffected, and to which no resistance or check of any sort is opposed by Lord Cornwallis. I enclose to you a pamphlet which is circulated by the Bar all over Ireland, and which you will observe (under the cry of "no union") travels over every ground of popular discontent, in a style for which many a man in the last five months has been hanged; and yet

on the part of the Government no struggle is made against it. Ballads are sung about in the same style without animadversion. Now all this is most painful because, after repeatedly turning it over in my mind, I am convinced the measure is more easy every hour, and that it will be effectually supported if Government do not run away from it. The Catholics almost unanimously are for it, even *without* a stipulation of any sort for advantages or for protection; which, as they have told Government, they conceive themselves sure of obtaining from the equity and policy of the kingdom when united, but which might embarrass the question if urged at present; but that, at all events, their *tolerated situation* would be abundantly safer and happier under a union than under the present feverish form of government. Much of the same language is held by the Dissenters in the North, and the commercial people, save the *traders* of Dublin, all appear eager for it; but the greater part of the Bar, and of its legal satellites, are wild upon the subject, and indefatigable. And when nothing is opposed to all this save the supineness, weakness, and ignorance (from want of communication) of Lord Cornwallis, I fear very much not only that the nonsense of Ireland will be triumphant, but that Great Britain will have lost irretrievably by her failure on the experiment. Lord Cornwallis is supposed to have expressed a wish that the sense of the people should be fairly taken, which, of course, has marvellously encouraged the disposition and opportunity of bringing back the press and the public mind to that state to which Lord Camden ascribed so much of the mischief, and to which he applied such vigorous and decisive remedies. And be assured that, whenever the time comes in the course of this discussion (and come it must) when Lord Cornwallis must recur to the same system, he will not find that confidence which is the main and leading spring of such an exertion. As to the measure, in all its great points it must be prepared in England, for there is neither sense nor temper here for such a discussion. Part of the smaller details of Parliamentary representation may be arranged here, but nothing can be done on that head until it is known what proportion Great Britain will entertain in the two Houses of Parliament. If that point could be cleared, the details of it would be more obvious and more easy. The great difficulty which I find in my discussions arises from the impossibility of fixing the quota of Irish contribution, either as a permanent or fluctuating proportion; for either of them might be manifestly injurious to the contracting parties. For example, a fifth would be a small contingent for Great Britain to look to from Ireland *hereafter*, and yet that contingent would be ruinous to Ireland *in presenti*; and I know not from what article of her commerce, or consumption, or taxes, you could form a criterion of the future increase or decrease of her means.

"I find that people here lean very much to the idea of appointing commissioners to digest and prepare all the details, and to present them *en masse* to Parliament, first to that of Great Britain and then to that of Ireland. By this arrangement they say that

the principle of union might be recognized at the same time in both kingdoms ; the details would then be arranged by commissioners, and the result would be passed into a law first in England, and afterwards in Ireland. My objection to all this is the delay ; and yet I do not know exactly how the measure can be hastened ; but, if this should be the intention, your Parliament should discuss such a Bill for Commissioners immediately, and the Irish Parliament should meet the 28th for the supplies, and for this Bill, and should then adjourn. I am not sure but that many advantages may arise from sending the commissioners from Great Britain to meet in Dublin, *at least for part of the time* ; for you will observe that all our Irish wisdom is centred in the Office people who cannot stir during Parliament, such as the Lord Chancellor, Speaker, Beresford, Parnell, and a very few others. You may be sure that the *Saint Esprit viendra en malle* to your English Commissioners, as it has arrived formerly at Rome, and that nothing will be done without it, and I think that many advantages might arise from this measure. Much of this must depend upon your Commissioners, but I think there are some who might be very usefully employed for Great Britain in this kingdom ; such as Lord Auckland, Lord Bolton, T. Pelham, Lord Hobart. I threw this out to Cooke, who agreed with me in that the greatest advantages might grow out of it, and particularly that it would conciliate much more than the measure of *closetting their great men in London*.

“ You probably are tired of the word union ; here we dream of nothing else, and hold Minorea and everything else very cheap.”

#### COURT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 7. Richmond.—“ J’ai reçu hier la nouvelle la plus agréable que je pouvais recevoir, puisqu’elle me donne la certitude de rester dans un pays que j’aime, et j’ai eu la satisfaction d’apprendre en même temps que l’Empereur a fait le meilleur choix qu’il pouvait faire parmi ses sujets, sans exception de personne, pour remplir notre département des Affaires Etrangères, en nommant Monsieur de Kotchoubey vice-chancelier, et Monsieur Rostopchin membre du collège des Affaires Etrangères. Ils ont, tous les deux, beaucoup de talents, de jugement, et d’élévation d’ame ; sont dans les meilleurs principes ; ont été, tous les deux, en Angleterre, et sont attachés au système de l’union indissoluble entre nous deux patries. Je vous réponds d’eux comme de moi-même. Je les connais à fond, parcequ’ils sont mes amis intimes. Ce qu’il y a d’heureux pour les affaires est qu’ils sont très amis entre eux, et également attachés au Prince Bezborotko, qu’ils regardent comme leur pere. Ce choix de l’Empereur lui fait honneur, et il [est] aussi heureux pour lui que pour le bien de l’Europe, dans la crise où elle se trouve ; aussi cette nouvelle m’a rendu parfaitement heureux. Comme vous m’honorez de votre amitié, et que vous êtes attaché à l’alliance que vous avez formé entre nos deux patries, je suis persuadé que vous partagerez ma joie.



“S[a] m[ajesté] le roi m’a dit hier que M. Tamara a signé notre traité avec la Porte. Pourriez vous me dire la date de cette signature, et si vous avez quelqu’autre nouvelle des opérations des Turcs, par terre et par mer, contre la France.”

#### THE PRINCE OF ORANGE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 7. London.—“J’ai reçu par la poste venue hier deux lettres de M. de Stamford. J’ai cru devoir former une note de ce qu’elles contenoient de plus intéressant, et je l’envoie ci-joint à Votre Excellence, avec prière de la mettre sous les yeux du Roi.”

#### *Enclosure.*

#### NOTE ON PRUSSIAN AFFAIRS.

1798, December 7. London.—“Le Général de Stamford a fait rapport au Prince d’Orange qu’ayant eu l’honneur de remettre au Roi de Prusse la lettre dont il l’avoit chargé pour ce monarque, il en avoit été reçu très gracieusement; et le Roi lui ayant demandé s’il resteroit quelque temps à Berlin, et le Général de Stamford lui ayant répondu que l’intention du Prince d’Orange étoit qu’il y prolongeat son séjour, se flattant que sa Majesté n’y seroit pas contraire et que lui nourrissoit le même espoir; le Roi lui serra la main en signe d’approbation, et il fut invité ce jour-là, qui étoit le 18 Novembre, jour anniversaire de la Princesse Héréditaire d’Orange, à la table du Roi, où il n’y avoit que la famille royale, et le Prince Auguste, fils de sa Majesté Britannique.

“Le Général de Stamford a mandé de plus qu’un jeune seigneur Polonois, dont il n’a pu apprendre le nom, s’étant rendu suspect, a été arrêté à ce qu’on prétend en Gallicie; qu’on a trouvé, parmi ses papiers une lettre du Prince Radzivil, époux de la Princesse Louise de Prusse, dont la date portoit le mois et le jour mais non l’année où elle a été écrite; que le Prince Radzivil, après avoir fait des vœux dans cette lettre en faveur de la Pologne, sa patrie, qu’il souhaite de voir rendu à son indépendance, s’explique de manière à faire entendre que le trône de Pologne ne scauroit être rétabli à moins que la nation Polonoise ne se détermine à y placer un prince de la famille royale de Prusse; que cela avoit excité à Vienne le soupçon que la Cour de Berlin tramoit quelque chose de ce genre, et qu’elle avoit d’abord donné connoissance de cette lettre à sa Majesté Prussienne, qui avoit pris la chose dans la plus sérieuse considération. Que le Roi avoit d’abord fait mettre le scellé sur tous les papiers du Prince Radzivil un jour qu’il étoit à une partie de chasse, et la Princesse son épouse à Bellevue, l’un et l’autre ne se doutant de rien. Il ajoute que beaucoup de personnes assurent qu’il ne s’est rien trouvé dans la correspondance de ce Prince qui indiquât de sa part quelque trame secrète et criminelle, et qu’il auroit convaincu le Roi et son Ministère que

la lettre à l'occasion de laquelle on faisoit toutes ces recherches, a été écrite il y a trois ans, et par conséquent à une époque où il pouvoit se croire permis d'énoncer ainsi sa façon de penser.

“Le Général de Stamford croit que ces personnes sont mal informées, et son opinion à cet égard se fonde sur les termes dans lesquels le Roi de Prusse écrit au Prince Radzivil en lui signifiant sa décision à cet égard. Sa Majesté a écrit à ce Prince que, quoique l'imprudence de sa conduite le mette dans le cas d'être déclaré coupable de haute trahison, elle veut bien ne pas donner de suite à cette affaire, et céder plutôt au penchant de son cœur en donnant encore à ce Prince cette marque de sa bonté, et cela d'autant plus qu'elle a adopté pour principe de traiter avec la plus grande indulgence ses sujets Polonois.

“La première fois que le Prince Radzivil a été mandé auprès des Ministres, ils lui ont fait subir un long examen ; la seconde fois ils lui ont déclaré comme sentence qu'ils se référoient entièrement au contenu de la lettre que le Roi lui avoit écrite à cet égard. Les scellés ont été levés, et le Prince a continué de paroître en publique comme à l'ordinaire.

“Le Général de Stamford dit n'être entré dans ces détails sur cette affaire que parcequ'elle a beaucoup occupé les Ministres, et qu'elle a été cause que la Comte de Panin n'a reçu que le 15 Novembre une réponse sur les dernières propositions qu'il a faites de la part de sa Cour. Cette réponse est encore évasive. Elle est courte et porte en substance ‘que sa Majesté Prussienne souhaite extrêmement que la France puisse être desserrée, sinon tout-à-fait dans ses anciennes limites, au moins dans des limites plus étroites que ne sont celles qu'elle s'est donnée ; que sa Majesté Prussienne pense que les forces des deux Cours Impériales seroient suffisantes pour obliger le gouvernement François à abandonner la plus grande partie des conquêtes qu'elle a faites ; et qu'elle croit concourir d'une manière assez efficace à leur faire atteindre ce but en continuant de protéger le nord de l'Allemagne, ainsi qu'elle l'a fait jusqu'à ce moment.’

“M. de Panin a répliqué, le 17, par une note verbale, dans laquelle, en mettant sous les yeux du Ministre les différentes positions que pourroient amener les circonstances actuelles, il a insisté sur une explication franche et loyale vis-à-vis de sa Cour quant à la conduite que la Prusse prétend tenir dans chacun des cas qu'il a clairement exposé. En suite de cette note [M. de Haugwitz] a demandé un court délai pour faire son rapport au Roi, et il a fixé le lendemain pour un entretien avec le Comte de Panin, dans lequel il lui feroit savoir la réponse de sa Majesté Prussienne.

“Le Général de Stamford a communiqué de plus que la réponse du Roi de Prusse à cette note verbale de M. de Panin relative aux secours offerts à la Prusse par l'Empereur de Russie, a été absolument conforme à la première, c'est à dire évasive ; que non seulement elle ne donne pas le moindre espoir d'un concert prochain entre la Cour de Berlin et celle de Vienne et de Petersbourg, mais qu'elle ne laisse pas même entrevoir que, tel ou tel cas échéant, la Prusse pourroit se reveiller de sa léthargie, prolongée

aujourd'hui non par M. de H[augwitz], mais par un parti qui doit s'être formé très en secret contre lui pour le culbuter ; lequel probablement est dirigé par les artifices du Ministre de Schulembourg. M. de Haugwitz doit avoir donné connoissance de cette trame, le 18 de Novembre, au Comte de Panin, lorsque celui-ci se plaignant, avec le ton de l'amitié et de la confiance, du peu de cas que sa Majesté Prussienne paroïssoit faire de l'amitié de l'Empereur de Russie, il ne cacha point à M. de Haugwitz qu'il le soupçonnoit d'en être la cause. Le Général de Stamford assure que ceci est fondé, et que la cabale dont M. de Haugwitz se plaint, existe réellement. Le Général de Stamford en a acquis la certitude par le chambellan de Reck, frère du ministre de ce nom.

" M. de Schulembourg qui, pendant que M. de Haugwitz étoit pacifique, ne parloit que de guerre, doit avoir changé de ton depuis un certain temps, et ne parle que de la nécessité de conserver la paix. Zastrow et Kôkériz, qui étoient ci-devant les échos de M. de Haugwitz, parlent comme Schulembourg ; et les uns et les autres font entendre au Roi que M. de H[augwitz] n'a changé de système que parcequ'il est piqué contre Sièyès.

" Le Général de Stamford dit que ceci explique pourquoi que Haugwitz, qui est un homme foible mais attaché par ambition à sa place au-dessous de la quelle il restera toujours, n'a pas osé se prononcer en dernier lieu auprès du Roi comme il l'auroit désiré en faveur des dernières ouvertures faites par la Russie.

" La question qui occupe depuis cette découverte Messieurs de Panin et de Stamford est, s'il faut laisser tomber M. de Haugwitz, ou chercher à le soutenir ?

" Haugwitz est un homme foible et qui n'a que peu de moyens ; Schulembourg doit en avoir davantage. C'est un grand antagoniste du Duc de Brunswic, et son intrigue actuelle paroît concertée avec le Prince Henry, qui doit avoir écrit à Madame la Princesse Ferdinand pour la consoler de l'affront qu'elle prétend lui avoir été fait dans la personne de son beau-fils le Prince Radzivil, que de cet événement il pourroit résulter un grand bien, parcequ'on pourroit en tirer parti pour obliger le Roi de chasser ce dangereux Haugwitz, qui cherchoit à l'entraîner dans une guerre contre la France.

" Le Général de Stamford ajoute enfin qu'il faudroit sçavoir à présent si un tel changement dans le ministère pourroit, ou non, devenir avantageux à la bonne cause ; qu'il lui paroît probable que lorsque le système pacifique de M. de Schulembourg lui auroit servi à supplanter M. de Haugwitz, il ne pourroit, au moins d'un certain temps, se départir de ce système auquel il seroit redevable de son triomphe, et que, par conséquent, il en résulteroit toujours un retard dangereux. Tout cela fait que M. de Stamford désireroit beaucoup d'avoir l'occasion de conférer sur ces objets avec le Duc de Brunswic avant de se décider."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 10. Wimbledon.—"Before I make any answer to the enclosed, I think it right to send it for your perusal. I

understood that, in consequence of our former correspondence, the Portuguese Government had been furnished with all the saltpetre they had occasion for. If there is however occasion for giving them any more, I do not object to it, provided it comes under your sanction ; but my reason for troubling you at present is that, in consequence of what has passed between us, I have had a full conversation with the Chairman, and suggested to him that the only proper method of conducting this business with foreign nations was that each nation should enter into an agreement with the East India Company for the specific quantity they require, and that the East India Company should bring home what is necessary to supply those demands, in addition to what they bring home for the use of our own Government. In any such agreement care must be taken to stipulate on the part of the East India Company that it shall be subject to the control of the executive government at home ; for, otherwise, the East India Company under their agreement might be compelled to proceed in furnishing a foreign power with a commodity which it would be the policy of Government at the moment to prevent."

LORD GRENVILLE to HENRY DUNDAS.

1798, December 11. Cleveland Row.—"I will write to Walpole guardedly on the subject of the acquisition of Diu, and he will feel the ground at Lisbon. I presume that what the company would offer for it is *money*, for I know not what else they have to give that Portugal would wish to acquire. Almeida has been directed to consult me how far our interests would be committed by their offering, and in case of need, ceding to France two small settlements which they say they have in the Philippines, instead of what France asks of them in Brazil. I conclude few things could be worse for us than letting France get any footing there. If you have a mind to talk to Almeida about it, he talks English, and will tell you the particulars; if not, write me a strong letter, that I may shew him on the subject.

"The paper you sent me does not relate to Portuguese but Danish purchases of saltpetre. Whatever other determination is taken about it, I think one resolution should be not to see or have any thing to do with this Mr. Coninck, who is the great conductor of all the schemes for bringing home Dutch property as Danish, and who is come here to defend the ships stopped at St. Helena." *Copy.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 11. Dublin.—"This accursed Warwick regiment has succeeded too fatally in corrupting my men, and yesterday, having judged it necessary to bring the matter distinctly to every man's personal consent, I found that very much the larger proportion insisted on their right to return, and, notwithstanding every exertion we could make, persisted in it. In consequence of which I wrote to Mr. Dundas, and to Lord Cornwallis, to

notify to them that a large proportion of the men refused to abide by the answer which I had, in my public orders, undertaken to give in their name, unless they should wish otherwise; and I rather think that the greater number will persevere in their cry 'Go to England with the Warwick.' No sooner had I notified this to Lord Cornwallis, than I received an official copy of a letter written by the Adjutant General, *by His Excellency's commands*, to the Medical Board here, charging me in the most distinct terms with disobedience of orders, and with having 'occasioned this disease' amongst my men; and all this written without the slightest communication to me on the subject, either from Lord Cornwallis or from *this greater man*, of any sort or kind whatsoever. I have, as you will easily believe, written to Lord Cornwallis in the style that becomes me; as yet I have had no answer, but the matter shall not rest here whatever be the consequence. I am indeed stung to death by all I see of this wretched man's conduct, who will as surely ruin the cause of England as can be. You have seen the result of the Bar meeting, where Government took no pains to collect the attendance of any of the very many legal dependents connected with them. Since then the Lord Mayor has called a meeting of all the merchants and traders of Dublin, with Latouche and Beresford at their head, and no exertion *is to be* made to check it. Those who talked stoutly a week ago (I could name you some of the best friends of Government) have told me that they will not commit themselves till they see further. The Chancellor is very ill and very dissatisfied, and no one civil officer of the Crown has the slightest intercourse with Lord Cornwallis. Lake and George Nugent, *whose names I trust to you only*, have told me that as an officer he has lost every faculty of explaining himself, so that we literally have no Government. All this will give you pain, but I owe it to you to plague you with these unpleasant truths, though nothing probably will arise out of it.

"I cannot tell you how happy I am to see our dear Tom now so fully and fairly employed in a line which may lead much further; for I never shall forgive you if you do not ultimately employ him to make the peace after his success (which God send him) in forming the war confederacy. For both he will be entitled to the best rewards this country can give him."

#### THE PRINCE OF ORANGE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 11. Hampton Court.—"Je m'empresse de vous envoyer une note contenant ce qu'il y a d'intéressant dans la lettre qui j'ai reçu hier de Monsieur de Stamford. Je prie Votre Excellence de la mettre sous les yeux du Roi."

*Enclosure.*

#### NOTE ON PRUSSIAN AFFAIRS.

"Dans une lettre que le Prince d'Orange a reçu hier du Général de Stamford, ce Général lui mande que la cabale qui

travailloit à perdre M. de Haugwitz paroît échouer complètement par sa propre maladresse ; elle avoit voulu se servir de l'affaire du Prince de Radzivil comme d'une arme contre ce ministre. La douceur du jugement du Roi envers ce Prince (de la conduite du quel le Général de Stamford dit que l'on pourra le mieux juger par la copie de la lettre écrite par le Prince de Radzivil, et adressée à Paris le 15 Novembre 1796,) a enhardi ce Prince à se plaindre au Roi du tort qu'on lui faisoit, et de la manière injuste dont on agissoit à son égard ; et poussé par le parti de Schulembourg, et probablement le Prince Henry, il s'est plaint hautement de M. de H[augwitz], et l'a accusé d'avoir eu, dès l'année 96, connoissance du projet dont on fait à présent le chef d'accusation contre lui ; cherchant ainsi à faire retomber cette affaire sur le Ministre lui-même. Le Général de Stamford ajoute qu'il n'a pas été difficile à M. de Haugwitz de se justifier de cette imputation, aucune pièce officielle ne l'accusant, et sa conduite prouvant que, s'il a eu effectivement connoissance du projet en question, il n'y a fait aucune attention, ne supposant nullement qu'on songeat à l'exécuter ; et que dans les conférences dont il avoit témoigné le désir, et que M.M. de Panin et de Stamford ont eues avec lui le 24 et 25 Novembre, il avoit paru fort tranquille au sujet de la trame qu'on avoit ourdie contre lui, et avoit dit lui-même le 25 Novembre au Général de Stamford qu'il en avoit parlé au Roi, et que sa Majesté Prussienne l'avoit tellement rassuré à ce sujet que, loin de lui avoir porté aucune préjudice, ceux qui ont cabalé contre lui paroissoient, au contraire, l'avoir raffermi dans son poste.

“ Enfin le Général de Stamford mande que M. de Haugwitz lui a témoigné mettre un très grand prix à la confiance du Duc ; qu'il s'étoit attaché à le bien persuader qu'il ne se l'est acquise que par son changement de système.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 12. Dublin.—“ The great pillar of our Irish salvation is the most contemptible personage I ever knew. I possibly may amuse you (or grieve you) with our correspondence, and you will see how very little a great man may be. I fancy that it is now closed with the insolent submissiveness in language of the very strongest sort that I could put together.

“ My heroes of the Royal Bucks are in their way as little ; for above 1,000 of them now sue for the extension of the golden sceptre, and entreat that they may stay to the 14th April, which was the day proposed to them. I have treated them very roughly, and my prescription will probably succeed in keeping very much the largest part, and possibly the whole. Lord Hertford has allowed the Warwick to run riot, and they tainted ours till they found me more sturdy than his Lordship. His brother has exhausted both his language and patience in endeavouring to put him right.”

## HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 13. Wimbledon.—“I daresay there are some unavoidable reasons for the delay, but if General Koehler is to be of any use at Constantinople, I cannot help regretting that he is not there before this time. It was wrote to me when in Scotland in September that he was to go there, and the month of December is now running on. All that I deprecate is an over confidence in the destruction of Buonaparte, such as to lose sight of the importance of its being in some shape accomplished. I am perfectly happy in the hope that his fate is decided before this time in the most adverse way, but I am sure nothing has yet reached us of a nature so decisive upon that point as to justify us in going to sleep in repose upon it.

“It was not, however, to say this that I took up my pen at present. Ever since I formed the opinion I early did that the expedition was destined for that quarter of the world, my unremitting attention has been paid to every view in which I could consider the subject, and I am not aware, looking retrospectively, that I have omitted anything, within the line of any department where I am authorized to act, which can tend to frustrate the success of this gigantic attempt. About a month ago Mr. Huskisson put a letter into my hands which he had received from Colonel Maitland. Not seeing the means of a pecuniary nature to attack Buonaparte in the manner that letter points at, I did not pay much attention to it; although several others who like him have been in that country, and viewed it with attention, concur with him on his ideas. You may however perhaps recollect that, in a very cursory manner, I one day threw out in Cabinet a notion floating in my mind that we might act against Buonaparte if necessary from India by the Red Sea. I have had many confidential conversations with the chairman, and likewise Mr. David Scott, on the idea. The last, who knows every part of the scene of action well, is very sanguine indeed, I think more so than several of the military men connected with India service with whom I have conversed. Among others I have endeavoured to analyze the subject in every view with Colonel Maitland, who is well acquainted with that service, and whose abilities enable him to talk upon it with more than usual precision. I think it right to send you the perusal of the letter to Huskisson I have already referred to; and I likewise send you a memorandum from him, which he prepared by my direction after one of our conversations. I have now put the Chairman in possession of all my ideas, and the resolution I have formed is to send off Colonel Maitland as quickly as I can; Suez or somewhere in the Red Sea being his ultimate destination. Having a perfect confidence in his pecuniary purity, I shall procure to him from the East India Company a credit to the amount of ten or fifteen thousand pounds to be used, if opportunity offer, in the manner his letter to Huskisson points out. But my chief object in sending him is with a view of deciding on the spot how far it appears to him, from the state in which he

finds matters, that a military force from India can be of any material use in that part of the world. I will at the same time send orders overland to India to have in readiness a body of five thousand men at Tellicherry, to transport to the Red Sea, if he shall send a requisition to that purpose. This force, acting with a small squadron on the Red Sea (where vessels for gunboats will be got) would be perfectly sufficient to keep in awe any hostile dispositions that may be likely to appear there; and, what is more material, will be adequate to protect all the ports and little powers on the Red Sea, and on the banks of it, from the plunder to which, unprotected, they will certainly be exposed from the rapacity and necessities of Buonaparte. By following this course I think I shall steer a middle course between too much dashing and too much caution. It would be too much of the first to order any body of troops to the Red Sea beyond merely what is already ordered for the Isle of Perim in the straits of Babelmandeb, without knowing how far they were likely to be of any service when they arrive there. On the other hand it would be too cautious and dilatory to give no order on the subject till I should have a report made to me by Colonel Maitland, and much valuable time may be lost by such a delay.

"These are the outlines of my project which I will carry into execution without delay. My idea is to send Colonel Maitland by land to Constantinople, and from thence to proceed to Rhodes, where he may embark and proceed to any landing place he pleases. I think the nearest to Aleppo is the most likely, but as to that I must leave him a discretion. I will of course direct him to correspond and give every information in his power not only to the agents of the East India Company, but to his Majesty's Minister at Constantinople, and the Commanders by sea in the Levant and Mediterranean. If there is any particular instruction you would wish me to give him connected with any arrangements you may have in view, you will let me know."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 14. Richmond.—"Je vous remercie pour la plaisir extrême que vous m'avez fait en me communiquant la nouvelle que le Ch[evalier] Eden a eu du B[aron] de Thugut; elle est si probable, si dans les mœurs du pays où s'est passée l'affaire, que je la crois, et que j'ai toujours cru que telle serait la fin de Bonaparte et de ses satellites. Le silence de Smith ne doit pas invalider cette nouvelle, puisqu'il lui est arrivé souvent d'être trois et quatre postes sans vous écrire, et que par la dernière malle il vous mandait, à ce qu'il me semble, qu'il est malade et à la campagne.

"Dans les mœurs orientales on peut s'emparer des richesses individuelles des particuliers en leurs supposant des crimes; et c'est ainsi qu'en agissent tous les despotes Asiatiques et Africains; mais des nouveaux impôts, et des contributions générales, ils n'osent jamais le faire. Quand les grands seigneurs se sont avisés se mettre des nouveaux impôts, ils se sont



toujours renforcé et appuyé par des fetfa du grand moufti; et encore cela n'a jamais passé sans une émeute à Constantinople, à la suite des quelles les grands seigneurs ont été quelquefois déposés. Avec des opinions pareilles, souffrira-t-on que des étrangers, d'une religion abhorrée, prennent sur eux une autorité qu'on n'admet pas même d'un souverain qui réunit en soi la puissance civile, militaire, et religieuse; car le grand Seigneur est reconnu comme successeur légitime des Califes?"

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, December 16th. St. Petersburg.—Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède s'est, en second lieu, adressé à nous pour nous demander nos bons offices auprès de la Cour de Londres, au sujet de plusieurs convois marchands Suédois qui ont été détenus par des escadres Angloises. La bonne harmonie qui existe maintenant entre nous et ce prince; la conduite actuelle de la Cour de Stockholm qui, d'après des renseignemens sûrs, n'est nullement conforme à leur ancienne partialité pour les François; et le désir que, si les alliés ne peuvent augmenter le nombre de leurs partisans ils ne s'attirent au moins pas de reproches, et surtout dans des affaires où, comme dans la présente, malgré les bonnes dispositions du Gouvernement, le désir du gain peut faire agir les commandans contre les règles de la justice, nous portent à vous prescrire d'employer vos efforts auprès du ministère Anglois de contenter la Cour de Stockholm autant qu'il est possible, en montrant au ministre Suédois, résidant auprès de la Cour de Londres, votre disposition d'employer vos bons offices dans cette affaire. Nous y accédons d'autant plus que, vû l'état de blocus où se trouvent presque tous les ports de la Méditerranée qui dépendent ou directement ou indirectement des François, il ne pourra être, à ce qu'il paroît, d'aucun inconvénient à l'Angleterre de faire passer des vaisseaux Suédois dans la dite mër. Notre ministère a fait au Chevalier Whitworth des insinuations pareilles à celles que nous vous prescrirons. *Translation.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 18. Yarmouth.—“I am this morning arrived here, and as the post is going to leave Yarmouth, I have only time to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th by Shaw, together with the secret service regulations, and Mr. Garlike's last letters enclosed to me in one from Mr. Hammond; Mason has likewise given me the two letters from the King to the Duke and the Duchess of Brunswick.

“I certainly will recollect to mention the subject of the Portuguese command to the Duke of Brunswick, and to learn his opinion without any formal application to him on the subject; you are however probably aware that, as no cipher will be within reach, and as our messenger must be reserved for Berlin, I shall not easily find any opportunity of writing to you from Brunswick.

“ Mr. Garlike’s dispatches seem to contain nothing new ; it is the old song set to the old tune. I heartily wish it were possible to change it, and if it is not changed it shall not be for want of every effort that I can make.

“ If Schawenburg would dip his Grison army, and the Neapolitan march of the 13th be as hostile as your private letter states it, they may be forced at Vienna. God send they may.

“ The *Juno* is not come, but a frigate is seen at a distance which they think may be her, though the fog is so thick they think she will come no nearer. They seem to hope that I may sail to-morrow, as Admiral Dickson thinks of sending me in the *Champion* if the wind is fair before the *Juno* comes.”

#### LEGISLATIVE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

*Note respecting evidence to be taken in Ireland.*

1798, [December 1-18].—“ One of the greatest difficulties which has been supposed to attend the progress of Union between Great Britain and Ireland, is that of the expense and trouble which would be occasioned by the attendance of witnesses in matters of controverted elections, or in matters of private business requiring Parliamentary interposition.

“ It would therefore be very desirable to devise a plan (which does not appear impossible) for empowering the Speaker of either House of the United Parliament to issue his warrant to the Chairman of the Quarter Sessions in Ireland, or to such other person as may [be] thought more proper for the purpose, requiring him to appoint a time and place within the county for his being attended by the agents of the respective parties, and reducing to writing in their presence the testimony (or the consents or dissents as the case may be) of such persons as by the said agents may be summoned to attend, being resident within the county. If not there resident, a similar proceeding should take place in the county where they do reside.

“ And such testimony, so taken and reduced to writing, might by such chairman, or by the sheriff of the county, be certified to the Speaker of either House, as the case might be.

“ It seems difficult to provide by a detailed article of the Union for all the various regulations which such a proceeding might require ; but the principle might perhaps be stated there, and the provisions left to be settled by the United Parliament.

“ All questions respecting the admissibility, competency, or credibility of such evidence, so certified, must of course still remain with the House or Committee to whom it is to be produced, but it does not appear that, in such cases, there is any benefit of *vivâ voce* testimony which might not equally be obtained by written evidence in this form.

“ Perhaps, in arranging the details, it may be useful to consult the provisions now subsisting by the different Acts respecting the procuring evidence in like manner from the East Indies.”

*Endorsed* :—“ Sent to Lord Castlereagh, December 18, 1798.”

## LEGISLATIVE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

*Note respecting the election of Irish Peers.*

1798, December 18.—“If the precedent of the Union with Scotland should be exactly followed in the present case with respect to the peerage, the following difficulties would arise.

1. “The principle of election for one Parliament only seems to be in itself adverse to the constitution and character of the House of Lords, as forming a part of the British Legislature. And the inconvenience arising from this circumstance would evidently be much augmented when, instead of sixteen, as at present, so large a proportion as near fifty out of less than three hundred members would be so elected.

2. “But in this instance the danger would be greater, because the Scotch peerage, though it has in the course of a century suffered some diminution, is nevertheless so constituted that it is little likely to suffer any further diminution; and the body is still sufficiently numerous to afford a reasonable security against improper combinations or cabals. But the Irish peerage, being for the most part of much later creation, and in almost every instance limited to heirs male, is likely to suffer a much more rapid diminution; and as the number to be elected is considerably larger, the effect might, at no very distant period, be extremely inconvenient of subjecting the election of so powerful a body in the House of Lords to be dependant on the cabals possibly of a very few individuals.

3. “The taking from the Crown all power of conferring Irish honours will necessarily reduce very considerably the objects of fair ambition to which persons of consequence in that kingdom might hereafter look; and it would, besides, throw such a pressure on Government of claims for British peerage, as must, in its effect, be highly embarrassing whether it be satisfied or not.

“May it not, therefore, be worth consideration whether a new principle might not with advantage be adopted as to the election of peers on the part of Ireland?

“That the Irish temporal peers now existing or hereafter to be created by his Majesty, should elect in the first instance 26 of their number to seats in the House of Lords for life, and should by like election supply all vacancies.

“And that all the electing peers should be capable of seats in the United House of Commons; if however this last provision was thought to bear hard on the leading commoners of Ireland, such right might be confined to the Irish peers who might be elected for places in England only.

“The spiritual peers should (it is thought) take their seats by rotation among the archiepiscopal and episcopal sees respectively; so that one archbishop and three bishops may be to sit in each Parliament.

“By this plan the Irish peers would be much less under the influence of the Crown, and would, at the same time, be also free from the operation of private cabals.

“Query : What should, in such a case, be done respecting the privileges of peerage ?

“It seems better, in every mode of election, that it should be done by signed lists sent to the Lord Chancellor here, rather than by any meeting of Irish peers at Dublin or elsewhere.”

*Endorsed* :—“Read at the Cabinet and sent to Lord Castle-reagh.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 19. Yarmouth.—“Your communication from General Stamford is in every respect very interesting, and in some respects certainly more favourable to your views than any of the latter accounts from Berlin. If General Stamford is not much deceived, there is more likelihood than ever of Haugwiz being inclined to push his own interests pretty far upon the assistance and the co-operation of the Duke of Brunswick; and if it be true that Zastrow much exceeded his instructions in the letter which he wrote to discourage the offer of assistance from Prussia to the Orange party, it may be a stronger lesson than any other to Haugwiz of the necessity of taking his measures so clearly and explicitly as to prevent the mischief of such a double line of conduct in the Prussian government as is found in the comparison between his profession and Zastrow’s official letter. The time seems to me to press so much for the personal assistance of the Duke of Brunswick at Berlin, that I shall not be sorry when I arrive at Brunswick to learn that he is already at Berlin, where his presence and influence seem more than ever desirable. I dare not, however, be sanguine enough to promise myself such good news, though it is difficult to conceive how, with the eagerness and zeal with which he seems to see this moment, he could hesitate to take in his own person every active means to assist the measures which appear to him to be so important and so necessary. While Haugwiz, however, is pressing from Brunswick for a regular military plan of operations, I daresay you yourself will feel likewise the necessity of advancing as much as possible the detail of those plans in which our naval force can co-operate; if the sea officers whom I have seen here are not extremely over sanguine, much indeed may be done; for Admiral Dickson, Captain Hope, Macdonald Deane and others are, in their conversation, forward to describe the certainty of success both as to the Helder Fort and Texel Island, and also, in the opinion of Admiral Dickson, as to the practicability of destroying by a boat attack the ships now at Helvoet. I mention this last circumstance only to shew how much these subjects occupy our seamen here, for certainly an attack of this latter description is calculated for a more decided state of hostility towards Holland than, by General Stamford’s letter, we should see ourselves placed in; but at all events we should gain much if we could accompany the Duke of Brunswick’s detail of military operations by a detail of measures for naval co-operation, and in this shape shew to the King of Prussia that nothing remained

to be done for the execution of the whole plan but his consent to take in it the part which should fall to his share.

"I take for granted the Hereditary Prince will pretty soon exercise his power of drawing for money, and I shall be glad if you will be so good as to send to me the form of the receipt which he is to give to me for the drafts in question; that which you have sent me being only the receipt which you are to have from me. I am impatient to get forward on my journey, and have agreed with Captain Raper of the *Champion* that I will go on board early to-morrow, if it be anyhow possible for us to make any way."

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 19. Cleveland Row.—"It is, I am afraid, too probable that this letter will find you still at Yarmouth. Stamford's communications will have shewn you that better prospects are opening at Berlin. We have in the *Morning Post* of to-day a report (said to come from Paris) of a considerable defeat of the Neapolitans in the Roman territory; but, as great pains seem to have been taken by the Directory to hinder their papers from coming over here, I give very little credit even to the fact of this story being in a French paper; but even if the report is true, I shall think the confirmation of the actual commencement of hostilities much more important than the success or failure on either side of the first operations.

"The Lisbon mail received to-day speaks so confidently of Minorca, as to put its surrender out of all doubt. But we have no letters from Stuart himself.

"The probabilities of immediate war between Spain and Portugal increases so fast that the subject you was to mention to the Duke of Brunswic becomes more and more pressing. You may easily send an express from Brunswic to Mr. Harward at Cuxhaven." *Copy.*

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, December 19. St. Petersburg.—"Conformément aux stipulations faites entre nous et la Cour de Londres à l'égard de l'isle de Malte, dont vous êtes déjà informé, nous avons donné ordre d'envoyer par dessus le secours que nous prêtons au Roi de Naples, trois bataillons de grenadiers et trois cent artillieurs en garnison sur la dite isle, à condition qu'à l'effet de la défense de cette isle et des fortifications qui s'y trouvent, il soit envoyé un nombre égal de forces, tant de la part de Sa Majesté Sicilienne, que de celle de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, comme vous le verrez par l'article séparé stipulé avec la Cour de Naples, dont nous vous envoyons ci-jointe une copie pour votre information. En réponse sur cela le Chevalier Whitworth nous a d'abord assuré que de tels arrangemens seront très approuvés par sa Cour, ce pourquoi vous ne manquerez pas de demander que les ordres nécessaires soient, à cette fin, donnés au Commandant des troupes Angloises dans la Méditerranée.

“ Dans notre rescrit nous ne sommes pas entrés en détail dans nos explications concernant les plans de l'Angleterre de conquérir l'isle de Minorque et de mettre la Suisse en activité. Nous vous ordonnons de déclarer au ministère de Londres que nous approuvons toute mesure que notre allié prendroit, et qui serviroit à causer des torts essentiels à l'ennemi commune.”  
*Translated into French.*

LORD GRENVILLE to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 20. Cleveland Row.—“ Though from your letter this moment received I think it is likely that this will not find you at Yarmouth I take my chance, in order to communicate to you the interesting intelligence.

1. “ That Malta as well as Minorca is certainly in our possession, with the French ships that were there; and

2. “ That on the 7th December the Directory declared war against Naples and Sardinia, in consequence of the Neapolitan army having on the 23rd November attacked and driven back the advanced posts of the French troops in the Roman territory.

“ The first piece of intelligence comes to us from Lisbon, where a letter was arrived from Lord Nelson; the second by Paris papers of the 8th.” *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 20. Yarmouth.—“ Nothing can be more perverse than the state of the weather; the wind continues due East, and it is impossible to stir; we have already five packets here waiting with as much impatience as ourselves. The agent of the packet boats has this moment left us with the agreeable news of his being persuaded that the Elbe is frozen, as the two packets from Cruxhaven, of Sunday and Thursday last, have not arrived, though the wind for them has been so favourable that it should have brought them hither in twenty-four hours if they had sailed on any one of these last seven or eight days. The Admiral tells us that the wind looks fixed for some days longer. I must therefore beg you to order through Mr. Broughton my letters and papers to be sent to me here, at Mr. Warmington's, agent for the packet boats at Yarmouth, as long as I am kept here, and I will desire him to forward to me at Berlin any that may come here when I am gone. It is tiresome to be kept here, but I am better satisfied to be upon the spot, than to be absent, because I am now as ready as it can depend upon me to be.”

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 20.—“ I have read the papers you have sent to me. It has often occurred to me that, after the disaster of the French fleet, the single stroke of despair which remained for Buonaparte was to push for India by the Red Sea, but I have always checked myself in that speculation by recollecting how

impossible it was for him to get shipping without previous preparation. Besides we should have heard of such a progress by one or other of the East India Company's agents at Aleppo or otherwise. The hearing either at Paris or Madrid of his having reached Ceylon is literally impossible; and, upon the whole, although there is nothing impossible from dates to his having gone to Suez, I think the other story of his assassination is infinitely more probable than this one. I suppose the other news from Malta is true, but I have not heard that the *Latona* is arrived.

"I don't like the style of Pinto's letter of the 1st December to Almeida. It looks like asking what they know they cannot possibly get, which is always bad, and must be meant to found a pretence for want of exertion on their own part."

*Postscript.* "Cuyler must in the first instance go to Portugal. If anything is made of the idea of Mulgrave, it must be a subsequent arrangement. It would be difficult from his rank in the army to propose him as commander-in-chief. He is only a major-general. If you was to succeed in obtaining the command of their army to a British officer, I see no means but either sending back General Stuart from Minorca, or taking Sir Ralph Abercrombie from Scotland, if he could be brought to accept of that command. He is naturally very fond of his present situation, but he wrote to the Duke of York some time ago stating that, if his services were thought to be of more use anywhere else, he hoped no ceremony would be used with regard to him. Another idea has struck me that perhaps Sir Charles Grey might be brought to go, if he saw any prospect of fame. If either he or Sir Ralph Abercrombie were to go upon such a command, I think you would have some offers of voluntary service."

#### LEGISLATIVE UNION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

##### *Cabinet Note as to Irish revenue.*

1798, December 21. London.—"That it is intended to propose for a given number of years a fixed proportion for the contribution of Ireland towards the peace establishment of the whole, and also a fixed proportion for her contribution towards the expenses of war.

"That whether these proportions shall be the same or different must be the subject of separate and detailed discussion.

"But, that on the whole, in as far as relates to peace establishment, it is not probable that, in the present arrangement of the business, Ireland will be called upon for any additional expense beyond what would now be her establishment at a peace, if the union did not take place.

"That the present Irish revenue should be made perpetual, subject to repeal and substitution of taxes by the United Parliament; that it should be appropriated towards defraying the proportion to be so fixed of the general peace establishment, as well as the interest and sinking fund of the Irish debt, and the objects now provided for by annual grant of Parliament.

“It may be matter of consideration whether any surplus of revenue beyond this proportion, which should arise from the increased produce of the Irish taxes, or from the extinction of debt, should be appropriated or reserved for the extra expenses; or should to any limited amount, and for a given time, be applied to objects of local improvement.”

*Endorsed*:—Taken at the Cabinet, December 21, 1798. Copy sent to the Duke of Portland.

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 25. Dublin.—“What the result of this struggle is to be, where every exertion is made on one side and none on the other, it is not difficult to foresee; but Cooke promises wonders as soon as you have settled the arrangement on your side of the water; but from Lord Cornwallis you are to expect nothing, for I am persuaded that of his former character nothing remains but that *opinionâtrêtê* which certainly will not essentially serve us without other points of character that are lost. It is, however, hopeless to think this over, for I see no solution to the difficulty, and therefore you must be content to work with the tools you have. I have very much thought over and discussed the points which you proposed to me in your letter of the 12th, and am fully satisfied that you will not find a single person *interested in the question* who will entertain for a moment the idea of classing the boroughs for delegates as in Scotland, and trust me it is equally hopeless to look to any distinction of city members beyond Dublin and Cork. Every thing beyond that will let you at once headlong into every question of population and contribution and all the other speculations of reformers and of republicans; and be assured that every friend to this great measure, whether English or Irish, will feel it an object paramount to every other that these most dangerous ideas *of reform of any sort* should be wholly put by. But, in whatever way it is done, whether by ballot or by nomination, pray be convinced that it is essential to the justice and to the existence of this country that a committee should be named from session to session, or from month to month, to sit *here* as an evidence committee, and for the trial of contested elections. And if you attempt to put this by, as well as the ‘committee of Lords Triers’ for appeals in the House of Lords, depend upon it you strengthen the resistance to the Union to a degree that will be irresistible; for I cannot but consider it as an absolute denial of all justice if you compel me to seek it, in the case of appeals, at the bar of the House of Lords of Great Britain, already so loaded that, when I left England, Cowper told me that four years would not clear the paper then before us. The same observation goes to the committees on private Bills, and even to a degree on public Bills; nor can I see what is to be feared from a body so fluctuating as the body would be who might be named by the House of Commons for this purpose. Recollect how much this country is governed by the lawyers, and



see what a force of argument and of prejudice you put, by this arrangement, into the hands of those who already are prejudiced against it. These observations are not merely mine, but are equally felt by others who are equally friends to the measure, and I wish you would weigh them very well. The Catholics, as a body, will clearly ultimately be with you, their clergy most decidedly so, and a great part of their lower ranks; but everything that is Republican will join in the fanatic frenzy of the Orangemen against it. Still however, *under every possible disadvantage*, I continue to think well of the measure, if it is to be such a one as a man can conscientiously say contributes to the strength of the whole by benefiting the component parts. But Foster's declared hostility, Parnell's *duplicity*, Lord Cornwallis's imbecility, Lord Castlereagh's inexperience, and the treachery of every subordinate minister who opposes upon principles of bargain and sale, altogether compose a mass of formidable considerations to be added to the *nonsense* of this good people. It is already understood that no man is to be turned out for his vote on the Union; and Lord Cornwallis's name is quoted for this, with as much truth as I was quoted for a declaration of the same nature respecting the Regency; but the effect of it *now* will possibly be the same as it was *then*."

W. A. CROSBIE to the DUKE [OF MONTROSE].

*Private.*

1798, December 25. Dublin Castle.—“We are in a very anxious situation in this country, and you are acquainted with part of the causes which contribute to put us in that state; and, if nothing else were added to so important a subject as the Union must at all times be, there would be matter enough to keep us for some time in a state of suspense and inquietude. A project so hostile to the selfish views of so many inhabitants of this capital of course must induce much opposition and clamour against the measure from them; and we know that the voice of a capital is a voice of great vociferation, and carries with it an almost irresistible force and persuasion. If that were all I should hope, if the measure be sanctioned by the enlightened men of both countries, that the violence and indeed indecent opposition which has been shewn to the measure, without anything like grounds on which to form an opinion, will be resisted by that wisdom, and confidence, and resolution, so necessary when a great measure of public utility is to be carried against the selfish views of some, and the prejudices of still a more numerous body. The lawyers, merchants, and others have had meetings, and have cried down the measure. The latter I think excusable, because, as a commercial body, they may be considered as justified in taking up the measure in a commercial point of view, and giving their advice to Government. I think they have not indeed been temperate in the manner of doing so, nor are they devoid of the imputation of selfish views. But the

lawyers are by no means in the same predicament. They have a right to expound the laws, but have nothing to say to the making of them; and I can compare their meeting to nothing but a Jacobin club deliberating upon a measure previous to it being discussed in the National Assembly. With whatever disgust we may look upon such proceedings, we must, however, acknowledge the public mind has been much inflamed by them; and the bringing forward the measure thereby rendered infinitely more serious, and, I am afraid I may add, alarming in the extreme; with this additional mortification in perspective, that whatever disturbances may arise independent of the present question, which are so likely to happen that we are in daily expectation of their breaking out, will be attributed to the proposing a question of such magnitude at so improper a moment. For most of the opposers have taken care to make that their objection, in order to state the impending rising as a consequence of the abhorrence of the people to a Union. You will be astonished, perhaps, to hear of our being still under any apprehension; but we are, I assure you, in a dreadful state, and only less dreadful than a few months ago, as much as private assassination and general plunder and robbery can be called less dreadful than open rebellion. If the present enormities were likely to continue, I should not scruple to say that an open rebellion, which must be crushed, would be infinitely more desirable; for we have troops sufficient to bid defiance to the disaffected in the end, though they may again give us some trouble. I am afraid Lord Cornwallis's system of lenity has not had the success it deserved. But I cannot blame him for trying it, though we *savage* Irishmen had a tolerable notion of the only way of putting down a rebellion of our own. As to conciliating the minds of the lower Irish, Roman Catholics or Presbyterians, I believe the attempt to be as foolish as the success is impracticable. Whether we act with lenity or severity, their minds will be the same, but their disposition to act can only be curbed by punishment staring them [in] the face. Every act of mercy, I believe in my heart, has operated directly contrary to the intentions of the benefactor, for, instead of bringing back a traitor to his allegiance, it gives him fresh hopes of impunity in crime, and operates still more as an incitement to others. For we all see daily proofs of the greatest villains, bearing commissions of generals in the rebel army, tried and condemned by courts martial, now walking about the streets, and probably hatching new treasons for our destruction.

"I have not heard any arguments against the union which satisfy my mind, and I think I conceive many reasons why it may be of advantage to this country. In the first place, I am not afraid of the English minister defying the members of the Irish branch of the Legislature, or oppressing Ireland in the face of the world, even with the corrupted voice of her members. I should hope there would be an end of divisions in Ireland; the Catholic question would be, of course, put an end to. Parliamentary reform must depend upon England; and we should get rid of

those seeds of discontent which were sown in this country by the members in our own Parliament, who were continually abusing England and the corruption of Government for their own purposes; at the same time, forcing that Government to fresh and fresh corruption to resist their opposition. We, of course, shall have as good laws as you have in England; we shall have all the trade we can employ. Dublin will continue still as great a town as it need be; and if some of its opulence shall be transferred to Cork, or elsewhere, I see nothing to lament. As to our pride and nonsense about our independence, I cannot but laugh at a country talking of its independence, who can neither defend herself against her interior or exterior enemies without the men, navy, or credit of the friendly neighbour of whom she is so jealous; and I am sure I feel far from being hurt at the idea of becoming a part of Great Britain."

THE EARL OF ELGIN TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 28. Broom Hall, by Edinburgh.—"Although I am in expectation of being in London in the course of ten days, I feel very anxious to lose no time in mentioning to your Lordship an occurrence of much moment to me; that the Duke of Hamilton is now dangerously ill, and in case of his death a green ribbon will be vacant.

"It has been, I believe, at all times customary to bestow orders of knighthood on foreign Ministers. At present, if I mistake not, every person in the line, of my standing and rank in it, has the order of the Bath; and on that ground, had I been within reach at Lord Mansfield's death, I should have been induced to apply to succeed to him, particularly as he received his ribbon while on foreign employment, and as I am the only Scotch Peer in that line. The circumstances of my case are, however, now become much more positive; and I should venture to hope your Lordship will consider this mark of dignity as a very suitable appendage to the embassy before me.

"May I therefore beg leave to solicit your Lordship's kindness and assistance to me in making an application in my favour in a view to a vacancy among the knights of the Thistle. I am quite aware I have no personal claim to urge in apology for my using this liberty with you. But my time having been wholly passed in your Department, I wish to stand upon no other ground; and I can, with truth, assure your Lordship that the sense I entertain of your conduct to me makes me very desirous of putting my interests in your hands, whenever I may be permitted to do so."

LORD GRENVILLE TO J. KING.

*Private.*

1798, December 28. Dropmore.—"Some time since I received a letter from you stating some circumstances respecting Mr. Arbuthnot, which made it particularly an object to him to be named to some mission. I could at that moment say nothing

on this point, however desirous of doing an act of friendship towards him; because I saw no certainty, nor even a near prospect, of such a vacancy as might enable me to consult my good wishes towards him.

"There are now two consulships vacant, one at Lisbon, the other at New York; each of them equal in rank and estimation to the situation of minister plenipotentiary, and I believe both considerably superior in value. If either of these would answer the object which was in view, when this particular application was made, I should be well inclined to recommend him for one of them to the King; but on this condition, which he will of course not think unreasonable that, as these situations are not strictly within the course of promotion in the foreign ministers' line, he will not think himself unkindly dealt with if, on a future vacancy of the situation of minister plenipotentiary, I should propose the removal to him, even though in point of income it might be somewhat less desirable.

"I need hardly add that my only view in this proposal is that of doing him a kindness; and that, if it should on any account not fully and completely meet his wishes, there can be no reason for his not telling me so without reserve, and without the least apprehension of producing any change in my desire to assist him on any other occasion."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1798, December 29. Yarmouth.—"Though very giddy and much shaken by a rough sea voyage of nine days, I have really lost all sense of my aches and pains in the additional disappointment which I feel at the failure of my voyage when the little news which I collect here seems so full of every possible motive for wishing that I could have succeeded in it. When I sailed I own I was taught by what I heard here not to be sanguine as to the practicability of the passage, though I thought it my duty at all hazards to undertake the experiment; we persevered in it as long as Captain Raper deemed it in any way safe to do so, and were unlucky enough to satisfy ourselves that every possible communication with the German continent was completely cut off; and as you see by the postscript to my public letter, great apprehensions are entertained for the fate of the packet the most advanced, which when last seen, appeared to be making fruitless efforts to return, and the lieutenant of the lugger which convoyed her fears she is lost. The rigour of the winter is beyond what I could have believed; our rigging was so frozen as to be almost unmanageable, and we had the misfortune to lose a man who fell into the sea probably by the slippery hold he had upon the frozen mast. I was less sick than usual, but am too giddy and shaken to add anything now to this letter. The extreme severity of the weather makes all chance of passing for these three weeks or month desperate; I therefore leave my heavy trunks here, and proceed slowly to Audley End, where I shall

stay Tuesday and hope to hear from you there ; if it were possible you could come there for a day or two I would stay on there, if not I will come to town.

"I send back Shaw and Mason ; when I go again I have another plan to propose as to having an extra messenger to go from Berlin to Cruxhaven, as Lord St. H[elens] had from the Hague to Helvoet, but I am too sick and giddy to talk of it now."

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1798, December 30. St. Petersburg.—"Jusqu'ici nous avons retardé de répondre aux propositions de la Cour de Londres, tant à celles qui vous ont été faites par Lord Grenville, qu'à celles qui ont été répétées ici par le Chevalier Whitworth, ayant rencontré des circonstances qui exigeoient des éclaircissemens ultérieurs. Mais, en attendant, nous avons senti dans toute sa force la solidité de ces communications amicales, et la nécessité réelle d'un accord sincère entre les Puissances intéressées, et, en conséquence de cela, d'un concert unanime de leurs efforts.

"Sans répéter ici la part active que nous avons prise au commencement de cette année dans la cause commune par nos forces de terre et de mër, envoyées au secours et à la défense de nos alliés, mais voulant que notre co-opération s'étende le plus loin que possible, nous avons crû que le premier pas étoit de tacher de rapprocher nos deux alliés vers les liens qui leur conviennent et aux intérêts communs ; et si nos derniers conseils seront considérés par le Roi de la Grande Bretagne avec les dispositions amicales touchant les disputes survenues avec l'Empereur des Romains, il en resultera un bon commencement pour des opérations vigoureuses contre l'ennemi, car on ne sçauroit nier que, sans la participation de la Cour de Vienne, il est difficile d'espérer de grands succès sur le Continent.

"Le second effort efficace de notre coté a été fait en faveur du Roi des deux Siciles. Aussitôt que nous avons sçu qu'il a fait une démarche convenable à sa dignité afin de délivrer l'Italie du joug François, accompagnée des mesures de prudence, nous avons consenti volontiers à lui donner un secours de nos troupes, consistant en huit mille hommes d'infanterie et d'artillerie avec 200 Cosacks, en les expédiant par le chemin le plus court par la Moldavie, la Wallachie, le Banat de Kraysovée, et la Croatie jusqu'à la ville de Zary, qui est dans la Dalmatie actuelle de l'Autriche ; d'où ils doivent être transportés sur des batiments Napolitains en Italie ; sans en demander aucun autre avantage que leur nourriture, comme cela est stipulé ordinairement dans tous les traités d'alliance.

"Le troisième moyen et très efficace pour faire du mal à l'ennemi, ou pour mieux dire, pour atteindre le but que nous attendons avec l'Angleterre, et avec toutes les Puissances bien organisées, est le consentement du Roi de Prusse d'entrer avec nous dans la coalition commune. Nous lui avions déjà préalablement proposé tout ce qui pouvoit exciter l'amour propre et l'appas des acquisitions en donnant l'espérance de notre propre

secours. Nous renouvelons actuellement les ordres à notre Ministre Comte Panin de lui faire définitivement les mêmes demandes, comme vous le verrez par notre rescrit, dont la copie est ci-jointe. Nous faisons consister le secours en question dans quarante-cinq milles hommes d'infanterie, et de cavallerie, avec le nombre suffisant d'artillerie, aussitôt qu'un traité provisional conclu par notre ministère et par le Chevalier Whitworth, et signé par ce dernier *sub spe rati*, aura été ratifié par Sa Majesté Britannique. Quoique d'après nos intentions qui assurent le salut de nos alliés, et même on peut dire de toute l'Europe, nous ne doutions par que la Cour de Londres approuvera la conduite de son Ministre, néanmoins nous avons reconnu nécessaire d'expliquer ici le contenu de ce traité.

“ Dans le préambule on fait mention du but des opérations du Roi de Prusse du côté de la Hollande, conformément aux propositions même de l'Angleterre, qui vous ont été communiquées par Lord Grenville et à notre ministère par le Chevalier Whitworth. Nous envisageons comme une acquisition grande et utile pour toutes les Puissances bien-intentionnées, si les ci-devant Pays-Bas Autrichiens puissent être arrachés à la France et joints à la Hollande. Touchant cet article, de même que des acquisitions que le Roi de Prusse pourra faire en sa faveur aux dépens de notre ennemi, nous avons des assurances de la part de la Cour de Vienne, qu'elle ne s'y opposera en aucune manière.

“ Dans les articles suivans du traité nous bornons notre secours au Roi de Prusse, comme il est dit ci-dessus, à quarante-cinq milles hommes et d'après cela on a posé par une diminution proportionnée d'avec les projets précédents tant les subsides, en les fixant à 900,000 livres sterling, que pareillement la somme un fois à payer, nécessaire pour équiper les dites troupes, faisant 225,000*l.* sterling, et pour d'autres dépenses à raison de 37,500*l.* sterling par mois, que le Roi de la Grande Bretagne prendra sur lui comme dette, payable après la conclusion de la paix. Quoique ce traité doive être considéré comme provisionel, car il est naturel que si le Roi de Prusse ne se décide pas à agir en faveur des alliés, et reste dans sa précédente neutralité suspecte, dans quel cas nous devons aussi nous borner à observer sa conduite, et nous tenir tout prêts à arrêter par la force toute démarche de sa part contre les Puissances en guerre avec les François ; dans quel cas le dit traité n'aura point son effet ; néanmoins si pendant la continuation de la présente guerre il s'ouvre une facilité pour employer notre secours, le dit traité y servira de fondement et de règle.

“ En laissant à vos soins de conduire à son terme cette affaire avec le ministère Anglois, nous revenons à d'autres propositions de Lord Grenville relativement à la guerre et à ses conséquences.

“ Nous considérons comme un moyen salutaire pour toute l'Europe, et comme le seul pour tranquilliser toutes les Puissances, de ramener la France dans les limites où elle a été avant la Révolution qui y eut lieu. Pour l'atteindre par la force des armées, c'est l'affaire de tous les alliés ; et ayant conclu la

paix à ces conditions on peut espérer très aisément qu'il s'y opérera de soi-même un changement ; par le moyen du quel il s'y établira un gouvernement régulier et qui ne sera ni préjudiciable ni dangereux pour les autres Puissances. Mais, au reste, toutes stipulations détaillées provisoires relativement aux acquisitions de la Cour de Vienne et autres objets pareils, entraînent plusieurs incoveniens. Premièrement l'acquisition des succès dépendra des suites et des avantages de la guerre exposée à beaucoup d'incertitude. En second lieu, en les fixant d'avance dans une vûe raccourcie, ne donnera-t-on pas par là-même un prétexte à cette Cour de chercher préalablement à la guerre, suivie de grandes dépenses et de grands dangers, à obtenir quelques avantages, même moindres, par le moyen de sa négociation avec les François. Et quoique sans doute cela ne sera pas solide, mais ayant résolu une fois de rester neutre, toute la coalition sera reduite alors à un grand affoiblissement. Et enfin, troisièmement, il ne sçauroit ne pas exister quelque proportion entre les acquisitions des Cours de Vienne et de Berlin, établie communement d'après les rapports précédents de la Puissance, et de l'étendue de l'une et l'autre : c'est pourquoi nous croyons plus convenable pour nos vûes communes avec l'Angleterre, sans ôter à ces deux Cours la perspective des acquisitions, si par malheur elles y trouvent plus d'appas que dans la sûreté pour les tems à venir de leurs propres trônes et de leurs possessions actuelles, de tâcher de les amener à une prompte décision. Nous ferons auprès de la Cour de Vienne de nouvelles instances en lui représentant que dans le tems que, non seulement le Roi des deux Siciles est entré dans les états de Rome et en Toscane pour en chasser les François, mais que même ces derniers ont déjà déclaré la guerre au Roi de Sardaigne, menacé d'une ruine totale ; quand leur traité conclû à Campo Formio est évidemment enfreint du coté des François par l'expulsion du Pape de sa capitale et de ses états, et par la subversion hostile de la Suisse ; et quand la négociation entamée à Rastadt est accompagnée des demarches violentes tendant à la ruine de l'empire d'Allemagne, la dignité personnelle de l'Empereur d'Allemagne et sa bonne foi à l'égard de ses alliés exigent impérieusement qu'il prononce sa détermination et adopte sans délai des mesures actives ; que personne ne peut le regarder comme agresseur, aussitôt qu'il défend le traité violé par la partie adverse, et l'Empire, dont il est le Chef, exposé aux vexations cruelles d'un ennemi acharné à la ruine de toutes les Puissances ; et que c'est actuellement qu'il se présente l'occasion et les moyens de montrer et sa grande force dans les opérations, et sa fermeté dans les principes et dans les procédés.

“Quant à ce qui regarde la réstitution au Pape de sa capitale et de ses états, le rétablissement du Roi de Sardaigne dans son ancienne indépendance, et d'autres articles expliqués par l'Angleterre, nos idées et nos intentions ne sont nullement différentes de celles du Roi de la Grande Bretagne ; et nous désirerions sincèrement que dans tous les arrangemens et transactions exigés par la nécessité, on puisse autant qu'il est possible éviter les

changemens, ou de secousses qui entraînent après soi l'annihilation des puissances ou des états entiers.

“D'après ces explications confidentielles de notre part, et des efforts employés pour l'avantage de la cause commune, nous nous flattons d'obtenir que la Cour de Londres reconnoitra que personne ne sçauroit nier que nous ne soyons dans la guerre actuelle une des parties principales agissantes.

“Tout ce qui a été dit ci-dessus, et tout ce que nous faisons pour aider nos alliés, est un témoignage meilleur que toutes les déclarations quelconques : mais si d'après le consentement général des alliés il sera trouvé nécessaire de faire des déclarations pareilles, soit auprès des autres Cours afin de les exciter d'entrer dans la coalition, soit à la Diète de l'Empire et au Congrès de Rastadt avec l'explication de nos intentions, en insistant de rompre une négociation aussi préjudiciable, et de conseiller aux membres de l'empire Germanique de faire cause commune avec leur Chef, nous ne nous refuserons pas à le faire, en expédiant en son tems à cet effet des ordres à nos Ministres, afin qu'ils agissent ensemble et d'accord avec les personnes accréditées par Leurs Majestés l'Empereur des Romains et les Rois de la Grande Bretagne et de Prusse ; avec cette reserve cependant, que les paroles soient fortifiées par les actions ; car autrement les suites de pareilles déclarations produiront seulement des réponses indécentes, des désagréments, et une inconsidération universelle.

“Vous communiquerez le contenu de ce rescrit au ministère de Sa Majesté Britanique dans toute son étendue, en demandant qu'on envoie des ordres à Vienne et à Berlin pour exiger les efforts nécessaires et uniformes des ministres Anglois avec les notres, qui se trouvent auprès de ces deux Cours. *Translated into French.*

#### HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 30. Wimbeldon.—“I send for your perusal a very rough draft of a private letter I propose to send to General Stuart. If any thing else occurs to you I shall be happy to receive your suggestions and likewise your corrections. I shall send off Major Gifford in a very few days.

“Have you ever turned in your mind how far it might not be practicable to induce Russia to give us a force of twenty thousand men, or even a less number of troops. They could be brought down the Mediterranean, and, if divided between Minorca and Portugal, they would do wonders. Under the sentiments by which that Court is now actuated, they certainly cannot wish to see France extend their successes in any quarter. If not to Portugal, perhaps they would agree to let them go to Italy, and they would be a wonderful tower of strength in that quarter. Do speak to Woronzow on this subject, and don't give it up unless you are convinced on trial that it is impossible.”

#### CHARLES ARBUTHNOT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1798, December 31. London.—“Happening to be at Lord Gwyder's in the country when King sent me your Lordship's



letter, it was not in my power to speak to him on the subject of it, or to answer it so soon as I should have wished to do; but now, if your Lordship will permit me, I shall beg leave to trouble you with a few lines, as I want extremely to endeavour to express my gratitude for the very uncommon kindness you have shown me, and at the same time to explain as clearly as I can the exact situation in which I am at present standing.

“As King has informed your Lordship of those circumstances which at a particular moment made me more than ever anxious to be employed, it would be unnecessarily intruding on your time if I now did more than merely say that the application which I ventured to make was in consequence of a conversation with Lord Cholmondeley, who confessed to me that he saw a very great chance of my being successful if I could obtain such an income as would meet with the family’s approbation. Not then flattering myself that such vacancies in the foreign line were likely to take place as could enable your Lordship to assist me, I thought myself called upon to desist from those endeavours which were sure of being opposed while my circumstances were so limited; and, whether it be owing to that or to any other cause, I am obliged to own that such information has very recently been given to me on the subject of my wishes as makes me apprehend that the appearances which really were most extremely in my favour are now considerably altered. But yet from what did happen, from the observations which I was enabled to make myself, and from those also which my friends made, I can’t help flattering myself that I may still succeed; though, at the same time, I ought not to conceal that, as there might be difficulty and even danger to my hopes in bringing this point at once to issue, I fear such a delay in filling up the vacancy could not be allowed by your Lordship as would permit me to take the necessary measures for obtaining the wished for information. If, however, a delay of a few weeks could be granted to me, I trust I need not say that I would not encroach on your Lordship’s goodness; for the very instant of my becoming certain either to succeed or fail, I would acquaint King with the result. But this favour I do not presume to ask; I merely mention it as desirable.

“As your Lordship has not only had the goodness to offer me a very lucrative situation, but has also most kindly left it entirely to my option either to accept it or decline it, without leaving me under the apprehension that in the latter case I might forfeit your future favour, I can only say that to me this particular appointment seems to be highly desirable in every respect, and to hold out such pecuniary advantages as must totally remove all difficulties with regard to income; but in reply to the expectation which your Lordship expressed of my not thinking it unreasonable if I were at some future period to be removed to a diplomatic mission, I must beg leave to assure you that, after having treated me as you have done, whatever conduct you might henceforward hold towards me I should always know it to be intended kindly; and indeed, with regard to the instance

now in question, instead of considering it as a disservice, I should feel it to be a peculiar favour if, at a convenient opportunity, I were again to be brought into my old line, which I should certainly prefer, however considerably I might be a loser in point of emolument.

"Before I conclude this letter, which is much longer than I had hoped it would have been, I should wish to return your Lordship those thanks which my heart feels, but which my words will ill express. I may however say with truth that your Lordship's long and continued kindness has made me devoted to you for life."

*Postscript.* "I forgot to mention that, if I were enabled to accept either, it would be the Consulship at Lisbon, which for many reasons I should prefer."

#### IRISH UNION.

*Note as to the mode of bringing forward the business of the Union.*

1798, December.—"The following may perhaps, on consideration, appear the most advantageous course of proceeding on this subject :

"That the British Parliament should adjourn to the same day (the 22nd or 24th of January) on which the Irish Parliament is to meet for the dispatch of business. That the measure should on the same day be recommended to both Parliaments ; in England by a message to both Houses, in Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant's speech. That the answer to this should, in the first instance, be quite general ; and that a day should be fixed for taking the subject into consideration ; which day should be, as nearly as might be, the same in both countries, and should be sufficiently distant to allow time for a call in Ireland, if that should be proposed by the opposers of the measure, unless indeed it were thought advisable that the proposal should come from Government.

"On the day fixed, no other proceeding would, as it appears, be necessary than a joint address of the two Houses in each kingdom, expressing their disposition to promote so desirable an object on suitable terms ; and requesting the king to appoint Commissioners of each kingdom to confer together, and to prepare a plan for this purpose to be submitted to His Majesty, and (if His Majesty shall think proper) to be laid before Parliament.

"Such an address would pass (if at all) by the first week in February. In the next six weeks it would be impossible that the Irish Commissioners should come to England, on account of the business of their Parliament. But much, and very valuable, time would be saved, if it were thought expedient that the British Commissioners should name a certain number of their body to go to Ireland to collect information there, and to confer with any sub-committee of the Irish Commissioners. If the persons selected for this purpose were men well acquainted with the details of Irish and English trade, particularly the former, more

progress might be made towards a conclusion by a fortnight or three weeks of such discussion taking place upon the spot, than in as many months of formal conferences between large bodies of commissioners, sitting in England."

HENRY DUNDAS to [W. PITT].

[1798, December.] Wimbledon.—"The more I consider it, the more doubtful I become on the subject of the Cabinet deliberation yesterday.

"In consequence of the rupture of the negotiation at Lisle, and the language and menaces of France immediately subsequent to it, the nation was put to the necessity of taking a decided and manly part on its own bottom, trusting to its own resources, and without longer entangling itself with the jealousies and perfidy of other powers to which they [it?] had already sacrificed so much of the treasure of the country. From that time Great Britain has proceeded acting upon those principles with fortitude, ardour, and perseverance; and having placed ourselves in a state of security by our own exertions, we perceive the effects of it upon every feeling and interest of the country. Every impatience for peace is gone, the word is never mentioned; our commerce is unbounded, daily increasing, and adding to the wealth, the capital, and of course the resources and revenues of the country. And I believe I may safely aver that the country has now settled itself into a calm determination to fight the battle we are engaged in without shrinking, on a confidence that the new mode of calling forth the resources of the country will be persevered in and improved upon, for the purpose of continuing the war so long as the madness and obstinacy of the enemy shall render it necessary.

"When I refer back to a period not older than twelve months, and compare the feelings and state of the country at present with what they were so short a time back, I am sure it will be admitted that, in the foregoing description of this country, there is nothing exaggerated, and nothing which every man cannot testify from his own personal observation.

"Placed in so enviable a situation, it behoves the rulers of the country well to consider before they adopt any measure or bring forward any proposition that may revolt the feelings of the country, or give a different direction to those feelings than that in which they now run. I am afraid that a new continental system, or an old one again reverted to at any burdensome expense, may stagger the confidence of the country in its own resources, and produce many of the prejudices and doubts which we have already encountered and overcome. At present we feel every shilling expended is for British security and for British purposes, rendered necessary by the obstinacy and inveteracy of our enemy. It may be true that the objects now in contemplation are so connected with the permanent interests of the country as entitle them fairly to be considered as British interests; but, still, that is a matter of reasoning rather than of immediate feeling, and in

every country, and in none more than Great Britain, the general conduct of the public at large is operated upon more by their feelings than by their reasoning and remote theories.

“Notwithstanding all I have said, I am not able to satisfy myself that it would be right to give a cold negative to the proposition of Russia. Every principle of policy present and future point out that power as the natural ally of Great Britain; and, in all our transactions with her, that principle ought never to be overlooked; our answer therefore ought to be open, frank, and unreserved. I would detail with much precision the change which the state of this country has undergone since its last proposition to the late Empress of Russia, and since our last proposition in April to the Emperor of Germany. For this purpose the topics referred to in the note Lord Grenville read to us yesterday ought to be particularly dwelt upon, and there are *two* topics so true and so striking they ought to be insisted upon as very prominent features. The *first*, the great expense we have been put to in arming the country at large for its own security, an expense rendered necessary by the abandonment of us by all our allies; and, therefore, the nation having incurred that expense, would complain with justice of being put to a second expense for the same purpose. I say the same purpose, for it will be recollected that one of the great grounds upon which this country has always justified foreign subsidies is the diversion it creates at a distance, and thereby indirectly providing for our security at home. We have now done this at our own expense completely by means of our fleets and armies; and we should be most unfavourably listened to, if we were now to resort to security *at home* as a topic for granting a foreign subsidy. The *second* topic I refer to is the great additional expense we have put ourselves to recently in augmenting our fleet so as to obtain the same decided superiority in the Mediterranean we have hitherto enjoyed everywhere else. This is an expense which we must continue, and any nation, whether it be Russia or Austria, that may be obliged to engage in hostilities with France, must feel that this last mentioned expense is, in truth, as much for the other powers of Europe in general as for any separate interest of this country. With that proposition, so undeniable in itself, and so obvious to the most limited understanding in the kingdom, it may be fairly stated to Russia and to Austria that this country will, in the expense of that fleet, feel that it is already contributing its full quota of a subsidy for the carrying on the war on the Continent.

“Having stated these topics with all their force, I would conclude with declaring that the Government of this country dare not venture to revolt the feeling of the public by bringing forward any such proposition of expense for continental purpose as they had formerly done with much difficulty under very different circumstances. At the same time, if Russia can form any concert with Austria so as to bring forward a co-operation between them truly and fairly and honourably directed to such a conduct of the war as tends to a more speedy termination of the war, and to

the future security of Europe, we will engage to embark in the cause a sum not exceeding one hundred thousand pounds per month, to be divided in such proportions as they may arrange between themselves; but beyond that sum in the whole we cannot go, without endangering that general good disposition which at present pervades this country. And here it would be necessary to state, that, although the observation does not apply to Russia, of whose fidelity we entertain no doubts, still it is improper to disguise that the aversion of this country to renew any more subsidiary treaties is greatly increased by the unfaithful execution of those already past, on the part of our allies.

“If Russia is not satisfied with the above proposition, our ambassador may be instructed to bring forward another upon the basis suggested in Lord Grenville’s note; I mean, without at all implicating ourselves with Austria, to offer to subsidize an army of Russians for British purposes; and if such a force could be obtained either for a vigorous attack on Holland, for the recapture of Malta, the defence of Switzerland, the opening the markets of South America, the capture of Brest, I am satisfied that a sum of twelve hundred thousand pounds given for such purposes would be not only tolerated but popular.”

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 1. Audley End.—“I have recovered my strength but not my temper, being still a good deal more cross and out of humour than I ever remember to have been. I shall be in town to-morrow, and am impatient to see whether, instead of groaning over my disappointment, I may not by the information which London can so extensively furnish, find some less tardy means of repairing it, than the season is likely to supply, or the helpless conversation of Yarmouth can suggest. If the King of Prussia had a hundredth part of the impatience to see me which I have to see him, and would only send the Duke of Brunswick forward to make a little thaw in Holland, the Prince of Orange would not be starving at Harwich, nor should I be grumbling over my return from Yarmouth.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 2. Dublin.—“Lord Castlereagh is come back announcing the determination of Great Britain to push the question to its utmost, and to carry it either now or to-morrow. But he says nothing of the *quo modo*, save that commissioners are to be named, and that the whole Catholic question is to be kept out of the measure. The latter, I know, *cannot be in fact*, though it may in appearance; because unless the Catholics understand distinctly that the door is left open, with the intention of letting them into the eligibility for Irish seats, on the same footing as a Scotch Presbyterian is eligible for a Scotch seat, at some convenient and fitting opportunity, be assured that the measure cannot pass. The foolish and almost Jacobin association of all the Orangemen against the Union has had the

fortunate effect of turning all the Catholics (except the republicans of that persuasion) to the measure, and they ought not to be lost. Pray turn this in your mind, and be a little communicative as to what you have settled; and remember that nothing will so completely relieve the non-efficiency of Lord Cornwallis on this subject as the having *here* an able Commission, to set [sit] *here* for the purpose of treating with the Irish Commissioners. Such an arrangement would wonderfully facilitate the whole thing, and you might be perfectly sure of controlling it from England. Lord Auckland would be the man in the world for such a mission, and the English militia now serving here might give some few who might be added to those whom you would send over, Lord Euston, Lord Hertford, myself, perhaps Lord Dorchester. But the advantage of this would be the giving real efficiency to Lord Cornwallis's government without trenching upon his situation."

LORD GRENVILLE to the EARL OF CARYSFORT.

1799, January 7. Cleveland Row.—"It was not till to-day that I have been able to talk with Mr. Pitt on the subject on which we conversed when you were last in town. The delay has arisen from his being wholly occupied in the details of the Income bill, and latterly from his being out of town.

"I found him, as I had expected, with every possible good wish to do whatever might be agreeable to you; but, at the same time, stating strongly the difficulties of an increase of the peerage, a measure to which I well know that the King has more than once expressed to him his great repugnance. I urged on this subject the necessity which there would probably be of extending this rule or limit, whatever it may be, on account of the measure of the Union in Ireland, and that as that extension would probably be in favour of Irish peers, that circumstance considerably strengthened your pretensions.

"He told me that it was yet quite uncertain what would be done on that point; that as yet he knows but of two persons intended, and those of a description or situation that seemed to make strong grounds of exception in their favour. That he could however certainly not answer for it that he might not be compelled to go further; and that, although the King's injunctions and his own sentiments as to the inconvenience of further increase would not allow him to stretch the rule with the view of including you in it, yet, unquestionably, it would give him pleasure to do in your instance what he did for any other person of pretensions at all equal to yours.

"Here I conceive the matter rests for the present; and till he sees a little further into the arrangements to which the discussion of the Union may lead, you will, I imagine, think it not unreasonable that he should not as yet be able to give a more decisive answer, nor do I think the delay at all injurious to your wishes." *Copy.*

## LORD GRENVILLE to RUFUS KING.

1799, January 9. Cleveland Row.—“In consequence of our last conversation relative to St. Domingo, I have, after discussing the subject with some of my colleagues, prepared the enclosed minute, which I send for your consideration as the basis of an arrangement which would, I think, provide equitably for the commercial interests of our two countries as concerned in that business; and what is infinitely more important, would afford as good security as the nature of things allows of, against the infinite dangers to which our islands, and your southern provinces, would be exposed from an unrestrained intercourse with St. Domingo in its present state.

“If you should be at leisure, and could meet Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas here to-morrow morning at eleven, half an hour's discussion might very probably so far terminate the business as to enable us to write to America, and to dispatch Colonel Grant. If you had any wish to see me earlier I shall be at home.”  
*Copy.*

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private and secret.*

1799, January 10. Constantinople, *Tigre*.—“I have much satisfaction in being enabled by my reception here to assure you that the measure you adopted of sending the person who was to fulfil the objects of the treaty of alliance himself to contract the obligations has been taken as you meant it, and has operated as an additional cement to a long subsisting friendship. I may add too that it has a good effect towards creating a better understanding between the Russian and British missions here than I found to subsist, our views and relative position being better defined *de vive voix* by a person so lately in direct personal intercourse with principals, than by formal notes and distant hints which did but increase distance. The Russian envoy is of the old school and much more exclusively Russian than is consistent with the liberal system of politics developed to me by his colleague at Richmond. His age and diplomatic rank occasioned him to make greater pretensions to take the lead dictatorially than my brother could or ought to admit, for, not content with the early, constant, and unlimited communication of the business in hand during its progress, he attempted to assume a right of decision and arbitration perfectly incompatible with our situation as an independent power of known good faith, and therefore not likely to infringe in the least on the conditions of our alliance; which, of course, if it were not expressed, implies the obligation not to contract anything contrary to the spirit of that alliance, a thing not in the least probable on such an occasion as the one in question. He even required that his act of acceptance (which I own I did not conceive to be necessary at all from the envoy at *Constantinople*, as we were not empowered to treat with *him*) should *precede* the signature of our treaty; which, had we acquiesced, would have made us appear in the eyes of the Turks

to be the passive instruments of Russia, or at least subject to her censure; the dragoman of the Porte (who, though sufficiently anti-Jacobin and anti-Gallican, is rendered, by his ambition to have one of the Principalities, much more exclusively Russian than he ought to be) being ready to give that turn to the transaction, by way of increasing the exclusive influence of Russia to his personal advantage. All this was to be seen with half an eye, and of course had not escaped my brother's penetration. M. Tomara not expecting to find me more pliant than my brother in this respect, only touched very gently on it, but finding me, notwithstanding, sufficiently disposed to conciliate as much as possible, and to pursue our equal interests with perfect impartiality, was content to accept our notification of our treaty after signature; which he even admitted to be the natural mode, considering that it could not be called a *treaty*, or accepted as such, till it was signed; after which he sent us whatever he pleased to call his act of acceptation, which, for my own part, I thought he might have allowed to be sent direct from Petersburg to London, instead of pushing himself forward as a principal. One naturally mistrusts some design where a man makes a very essential point of what is apparently of trifling import. We treated the matter as un-essential, at the same time of course receiving and transmitting whatever he chose to send us without commenting thereon when done. This accounts for the act of acceptation which will be transmitted with our joint dispatch, and which your Lordship may not expect to see come from Constantinople, as we were not instructed to make any agreements with Russia, and certainly had no occasion for any confirmation of those already existing. M. Tomara made such a point of this in conformity (as he said) to written private instructions from his sovereign, so that we let him take his own course, except as to the time, and he is now perfectly satisfied, which I, of course, wished he should be in the beginning of such a connection. I send you the inclosed in proof of our good personal understanding, which can alone excuse my transmission of personal compliments; his letter was in answer to my invitation to dine with me on board the *Tigre* the day after the signature of our treaty, when it was announced to the world by a salute from the *Tigre* and *Tophana* battery conjointly, as proposed by me, and agreed to after reference to Sultan Selim. His Imperial Majesty is much pleased with the presence of the ship under his windows, and has directed a *very ample* supply of fresh meat, vegetables, fruit, and wine!!! to be sent on board every day for the consumption of the *ship's company*; he has sent privately for the prints of the naval actions and the portraits of the admirals which his people told him were on board, and expressed much satisfaction at learning they were destined for him, as well as the acceptable present of cannon."

LORD GRENVILLE to the DUKE OF PORTLAND.

1799, January 12. Dropmore.—"I had intended before I left town yesterday to write to your Grace on the subject of the draft



of the Lord Lieutenant's speech, and I am very sorry that it escaped my recollection. I feel the delicacy that is due to a person in that situation who must be considered as the best judge of the effect to be produced in Ireland by particular phrases and turns of expression; and therefore, although there are several points put in a manner in which I should certainly not have expressed myself if it had fallen to my lot to address the Irish Parliament in the present very peculiar and critical circumstances, and some which may, I fear, in debate afford a handle against the Government, I do but [not?] think it necessary to trouble you with remarking on them, the rather indeed as I see that some of them had not escaped your notice.

"But there is an omission in the part which speaks of foreign politics, which I suppose is accidental, but which might produce serious mischief; I mean the passage where the Ottoman Porte is mentioned without any reference to the conduct of Russia; this I conclude there can be no difficulty in rectifying.

"Another passage which has struck me very forcibly indeed is that where the Lord Lieutenant (I write from memory, not having the draft here), after speaking of the system of mercy and lenity which he has pursued, contrasts it with a system of revenge and unnecessary severity. This is so put that I conceive no one can read the passage without supposing a censure intended on the plan of government which he found established in the country on his arrival there. I do not impute to him the intention of throwing so harsh, and so very unmerited a censure on his colleagues; but I am confident such must be the impression of the public if the speech should appear to the world in its present shape; and your Grace will not be surprised that, with this impression, I should be very solicitous for the omission or total alteration of that paragraph.

"Even in the view in which I conceive the Lord Lieutenant to have intended this sentence, I cannot help very much doubting its propriety or wisdom. That civil war should have produced mutual animosity and violence (such as persons not engaged in such a scene must condemn), is not matter of much surprise. Nor can any one at all acquainted with the local and peculiar circumstances of Ireland think it wonderful that these motives should, in that country, have produced individual instances of savage ferocity on both sides, which, God be thanked, are repugnant to the very nature of Englishmen. But while the Government applies itself in Ireland to check these outrages with an equal and impartial hand, I see neither necessity nor policy for bringing them forward to public view in a speech from the Throne, and loading with the odium of them (for such must be the effect) all those who have been fighting our cause as well as their own, and whose aid the Government must again require whenever the enemy may make another attempt on the Irish coast.

"You will have the goodness to excuse this long letter on a point in which it is most probable that your own opinion has outrun any remarks of mine." *Copy.*

## THE EARL OF MORNINGTON TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 13. Fort St. George.—“I hope you will have received long before this can reach you a great packet from me by the ship *Eurydice*. You will not be surprised to hear that I am at this place in the present crisis. Dundas will inform you of all my proceedings; which I *know you* will approve; unless you are much altered since the month of July, 1798. I still trust that we shall not have a war, but if war should be inevitable, it will be short and successful. All here is right; Lord Clive in high spirits. I find him a very sensible man; but he is so reserved and shy, that he is not known even to those who transact business with him every day. With me he is on the most intimate and cordial footing. His temper is admirable, and his disposition amiable to the greatest degree. All faction is fled.

“*Invidia infelix* . . . and you may rely on the best news from this quarter in a short time.

“I am in remarkably good health; much the better for my sea voyage, and ready for all events; but confident of a prosperous issue to this crisis. The great activity required by these times keeps up my spirits, which would otherwise sink under the horrors of separation from my family and friends.”

## THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, January 14. Dublin.]—“I see no reason to alter my opinion upon the question of the Union, namely that nothing except Lord Cornwallis’s imbecility can endanger it. But he and his Secretary have both taken a tone within these few days (the reason of which I do not exactly understand, and the effect of which may be very mischievous) of declaring that the Catholic question is wholly unconnected with the question of Union, and so entirely unmixed with it that he cannot discuss their Church establishment or any of their wishes. And Lord Castlereagh told my informant that this language was held because they feared they might indispose the Protestants, and because the Government of England was not prepared to say how far it might be possible for England to concede to them. I can easily conceive your difficulties on the latter head, but I cannot understand the policy in Ireland of risking the loss of the Catholic support for the idle speculation of coquetting with the Orange clubs, who are distinctly hostile to the utmost extent of their means. Remember that England is strong enough to maintain herself in Ireland against either of these parties by the help of the other, but she is not strong enough to grapple with both. This has completely put me out of conceit with my project for a church establishment for the Catholics, for it cannot be formed without some little communication; and I feel that I am doing mischief if it is determined not to go on with what I always thought had been settled as a leading feature, necessary for completing the measure of the Union. Lord Castlereagh is confident in his

numbers, but the violent Opposition are equally sure of their majority. The Speaker *refused* to call upon him when he landed in Ireland, and went out of town to avoid any further explanation; but is quoted for a declaration 'that this was a question upon which it is fitting that every gentleman, whether in office or not, should judge for himself; and that no Government would venture so violent a measure as that of removing from office for such an opinion.' This declaration has been acted upon; for several persons holding office during pleasure have declared and even advertised their hostility, and no notice has been taken of them. Lord Boyle has asked (and obtained) Lord Shannon's leave to oppose, and the Speaker has enlisted several of the young men, such as Lord Cole, Lord Corry, and others. Lord Carhampton is doing a great deal of mischief from England by declaring his intention to oppose, and by encouraging to oppose by stating that he had told Mr. Pitt 'that he dared not turn him out.' All this should be stopped or the contagion will spread. It is imagined that Parnell will oppose, but of that I do not believe one word; though I know that the Speaker has great influence with him. You should in England be prepared with means to meet one difficulty which will occur in April, namely, the return to England of many of the English militia who have volunteered to serve only to that period. Lord Cornwallis deceives himself into the idea that they will continue to serve, but remember that you ought not to trust to his information upon it.

"As to union, once more I add that Cooke is sanguine that it will be carried in Parliament; and, in that case, I have very little fear for the rest."

E. COOKE to [LORD GRENVILLE].

*Most secret.*

1799, January 15. Dublin Castle.—"There is much violence against union among the Protestants, and especially the old friends of Government who work, many of them, underhand. And the Protestant Ascendency men are active against it everywhere. I hope, however, our majority will be good on the first day; and if Lord Ely, Lord Downshire, and Lord Abercorn are decided, I have no doubt of the measure in Parliament.

"My particular reason for writing to your Lordship is that I conceive the question will be decided by the Catholics. The general order of the leaders of that body is for no Catholic to take a part against it; and, as Orange violence has increased against it, the Catholics seem more anxious for it.

"I find, in conversation, that several persons wish that the grant of political equality to the Catholics should accompany the measure of union, and many, such as Lord Shannon, who have been hitherto against them; but they conceive that, when the door is shut against reform, admitting Irish Catholics to sit in the English Parliament could do no harm.

"The Catholic Bishops are in town, and, I hear, admirably well disposed at present.

"I write this in order that your Lordship may consider whether, in debate in England, the exclusion for ever of the Catholics from equality and political privileges should be insisted upon; and whether some latitude should not be left for taking them in at an early period.

"I have not yet heard that there is any serious idea of making a tumult in the meeting of Parliament; much art is used to intimidate.

"We hear the Cork address will be unanimous.

"The North is not ill-disposed; but the general language of independence may have an effect on them.

"I do not see yet any junctions of opposition and united Irishmen, nor of Papist and Orangemen; some low attempts have been made.

"If it were possible to hint that the Catholics should be admitted to equality on a peace, provided they acted heartily in this question, and through the war, it might be of great use."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 16. Dublin.—"You will have heard by yesterday's mail that last night Lord Cornwallis dismissed Sir J. Parnell. I should have written to apprise you of it, but that I was in hopes to have been able to inform you of his successor, and I delayed till the mail (which was early) was gone. This morning Corry was ordered to attend Lord Cornwallis, and has just told me that he is appointed. You will at least have the advantage of a very able and active man, in the place of a most pig-headed and treacherous fool. *I know for certain* that he was convinced as late as yesterday morning that Government would not dare to remove him; and consequently that he is completely duped into his patriotism by the Speaker, who has thrown away his scabbard. The removal of J. C. Beresford and of two others is likewise *said to be* determined on. Cooke thinks the minority will be about 100; my ideas are that they will divide 120, but some of the stray sheep are returned to the fold, *amongst whom is Lord Boyle*. All now depends upon the immediate prosecution of the measure, even at the expense perhaps of some of the accuracy necessary in such a work; and with these impressions you will judge my disappointment when Corry told me that Lord Castlereagh had told him that he had not yet got the draft from England of the Bill for appointing commissioners; and that he could not engage for any specific time in which it would be ready. Now as you are always called upon to do everybody's business as well as your own, I do adjure you not to let this matter sleep, but to put it into some immediate train, for, if the interval of time between your prologue (as you term it in your last letter) and your play is too long, be assured that it will be damned. As to your new plan of electing peers for life, I own I do not like it; nor the new system of the House of Commons; but I like the Union too well as a measure to quarrel with the details upon points which I conceive are not exactly the end of

the world; but I own that I adhere most tenaciously, and as a *sine quâ non*, to the trial of contested elections by committees to be sent hither, and of appeals to the House of Lords by committees of Lords Triers, to be likewise sent over; for any other arrangement would be a *denial of justice in fact* though not in words, and this opinion is very generally held by every moderate man. The Catholics are coming forward very roundly, but the British Government must urge that of Ireland to the Catholic questions, or else nothing will be done, and their support will be lost."

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Quite private.*

1799, January 16. Constantinople, *Tigre*.—"Your letter concerning Brigadier General Khoeler, dated 11 November, only arrived this day. I have already paved the way at the Porte, where he is known advantageously and anxiously expected. I shall have pleasure in co-operating with a man like him of abilities and experience. I take for granted the officers who are to follow him will come out in the *Charon*, which, I learn with much satisfaction, is coming to this quarter under the command of my cousin. I think him just calculated for the sort of service.

"We have, of course, laid some stress on the unexampled liberality of the presents in the essential articles of military stores, so as to come off cheaper than could be expected in other respects. The prints which I brought for individuals of the government have been highly acceptable, as well as those intended for monuments of our naval achievements in the hands of the Grand Signor. I could wish those of the battle of the Nile and the best likeness of Lord Nelson to be sent out as soon as they are published, the prejudice of religion in respect of paintings having given way to custom, and admiration of the arts, and particularly the subject. The Turkey Company certainly never had their business managed cheaper than now, that it is more likely than ever to be enabled to bear even a greater expense than heretofore. The old British palace being so completely out of repair as to be no longer habitable, the representative of the nation which now takes the lead here is obliged to live in the worst house of the many bad ones at Pera, in which he has not a comfortable room to give even me who can put up with anything; and for this he is obliged to pay rent; whereas if Government would take the present favourable opportunity and buy one of the three vacant palaces which nobody else can bid for, there would be a proper establishment without the necessity of the minister paying house-rent out of appointments on which he cannot live as he ought to do. *A propos* to house-rent, it appears hard that the weight of the old bad bargain shall fall on my brother from the time of Mr. Liston's departure; the rent of the old house, near three hundred a year, being of course on his shoulders although he did not stand in need of a habitation of that size, not being married then, or

obliged to *représenter* quite so much as at present; and this too for a period of time when, by your Lordship's decision on his application as to his appointments, he literally had nothing from Government as sole *chargé d'affaires* without a secretary, doing the double duty of a political and military mission, and the consular correspondence of the commercial company. I told him what your Lordship said on the score of temporary augmentations of establishment and consequent expense being to be borne out of the secret service money, but he has naturally a delicacy at paying himself that way; for besides its being impossible to fix a price on one's hospitality, which is necessarily more widely extended where there are no inns for travellers, and where Europeans alone can entertain Europeans, it is very difficult to draw that sort of line that would satisfy one's conscience. Would it not be better for your lordship to decide on a given sum to be given for this contingency, if a proper permanent establishment cannot yet be formed, as you did in the case of Mr. Liston's first *début* here?"

PAUL, EMPEROR OF RUSSIA, to COUNT WORONZOW.

1799, January 16. St. Petersburg.—“En conséquence des Notes qui ont été présentées à Rastadt par les Ministres François à la Députation de l'Empire et au Comte de Lehrbach, à l'égard de nos troupes auxiliaires, et en nous attendant que les Agens François employeront tous les moyens possibles pour diviser à cet effet plusieurs états de l'Allemagne au grand préjudice des Alliés, notre ministère a communiqué au Chevalier Whitworth notre désir, pour que sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne prescrive au Ministre d'Hannovre à Ratisbonne d'employer l'influence de sa Cour à la diète de l'Empire, et d'agir contre les intrigues des François, soit dans le susdit cas particulier, soit dans tout autre cas, où l'intérêt commun l'exigera.

“Nous vous chargeons de vous expliquer dans le même sens auprès du ministère Anglois, et d'insister sur ce que les dites instructions soient expédiées. Nous les regardons d'autant plus nécessaires vu que la conduite de la Régence d'Hannovre et du Ministre Ompteda n'a pas jusqu'ici été fort analogue à nos vues communes avec l'Angleterre contre les François.” *Translated into French.*

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 18. Dublin.—“The storm is gathering very thick in this country, and Lord Cornwallis is likely to pay very dear for his utter want of all communication, and for his most indolent imbecility. Parnell appears full of regrets, and evidently might have been managed had it been wished. The Prime Sergeant has likewise notified his intention to oppose, and is to be removed; so are two or three of the *Dii minores*. But at this late hour no distinct answer has been obtained from Lord Downshire; and a letter very full of doubts has been received from Lord Ely, whose doubts on the measure have originated in London,

where he has been soliciting what he probably has not obtained ; you will easily see what a change in the book of numbers these two noble lords may make. Lord Abercorn, who never does anything like anybody else, has written to Lord Castlereagh to say that he and his friends are to support this measure ; but that his friend Mr. George Knox is to be at liberty to oppose it though he is a Commissioner of the Revenue ; and that ‘if a hair of his head is touched, every vote whom he can influence shall oppose.’ The Speaker has, in the resolutions of the county of Louth penned by himself, threatened that the attempt to carry this measure by force will ‘reduce the country to the necessity of recurring to *first principles*,’ and the violence of language is beyond all imagination. Still however I am confident that nothing can lose the question save Lord Cornwallis’s mismanagement of every means in his hands. Lord Donegal [Belfast ?] has writ from Belfast to all his father’s members (four) to call upon them to support him in his opposition to the union, and I fear he will succeed with three out of the four.

“The Catholic bishops have had a meeting in Dublin, and have unanimously agreed to support the Union ; and to write to their clergy to warn their flocks against tumultuous assemblies, and the misrepresentations of those who wish to mislead them.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 19. Dublin.—“I enclose to you Foster’s resolutions, in which you will observe his ‘recurrence to first principles’ ; by which phrase he admits to his friends that he means ‘the people.’ In the meantime he talks very openly of the influence which the Orange clubs have in all the Irish militias, and in the Scots Fencibles, and in the *English militia*. The whole of this is undoubtedly most exaggerated, but I think him capable of any extremities in the very desperate state of his private affairs. Lord Castlereagh is still confident of his book of numbers, but there are very many rats, and, if Lord Downshire and Lord Ely should play tricks, I should doubt the event. The yeomen of Dublin were all summoned to receive new colours with new mottos on Monday, but orders were sent for disbanding the first (Liberty Rangers) who moved, and they have cried *peccavi* ; but I have very little doubt but that there will be a street riot on Tuesday unless Lord Cornwallis should awake from his apathy, and avail himself of the force in his hands.

“I have just got your letter, and am most happy that your mind is so relieved. It has indeed relieved me from the full share of your uneasiness. I have only time to add that your plan for bringing the details forward in England on the 29th appears highly useful, and the appointment of Lord Auckland and others will, I trust, be by *resolutions* and not *by bill*, as they will be nothing more than a committee to digest and report, but not to conclude.

“This will save time, and the many stages in which the battle could be fought over and over again. I trust Lord Ely is secure. Lord Carhampton might be secured (as I know from his friends) by being threatened as to his Ordnance by Mr. Pitt.”

The PRINCE OF ORANGE to [H. FAGEL].

1799, January 20. Hampton Court.—“J’aurois envoyé les extraits des rapports de M. de Stamford à my Lord Grenville, s’il avoit été possible de les avoir mis au net, mais il s’est trouvé encore plus de chiffre que je ne l’avois vue ce matin, et ce n’est que dans ce moment que toutes ces lettres ont pu être tirées au clair. Je vous prie de passer chez my Lord Grenville, et de lui dire que je suis bien fâché de n’avoir pu être prêt aujourd’hui, mais que sans faute j’espère dans la journée de demain lui faire parvenir les précis qu’il désire voir, et que je comprends comme lui qu’il est nécessaire qu’il aye bientôt, et qu’il puisse lire avant le départ de son frère. Je vous écris cettre lettre le dimanche, mais comme vous ne la recevrez que demain, vous pouvez assurer my Lord Grenville que durant la soirée il aura ma lettre avec les papiers.”

The EARL OF ELGIN to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, January 21. Archerfield, Haddington.—“Your Lordship will, I am happy in believing, give me your good wishes on the occasion of my marriage, which is to take place very shortly. This event leads to no alteration in my plans as fixed with you, further than making me very anxious to have as much time as it is possible for you to allow me previous to my setting out for Constantinople. The long interruption of all intercourse with Germany, and the consequent delay in the notification of my appointment, induces me to hope that your Lordship will not find difficulty in granting me this indulgence. I should wish to receive your instructions on this suggestion, rather than name any limited period. But I shall have occasion for some time in Scotland for the different matters of business to be settled on such an event; and as much more afterwards as may be required for the preparations of my mission.

“Your Lordship would oblige me greatly by informing me, as soon as you conveniently can, what your wishes are on the subject, as all my arrangements, and in a moment of so much interest, depend upon your decision.

“Not having yet had time to make my friends acquainted with my present engagement, I would beg your Lordship not to mention it.”

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 22. Dublin.—“I have been busied this whole morning in consequence of the illness of Fremantle, and of the absence of my other field officers, in looking over my regiment, and over all the Dublin guards, which by accident are under my orders for this week, in order to insure tranquillity on this day. It is now four o’clock and nothing has stirred, nor are there any symptoms of mobbing more than applause to the Speaker, who



has been courting it in every way, and holding language little short of what he has been hanging so many croppies for. Lord Castlereagh is still very sanguine in his calculation of numbers, but I think the minority will divide above 100; though he in private assured me that they would not be 80. Lord Kingston moves a separate Orange amendment against Lord Cornwallis, but will support the Union. Lord Kingsborough is said to be gone to England, but the young Orange men in the House of Commons will be very personal and violent. George Knox, who has solved Lord Abercorn's difficulties by resigning on Sunday, is the only one of his family who opposes. The Hutchinsons are all eager supporters. Coote has writ a very manly letter to his Queen's County electors, declining to abide by their instructions; and has accepted, at Lord Cornwallis's earnest solicitation, the command of that militia to keep out W. Pole, who thought that it became him to write a most insolent letter to the Queen's County meeting, urging them to oppose the Union. I have judged it right, after turning the matter very fully in my mind, and after having arranged my ideas for speaking upon the Union in the House of Lords, to persevere in my original plan of cutting that illustrious assembly; but for fear of any misconstructions, I have given my proxy to the Lord Chancellor. I enclose you specimens of the language held by an Irish Speaker, and by an Irish judge of the Admiralty. I am at a loss to say which of them, were I in the Government, I would begin with; but I should most certainly think it right to attack both in their offices, which they probably deem secure before they would venture to use such language.

"I have just got your letter of the 18th, and your note of the 17th, which puts me in the highest hopes and spirits. God grant that the cards may yet be played to advantage at Berlin. I will work at the Catholic project upon your intimation; and with the more zeal because I have had an explanation with Lord Castlereagh, who is more reasonable, and at my desire has seen Dr. Troy, whom, he told me, he found much more reasonable than he expected. The Catholics are as a body quite staunch, and are very useful; and what is equally advantageous is that the mass of the Dissenters in the north are inclined to the Union. With arrangements for these Churches, which will cost 100,000*l. per annum*, and with a regulation for tithes, you are masters of Ireland."

7 o'clock.—"All has passed most quietly; not an outrage to any one, and *no mob* except about ten or twelve men to huzza the Speaker at his house. I have just dismissed 1,200 men, whom I have had under arms."

#### COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 22. Richmond.—"Je n'ai pas reçu la note explicataire de nos raisons contre la maudite convention, ou plus-tôt contre le projet de cette convention qui, n'étant pas signée, ne peut être regardée comme existante. Je n'ai pas reçu

non plus les lettres du Comte Panin que je vous ai laissé hier. Je vous prie donc de m'envoyer toutes ces pièces par l'homme que je vous envoie exprès à cheval pour cet effet.

"Faites-moi l'amitié de me faire savoir si monsieur votre frère va enfin comme ministre remplaçant my lord Elgin à Berlin ; ce qui mettra à son aise le trop timide ministère Prussien qui, jusqu'à la conclusion finale de ses arrangements avec vous, ne veut donner aucun ombrage à l'intrigant Syes, [Siéyès] et, en témoignant cette complaisance pour le Cabinet de Berlin, vous lui attirez bien des prétextes qu'il mettra en avant pour ne rien conclure. Monsieur votre frère a trop d'esprit pour croire que le grade diplomatique avec lequel il ira, l'obligera à une plus longue résidence, qu'il ne le désire.

"Il me reste encore à présent à vous prier, à vous supplier, à vous conjurer à ne pas rappeler votre ministre en Russie. Il est fautif sans doute ; mais il est déjà puni. Il doit être bien honteux pour la manière dont il s'est compromis chez nous, et il sera encore plus puni quand vous lui exprimerez l'indignation de Sa Majesté le Roi et de son ministère à cause du faux pas qu'il a fait : c'est certainement une punition terrible pour un gentilhomme comme lui. En le rappelant vous vous punirez vous-même, car l'importance des relations réciproques entre ce pays et le mien exigent que vous ayez chez nous Ministre qui connaisse bien le pays et ceux qui sont à présent, ou qui peuvent être à l'avenir, en place, qui soit aimé de l'Empereur et qui ait la confiance du ministère. Vous n'avez personne à la main pour le remplacer tout de suite. Est-ce le tems pour manquer d'information d'un pays aussi intéressant que la Russie ? Celui que vous enverrez à sa place, quelque mérite qu'il puisse avoir, sera plus d'une année sans avoir gagné la confiance qui ne se donne, ni ne se prend pas comme une prise de tabac. Il sera donc hors d'état de vous servir efficacement.

"Après de si grands intérêts, il ne me conviendrait pas de parler des miens, mais votre amitié pour moi m'enhardit à le faire. Je suis intimement persuadé que le rapel de votre ministre produira *ipso facto* le mien. Quel que ce soit qui me remplacera sera plus capable que moi, et s'il est un vrai Russe, il sera aussi bon Anglais que moi ; mais il se passera bien du tems avant vous le connaissiez à fond, et dans cet interval, il ne jouira pas de cette confiance dont vous m'honorez. Les affaires en souffriront dans cette crise générale, quand les ministres Anglais en Russie et le Russe en Angleterre ne seront pas connus dans les pays où ils se trouvent, et ignoreront le pays et les gens avec lesquels ils auront à traiter. En frappant avec trop de violence contre le Chevalier Whitworth vous frapperez aussi contre moi par bricole.

"Ce pays-ci est le seul au monde que je quitterai avec regret. Je suis persuadé qu'on me le fera quitter, et ce sera mon ami Lord Grenville qui me chassera d'ici !"

*Postscript.* "Dans ce moment un de vos couriers vient de me rapporter les lettres du Comte Panin. Il ne me reste donc à avoir que le papier que vous vouliez me donner hier, et que je

n'avais pas pris parceque je vous avais prié d'ajouter quelque chose que je ne comprenais pas, et vous m'aviez promis de m'envoyer."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 22. Richmond.—"Je ne sais trouver aucun terme suffisant à pouvoir vous exprimer ma profonde reconnaissance pour la nouvelle que vous me donnez que le Chevalier Whitworth ne sera pas rappelé, et pour le motif obligant auquel vous attribué cette résolution. J'en suis pénétré, et s'il y avoit moyen que quelque chose au monde puisse augmenter l'attachement sans borne que j'ai pour vous, cette nouvelle preuve de votre extrême amitié pour moi le produiroit. Qu'il est heureux pour moi de posséder cette amitié; je la mérite par celle que j'ai pour vous.

"Combien les affaires de l'Europe iroient en mieux s'il y auroit vue entre ceux qui les traitent cette cordialité qui existe entre nous. Vous m'avez rendu heureux par l'assurance que j'ai à présent de ne pas quitter ce pays que j'aime, et auquel j'ai été, je suis, et je serai, toujours attaché."

The EARL OF CARYSFORT to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 23. Dublin.—"I arrived after an unprosperous voyage (having been twenty-one hours in a storm, and landed sixteen miles to the north of Dublin, from whence I came to town on a car,) just as the Lord Lieutenant was going to the House. I wish I could announce to you better news. But I am afraid the plan of Union must be laid aside for the present, and I think it will require a good deal of prudence and management to prevent the bad consequences which may result to the public service from the heat which has been excited. In the House of Lords an amendment was first proposed by Lord Powerscourt calling in question the competency of Parliament. As the other lords in opposition were not prepared to go this length, he desired to withdraw it, but the Chancellor would not agree to it. There was a division on the question for withdrawing the amendment, 46 to 19, in which the Archbishop of Cashel was in the minority, Lord Ely going behind the throne. On the amendment afterwards proposed by Lord Bellamont the numbers were, 16 and 1 proxy to 49 and 3 proxies, Lord Farnham voting in the majority. I am not sure whether the Archbishop of Cashel voted at all. Lord Ely again went behind the throne. Lords Yelverton and Carleton spoke strongly and well on the side of Government, and the Chancellor played his part with great spirit, and I think with a considerable degree of effect and impression. In the House of Commons the amendment was rejected only by one vote. The fears expressed in the letter I sent you were too well verified by the event. Several persons who had been considered as firm friends joined the Opposition. Lord Castlereagh had been apprised that there were

grounds to suspect them, but continued to receive assurances from them to the last. The debate on the part of the Opposition was most violent, and all the most furious expressions applauded with clamour. On the side of Government the best speeches were not cheered at all. The benches left half empty, and the members affecting carelessness and inattention. Lord Downshire's friends were exactly divided. Lord Ely's, with one exception, a general upon the staff, did not vote. It appears to me that in the present state of things you cannot venture upon many dismissions. The removal of Parnell and the Prime Serjeant will tell to good account hereafter. But if you go further just at this moment, there will be danger of forming a strong party against Government under Mr. Ponsonby. A few, whose conduct has been peculiarly marked by treachery, might perhaps be turned out without risk; but I hope Government will be wise enough not to let the present or any future vacancies be filled by the friends and dependents of those who have acted with so much bad faith upon the present occasion, and have laid by to take advantage of any moment of distress. If they do, all hope of carrying this measure hereafter, or of any real strength or consistency of administration in this country is at an end. Lord E[ly] told me upon the journey that he was undecided. The Archbishop of C[ashel] had, I believe, a considerable influence upon him, and I hear that a good deal of the mischief is attributed to Carhampton, who has however availed himself of some pretence to stay away in order to save his office. Lord Enniskillen acted merely in resentment to Lord Cornwallis, and so did a few more of the violent Orangemen and exterminators; but, as far as I am informed at present, it will require a good deal of time and management to bring over sufficient numbers to form a majority which can be relied upon. I have the mortification of being obliged to require Mr. H. Osborne to relinquish his seat. He conducted himself with a degree of fury, and every attempt to restrain only served to inflame him. My arrival was too late for me to speak to him, but it would have been of no avail. The vacancy will be supplied by somebody who will be previously approved by the Government. C. Osborne, I hope, acquitted himself very well, and I rejoice that I had an opportunity of making a very unequivocal avowal of my own sentiments.

"I shall remain, at all events, long enough to know a little more of the state of our Parliament and the nation than I now do; and shall endeavour to put you in possession of information which, as far as it goes, shall be correct. I am not aware that I can be of any use by staying through the session, but I will do it if the Government here wish for it, or if there appears to be any storm brewing. Parnell is manœuvring to regain his post, and did it so grossly in the debate as to cover himself with ridicule."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 23. Dublin.—"The curtain is dropped on the Union. In the Lords, 51 for, 17 against. In the Commons,

Government opposed the amendment, and saved it by 106 against 105. Opposition tried to negative the main question with 105, and Government saved it by 107. Lord Castlereagh then gave notice that no further proceedings would be had upon this measure, without giving further and very full notice; and the House rose at  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 12 at noon.

"The mob drew the Speaker home, and then proceeded to hustle Lord Ormonde and Captain Pakenham; the latter drew a pistol, collared the first man who struck at him, and has secured him. They were dispersed by the first appearance of troops, but as their High Mightinesses have given their orders for illumination, and as Lord Cornwallis has given no one order yet (at five o'clock) for patrols, Dublin is in a very unpleasant state.

"Now read my letters, and see whether I have prophesied truly in stating the numbers against it to be above 100. Lord Castlereagh has really worked like a horse, but his principal is a dead weight that bears down everything. It is astonishing how many have voted in this business from their personal outrages or complaints, independent of and unconnected with the question of office, or objects; and I feel bound as an honest man to tell you that, having disgusted every man in the country, friend or foe, and having shewn, in the common management of the question and of the men through whom he was to work, the most absolute incapacity, you do not discharge your duty to either kingdom or both unless you recall him, and put the game (which I think recoverable) into other hands. The Speaker declares that he will not oppose Government on any other point; so does Parnell; but you will easily see that opposition is too tempting with such advantages as he has against the character of Lord Cornwallis. Herbert Taylor sails for England this night with his despatches, heartily sick of the country who are much disgusted with the effect of *his* influence on Lord Cornwallis's mind, to which much of what is disliked is ascribed. I again repeat my eager wishes for Lord Cornwallis's removal, it being, I am sure, clearly understood by you that *no consideration* will induce me to look to such a bed of thorns. But I feel that I do not discharge my duty if I do not urge you to save Ireland and the empire from the consequences of his misconduct, which I verily think are beyond all calculation.

"Orders are this moment come to me, as commanding officer for the night, from Lord Cornwallis, to send out two patrols from each corps of cavalry and infantry, of one officer and 18 men each, to patrol the streets till 12 o'clock; to be very careful not to molest individuals or small parties, but to protect houses and persons and to disperse large mobs, and upon no account to attempt to prevent illuminations.

"Such are our orders, given against the opinion of every person civil and military whom he has consulted, who have all told him that, unless illuminations are prevented, no house or person of any of those who have voted for the Union is safe. I shall do my best, but remember that these are my orders, and preserve this proof of (I know not what to call it) in case of accidents.

8 o'clock. "We have a most fortunate ally in a most heavy rain which has prevented much of mobbing; but all Dublin is illuminated at the same time. I repeat again and again that last night the lower classes were with us, and it is most cruel to lose this game where, above all other places, we had the means of ensuring it. I write to Mr. Pitt upon these points to deliver my conscience. I have been round Dublin where there is nothing serious, but every thing to apprehend from the inefficiency of a Government which exists *only in this very incapable man*. Again and again I repeat, the House of Commons was in his hands had he taken the most obvious and common care."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private for yourself and Mr. Pitt.*

1799, January 24. Dublin.—"The very unquiet state of Dublin kept me on horseback till two o'clock last night; but the force in very numerous patrols, which I arranged in breach of Lord Cornwallis's orders according to my own fancy, and the alertness of the troops in dispersing every assembly of people, prevented any serious mischief, or any resistance wherever it was necessary to interfere. Four or five houses in different streets suffered severely before it was possible for us to move the troops to check the mob, but, upon the whole, the night passed more quietly than I expected. I now write to you again to press upon your most serious and immediate consideration a subject which I mentioned to Mr. Pitt yesterday, and upon which I conversed much with Lord Castlereagh last night, having been called to disperse a mob near his house; I mean the situation of the Catholics. In consequence of what had passed between Dr. Troy and him about ten days since, which arose out of my earnest recommendation to him to converse with them on their objects, and on the arrangements necessary for connecting their Church with the Crown, Lord Castlereagh told me on Sunday last (what I knew before) that they had agreed to leave to the Crown the nomination of their bishops; to accept of such powers as Government might think necessary for their control over their clergy; to frame distinct and public ordinances, subject to the royal approbation, for the discipline of their Church; and to meet, if allowed, a High Commissioner (a Protestant) once a year, or not, as it might be wished by Government, for holding a General Assembly on the plan of that of Scotland; they likewise engaged to suspend refractory priests at the requisition of Government. This was the general outline of the conversations between Lord Castlereagh and Dr. Troy, who engaged to digest a plan for the pay of their Church according to ideas thrown out by Lord Castlereagh. In consequence of this conversation, all the Catholic bishops came to Dublin and agreed to these ideas as stated by Dr. Troy, and authorized him to assure Government of their active and immediate exertions for the Union; and last Sunday an admonition was read in all the chapels

warning their flocks to confide in the King's benevolent intentions for the peace and security of his subjects, and to refrain from any riot, tumult, or resistance to the Government. In the course of Monday they (I mean Dr. Troy) received a communication from a very violent Catholic anti-unionist, a son of Sir P. Bellew, to threaten (on behalf of the Speaker, whose name was used) every vengeance for what had been done, unless steps were taken to retract; which was refused. Yesterday, after the House was up, the same threats were repeated in general terms that they should be given up to the resentment of the Orange men. In consequence of this the Bishops all agreed that it was necessary for them to separate, and to go down to-morrow to their respective counties, under the greatest alarms for their own safety and that of their people. I spoke on this subject to Lord Castlereagh, and stated the absolute necessity of giving them some general assurance of the sense which Government entertained of their loyalty, and of the attention that would be given to prevent them or their people from suffering in consequence of it. He promised to urge Lord Cornwallis on the subject; but though I stated the bad consequences that would arise from neglecting this communication, particularly as they separate to-morrow, he doubted whether (under their press of business) Lord Cornwallis or he could have time to see Dr. Troy to make this communication. All this made me very uneasy, as I could not bear the idea of these persons going to the 32 counties of Ireland, each to tell the tale of their abandonment from the British Government whom they meant to serve; and, therefore, early this morning I sent a person (through whom I have had communication) to Dr. Troy to say, from a written memorandum, that *I* had no doubt but that he and his brethren would receive from Government the strongest assurances of their sense of the loyalty which had been shewn on this subject by the body of the Catholics; and of the disposition of Government to prevent them from suffering from any resentments or prejudices which their conduct might have raised in the minds of those who were ill disposed to them; but that, for fear of any mistake in the hurry of a moment so anxious as the present, I had written a private letter to Lord Grenville and to Mr. Pitt to express my sense of their services which were known to me, and my request that they might not escape the attention and protection of the English Government. I really believe that, if this had not been done, very serious and unpleasant consequences might have arisen; and, at all events, that it would have been impossible to have attempted to have brought them forward again on a similar occasion; for they were in the lowest state of dejection. I have now only to request Mr. Pitt and you to approve the very cautious way in which I have named you both, and to avail yourself of the first opportunity of directing the Irish Government to assure them of protection.

"Lord Castlereagh did not attempt to explain the causes of his defeat save in general terms of the treachery and poltroonery of individuals; and appeared wholly undecided what to do as to

removals of those who hold offices; and I suspect that Lord Cornwallis is very averse from any steps of this sort, for I know that he held very loose and strange language upon this subject about ten days since. I hope and trust that the very milk-and-water paragraph in the Speech, respecting the Union, was not of your fabrication; for I never read one less dignified, less impressive, or less calculated to convey the idea that Great Britain considered this measure as the only solution to the difficulties of every sort that press upon Ireland. I think it probable that the Opposition will endeavour to-night to throw out the address upon the report; and if they attempt it they will succeed, as all confidence is gone. But having stated this, I am as explicitly certain that an able man would recover the ground which Lord Cornwallis has lost; and would secure his majority out of the 83 who have not yet voted, and out of the enemy's ranks, capable of carrying this question with *éclat*; but indeed it is insanity to attempt to carry this or any other point so long as this mill-stone hangs upon the shoulders of Government. Once more I implore you to see well all the consequences of keeping Lord Cornwallis in a situation where his personal conduct and character make you enemies, without any one, *per contra*, to counterbalance all that he puts into the scale against you.

7 o'clock. "The same orders for patrols as last night, but, fortunately, I am not upon duty. I do not think from what I hear that there will be any riot."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 25. Dublin.—"Just as I foretold yesterday, Lord Castlereagh has lost his address upon the report, 109 for expunging the Union paragraph to 104. Immediately after this, W. Ponsonby urged a resolution pledging the House to their country that they would at no time consent to any Union, but would always support the constitution of Ireland under a King, Lords, and Commons, in a Parliament assembled and resident in Ireland. But this was immediately opposed by several of Mr. Ponsonby's new allies, who stated that such a resolution could not bind, and that though they had opposed it *now*, they would support it if the country hereafter wished for it; so the resolution was withdrawn. This is in itself a commentary worth a thousand others upon the text which I have so often preached, namely, that the majority was secure but for the imbecility of Lord Cornwallis; and it confirms me in my opinion that the thing may yet be carried (and even this session) by a majority secured out of these conscientious gentlemen, and out of the 83 who have not voted. But remember again and again that Lord Cornwallis can neither carry this, or any other point, so far as his talents or character are concerned. His language, of which Lord Carysfort will tell you more, is most scandalously lukewarm on the whole subject; and I can now tell you distinctly that his confidential *aide-de-camp* (Captain Raymond) told a person yesterday on whom I can depend, that Lord Cornwallis was not surprised at this defeat,



for that he expected it, and did not care one farthing for the event of the question. You will observe that I do not ask you to believe (what I do not) the truth of this assertion; but I desire you to think as I do of the effect which such conversation is calculated to produce, added to the impressions arising out of the very cold and careless style both of his personal language, and of his speech on this great question. Since I wrote yesterday I have received the signatures of almost every man of property, and of every Catholic in Westmeath, in the most distinct terms of approbation; and the anti-Unionists were both beaten on Monday in the counties of Longford and Cavan; and from every account I can get I am confident that the people, save in Dublin, are ten to one in favour of it; and even in Dublin it now appears that the priests had recovered and exerted their influence so successfully as to prevent the slightest appearance of a mob, till the question was lost.

“At all events, and whatever your determination may be, I implore for the sake of Government some assurances to the Catholics that they shall not be abandoned to the Orange anti-Unionists for this act of loyalty. Lord Ely was in the *House of Lords* and would not vote. Of his members all stayed away, save General Eustace. Of Lord Downshire’s members only two appeared; of Lord De Clifford’s not one. All this is very bad, but confirms my assertions.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE,

1799, January 26. Dublin.—“Only three words to say that the storm is thickening. Lord Cornwallis has ordered that the troops shall only act under the orders of a civil magistrate; and no justice in the city will or dares act, so that last night half the windows in Dublin were broke, and the mob very turbulent. A gentleman (a Mr. Bailey) whose house was attacked, fired and killed two; and Lord Clare fired a blunderbuss over the mob and dispersed them; but it is most painful to obey such orders.

“A more important fact is that G. Ponsonby has persuaded the Speaker to join him in giving *carte blanche* to the Catholics of repeal of test, and of a Church establishment, as the sure means of preventing an Union, and has created a great effect. Cooke came to me this morning about it, having heard it from a leading Catholic merchant, one Macdonnel, who seemed inclined to close with Ponsonby’s offer. This puts Government completely in a cleft stick, and the solution either way is very difficult. My solution for it is to persevere at all hazards in the plan for union; but *that* and every thing else depends upon the removal of Lord Cornwallis, for with him no one, friend or foe, will act.

“I can now *bring proof* of his having declared within these four days that ‘he had nothing to do with the civil government of Ireland,’ and the language of his *aide-de-camp* of ‘his not caring a farthing for the question’ still continues. No arrangements are taken with respect to the future common measures in Parliament, only that it is to be ordered to adjourn. But the Speaker yesterday told Cooke ‘that they must remain assembled till they heard

of Mr. Pitt's speech and motion, *for that Mr. Pitt was apt to be intemperate*, and if there was any expression of that sort in the speech (much more in the motion) it would be necessary for the House of Commons here to interpose with a strong resolution.' I repeat the words correctly as Cooke told them to me. He is anxious to go to London to speak his mind, where it may be wished to hear his opinions, which agree *in toto* with mine, except that he is more desponding."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, January 27. Yarmouth.—“Being just waked by your despatches, and having determined to sail as soon as it is light, I can only just cast my eye over them and write you one private line to tell you that I have received Nos. 2, 3 and 4, with the volume of credentials and the other accompanying papers. I should have been perfectly satisfied with whatever shape you had preferred as to the Prussian credentials, but my own individual opinion strongly leans to the special mission as bearing a character of more vigour and urgency, such as belongs to the time and subject of my mission. I will, however, venture to assure you that my decision upon this subject will be as open as you can wish it to be to any solid reasons which may occur on the other side. I presume that I am not to deliver the letters of Lord Elgin's recall, unless I present those of his resident successor. The only circumstance which strikes me in the instructions of No. 2 as being in any way doubtful is the shape in which you speak of the 800,000*l.* or million to be discussed in a new engagement with Prussia; you have said the whole of this may be given entirely to Prussian army; if that is the case what becomes of the arrangement necessary to take for the expenses of the Dutch army, which are put, as you know, at 500,000*l.*? Yet, if this is retained for Holland, it leaves only 300,000*l.* as applicable to Prussia, which is too small a sum to dwell upon as any object; perhaps the best course to follow might be to give to Prussia the disposition of the million as applicable to the deliverance of Holland, including in it the military force to be raised within the country. Of this, however, I wish you to think, as it is a very important point; I will likewise turn it in my mind as soon as my head has done turning at sea.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 27. Yarmouth, 2 p.m.—“Thick fog ever since daylight, and wind got round to be completely adverse. All hopes of stirring to-day are over; we live only in the hopes of to-morrow's dawn, and I begin to grow more confident after every disappointment, from a persuasion that I must at length have exhausted all the ill-luck which could attach upon the outset of my expedition. You thought by my letter of this morning, if you have read it before this, that you had fairly got

rid of me ; but here I am hanging still a dead weight upon my friends in England, more difficult to be shaken off than the little crooked old tormentor of Sindbad in the Arabian Nights Entertainment."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Privée.*

1799, January 28. Richmond.—"Dans les deux dernières entrevues que j'ai eu avec vous, nous étions si occupés d'affaires majeures, que j'ai oublié de vous remettre le papier ci-joint que j'ai reçu de l'Empereur relatif à l'étrange résolution dans laquelle il s'est précipité, induit à cela par Sitta et d'autre chevalier de Malte résidents en Russie, en acceptant la grande maîtrise de cet ordre que ces messieurs lui ont offert sans avoir ni droit ni autorisation quelconque pour lui faire cet offre. Ce n'est qu'au moment d'expédier mon courrier et retrouvent ce piece, que je me suis aperçu de l'avoir rapporté sans vous la remettre, et de peur d'être justement grondé de chez moi pour cet oubli d'une chose à la quelle, très mal-à-propos, on met un très grand intérêt à Petersbourg. J'ai écrit que je vous remis ce papier, et que vous m'avez promis de le mettre sous les yeux du Roi. J'espère que vous me pardonnerez ceci, et que vous le présenterez à Sa Majesté la première foi que vous en aurez l'occasion. Je suis affligé et étonné d'apprendre que l'affaire d'Irlande a manquée dès son commencement, et que l'opposition dans la chambre haute a eu l'avantage d'une majorité de dix-sept voix. Tandis qu'il y a à Londres et ses environs plus de vingt pairs Irlandais qui passent pour être bien intentionnés, et qui ne sont pas remués, ne suivent pas l'exemple de my lord Clifton qui passa d'abord la mer pour aller soutenir à Dublin l'union réciproquement utile au deux pays. Rassurez-moi, je vous prie, sur les malheureux bruits qui courent au sujet de Naples."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 28. Yarmouth.—"A fall of snow has changed the wind to the northward, and we are just going to make an effort which will, I trust, at last be successful.

"I hear nothing yet of the Hamburg mails, but the wind of yesterday must probably bring them in the course of this morning. The *Sun* of Saturday has sent the king of Naples to Sicily. I wish I had to determine where those should be sent who have made it necessary for him to go there. I have read your last papers more carefully, and think them quite out of the reach of criticism. I suppose you mean Whitworth should hang himself."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799,] January 28.—"I return Lord Carysfort's letter which is full of good sense. I think it best also to send you one which I received yesterday from Lord Buckingham, and for which (whatever I may think on the main point he suggests) I feel

myself much obliged to him. From what I have heard I expect to find by to-morrow's accounts that the proceedings of last Thursday in Ireland have been more violent than even the opening promised. Be they what they may, they can only make it more necessary to open fully and state decidedly our plan. In this idea, my notion was still to move on Thursday the resolutions we had settled. I wrote on Saturday to Lord Cornwallis to say I should do so, and the Duke of Portland (with the general agreement of the Cabinet) was to send a dispatch to the same effect. The subject of dismissal was to be left by the dispatch to his discretion, but with a leaning to pushing it as far as in prudence he could. I stated in my letter to Lord C[ornwallis] a clear opinion that he should, at all events, dismiss the Speaker's son; but suggested a doubt whether, in less striking instances, the line of forbearance might not be more advisable. Lord Carysfort's letter rather confirms this idea. I return to town to-morrow; and I wish much you could do the same. We must have a Cabinet on Wednesday, but I should like much to talk with you first. If you can come, you will find dinner and no company in Downing Street. Let the messenger bring your answer to town."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 28. Mountjoy Square.—"I think it impossible for any man at the present moment to form an estimate of the temper and disposition of the public, or of individuals, sufficiently accurate to be a ground for the future proceedings of Government. I hear it said that out of the eighty members who did not vote a sufficient majority might yet be obtained; but upon looking over the list with great attention, and making all the enquiries I could, I am convinced there is nothing to be expected from that quarter. The numbers are nearly balanced, but the scale against the Union appears to be preponderant. Of those who voted for it many of the placemen at least are not sincere; and the strength of the opposition would induce some to venture upon desertion, notwithstanding Sir John Parnell's dismissal. And among the country gentlemen, several have declared that they will not support it against the sense of so large a body in Parliament. On the other hand it is certain that many of the Opposition are well inclined to hear reason, and with a little patience and management I should not despair that, in the course of a few months, or at any rate by another session, a majority of thirty or forty might be obtained. It is rumoured that offers have been held out to the Catholics by both parties, and it is even said that the Speaker has been induced to promise them every thing, on condition of their joining to defeat the project of Union. If he has really taken this step, it is to me a decisive proof that he cannot depend upon the continued support of those who have acted with him upon the late occasion. But I do not believe the report; and I hope there is as little foundation for supposing that the Government, finding the Orange faction adverse to them upon

this point, will endeavour to carry it by the assistance of the Papists. In my opinion neither the Orange nor the Green occasioned our late defeat, or have consistence and power sufficient to procure a better success hereafter. Either time or address has been wanting to treat with individuals who are not prepared to make a great personal sacrifice without personal compensation. The Papists could bring no accession of Parliamentary strength. Many of the Orange leaders are well inclined to Government, and might yet be brought to give their support to the Union. But more activity and exertion is requisite. Lord Castlereagh has been very assiduous since his return, but no one else, if I am rightly informed, has moved at all. According to the best accounts I can collect there is a sufficient proportion of the nation in all parts of the kingdom (excepting the immediate vicinity of Dublin) favourable to the measure, to make the attempt perfectly safe, if a reasonable majority can be obtained in the House of Commons. As I think this is practicable I look forward to ultimate success, and presume the project will not be abandoned. But if Government is of a different opinion, there is undoubtedly an opportunity of carrying through without difficulty any measures short of a Legislative Union that may tend to strengthen the English interest there."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, January 28. Dublin.—"The game with the Catholics has been played with every eagerness by the persons I named to you, and various meetings of that body have been held, to whom it has been proposed to sign an immediate petition to the House of Commons, which is to be supported by the Opposition; not with any hopes of success, but with a view (as Mr. Barrington told a friend of mine) of separating them from Government, who, it is clear, could not give way to such a measure, introduced in such a manner, and for such an object. At these meetings the democratic Catholics have of course been most violent, and have certainly borne down many of the more discreet; but I am in hopes from what I have just heard of their meeting of last night and this morning, that they will agree to put off the petition for a few days, particularly as a message is to be sent to the House of Commons this day to adjourn. Lord Kenmare went yesterday to Lord Cornwallis to communicate to him the intentions of the body to petition, and his refusal to sign such a paper, or to join in any measure hostile to Government; but Lord Fingall will probably join in the petition, though he will wish to defer it for some days. Upon the whole, then, I hope that time will be given to you to take the only measure now in your power for re-establishing the King's government by the immediate recall of Lord Cornwallis, for indeed and most solemnly I aver to you, that there is not one of the servants of the Crown with whom I have conversed (and if it were fitting to write names by the post I would name them) who has not urged to me the necessity of a new appointment immediately, for that without it *no one measure*

*is safe for a moment.* The House of Commons are this day busy in framing resolutions upon Mr. Pitt's Irish speech, as printed in the *Morning Chronicle*; and Corry (who has vacated his seat) seems to think that, absurd as all this is, some resolutions probably will be carried. I doubt it; but am equally sure that you have all to fear from the present no-government, and all to hope if you would send us a steady Lord Lieutenant and a good Secretary.

"I feel bound to state to you all that occurs to me, and therefore I hint to you Lord Winchelsea, and above all Mr. Steele, whose pilgrimage here of one year would, to my conviction, and to that of every one to whom I have named not the man but the measure, give you the Union. I can now speak more confidently upon the 78 who have not yet voted; and of those pray believe me when I assure you that I have carefully examined that list, and that there exist the means of ensuring at least from 45 to 50, exclusive of some *who, I know, may be gained* from the Opposition ranks.

"Do not conceive me too much heated to judge fairly upon this great question; but believe me most earnest for the public service, most confident that all this disgrace originates in Lord Cornwallis, and most certain that it may be regained by his recall. But it must be immediate, or Ireland is lost; and experience tells you that the nomination of [a] new Lord Lieutenant, or even an avowal of the intention, always has and will suspend every motion and measure of Opposition."

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, January —.] . . . . "Il y a bien longtemps que je n'ai eu l'honneur de vous voir. Les nouvelles que nous avons reçu de Paris, depuis quelques jours, paroissent très fâcheuses à la première lecture, mais en les examinant avec attention et sur la carte, on trouve quelques consolations, et on peut se convaincre aisément qu'il n'y a rien de désespéré. Ce pompeux étalage de succès dont les papiers français sont remplis, se réduit, au résumé en une colonne, du résultat de plusieurs échecs partiels, mais il n'y a point eu d'affaire générale; il ne se seroit pas donné de bataille sans que Mack y fut, et les Français n'auroient pas manqué de *boast of it*, ce qu'ils ne font pas; ils se bornent à dire que le Roi et Mack fuient. Voici le fait je crois; Mack a voulu essayer par des affaires particulières une armée qui n'a jamais vu le feu. La retraite de Rome, qui est intenable, est une conséquence nécessaire des revers éprouvés, et sûrement moindres qu'on ne les présente. Donnez-vous la peine de regarder la carte et vous jugerez comme moi qu'un homme aussi habile que l'est certainement Mack, n'aura pas manqué d'occuper les positions de Velettri et de Tivoli. Il donnera bataille à un ennemi placé entre son armée et la mer, et pendant ce tems le Prince d'Orange descendra par Ancone avec nos troupes, car nous arriverons, n'en doutez pas. Il faudroit pour croire le contraire nous supposer traitres et imbécilles, et il m'est impossible

d'admettre cette hypothèse avant d'en avoir les preuves. Je ne vous cacherais pas dans notre confiante amitié que je ne puis m'empêcher d'en vouloir un peu à ceux qui en doutent. Nous n'avons pas encore mérité ce degré de réprobation. Vous connaissez mes sentimens, et combien notre conduite m'a révolté, mais néanmoins, comme disoit Louis XIV. à ceux qui paroissaient étonnés de lui voir joindre la devotion à la galanterie, *parce-qu'on commet un péché, il n'est pas dit qu'il faille les commettre tous*. J'aime à me flatter que vous ne vous rendrez pas coupable de celui de permettre à ce scélérat de Barthélemy de venir en Angleterre, comme on dit qu'il en a le projet. C'est un monstre bien dangereux. Adieu ; mon attachement et mon amitié pour vous sont aussi invariables que mes autres principes."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 1. Harley Street.—" Arrivé hier ici pour m'établir à Londres, j'ai trouvé chez moi votre billet par le quel j'ai appris à mon grand plaisir qu'on est déterminée à poursuivre les mesures tendentes à unir les deux isles. Rien n'est plus respectable, et n'imprime plus de dignité dans tout gouvernement que sa fermeté. C'est elle qui accroit la confiance et l'attachement de ceux qui lui sont dévoué, et qui décourage les factieux et les malveillants. Le discours d'hier de Monsieur Pitt est un chef-d'oeuvre d'habilité, et doit produire un grand effet en Irlande. Il n'offense personne. Il ménage et semble estimer même les opposants. Il caresse tous les différents intérêts de politique et de religion, et fait voir à tous, ce qui est vrai, que tous gagneront à cette union. Ce discours, qui fera certainement beaucoup de bien en Irlande, en auroit fait d'avantage s'il auroit pu être fait (du moins quant aux principes de cette union) s'il auroit été fait trois semaines avant qu'on ait débatté ce sujet à Dublin. Celui qu'a fait Sheridan n'est qu'une déclamation inflammatoire pour échauffer à la revolte des pauvres testes plus remplies de pomes de terre que de cervelles.

"La réplique que lui fit Lord Hawksbery est excellente, et fait honneur à ce jeune homme. J'apprens dans ce moment avec beaucoup de chagrin l'arrivée de l'infortuné Roi de Naples à Palerme. Il a été bien malheureusement conseillé à cette fausse mesure par la quelle il abandonne les trois-quarts de son principal royaume. Sa capitale pouvoit être prise et lui se retirer à Salerne, dans la Capitanate, dans les deux Calabres, disputer son pays, et le défendre pouce par pouce ; surtout dans les Calabres, toutes couvertes par les Apenins, et remplis de défilés aussi impraticables que facile à défendre. En restant dans son royaume il conservoit le gouvernement, un centre d'union et d'autorité, et ne décourageoit pas quatre millions et demis de ses sujets par une retraite qui équivalait à une abdication. En défendant son pays, pied par pied, s'il auroit été poussé jusqu'à Reggio, il n'avoit qu'un trajet d'une demi heure pour passer à Messine, et y rester là pour ne perdre de vue, au phisique comme au moral, les côtes du royaume de Naples

pour y rentrer à la première occasion. On dit que c'est le Général Autrichien Mak [Mack] qui a conseillé d'aller à Palerme ; mais pourquoi suivre, dans les affaires internes, le sentiment d'un Autrichien, et qui plus est, d'un ami de Thugut."

The MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 1. Dublin.—“A new mine to be sprung more mischievous than that intended to be played with the Catholics ! By a negotiation in which I was requested by Lord Castlereagh to assist, the principal Catholics had been induced to hold off from the petition ; and to urge the adjournment of all discussion of it till Mr. Pitt's plans and ideas could be ascertained, and understood by the public. In consequence of this, a meeting of Opposition was held on Tuesday at the Speaker's, where Ponsonby at length yielded to the earnest solicitations of Parnell and Foster, and engaged to abandon the Catholics, and to support the Orange party in a resolution which was sketched out, and of which I have seen an accurate copy, and which will be moved immediately ; ‘To regret that His Excellency's humane intentions in extending the mercy of the Crown have failed in the object proposed by them of recalling the rebels to a sense of their duty ; and to advise that immediate steps shall be taken for the suppression of this rebellion by the most active exertions of the army, and by giving to the Protestant ascendancy that decided and efficient support which alone can secure the constitutional connexion with Great Britain, and the establishments in Church and State.’ The copy I saw was much blurred, and the words of the resolution may be changed, but such is the purport of it. Now I have very little doubt but that, in the present state of no-government, this or any other nonsense of Orange run mad will be carried ; and the effect of it will be the instant revolt of the Catholics unless Great Britain interferes ; but it gives an opening of which the most decided advantage might be made, if there was any one to act in it ; but Lord Cornwallis says to every one that ‘he is no politician.’ Let me adjure you not to let this great moment of difficulty pass by without the most anxious exertions on your part to recall this *idiot* ; and believe me acting on the purest motives in urging the most decisive steps.

“I am most happy to hear that Mr. Pitt perseveres in proposing his plan on your side of the water.

“I am most decided in my opinion that the Union may still be carried ; but I am most decided that Lord Cornwallis will lose that and every other possible question.

“Again I say that I could name to you every one almost of the oldest and best friends to England and the Union, who declare the country lost if the Lord Lieutenant is not changed.

“This cruel easterly wind locks up our mails from England for which I am so anxious, not having heard from you ; but though I feel that I may distress you, yet I know I do my duty in stating to you all I hear and see. The chapter of the grossest negligence and incapacity increases hourly, and the necessity of



grappling with this unnatural coalition of Foster and Ponsonby is obvious and immediate. Cooke thinks the question of Union wholly gone by for the present; and the majority in the House of Commons irrecoverable to Government on any question connected with it, or with the Protestant ascendancy. I own I think differently, though I would certainly advise you to prefer his opinions to mine. But he thinks that a prorogation at no very remote period might do much. I have not, of course, asked him what he expects might happen in that prorogation to assist *his* plans, but it is impossible not to see that his opinions on his *master's* do not differ much from those of every one else."

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 1. Constantinople.—“ In making up my packet of yesterday's date, voluminous as it is, I cannot help making the present small addition, as happening to be so closely connected with a certain part of the main subject, consisting of a paper I in vain searched and ransacked every corner for when glancing at the same subject in a similar confidential way with your Lordship by the messenger. I was then checked from saying more on this particular point from the loss of the enclosed (which had been mislaid on board *le Tigre*) as I am now from a disinclination to renew a disagreeable topic, and the impropriety of pursuing one so delicate to any considerable extent in this open form; the only one I can at present have recourse to. I do not like troubling my superiors with official complaints, but I do not choose to lose the present unaffected opportunity of making your Lordship acquainted with the specimen alluded to of a certain captious *authoritative* tone in a certain quarter excessively disagreeable in business, more especially when not compensated for by the useful ready co-operation and never-failing reciprocity I had been so long habituated to by the gentleman's predecessor, whose polished manners, elegant hospitality, and friendly confidence, I must confess rather spoiled me for the contrast of a cold *enigmatical* politician, and that in times so much improved. In short, the '*Reverse of the medal*' sums up my meaning perfectly. I am only afraid sometimes of being misled by appearances in the individual to misinterpret the views of his comments, so difficult is it to suppose so total a change in the system of a conspicuous and preponderant portion of our society to spring from the sole uncouthness of character in the person of the chief, without some other influencing cause.

“ Perhaps this matter may still require a few more observations at a proper season, till when I am glad to take leave of the subject, and revert to one more agreeable set afloat in my mind by my brother's conversations. His arrival has revived a sympathy with friends, family, and home that long absence and other circumstances had much enfeebled, and public pursuits almost supplanted. I beg your Lordship's permission, with reference to a change of state on my own part, by a recent

marriage with the daughter of the Emperor's minister, *Baron d'Herbert*, (thus *repatriated*) to present my wife's and my own affectionate respects to Lady Grenville; whom so many many years' separation from, since early youth indeed, have however less impaired my remembrance of, than of many less distant scenes; and which later events have tended to restore."

#### INTELLIGENCE FROM BERLIN AND HOLLAND.

1799, February 2. Berlin.—“Les affaires ne sont pas aussi avancées ici qu'on s'en flattoit. St[amfort] est fort mécontent du D[uc] de Br[unswic] et prétend que celui-ci, bien loin de stimuler Haugwitz, ne le soutient pas même. Haugwitz par contre continue à se prononcer pour la guerre, mais Köckerits, influencé vraisemblablement par d'autres, veut temporiser; et le peu de confiance que la conduite actuelle de la cour de Vienne peut inspirer, la manière dont elle abandonne les Rois de Naples et de Sardaigne, la manière de s'exprimer de Thugut, qui doit avoir dit que rien hormis les intérêts particuliers de la Maison d'Autriche ne le décideront soit pour la paix soit pour la guerre, ce sont là autant de motifs dont ceux qui sont de cette opinion se servent avec avantage pour le soutenir. Jusqu'à présent le comte Panin n'a pas encore rien de réponse positive aux offres de secours et d'alliance offensive qu'il a faites, mais dans ce moment-ci il vaut mieux que cette réponse ne vienne pas, parcequ' elle ne seroit probablement pas satisfaisante, et que tout en avouant les principes, on voudroit se tenir ici sur le défensive; tandis qu'il est possible que l'arrivée de Mr. Grenville, que l'on attend avec une véritable impatience, apporte quelque changement dans ces déterminations, et si quelque chose est à même de la faire c'est bien sa mission. Sûr est-il que le Roi a prié le Duc de continuer son séjour à Berlin jusqu'après cette arrivée. Avant-hier au soir à une cour et bal chez la Reine-mère, le Roi s'entretint avec le Duc et avec Kockerits pendant tres-longtemps. Le Duc fut content de cette conversation, en ce qu'il trouvoit les bons principes établis; il y avoit cependant de l'éloignement pour la guerre offensive. J'ai communiqué au Duc et à Stamf[ort] le précis de la conférence du 27 Novembre; ils en furent très-contents. D'après l'avis de St[amfort] j'entretiendrai Haugw[itz] de ces matières, et vais à cet effet demain chez lui. Depuis mon départ vous aurez reçu les informations demandées par L[ord] Grenville par rapport à la navigation des Waddens, et si cela n'est point encore parvenu j'aurai soin de l'envoyer; de plus j'ai chargé quelqu'un de se rendre sur les frontières pour pouvoir s'y aboucher avec d'autres, et prendre plusieurs papiers afin d'avoir des détails par rapport au Zuider Zee, sa navigation, et les lieux les plus propres pour pouvoir débarquer; et s'il est nécessaire que quelqu'un s'abouche avec un amiral Anglois pour converser sur ces matières et lui donner des détails de bouche, le Lieutenant de Marine Spengler pourroit passer en Angleterre.

1799, February 1. Bremen.—“Le general Brune n'a pas été à Paris, mais il est retourné à la Haye après une absence de quelques jours: il y a mis en réquisition cent lits de la meilleure

qualité : on ignore dans quel but. Il continue à travailler au renversement du parti de Daendels, et à relever celui de Vreede. Il est sûr aujourd'hui que Daendels commandera les troupes embarquées à bord de la flotte, au nombre de 8,000 h[ommes] parmi lesquels je trouve un corps d'artillerie volante et autre : cette expédition projetée occasionne une désertion incroyable : à Campen 50 hommes de l'artillerie volante ont déserté en deux nuits. La flotte consistera en vingt vaisseaux outre ceux de transport. On répand divers bruits sur la destination de cette flotte. Les uns parlent du Cap. de B[on] Espérance, les autres des Indes occidentales, mais il paroît que *l'Irlande* est le véritable objet. Quoiqu'il en soit doivent, dans tous les cas, passer ou par le canal ou par le nord de l'Ecosse. Ce dernier est le plus probable. On assure que le Cap[itaine] Bosch s'est laissé engager à commander la flotte. Les insurgents dans la Belgique paroissent avoir remporté de grands pièces : plusieurs déserteurs Bataves se joignent à eux." *Extract.*

#### THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 3. Newwork.—“I write one line to tell you that we are all alive and well, having providentially escaped from the wreck of the *Proserpine* to this small island, eight miles distant from Cruxhaven.

“We sailed, as you know, on Monday the 28th January, though, from the mails not having arrived, we had some small apprehension about the passage. We took a pilot from Helegoland, who dissuaded us from the enterprise ; but the wind being favourable, and our own pilot confident, we determined to go on as long as we could with safety. A sudden change of the wind however brought down from the Elbe such immense fragments of ice that, by the time we had passed Nework in the way to Cruxhaven, we found it utterly impossible to proceed, and we began to attempt to return ; the buoys being all cut away, we saw our danger and the difficulty which we should have in escaping the pressure of ice, the mass and rapidity of which it is not easy to describe. On Friday the 31st, from there being no buoys left, we ran upon a sand-bank a few miles from this place and stuck there ; in this situation we had to stand the rapid tides which brought down upon the ship on every side larger and thicker blocks of ice than I could have conceived it possible to have been put in motion ; no boat could live a moment, and on Friday night the shocks were so great that our rudder was forced away, and the general opinion was that every hour was likely to break the ship down in a state that would leave us no chance of saving our lives, and we had already thrown overboard all our guns and heavy stores without any effect. Desperate however as our state was, Mr. Fisher, Baron Kirkla, and I determined to make any effort rather than await with a certainty of perishing where we were. Providentially the ice had increased so much that on one side of the ship it was frozen quite fast in, though the tide still

ran quickly on the other, and knowing that we could not be above a mile or two from the coast, we determined, and the captain and crew agreed with us, in trying to explore a passage on the ice on foot, and we succeeded well enough in this attempt to arrive safely at this place last night. Upon mustering our numbers we find that we have only lost twelve persons who perished by the extreme severity of the weather in the hazardous march which we were obliged to make; the frigate still appears not to be entirely broken down, and if the weather admits of it before she disappears, the captain will endeavour to save what he can. None of our party have any one article of baggage or dress except what we have on our bodies, but our escape is so wonderful that I can only dwell upon our miraculous deliverance, and have not room in my mind for any other reflections of loss or of embarrassments. I have been fortunate enough to save the greater part of my papers, all the material ones indeed *except the Full Power*, and some copies of the Petersburg correspondence. The communication between Cruxhaven and the continent not being likely to take place for some time, and our distress being likely to reach England and to alarm our friends by the report made of our danger from Helegoland, I send to Cruxhaven as soon as I can, and desire Horwood to insert our escape in the *Hamburg Journal*, and take any steps he can to get it inserted in the French papers, in hopes of its reaching you by those means before you receive this letter from Cruxhaven. Of the cutter which sailed with us we know nothing, but we learnt here that the packet which sailed from Yarmouth on the same day that we did (commanded by Captain Dean, of Yarmouth) was lost three miles from this place on the day before that of our misfortune. The passengers, however, and crew all escaped, except one or two of the seamen. We are likely to be detained here a few days before any road is practicable for us to reach Cruxhaven; from thence we shall proceed to Hamburgh in order to buy some shoes and stockings and coats and waistcoats, and from one of those places I will write again to you a letter which will, I doubt not, reach you as soon as this, as they tell me the passage of the Elbe is not likely to be open this fortnight at soonest."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 4. Harley Street.— . . . . "En vous envoyant les articles secrets qui font suite à notre traité avec la Porte que je vous avois communiqué dans son tems, permettez moi de vous demander si vous pouvez me faire l'amitié de me donner la copie de la lettre que vous avez reçu du M. Hamilton de Palerme, pour que je puisse l'envoyer ou en entier, ou en extrait, suivant que vous le jugerez à propos, à l'Empereur qui s'intéresse vivement au sort de l'infortuné Roi de Naples, et qui ne pouvait recevoir d'autre part les détails de ce qui lui est arrivé, que par Vienne, d'où toutes les nouvelles seront perverties et empoisonnées par les Thugut et les Cobenzel, qui ne manqueront pas de

calomnier et l'infortuné Roi abandoné par eux, et le gouvernement, et l'Amiral Anglais qui, à tant d'autres gloires, a eut encore celle de sauver la famille royale de Naples. Les nouvelles antiques que vous me metrez à même de présenter à l'Empereur ne serviront qu'à mieux démasquer celles, que le perfide ministère Autrichien lui aura communiqué, toutes forgées sur les memes événements."

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 5. Dublin.—"The fixed determination of the British Ministry, which will, I doubt not, be well supported by the voice of Parliament and the nation, will ultimately accomplish the great object of the Union. And I should hope that the extraordinary violence with which the Opposition here have resolved to act, will bring it nearer than might have been expected. They mean to require from Lord Castlereagh an express renunciation on behalf of the British Ministers of all intention to pursue the project now or at any future period; and, upon his refusal, to withhold the supplies. Though I learn from authority I can scarcely doubt that a resolution has been actually taken to this effect, and though I place great reliance upon the wrong-headedness of our faddy politicians, I think Foster must have more cunning than to suffer them to propose what must detach many of those who voted with them upon former occasions, and would lead immediately to a crisis which would threaten every man's property and personal safety. But he is strangely buoyed up just now with the success he has had. All the meetings of Opposition are held at his house, and he is indefatigable in his exertions to keep the party together. Bets are offered that Lord Cornwallis and Lord Castlereagh will be out of office, and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer restored before the end of this month. This confidence will be abated by a few more dismissions; and in the only case which at this moment occurs to me in which a powerful interest may be engaged in support of the delinquent, I mean that of George Knox, who is a friend of Lord Abercorn, I am glad to think that he was placed in a situation which distinguishes him from the generality; a test having been proposed to him at the election, which, however, he did not take without an express reservation by which he is not precluded from ultimately giving his support to the measure. The other two commissioners, Forster and Wolfe, the one for his own misdeeds and the other for his father's, deserve no mercy; and I think the vacancy of their offices will certainly be a lure to some better men. I communicated to Elizabeth a piece of intelligence, which is not to be doubted, of a combination between some proprietors of boroughs to secure their interest; which accounts satisfactorily to me for the defection of some persons upon whom Lord C[astlereagh] had entirely relied. I think it not altogether impossible that the Lords who have decided in favour of Union may be called upon to check

the impetuosity of the Commons ; and that they have some weight with the public, and might therefore be made good use of, appears to me very plain from the hesitation of the Aggregate Body of Dublin to thank the minority of the Lords, lest they should offend the majority."

W. PITT to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799,] February 7. Downing Street.—"I send you a draft of a message respecting the Militia. Be so good to make any alteration in it you think right, and send two copies of it to me at Hollwood to-morrow, so that I may forward them to the King for signature, in time for their being presented on Monday. I will write to him at the same time to remonstrate a little against the notions which he seems forming every day, more and more, of excluding the Catholics in case of an Union."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 7. Cruxhaven.—"Anxious to pursue my journey after the escape which I described to you in my letter from Nework, and depending upon the safe though long march which the guides announced as sure to bring me from that island hither, I set out yesterday on foot with seventy seamen to walk about eight miles, chiefly over ground overflowed by high water tides, though practicable on foot at low water. Judge, however, of our dismay in finding that, by a mistake of the guides as to time of tide, they had brought us half way when they found the tide rapidly coming in ; to return was impossible, and the only chance left us was to struggle forward through water often as high as our middle, sometimes higher, through a current so rapid that it overthrew some of our stoutest seamen, and this for above an hour together in the severest frost I ever felt, and with a violent sharp snow storm in our face. My poor Henry supported it with wonderful fortitude, and thanks be to God we arrived here safely, though entirely exhausted with fatigue, and literally sinking down with lassitude. Here however we are, and here I find a letter from Mr. Garlike informing me that the H[ereditary] P[rince] of Orange, who arrived at Berlin on 29th ultimo, had desired him to express to me the Duke of Brunswick's wish that I would come on straight to Berlin to converse with him there, instead of going round by Brunswick. I have therefore sent Shaw directly on to Berlin with a letter to Mr. Garlike to say that, in obedience to H[is] S[erene] H[ighness]'s commands, I am proceeding directly to Berlin. I thought this the more necessary because, though I am anxious to get forward, the extreme fatigues which I have undergone will not, I fear, allow me to travel very expeditiously ; our baggage however will not detain us as there is not a second shirt in the company, and we shall travel something quicker for going in the post-waggons of the country.

"The surrender of Ehrenbreitstein is horrible, but was so certain that I am not much struck by it. A Russian messenger is here

who probably carries to you Whitworth's Russian convention. I hear no other news, and am really so much tired that I must add no more now. I presume that I need not formally announce my arrival upon the continent to the Secretary of State till I get to Berlin, as I am put by from Brunswick.

"I have saved yesterday the same papers as before, and Count Woronzow will be glad to know that I preserved his private letter to Panin as well as the other letter. The packet to Prince Adolphus from the Princesses is lost with the frigate, but all the other letters are preserved. Adieu, I am just getting into my waggon."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 8. Dublin.—"I am most anxious that Mr. Pitt's Union speech should be accurately corrected and printed, for the effect produced here by it is beyond all calculation. I know that he does not usually *correct* his speeches, but he should consider this as a sort of manifesto which is to operate very essentially on the public mind. Foster is irritated beyond all imagination, and declares his intention of answering it. Bowes Daly and Ponsonby have prevailed upon *their* Catholics to present a petition on Monday next, which Foster and his Orange are to oppose. Foster's friends are then to urge the censure on Lord Cornwallis's measures, and the invitation to employ the Protestant ascendancy or Orange party in putting down the rebellion, which Ponsonby has promised to support, but which Lord FitzWilliams has peremptorily written to him to oppose; so that it will be difficult for these new allies to avoid quarrelling, though it is avowed that the intention of the Catholic petition is only to compel Government (as they must do) to oppose it. Every day convinces me that in the country the Union gains ground. In the venal town of Newry, Opposition sent down a Mr. Ball with a subscription purse of 100*l.* to oppose Corry upon Union grounds, [but he] could only get 11 votes. I am confident, therefore, that the thing may be done, but not by Lord Cornwallis. If, therefore, you are decided to let him try to close his session, for God's sake look to a successor, and strike at the Union as soon as he arrives. I cannot but think that Lord Euston and Steele would answer every purpose; and Lake would answer every purpose as well as your old woman in a blue riband, who may pair off with any old lady in a red riband."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 13. Dublin.—"Six mails due from England have made us very impatient, as every moment on the Continent is so interesting and important. Paddy goes on with his usual absurdity; for the great contending parties, having disagreed on their Protestant and Catholic objects, agreed that it was highly necessary to prove the dignity, impartiality, and superexcellence of the Speaker, and the gravity, decorum, and wisdom of the

House by burning the unfortunate *Sun*, who dared to assert what twenty persons said on their legs, and what every one present at the Union debate heard and saw ; namely, the clapping, hissing, groaning, and applauding in the galleries, and the violent and continued clapping as soon as the division had been announced. And the House having now asserted that no such thing existed, I have no other argument left to convince you save that of Saint Peter in Swift's *Tale of the Tub*. But St. Peter has at length done himself credit ; for after having kept Parliament in suspense for a week, waiting for their resolves, a meeting was held yesterday of 83 of the principal Catholics of Leinster and Dublin, at which a unanimous letter of advice from all their Bishops was read, recommending them to wait patiently for that kindness and relief which it was manifest that the English Government had always shewn them, as far as it was possible for her to grapple with the party prejudices of this country. To this letter the Catholic peers and gentlemen of property have acceded, but did not attend. The democratic and personal friends of Mr. Ponsonby moved the same petition as was presented to Lord FitzWilliam, and stated that they were now sure of extorting from the friendship of one party and the fears of another all they wished ; but, after a debate of seven hours, they divided only seven against 76, who proposed that they should remain quiet and take no step of petition to Government or to Parliament during this session. In consequence of this they are to be given up by Mr. Ponsonby and Mr. Daly to the Orangemen and John Foster, provided that Opposition are strong enough to carry their question on Lord Corry's intended motion for Friday next ; which is for a committee on the state of the nation ; where (as at present settled) Foster is to move an address to the King, 'to quiet the alarms of Ireland by his paternal advice to his faithful Commons not to discuss further a measure so fatal as the Union.' I give you the *sense* of this *nonsense*, not the words. After that, they announce a severe enquiry into the misconduct of individuals in public Offices, who have, as they say, broke their promises by voting with Government ; such as my *virtuous friend* Cuffe and others ; but this threat has exactly operated the other way, by alarming for mutual defence. Cooke, whom I have just seen, tells me, *entre nous*, that *he* is confident that Government will beat on any question moved against them on Friday ; but I own that I have no great faith in this confidence. Still, however, I can make no reply to such a communication ; and the enormous weight of new taxes for the five millions that Ireland must borrow will give to Foster and Parnell, who are now playing the whole Opposition game, great facilities of impeding Government. I have been carrying on with Lord Cornwallis a temperate but strong correspondence upon the situation of the British (and of all the other) troops in this country, in consequence of the apprehension in more than one instance of the military for acting in obedience to the Proclamation ; and, after much difficulty, Lord Cornwallis has consulted the Chancellor upon a Bill to render the military (while



the Proclamation continues in force) amenable only to the military tribunals for acts done by them in obedience to it; and the Chancellor tells me this morning that he has prepared the Bill. I should think that it would be carried, and God knows it is too necessary, if the country is to be held from those who would overturn it."

*Postscript.* "Old Beresford says that the Union is carried, and will be voted whenever Mr. Pitt chooses it should, *after this session*. Foster says to my informant that Mr. Pitt's is a very flimsy speech, and not half so good as half the *silly* pamphlets he has read for the Union. Such as it is, however, in the newspapers, it has had a wonderful effect here. I only wish it had been corrected in parts where I can plainly see that he is mis-stated. I am most anxious for a correct copy."

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 14. Dublin.—"I enclose to you a pamphlet from which you will, I think, derive much entertainment: for, with proper allowances for a style which is rather pedantic, I consider it as the ablest performance that has appeared. The effect of it, particularly with the Catholics whom he warmly supported in 1795, has been very great; for three editions have been sold in the course of as many days. Mr. Smith has the merit of taking this line in the teeth of the mortification he felt at seeing the very young and inefficient Mr. Stewart named Solicitor General, and St. George Daly, equally inefficient though with parts, preferred to him for bar promotion, and both silent on the first day of struggle; and most certainly he has placed himself on very high ground by his abilities and conduct.

"It now seems clear that the question is gaining ground, but there certainly is not the chance of carrying it through Parliament in the hands of Lords Cornwallis and Castlereagh. So long, therefore, as other considerations bear upon that question of change, we must not look for the consummation so devoutly to be wished. An opening is said to have been made yesterday from some of the new allies, stating that if Lord Castlereagh would repeat, *as his personal promise*, Mr. Pitt's words (of his last speech) in which he declares his intention not to press this question in the present state of mind of the Irish Parliament, and would add the words *during this session*, they would immediately return to the Government colours. Some pains are taking to ascertain the extent of this opening; and *my opinion having been asked by Lord Castlereagh*, I have said that, in his situation, I should do it, if I saw clearly the means of resisting by such an accession every other question; for that I saw much inconvenience to the prospect of this measure of Union, and much danger to the country, from keeping the county meetings in hot water, and from pledging them as anti-unionists at a time when it was plain and palpable that Government were making no exertions to stem that torrent. But that I doubted very much the good faith of this proposed opening and the extent of it. I

think it unlikely that anything can be ascertained on this chapter till to-morrow, for which contest every man on both sides is summoned; but under the impression which is now prevalent on all sides that this measure will be carried, it is plain that many of these honest patriots are looking out for a bridge on which to get back. Parnell said yesterday that Mr. Pitt and Foster were at issue who should be minister of Ireland; from which wise observation it is clear that this mock-monarch has promised him 'Th' Earldom of Hereford' in the shape of his old office, for which he is languishing. I shall be able to judge more of the style and manner of this great man this evening, as he has begged me as a particular favour to dine with him; but he is said to be confident in his manner, though disclaiming regular opposition. Whenever I have seen him, there has been much embarrassment in his manner."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 15. Dublin.—"I have just got yours of the 8th. The same reasons which induced you to turn with disgust from the Continent turn me from Ireland; I mean the closer view which is equally painful to us both. The opening in question appeared so loose that though, when I wrote to you yesterday, I thought it might be wise to act upon it, I am now satisfied that it would have produced no real good. The motion is for a committee on the state of the nation, which, from various changes of opinion, Government is confident that they can resist. I have seen too much of that confidence to be very sanguine, particularly as I cannot guess as to the grounds on which they suppose certain persons to vote with them who did vote against them.

"I dined with Foster, and never saw a man so painfully embarrassed. The mails came in after dinner, and from his letter he announced that Dundas had been most indecent in his attack upon Ireland, and most violent in his declarations of persevering. This account, though untrue, produced some very long faces; but when he read aloud in the papers the division, he said that the snow must have kept the opposition in the country. In a word he was most evidently extremely mortified and disappointed."

*Postscript.* "I am very shy of quoting you on any occasion to any one; but I have ventured to quote your opinion that the French are certainly preparing another visit; for the fears of Paddy on that chapter are very great, and certainly bind them to Government."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 16. Dublin.—"The enclosed will give you the result of last night's struggle, and I have the satisfaction to tell you that the victory was more complete, because only five (as I have heard) of the anti-unionists joined Government, namely

the two whom I have crossed, and the two Rowley's, and Colonel King; and the difference has therefore chiefly arisen from the additional strength who have been collected by Government, and by the absence of some of the anti-unionists who *stayed away*. But the mass of the new allies voted with Opposition, and specifically all that the Speaker could get together, such as Lord Cole, G. Ogle, Maxwell, Rochfort, Lambert, and Ruxton, all of whom used to vote steadily with Government. I understand that the Speaker could not conceal his misery; and Sir I. Parnell was much more violent in his general language than G. Ponsonby, having depended upon dividing, as he told a friend of mine who votes with them, 127. Now upon this very much might be done, but it is clear to me that nothing will be done effectually by Lord Cornwallis; and perhaps the best one can look for is to tide quietly to a prorogation, if the *impossibility* is as decidedly clear as you seem to imagine it; but as you well know my opinion upon his military conduct in Ireland, you will not be surprised at my persuasion that any old woman in a red riband would do as well as the old woman in a blue riband; and that Lake is fully adequate to the general duties of Commander in Chief, and, though not all one could wish, most certainly equal to his Lordship in the task of hunting 800 Frenchmen, or those great officers Generals Holt, Aylmer, and the rest. However, I do not expect every one to see all this so strongly as I do; but I should deceive you if I did not press most earnestly upon you the duty of carrying the Union, which cannot be done by Lord Cornwallis, as paramount to every other consideration, whether of present invasion or future rebellion."

*Enclosure.* A letter, signed Charles H. Coote, giving some particulars of the debate in the Irish House of Commons, on Lord Corry's motion for a committee on the state of the nation.

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 19. Berlin.—"The date of this letter will show you that difficult as our journey has been, it is, however, at length accomplished; we arrived here on the 17th well in health, with no bad effects, as I trust, from the extraordinary fatigues which we have all undergone; my companions are both well, and I am myself entirely recovered by a day's rest at home from the lassitude which I had begun to feel. Mr. Garlike sends to you by this post a dispatch which will announce my arrival, but I have not time myself to write more than these few lines of a private letter to tell you that I am here and well. I am to-morrow to see the ministers; I have passed the greatest part of the day with Count Panin, whom it is impossible to see and to converse with without feeling great esteem and admiration for his talents and principles, and for the vigour and energy of his active mind. I expect him here every moment, and have therefore nothing to add in these first hours to these few lines, which I abandon to the course of the common post. I shall write by a messenger

very shortly, but until the weather changes it is useless to do so, as there is no possibility in this continued and severe frost that any communication should be had between England and Cruxhaven."

The EARL OF MORNINGTON to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, February 21. Fort St. George.—"I return you a thousand thanks for your very kind letter of the 5th of October; it is not possible to give an idea of the pleasure which I receive from your letters in this magnificent solitude, where I stalk about like a Royal Tiger, without even a friendly jackall to soothe the severity of my thoughts.

O Majesty! where are the charms  
That Vanity sees in thy face!  
Better toil in my Domine's farms,  
Than reign in this horrible place!

But although I feel the perpetual misery of solitude, excepting my brother having no resource of society, and having (excepting him) left every thing that is dear and valuable to me in England, my sceptre is not otherwise burdensome to me; nor am I afraid to wield it; as you will have learnt by my dispatches *per Eurydicé*, which I conclude will reach you in the course of the month of March. Pursuing the course traced in my minute of the 12th August, I have had the satisfaction to succeed completely in drawing the Beast of the Jungle into the toils. Beast of Jungle is a metaphor by which Tippoo Sultan is ordinarily described. I know nothing yet sufficiently certain of the French army in Egypt to be able to agree with you in the proved impracticability of their throwing four or five thousand men into Mysore, and then T[ippoo] S[ultan] would most assuredly rise. I know nothing yet of Blankett, Richéry, and the others; we have not heard a word from the Red Sea since the 26th August, 1798. In this situation I have continued my military preparations, and I am resolved to bring Tippoo Sultan to terms which shall preclude him from the expected benefit of his alliance, before the season can admit of any assistance reaching him. The happy success of the treaty with the Nizam is now completely felt. The company's subsidiary force (for which *he* pays) together with a large army of his own, was actually ready to join our army before our General was prepared to receive it. This event (if your interest in my success has made you sufficiently an Indian politician to feel it) you will perceive is a great triumph to me. The Mahrattahs are also ready to bring as large a force into the field as they did with Lord Cornwallis. Our own army is the finest which ever took the field in India; and by dint of scolding and flattering, I have equipped it within a period of time perfectly astonishing to the Old School. All this has already (although late in one sense) brought Tipoo Sultan to an humble posture; but I am resolved not to forfeit the inestimable advantages of that position which he

has compelled me to take, and I trust that before the 18th of May, 1799, the anniversary of my taking charge of the government general, I shall have concluded a peace which shall for ever exclude the French from India. *All* I want is a good general, which you will say is to want *all*; but I believe we shall succeed without that *sine quâ non*. Pray read my last letters to the Secret Committee, but take care not to appear to interfere too much in Indian affairs. I suppose I shall be accused of having created a war, but I shall wait with patience for the opinions which shall reach me in the month of February, 1800. Nelson's victory is an interminable theme of poetry and joy. So write a joyful ode upon it to this motto:

*Quidlibet impotens  
Sperare, fortunâque dulci  
Ebria, sed minuit furorem  
Vix una sospes navis ab ignibus.*

"I have sent you by this dispatch a long and entertaining history respecting Tranquebar; you will of course immediately communicate the whole to Dundas, but to the Secret Committee you will not send the private correspondence of Anker, Muhldorffs, and Macaulay.

"Two events have lately happened which have taught me the pangs of a great government, and what terrible effects are often produced by an inadequate execution of one's most seriously considered orders. A dreadful massacre has been perpetrated at Benares by Vizier Ali the pseudo-Nabob of Oude, whom Lord Teignmouth most properly compelled to descend from the throne, which he had most weakly and unjustifiably allowed him to mount to the prejudice of the lawful heir. You will see the whole history in my letter and inclosures of this dispatch to the Court of Directors. This event has given me great pain, as the immediate cause of the massacre probably was the neglect of those employed in omitting to take the precautions which I had enjoined previously to the removal of Vizier Ali from Benares to the Presidency. My second grief is still more painful. The intrigues of the French at Pondicherry rendered it necessary to remove several of them to Europe in the present crisis; a list had been made out by the commanding officer on the spot, and sent to me for approbation; I reduced the list with my own hand on the principle of not including any father of a family; and it was returned to Pondicherry so reduced, with an explanation of my object not to separate parents from their children. The officer in command, had, it seems, originally sent me a false list; and although aware of my intentions, he has embarked several fathers of families for Europe, and occasioned a heart-rending scene of misery and distress. I suppose that a hundred such misfortunes have happened to you in the course of your official career, but I am new to the harness, and this weight has galled me most grievously.

"I am happy to tell you (if I have not told you before ; and I believe I have not ever told you that I am now at Fort St. George, having magnanimously sallied forth to carry on the war with my own hand) that all faction is crushed here, and that I meet with nothing but zeal, alacrity, and prompt obedience. All Lord Hobart's friends now behave very well ; but they must be scolded from home for their former misconduct, which would have ruined India, if I had not bullied and ranted. Now I forgive all that is past. Lord Clive is really happy to see me here ; there cannot be a better man, and his understanding is far beyond his reputation. But for God's sake, whatever may become of me, never send him to Bengal, if you have any share in such arrangements ; I am convinced he would ruin everything with the best intentions.

"I am grieved to hear your account of Pitt, whom I love as if he were my brother. I have known such attacks (for I understand it to have been nothing more than a great weakness of stomach) completely pass away, and even leave the constitution stronger than it was. But I am afraid he will not take the necessary care of himself. I wish he would come to see me in Bengal ; a long sea voyage would be an effectual remedy for all his complaints. Pray remember me to Lady Grenville. Have you got your plants and seeds from Bengal ?

"Mr. Spencer Smith is diligent ; he has sent us an excellent letter from the Grand Seignior to Tippoo, which I have no doubt will be useful.

"If you ever make peace with France you must retain Pondicherry, Mahé, and Chandernagore ; you must also retain Ceylon and all the Dutch possessions on the continent of India, otherwise you will soon have confusion here.

"I hope you will rent Tranquebar and Serhampore, those nests of Jacobinism and treachery.

"Do not listen to a pompous blockhead, a Sir Charles Malet ; he is a prejudiced system-monger in Indian politics. He will tell you that the Mahrattahs are now jealous ; they are always so ; but never less so than now."

COMMODORE SIR W. SYDNEY SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 22. Dardanelles. *Tigre*.—"To meet your anxiety as to my progress in the labour your friendship assigned me, I take up my pen before the Consul's boat puts off to say that I am got thus far on my way to the theatre of operations, where, however, I am told I shall find an older officer than myself ; which, if so, renders the letter I have from the Vizier for Gezzar [Djezzar] Pasha of Acre, and Hassan Bey, governor of Rhodes, unfit for delivery, as being inapplicable to any other arrangement than that of the command being in the hands of the person who has been in conference with the Ottoman Ministers on the projected operations and necessary preparations, and who can speak to them authoritatively as to detail.

Be this as it may, you may be sure I have the service and the good of the cause too much at heart to let anything stand in the way of the cordial co-operation of the allied forces so far as depends upon me. About the same time this news arrived by the *Bonne Citoyenne* of Captain Troubridge being gone to the station off Alexandria, which however is not mentioned in Lord Nelson's letter brought by her, a paragraph in a newspaper announced the appointment and immediate departure of Lord Elgin as ambassador for this court. This news together surprised us all in the middle of our work, and rather paralyzed the action of those we had to deal with by making them feel that much of what was in hand might be to be done over again; on our part of course we endeavour to keep the traces tight for fear of a retrograde movement, which, of course, is recommended by those who point out Naples as a warning to such as go on too fast. I can't say I saw any inclination or disposition to listen to this sort of timid counsel, or to recede; on the contrary every confidence in our ability and readiness to protect this empire was manifested, although it was strongly urged that more force than that pointed out by Lord Nelson's last letter to me, a copy of which I send enclosed, was necessary in the Levant, lest anything from Ancona or Toulon should escape the vigilance of our cruising squadrons lower down. The force assigned is exactly what was specified in your Lordship's instructions to us, communicated to Lord St. Vincent and Lord Nelson; no mention being therein made of frigates. None are appropriated to this service, and thus if Smyrna, which is exposed to a *coup de main*, should be visited by any straggling runaways while we are on the coast of Egypt, our establishment there, which is but barely reviving since the fire, will be again destroyed, as our fishery at Newfoundland was by Richéry.

"I have made the necessary requisition to the admiral in the Mediterranean for a certain force in frigates, as required and even stipulated in our conferences; but it will be necessary that this should not only be backed by orders from home, but by the means of dispatching them being furnished from England. This being become a diplomatic question I leave it in your Lordship's hands to settle with Lord S[pencer] rather than intrude on him with my reasoning, which, with all his indulgence for me, will be set down to the same account as all the similar applications he is daily receiving from every quarter of the globe. Three frigates at least are necessary to preserve the footing we have gained here, as we cannot as yet count on efficient force from our new allies, though we are forming it. As to their force in troops of disembarcation, I mean in a disciplined state, it does not amount to more than 1,000, which have been placed at my disposal. I have therefore been induced to listen to an offer made me by an Albanian chief of a thousand men, who are ready to enter into the British service in preference to any other. These are to be paid as our marines are being, to do not only the same duty as they do on board, but that of able seamen, which is a very great acquisition; and if they perform what they promise, this force

may be increased to a greater number with great advantage. The late intercepted letters speak of the discontent and distress which prevails in Buonaparte's army; we have taken measures to turn it to account, looking forward to drawing off the malcontents, irritated as they are against the Directory, and turning their arms against them either in Italy or the South of France. I hope if my brother is removed from Constantinople (and removed he must be, for after the place he has held, and filled with such credit, he can no more become second than I could become Lieutenant of the *Tigre*) I hope he will not quit this scene of action entirely. Naples is not gone yet. Sir William Hamilton writes me word he is going home. Perhaps a younger man may now be required there; my brother speaks Italian."

*Enclosure.*

ADMIRAL LORD NELSON to COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH.

*Extract.* 1798, December 31. Palermo.—"I have been honoured with your letter from off Malta, with its several enclosures; namely an extract of a letter from Lord Grenville to John Spencer Smith, also an extract of another letter from Lord Grenville to yourself and brother; and Earl St. Vincent having sent me an extract of a letter from Earl Spencer to him saying that you should, from certain circumstances, be the officer selected for the command of a small squadron in the Levant seas, and his Lordship having also informed me that Captain Miller was the officer of your choice, and desiring me to give you a frigate or sloop of war until Captain Miller's arrival, you may rest assured that I shall most strictly comply with the instructions sent by Lord Grenville to your brother, also those of Earl Spencer and Earl St. Vincent; for this purpose I must desire you will lose no time in proceeding to Alexandria to take upon you the command of the blockade, which I shall direct to be delivered up to you, and from my heart I wish you every success. The united squadron of Turks and Russians, and of two sail of the line under your command, must be sufficient for the two ships *armés en flûte* and three frigates, which, thank God, are all the enemy have left in those seas."

BARON de LERTHE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Austrian negotiations with France.*

1799, February. London.—"On écrit de Berlin, en date du 5 Janvier, qu'on sait de quelqu'un qui, selon toute apparence, doit être bien informé, que les négociations entre l'Autriche et la France ont été entamées par la cour de Toscane, et se continuent peut-être encore. La base principale sur laquelle la cour de Vienne a traité roule sur les points suivants.

1. "Que tout soit rétabli comme il était lors de la conclusion du traité de Campo Formio.



2. "Que, par conséquent, les monarchies en Italie restent comme elles étaient alors.

3. "Que l'Autriche, pour sa sûreté, ait la rivière Oglio pour frontière, et obtienne par conséquent Mantoue.

"On ajoute, d'ailleurs, que l'Empereur ne demande aucune acquisition en Allemagne, mais veut se borner à des arrondissements en Italie; que par la base surmentionnée, on avait entre autre le but de mettre un frein aux manœuvres révolutionnaires de la France; et que, quoiqu'on eut fort bien senti que par le même il serait fort difficile de l'y faire accéder, on s'était flatté de la porter à des termes plus équitables, par les armements formidables de l'Autriche elle-même, par l'assistance de la Russie, et par les préparatifs militaires du Roi de Naples. Sous ce point de vue le Baron de Thugut avait été très fâché que Naples eut attaqué sitôt; croyant que cette puissance aurait pû imposer à la France, mais non pas se soutenir contre elle à la longue. Il était d'avis que l'Autriche ne devait pas, en suivant cet exemple, risquer le tout en recommençant la guerre; mais plutôt tâcher de s'arranger avantagement avec la France en Italie, et laisser aux autres puissances à trouver elles-mêmes les meilleurs moyens pour convenir avec les Français de ce qui concernait leurs propres intérêts. On a ajouté enfin que le Baron de Thugut voyait avec beaucoup de peine que, vraisemblablement, la levée de boucliers précipitée de la Cour de Naples avait renversé toutes ces idées." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 23. Berlin.—"In the expectation of being able to dispatch Mason in two or three days, I write only a few lines of a public dispatch by the post of to-day to tell you of my arrival here on the 17th instant, and I add a few words of a private letter only to tell you that we are all well and somewhat recovered from our fatigues. By a letter of the 8th instant, which I had received yesterday from Captain Wallis at Newark, I find that a good part of our baggage is likely to follow us safely to Berlin, and as his letter announces the certain destruction of the frigate, which is broke down at both ends, and was only supported by the ice in the middle, I take for granted that in the first moments of this thaw the *Proserpine* has crumbled to pieces. I cannot enough speak of the praise due to Captain Wallis in these hard trials, and I should not have thought I had done fairly by him if I had not spoken as I ought about him, both in my public dispatch of to-day, and in a letter which I wrote concerning him to Lord Spencer on the second day after our escape. The interest which has been taken about us here is extremely flattering, and considering that we are come naked into this world of Berlin, we have much to say of the kindness which has been shown to us here. Of Count Panin I shall have too frequent occasion to write to you to make it necessary for me to dwell now upon his subject as much as I should at all

times be glad to do ; but, in truth, I am a good deal pressed in time by the first hurry of the thousand things which are to be done in the first days ; and as I had hoped that I should have had early communication enough to have enabled me to send a messenger to-morrow, I had not in any degree prepared myself for to-night's post, and the little time I have is shortened by the necessity of my going this evening at six to be presented to the Queen. It is now an age that I have lived in ignorance of England, as not a word can as yet have reached me since I left Yarmouth, which will have been to-morrow a complete month. The snow however has disappeared, and three successive days of south wind make us look with confidence every hour for the arrival of English letters.

"Death has been busy here, and has given room to great regrets, in the person of Prince Reuss, and Prince Frederick of Orange ; to these the last posts have added the Elector Palatine, to whom the Duke de Deux Ponts has quietly succeeded.

"There were a few lines to-day from Sir M. Eden to Mr. Garlike dated February 16, but the same post will have brought you dispatches from him at greater length than those which reached us here, which do not contain any important news."

COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 26. Rhodes.—"I take the opportunity of a Tartar which my very old friend Hassan Bey dispatches to the Porte, to afford you the satisfaction of knowing that I am here with him combining the operations settled in conference with the Ottoman ministry, as far as his very limited means will allow ; and as soon as my next conference with him is over, and matters finally arranged for him to follow me with an efficient force (as to equipment at least, however small) I shall proceed to meet Captain Troubridge's very natural impatience to be relieved. He writes me word from Alexandria that he supposes me gone on to Constantinople by his not finding me on the station, as he was led to expect from the tenor of his orders, not knowing that I had other duties to do, and that my operations were not to be confined to the simple 'blockade,' but extended to the preparation of a force sufficient to carry the place, which, from its state as he describes it, I hope to do when the first division of Turkish troops arrives. I find the arrangement of the relief of that station by an older officer than me, which has taken place since Lord Nelson's letter to me of 31 December, is, notwithstanding, in conformity to the disposition contained in that letter, as Captain T[roubridge] says he is instructed to leave me in the command of the blockade ; thus my apprehensions of want of connection in the measures to be executed under the combination of Gezzar Pasha, Hassan Bey, and a new person who was not at the conferences wherein they were debated, is done away, and we shall go on very smoothly, I have no doubt. I hope, however, that my operations will not be interrupted in the middle by the

arrival of any chance comer as senior officer, because the service must in that case suffer after all that has passed, and I shall be left accountable for measures suggested by me, and which require the fostering hand of the projector in the execution. When we come to blows, which I hope will be soon now as the season is becoming fine and the Ramazan fast is over, we shall soon prove whether, as is said, Alexandria must fall on the first attack; if it should not, we shall at least have learnt how to make a second to greater advantage."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, February 28. Berlin.—“The dispatch which I send to you I presume is very much that which all the latter correspondence of Count Panin and Mr. Garlike must have taught you to expect. Haugwiz and Finchenstein are both believed to be sincerely disposed to adopt the measure of war, but the first of these two is thought to have rather less influence than he had, and to be afraid of still diminishing that by pressing opinions against which the mind of the king is pre-occupied by the influence of so weak a man as Koekeritz, who is made the tool and channel of designs which he has not sense enough to perceive the drift of. Old Finchenstein meanwhile has obtained an audience of the king to urge the necessity of the measures which we recommend, and I am in hopes he will in a day or two repeat his advice in a written *mémoire*, after which General Stamford will make an effort to prevail upon the Duke of Brunswick to second the joint opinion of the two most influential cabinet ministers here. Schulemburg said the other day on this subject, *on a beau faire tout ce qu'on voudra mais on aura la guerre*; and in this opinion many reasonable persons concur, though it is evident that the king's mind is not yet suffered to look to so manly a decision. Count Panin's hopes are, I think, rather diminished by his extreme disappointment at the fatal weakness of the Duke of Brunswick, of whom none of our friends here can speak with patience; he is likewise much embarrassed by the positive orders of his court to retire from hence if he has not a prompt and satisfactory answer, and he is naturally impatient in having as yet received no answer from Thugut to the letter which he wrote to Vienna in November. That my hopes are very sanguine as to succeeding in the prompt attainment of what we wish I cannot say; but I am nevertheless not without good hopes that Austria and Prussia must, before it is long, be driven into the necessity of war, and in that view you will see that I am working on as well as I can. My first care was to persuade Count Panin to make (without directions from his Court) the formal offer from Vienna which Prince Reuss had been directed by Thugut to press upon them here through the medium of Count Panin. I am now very well pleased that I did so, for I last night received a letter from

Sir M. Eden of 20th instant, expressing the astonishment there at no answer being sent yet from Berlin to their offer of a month ago of dissolving the Congress. I shall send to-day, either by *estafette* or courier, to explain to Thugut through Sir M. Eden that this proposal had not been made till four days ago, and I will not let them rest here till they send the answer which is desired, or one as favourable as can be obtained from them. You will observe that I have spoken to Haugwiz of the offer of Russian auxiliaries as the joint offer produced by the concert between the two courts of London and Petersburg. I did so because, though I found Count Panin was ordered by his court not to speak here of the Russian convention with England, I thought it not fit to let that stand here as the bare and single offer of the court of Petersburg; by Panin's communications I have seen that convention. I think it should have contained a more marked reference to Great Britain in the disposal of the force which she pays, but I presume you will be so well satisfied with the general effect of the convention that you will not demur as to several inaccuracies which are to be found in it, and the neglect of some points which ought to be found in it; and you will have seen that to this convention the Emperor adheres, notwithstanding the failure of Count Cobenzel's famous convention. When we speak of Holland, if we get on to that detail, which we shall do if Austria does not make peace, Haugwiz will recommend much caution in the naming the restoration of the Stadtholder, and will urge the advantage of declaring at first only for the deliverance of Holland, a distinction which it is probable enough the situation of parties in that country may in the first moments render necessary.

"I do not find as great a jealousy here of the designs of Austria as to Bavaria as I thought would have arisen from the death of the Elector Palatine; their blow, if they intended any, would probably have been struck on that occasion, for they have certainly 110,000 men in Bavaria and the Palatinate exclusive of the Russian army. Is it new to you that the supposed agent for the intercourse said to be carried on between Austria and France is Marcolini, now at Vienna from the Cisalpine Republic, and it is through him that Haugwiz believes they are negotiating. I have written these desultory sentences as they occurred, and my time allows of no more, as I must see Haugwiz upon this offer from Vienna, on which I still build some hopes of concerted hostilities as long as I can."

#### COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, February. Harleÿ Street.]—"Je vous suis bien reconnaissant pour la communication que vous avez eu la bonté de me faire de l'avis que vous avez reçu de l'Amirauté par rapport à notre escadre. C'est à vous que je dois sans doute ces arrangements dont on sera content en Russie, et qui m'épargne des désagréments infinis. Depuis votre entrée dans le ministère je n'ai reçu que de ces marques de bontés de votre part, et je vous

proteste que je sens tout le prix du bonheur de traiter avec vous les affaires. Je me trouve come en Paradis apres avoir été plus de sept ans en Purgatoire. Je vous supplie de me faire la grace de parvenir à Sa Majesté le Roi la lettre que j'ai reçu du Duc d'Oldenbourg.

“ Si vous n'avez pas envoyé au chevalier Whitworth le projet du manifeste du Roi de France, pourriez vous me faire la grace de m'en donner une copie pour que je puisse l'envoyer à l'Impératrice par mon courier que je compte d'expédier vendredi prochain. Je vous suis bien obligé pour la copie de l'extrait de la plate lettre du Duc d'Alcudia à M. del Campo.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, January-March.]———“ Je crois pouvoir avoir l'honneur de vous assurer, d'après plusieurs conversations presque confidentielles que j'ai eu avec M. de Pergen, que ce jeune homme est entièrement porté pour une paix même honteuse avec les Français. J'ai lieu d'être certain, en conséquence, qu'il écrit dans le même sens par le courier d'aujourd'hui, et qu'il déconseille l'emprunt, maintenant notre *palladium*, le plus qu'il peut. Quoique sa mémoire ne porte que sur la partie financière, je crains toujours les effets des *mauvais* avis dans un pays où l'on n'est que trop sujet à prendre le mauvais parti. Je sais d'ailleurs que sa dépêche sera portée sous les yeux de l'empereur comme la mienne, et je meurs de peur qu'elle n'ait plus de succès, parcequ'elle est un peu plus platte encore. Si je ne connoissois pas Milord Grenville, je n'oserais pas prévenir le Secrétaire d'Etat de mes craintes, mais je sais qu'il rend justice aux motifs qui m'animent ; l'amour du bien général et la gloire même de ma Cour qui pourroit ignorer ses propres intérêts, me font un devoir de l'avertissement que je prends la liberté de vous donner. Je sais qu'en en profitant, vous me rendrez justice sans me compromettre, et surtout, qu'après avoir lû cette lettre, vous la brûlerez immédiatement.”

*Postscript.* “ Si vous ne me savez pas gré de mon zèle, soyez au moins convaincu de l'étendue de ma confiance et de ma haute opinion. Je ne trouverai vraisemblablement plus l'occasion de vous en donner un témoignage aussi démonstratif.”

COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, January-March.]———“ J'attends avec une véritable impatience des nouvelles de l'homme que nous avons envoyé aux Pais-Bas ; le premier bâtiment nous en apportera sans doute. On m'a dit ces jours derniers que les Belges avaient envoyé nouvellement quelqu'un ici tout-à-fait dans nos vues. L'amitié que vous me témoignez et mes principes me donnent le droit de vous demander franchement si la chose est vraie, comme je songe sans cesse à cette diversion intéressante qui

sourit à mon cœur comme à mon esprit. Il m'est venu plusieurs idées à ce sujet que je crois utiles, et que j'aurai l'honneur de vous soumettre lorsque vous aurez bien voulu m'indiquer le moment de vous faire ma cour. Agréez tous mes hommages et mes félicitations les plus sincères sur le part que je prends en bon Anglois à la gloire immortelle dont se couvre  *votre véritablement grande nation*, sous le sage gouvernement *des très grands ministres*, qui la conduisent sur le sentier droit de la vertu de l'héroïsme et de la prospérité.

“Je crois qu'il seroit à propos que j'eusse aussi l'honneur de vous entretenir avant le départ de Mr. Grenville. Je serai toujours prêt à faire tout ce que je dois pour la cause; et pour mon ami, et le frère de mon ami, tout ce que l'un et l'autre pourront désirer.”

#### COUNT STARHEMBERG to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, January-March.]———“J'ai prié mon ami le Comte de Woronzow de vous parler de toutes mes peines; en vérité les évènements du moment me percent le cœur. Je n'ai pas pu prendre sur moi de faire ma cour au Roi depuis quinze jours. Vous savez combien j'étois exact auparavant, et les bontés touchantes de Sa Majesté m'y engageoient doublement; mais autant j'étais fier de me montrer, autant ma constance doublait quand le voisinage des Français de Vienne ne nous embrouillait pas encore, autant suis-je honteux de les voir si près de Naples. Votre belle âme me comprendra et me plaindra. Daignez dans l'occasion en dire un mot au Roi, auquel je suis bien respectueusement et sincèrement attaché. Quoique je n'ai malheureusement jusqu'à présent aucune communication officielle à vous faire, je voudrais avoir l'honneur de vous entretenir quelques instans. Ma tête travaille sans cesse dans le sens du mal à faire à ces infâmes Français, et j'aurais à ce sujet quelques idées à vous soumettre. Je viendrai demain en ville, et je me présenterai à votre porte en Cleveland Row après onze heures. Si vous ne pouviez pas me voir, laissez de grâce un mot à votre portier par lequel vous voudrez bien m'indiquer à quelle heure je pourrai vous faire ma cour.”

#### MILITARY DISPOSITIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

##### LORD GRENVILLE to COUNT WORONZOW.

##### *Minute.*

[1799, February-March.]———“Nous croyons que l'emploi des 45,000 hommes en Suisse seroit infiniment plus utile à la cause commune que si on les envoyoit sur le Bas-Rhin.

1. “Parceque les opérations que l'on pourroit avoir en vue dans cette dernière destination, seroient toujours plus ou moins embarrassées par la démarcation Prussienne, et par la politique vacillante de cette Cour.

2. “Parceque toute cette ligne depuis Dusseldorf jusqu'à Mentz, et de là encore jusqu'à Strasbourg, est hérissée de

forteresses, la France ayant aujourd'hui entre ses mains toute son ancienne barrière, ainsi que toute celle qui lui étoit opposée. Il faudroit donc absolument une forte artillerie de siège pour pouvoir faire le moindre progrès de ce côté là.

3. " Dans cet état des choses une armée sur la rive droite du Rhin n'auroit aucune influence sur ce qui se passe en Brabant et en Hollande. Le seul moyen de favoriser des insurrections dans cette dernière seroit de pouvoir entrer dans le pays du côté de la Prusse, ou de s'emparer de quelques positions importantes sur les côtes maritimes de ces Provinces par des troupes de débarquement.

4. " Il est de toute évidence que la présence de cette armée sur le Bas-Rhin influeroit encore moins sur la défense de Hambourgh, et des autres villes Anséatiques. La part que l'Empereur de Russie paroît vouloir prendre à cette défense est, sans doute, un objet de la plus grande importance pour bien des raisons. Mais cet objet seroit (je pense) beaucoup mieux rempli par l'envoi d'un corps très inférieur en nombre, mais qui débarqueroit près de Hambourg, et s'établirait soit là, soit en Holstein; soutenu, s'il le falloit, par un corps de troupes Danoises que le Roi de Danemarck ne refuseroit pas aux instances de l'Empereur.

5. " La grande faute des opérations militaires contre les François a été, jusqu'ici, la trop grande division des forces que l'on auroit dû concentrer sur une seule ligne d'attaque. L'opération contre la Suisse offre de plus les deux grands avantages, de délivrer un peuple militaire qui ne demande pas mieux que de s'armer contre les François, et d'ouvrir aux attaques des alliés la seule partie de la frontière Française qui soit sans défense. Cette opération auroit aussi une grande influence sur la guerre en Italie.

6. " Il y a aussi des considérations morales, surtout par rapport à l'impression du public ici, qui font que la délivrance de la Suisse serviroit plus que tout autre succès à remplir les vues que l'on doit se proposer par la guerre actuelle."

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 4. Berlin.—" To-morrow morning being fixed for announcing the answer to the proposal from Vienna, and some account being to be given by Haugwiz, on the 6th, to Count Panin and myself upon the general concert, I shall send a messenger to Cruxhaven with what information I may have on these subjects, and will write this morning such desultory matter as belongs better to a private letter. I was scarcely arrived here when I received a communication from Stutgard, signed W. M'Intosh, and claiming to be known to you and to Mr. Canning, which expresses the greatest apprehensions at the progress of French principles in the duchy of Wirtemberg under the active directions of *Citoyen Mengaud* and *Citoyen Trouvè*, who are so good as to employ themselves with great zeal and success for that purpose; and the informations which I have since had

confirm this account, with the addition that the Duke of Wirtemberg is so disheartened and dispirited at the contradictions which he meets with from the States now assembled at Stutgard, that he talks of retiring to Louisbourg, and if he does so, that timid measure will, it is feared, be of the most fatal consequences. It had been suggested to me to try to prevent this by procuring some encouraging assurances from this Court, but knowing the direct communication between Wirtemberg and Vienna, and judging that such an interference from Prussia would increase the jealousy which the Austrian Government have of Prussian interference in the empire; considering too that 110,000 Austrians are upon the line of march towards that country, I thought that every consideration led to try the influence of Vienna rather than that of Berlin, and I accordingly have recommended this object to Sir M. Eden's attention. I hope no time will be lost in it, for every account concurs in the description of danger which prevails there. Trouvè was originally employed in England by Prussia, but proving himself, as Haugwiz told me, to be a very mischievous democrat, they sent for him here to shut him up, which he avoided by escaping to France, and has since become one of the most active agents for the revolutionizing of Germany. I do not know how far your Wirtemberg negotiator, Sir J. Hippley, could be likely to put into the Duke the courage and prudence which is wanting, but if he really has any means of influence there, it were well perhaps that he should employ it. With the Prince of Hesse Cassel the French Directory have likewise been tampering, and have been endeavouring to tempt him to range himself under the protection of France. I believe, however, that the only effect of this has been to alarm and indispose Prussia the more with respect to France, the Landgrave himself being, as Haugwiz describes him, perfectly steady and well disposed to resist both the intrigues and menaces of France.

"I have seen since my arrival here the Baron Linden who came from Holland, as you know, to solicit assistance from the Court of Berlin. I have found him extremely dissatisfied at the distance at which he has been kept here, and impatient of the various excuses under which Haugwiz has hitherto avoided seeing or communicating with him. I have thought it right to do what I could to shew him the necessity of waiting for a fit and well-concerted opportunity of resistance in Holland, and have pacified him with the assurance of my belief that, whenever that moment should arrive, Haugwiz's present silence and coldness would not stand in the way of whatever arrangements might appear to promise best. He laments the disadvantage of letting go by the opportunity which arises from the present detestation of the French in the United Provinces, where the pecuniary requisition can hardly be collected, and the requisition of men has not been ventured since the passing of the decree. The alarm at Hamburgh of an expected attack from the French seems meanwhile to increase, and information has been sent to the King of Prussia from thence which confidently names



General Brune as destined by the Directory to command 30,000 men on this expedition. The King's answer, for he wrote one with his own hand in returning thanks for the information, expressed his firm determination to try the fate of his army to the last man rather than suffer the approach of the French to the city of Hamburg. We have lived hourly in the expectation that the news which arrived here from Rastadt would be confirmed, but it still rests on the same single authority. It is a letter sent to the Duke of Brunswick by Eberling, who is *chargé d'affaires* to the Duke of Brunswick at Rastadt; it is dated the 24th ultimo at 12 at night, and positively asserts the arrival there of a courier from the Directory notifying to the French ministers there a declaration of war from France against the King of Bohemia, and an order to the French troops to cross the Rhine. Haugwiz still continues to believe it, but still is without any letter whatever from Rastadt.

March 5. "I continue to add to this private letter, which I trust I shall be able to send to-morrow with some certain knowledge of the answer to my overture, though without any official communication; for to-morrow is now fixed by Count Haugwiz to shew confidentially to Count Panin the answer which is afterwards formally to be made to the proposal of assistance from Russia; and Haugwiz has told me that, from my manner of stating this offer, he should consider the answer to Petersburg as applying in great part to London likewise. Meanwhile the answer has this morning been given to the proposition from Austria for the dissolution of the congress at Rastadt; it is a verbal answer, and purports to be an assurance on the part of the King of Prussia that he is ready to concur in that measure *pour le cas d'hostilités commencées, et à condition que S[a] M[ajesté] I[mpériale] voudroit bien communiquer à S[a] M[ajesté] P[russienne] les mesures et la disposition qu'il aura pris pour la sûreté des princes du Sud de l'Allemagne, et particulièrement pour les princes rive-Rhins en cas de rupture.* Count Panin, who was present at this answer, from the part which he had taken in the measure, thinks this condition equitable, and is not as much dissatisfied with it as M. de Hudelist, the Austrian *Chargé d'Affaires*, to whom it was made; for my own part I think there is too much of fencing in it, and I had rather have seen, no doubt, a direct assent to the proposal. But in order to do away the inconvenience of M. Hudelist giving a harsh or unfavourable representation of this by his courier to-night, I have seen Count Haugwiz myself upon this answer, and I asked him whether he did not think 110,000 Austrians in Bavaria and the Palatinate a sufficient security for the princes in the south of Germany; 'Yes,' said he, 'most assuredly, if Austria will act with them: and the only object which we have in our answer is to ascertain that point.' With this explanation I have written by Hudelist's courier to-night, to state to Sir M. Eden what had been Haugwiz's view of this answer, and to urge him to try all his influence with M. de Thugut to obtain from him such an intimation of the Emperor's meaning to act for the defence of

Germany, as will satisfy the appearance of hesitation which this answer may seem to carry with it. In truth the King of Prussia, as Haugwiz states it, desires, before he invites the princes of the Empire to challenge the hostility of France, to be enabled to tell them that means are likely to be employed which are adequate to their defence. This point, therefore, I have pressed to Sir Morton, and to Thugut through him, and have represented that if Austria was really determined to abide the consequences of the proposal which she had made, and which I considered as equivalent to an offer of commencing hostilities, a plain and direct language upon that subject would, I was confident, remove all difficulties here, and begin at once a concert of good hope and promise. If these expressions are something more sanguine than belong to the moment in which I write them, yet as I allow something for their evaporating in their passage to Thugut, and something for the prejudices which they are intended to counteract, I do not repent of the favourable statement which I have made for Vienna in describing the disposition which prevails here. If I gave way to my own suspicions, I should perhaps fear that this answer from Berlin, which seems to call for promise of hostility as measures of defence for the princes of Germany, may mean to hint at an extended line of demarcation with the present system of neutrality as affording sufficient measures of defence; and all that I have heard of the Elector of Bavaria and other southern states of Germany soliciting to be included in the Prussian line of neutrality would increase this apprehension, concerning which I am the more jealous from thinking that it may accord with the sort of *concert of vigorous defence* which I am always afraid of seeing brought forward at Berlin instead of the vigorous offence which it is my business and study to promote here. Great objections indeed in every view seem to me to arise to any system which leaves the greater part of Germany in a state of neutrality while the Emperor is in a state of war; nor do any of the military opinions which I have heard in favour of this arrangement, as telling more against France than against the Emperor, satisfy me in any degree against the political mischiefs arising from it. The activity of French agents in revolutionizing Germany remains in full vigour and effect during such a state of neutrality, and it is against this growing evil that open and successful hostility can alone furnish sufficient security. I heartily hope that my suspicions as to such an extended line of defence being the only measure which Prussian spirit is yet equal to, are ill-founded; but when I so often sound Haugwiz and find him answer well both as to the general danger and the necessity of concert, and yet see him hesitate as to the immediate active and vigorous hostility which I look for in that concert, it is impossible not to have much apprehension on that subject. If that be the line which they adopt I see no remedy, unless their eventual concert should turn upon any event so near and probable as to offer good hope that the event may have arisen while we are discussing it; but unless I am otherwise directed, nothing else short of vigorous hostility is the discussion of my mission.

March 6. "This morning brings an account from Paris through Baron Rede that, in consequence of the Austrian troops having passed the Inn, the French Directory had directed their troops likewise to move forward; and had announced at Rastadt that they were still equally desirous of peace, and would order their army to resume its former line of position whenever the Austrian troops would return to theirs, and satisfy the Directory upon their demand respecting the march of the Russians. I presume this will be found to be the explanation of the Rastadt news which was called a declaration of war; but if the Austrians have advanced their army rather than give way upon the demand made by France, I think it is not easy to see how Austria can now recede, and therefore I am still much disposed to believe in immediate hostilities between France and Austria. The object here which Haugwiz will probably attempt is to limit the proposed concert to that of an extended line of what he honours with the name of vigorous defence; but I will not tire you with more speculations on this point, as I will keep my letter open till I learn to-day from Count Panin what is the complexion of the answer which is confidentially to be shewn to him this morning. Fauche is come here from Hamburgh, and is, as I understand, very sanguine in the hopes of his negotiation at Paris. Pichégru is likewise here *incognito*. I have seen neither of them, but it is because I have not sought much for that communication, and am in general disposed to place no great confidence in the intrigues of Paris, or in the judgment and discretion of those who conduct them. Another motive with me for not being forward in these discussions is that I am persuaded Siéyès must be informed of them, and for gaining the public mind or that of the king to the concert which we wish, we should risk much if we gave Siéyès the advantage of stating that the war which we provoked was a war only for the establishment of the monarchy of France. I should however be glad to hear what you wish me to do in this matter, as although I keep clear of it, Count Panin and General Stamford are in a good deal of communication upon it, and I am likely to be pressed to mix a good deal more in it than at present I am disposed to think would be right or useful.

March 6, 3 p.m. "I am this moment furnished with the official papers from Rastadt sent by M. Goertz on the 27th ultimo to the Government here, by which the event of war between Austria and France seems ascertained beyond all doubt; and if further proof was wanting, it is found in the circumstance of M. Domb (another Prussian Minister at Rastadt) having been told by the French Ministers there that General Masséna had orders to demand the immediate evacuation of the Grisons, and in case of refusal to attack the Austrians there. So far so good; yet you will see that this event has produced no good spirit in the answer from Prussia to Austria; and I find from Panin's confidential conversation with Haugwiz this morning there will be no better spirit in the official answer preparing for him and for me. That answer will be to concur with us in our view of the

common danger, and the necessity of common concert, but to offer on the part of Prussia, instead of immediate hostilities against France, a more extended concert for the protection of the north of Europe. This concert is to embrace Denmark under the supposed influence of Russia, and though it is actually a defensive concert, we are to be reconciled to it by being told that it may easily lead to offensive measures. I asked what were the cases in which defensive measures might become offensive, but I do not find that any such are explained, nor do I understand that any distinct solution is suggested by Haugwitz to the difficulty which he will hear from us of our being instructed to pursue offensive measures, and to establish, not a concert of defence, but a concert of prompt and vigorous hostility ; yet he continues to express sanguine hopes that events may daily arise which will enable him to bring the measures of his Court nearer to the wishes of London and of Petersburg. If the only difficulty which existed here was founded on suspicions of Vienna I should understand this ; but when Haugwitz to-day described the proposed answer to Panin, he knew that Austria was either actually at war or in a state equivalent to it ; as no man believes that they will have crossed the Inn to give up the Grisons and send back the Russian troops at the requisition of France. In this state both Panin and myself are disposed jointly to make the strongest representation against the answer as it is described, and to ask for a specific explanation of the case, whatever it be, in which Prussia will act hostilely against France in concert with the two Courts. Infinite will be the mischief resulting from this conduct in Prussia, because in continuing to offer to great part of Germany the specious though fallacious appearance of peace and neutrality, while Austria and the south of Germany is separately fighting for its existence, that spirit of division which France is successfully pursuing in Germany is powerfully assisted, the general means of defence are impaired and lessened, and Prussia becomes by this line of conduct a party to the measures pursued by France, in the moment when we are seeking to engage them [her?] under a sense of common danger, in measures of common hostility. I shall wait impatiently to hear from you on this subject. Count Panin seems sometimes to entertain rather more than I do the discussion of defensive concert, if the positive and marked orders of his Court would allow it. I am inclined to think that it might be useful to alarm them here with the idea that, if Austria makes war and Prussia remains neutral, the whole co-operation of the two Courts of London and Petersburg will naturally centre in Vienna instead of Berlin ; but this is delicate ground, partly because we must have the concurrence of Prussia for the great object of Holland, and partly because the conduct of the Cabinet at Vienna makes it difficult for us even to threaten to connect ourselves in a subsidiary view with them ; yet it will not escape you that in Sir Charles Whitworth's last dispatch there is an insinuation of Cobentzel's which is meant to lead to communications of this description. Upon the whole I shall be inclined to feel the ground a little here in that shape, and shew to them, rather as a

danger than a menace, that Great Britain and Russia, looking for active co-operation in war with France and finding it offered by Vienna and refused by Berlin, must, if it [they] be consistent with its [their] own principles, give its [their] means, its [their] support and its [their] concert to those who adopt the same system, instead of reserving it for those who, in professing to be neutral, rather augment than diminish the common danger."

Commodore SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 7. *Tigre*, off Alexandria.—"I send you the enclosed papers communicated to me by Captain Troubridge. I shall of course turn the information to account. In my intercourse with the shore I feel much in want of a good Arabic interpreter, which was not to be procured at Constantinople in time enough for him to come with me. I shall endeavour to get one at any price, for I cannot get on without direct intercourse with the enemies of the French on the coast. I have heard nothing of Murad Bey since his first letter to Captain Hood after the battle of the Nile, so that I am not able to judge how far he may be in force. Ibrahim Bey is at Gaza, on better terms with Gezzar Pasha than the former. I shall labour to make them act together in the common cause. I have sent Mr. Wright to Gezzar Pasha to open my communication with him. He promised to move after the Ramazan feast, which being over yesterday I hope he will meet me on my rendezvous, thereby evading Buonaparte's meditated blow, and taking him in the rear with a more formidable artillery than the French can have with them. The intercepted French letters call Egypt *une parfaite Vendée*, by which it should seem that the whole country is against them, independent of combined military operations, which, since Murad and Ibrahim Beys' first efforts of resistance, have not been tried.

"I am very apprehensive no Turkish army that we shall be able to assemble under a Turkish leader, will be able to do more than fight one pitched battle. I reckon, with even so few as three thousand of the native troops in British pay, I could manage to keep a certain force always in line to guard artillery, to attack an essential point, to turn the scale of a battle as *corps de reserve*, or to cover a retreat. I have taken on myself to accept an offer made me by an Albanian chief from the Morea, of one thousand with proper officers as marines, which I mean to employ in gun-boats on the coast and on the Nile. Without some such force I see we may cruise here to eternity, hauling off to sea for every gale, and never be able to profit by the openings which famine, disease, and desertion may, nay do, give me. I am at a loss to know what fund to draw on for the contingent expenses of formation. The monthly pay can come from the ships' books on the naval establishment."

*Enclosure.*

LERIGI MALAGAMBA to COMMODORE SIR W. SIDNEY SMITH.

1799, March 1. Acre.—"D'ordre de Son Excellence Gezzar Pascha, j'ai l'honneur de vous écrire la présente qui vous sera

rendue par Mahomet Bey, capitaine d'un petit brigantin du dit gouverneur. Voici ce qui en est l'objet. Puisque par Monsieur le capitaine Foote, vous avez eû la bonté d'envoyer avis de l'invasion que les François devoient faire en Syrie, vous n'ignorez pas le dessein de nos ennemis communs. Je dois à présent vous dire que, les jours passés, après s'être emparés de Lariss, [El Arisch] chateau entre les frontières de l'Egypte et la Syrie, que les troupes de Gezzar n'ont presque rien défendu, sont aussi entré à Gaza, que les mêmes troupes ont abandonnées.

"Aujourd'hui les soldats de Gezzar, au nombre de 13 à 15,000, sont, une portion à Jaffa, une autre à Ramé, et à Lidda, villages pas éloignés de Jaffa. Mais dans ces soldats règne le plus grand désordre et crainte des François, de façon qu'à chaque instant nous nous entendons à quelque autre revers, et même à être renfermés à Acre, qui tiendra bien peu si les troupes n'ont pas plus de courage. En outre de ce que je viens de vous dire, il y a presque tous les habitans des environs qui n'attendent que les François, surtout au Mont Liban, qui sont absolument déclarés pour les François. Voilà l'état véridique où ces contrées sont réduites, et peut-être qu' à l'arrivée chez vous de la présente, nous serons encore plus mals.

"Dans ces tristes circonstances le Pascha n'a d'autre secours que dans votre amitié. C'est le tems de l'aider, et de remplir les promesses que, tant de fois, votre prédécesseur et, dans votre dernière lettre, lui avez fait. Ainsi il me charge de vous dire qu'il vous prie instamment de vouloir bien expédier tout de suite deux vaisseaux, si vous le pouvez, pour rester à Caiffa, et l'aider en cas de besoin; et s'il est possible, de faire croiser de Damiette à Gaza, pour empêcher que les François ne portent les vivres par mer à l'armée, étant assuré que c'est par ce canal qu'ils font passer leurs provisions. Si vous ne pouvez pas expédier deux vaisseaux, il en attend un, sans faute, et avec la plus grande diligence. Ici vous trouverez toutes les provisions que vous aurez besoin, et s'il ne vous envoie rien par la présente occasion, c'est parcequ'il ne veut que personne sâche pour où il expédie ce bâtiment.

"Tout ce que j'ai l'honneur de vous dire, c'est d'ordre du Pascha. J'espère que votre générosité n'abandonnera jamais un ami et allié comme lui qui feroit tout pour votre service, sans vous dire les autres raisons qui peuvent vous engager à venir.

"Quant à la peste, depuis quelques jours elle a beaucoup diminué, et aujourd'hui il y a peu de chose."

*Postscript.* "Dans l'instant on apporte la nouvelle que Jaffa est prise, mais il faut attendre d'en être assuré." *Copy.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 10. Berlin.—"My last dispatch, No. 3 by Dietry, will have completely prepared you for that of which Shaw is the bearer to-day. The answer given to us is certainly a distinct

refusal in the present moment to accede to offensive measures ; and as this refusal seems chiefly to be attributed to the weak and feeble counsels of Köckeritz and of those who act through his influence, while that influence prevails, there is little chance of a change of conduct, unless events should force it. I mean, unless the French should attack Hamburg, or court hostilities with the north of Germany ; a measure which, however, does not accord with the language of Jourdan's address, though every post brings me accounts from Sir J. Craufurd of this project against Hamburg being pursued, and though Daendels is gone to Paris, as is supposed, for this arrangement with the Directory. Meanwhile I shall be impatient, as you will naturally suppose, to hear what may be your decisions in England upon the present situation of the Continent ; seeing that Prussia refuses war and Austria declares war, we who want at London and Petersburg to pursue the war with vigour should naturally look in the first place to Vienna ; where, I presume, their disappointment in seeing the inactivity of Prussia will lead them to be manageable enough as with respect to us and our convention, if they do not at once become so dispirited as to hurry back into negotiation and peace. In this light (I mean in the view of some co-operation with Austria) I propose to write a few lines to Sir M. Eden and endeavour to nurse their courage there with the hopes of the efforts made by Russia and Great Britain centring now more entirely with Austria ; this seems to me to be all that can be done on the sudden, and I have the satisfaction of finding Count Panin disposed to look to the same arrangement as probable ; and his letters to Petersburg to-day may, in presenting that view more nearly to them, already induce them to prepare for executing that plan. It does not appear to me that, even if I was sure you would act upon this view, I should do any good by going instantly to Vienna ; if I could have carried from hence any, even conditional, promise of support to Austria, I might with advantage have combined it by going there ; but that hope being out of the question, I do not see that my immediately going there could have any other effect than that of shewing an unbecoming solicitude to be allowed to do them at Vienna the service of support and co-operation. If they are in earnest there to try the chance of war vigorously we shall soon hear of them, and I do not think we need be the beggars in this suit, and carry our partnership about to every market that will be open to us. Another hesitation in my mind as to an immediate conclusion and departure from hence belongs to the proposed project of defensive concert for the north of Europe, and some doubt whether that idea should be finally and absolutely renounced by us. It is very true that such a concert is not that which we think best suited to the interests of England, of Prussia, or of Europe ; but if we do not succeed in the concert which we wish to form, it is perhaps going too fast to say that we will form no other ; the true question seems to me to be whether, by adopting this defensive system of concert here, we can keep that in reserve, and yet pursue active co-operation now wherever we can find it.

If the form of their defensive system here were such as demanded no immediate sacrifice of expense from Great Britain, and left us in the present moment the full application of all our means to Austria, I should not hesitate to say we should adopt it, and consider it as an acquirement more or less valuable, though not precisely what we had wished; if that sacrifice which it may now require is great enough to suspend our efforts for immediate action, the defensive concert should give way to the better course of vigorous measures. The great point therefore to ascertain appears to be to know what proportion of those means which we destine to vigorous war would be diverted or suspended by the defensive concert proposed here. We accordingly pressed Count Haugwiz very closely on this point, and urged him much to give us a sketch or *projet quelconque* of the general stipulations which would be included in his view of such a concert; he has not absolutely promised it, but he speaks as if he intended to offer some such confidentially; and as we could only take his last answer *ad referendum*, we must wait some time for decision, and cannot better employ that time here than by endeavouring to learn whether his proposed concert is a regular systematic measure, or only imagined to soften their other refusal, and preserve a connection which they do not like to lose sight of though they run no risk to secure it. If the King had a fixed character, and opinions of his own, I should dwell more upon the two or three conversations which I have had with him, and in which I am told that he has shewn to me more ease and readiness to discussion than he has yet shewn to any foreigner; but though I do not see much advantage in this, it has, however, given opportunities of convincing me that his mind is much impressed with the supposed benefits which would arise from this defensive concert, and therefore I presume his ministers and his advisers must likewise attach much importance to it. I cannot better describe this eagerness of his to you than by telling you with how much warmth and anxiety he answered me when I told him, the night before last, that to see Prussia still inactive now that Austria had engaged in war made me for the first time begin to despair of any hope for the safety of Germany; he repeated the word with so much anxiety both in tone and manner that I said I certainly would not use that word if any foundation of better hope could be supplied; and he then dwelt with much vehemence upon this concert of defence as supplying that hope. You see therefore he is at least taught to represent, if not to consider, this new proposed concert as a measure which they have much at heart to obtain. In speaking of this to Haugwiz he considers, I find, Sweden as necessary and willing to engage in this concert; and says that he has only named Denmark because the relations between this Court and Sweden are not strong enough to be named upon the same footing in the note to Count Panin. In that note you will be struck with the expression of *dès lors le moindre revirement*, but he explains himself to mean by *revirement* any change of circumstances which might make the moment more favourable for Prussian hostilities; and he stated



that this change might happen either by new hopes from Austrian success or by new fears from Austrian defeat; so that you see by this he confesses his principle of avoiding aggression dwindles down into a mere calculation of favourable or unfavourable chances. Among those chances it is important to mention that we took up his idea of the Russian troops being so placed as to be efficient in the Austrian war, and applicable to the proposed concert of defence, and we asked whether, to enable them to take such a position, Prussia would admit of their passing through Prussian territory; he gave no precise answer, but I was led to think that this question, like most of those which we put to this timid and irresolute government, is left for the calculation of the moment, and is not tried by any regular system or established plan. Another reason for putting the question which I have quoted was a desire to know how far we might look to the possibility of a passage for Russian troops to Holland through the country within the line of demarcation; but no precise answer could be obtained to this suggestion; and here I am sorry to observe in Sir C. Whitworth's dispatch to you that the idea of transporting a body of Russian troops by sea to the attack of Holland is considered at Petersburg as impracticable, both from the expense and the difficulties attending it. I had always imagined this project to be by no means impracticable, and sometimes looked at it as a measure which, if carried into effect, might in its first impression decide Prussia to exert itself, when so fair a chance offered itself under their eyes for the deliverance of Holland and the security of their frontier, instead of the precarious defence which the Ems, under their line of demarcation, at present affords to them. You will learn probably from Panin and Stamford's correspondence all that has passed between them and the Paris negotiators. I am somewhat incredulous, but they were right in trying perhaps all means, and if Count Panin's last manœuvre succeeds, he hopes to buy a good cause of breach with France by an attack upon the line of demarcation.

"The only news which I yet hear to-day is that Haugwiz has sent for the ministers from Mayence, Hesse Darmstadt, and one or two other lesser German princes who had applied for the protection of Prussia, and for being included in the line of demarcation, and he has formally told them all that Prussia can take no step of that nature, and has recommended to them to ask the protection of Austria; this measure confirms the final decision being taken here of adhering to their present system of neutrality. I have received a letter from *le Baron de Gross, ancien Colonel Suisse*, with a proposal for raising a *légion Helvétique* of 2,050 men in Switzerland and the Grisons. I do not send you his plan because he tells me that he had written to you himself. I know nothing of him, but he speaks of his project as having been approved by the Archduke Charles, and General Hotze."

*Postscript.* 6 p.m. "As I am going to seal my letter I stop to tell you that, in a short conversation with Haugwiz, he has just told me that, by letters arrived here from Vienna dated on the 2nd

instant, they still seem ignorant of the French declaration, nor has he yet heard of any movement of the Austrian army. He thinks Philipsbourg will fall; it is besieged by Bernadotte and is defended by Salm with 4,000 men, but the troops are of the Empire and not reckoned very good. The French are preparing a general attack along the Adige, in the Grisons, on the *Lac Constance*, and up to Ulm at the same time. The Duke of Wurttemberg sends a Minister here to-morrow, but I fancy he will obtain no protection—so much for Germany. There are unpleasant reports from Milan of the 22nd February describing an insurrection in Sicily, and the King obliged to leave Palermo; the Grand Duke is allowed to remain in Tuscany, paying a large fine immediately for that indulgence.

“The accounts from Constantinople speak of Sir Sidney as having sailed with an expedition against Alexandria, and describe great preparations making for the army to be sent to Egypt. They add a vague report of some French frigates in the Red Sea, but I cannot find there is any reason for believing this. From Petersburg Suwarow is described to have accepted the command in Italy with the greatest joy, and is set forth; they have carried Mack back to France. I say nothing to you of the unpleasant situation in which my most valuable colleague and fellow-labourer is placed, because his correspondence with Count Woronzow will give you a better account of it; his instructions, which are positive, direct him, in case of a doubtful answer from hence, to withdraw immediately from Berlin to the baths of Carlbadt and to wait there. If the defensive concert is not enough explained to justify his pausing upon this order, he is afraid he must comply with it in form by withdrawing from the business, though in substance he cannot, as his wife is too ill to move. I shall try as much as in conscience I can to advise him to have recourse to any expedient which may be possible by which this step could be avoided. It is a *mouvement d'humeur* in the Emperor which can do no good, and the absence of Panin cannot but do great mischief.”

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 11. Dublin.—“I enclose to you a letter, which I have written with more heartfelt happiness than I ever felt, in answer to a very few lines that I received from our brother dated the 7th, under cover from Fisher. They promise me further details; but indeed I have not the heart to hear more on so perilous and dreadful an escape. I am most grateful to Providence for the result, and only look now to the certainty of his not having suffered in health.

“I now wish not to lose a moment in consulting you upon his private affairs; he says shortly that he has not saved a single shirt, and that his private loss is above 700*l*. I have written to him to draw upon me for whatever he wants, but I wish (for I know he will not do it) to ask you whether I should not present

a memorial to the Treasury or somewhere else praying an allowance for equipage money to replace what is lost. In fact this will ultimately save my purse, which is, by various calls upon it, low enough, but which must replace to poor Tom his pacotille if Government will not. I do not know what precedents you have of wrecked ambassadors, but you well know that all army officers wrecked have their full losses replaced to them.

"Our judges are now all gone, under separate escorts of cavalry, to administer the blessings of civil law to counties all of which are disturbed, and in which no sheriff or magistrate dares to act except for the purpose of calling a mob meeting to oppose the union. The mischief done to private property by the new system (as ordered by the Directory here) of plunder and of destroying cattle is out of all calculation; none of the roads to Dublin are passable at any hour of the day save to large parties or military escorts; and this system is openly talked of as being more certain, and more destructive, than that of open force till their friends arrive, who are most impatiently looked for in the counties of Antrim, Galway, and Cork. I have no correspondent now likely to be informed, but everybody here tells me that the French fleet is 16 sail, and that they dropped into the outer road of Brest on the 1st of March. I should have doubted the number, and most certainly the seamen necessary for such a squadron.

"Opposition here are very much disconcerted by the defection which has left them in the lurch; the real secret of which is the conviction that Government is to be changed as soon as the Parliament is prorogued; and the disinclination to engage in opposition measures which, certainly, many of the new opponents personally dislike, and which they certainly see very contrary to their personal interests, *vis-a-vis* to a new Lord Lieutenant. In the meantime Lord Cornwallis has, for the benefit of his successor and of the Union, named for sheriff in Westmeath the most violent anti-Unionist, notwithstanding my representation of the fact, perhaps for that very reason, and has done the same in three other counties; in all of which he might, as in Westmeath, have named either of the other two on the roll, zealous Unionists."

*Postscript.* "George Nugent writes me word that, from the appearances in the county of Antrim, it is clear that they have been assured of the intention of a landing there.

"I open my letter to enclose to you one which I have just received from the Duke of York. I entreated six months ago, and again lately, that the regiment might be stationed at Chelmsford, that I might have the opportunity of passing one summer in my own house by living at Gosfield; and I pressed for leave for my regiment to halt 14 days in the county. Both are refused. I feel as I ought this return for all I have done, and all that I and my regiment have suffered. I do not know whether you can help me, but, when he is consulting the local case of others, I cannot but be sensible to this *mark* which is personal to me, because it can affect the convenience of no one but of me,

which it does to a degree that cannot be over-stated when I assure you that nothing but my affection to my regiment will prevent my resignation instantly. I shall, however, keep this letter an entire secret for the present from everyone, in hope that you may be able to assist me in changing this cursed Ashford for Chelmsford.

"Pray let me hear from you on this cursed subject as soon as you can."

*Enclosure.*

A letter from the Horse Guards, dated March 7, and signed Frederick, Field Marshall, Commander-in-Chief, informing the Marquis of Buckingham that Ashford Barracks had been allotted to the Militia regiment under his command.

#### THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 13. Dublin.—"I would not worry you to endeavour, through Mr. Dundas, to get this cursed arrangement made by the Duke of York, which sends my regiment to Ashford, changed, if it did not break in so essentially and so unhand-somely upon my individual and private comfort, to which I looked in my house at Gosfield; and I must say that I think it very wanton oppression to be sent where there is not a lodging or the means of living save in a barrack, and that at the distance of Ashford; when the barracks at Chelmsford, and even those, which are unhealthy, at Colchester, both within 12 miles of Gosfield, are actually vacated by the march of regiments to Ireland; particularly so as Mr. Dundas assured me (when I embarked) that he would urge the Duke to let me return to Chelmsford. I have not said one word to any creature breathing of this new arrangement, in hopes that you can assist me; and I know your kindness will exert itself whenever you can, without impropriety, contribute to my comfort and that of my family."

#### LORD GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, March 15. Cleveland Row.—"Although I am much pressed for time in sending off this messenger, I cannot omit troubling you with a few private lines to express to you the real concern I felt at the necessity of sending an official disapprobation of your conduct in the Austrian negotiation. I do this in order that you may not think that the answer which I gave to Count Woronzow's communication of the Emperor's offer to you of the order of Malta, was connected with that impression. It was, if I recollect right, anterior to it in point of date, and it originated in a sense of the many difficulties which belong to that subject, and which are daily increased by the Emperor's mode of acting with respect to it.

"I think it is very much the interest of this country to gratify the Emperor of Russia in his political views of obtaining an influence and footing in Malta; but some of the steps taken by him outrage both forms and principles so much, that the

concurrence of a regular and systematic government like this in such proceedings becomes very difficult. For this reason I have endeavoured, as far as could be done without offending the Emperor, to keep his Majesty's government unmixed in those transactions; and I declined Count Woronzow's proposal on the ground that the King disapproved of his ministers employed abroad accepting foreign orders." *Copy.*

COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 18. Harley Street.—“Pénétré de reconnaissance pour les marques d'amitié et de confiance que je reçois ici, je suis Anglais par sentiment individuel, et je le suis encore parceque je suis bon Russe, qui ainssi que tout bon Anglais doit être persuadé que l'alliance entre leurs patries est la plus raisonnable, la plus utile, et la plus permanente de toute autre. Ce sentiment qui est gravé dans mon ame, et l'amitié et la confiance dont vous m'y honorez, m'encourage à vous écrire à coeur ouvert pour vous développer quelque idées qui me sont venues à l'occasion d'une lettre que je viens de recevoir du Prince Castelcicala du neuf janvier de Palerme, dans laquelle il me dit : ‘Il a fallu quitter Naples pour sauver la famille royale. Le malheur est grand, mais il peut être réparé dans peu de tems, si les trois grandes Puissances viennent à notre secours efficacement et sans tarder ; si l'Autriche seveille ; si votre magnanime souverain fait pour nous tout ce qui sera dans son pouvoir pour nous assister ; et si le vertueux ministère de la plus généreuse des nations, au milieu de laquelle vous avez le bonheur de vivre, renforce le brave Nelson et nous assiste en argent. Les Sicilliens sont fidèles : les trois-quatre du royaume de Naples ne sont pas encore envahis : mais notre marine est détruite, notre armée est débandée. Nous sommes occupés à construire de vaisseaux, à fondre des canons, à nous pourvoir d'armes de toutes espèces, à lever des troupes pour les porter au plus tôt possible dans les provinces Napolitaines non envahies, à fin de les conserver, et pouvoir, de là, délivrer les autres : mais nos ressources sont déjà épuisées : les moyens nous manquent pour tant de dépenses, aussi extraordinaires qu'indispensables et urgentes. Si l'ennemi s'empare de tout le royaume de Naples, il trouvera des ressources immenses pour continuer la guerre en Italie, et trouvera aussi des bois de construction et du chanvre à pouvoir former dans peu une marine qu'il n'avoit plus dans la Méditerranée.’

“Ce passage de cette lettre que je viens de vous transcrire m'a fait faire des réflexions qui m'ont conduit à la persuasion que si le Roi des deux Sicilles ne reçoit pas de vous une prompt assistance en argent, le royaume de Naples est perdu. Quand le prince m'écrivoit il ne savoit pas encore la prévoyante sollicitude avec laquelle le ministère Britannique et l'amiral Lord Saint Vincent avoit déjà renforcé Nelson : il ignoroit aussi le secours que l'Empereur mon souverain envoyoit au sien ; ainssi la cour de Palerme doit être à présent tranquille sur ces deux points. Quand à l'Autriche je crains qu'il ne se passe bien

de tems avant qu'elle se mette en mouvement, et je crois qu'elle le tardera d'autant plus à présent qu'elle sait que, dès qu'elle aura lancé Souvorow, elle ne serat plus la maitresse de l'arêter ; car ce n'est pas un homme à se laisser conduire et diriger par des plans envoyés de Vienne, Si, en attendent, les Calabres se défendent, les Français qui ne ne sont qu'aux environs de Naples, seront obligés de courire vers la Lombardie, quand les Autrichieus y entreront, pour n'être pas pris entre deux feux, sans aucun moyen de retraite, ou d'appui de place forte comē ils en ont en Piédmont : mais s'ils parvienent à se rendre les maitres de ces provinces et du reste du royaume de Naples, rien ne pourra plus les y déloger. Ils auront le dos libre de ce coté, et tireront de ce pays tout ce qui leurs faut pour la continuation de la guerre.

“Jamais les Autrichieus n'irons les chercher au bout de la pointe de l'Italie, et ce seroit même une imprudence de le faire en laissent derière soi Mantoue et toutes les fortresses que l'ennemi a en Lombardie ; mais si par le secour pécunier que vous ferez parvenir immédiatement à Palerme, vous metez le Roi de Naples en état de s'armer et de secourir les Calabres, dont les habitans sont fidels à leurs souverains, et harasseront continuellement les Français qui sont autour de Naples, comē les Arabes harassent les Français aux environs du Cair, les Carmagnols n'ayant aucun renfort à espérer de la Lombardie, attaquée par Souvorow, iront vers le Po pour se réunire à leurs compatriotes, et dans ce cas inmanquable, c'est la grande Bretagne seule qui aura la gloire de rétablire le vertueux roi de Naples sur son trône.

“Si ce roi infortuné, faute de moyen, perd son principal royaume, les Français, maitres de toute la botte de l'Italie, le seront aussi dans peu de la Sicille ; les passages des Calabres dans l'isle où se trouve le roi est aussi court que facile, et il faut des milliers des vaisseaux pour l'en empêcher. Maitres de deux Sicilles ils deviendront dans peu d'anées les souverains de la Méditeranée et la proclameront, comē c'étoit déjà leur projet, *la Mer Française*. En attendent qu'ils aient des vaisseaux de guerre, ils auront des milliers de corsaires qui infesteront votre comerce du Lévant.

“Est il économique d'épargner dans un cas si grave et si extraordinaire 4 à 500 milles livres sterling, pour empêcher que l'ennemi n'en gagne 4 à 5 millions ? pour empêcher qu'il ne se donne des nouvelles ressources en tout genre, et pour empêcher que ses corssaires ne detruisent cette nouvelle mine de richesse que vous ofre à présent le comerce exclusif du Lévant et de la Méditeranée ?

“Il y a une autre considération majeure à ne pas négliger. Soyez perssuadez qu'une fois que les Français sont maitres de l'Italie, qui flaque l'Albanie, l'Epire, la Morée et l'entrée de l'Archipel, les Tures perdront courage, et l'Egypte une fois reprise pour eux, ils fairont la paix avec le Directoire ; car quelle espérance pourront-ils avoir dans leurs alliés quand ils les veront incapables de sauver le Roi de Naples.

“Peut-on craindre que le Parlement et la nation blament le ministère d’avoir fait cette dépense extraordinaire et indispensable, qu’il est généreux, sage, politique, et très utile de faire. Le Parlement et la nation vous blameront au contraire, et avec raison en vérité, de ne l’avoir pas fait, et vous reprocheront les suites funestes de cette économie mal-placée, et qui aurat des conséquences irréparables, et qui ternira la gloire d’un ministère et d’une nation qui font l’admiration de l’Europe.

“On ne peut pas se refuser à l’évidence que l’Italie est le centre de la vraie force et des ressources de la France, que celle-ci a eut le bon jugement de le comprendre d’abord. Elle l’a prouvé quand elle ne s’est pas soucie de l’Allemagne, et laissoit battre tout qu’on vouloit Jourdain et Morau [Moreau], pourvue qu’en Italie, cet important théâtre le la guerre pour elle, son armée fasse de progrès, et s’y établisse d’une manière à pouvoir, à la suite du tems, s’emparer du reste de cette plus belle partie de l’Europe.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 18. Berlin.—“The frequency as well as the length of my public letters leaves me very little to add to the two despatches which I am going to send to London, and which I am sorry to find again leave me without my having yet had a word from England. The situation of things becomes to the last degree critical, and it is peculiarly unlucky that the adverse winds should add so much to the long state of ignorance in which the frost had kept me, for there was never a moment in which communication with you was more important.

“You will naturally suppose that I feel in private a good deal more of the difficulties which I hint at in my public letter; on the one hand, though Prussia will not act, there is too much left of value for me to lose sight of, who think that Prussia tells so powerfully for Holland; while on the other hand, I scarce know how to flatter myself that even if our new device, of secret convention accompanying defensive concert, should succeed, it can be arranged in a pecuniary light so as to tally with the disposition which is made for continental charges. Panin has a notion that we might lend a sum to the king of Prussia for the enabling him to collect and put in motion a large body of troops, this loan to be repaid by him in instalments if the defensive concert alone should continue, but to be considered as discharged by him whenever his army marches into Amsterdam; if, however, their present fears of France continue, they will continue from the same wretched motive to think that, while they are marching to Amsterdam, General Jourdan will march into Berlin; and if they do not discharge their debt in the shape of Dutch conquest, I have not much more confidence in their punctuality here than we have found in our friends at Vienna. This name, too, recalls my second difficulty, which is that, for fear of Prussia slipping

through our propositions, we must go on to feed them with hope there ; and yet for both arrangements we cannot suffice, if both should at once agree to proposals of concert by which they always mean proposals of subsidy. I have however sent you my letter to Sir M. Eden, which I trust you will think may keep the thing alive there without pledging us too strongly, even in the case of their ratifying the celebrated convention. Upon the whole my favourite project is still that about which I have employed General Stamford, who is grown quite as partial to it as myself ; and if I was to follow my own inclinations only, I should press vigorously at Petersburg for their directing 50,000 men immediately to march *à la Stamford*, and, electrifying the German electors as they pass, to frighten or encourage them into active co-operation. Still too, in further assistance, I think a naval disembarkation of 20 or 30,000 Russians and Danes would so distract the rulers of the great nation, that they would find it easier to give up their Batavian Republic than to defend it under such a pressure, even with Prussia only looking on. The point I fear for in this project is that, if it does not soon take place, the Emperor may make again some wretched peace patched up with the old rags of Campo Formio, and sell them the Republic of Swabia for a yard and a half of Bavaria, or a little more of elbow-room towards Ravenna ; in truth, however, his battle must perhaps be fought now for his existence, and in this view likewise it is that if I could I would set this plan in military array before I went to sleep this night, whereas all that I can now hope is to bring it into discussion between those distant ends of the globe called London and Petersburg. I have not, however, been idle in this cause, for I have written, besides the letter which I enclose in the despatch, both to Sir M. Eden and Sir C. Whitworth to implore their activity in this very critical and important moment. I have likewise seen the Prince of Orange and Baron Lynden, and have conversed with them much upon the necessity of better intelligence than they now have respecting Flanders and those, whoever they are, who still lead in creating very powerful risings in that country. In Holland I have still recommended patience in waiting for the favourable moment ; but, whenever that moment comes, I think you will agree that in every point of view, both as to present hope and future arrangement, a correspondence and common interest should be established and ready for action, whereas in point of fact I find there is no man in Breda or Boisleduc who has the least notion of what is passing at Ghent or Antwerp. I hope, however, that this will now soon be mended, as one or two discreet persons are going to be sent there. Baron Lynden has an offer of a good correspondent at Amsterdam to give naval intelligence ; if you employ him he must have three hundred florins for three months ; pray tell Lord S[pencer], for I am too much tired to write any more."

*Postscript.* "Musquiz, the Spanish Minister, has just heard from Azara at Paris that the French Directory has officially and confidentially declared to him that the object of France is to



keep foreign interference of every kind out of Italy in order to consolidate the new republics there; that the Duke of Parma must therefore be provided for by Spain.

"Lehrbach is gone from Rastadt; Metternich is going. The French openly declare their intention of revolutionizing Suabia, and it is believed that they will direct their first attack against Venice and its territory."

THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 23. Dublin.—"I have only a few minutes left before the mail goes out to thank you most warmly for your kind attentions to my wishes, and Mr. Dundas for the trouble he has so obligingly taken. I happen to know that the Colchester barracks are promised to the Warwick regiment, so that I take it for granted that the Duke of York will have apprized you long before you receive this letter that he cannot place my regiment there. To say truth I conceive that he means to make me feel that he has the *power* of doing a very unpleasant thing to me; for I wrote to him on this very subject twice in the months of October and November last, long before the 'two months' since which he has thought it necessary to promise those very barracks for which I applied, to Lord Euston, who landed in Ireland three months after me, has never done one hour's duty, and is (if I am rightly informed) to leave it before me. And in my letters I stated expressly the *personal* convenience which I proposed to myself in this arrangement, as one very highly interesting to me. Such is the return I meet with; and I leave you to judge whether it does not justify me in my persuasion that this *act of power* is intended. I enclose a letter to Mr. Dundas, which I will thank you if you will send him, and I shall wait impatiently for the return of the post that will untie my tongue, and enable me to explain to my officers how my wishes and theirs have been received by His Royal Highness in return for having led the way on this *most thankless* duty, which every hour makes me regret the having undertaken."

*Postscript.* "Surely Mr. Dundas's hint of his having expected the militia to remain longer in *Ireland*, does not apply to *us*, who will have been ten months absent from England."

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 23. Berlin.—"I had not intended to have sent Dietry till the day after to-morrow, but I have myself felt so much pleasure in the account just received of Jourdan's retreat, that I pass over all diplomatic considerations, and send it to you as quick as it can go, depending upon the entire credit which Haugwitz gives to the official reports of which he has furnished an extract. I had doubtless proposed to have written to you in some detail for your own private consideration the many tempting and flattering prospects which belong to the little Holstein army that

Count Panin and I are trying to raise for the nominal defence of Hamburg; but these advantages are so obvious in the view of assisting the operations of the Russian army in middle Germany or Switzerland by diversion, that I believe you have nothing to regret in my time becoming too limited to admit of any such wearisome dissertations. I must not, however, forget to observe that if this project be adopted, it may perhaps be very much assisted by your applying to it some modifications of the matter which was treated of by Colonel Anstruther, and it may be likewise worth considering whether the payment of any expenses so incurred might not be ultimately thrown either upon Holland, in case of success, or indeed upon England, where the deliverance of Holland would be enough valued in the result to make the burthen of such a debt comparatively light. You see that I am following General Brune's example in looking towards the Dutch trousers for money. Baron Lynden told me to-day that the General has had an amicable private conference with the rich merchants of Amsterdam, in which he has recommended to them the immediate voluntary loan of twelve millions of florins (above a million sterling); he has intimated that the Great Nation will expect this loan in money or accepted bills, and that the Great Nation will have infinite regret in being obliged to take it instead of borrowing it, but that one way or another the money must be forthcoming without delay. In their fleet the desertion increases; it is ready, and Story has accepted the command; but Linden's correspondent, who has a command in it, tells him that he thinks it will not sail.

"Syéyès has announced to Haugwiz the declaration of French war with Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

"I have not ventured in my public letter to give you the intelligence which Count Dietrichstein gave me yesterday as just arrived from Vienna; he tells me as a *nouvelle qu'il sait estre sûre*, that a letter has been found from Buonaparte to the Marquis del Gallo, in which, not knowing of the war between France and Naples, he begs the Marquis to be his mediator at the Porte to obtain for him *la libre sortie d'Egypte*.

"Count Dietrichstein sent a courier yesterday to Vienna, and I suspect that it is in consequence of my having conveyed to him through Panin that it would be utterly impossible for me to converse with him upon any arrangement of concert unless I had the full previous assurance of unqualified ratification; and, as a proof of my sturdiness upon this subject, I declined talking with Panin for any of the modifications which he seemed to think were intended to be proposed to me, and assured him he could do no such good service upon that subject as by persuading Count Dietrichstein that it would be most for the honour as well as for the advantage of his Court to give the simple ratification at once, instead of waiting to have it demanded and insisted upon by the British Minister. I hope this will succeed.

"I send you enclosed a notice about a supposed project of two French spies embarking for England, and I likewise send the same to Crawford at Hamburg."

## COUNT WOROZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 24. London.—“Ne croyez vous pas qu'il soit nécessaire d'après le refus de la Prusse de se coaliser, d'envoyer un courrier à St. Petersbourg pour prendre d'autres arrangements, vue que la dernière convention signée par le Chevalier Whitworth ne sert plus de rien, puisqu'elle a été faite d'après la base supposée que la Cour de Berlin entrera en jeu.

“Je vous demande pardon, mais je ne puis en conscience ne pas revenir encore sur l'état actuel du Roi de Naples, qui sera obligé d'abandonner toute idée de conserver les trois-quarts de son principal royaume, faute de moyens d'armer les fidèles sujets qu'il conserve là jusqu'à présents. Qu'est-ce que c'est qu'un *amas* d'hommes sans fusils, sans gibernes, sans poudre et balles, et sans eppées et sabres? Qu'est-ce qu'est qu'une armée sans tentes, sans artillerie, sans chariots, et sans chevaux pour tirer les canons, les caissons, et les vivres? Or de tout ceci il n'y a que les hommes et leur bonne volonté; ce qui est beaucoup il est vrai, mais ce qui, manquant de tout le reste, n'est qu'un troupeau sans armes et sans défense, qui n'iroit que pour être égorgé sans pouvoir même venger sa mort. Or tout ce qui manque à ce Prince infortuné ne s'obtient que par l'argent, et c'est-ce qui lui manque le plus. Vous m'avez dit, et M. Pitt me l'a aussi répété, qu'il y a 2½ millions qui sont en reserve pour les subsides de l'année courante; permettez-moi d'entrer dans le calcul de ces dépenses:—

“Pour 45,000 Russes, destinés par supposition à servir avec les Prussiens, et qui probablement seront actuellement employés par vous à être avec les Autrichiens, les subsides pour ces troupes sont fixés par le dernier traite provisionel, par mois à - - -	75,000/.
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“Je suppose qu'après avoir procuré à l'Autriche ce surcroît de troupes outre ce qu'elle a déjà de troupes Russes auxilliaires en vertu de notre alliance avec elle, vous voudrez encore avoir un pareil nombre de quarante-cinq milles de Russes pour être employés en Suabe, et aller vers la Suisse. Cette dépense par mois sera pareillement de - - - - -	75,000/.
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“Vous avés idée de lever un corps de 20,000 Suisses dont la dépense par mois, calquée sur celle des Russes, est de - - - - -	31,000/.
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Total par mois - - -	181,000/.
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“et dans l'année, qui est de douze mois, et non de treize comme on la compte ici, dans le service Anglais, où le mois est composé de quatre semaines, le total de la dépense sera de - - - - -	2,172,000/.
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“Il restera donc de la somme de 2½ millions destinée pour les subsides - - - - -	328,000/.
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“Vous m'objecterez que j'oublie l'argent nécessaire pour mettre en mouvement ces troupes, ainsi que pour les dépenses extraordinaires, et que les 328,000/ suffiront à peine pour les couvrir, et vous aurez raison. Mais je vous prie de considérer d'un

autre coté qu'il y a déjà trois mois de passés de l'année courante, et que, vue la lenteur, la mauvaise foi, et les négociations entortillées de l'Autriche, vous serez deux mois avant que de pouvoir arranger vos affaires avec elle; que vous ne pouvez pas, à moins que vous ne vouliez jeter votre argent par la fenêtre, lui donner un *Penny* pour ses propres troupes, car elle ne les augmentera pas d'un seul homme, et mettera votre argent en poche, de sorte que vous ne pouvez l'aider qu'en lui procurant des troupes étrangères non corrompues, non intimidées par des défaites et des retirades continuelles, et que ces troupes, soit Russes, Saxones, ou Suisses, ne peuvent se mettre en train que d'après des arrangemens pris à Vienne, à Dresde et sur les confins de la Suisse, si tant est que les Autrichiens ne reculent pas d'avantage après la première défaite à Coire dans le pays des Grisons; et comme ces arrangemens ne peuvent même se faire que du consentement de la Cour de Vienne, par le territoire de la quelle les auxilliaires doivent marcher, et les Suisses être pourvus, ces arrangemens ne se feront pas si vite, et il se passera encore deux mois et plus avant que vous soyez arrangés avec le vertueux Thugut et compagnie; ce qui fait plus du tiers de l'année courante, et ce tiers de la somme destinée pour les subsides iroit à 833,000*l.* Quoique vous êtes généreux en votre particulier, j'ai observé que vous êtes bien avare des deniers publics. Ce qui est une vertu dans mille occasions, mais ce qui peut être dans plusieurs autres très dommageable pour le bien même du service public. Je sais que ni vous ni M. Pitt n'admettez pas la propriété de donner au Roi de Naples ce qui reste de non-employé dans le courant des premiers quatre mois de cette année, et que vous voudrez avoir au moins deux mois de dépense assurée pour l'année prochaine; mais en vérité vous devez, en toute et bonne politique, envoyer à Palerme 400,000*l.* pour dégager d'embaras le seul souverain qui a risqué son trône pour le bien de la bonne cause, et qui a été, lui-seul absolument, la vraie cause du renouvellement des hostilités entre la France et l'Autriche. Parceque celle-ci a été tellement menacée par la Russie d'être abandonnée par elle, et de la propension qu'avoit mon Empereur de se lier avec la Prusse si la Cour de Vienne ne va pas au secours du Roi de Naples, que Thugut, ne pouvant plus continuer ses négociations secrettes avec le Directoire, celui-ci a rompu et a pris les armes. Sauvez, pour l'amour de Dieu, l'infortuné roi de Naples, et vous avancerez vos propres affaires, mais vous ne pourrez le sauver qu'avec 400,000*l.* au moins. Tout ce qui sera donné à ce prince infortuné sera employé au détriment visible de la France. Il aura les moyens de conserver les Calabres, de chasser les Français du reste de son royaume. Dès que la guerre, rallumée en Lombardie, ne leur permettra plus de recevoir des renforts de leurs compatriotes, ils ne pourront plus piller le royaume, et en s'enrichissant, avoir des nouveaux moyens pour la guerre. Ils seront surtout privés des grands moyens à remettre leurs marins dans la Méditerranée, et ne pourront pas faire la guerre de course et en corsaires, qui auroient porté un coup mortel à votre commerce, car l'escadre de

Nelson n'auroit pas été en état de l'empêcher, comme vos nombreuses flottes dans le canal et la Baie de Biscay n'empêchent pas que les corsaires sortent des ports de la France, et ne fassent continuellement des prises. Vous maintiendrez aussi, par là, les Turcs dans leur guerre contre la France, car si le royaume de Naples est conquis, ils seront forcés à faire la paix. Ce que vous voulez donner au roi est, en vérité, insuffisant. Cet argent ne le sauvera pas ; mais en proportionnant le secours à la grandeur du besoin, vous faites l'emploi le plus utile et le plus politique que vous puissiez jamais faire. Enfin, pour dernier argument, je suppose déjà fait ce qui malheureusement ne manquera pas d'arriver, que le Roi de Naples, faute de moyens, ne pourra pas armer assez de monde pour conserver les Calabres, et perdra son principal royaume d'où les Français menaceront la Sicile en amassant, en attendant, tout ce que le pillage leur procure pour se maintenir en Italie ; et infestant la Méditerranée et l'Archipel par leur corsaires, ruineront votre commerce, et souleveront les îles Grecques appartenantes aux Turcs. Si dans cet état des choses quelqu'un vous présente le plan de chasser les Français du royaume de Naples avec une armée de 60,000 hommes, en vous demandant un demi-million pour opérer cette diversion aussi heureuse qu'inattendue, auriez-vous quelque raison plausible pour refuser ce plan ?—Ne l'embrasseriez-vous pas avec reconnaissance ? C'est précisément ce que le Roi de Naples offre, et peut faire, lui seul, et aussi vite que vous serez prompts à le secourir et à vous secourir vous-mêmes ; car sa cause est plus intimement liée avec vous que ne l'est la cause de l'Autriche. Souvenez-vous, je vous supplie, que les deux Siciles sont dans la Méditerranée, et dominent l'Archipel, et que dans ces mêmes mers vous avez un ennemi, qui est l'Espagne, qui deviendra encore plus servilement dépendante de la France quand le royaume de Naples sera perdu ; et que vous avez pour amis les Turcs qui ont excité les Barbaresques contre le Directoire, et que ces amis et leurs adhérents se sépareront de ceux qui n'ont pas pu soutenir l'Italie méridionale, et finiront par s'accomoder avec la terrible République contre laquelle rien ne résiste, et contre laquelle les Puissances les plus formidables n'ont pas les moyens de secourir leurs alliés. Dieu veuille que mon sort ne soit pas celui de Cassandre, qui voyoit les malheurs à venir, les prévisoit, et n'étoit jamais crue.

“Je désire que mon idée soit fautive par l'événement, mais en attendant, je suis intimement persuadé que le point le plus important du théâtre de la guerre dans le moment où nous sommes, n'est ni sur le Rhin, ni sur le Danube, mais dans la partie méridionale de l'Italie.”

SPENCER SMITH to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 25. Constantinople.—“In addition to the public packets I have entrusted to the gentleman who will have the

honour to deliver this letter to your Lordship, and to his companion, I embrace such a good opportunity to convey the letters for you from my brother, expressly recommended not to proceed by the common courier, the precariousness of which is a constant source of annoyance and inconvenience; and at the same time I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's care a letter annexed for Lord Spencer.

"And I am moreover glad of an occasion, at the present moment of distress and embarrassment, to recommend myself rather more particularly to your Lordship's benevolent remembrance than would be proper on a mere official ground.

"When Mr. Liston made over the charge of the affairs here to me in the year 1795, he gave me to understand that I should naturally receive the full and usual allowances of that rank from his Majesty, in addition to the consular appointments of the Levant Company, about 1,000*l.* a year, a bare compensation for the heavy load of their local business here, and the judicial duties attached to this situation, as well as for the occupancy of a set of extensive premises at a rent of near 300*l.* a year, and the maintenance of a large household, augmented by the board and lodging of their Worships' chaplain and chancellor. My expectation of the full allowances was confirmed too by Mr. Liston from London, as I conceived, in your Lordship's name, as well as by Mr. Sidney Smith in explicit terms from the mouth of Mr. Aust; and the same idea encouraged by the expressions of my agents in the Office. So that, considering myself as having an income of 600*l.* a year accumulating in England, the arrears of which would meet the heavy debt incurred by my outset in such an expensive line of housekeeping, I devoted the whole of the Levant Company's pay to the keeping up of the establishment of the British palace, upon the necessary scale, for the credit of the nation; and even for the unavoidable contingencies of the post in a country where the *corps diplomatique* live constantly and almost alternately with each other; in a country where the Ministers are governors of their respective national colonies as well as representatives of their Courts; in a country where there are no inns for travellers, and where the frequency of the plague necessitates a double home in town and country, and where the situation and the nature of the communications and mode of transacting business require a double equipage by land and water. Thus, then, I went on till I received last summer your Lordship's explanation of the real footing I stood upon, and even that my appointment as Secretary of Legation only dated from the April preceding; whereby I found that I had been spending exactly double my income in a position that admitted of no retrenchment, as in other countries where a person is master of their society, their amusements, and even of the rank they chose to occupy; and received at the same time an increase of character, which together with my marriage (concluded under the former impressions) rendered domestic reform still more impracticable. I was therefore obliged to begin to devote a considerable part of my wife's little fortune to

rub off the debt of my early equipments, settle long-standing accounts with my predecessor, and repay some advances made to me by friends here upon the spot; while the remainder of that fund devoted to the unavoidable expenses of removing the Mission from the old to the new palace, where I was hardly warm; (and still a little further involved by the pleasing duties of hospitality I had to exercise towards the ships of war of a size unseen here, during several weeks that my brother was here with the *Le Tigre* and *La bonne Citoyenne*; which furnished near seventy pretty constant guests in succession at bed and board), when I suffered the ruinous blow of the fire which consumed everything almost but my debts. At a time, therefore, that I have to begin entirely anew, under circumstances of such peculiar difficulty, and under circumstances of a public nature almost unprecedented at this Mission, I presume to hope your Lordship will stretch forth a hand to extricate me by approving my transfer of the palace rent, since the absence of an ambassador, to my contingent accounts, and by such a further grant upon any footing that the rules of government may admit, to defray my purchase of the furniture which the Prussian envoy, M. de Knobelsdorff, will make over to me in his house, which I have been so fortunate as to succeed him in at the easier rent of 1,600 piasters, or about 120*l.* sterling a year; he being upon the point of removal into the Dutch palace hitherto inhabited by his father-in-law, M. Dedem. I will not impeach your Lordship's humanity and gentlemanly feelings by dwelling longer upon these sort of details than barely to state the position of 1,000*l.* a year being inadequate to keep a sort of open table, support a family of near fifteen persons, besides comers and goers, with two official inmates quartered upon me, house rent for a dwelling fit for a public character, at, if anything, a more expensive rate than in London, and a country house and establishment upon rather a less scale. I assure your Lordship that, so far from being actuated by any money-making spirit at a post that has a far better reputation in that way, I can assure you, than it has ever deserved since I have known it, I make this appeal to your Lordship's indulgent patronage with clean hands, after devoting my all to keep up becoming appearances, simply that seven years' exile in discomfort and danger, in an unfavourable climate, and with an increase of labour unknown in this mission, may not terminate in penury and humiliation from the want of due knowledge alone perhaps in my superiors to guide the exercise of their bounty; which needful information I thus take the liberty of presenting to your Lordship in full confidence that you will be good enough to do for the best, and excuse a mode of application unavoidable in the haste with which I am obliged to throw my thoughts on paper.

"I am glad to take leave of all this egotism to mention to your Lordship's private ear that Mr. Reinaud, the bearer of this, is an agent of Mr. Manesty, the East India Company's very respectable and indefatigable resident at Basora. Mr. Manesty seems to feel himself hurt by the abrupt mission of a gentleman to Baghdad

Mr. Harford Jones, whose residence clashes a little with the jurisdiction attached to his post. While I must say, on the other hand, that Mr. Jones's appointment has equal need of being more distinctly defined to me or my successors here than by the simple recommendation he produced to me from your Lordship. It is for the Levant and East India Companies to settle where their respective charters are bounded; but it is for his Majesty's Minister at the seat of government to represent the tendency of any measure that leads to the formation of *imperium in imperio*; such for instance as the Chairman of the East India Company's credentials to a provincial governor of the Ottoman emperor, as well as to understand the precise relation between this Mission (hitherto the source of all consular appointments) and a new independent agency, whose conduct it is, nevertheless, and must be by the capitulations, responsible for to the sovereign. Mr. Jones, to ensure himself credit as a confidential agent, would have done well to present himself to the Pasha of Baghdaad with the usual and known patent under the broad Seal of this legation; or, if he aimed at the immunities of a public character, to have brought me instructions to sue out for him from the Porte the accustomed consular *beraat* or imperial diploma for his recognition by all Ottoman magistrates. I am glad of this unaffected opportunity to submit these reflections with the frankness the present form admits of, and before anything shall have happened between the gentleman in question and myself, which his captious reputation renders possible, and which might render such remarks more *ad hominem* than *ad rem*. For Mr. Reinaud has laid a complaint before me of Mr. Jones's excessive rigour in his police over his countrymen, that I have smothered *officially*, but think it right to make your Lordship timely and directly acquainted with in this way, by means of the annexed copies of his letter to me and correspondence with Mr. Jones when passing through Baghdaad, where he had the misfortune to excite Mr. Jones's jealousy to a high degree. But all these East India gentlemen are excessively punctilious and sensitive towards each other, so that a trifle creates misunderstanding. However Mr. Reinaud was in fact charged at his departure by the Pasha, in secret as it should seem, with two dispatches for the Board of Control and the Directory, which he voluntarily delivered up to me to be forwarded in a more regular channel. I therefore refer him to your Lordship for the disposal of these packets, which I have opened on account of the quarantine, to which their silk covering would be liable. Your Lordship will find enclosed a letter of Lord Nelson's, and at the same time I communicate some letters of Mr. Forest's, received since my last, prepared to accompany my despatches, but, which certain passages that cannot fail to strike your Lordship, equally determined on second thoughts to submit to your perusal confidentially instead of publicly. I must confess that my observations here coincide but too much with such opinions, but I have never thought the subject mature enough for ostensible correspondence."



## COUNT WORONZOW TO LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 27. London.—“Je n’ai reçu votre lettre qu’à huit heures au soir hier, et pour ne pas retenir le courier, je n’ai écrit qu’une lettre très courte au Prince Bezborotka pour le prévenir du sujet de cette expédition. Je ne doute nullement qu’on n’en soit bien aise chez nous, où on est si zélé pour le salut de l’Europe, et si impatient de voir nos troupes agir et combattre contre les scélérats qui la désolent et la désorganisent. Il y a tout lieu de croire que Massena a été bien frotté par Hotz. Quand vous arriverez à Londres, je vous prie de me donner un quart d’heure.”

## THOMAS GRENVILLE TO LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 27. Berlin.—“I am afraid that you will not feel much obliged to me for my despatches of to-day, which certainly do not offer a very pleasant picture or promising prospect of our negotiation. The state of things is worse than it was in my former despatches, because Sir Morton Eden’s letter, and Count Dietrichstein’s conduct here, appear to me to confirm beyond all doubt the suspicions which I have described, and render the concert with Vienna impracticable in the moment at which all arrangement with Berlin seems to grow more and more difficult. I own that I much regret that Count Dietrichstein has been so much informed of the bad state of our negotiation here, though I must not be understood as throwing any blame on Count Panin, whose situation on many accounts left him no option upon this subject. You will easily understand this if you recollect that Rozamowski [who] had been recalled from Vienna for not co-operating more actively in the common cause, was suddenly replaced there at the Palatine’s request, was decorated with the *cordon bleu* and rewarded with a magnificent diamond star; proof enough that the Austrian influence was very powerful at Petersburg, and that it could not be safe for Count Panin to refuse himself to the confidential intercourse which was established between the two courts. I have enclosed in my despatch Sir M. Eden’s letter, which has much the advantage of mine in point of conciseness, as he dismisses with one line a business upon which I have already written to him more, I believe, than one hundred. My answer I thought necessary to annex to the despatch, because, as we in some degree partners in this business, I wish to have it known how little I desire to be included either in such feeble representations or in the reasoning which he puts forward, pretty nearly in the same tone with that in which Thugut himself would have written. I presume, however, that you have fuller information on this point than I have, but till I know that you are better satisfied than I am to leave this subject in this lax, slovenly manner, I shall continue to write my daily philippics, and make the dose stronger and stronger until in some way or other it does its business. Certainly it is impossible for Dietrichstien to conceal the security

which he feels that Austria, without any special convention with England new or old, will have the benefit of all the Russian troops which England may pay; that benefit too must be had even if my project should succeed of the Russian force of 50,000 men marching *à la Stamford* through the heart of Germany, for even in that case the Austrian right flank will be so protected that they will be able to withdraw Staray's corps of 20,000 men, and apply them either to Swisserland or Italy; yet such is my hope of this plan, that I confess I still feel partial to it, and see no very great difference as to its success, from our not having an Austrian convention; though doubtless there is much difference, which tells on other objects, from want of common concert with them. The great difficulty which I apprehend you will feel as to the plan which I sent to you is that such a march does not seem to acquit you as with respect to Switzerland; yet, in truth, it must not be forgot that your engagements there depended always upon concert with Austria, and that, in fact, to enable Austria to detach troops there by strengthening the right of their line, is as serviceable to Swisserland as a smaller force more peculiarly appropriated to that duty could be; nor does it seem to me to be out of the question that you might apply a smaller sum of money to the support of Swisserland than that which you would have given to it in Austrian concert; and you will then have, in reserve for the enterprise in Holland, a large remainder of the whole sum which you had destined to continental operations. You see I am still supposing that no pecuniary stipulations take place either with Prussia or Austria, and I own I am disposed to think that, with the little ground of confidence which they offer, it may be more expedient to apply those sums to purposes perhaps more advantageous, and certainly more popular with the good people of the good country that you are living in. As to the politics of Berlin, there is still a question about the sincerity of Haugwiz; but it is a question not very interesting to me to follow, for whether his wishes are honest and his influence weak, or his language false and his influence powerful, the result is the same; and beyond the general conciliation of his manners and conversation, I do not perceive any advantage from the favourable opinions which he sometimes expresses, and for which there are some who give him complete credit. The only one favourable circumstance which has lately appeared is that a contract is just signed here for five hundred horses for the *artillerie légère*, which are to be ready in three weeks, and General Stamford considers this as no small indication of its being in contemplation to take measures of hostility; it appears to me, however, more like a measure of precaution than activity. I cannot find time to write to you of the correspondence at Hamburgh and Petersburg in any shape so easy as by sending you copies of what I write there. I believe it would be more correct to send them officially, but I do not see that they can be of any use at the Office; if you think they can, it is very easy to leave them there as if they had been sent there. I send you likewise the letters from Eden and Thugut respecting Dietrichstein.

"It is to the last degree surprising that no official confirmation is yet arrived of the news which I sent by my last, although many corroborating circumstances daily arrive. Hotze is believed to be in force in the *petits cantons*, which seems to me to account for Jourdan's retreat in order to defend Swisserland, and I presume that Jourdan's retreat accounts for the panic of Strasburg and Kehl. The Archduke has shot five officers of Hulans who behaved ill with Hotze, and has sent one in irons to Vienna, said to be the commandant *des manteaux rouges*. The last news from the frontiers of Swisserland say that there is not a Frenchman between Schaffhausen and Lindau or the *lac de Constance*. I enclose to you Talbot's last letter from headquarters, by which it is evident that nothing so material was known on the 16th at headquarters; but I am still persuaded, and so is all Berlin, that Jourdan has retreated. A strong report prevails that Syéès has received an account of bad news from Paris which is believed to be an insurrection there, but I know nothing of this with any certainty."

LORD GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, March 30. Dropmore.—"Although I trust the idea will of itself occur to the Emperor of Russia, yet it may be worth while to suggest to you that nothing could be more gratifying to the public here than that, on the occasion of the capture of Corfu of which we have just received the account, the two Imperial Courts, I mean Russia and the Porte, should request His Majesty's acceptance of it, as a testimony due to the conquerors at Aboukir, and to the gallant defence of the *Leander* itself."

HENRY DUNDAS to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, March 31. Downing Street.—"I have received the proposal relative to Surinam. I have long wished for the possession of it for the reasons mentioned by Sir J. Craufurd, and I was doubtful at the time if it should not be preferred to Trinidad; but, upon the whole, I was satisfied that the latter ought upon the same principles to be preferred; and since that time you are aware that our want of troops, and at one time our want of finances, checked all my ideas of any further offensive operations in that quarter of the world. If we can get Surinam without a great expenditure of men or money it is highly desirable. I suppose you will be in town on Wednesday."

COUNT WORONZOW to LORD GRENVILLE.

[1799, March. Harley Street.]—"On m'écrit de chez moi du 9 février, que la Cour de Vienne nous a demandé le Maréchal Souvaroff pour le commandement de son armée en Italie, que l'Empereur a fait chercher ce guerrier vétéran, qui a accepté. Cela comence à me faire croire que l'Autriche comence à aller de bon coeur.

"Le Grand Duc Constantin, second fils de l'Empereur, vat servir dans les armées comē volontaire.

“La nomination de Souvarow pour commander l'armée Autrichienne me ravi. C'est un homme incorruptible, d'un courage personnel à tout épreuve, ayant des grands talents militaires, et a pour principe constant, d'attaquer toujours l'ennemi.”

GEORGE CANNING to LORD GRENVILLE.

1799, April 1. Downing Street.—“It was with the view of getting the Secret Service Accounts in order that I called upon Duthiel for his statement. I will take care to have them in readiness to be passed immediately upon Talbot's arrival.

“I have just now put Frere into possession. I cannot close my last box to you without again expressing my hopes that no change of situation can alter or impair the kindness and friendship which you have shewn towards me; and again assuring you that you will always find me (pray do not think them words, of course) most faithfully and affectionately yours.”

THOMAS GRENVILLE to LORD GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, April 3. Berlin.—“If the time permitted, or the subject called for it, I might say much to you upon that explanation of their defensive concert here, which, after all the fine promises of Count Haugwiz, is reduced to a most impudent demand upon us to pay an extravagant price for what we think of little value, so that, in complying with it, we should fare like the Irishman in the Jubilee, who got nothing for supper and was obliged to pay double for it. Count Haugwiz has, however, penetration enough to see how little I am the dupe of all his familiar protestations, which, whether they are sincere or no, it is scarcely worth while to examine, while it is evident that they in no respect influence his conduct, or affect the course of the business which he appears to control. To persuade me, however, of his sincerity, he detaches De Luc with long narratives of most virtuous conversations, the results of which it is supposed must lead the British Government to give its money to the Prussian line of demarcation, and require no better security for warlike operations than the magnanimous whispers of Haugwiz as recorded by De Luc. With the candour and impartiality, however, of the most faithful of historians, I furnish to you most willingly all that may be matter of evidence on this point, and have had the generous attention to your eyes to send you Mr. Fisher's enlarged copy of the diminutive handwriting, which I have heard you so often speak of with despair; they are the confidential notes of three confidential dialogues between Haugwiz and De Luc; surely plain truth is more easily spoken and may be more concisely rendered either into English or into French. Another manuscript which I enclose to you is of a much more manly and decided character; it is a *letter from General Stamford* to the Duke of Brunswick, and is written under the impression that it may be possible for him to be more influenced by his Austrian prejudices than by plain and direct

good sense. If his character is weak enough to be so worked upon, the letter is ably written in that sense, but among my sanguine hopes that of the Duke of Brunswick's exertions is not in the first rank. In that first rank stands first the project of Russian armies traversing Germany to the Rhine and aided by the diversion of the arms of Russia, Denmark and England in an attack on Holland. Judge only with all my partiality to this project, and all the pains which I have taken to recommend it to Petersburg that it might there ripen into action, judge of my delight in reading by Sir C. Whitworth's of the 19th ultimo that this very project had already been discussed, was eagerly adopted by the Emperor, and waited only for my *evil reports* from Berlin to hurry on to England in the shape of a *projet*. I trust that long before this time my reports to Sir Charles have been evil enough to have decided on the departure of that *projet* from Petersburg to London, but lest any doubt should yet remain I have again written to Sir Charles, and I enclose to you a *copy of my letter* to him. In the middle, however, of my Russian joy arrived this evening the letter from Sir Morton Eden which I have enclosed in my despatch, and I do assure you that it required as much patience as I could muster to find that, though I have wearied my pen with incessantly writing to him upon the same subject, I never can obtain the smallest approach to the business on which I write; and instead of any answer to my letter, I am put off with the second edition of M. de Thugut's lamentations over the tergiversations of the Court of Berlin. I really am so much at a loss what to turn to in this stage of the business, that I must beg from you some suggestions of what you wish upon it. In my correspondence with him, which I have always sent to you, you will see that I have managed the dignity of the resident minister there with all the respect which I could shew him; but, if he does not mind his business, and will not stir out of the coat-pocket of Thugut, I must tell him my mind upon the subject, and must liberate myself from the disgrace of so discreditable a partnership. I had scarcely finished reading his letter this evening, when Count Dietrichstein came into my room and gave me to read a letter which he had received by the same courier from Thugut full of complaints of the Court of Berlin; imagine only what was my indignant surprise when I found that one complete page of Thugut's letter to Dietrichstein was translated into English, and made into one side of Eden's letter to me; I mean the part which questions the efficacy of any motives to persuade the government of Prussia to go to war. The circumstance of these Vienna dispatches being, not like the former, under flying seal would make me imagine that he was grown angry as well as stupid, if my attention to that quarter was not entirely occupied by the shabby cunning of the Austrian Government, and the abject servility which Sir Morton exhibits there; for I am entirely persuaded that, with only common firmness and discretion, we had completely in our hands the management of the ministers there, who would have done whatever we pleased to have prevented Prussia from benefiting by us, though they would do nothing, not even what

they promised to do, for their own benefit; but instead of supporting me in my remonstrances there, and strengthening them by the fear of what might be concluding here, he writes and acts in the business precisely in the words only which Thugut dictates to him. In short I am so completely out of humour with my Vienna correspondent that I know not how to write to him with any hope of advantage, and I will bring my mind back to a better train by thinking more entirely on the Russian march and on the magnanimous Paul. I find from Panin that, if Woronzow goes to Petersburg, his wish will be either to go there and work with him, or to succeed to him in the mission to England. I ought to wish him too well to wish him so desolate a state as that of a foreign minister in London, but charity begins at home, and Russian politics are too important to us now not to make it a most essential point to have such a man as Panin in England, and there are few such, very few such, to be found, I believe, in all the extent of that great empire. You will be tired of my joys, and of my sorrows, and of my opinions, and of my pen and ink; of the last I am myself tired."

*Enclosure 1.*

SIR MORTON EDEN to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, March 11. Vienna.—"My official despatch of this day, which I request of you to forward by your first messenger, will fully explain to you the object of Count Dietrechstein's mission.

"You will, I am sure, approve of the measure and do everything in your power to further its success, of which your letter of the 2nd instant, in which you seem to think that some such measure as that now adopted might prove effectual, holds up the fairest prospect. I need not tell you what pleasure the contents of that letter gave me. It may be essential to add that Count Dietrechstein was employed at Petersburg during the absence of Count Cobenzl, that he is on a very confidential footing with Baron Thugut, and that he has been uniformly steady and hearty in the good cause."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 2.*

BARON DE THUGUT to THOMAS GRENVILLE.

*Private.*

1799, Mars 11. Vienne.—"M. le Comte de Dietrechstein se rendant à Berlin d'ordre de Sa Majesté, je saisis cette occasion pour me rappeler à votre souvenir, et pour vous renouveler l'assurance des sentimens invariables que je vous ai voués dès le tems que nous avons eû le bonheur de vous posséder à Vienne. M. le Comte de Dietrechstein est chargé des explications les plus propres à faire disparaître une bonne fois les doutes si fastidieusement affectés par la Prusse à l'égard de nos dispositions

envers la France, et pour provoquer ainsi le Cabinet de Potsdam à une déclaration franche et positive de ses propres sentimens et faire cesser enfin une incertitude qu'a déjà fait tant de tort à la cause commune.

“Je vous prie d'aider M. de Dietrechstien de vos conseils pendant son séjour à Berlin, et de l'honorer de votre confiance. J'ose vous répondre du soin qu'il mettra à la mériter.

“Croyez-moi, je vous en supplie, que malgré tous les bruits, artificieusement répandus par la malviellance, nous n'avons jamais varié *un seul instant* ni dans nos anciens sentimens pour la Grande-Bretagne, ni dans notre manière d'envisager l'état des affaires en Europe; et il me seroit bien douloureux d'imaginer qu'on eût jamis pû nous soupçonner à Londres de la moindre vacillation dans nos principes, ou d'un refroidissement de notre ancien zèle.”

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 3.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO SIR JAMES CRAUFURD.

1799, March 21. Berlin.—“A courier from Petersburg is arrived here this morning with despatches to Count Panin, and with despatches likewise, which I shall forward to Lord Grenville, from Sir Charles Whitworth.

“They relate entirely to the subject of your last letter, and I therefore lose no time in writing to you by a courier sent from Count Panin to the Russian Minister at Hamburgh.

“The Emperor of Russia, apprised of the danger which menaces that city, and sensible of the importance which is attached to its preservation, proposes to concert with the King of Prussia and with his Majesty for the most effectual means of securing that city from the rapine and violence with which it is threatened; for this purpose his Imperial Majesty offers to send by sea a body of five thousand troops (in addition to those already agreed for) as soon as the season will permit, to co-operate with such Prussian troops as his Prussian Majesty may destine for this service, and his Imperial Majesty has already taken steps for inducing the Court of Denmark to accede to this measure.

“I have already begun in concert with Count Panin to urge the court of Berlin in this business, which is in many points of view likely to become of very great and extensive importance, and as such I cannot but recommend it to your very serious consideration.

“In the first place the mere circumstance of providing for the defence of the city of Hamburgh, without singly depending upon the determination of Prussia, is in itself a very considerable object; added likewise to that is the chance that a decided measure of this description may either at first, or ultimately, produce a more direct conduct in the Prussian Cabinet, as with respect to France, than could so well be obtained by any other

means ; and it will easily occur to you that the assembling a force, though only in preparation, near the Elbe may tell with infinite advantage to more than one object.

“A good deal of management and discretion will however, I presume, be found necessary to the success of this very important object. In the first place Prussia will be jealous of it from an apprehension of its being likely to involve them in difficulties with France, although there is certainly no pretence in point of justice under which the French could complain that, while they are preparing to attack Hamburgh, the Northern Powers should be preparing to defend it. It is likely, however, that the ministers here may endeavour to put by this proposition, by obtaining from the city of Hamburgh some declaration of its being satisfied with Prussian defence only ; against this therefore it may be useful in some way to provide, by shewing to the most influencing persons how much better the independence of the city of Hamburgh will be secured by its becoming the object of attention to all the Northern Powers, instead of depending solely and absolutely upon Prussia only. It may likewise be a matter of consideration to the same persons whether their security will not be better provided for by a mixed garrison (if there be any) than by a garrison entirely Prussian. In no part, however, of this business is there more importance, as to the success of it, than in the secrecy with which all discussion relative to it must be carried on ; for it is obvious that if the French become apprised of this plan they may thwart it by an early and sudden attack, or may alarm the Court of Berlin by demonstrations of hostility, before measures of defence are taken. Great caution and secrecy is therefore obviously necessary ; but as Count Panin is writing confidentially to the Russian Minister at Hamburgh on the same subject, perhaps you will think it useful to communicate with him in this very interesting business.

“Any circumstance which may contribute to place a corps of ten or of fifteen thousand men so as to bear on the Elbe and the neighbouring country, seems to offer advantages of the greatest importance to the interest of the allied courts ; and, in this view, I am inclined to think the alarm which prevails at Hamburgh of attack from Holland may ultimately produce the most beneficial consequences.

“You will therefore, I am sure, forgive both the pressing manner in which I recommend it to your care, and the remarks which I have had to make upon the secrecy with which it must be conducted in order to ensure its success.

“They certainly will not venture here openly to oppose a proposition in which all the Northern Powers have so evident and so pressing an interest ; but it is probable that they will take every circuitous step in their power to prevent their being placed in a situation which may soon become more decisive than belongs to the irresolute system which they have hitherto adopted.

“Every reasoning and thinking man in Hamburgh might easily see the advantage of placing the security of their own independence



rather in the hands of all the Northern Powers than in those of Prussia. But the difficulty will be to have the benefit of this reasoning without the inconvenience of that publicity which might disappoint our object.

"I have not time to add more, nor indeed can it be necessary that I should, although the magnitude of the business in question would not allow me to say less.

"We have no fresh accounts of the armies; letters from Vienna mention that the Archduke Ferdinand had just been informed that the French have been obliged to evacuate Naples and retire to Capua; and I am informed from good authority that a letter is found from Buonaparte to the Marquis del Gallo, in which, not knowing of the war with Naples, he desires the mediation of the Marquis del Gallo with the Porte to allow him *libre sortie de l'Egypte*."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 4.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE TO SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, March 23. Berlin.—"I received on the 21st instant your obliging letter of the 10th instant, together with your despatch to Lord Grenville, which I have forwarded to London by a messenger this evening.

"I am sorry that a great pressure of business, and the very short notice which there was of the present opportunity of writing to Petersburg, does not allow me more than a few lines upon the interesting subject of your last despatch.

"In every possible point of view it appears to me to be of the highest importance that the measure of sending Russian troops to co-operate with Danish and British force should be steadily pursued by the Northern Courts for their own security, whatever may be the decision of the Court of Berlin respecting it; nor does it seem in any degree desirable that the independence of the city of Hamburg, which is a common interest, should depend solely upon the protection of Prussia, or rest its security entirely on the Prussian army if any additional or other means can be supplied to strengthen its defence; nor should it indeed be forgotten that the protection of the Prussian line of demarcation did not secure the city of Hamburg from the insult of a forced loan, urged by the menaces of France within the boundary of the line of neutrality.

"If therefore by co-operation with Denmark, any such force as that destined by the Emperor could be brought to be assembled in the Duchy of Holstein, it might either there or in the Elbe become a sufficient and solid protection against the danger which threatens the city of Hamburg; nor is there any pretence for regarding such a measure as any trespass on the system of neutrality, the force in question being assembled to act upon the defensive against the attack which is so openly announced in the preparations which are carried on.

"Count Dietrichstein, the Austrian Minister, is arrived here. He seems both more desirous and more confident of co-operation with the allied Courts of London and Petersburg than with that of Berlin; and certainly you will have already seen that my instructions very much accord with those views, and that I am of nothing more desirous than to see the military force of Russia, in concert with Great Britain, giving to the German Empire that effectual assistance which is so slow in its appearance at Berlin.

"Hitherto, however, no communication of real advantage can have taken place between Count Dietrichstein and myself, nor indeed can there be any such until the great obstacle of the convention be removed by the simple, unqualified, ratification of the Court of Austria.

"That this step may be taken I will hope, and I trust that I have reason to think I may not be disappointed in that hope.

"When that is done I shall feel as anxious as they can feel at Vienna to see the force of the allied Courts directed to the support of Austria, by marching immediately to act in middle Germany or Swisserland, as may be found most useful.

"The news which I have desired Mr. Garlike to enclose to you is indeed of the most important description, and I trust will soon be described in more accurate detail.

"I enclose to you another copy for fear that he should have forgotten it.

"Allow me likewise to avail myself of this opportunity of sending to you a short paper written by that very able and active officer General Stamford, who has at my request thrown together in a few lines the general idea of such co-operation on the part of the Emperor of Russia as seems to promise well to the success which we desire so much to see. I have sent the same paper to England, and trust that both there and at Petersburg it may be found not undeserving of serious consideration."

*Copy.*

#### *Enclosure 5.*

GENERAL DE STAMFORD to the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK.

"Si j'ai déferé jusqu'ici de rendre compte à votre altesse sérénissime de l'état de nos affaires politiques pour autant qu'il m'est connu, c'est que cet état ne présentant ou ne laissant entrevoir que des choses infiniment vagues et incertaines, j'espérais, d'un jour à l'autre, que les négociations et les fréquentes conférences des ministres du roi avec les envoyés de Londres et de Petersbourg, amèneraient enfin un résultat quelconque sûr et positif. Mon espérance à cet égard, trop souvent trompée, m'oblige enfin de rompre le silence, et d'offrir à votre altesse sérénissime, faute de certitudes, du moins des probabilités, ou des conjectures, sur l'issue prochaine des ces conférences et de ces négociations.

"Les propositions faites à la Cour de Berlin par celles de Petersbourg et de Londres sont claires et précises. Elles consistent dans des offres de secours d'argent et de troupes, si la

Prusse se décide à prendre une part active à la guerre. Celle-ci rejette ces offres, et témoigne le désir de substituer à des traités offensifs, des traités d'alliance défensive; mais sans vouloir stipuler d'autre *casus fœderis* que celui d'une attaque directe de la part des Français, contre sa ligne de neutralité. Ce qui doit paraître plus extraordinaire encore, c'est que le cabinet de Berlin donne à entendre, qu'en conséquence de ses vues, il lui serait agréable que l'Angleterre voulût fournir quelques subsides à la Prusse, afin de suppléer par là à ce qu'elle manque de moyens, pour se mettre sur un pied de guerre réputable, et pour renforcer par quelques mille hommes de troupes son armée d'observation en Westphalie. Cela veut dire, si je ne me trompe, que la Prusse désirerait que la Russie et l'Angleterre concourussent à consolider sa sûreté et son état d'inertie et de repos, même aux dépens des moyens qui leur sont nécessaires pour défendre une cause qu'il serait surprenant que la Prusse ne regardât pas comme la sienne, puisqu'elle ne saurait se perdre sans que ce malheur n'entraînât irrévocablement sa chute, ainsi que celle de tous les états du monde. Nous saurons dans peu ce que les cours de Londres et de Petersbourg jugeront devoir répondre à des vues si peu conformes aux leurs et aux circonstances; et je pense que leur réponse n'est pas difficile à prévoir.

“Au reste il ne me paraît pas, d'après la manière dont M. le comte de Dietrichstein se prononce ici, que la cour de Vienne désire infiniment d'engager la Prusse à reprendre les armes. Il me semble au contraire qu'elle ne serait pas fâchée qu'elle se tint strictement renfermée dans son système de neutralité, et que les secours qu'elle a à attendre de la part de la Russie et de l'Angleterre fussent augmentés de ceux que ces deux cours offrent à la Prusse, et que celle-ci refuse.

“Je suis d'autant plus porté à croire que telles sont les dispositions et les vues du cabinet de Vienne, qu'il me semble que j'en pénétre le motif et les raisons, que voici :—

“Ce cabinet voit dans le nord de l'Europe un faisceau de puissance et de forces qui, pour mériter ce nom, n'a besoin que d'un lien qui les unisse, et qui dans les circonstances présentes sera formé et serré aussitôt que la Prusse le voudra.

“Il voit que celle-ci, reprenant les armes, disposera de ce faisceau pleinement à son gré; et que combattant alors avec d'aussi puissans alliés sur un théâtre de guerre indépendant de celui de l'Italie et du Haut Rhin, elle sera en état de poursuivre ses succès au delà du Bas Rhin, aussi loin qu'elle le jugera à propos et convenable à ses intérêts et à ceux de ses alliés.

“Il voit que lorsque ces succès l'auront mise à même de régler avec ces mêmes alliés le sort de la Hollande et de disposer de celui de la Belgique, elle saura également trouver moyen de prescrire et de faire prescrire des bornes à l'Autriche, dans le cas où d'heureux succès l'engageraient à porter trop loin ses vues ambitieuses.

“Enfin il voit que si la Prusse se décidait dans le moment actuel de tirer parti de la position favorable où elle se trouve, il en résulterait probablement, pour des tems futurs, un système

politique et une balance entre le Nord et le Midi de l'Europe, d'un avantage incalculable pour la Prusse; d'où le cabinet de Vienne conclut qu'il lui importe de ne point tirer cette puissance de l'inaction à laquelle elle se condamne, mais de profiter de son sommeil et de ses faux calculs, pour donner naissance à un système et à une balance qui tourne au profit de l'Autriche.

"Voilà, monseigneur, les raisons qui me paraissent motiver la froideur de la cour de Vienne envers celle de Berlin, et le peu d'empressement qu'elle témoigne, depuis quelque tems, de se rapprocher d'elle.

"Dans ce moment, il dépend encore de la Prusse de déjouer la politique de sa rivale. Les moyens lui en sont offerts, mais elle n'a plus qu'un instant à se décider; et je crains que ce ne soit en vain que ceux qui s'intéressent à sa gloire et à ses vrais intérêts forment des vœux pour qu'elle mette cet instant à profit. Elle s'aliène imprudemment les deux plus fermes appuis de son trône, qui sont l'Angleterre et la Russie, et cela dans un tems où les fondemens de ce trône sont journellement minés. Aussi s'apperçoit-on déjà que, par une conduite si peu appropriée aux tems et aux circonstances, et pour cette raison si inexplicable, elle a commencé à inspirer une sorte de méfiance à la cour de St. Petersbourg; puisque celle-ci, ne croyant pas la ville de Hambourg suffisamment garantie, se propose d'y suppléer par un corps de ses propres troupes, et que, ces jours passés, elle a fait donner connaissance de sa résolution à cet égard au Ministère de Berlin."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 6.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, March 26. Berlin.—"My letter of the 23rd instant will have shewn you what had appeared to us here to be the importance of pursuing the proposal made by the Court of Petersburg for sending a body of troops to co-operate with, or to act without the assistance of Prussia, for the defence of Hamburg.

"Since my last I have again heard from Sir James Craufurd, and should conceive by his answer that there would be great difficulty in prevailing upon the city of Hamburg to accept a Russian garrison, or perhaps any other.

"To me, however, it seems even more desirable that the Russian force in question should [land] in the Duchy of Holstein, if the consent and co-operation of Denmark could be obtained, with the assistance of some Danish troops; because, without some additional numbers, the five battalions alone would scarce be sufficient either for that or for any other object. The Government here have not yet formally given an answer to this proposal from Count Panin, but I apprehend that they will offer from hence to send some troops to Cuxhaven, and that they will endeavour to dissuade the Emperor of Russia from the opinion that any exertion on the part of his Imperial Majesty is necessary for the

protection of Hamburgh; an opinion which, however, will, I hope, still be retained at Petersburg, and acted upon without scruple or delay, and with the co-operation of Denmark.

"The state of the negotiation here continues to be unpromising of active concert, and I have no reason to think that his Majesty's Government will sacrifice the object of vigorous hostility in order to partake of the wretched temporising system which prevails here.

"On the other hand I learn from Sir Morton Eden, by a letter of the 20th instant, that at Vienna they still obstinately refuse the ratification of the Convention. Since my arrival here I have written repeatedly to Vienna to state the absolute impossibility which there was of establishing any concert, general or limited, with Austria, till his Majesty's just claims shall have been satisfied; and I have again written to Sir Morton Eden to apprise him that my instructions absolutely forbid me from any concession on this point, and therefore, till he should succeed in his representations to M. de Thugut on this subject, all hope of concert between England and Austria was out of the question.

(*Cipher.*) "Count Dietrichstein's arrival here has not in any degree assisted me, as he has never made the least overture on this subject, although he is apprised of the importance we annex to it, and although he knows that without it I cannot stir in any concert or arrangement with them.

"I apprehend that the main object of his mission may be to endeavour to prevent our making any final arrangement with Prussia, and that the Austrian Government may hope to derive through Russia all the advantage of English subsidy, without satisfying those claims upon the good faith and honour of Austria which prevent the possibility of any direct arrangements between London and Vienna; if this, however, is their hope, it is one so little suited either to the object or to the time in question, that they will become by it the dupes of their own wretched policy, and again sacrifice to these little miserable shifts the great objects of public safety and success.

"It is doubtless vexatious to see the moment for action lost at Berlin and Vienna in these disgraceful and little discussions. Count Dietrichstein has in no respect hitherto lessened these difficulties; on the contrary, the violence of his prejudices against Prussia appears much too strongly for any measures of conciliation, and although M. de Thugut has written to me to avail myself of the full explanations which Count Dietrichstein would offer to the Court of Berlin, I do not find any yet made by him, or indeed likely to be made; and while he holds back upon the subject of the Austrian Convention, he knows well enough how useless all discussion must be with the English Minister here.

"To my wise and amiable colleague his arrival here is still more embarrassing, because the connection prevailing between the Imperial Courts leads him of necessity to more confidential intercourse, but puts him daily under new difficulties by the abruptness and want of prudent temper which is so strongly marked in the conduct of the new Austrian Minister.

"In this state my best hopes are that my repeated and pressing remonstrances through Sir M. Eden to M. de Thugut will at length prevail, and that we may arrive at the desirable object of combining for the common interest, in one common concert, the force of the two Imperial Courts and that of Great Britain. (*Cipher ends.*)

"The news of Massena's defeat and of Jourdan's retreat is more and more confirmed, though no direct official detail be yet arrived."

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 7.*

CONFIDENTIAL NOTES, by M. DE LUC.

1799, March 31. Berlin.—"Précis de ce que m'a dit M. de Haugwitz dans un entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir ce matin avec lui, et que je lui avois demandé pour lui témoigner le chagrin de M. le Comte de Panin et de M. Grenville, d'avoir remarqué dans leurs deux dernières conférences qu'ils réculoient au lieu d'avancer, comparativement à ce qu'ils avoient eu lieu d'espérer soit dans leurs entretiens préliminaires, soit d'après ce que j'avois eu l'honneur de leur dire de lui.

"L'objet principal de cette différence remarquée concerne les stipulations d'un traité à faire, dans lequel le Roi de Prusse s'engageroit à rendre mobile un corps considérable de troupes pour l'amener aux lieux convenables sur les confins de la ligne de démarcation, et pour agir *au besoin* ; moyennant un subside de la part d'Angleterre, et un concert avec la Russie pour un autre corps de troupes ; et l'objet de la différence porte sur la stipulation de ce besoin ; c'est à dire sur le '*casus foederis*' à exprimer dans le traité. On est d'accord à cet égard quant au fond, mais non quant à la stipulation à en faire. M. de Haugwitz ne propose d'exprimer que *la défensive sur la ligne de démarcation*, quoiqu'il soit d'accord avec les deux ministres que ce n'est pas à cela qu'il faut se borner. De leur côté ces ministres pensent que le corps de troupes ne sauroit être l'objet d'un traité sans ces stipulations ultérieures, et que puisque M. de Haugwitz les disoit être dans les intentions du Roi et les siennes propres, ils ne sauroient voir ce qui pouvoit empêcher de les exprimer dans le traité.

"C'est sur ce point que M. de Haugwitz a bien voulu entrer en explication avec moi ; et c'est le précis de ce qu'il m'a dit à cet égard que je vais tracer ici en le rangeant sous trois points.

1<sup>mo</sup>. "Que l'on pouvoit compter sur ce qu'il disoit être les intentions du roi et de lui-même, quant aux vues pour lesquelles Sa Majesté entreroit en négociation relativement à ce corps de troupes.

2<sup>o</sup>. "Que la négociation elle-même donnoit une assurance de ces vues.

3<sup>o</sup>. "Qu'il ne lui étoit pas possible, cependant, de stipuler formellement d'autre cas que *la défense de la ligne de démarcation*.

*Premier Point.*

“Pour me convaincre que le roi et lui-même n’avoient d’autres vues que celles des deux puissances, il a eu la condescendance de me communiquer les parties essentielles du mémoire qu’il remit au roi avant l’arrivée de S[on] A[ltesse] s[érénissime] le Duc de Brunswic, au sujet des propositions faites par la cour de Russie de concert avec celle de Londres, relatives à un traité conforme aux circonstances ; traité qui devoit avoir pour objet le corps de troupes dont il s’agit. Tout le mémoire tend à l’acceptation de ces offres, et les motifs de M. Haugwitz en forment l’introduction. Il y présente un tableau aussi fort que vrai des dangers de toute l’Europe et de la Prusse particulière, plus même par les principes de la guerre que font les François à toutes les nations, que par l’aggrandissement énorme qu’elle leur a déjà procuré ; principes d’après lesquels il montre qu’il ne peut y avoir avec eux aucune paix qui ne soit pas aussi menaçante que la guerre ouverte. Je doute qu’il fût possible de rien ajouter à ce tableau.

“Partant de cet état des choses, il représente les propositions de l’Angleterre et de la Russie comme une circonstance extrêmement heureuse à la quelle il faut donner la plus grande attention ; fondant le besoin de rendre mobile un corps de troupes très considérable sur trois cas qu’on pouvoit avoir déjà en perspective, d’après la situation de l’empereur des Romains vis à vis des François.

1<sup>er</sup> Cas. “Si la guerre recommençoit entr’eux, et que l’empereur, repoussant les François, reconquit ce qu’il a abandonné par la paix de Campo Formio, il ne faudroit pas balancer d’aller reconquérir la Hollande et la Belgique ; dont M. Haugwitz représente non seulement l’importance, mais la nécessité ; puisque jusqu’à ce que cet objet puisse être rempli, il n’y aura que danger à craindre pour la Prusse, y eut-il même une paix de l’empire ; les François ne pouvant que conserver toujours une guerre quelque part pour germe d’autres, fut-ce que contre l’Angleterre, dont la conservation est très importante à la Prusse.

2<sup>nd</sup> Cas. “Si en recommençant la guerre, l’empereur avoit au contraire des échecs qui missent l’Allemagne en danger, il ne faudroit pas balancer non plus à employer les troupes, dont il s’agissoit ainsi que tous les efforts de la Prusse pour aller à son secours, et pousser alors la guerre de concert avec lui.

3<sup>me</sup> Cas (celui-ci étoit plus possible au temps où le mémoire fut écrit). “C’étoit celui où l’empereur, par motif de crainte, ou par les appâts que pouvoient lui présenter les François, faisoit avec eux un traité d’alliance ; en ce cas, disoit-il, il ne pourroit y avoir de sureté pour le nord de l’Europe que par l’alliance le plus intime de toutes les parties.

“Tel fut donc le mémoire que M. de Haugwitz remit au Roi, et voici d’où il conclut qu’on peut compter sans stipulation de ces cas dans le traité, qu’ils ne peuvent qu’en être le but.

“En remettant ce mémoire au Roi, M. de Haugwitz dit à Sa Majesté que c’étoit le résultat des plus profondes méditations à sa part pour le bien de la Prusse, dans les circonstances présentes ;

qu'il la prioit d'y accorder toute son attention, déclarant que sa conscience ne lui permettoit pas d'agir comme ministre de s[a] M[ajesté] si ce ne devoit pas être là le plan de sa conduite.\* Or le Roi ayant examiné ce mémoire, répondit à M. de Haugwitz qu'il en approuvoit tout le contenu, et souhaitoit qu'il conduisit les affaires d'après le plan qui y étoit exposé.

“J'ai représenté à M. de Haugwitz que quoique cela fut très satisfaisant quant aux principes manifestés par lui-même et approuvés par le Roi, ainsi qu'à l'égard de leur application, il n'y avoit rien qui put être présenté aux deux Cours par leurs ministres comme conduisant à un traité ; puisqu'on ne vouloit pas en faire des objets de stipulation, et c'est ce qui a amené l'objet suivant.

### *Second Point.*

“Il m'a représenté à cet égard que la seule stipulation d'un corps considérable à faire avancer sur la ligne de démarcation, et son exécution, emportoient implicitement les autres pour le fait ; puisqu'il étoit impossible que la Roi pût y acquiescer dans aucune autre vue.

“Dès le moment, dit-il, que nous prendrons cette attitude, nous devons nous considérer comme en état de guerre avec les François, et notre sûreté ne sera plus dès lors que dans la force. Il est impossible qu'on puisse supposer que notre idée soit à cet égard que les François, nous voyant dans cet état de défense, nous laisseront tranquilles par politique ; sûrs que s'ils ne nous attaquent pas, nous ne bougerons point. Car si, continuant ainsi à porter toutes leurs forces contre l'empereur, un des cas supposé possible arrivoit, savoir, que l'empereur vint à avoir de grands échecs, notre propre sûreté ne nous dieteroit-elle pas impérieusement d'aller à son secours ?

“Il n'est pas possible non plus de penser que nous fussions si aveugles sur nos intérêts les plus grands, pour ne pas profiter de l'événement contraire, soit de grands succès de l'empereur pour repousser ces ennemis de toute monarchie aussi loin qu'il seroit possible, en rétablissant la Hollande sous le Stathouder, et la fortifiant par une partie de la Belgique.

“Mais puisque ces intentions sont si naturelles à supposer et si positivement déclarés, pourquoi ne les pas stipuler ?

### *Troisième Point.*

“Ici la réponse de M. de Haugwitz a été péremtoire, c'est que le Roi ne l'y autorise pas. Mais il m'a témoigné ensuite qu'il verroit avec la plus grande douleur que cette circonstance fit manquer le traité. Que personne ne sentoit plus que lui le besoin de cette armée, tant pour le salut de la Prusse que pour la cause commune qu'il ne séparoit point dans ses pensées ; et que cependant, si le traité n'avoit pas lieu, la Prusse se verroit obligée

\* M. de Haugwitz prit déjà la même résolution auprès du Roi défunt, et par la même raison d'opposition d'autres ministres ; ce fut à l'occasion de la paix de Bâle, à laquelle on avoit entraîné le Roi, et il l'emporta sur la manière de la faire.



à ne rien changer dans la situation présente, et à attendre les événements ; avec plus de danger sans doute ; mais que telle étoit la situation des choses et qu'il ne pouvoit rien y changer. Que c'étoit, sans doute, aux deux puissances à examiner si elles pouvoient employer leurs moyens d'une manière plus conforme au but qu'il leur supposoit comme à la Prusse, de sauver l'Europe avec elles-mêmes ; qu'il souhaitoit que cela fût, mais qu'il craignoit qu'il ne vint un moment où l'on auroit lieu de regretter, quoique trop tard, de n' avoir pas concouru à avoir cet armée prête à agir pour le besoin.

“ Sur ce que je lui ai dit alors, que la Prusse elle-même pourroit en ce cas avoir à regretter de ne s'être pas procuré cette armée en acquiescant aux stipulations nécessaires, il m'a fait entendre que le jugement qu'il porteroit sur la chose ne pourroit influencer sur la négociation ; que sa conscience l'assuroit qu'en allant aussi loin qu'il lui étoit permis, il y avoit dans le fond, si non dans le forme, toute l'assurance nécessaire pour aller en avant, mais que surtout, puisque le Roi le pensoit ainsi, il ne pouvoit pas aller plus loin.”

*Copy.*

*Enclosure 8.*

THOMAS GRENVILLE to SIR CHARLES WHITWORTH.

1799, April 2. Berlin.—“ It is with infinite pleasure that I found by your despatch under flying seal to Lord Grenville of the 19th inst. how much the views entertained here by Count Panin and myself of the future course of the campaign appear to agree with those already adopted by h[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] at Petersburg.

“ My conference of this morning has not increased my hopes as to the final result of the defensive concert proposed here, and you will already have seen by my letters that I have long ceased to expect from hence any active and immediate concurrence in hostilities, and have likewise long since been persuaded, whatever be the exertions of the allied Courts of London and Petersburg, they must depend either solely upon their own activity, or upon such concert of operations as might be advantageously combined with the course of the Austrian campaign ; but on this latter point I have still to complain that even these times of urgent pressure have not yet induced the Austrian Government to take the first necessary step of satisfying his Majesty's just claims by the ratification of the convention ; and it is the more irksome to remark the continuance of this fatal obstinacy, as it prevents me absolutely from pursuing that plan of limited concert with Austria which might already have proved so beneficial to both parties. In other respects I still think no difficulty could stand in the way of the plan which h[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty] seems disposed to adopt, and I cannot avoid expressing my earnest hope that not one moment may be lost in despatching the messenger from Petersburg to London with those necessary communications, which the distance and the season can scarcely admit to be as promptly made as it would be useful that they should be.

“The idea of a garrison continues to be very adverse to the wishes of the city of Hamburgh; but I doubt not that any military force, Danish and Russian, established with this view in Holstein, would answer that object as well, and would very happily combine with the other march as proposed in your letter to Lord Grenville.

“By letters from Munich authentic accounts are received that, on the 20th and 21st instants, the Archduke compelled Jourdan’s army to retreat from Pfullendorf behind Stockach; in this retreat the French lost their *artillerie de reserve*, and though the Austrians lost some men, amongst whom is P[rince] Lichsteinstein, the French suffered in more than double that proportion, and the advantage gained by the Austrians is considered as being of great importance.” *Copy.*

#### INTELLIGENCE FROM FRANCE.

*Etat Général des Armées Françaises, remis au Directoire le 25 Février, par Scherer Ministre de la Guerre, sortant le lendemain de ce Département.*

*Note on this statement by Lord Grenville.*

French army at the opening of the campaign of 1799.

Italy, Naples, and Piedmont	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84,000
Malta and Corfu	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,000
Holland, Germany, and Switzerland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,000
In France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100,000
In Egypt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31,000
								<hr/> 326,000 <hr/>

These details do not tally with the totals, which are stated to be :—on an establishment of 400,000 men—present, fit for duty, 353,000; independent of the troops of the affiliated Republics. The army under Jourdan reaching from Amsterdam to the Tyrol seems understated at 100,000 men. That in France must be exaggerated.

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
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